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### CHARACTERISTICS OF AVERSIVE RACISM

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

By Bryan T. Hall

December 2008

### CHARACTERISTICS OF AVERSIVE RACISM

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#### CHARACTERISTICS OF AVERSIVE RACISM

Bryan T. Hall December 2008 Pages 80

Directed by: W. Pitt Derryberry, Sam McFarland, Kathi Miner-Rubino

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Recently in the psychological field, attitudes are being recognized as existing on the explicit and implicit level (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Aversive racists have been defined as people low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice (Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). The purpose of this study was to determine what distinguishes those who are low in prejudice from aversive racists. Participants were compared on eight different constructs: authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. No differences were found between low prejudice people and aversive racists. People high in explicit prejudice were found to differ from people low in explicit prejudice on authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, and authoritarianism.

#### Introduction

Recently, the psychological field has experienced a shift in paradigms as attitudes have begun to be examined in not only a conscious manner but in an unconscious manner as well (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Attitudes are being recognized as existing on two levels: explicit and implicit. Explicit attitudes are attitudes that a person publicly and consciously endorses, while implicit attitudes present themselves as actions and judgments that are automatically activated without the person's awareness (Greenwald et al.). In many cases, the attitudes expressed on an explicit level and on an implicit level agree. For instance, in the case of insects, both implicit and explicit attitudes concur as people generally report a negative explicit view of insects and also display an implicit bias against insects (Greenwald et al.). Agreement between implicit and explicit attitudes is not always the case, though.

For example, in topics where there is a societal norm to respond in a certain manner, explicit and implicit attitudes can differ. For instance, Greenwald et al. (1998) demonstrated that a disagreement appeared between implicit and explicit attitudes on attitudes regarding racial or ethnic groups. On explicit measures, people tended to respond in an egalitarian fashion (i.e., no prejudice), while on implicit measures, those same people tended to respond in a manner favoring their in-group (Greenwald et al.). In this experiment, there was one exception (out of 26) to this finding; one participant had a positive implicit score and a positive explicit score (Greenwald et al.).

A natural conclusion one might come to regarding the dichotomy that is sometimes found between implicit and explicit attitudes is that they are not measuring the same construct. However, the findings of Asendorpf, Banse, and Mucke (2002) and

Dambrun and Guimond (2004) suggest otherwise. Asendorpf et al. demonstrated a double dissociation (i.e., two similar but different behaviors are controlled by two different entities) in their study suggesting the two kinds of attitudes do in fact tap into the same construct. Participants completed an explicit self-rating measure of shyness and an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) version modified to deal with shyness (Asendorpf et al.). The IAT is a well-known and widely used measure designed to illustrate a person's implicit attitudes or associations of various constructs (i.e., gender, race, self-constructs, etc.). The IAT requires a person to categorize two objects along with positive and negative attributes. If a person responds quickly when an object is paired with positive (or negative) attributes, then it can be inferred that those two constructs (i.e., the object and the positive or negative attributes) are associated very closely together. If an object is closely associated with a negative attribute then it can further be inferred that the person holds a generally negative view of the object. Asendorpf et al. found that the explicit measure predicted a person's controlled shy behavior, while the IAT predicted a person's spontaneous shy behavior. This suggests that implicit and explicit measures are measuring the same construct because they predict the same behavior under different circumstances. Dambrun and Guimond (2004) manipulated relative gratification (i.e., people led to believe they are privileged, or in a gratified position), which is a process that increases explicit prejudicial attitudes, and found that implicit prejudicial attitudes also increased. Together, these findings indicate that implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes are part of the same constructs.

According to Asendorpf et al. (2002), findings like these support the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model of attitude-behavior relations (Fazio,

1990). MODE suggests that measures of implicit attitudes predict spontaneous or automatic behavior better than controlled behavior, while measures of explicit attitudes predict controlled behavior better than spontaneous or automatic behavior (Fazio & Towles-Schwenn, 1999). Related to and supportive of MODE is the behavior manifestation that can be witnessed in the aversive racism literature. Aversive racists are defined by Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) as people who consciously advocate egalitarian attitudes but subconsciously have negative feelings toward out-groups, particularly African-Americans. Aversive racists have also been categorized as people low in explicit prejudice (i.e., negative evaluations of out-groups that are consciously endorsed) but high in implicit prejudice (i.e., negative associations of out-groups that are unconscious; Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). Aversive racists often perform behavior that is egalitarian when the situation is unambiguous, but when the situation is ambiguous, aversive racists often display biases (Gaertner & Dovidio).

An example will clarify this matter. Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) had European-American participants, who were divided into high and low prejudice scoring groups by responses on an explicit measure of prejudice, evaluate applications for admission to a university. When the situation was unambiguous (i.e., the applicant had either high aptitude and achievement scores or low aptitude and achievement scores)

African-American and European-American applicants were accepted at the same rate by both high and low prejudiced groups. However, when the situation was ambiguous (i.e., the applicant had a high aptitude score and a low achievement score, or vice versa) bias was observed as European-Americans were accepted to the university at higher rates than African-Americans by the high prejudiced group.

In a similar fashion, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) demonstrated that while self-reported prejudice has diminished in recent history, the level of bias in selection decisions has not decreased. Dovidio and Gaertner had participants complete a self-report measure of prejudice and make hiring decisions based on qualifications of job applicants. Two different groups of participants completed this study; one group participated in 1989, while the other group participated in 1999. The authors found that self-reported prejudice decreased across the 10 year span, but bias in hiring decisions in an ambiguous situation remained at a constant (Dovidio & Gaertner). This decrease in explicit prejudice, but consistency in implicit prejudice, may suggest that people are becoming more conscious of negative attitudes and what society advocates as correct. This trend of explicit prejudice decreasing with implicit prejudice remaining constant has been shown in other ways as well.

For example, Baron and Banaji (2006) sought to understand the development of implicit prejudice. They gave six-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults, an explicit measure of prejudice and an implicit measure of prejudice. Baron and Banaji found that explicit prejudice was rather strong with the six-year-olds and steadily declined with the adults until the attitudes were seen as egalitarian. Implicit prejudice, on the other hand, was steady and did not change across the age groups (Baron & Banaji). With implicit attitudes being established at such an early age, one ponders if they are hard wired into the brain and are more of an internal structure rather than an external presence that can be changed like a habit.

#### Purpose of the Current Study

So far, the discussion has focused on differences between implicit and explicit

attitudes, and on aversive racism as a way to address the differences that can exist between these attitudes. While some findings (e.g., Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998) may suggest that all people are implicitly prejudiced, the aversive racism literature has shown this is not the case. The question of interest where the current study is concerned is what aspects of an individual lead that person to be someone who is low prejudiced or is an aversive racist. There is limited research on this topic, and because of the behavioral implications of aversive racism (e.g., job selection) more research is needed. Before discussing the limited research, the various manners of operationally defining aversive racism should be highlighted.

To date, aversive racism has been measured in a number of ways. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) used a behavioral task that involved participants making a selection decision to determine aversive racism. Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) used a self-report scale to identify aversive racists. Son Hing, Li, and Zanna (2002) used an explicit and an implicit measure of prejudice to define aversive racism. The current study operationally defines an aversive racist as a person low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice (i.e., in the manner of Son Hing, et al.). Now the literature will be discussed.

A literature search only produced two studies on the topic of characteristics of aversive racism. Silvestri and Richardson (2001) examined the relationship between the Big Five personality constructs and aversive racism, finding that the constructs of agreeableness, extraversion, and openness were negatively correlated with aversive racism. This suggests that aversive racists are more prone to skepticism and critical evaluation of others, and they are socially reserved and conventional (Silvestri & Richardson). Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) examined the connection of social

dominance orientation and authoritarianism to aversive racism. Social dominance and authoritarianism were found to differentiate between egalitarianism and aversive racism, indicating that aversive racists prefer inequality among social groups, submit to authorities, possess a general aggressiveness, and adhere to social conventions (Van Heil & Mervielde).

While Silvestri and Richardson (2001) and Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) have noted some important relationships with aversive racism, there is still much ground left to uncover. This study will move away from examining the Big Five Personality factors in conjunction with aversive racism for a few reasons. The Big Five Personality factors are so broad and general that some aspect of the factors can be found to correlate with most other constructs. Also, given that these factors have been examined and a relationship has been established, the urgency to establish a connection no longer exists. There is a need to explore further the contributions of social dominance and authoritarianism in the tradition of Van Heil and Mervielde, however. This is because Van Heil and Mervielde used a different definition for aversive racism (i.e., as a reluctance to interact with members of an out-group) than what is used in the proposed study. Also, these two constructs are theoretically relevant to aversive racism.

In examining contributions to aversive racism versus those to truly low prejudice, I propose that specific relationships will be seen on dimensions of authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. Each of these constructs is reviewed below. With the exception of social dominance and authoritarianism, most of these constructs have not been examined in connection with aversive racism or with implicit attitudes. Thus, the

support given for each construct's relationship with aversive racism is largely inferential.

Nonetheless, the theoretical nature of these constructs along with some of these constructs' noted relationships with explicit prejudice suggest that they may pertain to the likelihood of aversive racism.

#### *Authenticity*

Authenticity is defined as the unhindered operation of a person's true self in daily activities (Goldman & Kernis, 2002). Kernis and Goldman (2005) conceptualize authenticity as being comprised of four components: awareness, unbiased processing, behavior, and relational orientation. The awareness component deals with awareness of and trust in one's feelings and desires. Unbiased processing of information involves not denying or modifying private knowledge, internal experiences, or externally based evaluative information. The behavior component of authenticity involves people acting in agreement with their true selves. The relational orientation component deals with the amount to which a person values and achieves openness and truthfulness in the person's close relationships.

If a person explicitly reports low prejudice and also scores high on an authenticity scale, then it would make logical sense that the person would further score low on an implicit measure of prejudice. An authentic person operates from his or her true self in an unobstructed manner (Kernis & Goldman, 2005). The highly authentic person's implicit attitude should match his or her explicit attitude because the person authentically presents the person's true self/feelings to the outside world. This does not mean that high authenticity scores would necessarily decrease the likelihood of aversive racism, though. For example, for a person with a truly authentic understanding of self, scores on an

explicit measure of prejudice should correspond with how he or she scores on the implicit measure whether the explicit measure of prejudice is positive or negative. If a person is low in authenticity, this person would present a false representation of him/herself to the world. This could translate into a person being labeled as an aversive racist, because the person has negative implicit attitudes, but does not willingly express these feelings and thus reports positive explicit attitudes.

#### Moral Judgment Development

The neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development emphasizes cognition, personal construction of epistemological categories, and change over time in terms of development with a shift during young adulthood from conventional to postconventional moral thinking (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). The neo-Kohlbergian approach defines moral judgment development as occurring in schemas rather than in hard stages. Schemas are general knowledge structures that exist in long-term memory and facilitate information-processing (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). The neo-Kohlbergian approach devises three schema of moral judgment development that a person progressively develops through, beginning at the lower levels until reaching the highest level (although reaching the highest degree of schema development does not occur in every instance; Rest, et al., 1999). The first is the personal interest schema, followed by the maintaining norms schema, and finally the postconventional schema.

A person operating from the personal interest schema justifies a decision according to what is personally at stake for that person and what direct consequences accompany the action (Rest, et al., 1999). A person operating from the maintaining norms

schema justifies a decision according to the norms of society. A person operating from this schema realizes that laws need to be established which the entire society follows. A person operating from the postconventional schema realizes that moral obligations should be based on shared ideals that are reciprocal and open to debate. The postconventional thinker realizes that laws can be made in an arbitrary manner and do not necessarily mean that a person must follow the laws. This person accepts that laws can be biased.

Moral schemas are seen as operating on an implicit and tacit level (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). The Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 1999) is said to measure moral judgment development on a non-verbal and intuitive level (Narvaez & Bock). The DIT accomplishes this by measuring recognition knowledge rather than explicit knowledge (Rest et al., 1999). The manner in which the neo-Kohlbergians envision moral judgment development is an implicit cognitive process rather than an explicit cognitive process. When completing both the DIT and the IAT a person is required to recognize rather than articulate responses. Because both measures are tapping into an implicit process, they should reflect each other in certain ways.

People operating from the personal interest schema are more likely to be either explicitly prejudiced or aversive racist because they are self-focused and would not be implicitly or explicitly focused on treating others with justice and fairness. People operating from the maintaining norms schema generally feel pressure to conform to societal norms (Rest et al., 1999). Because they do conform, it is plausible that they would be likely to explicitly report an attitude favoring nonprejudice (i.e., an attitude approved by society) while having a different implicit attitude (i.e., like an aversive racist). People operating from the postconventional schema tend to be outside of the

pressure to conform to societal norms and are characterized by appealing to an ideal (Rest et al.). Rest et al. state that these ideals can include things like mandating fair treatment, actualizing personhood, and so forth. It seems plausible that people who make moral decisions that are driven from the postconventional schema should report low explicit prejudice as well as low implicit prejudice. It is possible that people operating at the maintaining norms schema could be aversive racists if their implicit attitude differs from their explicit attitude.

The relationship between moral reasoning and prejudice has been examined minimally, however. It is logical to suggest that a person operating from an advanced moral judgment developmental schema like the postconventional schema would be more concerned with treating all people as equals (i.e., appeals to an ideal). McFarland (in press) is the only study to be identified that has examined the relationship between moral reasoning and prejudice. McFarland demonstrated that postconventional moral reasoning was a negative predictor of generalized prejudice. McFarland's finding deals with explicit attitudes and moral reasoning but not with implicit attitudes. This current study hopes to build upon McFarland's findings and supplement it by differentiating how moral reasoning affects implicit and explicit attitudes.

Higher scores on the DIT have been linked to other constructs that should pertain to prejudice, as well. For example, Rest et al. (1999) reported that higher scores have been related to community involvement and civic responsibility. Derryberry and Thoma (2005) demonstrated that moral judgment development predicted self-reported altruism and attitudes regarding civil liberties. Given that higher moral judgment development scores have been linked to prosocial behaviors like these, it seems plausible that

developmentally more morally advanced people would also be concerned with treating others as equals. So, people that are advanced in moral judgment development (i.e., consistently operating from the postconventional schema) should score low on explicit and implicit measures of prejudice and therefore not be categorized as aversive racists. *Moral Identity* 

Hart, Atkins, and Ford (1998) defined moral identity as a commitment to one's understanding of self to behaviors that promote or protect the welfare of others. Blasi (1984) suggests that moral identity is a mechanism that motivates moral action. Blasi (1993) hypothesizes that moral understanding gives rise to moral action if one is deemed personally responsible, moral responsibility is the outcome of integrating morality in one's identity, and moral identity drives one to make one's actions consistent with one's ideals. In a similar vein, Rest proposes a Four Component model of moral functioning (Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This model proposes that in order to produce moral behavior, four processes must be present. The four components are moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and implementation. Moral motivation suggests that a person gives priority to the moral value above all other values and intends to fulfill it. Both Rest and Blasi therefore agree that moral identity is important in performing moral behavior.

Aquino and Reed (2002) examined the construct of moral identity as a connecting piece between moral reasoning and moral behavior and created a measure to assess moral identity. If a person is truly committed to being a moral person and engaging in moral behaviors, then treating all humans with equality should be a priority to this person.

Aquino and Reed make the argument that moral identity is separate from moral reasoning

because reasoning deals with the cognitive aspect of knowing right from wrong, while identity deals with claiming moral traits as being essential to a person's self-concept. Aquino and Reed envision moral identity as being comprised of two components: internalization and symbolization. Internalization deals with the self-importance of moral characteristics, while symbolization refers to engaging in public actions that demonstrate that a person values moral traits (i.e., volunteering at a homeless shelter). The internalization component may reflect implicit processing. If some construct(s), in this case moral traits, are internalized, then it would make sense that they would exist on an implicit level. Aquino and Reed also correlated scores on the moral identity measure with an IAT modified to deal with moral traits and the self. The IAT was correlated with the internalization dimension but not the symbolization dimension (Aquino & Reed).

Aquino and Reed (2002) further demonstrated that a person who identifies highly with moral traits also report greater amounts of volunteer behavior as opposed to someone who does not identify with moral traits. This last finding has some problems as both constructs, moral identity and volunteer behavior, were both determined by self-reports; it could be possible that people are savvy to what a researcher is looking for and reporting in a like manner. To clear confusion, Aquino and Reed conducted a study where they found that moral identity significantly predicted actual donation behavior.

The connection between moral identity and donation behavior is extremely important. The experiment was set up in a way such that when the participants donated there was no way for the researcher to know who did or did not donate (at least the participants did not know of a way) (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This removes any social desirability factor and suggests that people that consider morality a strong part of their

self-concept will perform moral behavior when no reward is provided. This should play a factor into why a person would be implicitly prejudiced and explicitly egalitarian as opposed to both implicitly and explicitly egalitarian. If a person highly values and identifies with moral traits, then it makes sense that the person should also value equality and respect for various racial and ethnic groups on both implicit and explicit levels, leading that person to be implicitly and explicitly low in prejudice. Reed and Aquino (2003) examined this notion by demonstrating that a person who scored high on the moral identity scale also viewed out-groups as the same as in-groups. People who considered moral identity to be a very important self-relevant construct of theirs also had more favorable attitudes toward relief efforts to aid out-groups (Reed & Aquino).

As noted previously, the argument that people high in moral identity are more likely to be implicitly and explicitly egalitarian has been made. In the other direction, people low in moral identity may be likely to be aversive racists because they are less likely to have internalized moral traits, like treating others in an unbiased manner. Because they have not internalized these traits, their explicit attitude is likely to differ from their implicit attitude. Further, because we live in a society where unbiased behavior is looked upon favorably, their explicit attitude will likely coincide with this, while their implicit attitude may not.

#### Nonprejudice

A seemingly obvious construct that should predict if a person is truly low prejudiced or is an aversive racist is nonprejudice. Phillips and Ziller (1997) have defined nonprejudice as a universal orientation where similarities between the self and diverse others are emphasized. Phillips and Ziller suggest that this perceived similarity is a

fundamental link to a number of positive outcomes including helping, understanding, and reduced prejudice. The authors further demonstrated that participants who scored high on the Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller), a measure of nonprejudice, were as accepting of minority members as they were of nonminority members.

Participants scoring low on the UOS were also as accepting of minority members as high scoring UOS participants, but high scoring UOS participants further rated the minority members as equally attractive, similar, and desirable, while the low scoring UOS participants did not (Phillips & Ziller). Given findings such as these, people who identify themselves as having a universal orientation towards all racial and ethnic groups should also be truly low prejudiced. People identifying themselves as not having a universal orientation towards all racial and ethnic groups may be more likely to be aversive racists because they do see differences in people. Seeing these differences could lead people to show implicit bias against others while they still report explicit egalitarianism because that is what is socially sanctioned.

#### Social Dominance Orientation

Social dominance theory states that societies reduce group conflict by creating a consensus on ideologies that promote the superiority of one group over others (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the extent to which people desire their in-group to be dominant and superior over out-groups (Pratto et al.). People holding this belief will endorse laws and institutions that favor their ingroup and reduce equality.

Pratto et al. (1994) demonstrated that a measure of social dominance correlated very strongly with measures of ethnic prejudice. Social dominance can be viewed as a

generalized preference for group dominance that should influence a specific prejudice against any given out-group. Pratto et al. particularly stress how correlated a person's social dominance is to anti-Black racism. Social dominance was correlated with anti-Black prejudice in every sample they ran from .42 to .65 (Pratto et al.).

Esses and Hodson (2006) corroborate Pratto et al.'s (1994) results by finding that high social dominance-oriented individuals were likely to hold prejudicial attitudes toward ethnic groups. Further, Esses and Hodson found that individuals high in social dominance blame prejudice on societal factors (i.e., true group difference) instead of personal factors (i.e., ignorance); people high in social dominance also do not support social change. Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) found a positive relationship between SDO and support for aggression against an out-group when a socially dominant sample completed the measures, but a negative relationship was found between SDO and support for aggression against an out-group when a subordinate group completed the measures.

The link between SDO and explicit prejudice has been made, but the question of SDO involvement in implicit prejudice has yet to be fully established. Van Heil and Mervielde (2005), as stated before, found a relationship between SDO and aversive racism, but they defined aversive racism as a reluctance to interact with members of an out-group, which is inconsistent with previous definitions. Also, Van Heil and Mervielde did not examine implicit attitudes. This study will examine SDO and aversive racism according to already established definitions and means. It seems plausible to expect SDO to affect implicit prejudice in a similar manner as it does explicit prejudice. People high in implicit prejudice will likely score higher on a measure of SDO compared to people

low in implicit prejudice. Further, aversive racists will be more likely to be high in SDO because they are not likely to edit themselves when discussing social dominance because it is a topic that is not as publicly disavowed as prejudice is.

#### Authoritarianism

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is defined as a high degree of submission to authorities, a general aggressiveness toward various people that is approved by authorities, and a high degree of conformity to social conventions (Altemeyer, 1988).

Altemeyer suggests RWA should be correlated with racial and ethnic prejudice. By examining the definition of RWA this conclusion can be rationalized. In certain sociocultural contexts in the United States, social convention is to shun minorities. In such contexts, the authoritarian person would conform to this by carrying out the second part of the definition by being aggressive toward these groups, believing he or she is submitting to authorities. A person with an authoritarian personality would believe that authorities approve of this type of prejudice (Altemeyer). This approval is not necessarily an actual approval but is at least a perceived approval.

RWA Scale scores were found to correlate around .35 with attitude scales that measured prejudiced opinions of ethnic and racial groups (Altemeyer). Altemeyer reports that people high in authoritarian personality admit to more prejudice and mean-spiritedness when answering anonymously compared to when there is a possibility to identify them through a sign-up sheet. This finding presents a reason for any differences found between an implicit measure and explicit measure of prejudice. In the case of an explicit measure, the authoritarian person may adjust responses to maintain his or her public image. In the case of implicit measures, this adjustment would be impossible

because the person would be unable to control an unconscious cognition.

Henry et al. (2005) found a significant relationship between RWA and intergroup aggression support for an out-group but not for an in-group. Esses and Hodson (2006) demonstrated that individuals high in authoritarianism were likely to hold prejudiced attitudes as measured on an explicit scale (i.e., Modern Racism Scale) that is proposed to have low reactivity (i.e., the items on the scale are recognized to be measuring racial prejudice; McConahay, 1986). Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) found a connection between RWA and aversive racism, but implicit attitudes were not examined in this study. Together, these findings suggest that aversive racists will score higher on a RWA measure compared to people low in implicit prejudice. Both sets of people should score similarly on explicit measures because of social norms.

#### Empathy

Empathy is the reaction of a person to the observed experiences of another (Davis, 1983). Two main components of empathy are perspective taking and concern for another. Logically, these two components should lead to lower amounts of prejudice because an empathic person is more likely to sympathize with the hardship of out-groups and recognize these hardships. Batson et al. (1997) demonstrated that increasing empathy toward an individual of a stigmatized group leads to improved attitudes toward the overall group. Batson, Chang, Orr, and Rowland (2002) demonstrated that not only does increasing empathy towards an individual of a stigmatized group improve attitudes towards the overall group, but these improved attitudes also translate into behaviors favoring the out-group. Johnson, Brems, and Alford-Keating (1997) found that greater amounts of empathy predicted lower prejudice toward an out-group of people (i.e.,

homosexuals). McFarland (in press) found that empathy correlated negatively with generalized prejudice.

Given that variations of empathy have led to differences in explicit attitudes and behaviors towards out-groups (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Johnson, Brems, & Alford-Keating, 1997; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; McFarland, in press) a difference between implicit attitudes is a logical proposition. Aversive racists will likely be low in empathy because they are not in touch with their inner attitudes, so they would likely not be in tune with others needs and desires. If they are not aware of others needs, desires, etc. then they cannot be concerned about those things. Aversive racists may have difficulty empathizing with others, which could lead them to not understanding the difficulties of others and could further lead them to holding implicit prejudice while they explicitly report a lack of prejudice possibly because of social sanctions.

Social Desirability

A common occurrence in survey research is the over reporting of socially desirable attitudes and behaviors and the underreporting of attitudes and behaviors that are socially undesirable (Krosnick, 1999). Most measures of explicit prejudice are questionnaires and so they too would be affected by this phenomenon. Dunton and Fazio (1997) found that European-American participants who were motivated to control their prejudice reported less prejudiced responses on an explicit attitude measure while their unobtrusive estimates indicated negativity in response to African-Americans. European-American participants who were not motivated to control their prejudice responded on an explicit attitude measure consistent with their automatically activated attitudes (Dunton & Fazio). Dambrun and Guimond (2004) also found that when there are strong norms

against prejudice explicit and implicit measures are negatively correlated. This current study will examine the degree that responding in a socially desirable manner contributes to aversive racism. Whenever examining a discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitudes, social desirability should be examined and possibly controlled for. Aversive racists should respond in more socially desirable ways compared to low prejudice people.

#### **Hypotheses**

This study attempts to determine what constructs contribute to aversive racism.

The major hypothesis is that an aversive racist (i.e., a person high in implicit prejudice and low in explicit prejudice) will differ from a low prejudice person (i.e., a person low in implicit and explicit prejudice) on dimensions of authenticity, moral identity, moral judgment development, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, nonprejudice, and social desirability. Specifically, an aversive racist will score higher on dimensions of social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and social desirability compared to a low prejudice person. An aversive racist will further score lower on dimensions of nonprejudice, moral judgment development, moral identity, and authenticity.

#### Method

#### **Participants**

Participants included 120 students from a large Southeastern university.

Participants were recruited via the Psychology's study board subject pool. Participants included 45 males and 75 females. For class year, 48 were freshmen, 18 were sophomores, 22 were juniors, 20 were seniors, and 12 reported other for class year. Only participants of European-American descent were used. Other ethnic/racial groups were allowed to participate, but their data were not included (*n*=5). European-Americans were specifically examined because the majority of students on Western Kentucky University's campus are European-Americans. More importantly, though, when aversive racism was first conceptualized it was propositioned as a phenomenon that exists among the majority racial class, particularly European-Americans (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). *Measures* 

Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to record demographic information, which includes age, gender, ethnicity, and college year in a demographics questionnaire (Appendix A).

Authenticity. The Authenticity Inventory 3 (AI3; Kernis & Goldman, 2005; Appendix B) measures participant's authenticity. The AI3 is composed of 45 five-point Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 5 (*Strongly agree*). The AI3 generates a composite score and four subcomponent scores: Awareness, Unbiased Processing, Behavior, and Relational Orientation. Only the composite score was referenced in the current study. Scores on the composite score can range from 45 to 225 where higher scores indicate greater authenticity. Higher scores indicate greater amounts

of authenticity. Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at  $\alpha = .83$  for the composite score (Kernis & Goldman). In the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at  $\alpha = .88$  for the composite score.

Moral judgment. The Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999; Appendix C) is an objective measurement used to assess moral judgment. A participant reads a series of five moral dilemmas and is asked to make an action choice about what the protagonist in the dilemma should do. The participant can choose the protagonist to either perform an action, not perform an action, or the participant indicates that he or she cannot decide. After the action choice has been made, the participant is presented with 12 issues that are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 in terms of overall importance (1=great importance to 5=no importance) in facilitating the participant in making his or her decision about what the protagonist should do. Finally, the participant ranks the four most important items of the 12 that were useful in facilitating his or her action choice. This process is performed for each dilemma. The issues that the participant rated and ranked as important are used to determine what moral judgment schemas (i.e., personal interest, maintaining norms, and postconventional) he or she considers important. This is an indication of moral judgment development.

A variety of indices can be obtained from the DIT-2. This study references the Personal Interest (PI), Maintaining Norms (MN), and Postconventional (P) scores. Each of these scores ranges from 0-95, with greater scores indicating a greater preference of reasoning from that moral judgment development schema. Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at  $\alpha = .81$  for postconventional items (Rest et al., 1999). For the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is  $\alpha = .73$  for

personal interest items,  $\alpha = .71$  for maintaining norms items, and  $\alpha = .79$  for postconventional items.

Moral identity. The Moral Identity Scale is a measure developed by Aquino and Reed (2002) to assess a person's self-identification of moral traits (Appendix D). The measure is composed of nine moral traits (e.g., Generous, Helpful, etc.) and 10 items assessing their self-importance that are rated on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The Moral Identity Scale measures two constructs: Internalization and Symbolization. Internalization deals with the amount the traits are central to the person's self-concept. Symbolization deals with the amount the traits are reflected in the person's behavior. Each construct is composed of five items apiece and scores on each range from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating a greater amount of the each respected factor. Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency for the Internalization and Symbolization were reported as  $\alpha = .73$  and  $\alpha = .82$ , respectively (Aquino & Reed). Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency for Internalization and Symbolization in the current study is  $\alpha = .90$  and  $\alpha = .84$ , respectively.

Nonprejudice. The Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller, 1997; Appendix E) measures a participant's nonprejudice. The scale measures people's identification to similarities they have with other people. The UOS is composed of 20 five-point Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Does not describe me well) to 5 (Describes me very well). Scores range from 20 to 100, where higher scores indicate nonprejudice. Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at  $\alpha = .76$  (Phillips & Ziller). For the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is  $\alpha = .67$ .

Social dominance orientation. The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Appendix F) scale measures a participant's desire for his/her in-group to be dominant and superior to other out-groups. The SDO scale is composed of 16 seven-point Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (*Very negative*) to 7 (*Very positive*). Scores range from 16 to 112 with low scores indicating endorsement of equality among groups and high scores indicating endorsement of domination of certain groups over other groups. Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at  $\alpha = .90$  (Pratto et al.). For the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is  $\alpha = .93$ .

Authoritarianism. The Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 2006; Appendix G) measures a participant's endorsement of authoritarian ideals. The RWA scale is composed of 22 items nine-point Likert scale items, ranging from -4 (*Very strongly disagree*) to 4 (*Very strongly agree*). Scores can range from 30 to 270 (-4 is scored as 1, -3 is scored as 2, ... 4 is scored as 9), higher scores indicate a participant's endorsement of authoritarian ideals. Test-retest reliability has been reported to range from r=.85 to r=.95 (Altemeyer, 2006). Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported to range from  $\alpha$  = .85 to  $\alpha$  = .89 (Altemeyer, 2006). For the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is  $\alpha$  = .94.

Dispositional empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; Appendix H) measures four different aspects of empathy: fantasy, perspective taking, empathic concern, and personal distress. Each subscale is composed of seven items, yielding a 28 item measurement overall. Items are responded to on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Does not describe me very well) to 4 (Describes me very well). Scores can range from 0 to 112 with high scores indicating greater amounts of empathy.

On all subscales, higher scores indicate greater amounts of empathy in regard to the respected scale. Test-retest reliability has been reported to range from r=.61 to r=.81 (Davis, 1980). Only the composite score is used in the current study. For the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is  $\alpha = .82$ .

Social desirability. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 (BIDR-6; Paulhus, 1991; Appendix I) measures participants' manner to respond in socially desirable ways. The questionnaire is composed of 40 seven-point Likert items, ranging from 1 (*Not true*) to 7 (*Very true*). Scores can range from 40 to 280. Higher scores imply socially desirable responses. For the current study, Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is  $\alpha = .76$ .

Explicit prejudice. The Attitude Toward Blacks (ATB; Brigham, 1993; Appendix J) is composed of 20 items that measure participant attitudes toward African-Americans. Items are ranked on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Scores on the ATB range from 20 to 140, with lower scores indicating negative attitudes toward African-Americans and higher scores indicate positive attitudes toward African-Americans. Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at  $\alpha = .88$  (Brigham). Cronbach's alpha measure of internal consistency for the ATB in the current study is  $\alpha = .86$ .

Implicit prejudice. The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) measures participant's associations of two target concepts with an attribute. The IAT is composed of five sequences that are presented via the software package Inquisit. In the first sequence, the participant categorizes pictures of faces as being either African-American or European-American by selecting a different key on the

computer for each category. In the second sequence, the participant categorizes adjectives as either pleasant or unpleasant. In the third sequence, the two previous tasks are combined and the participant must categorize European-American faces and pleasant adjectives with one key and African-American faces and unpleasant adjectives with another key. In the fourth sequence, the keys for identifying European-American and African-American faces are reversed and the participant categorizes them again. In the final sequence, the participant categorizes the European-American faces and unpleasant adjectives with one key and the African-American faces and pleasant words with another key. If any of the concepts are associated (e.g., African-American faces and pleasant adjectives) then the participant should find one of the combination sequences (Sequence Three or Five) to be much easier than the other. Ease of identification is noted by recording response times. The difference between these two sequences provides the measure of implicit attitudinal difference between target concepts.

#### Procedure

Participants signed up for the study and selected a timeslot via the WKU study board. The study was split between two sessions. The study was split into two sessions because participants may have become fatigued completing all measures in a single session. One session took place online before the participant came into the laboratory. At the first session, the participants completed the Moral Identity Scale, BIDR-6, RWA scale, SDO scale, UOS, IRI, ATB scale, and the AI3. The second session took place in the laboratory. Upon a participant's entry into the lab, the researcher greeted the participant and briefly explained the purpose of the study. The participant was then seated at a computer. Using the computer, the participant took the IAT and the DIT-2. The IAT

was selected to be completed in the lab because it must be run on specific software. The DIT-2 was selected to be completed in the lab because the directions for it are long and participants often have questions. All of the various measures from the first session were counterbalanced and the measures from the second session were counterbalanced. After completion of the measures, the participant was thanked for his or her participation and allowed to leave.

#### Results

Descriptive information for participants' responses to the various questionnaires can be found in Table 1.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

| Index | Mean   | Std. Deviation | N   |
|-------|--------|----------------|-----|
| AI3   | 161.21 | 18.01          | 120 |
| PI    | 28.79  | 11.63          | 120 |
| MN    | 28.02  | 12.34          | 120 |
| P     | 36.70  | 16.67          | 120 |
| MI-I  | 22.41  | 4.02           | 120 |
| MI-S  | 16.89  | 4.07           | 120 |
| UOS   | 70.65  | 8.01           | 120 |
| SDO   | 39.96  | 17.70          | 120 |
| RWA   | 89.05  | 32.66          | 120 |
| IRI   | 95.92  | 13.08          | 120 |
| BI-6  | 156.25 | 25.46          | 120 |
| ATB   | 107.68 | 16.74          | 120 |
| IAT   | 52     | .42            | 120 |

Note: AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3 Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score, ATB = Attitude Toward Blacks Score, IAT = Implicit Association Test of Race Score.

The sample as a whole reports to be fairly authentic and empathetic, is modal at

the postconventional schema of moral judgment development, possesses moderate (i.e., symbolization) to high (i.e., internalization) moral identity, tends to see more similarities in others than differences, is low in social dominance and authoritarianism, and is neither low nor high in responding in a socially desirable manner. Participant responses indicate that the group on average is low in explicit prejudice but is slightly high in implicit prejudice.

Correlations among the different measures are noted in Table 2. As marked, significant correlations exist among many of the various indices. The strongest relationships are seen among the indices that measure similar constructs (e.g., SDO and RWA).

Participants were categorized as being either low or high in explicit prejudice by their scores on the ATB. Participants scoring 100 or higher (N=87) were considered to be low in explicit prejudice, while those scoring lower than 100 (N=33) were considered to be high in explicit prejudice. The score of 100 was determined to be the dividing line because if a person responds that he or she slightly agrees (i.e., selects "5,"which indicates a lack of prejudice) with the 20 items that person would receive a score of 100. Any score below 100 would indicate the person has at least a slight prejudice toward African Americans. Because the population of interest were aversive racists (i.e., people low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice), the low explicit prejudice participants were further divided into low, mild, and high implicitly prejudiced groups. This was accomplished by splitting the low explicit participants into thirds according to scores on the IAT. Generally, when dividing participants into high and low scoring, data are dichotomized and a standard deviation of the data is removed from around the mean

Table 2

Correlation Matrix

|      | AI3    | PI     | MN     | P      | MI-I   | MI-S   | UOS    | SDO    | RWA    | IRI    | BI-6   | ATB    | IAT |
|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----|
| AI3  | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| PI   | -0.047 | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| MN   | -0.013 | 317**  | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| P    | 0.018  | 475**  | 618**  | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| MI-I | .197*  | -0.042 | 0.016  | 0.04   | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| MI-S | .241** | -0.011 | 0.095  | -0.053 | .453** | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| UOS  | .316** | -0.044 | -0.081 | 0.092  | .283** | .248** | 1      |        |        |        |        |        |     |
| SDO  | 316**  | 0.055  | 0.065  | -0.085 | 196*   | -0.125 | 348**  | 1      |        |        |        |        |     |
| RWA  | -0.038 | 0.039  | .356** | 304**  | -0.05  | 0.111  | 203*   | .399** | 1      |        |        |        |     |
| IRI  | 0.16   | -0.099 | -0.122 | 0.176  | 0.149  | .319** | .346** | 309**  | -0.102 | 1      |        |        |     |
| BI-6 | 394**  | 0.101  | 179*   | 0.055  | -0.134 | 243**  | -0.132 | 0.078  | -0.199 | -0.103 | 1      |        |     |
| ATB  | 344**  | 0.147  | .188*  | 331**  | 291**  | -0.125 | 405**  | .597** | .369** | 332**  | -0.104 | 1      |     |
| IAT  | 0.013  | 0.032  | 0.065  | -0.047 | 0.114  | 0.091  | 0.102  | -0.057 | 0.08   | 0.017  | -0.132 | -0.114 | 1   |

Note: \*\* p<.01, \*p<.05; AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3 Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score, ATB = Attitude Toward Blacks Score, IAT = Implicit Association Test of Race Score.

(to assure that the low and high groups really are different from each other). By dividing the data into thirds, the middle standard deviation was allowed to become another group for analysis rather than completely disregarding the data. Four groups were ultimately created for analysis. Group 1 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in explicit prejudice and high in implicit prejudice (i.e., aversive racists). Group 2 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in explicit prejudice and medium in implicit prejudice (i.e., medium implicitly prejudiced). Group 3 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in both explicit and implicit prejudice (i.e., truly low prejudiced). Group 4 (n = 33) consisted of participants high in explicit prejudice (i.e., explicitly prejudiced). Each group's mean and standard deviation for each dependent variable is noted in Table 3.

A series of Multivariate Analyses of Variances (MANOVAs) and Analyses of Variances (ANOVAs) were conducted to examine any differences among groups. Moral identity subscales (i.e., Internalization and Symbolization), authenticity, and universal orientation were examined together in one MANOVA. This group was selected because they are theoretically similar in that they deal with aspects of the self, and all four constructs were highly correlated. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism were grouped together in one MANOVA. These two variables were examined in conjunction because they tend to center around similar ideologies in terms of dominance and submission, and are also significantly correlated. Moral judgment developmental schemas (i.e., Personal interest, Maintaining norms, and Postconventional) were grouped together in one MANOVA. The moral judgment developmental indexes were examined together because viewing each index together gives a more complete picture of moral judgment development, and are significantly correlated. Social desirability and empathy

were examined separately in two ANOVAs. These two constructs were examined alone because they did not consistently correlate to a specific group of indices.

Table 3

Group Scores on Dependent Variables

|      | Group 1 |       | Group 2 |       | Group 3 |       | Group 4 |       |
|------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| DV   | M       | SD    | M       | SD    | M       | SD    | M       | SD    |
| AI3  | 166.07  | 19.71 | 163.86  | 17.27 | 165.62  | 17.11 | 150.73  | 13.78 |
| PI   | 29.42   | 11.03 | 22.60   | 10.57 | 29.94   | 11.39 | 32.65   | 11.55 |
| MN   | 24.57   | 10.08 | 25.06   | 11.78 | 30.21   | 13.24 | 31.72   | 12.86 |
| P    | 40.30   | 13.79 | 46.09   | 16.48 | 34.13   | 17.32 | 27.52   | 13.49 |
| MI-I | 22.31   | 4.60  | 23.52   | 1.62  | 24.03   | 1.24  | 20.09   | 5.38  |
| MI-S | 16.59   | 4.92  | 16.69   | 3.64  | 18.48   | 3.42  | 15.94   | 3.90  |
| UOS  | 71.00   | 8.18  | 72.62   | 9.21  | 73.03   | 7.16  | 66.52   | 5.87  |
| SDO  | 34.38   | 13.25 | 34.10   | 16.98 | 34.93   | 16.86 | 54.42   | 14.58 |
| RWA  | 76.90   | 29.10 | 78.93   | 34.46 | 92.48   | 32.73 | 105.61  | 27.00 |
| IRI  | 100.14  | 15.32 | 96.52   | 11.93 | 95.28   | 12.31 | 92.24   | 11.95 |
| BI-6 | 162.48  | 20.33 | 157.52  | 22.75 | 155.03  | 37.73 | 150.73  | 16.74 |
|      |         |       |         |       |         |       |         |       |

Note: Group 1 = Aversive Racist (Low Explicit Prejudice, High Implicit Prejudice), Group 2 = Mild Implicit Prejudice Group (Low Explicit Prejudice, Mild Implicit Prejudice), Group 3 = Low Prejudice Group (Low in Explicit and Implicit Prejudice), Group 4 = High Explicit Prejudice Group (High in Explicit Prejudice). AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3 Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score.

The first series of analyses only examined the three implicit groups because the original research question involved the differences between aversive racists (i.e., Group 1) and truly low prejudiced people (i.e., Group 3). Multivariate tests examining

authenticity, moral identity subscales, and universal orientation revealed no significant differences among the groups. Univariate tests examining these constructs also revealed no significant differences.

Multivariate tests examining SDO and RWA revealed no significant differences among the groups. Univariate tests further revealed no significant differences.

Multivariate tests examining moral judgment development constructs revealed a significant difference among groups (F [6, 166] = 2.765, p < .05,  $\eta^2$  = .091). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups for postconventional reasoning (F [2, 84] = 4.086, p < .05,  $\eta^2$  = .089). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the medium implicitly prejudiced group operated at a higher level of postconventional reasoning than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests also reported significant differences in personal interest scores (F [2, 84] = 4.017, p < .05,  $\eta^2$  = .087). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the truly low prejudiced group operated at a higher level of personal interest reasoning than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05).

Univariate tests examining social desirability and empathy were performed.

Neither of these tests revealed significant differences.

Additional analyses were also performed, in order to include the explicitly prejudiced group. MANOVAs and ANOVAS were performed to assess any differences between the explicitly prejudiced group and the three low explicit groups. The same tests performed for the low explicit groups were carried out again, with the inclusion of the explicitly prejudiced group (i.e., Group 4). Again, moral identity subscales (i.e., Internalization and Symbolization), authenticity, and universal orientation were examined together in one MANOVA. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism were

grouped together in one MANOVA. Moral judgment development schemas (i.e., Personal interest, Maintaining norms, and Postconventional) were grouped together in one MANOVA. Social desirability and empathy were examined separately in two ANOVAs.

Multivariate tests examining authenticity, moral identity subscales, and universal orientation revealed a significant difference (F [12, 345] = 3.215, p < .01,  $\eta^2 = .101$ ). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups on moral identity internalization (F [3, 116] = 6.863, p < .01,  $\eta^2 = .151$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in internalization than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05) and lower than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05).05). Univariate tests further revealed a significant difference among groups on authenticity (F [3, 116] = 5.861, p < .01,  $\eta^2 = .132$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in authenticity than the aversive racist group (p < .05), than the medium explicitly prejudiced group (p < .05), and lower than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests further revealed a significant difference among groups on universal orientation (F [3, 116] = 4.819, p < .01,  $\eta^2 = .111$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in universal orientation than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05) and lower than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05).

Multivariate tests examining RWA and SDO revealed a significant difference (F [6,232] = 7.015, p < .01,  $\eta^2 = .154$ ). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups in RWA (F [3, 116] = 5.834, p < .01,  $\eta^2 = .131$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was higher in RWA than the aversive racist

group (p < .05) and higher than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups in SDO (F [3, 116] = 13.290, p < .001,  $\eta^2 = .256$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was higher in SDO than the aversive racist group (p < .05), higher than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05), and higher than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05).

Multivariate tests examining moral judgment development constructs revealed a significant difference among groups (F [9, 348] = 3.500, p < .001,  $\eta^2 = .083$ ). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups for postconventional reasoning (F [3, 116] = 8.415, p < .001,  $n^2 = .179$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in postconventional reasoning than both the aversive racist group (p < .05) and the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05). Bonferonni post hoc test also showed that the medium implicitly prejudiced group was higher than the low implicit/low explicit group (p < .05). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups for maintaining norms reasoning (F [3, 116] = 2.720, p < .05,  $\eta^2 = .066$ ). Bonferonni post hoc tests did not reveal any significant differences among the groups, though the explicitly prejudiced and truly low prejudiced groups were higher than the aversive racist and medium implicitly prejudiced groups. Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups for personal interest reasoning (F[3, 116] = 4.421, p)< .05,  $\eta^2 = .103$ ). Bonferonni post hoc test showed that the explicitly prejudiced group was higher in personal interest reasoning than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05).

Univariate tests examining social desirability and empathy were performed.

Neither of these tests revealed significant differences.

In summary, no significant differences were found between aversive racist and truly low prejudiced people. The medium implicitly prejudiced group was found to reference postconventional reasoning more often than the truly low prejudiced group. The truly low prejudiced group was also found to emphasize personal interest reasoning more often than the medium implicitly prejudiced group. The explicitly prejudiced group differed from the other three groups (i.e., aversive racist, medium implicitly prejudiced, and truly low prejudiced groups) on every construct with the exception of social desirability and empathy.

#### Discussion

The purpose of this study was to determine what distinguishes those who are truly low prejudiced from aversive racists. Eight different constructs were considered. These constructs were authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. Specifically, it was proposed that aversive racists would score higher on dimensions of social dominance, authoritarianism, and social desirability compared to truly low prejudiced people.

Further, it was hypothesized that aversive racists would score lower on dimensions of nonprejudice, moral judgment development, moral identity, and authenticity.

To test participants on these various aspects, participants were divided into groups according to their scores on an explicit and an implicit measure of attitudes regarding African Americans. Participants who had scores indicating low prejudice on the explicit measure were further divided according to their scores on the implicit measure into low, medium, and high groups. Participants who were low in explicit prejudice and high in implicit prejudice were categorized as aversive racists, while those low in explicit and implicit prejudice were categorized as truly low prejudiced.

It was hypothesized that aversive racists would differ from truly low prejudiced people on eight different constructs. The data presented here indicate that aversive racists did not differ from low prejudice people on any of the examined constructs. The only significant differences found were between the low prejudice group and the medium implicit prejudice group. The low prejudice group operated from the personal interest schema to a greater extent than the medium implicit prejudice group. Also, the medium implicit prejudice group operated from the postconventional schema to a greater extent

than the low prejudice group.

Unlike Van Heil and Mervielde (2005), aversive racists were not found to differ from low prejudice people on social dominance orientation or authoritarianism. This may be due to the differences in how aversive racism was defined in the two studies. In the Van Heil and Mervielde study, aversive racism was defined as a reluctance to interact with a member of an out-group. In addition, the samples used in the two studies varied from each other, the Van Heil and Mervielde sample consisted of Europeans, while this study's sample consisted of U.S. citizens. It may be possible that aversive racists are more pronounced in the European culture, which may explain the differences found between the current study and the Van Heil and Mervielde study.

Further analyses comparing participants who were high in explicit prejudice to participants low in explicit prejudice (i.e., the three aforementioned groups) were performed. The low explicit and high explicit groups were compared on the same eight constructs: authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. These analyses found that participants high in explicit prejudice scored lower on moral identity internalization, authenticity, nonprejudice, and postconventional moral reasoning compared to participants low in explicit prejudice. Those participants high in explicit prejudice also displayed greater amounts of social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and personal interest moral reasoning compared to participants low in explicit prejudice.

The differences found between people high in explicit prejudice and people low in explicit prejudice are not revolutionary and agree with past findings. In agreement with

the McFarland (in press) study, postconventional reasoning was found to differentiate people who differed in explicit prejudice. In keeping with the trend (i.e., Phillips & Ziller, 1997), people low in explicit prejudice were found to have greater amounts of nonprejudice compared to people high in explicit prejudice. People high in explicit prejudice displayed greater amounts of social dominance orientation compared to those low in explicit prejudice, which replicates Pratto et al. (1994). People high in explicit prejudice displayed greater amounts of authoritarianism compared to those low in explicit prejudice, which supports Altemeyer (1988).

People high in explicit prejudice were also found to differ on levels of authenticity and moral identity, which has not been documented before. People high in explicit prejudice were found to have lower authenticity scores compared to people low in explicit prejudice. This suggests that explicitly prejudice people do not understand themselves as well as people with less explicit prejudice do. People high in explicit prejudice were also found to have lower moral identity internalization scores compared to people low in explicit prejudice. This suggests that moral traits are not as large a portion of the explicitly prejudiced person's life in comparison to the non-explicitly prejudiced person. This finding also supports the validity of the Moral Identity Scale because a person high in explicit prejudice would not be expected to have a high moral identity.

Overall, the data suggest that being an aversive racist may not have a truly significant effect on a person's life – at least as far as the constructs considered in this study are concerned. While people who explicitly express a lack of prejudice may have implicit prejudices, it appears that these biases are not transferred to other relevant areas. The findings from this study suggest that the more important factor appears to be what a

person explicitly reports. People that are explicitly prejudiced differ from people who are not explicitly prejudiced on many different aspects. Even though a person's implicit attitude may differ from his or her explicit attitude, the current study supports that it is the person's explicit attitude that truly matters where the measured areas are concerned.

Another point arises from the data. The mild implicit prejudice group and the aversive racists both had fairly high postconventional scores compared to the low prejudice group (The mild implicit prejudiced group differed significantly from the low prejudice group, and the mild implicit prejudiced group and the aversive racists did not significantly differ from each other). Having a high postconventional score could be the factor that allows these people to keep from either acting on or transferring their implicit biases to other areas. This finding may therefore support Rest's four component model of moral functioning (Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This model suggests that moral behavior is a factor of four components: Moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and implementation. In regards to the moral functioning of the mild implicit prejudice and aversive racist groups, having a high postconventional score could be what prevents their implicit prejudice from bypassing their moral motivation. Because this study did not obtain any behavioral data from the participants, there is another possibility that Rest's four component model (Narvaez & Rest) would support. It might be that implicit biases exist among the mild prejudice and aversive racist groups exist due to deficiencies in components like moral sensitivity and/or moral motivation.

An additional aspect needs to be considered in explaining the findings of this study. The lack of differentiation between aversive racists and low prejudice people may be an artifact of the IAT. When assessing bias against African-Americans, the IAT

presents pictures of African-Americans and European-Americans along with negative and positive words (Greenwald et al., 1998). Because of this, scores can be interpreted in three ways: biased against African-Americans, biased against European-Americans, or unbiased. The presence of a negative bias against African-Americans was the concern in this study. Participants that displayed negative bias against European-Americans were still included in the analysis and because of the manner in which the participants were categorized, they were further included into the low prejudice group (because they showed no bias against African-Americans). The similarity of scores between aversive racists (implicit bias against African-Americans) and truly low prejudiced people (some of which display bias against European-Americans) may be due to the presence of some sort of bias against a racial or ethnic group existing in both groups.

### Strengths and Limitations

Before discussing strengths, the limitations of the study will be addressed. In labeling participants as aversive racists, the IAT was used to distinguish participants in regards to their implicit biases (or lack thereof). Since the inception of the IAT, the method has been criticized. Arkes and Tetlock (2004) suggest different interpretations of IAT scores. The effects seen in the IAT may be due to cultural stereotypes rather than personal beliefs or due to cognitive processes that are not necessarily prejudiced (Arkes & Tetlock). Kinoshita and Peek-O'Leary (2005) suggest that the negative bias seen against a certain ethnic or racial group can be due to familiarity rather than actual negative affect toward that group. Because these interpretations are plausible, it is possible that the scores from the IAT in the current study may be due to these other interpretations. If this is the case, then the lack of differentiation between aversive racists

and truly low prejudiced people, as defined in this study, is understandable.

A further limitation concerning the IAT is its duel nature. The IAT can assess bias against African-Americans and European-Americans. If a person shows bias against African-Americans, then he or she will not show bias against European-Americans, when in actuality they may hold a negative affect against both sets of people. The lack of a score suggesting bias against a certain group may not necessarily mean that negative associations do not exist for that group. It may instead mean that a certain person has equally negative associations against more than one group of people, or perhaps the person has a more negative association with another group. The point remains, however, that a person may have a negative association even if the IAT does not suggest the person does.

Another limitation associated with this study is generalizability of the results. Because of the original definition of an aversive racist (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), only European-Americans were examined. This greatly limits the generalizability of the results to only one race in a nation where multiple races and ethnic groups coexist. The sample was also young adult college students and did not represent all ages during adulthood.

Finally, participants were categorized into groups according to continuous variables. Normative data were not available to ensure the way the groups were categorized was the most accurate division of the participants. The groups were determined by cut off points that theoretically seemed to distinguish high and low prejudice. Without normative data to support these cut off points, the accuracy of these designations is uncertain.

A strength associated with this study is the wide variety of constructs considered in the examination of aversive racism. This study incorporated many different constructs in order to achieve a more detailed picture of the topic of interest. Another strength of this study was the manner in which the data was collected in two sessions. This allowed participants to keep from becoming fatigued and becoming apathetic in their responses.

Further, this study helps bring more understanding to the concept of prejudice and behavior related to prejudice. Crimes committed against a person that are motivated by the offenders' bias against race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/nationality (i.e., hate crimes) total to 9,035 in 2004 (Department of Justice, 2004). Of those 9,035 crimes, 6,064 were committed because of race and or ethnicity (Department of Justice). Given these high rates of crime, which are motivated by prejudices, understanding prejudice – whether implicit or explicit – is imperative. This study assists in understanding the phenomenon of prejudice.

### Future Directions

In the future, the inclusion of more racial and ethnic groups into the sample would be a great improvement. This would allow the data to be generalized to a greater proportion of the population. Also, other biases against more racial and ethnic groups should be examined. While certain things may be true for explicit and implicit biases against African-Americans, it would be interesting to see if these same sorts of trends hold for biases against other ethnic groups.

Other methods for categorizing people as aversive racists should also be used to determine if the results from this current study hold up, or if they had been distorted because of the concerns associated with the IAT. In some aversive racism literature,

people are categorized as aversive racists according to a behavioral task. Generally, participants are given a task where they select people for admittance to a college, employment, or pay raises (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002). Using a task in which participants make a selection decision based on ambiguous information has demonstrated that some people tend to make decisions favoring their own racial group. Using the selection decision task may be a better method for categorizing aversive racists than the IAT. Further, using behavioral data could further confirm the groupings used for this study and help draw more precise conclusions about aversive racism. For instance, it may confirm that it translates to behavior but not to other related areas (such as those addressed in this study).

The finding that participants high and mild in implicit prejudice have elevated postconventional scores compared to low prejudice participants suggests more examination in this area are warranted. As noted earlier, Rest's four component model makes the findings of this study interpretable in two different ways. Hence, a future study should examine other components of Rest's four component model of moral functioning (i.e., moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and implementation) to determine how aversive racism best fits into this model.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, no significant differences were found between aversive racists and low prejudice people. Further evidence was found distinguishing people high in explicit prejudice from people low in explicit prejudice. The results suggest three implications. First, while a person may have implicit biases, what appears to matter more is what that person's explicit attitude is. Second, the implicitly biased groups had high

postconventional scores, which could be the factor that is keeping these people from transferring their implicit prejudices to other aspects of their lives. Third, the lack of distinction between aversive racists and low prejudice people may be due to an artifact of the IAT. While no constructs were found to differ between aversive racists and low prejudice people, further exploration with a different method of labeling participants as aversive racists is needed.

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# Appendix A

Demographic Questionnaire

# Demographics

| 1. Age: years.        |                                     |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2. Gender (circle one | e): Male Female                     |
| 3. Education level:   | Freshman                            |
|                       | Sophomore                           |
|                       | Junior                              |
|                       | Senior                              |
|                       | Other:                              |
| 4. Ethnicity (optiona | 1):                                 |
|                       | African American                    |
|                       | American Indian of Alaska Native    |
|                       | Asian                               |
|                       | European American                   |
|                       | Hispanic/Latino                     |
|                       | Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander |
|                       | Other:                              |

Appendix B

Authenticity Inventory 3

## AI3

The following measure has a variety of statements that involves peoples' perceptions about their self. There are no right or wrong responses so please answer honestly. Use the following scale when responding to each statement by writing the number from the scale below which you feel most accurately characterizes your response to the statement.

| Strongly<br>Disagree                | Disagree         | Neither Agree<br>Nor Disagree         | Agree         | Strongly<br>Agree       |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| 1. I am often con                   | nfused about m   | ny feelings.                          |               |                         |
| 2. I frequently pr                  | retend to enjoy  | something when i                      | n actuality   | I really don't.         |
| 3. For better or fe                 | or worse I am    | aware of who I tru                    | ly am.        |                         |
| 4. I understand w                   | why I believe th | he things I do abou                   | t myself.     |                         |
| 5. I want people                    | with whom I a    | am close to underst                   | and my stre   | engths.                 |
| 6. I actively try t core or true se |                  | which of my self-as                   | spects fit to | gether to form my       |
| 7. I am very unco                   | omfortable obj   | jectively considering                 | ng my limit   | ations and shortcomings |
|                                     | •                | r head-nodding to even though I reall |               | eement with someone     |
| 9. I have a very g                  | good understar   | nding of why I do t                   | he things I   | do.                     |
| 10. I am willing                    | to change mys    | self for others if the                | e reward is   | desirable enough.       |
| 11. I find it easy                  | to pretend to b  | be something other                    | than my tr    | ue self.                |
| 12. I want people                   | e with whom I    | am close to under                     | stand my w    | eaknesses.              |
| 13. I find it very                  | difficult to cri | tically assess myse                   | elf.          |                         |
| 14. I am not in to                  | ouch with my     | deepest thoughts ar                   | nd feelings.  |                         |
| 15. I make it a po                  | oint to express  | to close others ho                    | w much I tr   | ruly care for them.     |
| 16. I tend to have more positive    | •                | cepting my persona                    | ıl faults, so | I try to cast them in a |
| 17. I tend to idea                  | lize close othe  | ers rather than obje                  | ctively see   | them as they truly are. |

| 18. If asked, people I am close to can accurately describe what kind of person I am.  |
|---|
| 19. I prefer to ignore my darkest thoughts and feelings.  |
| 20. I am aware of when I am not being my true self.   |
| 21. I am able to distinguish those self-aspects that are important to my core or true self from those that are unimportant.         |
| 22. People close to me would be shocked or surprised if they discovered what I keep inside me.                                      |
| 23. It is important for me to understand my close others' needs and desires.  |
| 24. I want close others to understand the real me rather than just my public persona or "image"                                     |
| 25. I try to act in a manner that is consistent with my personally held values, even if others criticize or reject me for doing so. |
| 26. If a close other and I are in disagreement I would rather ignore the issue than constructively work it out.                     |
| 27. I've often done things that I don't want to do merely not to disappoint people.   |
| 28. I find that my behavior typically expresses my values.  |
| 29. I actively attempt to understand myself as best as possible.  |
| 30. I'd rather feel good about myself than objectively assess my personal limitations and shortcomings.                             |
| 31. I find that my behavior typically expresses my personal needs and desires.  |
| 32. I rarely if ever, put on a "false face" for others to see   |
| 33. I spend a lot of energy pursuing goals that are very important to other people even though they are unimportant to me.          |
| 34. I frequently am not in touch with what's important to me.   |
| 35. I try to block out any unpleasant feelings I might have about myself.   |
| 36. I often question whether I really know what I want to accomplish in my lifetime.  |

| 37. I often find that I am overly critical about myself.   |
|--|
| 38. I am in touch with my motives and desires.   |
| 39. I often deny the validity of any compliments that I receive.   |
| 40. In general, I place a good deal of importance on people I am close to understanding who I truly am.                |
| 41. I find it difficult to embrace and feel good about the things I have accomplished                                  |
| 42. If someone points out or focuses on one of my shortcomings I quickly try to block it out of my mind and forget it. |
| 43. The people I am close to can count on me being who I am regardless of what setting we are in.                      |
| 44. My openness and honesty in close relationships are extremely important to me.                                      |
| 45. I am willing to endure negative consequences by expressing my true beliefs about things.                           |

Appendix C

Defining Issues Test-2

### Defining Issues Test 2

### **FAMINE**

The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this year's famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to sustain themselves by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh's family is near starvation. He had heard that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq was desperate and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man's warehouse. The small amount of food that he needs for his family probably wouldn't be missed.

| What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking the food? (Mark one)  |
|--|
| Should take the food Can't Decide Should not take the food   |
| Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.  |
| 1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No  1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught stealing?  2. Isn't it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal? |
| 3. Shouldn't the community's laws be upheld?   |
| <ul><li>4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?</li><li>5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?</li></ul>                 |
| <ul><li>6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?</li><li>7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?</li></ul>                                 |
| 8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?   |
| 9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?   |
| 10. Isn't private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit the poor?  |
| <ul><li>11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or not?</li><li>12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society?</li></ul>                   |
| Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to fourth most important in making a decision about what Mustaq Singh should do.   |
| # of Most important item# of Third most important item   |
| # of Second most important# of Fourth most important item  |
| REPORTER   |

Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the *Gazette* newspaper for over a decade. Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting, 20 years earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had undergone a confused period and done things he later regretted which were very out-of-

character now. His shop-lifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out since then, but in addition built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading community projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders whether or not she should write the story about Thompson's earlier troubles because in the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story would wreck Thompson's chance to win.

| Do you favor the action of reporting the story? (Mark one)  |
|---|
| Should report the story Can't Decide Should not report the story  |
| Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.     |
| 1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No   |
| 1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for office?   |
| 2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?  |
| 3. If Dayton doesn't publish the story wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and get the credit for investigative reporting?                               |
| <ul><li>4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?</li></ul>   |
| 5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier days as a shop-lifter?  |
| 6. What would best serve society?   |
| 7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?  |
| 8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about candidate Thompson?  |
| 9. Does the right of 'habeas corpus' apply in this case?  |
| 10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?  |
| 11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting   |
| everything she learns about them, good and bad?   |
| 12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?  |
| Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to fourth most important in making a decision about what Reporter Dayton should do. |
| # of Most important item# of Third most important item  |
| # of Second most important # of Fourth most important item  |

### SCHOOL BOARD

Mr. Grant was elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be Chairman. The district was bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One of the high schools had to be closed for financial reasons, but there was no agreement over which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a series of "Open Meetings" in which members of the community could voice their opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussion, the difficulty of the decision would be appreciated, and the community would ultimately support the school board decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate speeches dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls. Mr. Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.

| Do you favor calling off the next Open Meeting? (Mark one)  |
|---|
| Should call off the next open meeting Can't Decide Should have the next open meeting  |
| Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another. |
| 1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No   |
| 1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on major school board decisions?  |
| 2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by discontinuing the Open Meetings?  |
| 3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if he stopped the Open Meetings?  |
| 4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?   |
| 5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect the Board by making decisions in closed meetings?                   |
| 6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the Open  |
| Meetings?   |
| 7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?   |
| 8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them from making long speeches?  |
| 9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school board process by playing some sort of power game?  |
| 10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle controversial issues in the future?                                     |
| 11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is the community in general really fair-minded and democratic?  |
| 12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion   |
| from the community?   |

| Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to fourth most important in making a decision about what Mr. Grant should do.   |
|---|
| # of Most important item # of Third most important item   |
| # of Second most important # of Fourth most important item  |
| CANCER  Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in terrible pain and asks the doctor to give her more pain-killer medicine. The doctor has given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life. Should the doctor giver her an increased dosage? |
| Do you favor the action of giving more medicine? (Mark one)   |
| <ul><li>Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die</li><li>Can't Decide</li><li>Should not give her an increased dosage</li></ul>   |
| Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.   |
| 1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No   |
| <ol> <li>Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving an overdose would be the same as killing her?</li> <li>Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?</li> </ol>  |
| 3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?  4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?   |
| <ul><li>5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?</li><li>6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live?</li></ul>  |
| <ul><li>7. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?</li><li>8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?</li></ul>   |
| 9. Wouldn't the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?   |
| 10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?  11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?  12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the person wants to?   |

| Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to fourth most important in making a decision about what the doctor should do.  |
|---|
| # of Most important item # of Third most important item   |
| # of Second most important# of Fourth most important item   |
| DEMONSTRATION  Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the President of the United States to send troops to "police" the area. Students at many campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States was using its military might for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational companies were pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means loss of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstration, tying up traffic and stopping regular business in town. The president of the university demanded that the students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college's administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to demonstrate in these ways? |
| Do you favor the action of demonstrating in these ways?   |
| Should continue demonstrating in these ways Can't Decide Should not continue demonstrating in these ways  |
| Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.   |
| 1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No   |
| <ol> <li>Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn't belong to them?</li> <li>Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?</li> <li>Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing it just for fun?</li> <li>If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?</li> <li>Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few demonstrators?</li> <li>Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil companies?</li> <li>Why should a few people like the Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary people?</li> </ol>  |
| than ordinary people?  8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?  Ordinary people?  |
| 9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?   |

| 10. Shouldn't the authorities be respect | eted by students?   |
|--|---|
| 11. Is taking over a building consister  | nt with principles of justice?  |
| 12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the | law, whether one likes it or not?   |
|  |   |
|  | please rank them below from most important to cision about what the students should do. |
| # of Most important item                 | # of Third most important item  |
| # of Second most important               | # of Fourth most important item   |

Appendix D

Moral Identity Scale

# Self Description Scale (i.e., Moral Identity Scale)

Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person:

Caring
Compassionate
Fair
Friendly
Generous
Hardworking
Helpful
Honest
Kind

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like answer the following questions using the scale below.

|    | Strongly<br>Disagree         | <b>Disagree</b>               | Neither Agree<br>Nor Disagree | Agree        | Strongly<br>Agree     |              |
|----|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| 1. | . It would mal               | ke me feel go                 | od to be a person v           | who has th   | ese characteristics.  |              |
| 2. | Being some                   | one who has th                | hese characteristic           | es is an imp | portant part of who I | [ am.        |
| 3. | I would be a                 | shamed to be                  | a person who has              | these char   | acteristics.          |              |
| 4. | . Having these               | e characteristi               | cs is not really im           | portant to   | me.                   |              |
| 5. | I strongly de                | esire to have th              | nese characteristic           | es.          |                       |              |
| 6  | I often wear                 | clothes that ic               | dentify me as havi            | ng these cl  | naracteristics.       |              |
| 7. | • •                          | things I do in characteristi  | • •                           | .g., hobbie  | s) clearly identify m | ne as        |
| 8. | The kinds of characterist    |                               | agazines that I rea           | nd identify  | me as having these    |              |
| 9  |                              | I have these of in certain or |                               | communica    | ated to others by my  |              |
| 10 | 0. I am activel these charac | •                             | activities that con           | nmunicate    | to others that I have | <del>)</del> |

Appendix E

Universal Orientation Scale

## **Universal Orientation Scale**

<u>Directions:</u> Using the scale below, indicate to what extent each of the following statements describes you or your opinion.

|   |   | 1<br>Does<br>scrib<br>we | oe m | e | 2   | 3<br>Not Sure                       | 4                                 | 5<br>Describes me<br>very well |
|---|---|--------------------------|------|---|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 1. The similathe the differe                          |                                     | males and females                 | are greater than               |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 2. I tend to va someone.                              | alue similarities                   | s over differences v              | when I meet                    |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 3. At one leve  | el of thinking w                    | e are all of a kind.              |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 4. I can under everyone.                              | rstand almost a                     | nyone because I'm                 | a little like                  |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 5. Little diffe                                       | rences among p                      | people mean a lot.                |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 6. I can see myself fitting into many groups.         |                                     |                                   |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 7. There is potential for good and evil in all of us. |                                     |                                   |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 8. When I look into the eyes of others I see myself.  |                                     |                                   |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 9. I could nev  | er get accustor                     | ned to living in an               | other country.                 |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 |   | rst meet someon                     | ne I tend to notice other person. | differences                    |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 |   | " describes my does "in" and        | position with rega "out."         | rd to groups                   |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 12. The same spirit dwells in everyone.               |                                     |                                   |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 13. Older pers  | sons are very di                    | fferent than I am.                |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 14. I can tell a gender.                              | great deal abo                      | ut a person by kno                | wing their                     |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 15. There is a  | certain beauty                      | in everyone.                      |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 |   | =                                   | ut a person by kno                | wing their age.                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 17. Men and v   | =                                   | er totally understa               |                                |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 18. Everyone we all die.                              |                                     | very much alike be                | ecause in the end              |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 | 19. I have diff<br>than I.                            | ficulty relating                    | to persons who are                | much younger                   |
| 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4    | 5 |   | eet someone I t<br>d the other pers | end to notice similon.            | arities between                |

## Appendix F

Social Dominance Orientation Scale

#### Social Dominance Orientation Scale

Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards? Beside each object or statement place a number from '1' to '7' which represents the degree of your positive or negative feeling.

| 1 (Very negative), 2 (Negative), 3 (Slightly negative), 4 (Neither positive or negative), 5  |
|--|
| (Slightly positive), 6 (Positive), 7 (Very positive)   |
| 1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups                                 |
| 2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against                  |
| other groups   |
| 3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others                          |
| 4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups                   |
| 5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems                     |
| 6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the |
| bottom   |
| 7. Inferior groups should stay in their place  |
| 8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place  |
| 9. It would be good if groups could be equal   |
| 10. Group equality should be our ideal   |
| 11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life                                       |
| 12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups                     |
| 13. Increased social equality  |
| 14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally                           |
| 15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible                                    |
| 16. No one group should dominate in society  |

Appendix G

Right Wing Authoritarian Scale

#### Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale

This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each of the statements by recording a number beside each statement, according to the following scale:

- -4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement
- -3 if you *strongly disagree* with the statement
- -2 if you *moderately disagree* with the statement
- -1 if you *slightly disagree* with the statement
- 0 if you feel *neutral* about the statement
- +1 if you *slightly agree* with the statement
- +2 if you *moderately agree* with the statement
- +3 if you *strongly agree* with the statement
- +4 if you very strongly agree with the statement

You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of the statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("-4") with one idea in a statement, but slightly agree ("+1") with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel "on balance" (that is, a "-3" in this example).

| 1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the |
|---|
| radicals  |
| and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance.            |
| 2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.         |
| 3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to   |
| destroy   |

| the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.                                    |
|---|
| 4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.                         |
| 5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government        |
| and   |
| religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create |
| doubt in people's minds   |
| 6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no           |
| doubt every   |
| •   |
| bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.                              |
| 7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our          |
| traditional   |
| values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad        |
| ideas.  |
| 8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.                                     |
| 9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways,           |
| even if this  |
| upsets many people.   |
| 10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating         |
| away at   |
| our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.  |
| 11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual                 |
| preferences, even if  |
| it makes them different from everyone else.   |
| 12. The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way         |
| to live.  |
|   |
| 13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by              |
| protesting  for your and a chartier rights for animal rights on to shalish school groups    |
| for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.                |
| 14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil,       |
| and take  |
| us back to our true path.   |
| 15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our                |
| government,   |
| criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way things are supposed to be done."         |
| 16. God's laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed           |
| before it is  |
| too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.                               |
| 17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to          |
| ruin it for   |
| their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.                  |
| 18. A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women               |
| are   |
| submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.            |
| 19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the          |
| authorities   |
| tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.               |
| ton us to uo, and get hid of the fotten apples who are fullling everything.                 |

| 20. There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way. |
|--|
| 21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy       |
| "traditional   |
| family values.   |
| 22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would    |
| just shut up   |
| and accept their group's traditional place in society.                               |

Appendix H

Interpersonal Reactivity Index

#### Interpersonal Reactivity Index

Mark the following items from 0 (*Does not describe me very well*) to 4 (*Describes me very well*).

| 1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might               |
|--|
| happen to me   |
| 2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me             |
| 3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view      |
| 4. Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems           |
| 5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel                  |
| 6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease                          |
| 7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely |
| caught up in it  |
| 8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision          |
| 9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective                |
| toward them  |
| 10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation      |
| 11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from    |
| their perspective  |
| 12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me          |
| 13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm                                   |
| 14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal                    |
| 15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other    |
| people's arguments   |

| 16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters     |
|--|
| 17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me                                       |
| 18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for |
| them   |
| 19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies                            |
| 20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen                                 |
| 21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both    |
| 22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person                              |
| 23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading    |
| character  |
| 24. I tend to lose control during emergencies  |
| 25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while    |
| 26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the   |
| events in the story were happening to me   |
| 27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces              |
| 28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in          |
| their place  |

### Appendix I

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6

#### Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6

| Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how   |
|--|
| much you agree with it.  |
| 17   |
| NOT TRUE SOMEWHAT TRUE VERY TRUE   |
| 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.  |
| 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.  |
| 3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.  |
| 4. I have not always been honest with myself.  |
| 5. I always know why I like things.  |
| 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.  |
| 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.   |
| 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.   |
| 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.   |
| 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.   |
| 11. I never regret my decisions.   |
| 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.  |
| 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.  |
| 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.   |
| 15. I am a completely rational person.   |
| 16. I rarely appreciate criticism.   |
| 17. I am very confident of my judgments.   |
| 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.  |
| 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.  |
| 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.  |
| 21 I sometimes tell lies if I have to  |
| 22. I never cover up my mistakes.  |
| 22. I never cover up my mistakes.  23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.                         |
| 24. I never swear.   |
| 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.  |
| 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.  |
| 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught. 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. |
| 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.   |
| 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.   |
| 30. I always declare everything at customs.  |
| 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.   |
| 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.   |
| 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.   |
| 34. I never read sexy books or magazines.  |
| 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.   |
| 36. I never take things that don't belong to me.   |
| 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.  |
| 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.   |
| 39. I have some pretty awful habits.   |
| 40. I don't gossip about other people's business.  |

Appendix J

**Attitudes Towards Blacks** 

#### Attitude Toward Blacks Scale

Using the scale below, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Place the corresponding number beside the statement.

| 1 Strongly disagree   |
|---|
| 2 Disagree  |
| 3 Slightly disagree   |
| 4 Undecided   |
| 5 Slightly agree  |
| 6 Agree   |
| 7 Strongly agree  |
| 1. If a black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from |
| him or her  |
| 2. If I had a chance to introduce black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be  |
| pleased to do so  |
| 3. I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in           |
| 4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public         |
| place   |
| 5. I would not mind it at all if a black family with about the same income and education  |
| as me moved in next door  |
| 6. I think that black people look more similar to each other than white people do         |
| 7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the "who-am-I?" confusion which    |
| the children feel   |
| 8. I get very upset when I hear a white make a prejudicial remark about blacks            |

| 9. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods             |
|--|
| 10. I would not bother me if my new roommate was black                                       |
| 11. It is likely that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in          |
| 12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive                 |
| 13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices blacks      |
| suffer at the hands of local authorities   |
| 14. Black and white people are inherently equal  |
| 15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights              |
| 16. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and                |
| segregation  |
| 17. Generally, blacks are not as smart as whites   |
| 18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a         |
| promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members                  |
| 19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefitted both whites |
| and blacks   |
| 20. Some blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them         |

### Appendix K

Informed Consent Document and Human Subjects Review Board Approval

#### INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT

Project Title: Addressing the Relationships Among Aspects of Self and Social Attitudes

Investigator: Bryan Hall

Psychology Department 502-460-0595 bryan.hall@wku.edu

W. Pitt Derryberry, Ph.D.

Psychology Department 270-745-5250 pitt.derryberry@wku.edu

You are being asked to participate in a project conducted through Western Kentucky University. The University requires that you give your signed agreement to participate in this project.

The investigator will explain to you in detail the purpose of the project, the procedures to be used, and the potential benefits and possible risks of participation. You may ask him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project. A basic explanation of the project is written below. Please read this explanation and discuss with the researcher any questions you may have. If you then decide to participate in the project, please sign on the last page of this form in the presence of the person who explained the project to you. You should be given a copy of this form to keep.

- 1. **Nature and Purpose of the Project:** The purpose of this research project is to address the relationships among various constructs of self and social attitudes.
- 2. **Explanation of Procedures:** Participation in this study involves completing 12 questionnaires. If you decide to participate in this study, you will complete the 10 questionnaires on-line after submitting this document. After you complete the first 10 questionnaires you will schedule a session to complete the remaining two questionnaires questionnaires. The questionnaires to be completed ask participants to report demographic information, information about their thoughts about various social dilemmas and situations, attitudes, and aspects of self. In the laboratory participants will complete a categorization task on a computer in which you will categorize pictures and adjectives according to a set of rules. Your participation in this study will take around 90 to 120 minutes.
- 3. **Discomfort and Risks:** There is minimal or no risk to you in participating in this study. This study involves some self disclosure, and a commitment of your time is also involved.
- 4. **Benefits:** Your participation in this research will contribute to psychological research by helping to better understand how individuals differ on self-constructs and attitudes.
- 5. **Confidentiality:** Answers and information obtained in this study will remain anonymous and confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of this study. Additionally, answers and information obtained will not be identifiable as your specific answers. If you should become uncomfortable at any time, you have the right to discontinue your participation, and your answers will be removed from the study. You have the option to refuse to answer any question and remain in the study. Only group data will appear in any reports of this study.

6. **Refusal/Withdrawal:** Refusal to participate in this study will have no effect on any future services you may be entitled to from the University. Anyone who agrees to participate in this study is free to withdraw from the study at any time with no penalty.

If you have read and understand the parameters of this study and wish to participate, please read the statement that follows and then click the submit button below:

I understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental procedure, and I believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the known and potential but unknown risks.

# -BY SUBMITTING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE PROVIDING YOUR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT –

SUBMIT (wish to participate) DON'T SUBMIT (do not wish to participate)

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD
Sean Rubino, Compliance Manger
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652

HSRB APPLICATION # HS08-157

APPROVED 04/02/2008

EXPIRES 04/02/2009

EXEMPT EXPEDITED FULL BOARD