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FAN PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE IN TEAM DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts, Industrial/Organizational Psychology

By Lauren Cathryn Gruchala

May 2009

FAN PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE IN TEAM DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS

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The present study examined procedural and distributive justice outcomes of discipline in an athletic team setting. A 2 (Consistency of Punishment: consistent vs. conditional) x 2 (Violation Severity: moderate vs. severe) x 2 (Punishment Severity: moderate vs. severe) x 2 (Decision Maker: head coach vs. team captains) factorial design was used. Participants responded to four of the 16 hypothetical scenarios resulting from the design. Participants included 354 fans in attendance at a several university athletic events and students in psychology courses. The results indicated that consistent punishment was perceived as more fair to the punished athlete, teammates, and fans than was conditional punishment. Consistent punishment was perceived as more likely than conditional punishment to deter future misconduct by the punished athlete and teammates. The findings of the importance of consistency to fairness perceptions are consistent with the organizational justice literature and suggest that principles derived in traditional organizations may apply in athletic team settings. However, the current study did not find that severe punishment was more likely than moderately severe punishment to deter future misconduct by the punished athlete and teammates, which was inconsistent with the research literature on punishment. The present research indicated that inconsistencies in applying punishment based on status likely will have a negative effect on fairness perceptions in an athletic setting just as it does in an organizational setting. Intercollegiate athletics are unique in the sense that there are many outside

observers, most notably fans, who pay close attention to athlete misconduct and its subsequent outcome. According to the present results, if coaches are interested in fan perceptions of fairness, punishment should be consistently applied according to team rules for all players regardless of their status on the team.

Fan Perceptions of Justice in Team Disciplinary Decisions

The dynamic of many organizational settings is that power typically is not equally distributed across all of its members. While a hierarchal arrangement may work well for maintaining power in upper levels of management and distributing tasks, it also may lead to unfair practices. Although it is likely the goal of any organization to be fair, it is often the case that what members of upper management and lower level employees think is fair are not the same. Thus, the extent to which events are *perceived* as fair may be more important than actually being fair (Greenberg, 1988).

Much research has focused on fairness in the organizational setting, for good reason. Perceptions of unfairness can lead to lowered job-satisfaction, lowered organizational commitment, decreased citizenship behavior, and lowered job performance (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002). The principles associated with fairness in the workplace are known as organizational justice (Moorman, 1991). Organizational justice is commonly divided into three constructs: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. *Distributive justice* refers to perceptions of fairness of allocated outcomes. *Procedural justice* refers to perceptions of fairness of the procedures or processes used to determine allocation outcomes. *Interactional justice* refers to perceptions of how fairly one believes he or she is treated by the decision makers (Colquitt & Jackson, 2006).

Although much research has focused on organizational justice in the organizational setting, it seems likely that these same principles can apply to other team settings as well. The present study will address whether these same principles apply to intercollegiate athletes in a team setting. While the roles in a sport situation may be

different, they are analogous to roles in an organization. (Jordan, Gillentine, & Hunt, 2004). Coaches are analogous to the bosses and players are analogous to the employees. The fundamentals of organizational justice will also likely work much as they do in an organizational setting. In the organizational setting, there are key members who play a greater role than others. In an athletic team, these individuals are typically called the "star players." Additionally, violations of rules often call for disciplinary measures both in the organizational setting and in athletic teams. In some instances, these violators are the key players of the team. However, the coach still holds ultimate responsibility for all members of the team, much like upper management does for its employees. Team decisions, including disciplinary decisions, are likely to evoke perceptions of fairness (or lack thereof) by the recipient of the discipline and his or her teammates.

In the athletic setting, perceptions of fairness are not only formed by the athletes on the team, but also by individuals who follow a given team, that is, fans. Fans are individuals who are interested in and follow a sport, athlete, or team. Fans can be categorized into two groups: those highly identified with a team and those who have low identification with a team. Highly identified fans typically view their team as an extension of themselves' and the team's performance is important to their own self-concept. While low identified fans may still want their team to perform well, they do not view failure as a reflection of themselves (Wann, 1997). Although highly identified fans are supportive of their teams, it is incorrect to presume that they will hold these same sentiments in all situations. Specifically, highly identified fans may not show support for activities that occur off the playing field that may threaten the integrity of their sport (Wakefield, 1955 as cited in Wann).

For example, Major League baseball games suffered a significant drop in attendance following the 1994-1995 strike. In fact, after this strike the Houston Astros tried to draw fans in by giving away free tickets. Of the 50,000 seats, only 30,000 were filled (Wann, 1997). The same attendance issue was present at the baseball Hall of Fame. As Wann stated, this was of particular importance as highly identified fans often attend. More recently, on August 30, 2002, it was believed another strike may occur. At baseball games across the nation, fans held up signs displaying their disapproval. Signs displayed messages such as, "You strike we walk," "I gave up smoking, I can give up baseball," and "No balls, one strike, we're out" (ESPN, 2007).

The present study will focus on fan perceptions of justice of athletic team disciplinary decisions. In organizations, punishment is often used to deter unwanted behavior (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). Shoenfelt and Bucur (2002) found that severe punishment acted as a deterrent to future misconduct. This study will examine the extent to which fans perceive punishment given to a star player as fair or unfair, and the degree to which they believe it will deter future rule violations.

A review of organizational justice follows. The advantages and effectiveness of punishment applied in organizational settings will then be reviewed. Next, an overview of organizational justice and its role in sports teams will be presented. Finally, fans and the role of team identification will be addressed.

Organizational Justice

Regardless of setting, whether it be work, school, or a sport context, individuals want to be treated fairly (Jordan et al., 2004). The idea of organizational justice was introduced over 20 years ago in the context of general theories in psychology and

sociology that deal with individual perceptions of fairness in an organizational setting (Greenberg, 1987). Over time, the construct of organizational justice has been broken down into three sub-constructs, distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. Although each of these constructs is distinct in its own right, they all address the same question, "What's fair?" (Greenberg, in press). As we will see, the way in which these three constructs operationalize the issue of fairness differs.

Distributive justice was the primary derivative of organizational justice for several years. Formalized by Adams as equity theory in 1965, distributive justice assesses the degree to which people believe their outcomes are a fair reflection of the amount they contribute to their jobs (Greenberg, in press). In the 1970s, another perspective, procedural justice, gained attention. Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the procedures used when making decisions. Procedural justice has been suggested to be related to cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions toward an organization. Therefore, it is not surprising that an individual who perceives the processes leading to an outcome as unfair will focus on the organization itself rather than the specific outcome (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Both procedural and distributive justices have brought unique perceptions of fairness in relation to outcomes. In the mid 1980's, a third perspective, interactional justice was introduced. Interactional justice focuses on the extent to which individuals feel decision makers are treating them with respect and sensitivity during the decision making process (Bies & Moag, 1986). While some researchers have shown support for this as an independent factor, it has also been demonstrated to be highly correlated with procedural justice. Because of the interrelatedness of procedural and interactional justice, interactional justice often has

been considered as a subset of procedural justice (Moorman, 1991). Interactional justice will not be addressed in the current study. Outcomes of organizational justice will first be presented before examining distributive and procedural justice in more detail.

Benefits of organizational justice extend to the organization and the employees. In the organizational setting, perceptions of high levels of organizational justice have been linked to lower turnover (Dailey & Kirk, 1992), higher customer satisfaction (Lam, Schaubroeck, & Aryee, 2002 as cited in Greenberg, in press), increased organizational commitment (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), organizational citizenship behavior (Fassina, Jones, & Uggerslev, 2008), and lowered employee theft (Greenberg, 1990). From the perspective of the employee, when upper management employs fair practices, it indicates that employees are valued and accepted into their work group. These feelings of value and acceptance have been linked to enhanced self-worth (Tyler & Lind, 1992). For both the employee and the employer, these feelings have added benefits, including: lowered feelings of discrimination (Cropanzano, Slaughter, & Bachiochi, 2005), reduced stress (Judge & Colquitt, 2004), and better physical and mental health (Greenberg, in press). Organizational justice may also have added moral benefits because it is simply the right thing to do. However, Greenberg suggested that the more tangible reasons, as seen in organizational and employee benefits, are more instrumental in promoting justice than is the general moral rationale.

Organizational Justice as a Construct

Organizational justice has proved to be an important construct as it affects virtually everyone in an organization on a daily basis. Organizational justice has far-reaching consequences which cause people to turn a careful eye in determining if a

decision was truly fair (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Yee Ng, 2001). Research has shown support for a two-factor conceptualization of organizational justice, specifically showing the difference of outcomes between distributive and procedural justice. Sweeney and McFarlin's (1993) structural equation model showed that while distributive justice was related to pay satisfaction and other personal outcomes, procedural justice referenced outcomes that are connected with the organization such as commitment. Because the expected outcomes can be separated into the self versus the organization, having a model with non-overlapping constructs has proved conducive to studying organization justice. Sweeney and McFarlin were not the only ones to discover this, as many researchers have come to the same conclusion (Colquitt et al.). A review of distributive justice will be addressed first followed by a review of procedural justice.

Distributive Justice

Distributive justice addresses an individual's perception of how fairly resources and outcomes are allocated throughout the organization. The theory behind distributive justice originated long before it became a construct of organizational justice. Originally, distributive justice was studied as equity theory. Equity theory was formalized by Adams (1965), and examines the way in which resources are allocated to one individual compared to a similar other. Outcomes could be distributed according to three principles. If the ratio of inputs and outputs is proportional across individuals, then *equity* would result. Therefore, individuals who contributed the most to the organization (inputs) would receive the most outcomes. However, *equality* distribution indicates that individuals would have equal outcome allocations, regardless of their contribution (Gilliland & Chan, 2001). Finally, outcome distribution could be made on a *needs* basis. That is, individuals

who are the most in need would receive larger outcome allocations than others. Gilliland and Chan suggested that what one believes he or she deserves may actually be a stronger predictor of distributive justice than expectation.

The predictive role that distributive justice will have likely depends on the outcome of a situation (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). Distributive justice has been found to be a better predictor of pay satisfaction than procedural or interpersonal justice. Findings have indicated that distributive justice may be of particular importance for predicting personal outcomes, whereas procedural justice is more likely to predict outcomes associated with evaluating an organization and its decision makers (Folger & Greenburg, 1985).

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice is concerned with the perceived fairness of the process used when making decisions. Although individuals are greatly concerned with whether or not the actual outcome is fair, it has been suggested that they are equally concerned with the process used to come about the decision that determines the outcome. That is, the "means" by which the decision is determined is just as important as the "ends" (Jordan et al., 2004). In fact, McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) found that disappointment associated with outcomes can be reduced if the procedures used are perceived to be fair. A key component for individuals to perceive processes and procedures as being fair is the feeling that they were a part of the decision-making process, or "voice."

The extent to which individuals are allowed to participative in the decision-making process is an important component in perceptions of fairness. However, whether participation will be effective or ineffective is dependent upon the situation (Vroom &

Jago, 1988). In an attempt to address what situations will likely benefit or be hindered by participation, Vroom and Yetton developed a taxonomy of decision-making processes. Five levels of decision processes were identified that range from autocratic, to consultative, to group processes. Situational factors should determine which of the following procedures should be used: (1) Autocratic I (AI): Using currently available information, the leader solves the problem or makes the decision by him/herself; (2) Autocratic II (AII): Necessary information is obtained from a subordinate, the leader then makes the decision him/herself; (3) Consultative (CI): Leader shares the issue with subordinate and asks for input, the leader then makes the decision which may or may not reflect the subordinates input; (4) Group I (GI): Leader shares issues with subordinate and a joint decision is then made; (5) Delegative I (DI): Leader delegates issue to subordinate and gives the subordinate available information so he or she can solve the issue on their own. However, it is typical of many organizations to implement multiple methods, sometimes even all five (Vroom & Jago). The extent to which a process is effective is determined by three dimensions: (a) quality: refers to rational behind the decision; (b) acceptance: extent to which the subordinates acceptance and/or commitment is necessary for implementing the decision; (c) time: available time to make the decision. Although participative styles are typically more time intensive, they lead to more acceptance of the decision as well as contribute to the development of subordinates (Vroom & Jago).

Thibaut and Walker's (1975) process control model has been viewed as synonymous to procedural justice (Colquitt et al., 2001). Under the process control model, two types of controls were identified during dispute-resolution procedures. The

first, *process control*, is the amount of control one has in procedures used to settle complaints. In this process, individuals are given the opportunity to voice their views and opinions. Thibaut and Walker recognized that process control would be of particular importance when individuals other than the disputant have the ultimate control of allocations. Process control, or voice, gives the disputant at least an indirect means of decision control (Colquitt & Jackson, 2006). The second, *decision control*, is the amount of control an individual has in determining outcomes (Konovsky, 2000). In this process, individuals are allowed to help make allocation decisions. Research on the process control model has indicated that individuals are willing to give up control during the decisions stage as long as they could retain it in the process stage (Colquitt et al.).

Third-party dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation, were viewed as having both a process and decision stage by Thibaut and Walker (Colquitt et al., 2001). During dispute-resolutions, a variety of procedures can be used: (a) *autocratic procedures* are when complete control of processes and decisions is given to the third party, (b) *arbitration procedures* are when the third party has control over decisions but not processes, (c) *mediation procedures* are when the third party has control over processes but not decisions, (d) *moot procedures* are when both the individual(s) engaged in the dispute and the third party share control over the processes and decisions, (e) *bargaining procedures* are when the third party is given no control over processes or decisions. In third-party decision making, dispersing control between the individual(s) engaged in the dispute and the third party is central to perceptions of fairness. The resolution procedure is based on an instrumental model in which people believe that they

will ultimately get their desired outcome, so long as the processes used to make these outcomes are fair (Konovsky, 2000).

In 1976, Levanthal introduced his conceptualization of procedural justice, which he called procedural fairness, based on the dispute-resolution process. Levanthal argued that there were seven procedural elements used when forming perceptions of fairness: (a) *selection of agents* refers to procedures used for determining who makes the allocated decisions; (b) *setting ground rules* refers to procedures used for the determination and evaluation of potential rewards, as well as the behaviors needed to reach them; (c) *gathering information* refers to procedures used to obtain information about individuals receiving the reward; (d) *decision structure* refers to procedures used to define the allocative decision processes structure; (e) *appeals* refers to the procedures used to ensure power is not abused by the decision-making body; (g) *change mechanisms* refers to procedures used to allow allocation processes to be changed (Folger & Greenburg, 1985).

The above research cited by Thibaut and Walker (1975) recognized that perceptions of procedures and the way the procedures will affect individuals are important considerations in perceptions of fairness. Levanthal (1980) expanded these initial findings to include the components a procedure should include to be considered fair. Fair procedures are ones that: (a) are consistently applied, (b) made on the basis of valid information,(c) unbiased and not based on self-interest, (d) have room to correct any flawed decisions, (e) meet the concerns of those affected by the procedure, and (f) are in adherence to ethical standards (Greenberg, in press).

Consistency is often linked to a social comparison process in which individuals determine if, for example, they were punished in a like manner to others who engaged in past similar misconduct. This same determination is often done by individuals who observe others, for example, being punished. In this instance, observers will decide if the punished individual was treated similarly to others who committed a similar violation in the past. Whether looking from the self or observer perspective, punishment outcomes perceived to be consistent across individuals are perceived as more fair than outcomes that are more or less severe dependent upon who received them (Trevino, 1992).

As can be seen, research on procedural justice has identified several similar, but somewhat inconsistent findings. While Levanthal (1980) believed that procedural fairness must occur before distributive fairness can be established, Thibaut and Walker (1975) believed that procedural and distributive justices are distinct from each other. Thus, although procedural justice may often be a precursor for distributive justice, distributive justice may be achieved without a specific procedure (Folger & Greenberg, 1985).

Up to this point, the main focus of this review has been on identifying and reviewing organizational justice and its two major constructs, distributive and procedural justice. Attention will now shift to a review of punishment, as well as address the role that these constructs play in terms of punishment.

Punishment

When one hears the word punishment, negative thoughts and images typically come to mind. Although these negative connotations are typically associated with punishment, punishment is important in directing what one should and should not do. It is a common practice to use punishment, or a threat thereof, in organizational settings

(Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). Although other academic disciplines have focused attention on punishment, it has received relatively little attention from organizational researchers. Rather, organizational research has focused on positive rewards in attempts to change behaviors. However, Johnston (1972) indicated, no other procedure has empirical data suggesting it can provide "immediate, enduring, and generally effective" (pp. 1050-1051) effects as punishment does.

Punishment can be defined as "the presentation of an aversive event or the removal of a positive event following a response which decreases the frequency of that response" (Kazadin 1975, p.33, as cited in Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). That is, a relationship exists between a defined response and an aversive consequence. Punishment is not a random aversive stimulus, but rather it occurs as a direct result of an undesired action.

There are two circumstances under which punishment can occur (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). First, punishment can occur when an aversive event is presented after a response. Two forms of aversive stimuli are recognized. A *primary* aversive event is one that is inherently aversive in its nature, such as electric shock or loud noises. A *secondary* aversive event is one that is not aversive in nature, but becomes aversive through repetitive pairing with an aversive event such as, nods, gestures, and reprimands. A secondary aversive event is used for two purposes. First, it may decrease or punish the response that led to it occurring. Second, it may predict an aversive consequence if a specific response is performed. Other examples of aversive events are when responses lead to costs such as paying a fine. The second punishment circumstance is removing positive outcomes and/or reinforcements when an undesired response is made. Examples

under this circumstance include taking away privileges, not being considered for promotions, and being ignored (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980).

Effectiveness of Punishment

Although punishment has many negative connotations, punishing events naturally occur in many situations in our lives (Bandura, 1969, as cited in Ball & Sims, 1991). As Bandura pointed out, we learn from behaviors such as touching a hot stove and getting burned, or sliding when we drive too fast on icy roads. When we perform these behaviors and they are followed by a negative consequence, we quickly learn not to repeat these behaviors again, typically without enduring negative side effects. Outside of natural occurring events, such as in an organizational setting, there are several variables that affect punishment effectiveness. Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) identified six of these variables.

The first variable Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) identified is *timing of punishment*. Specifically, punishment can be presented while the punishable response is happening, or immediately following the response. Johnston (1972) and a variety of other researchers have suggested that punishment is most effective when it is delivered in close proximity to the undesired behavior. Therefore, it is in the organization's best interest not to wait any extended period of time to administer punishment for misconduct. The second variable is *intensity*. Relatively intense punishment has been shown to produce the greatest effectiveness in relation to an undesired behavior. Therefore, from an organizational standpoint, management should use relatively intense punishment from the beginning. Organizations typically do not take this approach and begin with mild disciplinary measures. Specifically, if an organization begins with weak punishment,

individuals are likely to adapt to the weak stimuli and continue exhibiting the undesired behavior (Parke & Walters, 1967 as cited in Arvey & Ivancevich). However, Parke and Walters indicated that if individuals believe that making a mistake will lead to a highly intense punishment, they may be affected with feelings of anxiety. Because of this, severe levels of punishment have the potential to reduce both undesirable and desirable behaviors. Arvey and Ivancevich recommended that the best route for organizations may be using moderate levels of intensity. The third variable is relationships with punishing agents. Arvey and Ivancevich proposed punishment will be more effective when the person administering the punishment has a friendly relationship with the employee being punished. The fourth variable, schedule of punishment, indicates how often punishment is applied following an aversive event. It could be on a *continuous schedule* where it occurs after every response or a variable or fixed ratio schedule where it occurs after a varied or fixed number of responses (Arvey & Ivancevich). While both methods are used by management, research has shown that punishment applied on a continuous schedule is most effective (Johnston). The fifth variable is provision of rationale. Punishment may be more effective when employees are provided with a clear rationale for why the punishment process occurred. On the same token, it should be communicated to individuals what will occur if the misconduct occurs again. Interestingly, Parke and Walters found that if a clear rationale was provided, low intensity punishment was as effective as intense punishment for changing behaviors. The sixth variable is alternative response available. If employees have alternative response options available, the effectiveness of punishment will be enhanced (Arvey & Ivancevich). Specifically, employees should be positively reinforced for choosing a desired alternative behavior.

Positive Outcomes Associated with Punishment

Punishment has been shown to enhance employee satisfaction, as long as it is applied in the correct manner (Podsakoff, 1984, as cited in Ball & Sims, 1991).

Punishment has been linked to greater job satisfaction and shown to provide role clarity for ambiguous situations (Sims, 1980). While these and other similar findings have shown that punishment can positively affect performance, the way in which it is administered is likely one of the greatest determinants of punishment success (Ball & Sims, 1991). If punishment is not administrated correctly undesired responses will likely result.

Disadvantages of Punishment

The idea of punishment has been a controversial concept in organizations. It was first highly criticized by Skinner (1938, as cited in Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980) when he stated that punishment was both ineffective and temporary. He went on to say that it actually lead to unwanted side effects (Arvey & Ivancevich). Because Skinner was highly respected, many accepted the notion of punishment being an ineffective method. At the time Skinner made these remarks, there was proof of the effectiveness of punishment, but it took almost twenty years since those statements were made for researchers to begin examining it (Arvey & Ivancevich).

Organizational research suggests several reasons for avoiding punishment. To begin with, it is believed that punishment may lead to undesired emotional and behavioral consequences for both the individual being punished and the punisher (Ball & Sims, 1991). A particular side effect would be the individual who was punished retaliating against the punisher. In this instance, they may act aggressively or try to sabotage the

punisher. They also may try to make the punisher look bad (Ball & Sims). If they do not try to retaliate directly against the punisher, the individual may have increased absenteeism or choose to simply leave the organization (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). These undesirable side effects are likely to be lessened by the use of systematically administered punishment (Ball & Sims). While organizational research has indicated these side effects, research from non-organizational settings has not supported these notions (Arvey & Ivancevich). Further data should be collected to determine whether these potential side effects really occur.

Another argument against the use of punishment is that it is inhumane and unethical. Individuals who believe this typically view punishment as reflecting "an eye for an eye" mentality (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980). The idea of getting back at another individual takes away from its expected outcome, reducing undesirable behavior, and thus promoting desirable future behavior. While retributive punishment likely may be unethical, punishment that is intended to be corrective in nature is likely ethical (Arvey & Ivancevich). Further rationale suggests that punishment does not actually eliminate undesirable behavior, but rather keeps it suppressed until the threat of punishment is no longer present. However, this rationale has been refuted by Johnston (1972), who argued that the effects of punishment are no more temporary than those of reward; rather, it is the role of the rewarder or punisher to continue the longevity of desired behaviors (Ball & Sims, 1991).

While punishment may have potentially negative side effects, Rimm and Masters (1974, as cited in Ball & Sims, 1991) have argued that the potential negative side effects that may occur if nothing is done may be more detrimental. As can be seen, the use of

punishment has the potential to modify behavior, despite its criticisms. However, the distribution of punishment will likely affect the individual being punished and those observing the punished behavior differently.

Effects of Punishment and Justice on the Individual

Although managers are cautioned about using punishment techniques, the negative side effects that are assumed to result have not been supported by evidence. Rather than completely discrediting all negative associations with punishment, Ball, Trevino, and Sims (1993) suggested that depending on perceptions of fairness of processes and outcomes, either positive or negative reactions may be produced. Side effects that are typically associated with punishment have been found to show a resemblance to reactions associated with justice (Ball et al.). Research supporting this finding was conducted by Mikula (1986, as cited in Ball et al.); participants who believed they had been unfairly treated showed emotional responses such as anger, rage, and indignation. Despite these findings, justice and punishment theory have remained separate entities. This is largely because justice research has focused on allocations of positive outcomes, while ignoring allocations of punishment. However, as Mikula stated, unfair punishments will frequently cause one to feel the experience of injustice.

Specifically, the concern of fair distribution of punishment can be linked to distributive justice. Ball indicated that employees who have been punished will evaluate the fairness of the punishment's intensity in relation to two things: (a) punishments others have received, and (b) the severity of the misconduct (Ball et al., 1993). Individuals are likely to believe that the principles behind distributive justice are not met if the comparison between one's own punishment and that of a similar other is perceived to be

inconsistent. Equity theory applies in these instances of punishment, as it is important that individuals believe they received a punishment that was merited by the infraction they committed (Ball et al.). Individuals who do not perceive the intensity of the punishment received as fair in relation to the severity of the violation may begin to reduce perceptions of the factors identified by Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) for effective punishment procedures. Specifically, *relationships with punishing agents*, which were proposed to impact perceptions of punishment such that punishment will be more effective when the punisher has a friendly relationship with the employee being punished, are likely to be impacted. Greer and Labig (1987) found this to be true when they studied employees' reactions to disciplinary actions. While individuals rated severe punishment as likely to reduce violations, the most severe punishment also was believed to damage the relationship between management and employees.

In relation to procedural justice, employees are likely to react to the processes used to make punishment decisions. As stated, unfavorable outcomes are perceived as more acceptable if the process leading to the punishment is thought to be fair (LaTour, 1978, as cited in Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1993). Fair procedures can be an important component for developing feelings of respect and dignity, as well as promoting a sense of community (Ball et al.).

Another dynamic that likely will affect subordinate perceptions of punishment is personality characteristics (Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1994). Personality traits are typically stable over time, and therefore are able to help explain differences in individual cognition and behavior. Ball et al. suggested two personality traits that are of particular relevance to punishment. The first of these is *belief in a just world*, that is, a belief that people will

preconceptions about the punishment that should occur for a given situation. Therefore, these individuals are most likely to view punishment as just. If they violate a rule or procedure they likely will expect to be punished, as they would deserve it according to a belief in the just world principle. Individuals who hold a rather low belief in a just world are likely to attribute blame to other individuals, the situation, or even fate if they are punished. They do not hold preconceptions about the punishment likely to occur for a given situation. Therefore, these individuals are most likely to view punishment as unjust. The second trait is *negative affectivity*. Individuals high in negative affectivity tend to focus on the negative aspects of all areas in their life, including themselves. Because these individuals have an ongoing negative interpretation of information, individuals high in this trait are likely to perceive punishment as just and equitable. Individuals low in this trait are likely to view punishment as less just and thus less equitable (Ball et al.).

One final factor that often affects disciplinary judgments is the extent to which an employee is valued by the organization. Research by Boise (1965, as cited in Rosen & Jerdee, 1974) found that supervisors were hesitant to impose punishment on an individual who had skills that were in high demand. Rosen and Jerdee (1974) conducted a study examining the organizational role an individual's value played in punishment decisions and found similar results. In their study, individuals in two different positions in the organization, a janitor and a vice president, received significantly dissimilar punishment for an identical violation presented in a hypothetical scenario. The janitor was punished much more severely than was the vice president. Other members of the organization outside of upper management were also punished more severely than the vice president.

Individuals who have greater value to the organization are viewed as less unethical and are perceived as committing a less serious infraction for the exact same violation as a dissimilar other (Rosen & Jerdee).

While an individual's perception of justice in relation to punishment is clearly important, others are likely to be affected by the punishment as well. This effect was demonstrated in a study by Butterfield, Trevino, and Ball (1996), who found that supervisors see punishment as having an effect on others beyond the punished violator. *Effects of Punishment on Observers*

Long ago, punishment was deliberately administered for public viewing (Pinder, 2008). In today's society, when one thinks of punishment, he or she will most likely focus on the individual(s) who actually received the punishment. However, not unlike traditional viewings of punishment, individuals in organizational settings often witness punishment and disciplinary actions. Trevino (1992) defines observes as "individuals in the relevant social context who take an interest in the punishment of a co-worker (pg. 1)." Watching a co-worker being punished will likely have an effect on the observer. This leads us to the question Pinder asked, "What are the effects on other people of the administration of organizational discipline and punishment (p. 347)?"

Viewing the administration of punishment can actually prove useful as it relates to social learning, modeling, and vicarious punishment for observers (Pinder, 2008). Arvey and Jones (1985, as cited in Trevino, 1992) suggested that social learning was a key element of organizational punishment. In the organizational context, proof of this can be seen in a study by Schnake (1986, as cited in Trevino) in which observers saw another worker receive a pay reduction for low output. Results showed that observers in this

condition increased their work output more than observers in conditions where a co-worker was threatened with punishment or no punishment was threatened. One valuable conclusion that can be drawn from this is that both punishment and non-punishment are likely to affect observers' subsequent misconduct (Trevino). One final component associated with social learning theory states that individuals are most likely to learn from another individual being punished if they believe the supervisor is both credible and attractive, and the extent to which they believe they are similar to the individual being punished (Bandura, 1986, as cited in Trevino).

Deterrence theory also can explain the impact of punishment on observers. Meier and Johnson (1977) argued that under deterrence theory individuals are likely to be deterred from misconduct because of perceived risks associated with the misconduct. This underlies the idea that individuals will do whatever they can to maximize rewards and minimize costs. In terms of the organization, if an individual expects a certain punishment for a particular action and that punishment is severe enough that it outweighs the reward of doing that action, then the person likely will not commit that action (Trevino, 1992). Organizational literature on punishment severity in relation to punishment expectancy has shown that observers are only influenced by severe punishments of misconduct. Therefore, to gain the attention of observers, severe punishments will likely need to be imposed (Trevino).

Trevino's (1992) findings suggested that observers' evaluations of punishment outcomes often depend upon their evaluation of the manager (or punisher) as being just or unjust. In relation to distributive justice, Trevino suggested two ways in which observers can evaluate fairness of punishment outcomes as just or unjust: (1) *severity*

appropriateness and (2) consistency. In severity appropriateness, observers are able to evaluate the punishment in relation to the misconduct. This has proved troublesome, as the evaluation is based on an observer's own belief as to what punishment would fit that particular violation. Guidelines have been developed to help set specific contingencies that should be considered before deciding on the severity of a punishment (Redeker, 1984, as cited in Trevino, 1992). Commonalities across disciplines have found that observers prefer certain punishment. Specifically, observers prefer severe punishment, typically more severe than that actually given (Blumstein & Cohen, 1980). This implies that although there are guidelines to follow, the way in which observers and punishers are interpreting them are quite different. It was suggested that one potential explanation for this is the difference in expected goals that are hoped to be accomplished by the punishment. Further research should be conducted to determine why observers may prefer harsher punishment (Trevino). With consistency, an observer evaluates fairness in relation to social comparisons. Related specifically to equity theory, an individual would equate a similar past violation and its punishment in relation to the current violation and its punishment. If these comparisons lead the individual to believe no one individual was given a harsher or lenient punishment, then it will be perceived as just (Trevino).

From a procedural justice standpoint, observers would view the punishment outcome fair as long as the process used to determine it was also perceived as fair (Trevino, 1992). Lind and Tyler (1988) suggested a group-value model. This model assumes that individuals value their social groups and therefore are concerned with maintaining relationships with its members. Specifically, individuals are concerned with neutral treatment of group members, trust within leadership, and their social status within

the group context (Trevino). Group members are particularly concerned with fair processes being used, because it is the belief that all members of the group will benefit from this treatment. On the other hand, unfair treatment of one individual in the group would potentially be harmful to all other members in that group. Future research on procedural justice in relation to observers is necessary, as most current studies have been concerned with individuals actually receiving the punishment.

Ball et al. (1994) suggested several positive implications for punishment's effects on observers. Specifically, they indicated punishment's role in promoting group norms, showing individuals what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behaviors, deterring misconduct, and creating perceptions of an organization and its management as being just or unjust. As we have seen, individuals' perceptions of fairness are greatly influenced by the extent to which they believe punishment is distributed consistently, and the punishment level of severity.

The majority of the aforementioned research has focused on organizational justice and punishment from an organizational standpoint; next, the review will focus on punishment in a team sport setting.

Organizational Justice in a Team Sport Setting

Sport teams and organizations share many similar characteristics, as coaches play the role of management and players the role of employees (Chelladurai, 2001). In order to institute a formal management structure, Bridges and Roquemore (2000) identify three criteria that must be met: (a) an organization is established, (b) the established organization sets clearly defined goals and objectives, and (c) there is a hierarchal structure within the organization (i.e., all members are not of equal stature). These criteria

can be applied to the athletic team in the sense that sport teams are typically a segment of a larger organization, such as a university or athletic department. Because of this, they are subject to both internal and external rules and policies. It is also the norm for teams to establish clear-cut goals of what they would like to accomplish as a whole and individual goals for each member on the team, which satisfies the second criteria, establishing clearly defined goals and objectives. A hierarchal structure can be seen, as there are often multiple coaches (e.g., head coach, assistant coach) who are ultimately in charge of the players. Jordan et al. (2004) recognized that in addition to structural components, there are also common skill components between coaches and management. Coaches and managers must be able to lead their team, as well as understand how they can help their members develop.

When organizational justice principles are applied to a sport team by a coach, team members will likely demonstrate improved attitudes and behaviors (Jordan et al., 2004). These new attitudes and behaviors will likely lead to increased performance, commitment to the team, satisfaction with the team, team unity, and an increase in enjoyment for the activity in which members are participating (Chelladurai, 2001). However, just as in the organizational setting, being perceived as fair can prove challenging. In relation to distributive justice, there are many favorable outcomes, such as playing time or being assigned team captain, a player can receive. However, it may be the case that a player does not believe that his or her outcomes are fair in relation to their inputs. In these instances, the player may demonstrate detrimental behaviors and attitudes that will likely affect the entire team. Players will compare their outcomes to both what they believe they contribute and thus should receive, as well as their outcomes in relation

to other team members. Therefore, not establishing a sense of fairness will affect productivity whether in a traditional organization or a sport team. Just as important as outcomes are the policies and procedures used to decide them (Jordan et al.). As in the organizational setting, procedural justice can help to appease an individual's unfavorable outcomes, as long as the decision used to decide the outcome is perceived as fair (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). Player's negative perceptions of outcomes can be offset by the notion that if they work harder good things will come. Even if current outcomes may not reflect a players expected outcomes, knowing that there is a fair procedure in place will lead them to believe their outcomes are attainable in the future if they continue to work hard (Jordan et al.). As discussed, the athletic setting shares many similar characteristics to an organizational setting. Thus, sports teams fit well in the dynamics of organizational justice.

In the traditional sense, teams are made up of coaches and players. However, there are other individuals who view themselves as an integral component to a team's make-up. As will be seen, fans, specifically highly identified ones, view a team as an extension of themselves.

Sports Fans and Team Identification

The way in which a sport fan reacts to a situation involving the team he or she supports is influenced by the degree to which they identify with and are committed to that team (Wann & Pierce, 2003). Sport fans can be identified as individuals who have an interest in and follow a sport, athlete, or team. This definition leaves out a subgroup of individuals who may not necessarily be interested in a sport or particular team, but nonetheless are watching or listening to a game; these individuals are referred to as sport

spectators (Wann, 1997). Both fans and spectators are present at sporting events. However, the way they identify with a team will likely vary significantly.

Team identification is a psychological association an individual feels with a team (Wann, 1997). Fan identification can be categorized into two levels: those highly identified and those with low identification. Specific differences exist between the two categories. Highly identified fans feel a psychological connection with teams they support; thus, they view the team as an extension of themselves. They invest much time, effort, and money to remain knowledgeable about their team. Therefore, their team's performance will likely affect their own self-concept. Because the team's successes and failures are important to them, highly indentified fans attempt to influence the outcome of games by shouting supporting remarks to players on their team and derogatory remarks towards their opponents (Wann, Hunter, Ryan, & Wright, 2001). These individuals also feel people who share their association with a sport team are better than those who support rival teams (Wann). While low identified fans may feel some sense of connection with a team, it is to a much lesser degree.

Highly identified fans are likely to remain loyal to their team regardless of performance, and they will often blame failures on bad luck or poor officiating skills. However, stellar performance is described as the result of great skill and effort (Wann, Koch, Knoth, Fox, Aljubaily, & Lantz, 2006). As shown by Wann (1997), even highly identified fans will disconnect from a team if they believe events occurring outside of the playing field are leading to the demise of the sport as a whole. A low identified fan may distance himself or herself from a team that begins to consistently lose. This can often be seen in the way in which a low identified fan will describe a win or loss; "We won,"

"They lost." This is an easy break for low identified fans as they have invested minimum time, money, and effort.

Implications for the Present Study

One need not look far to find current examples of rule violations in athletic settings. In December of 2008, Syracuse University's starting point guard and third leading scorer, Eric Devendorf, was accused of allegedly hitting a female student in the face. The judicial board originally ruled that this was a violation of the Student Code of Conduct and that he would be suspended for the rest of the academic year (Associated Press, 2008). This would have prevented him from continuing to play on the basketball team. However, after appealing the ruling, Devendorf was given 40 hours of community service at Syracuse's Rescue Mission where he served food and washed dishes on Christmas (Waters, 2008). Devendorf ended up missing only two games.

Another violation occurred at Florida State University in December of 2007. Twenty-three FSU football players were suspected of cheating on an online final and suspended from playing in the Music City Bowl as well as missing the first three games of the 2008 season. Players were allegedly given answers as they took the test by academic tutors. Although the roster containing individuals' names that were still eligible to play did not specify why each of the 23 players would not be playing, it can be inferred that many of them were not present due to the cheating scandal. Eleven of the suspended players had started at some time for the team (Schlabach, 2007).

The degree to which players are disciplined will likely have an effect on how successfully the team performs. If team members perceive the punishment of teammates to be unfair, it will likely have a negative impact on subsequent discretionary behavior.

Likewise, punishments distributed consistently will be viewed as more fair (Shoenfelt & Bucur, 2002).

Summary of Literature

Organizational justice is undoubtedly an integral component of any successful organization. The premise behind organization justice is that individuals perceive their organization as treating them fair. As such, members of the organization will show increased commitment to the organization, have greater job satisfaction, and feel an allegiance with their supervisors. The two components of organizational justice addressed in the current study are distributive and procedural justice. Both of these address distinct, yet central components of perceptions of fairness by the workforce. Equity theory gave reference to distributive justice before it was recognized as a construct in organizational justice. Under equity theory, individual's outcomes should be proportional to their inputs and in relation to a similar other. Outcomes are typically thought of as being positive; however, negative outcomes such as punishment are also a common outcome. The effects of punishment do not stop with the individual being punished, but likely affect all those surrounding them.

Although in the traditional sense, an athletic team setting may seem to differ significantly from the setting of a traditional organization, there is substantial overlap between the two. Many roles are analogous: the roles of upper management and coaches, employees and players, and fans and observers. As such, it can be inferred that the principles of organizational justice may apply across domains. The way in which one identifies with a specific individual, in relation to a star player on a sport team or a coworker, will likely affect the extent to which one believes rewards and punishments are

being distributed fairly. Whether we are looking in an organization or on the playing field, rewards and punishments have been shown to reinforce desired behavior and deter undesirable behaviors.

The Present Study

The present research study examined whether previous empirical findings from organizational research apply to sport teams and fan perceptions. A previous application to sport teams by Shoenfelt and Bucur (2002) suggested that applying consistent punishment to all members of a team, including the star player, is perceived as more fair. They also found that punishment applied for severe violations was perceived to be more fair than punishment for moderate violations; and that severe punishment is more likely than moderate punishment to deter the punished athlete and teammates from future misconduct. Furthermore, Shoenfelt and Clark's (2002) findings suggested that autocratic procedures used to apply severe punishment were viewed as significantly less fair than were participative decisions.

Specific questions addressed in this study were, first, what factors influence perceptions of fairness in team disciplinary settings? What role does the perceived fairness to the punished team member, other teammates, and to the fans play? Was the procedure used fair? Second, what factors influence the ability of punishment to deter future misconduct of both the punished team member and other teammates?

This study addressed these questions by utilizing hypothetical scenarios that involved the effects of two levels of consistency of punishment (consistent and conditional), two levels of severity of violation (moderate and severe), two levels of severity of punishment (moderate and severe), and two levels of decision making (coach and team captains) in a sports team setting. Consistent punishment was operationalized as all team members receiving the same punishment for a given violation. Conditional

punishment was operationalized as the star player receiving an exception to the prescribed punishment. The following hypotheses were tested:

Hypothesis 1a: Punishment consistent with team rules will be perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than will conditional punishment.

Hypothesis 1b: Consistent punishment will be more likely to deter future violations by the punished athlete than will conditional punishment.

Hypothesis 1c: Consistent punishment will be more likely to deter future violations by teammates than will conditional punishment.

Hypothesis 2: Punishment for severe violations will be perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than will punishment for moderate violations.

Hypothesis 3a: Severe punishment will be perceived as less fair to teammates than will moderate punishment.

Hypothesis 3b: Severe punishment will be perceived as less fair to fans than will moderate punishment.

Hypothesis 3c: Severe punishment will be more likely to deter future rule violations by the punished athlete than will moderate punishment.

Hypothesis 3d: Severe punishment will be more likely to deter future rule violations by teammates than will moderate punishment.

Hypothesis 4a: Autocratic procedures will be perceived as less fair to the punished athlete than will participative procedures.

Hypothesis 4b: Autocratic procedures will be perceived as less fair to teammates than will participative procedures.

Hypothesis 5: There will be a negative relationship between fan identification and perceived fairness of severe punishment (i.e., SSIS will be negatively correlated with fairness of severe punishment).

This study was approved by the Western Kentucky University Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB). The HSRB Approval form may be found in Appendix A.

Method

Participants

Students enrolled at a mid-sized southeastern university and nonstudents from the community participated in this study. Participants included fans in attendance at several university athletic events and students in psychology courses. An initial sample of 379 participants completed the scenario-based questionnaire. Four items for each scenario on the questionnaire served as a manipulation check to ensure the participants understood the scenario. The data for any scenario where participants failed the manipulation check were not used in the analyses. Responses were not used from any participant who failed the manipulation check on three or four of their scenarios. The final sample consisted of 354 participants who passed the manipulation check for at least one scenario. Participant age ranged from 18 to 78 years old, with an average age of 25.84 years (SD = 11.78). Of the 354 participants, 35.4% were male and 64.6% were female; 88.6% were students and 11.4% were nonstudents. The majority were white (90%); 6.5% were African American; 1.8% listed Other as their ethnicity; 1.2% were Hispanic; and .6% were Asian.

Design and Instrument

A 2 (Consistency of Punishment: consistent vs. conditional) x 2 (Violation Severity: moderate vs. severe) x 2 (Punishment Severity: moderate vs. severe) x 2 (Decision Maker: head coach vs. team captains) factorial design was used to test Hypotheses 1-4. A correlation was calculated to test Hypothesis 5.

The instrument used for this research may be found in Appendix B. The first page of the instrument contained items assessing demographic data and the Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS). The SSIS contained seven self-report items rated on an

8-point graphic rating scale (1-low, 8-high; scale anchors vary depending on the item). The SSIS has been shown to have sound psychometric properties (Wann & Branscombe, 1993). Wann and Branscombe assessed internal consistency and found Cronbach's standardized reliability coefficient to be .91, indicating all of the items are measuring one underlying construct. The average item-total correlation was .59. The instructions for the SSIS asked participants to identify their favorite sports team and to answer the SSIS items in relation to that team. SSIS scores, which indicated participant identification with their favorite sport team, ranged from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 56, with higher scores indicating stronger identification. In the current study, the average SSIS score was 36.48 (*SD*= 13.48).

Perceptions of justice and the effects of punishment were measured using a questionnaire consisting of a hypothetical scenario and eleven items (see Appendix B). In total, 16 scenarios representing each of the cells created by the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design were used. SSIS is not represented in the scenarios. Each participant responded to four scenarios. Scenarios were blocked in groups of four such that both levels of each dependent variable were represented in each block. Random assignment was used to determine which block of scenarios participants received. The scenarios represented a star intercollegiate athlete from a fictional university committing a violation of a team rule and receiving punishment from a decision maker, either the head coach or the team captains. The punishment implemented in the scenario was either conditional for the star player or consistent with team rules. Conditional punishment indicated making an exception to the rules for key athletes, while consistent punishment indicated the same treatment for all team members.

The punishments and violations in the scenario were selected from a list of punishments and violations calibrated in a stimulus-centered rating study (Specht, 2000). A list of 17 infractions and 11 punishments was given to students, athletes, and coaches at three universities. These participants rated the infractions and punishments on a five point severity scale ($1 = not \ severe \ to \ 5 = extremely \ severe$).

Violation ratings demonstrated acceptable inter-rater reliability ($r_{coaches/athletes} = .92$; $r_{coaches/students} = .79$; $r_{students/athletes} = .82$). However, there were differences between groups in ratings of severity of violation, F(2, 48) = 6.35, p < .01. Tukey's post hoc analysis indicated coaches rated the violations as more severe (M = 4.13; SD = .54), then did athletes (M = 3.34; SD = .69); student ratings did not differ (M = 3.64; SD = .71) from either coaches or athletes. Punishment ratings demonstrated high inter-rater reliability ($r_{coaches/athletes} = .95$; $r_{coaches/students} = .95$; $r_{students/athletes} = .94$). No differences were found between groups in ratings of severity of punishment, F(2, 30) = .012, p > .01, n.s.: M = 2.78, SD = .92.

Based on mean ratings, the severe punishment selected for use in the current study was dismissal from the team, and the moderate punishment selected was suspension from practice. The severe punishment was rated as most severe across participants, and the moderate punishment was selected because it was judged to be closest to midrange and received the median rating for punishment. The severe violation selected was failing a drug test while the moderate violation selected was unexcused, late to practice. The severe violation was rated as most severe across participants, and the moderate violation was used because its rating was the closest to the middle rating on the scale.

The first four items on the questionnaire served as a manipulation check to ensure the participants understood basic information regarding the scenario. Specifically, the manipulation check items asked which rule was violated, what punishment was implemented, if the punishment was in accordance with team rules, and who decided on the punishment to be implemented. These four items were answered with fill-in-the-blank or yes/no responses. The seven remaining items addressed the following: whether or not the actual punishment was fair to the athlete who violated the rule and to the other team members, whether the procedure used to determine the actual punishment was fair to the athlete who violated the rule and to other team members, and whether the punishment implemented would deter the athlete who violated the rule and other team members from violating the same rule or similar rules in the future. For the final seven items, participants were asked to rate their agreement on a five point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Although it is recommended that multiple-item measures be used to assess complex constructs (Loo, 2002), single-item measures also are acceptable to assess some constructs. A literature search yielded no information regarding single-item measures for fairness constructs. However, a meta-analysis conducted by Wanous, Reichers, and Hudy (1997) evaluated single-item measures used to assess the construct of job satisfaction. Wanous et al. determined that the mean correlation between a single-item measure and a multiple-item measure for job satisfaction was .67, and the estimated reliability was at a reasonable level, between .63 and .69. Thus, the single-item measures were found to be reliable and valid for assessing job satisfaction. The construct of job satisfaction is similar to the justice constructs used in this study. Job satisfaction and

justice are similar constructs, because they both evaluate affective reactions to events in organizational settings. Thus, Wanous' findings should generalize to the measurement of justice. Additionally, Loo found support for using single-item measures in short, homogenous scales with high, internal consistency reliability. Furthermore, there are advantages for using single item measures. As Gorsuch and McPherson (1989, as cited in Loo, 2002) stated, they are quick and easy to use and can be given to numerous subjects.

Test-Retest Reliability

A pilot study was conducted using 21 Western Kentucky University graduate students and one Western Kentucky University professor to determine the length of time needed to complete the questionnaire and to identify potential problems with the instrument. Minor revisions were made to the questionnaire. The pilot participants completed eight scenarios on two occasions six weeks apart, providing data to assess test-retest reliability.

Coefficients of stability were calculated and may be found in Table 1. As seen in Table 1, reliabilities ranged from .69 to .89. Coefficients indicated an acceptable level of reliability for each item. Test-retest reliability was also estimated for three composites. The two items for Fairness of Discipline to Player and to Teammates were combined to form a Fairness of Discipline composite. The two items for Fairness of Process to Player and to Teammates were combined to form a Fairness of Process composite. The two items for Deterrence to Player and to Teammates were combined to form the Deterrence composite. Coefficients for composites may be found in Table 1. As seen in Table 1, reliabilities ranged from .80 to .91.

Table 1

Dependent Variable Coefficients of Stability

<u>Item</u>	Coefficient of Stability*				
1. Discipline Fair to Player	.82				
2. Discipline Fair to Teammates	.83				
3. Process Fair to Player	.69				
4. Process Fair to Teammates	.83				
5. Deter Player	.88				
6. Deter Teammates	.89				
Composite	Coefficient of Stability*				
1. Fairness of Discipline	.86				
2. Fairness of Process	.80				
3. Deterrence	.91				

^{*} N = 22, p < .01 for all coefficients

Procedure

Graduate students attended the designated athletic event or assigned class period and asked adult fans or students whether they were willing to complete a questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to respond to four scenarios administered as hard copies of the questionnaires. Participants were asked to read the informed consent preamble before completing the questionnaire. After reading the consent preamble, willing participants completed the demographic items, the SSIS, and the scenario items. Upon completion of the questionnaire, instruments were collected and participants were thanked for their contribution to the study.

Results

Bivariate correlations were calculated between the dependent variables. As seen in Table 2, all dependent variables were significantly correlated with each other.

Correlations between the dependent variables for perceptions of fairness of punishment and procedure fairness had higher magnitudes with each other than with the deterrence variables, while the dependent variables for perceptions of deterrence to future misconduct had higher magnitudes with each other then with the fairness variables.

Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficients for Dependent Variables

Item	М	SD	N^{a}	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Discipline Fair to Player	3.22	1.49	354	1.00						
2. Discipline Fair to Teammates	2.96	1.56	354	.77	1.00					
3. Discipline Fair to Team Fan	3.14	1.33	354	.71	.69	1.00				
4. Process Fair to Player	3.26	1.44	354	.81	.69	.67	1.00			
5. Process Fair to Teammates	3.04	1.50	354	.72	.84	.66	.79	1.00		
6. Deter Player	2.90	1.54	354	.55	.67	.42	.55	.64	1.00	
7. Deter Teammates	2.96	1.51	354	.57	.69	.42	.55	.66	.91	1.00

Note: All correlations are significant at p < .01.

The design of this study was a 2 (Consistency of Punishment: consistent vs. conditional) x 2 (Violation Severity: moderate vs. severe) x 2 (Punishment Severity: moderate vs. severe) x 2 (Decision Maker: head coach vs. team captains) factorial design.

^a Results were based on 354 participants who completed 1293 scenarios

The gender of the participant was added to the overall model. The dependent variables were perceptions of fairness of punishment to the punished player, teammates, and fans; perceptions of procedural fairness to the punished player and teammates; and perceptions of deterrence of future misconduct for the punished player and teammates. Univariate Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were conducted for each of the dependent variables to examine significant effects and to test the proposed hypotheses. As seven analyses were performed, a Bonferroni correction was calculated to adjust the alpha level of p < .05 to an alpha level of p < .007 to determine significance. Significant effects that accounted for less than 5% of the variance are reported, but not discussed. Only the effects that accounted for at least 5% of the variance in the dependent variable are discussed as results that account for less variance have little practical significance. Results will be discussed in the following order: perceptions of punishment fairness, perceptions of procedural fairness, and perceptions of deterrence to future misconduct. The relationship between fan identification and perceived fairness of punishment severity is discussed last. Justice Perceptions of Punishment Fairness to the Punished Athlete

The ANOVA table for justice perceptions of punishment fairness for the punished athlete may be found in Appendix C. Results revealed two significant main effects. First, in support of Hypothesis 1a which stated, punishment consistent with team rules would be perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than would conditional punishment, there was a significant main effect for consistency, F(1, 1292) = 941.31, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .43$. Results indicated that consistent distribution of punishment (M = 4.18, SD = 1.09) was perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than was conditional distribution of punishment (M = 2.27, SD = 1.19). Second, a significant main effect for punishment

severity was revealed, F(1, 1292) = 15.24, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that severe punishment (M = 3.09, SD = 1.47) was perceived as less fair than moderate punishment (M = 3.35, SD = 1.49) to the punished athlete; however, this effect accounted for only 1% of the explained variance. No other main effects were significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 which stated, punishment for severe violations will be perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than for moderate violations, was not supported, F(1, 1292) = 6.34, p = .01, $\eta^2 = .005$.

The ANOVA revealed three significant interactions. First, there was an interaction between violation severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 53.90, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .04$. Second, there was an interaction between punishment severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 21.10, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .02$. Third, there was a three way interaction between violation severity, punishment severity, and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 18.93, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .02$. These three interactions each accounted for less than 4% of the explained variance; thus, they have little practical significance.

Justice Perceptions of Punishment Fairness to Teammates

The ANOVA table for justice perceptions of punishment fairness for teammates may be found in Appendix C. Results revealed three significant main effects. First, a significant main effect for punishment severity supported Hypothesis 3a, which stated that severe punishment would be perceived as less fair to teammates than would moderate punishment, F(1, 1292) = 7.79, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that severe punishment (M = 2.87, SD = 1.52) was perceived as less fair than moderate punishment (M = 3.04, M = 3.04

the explained variance. Second, a significant main effect for consistency of punishment was revealed, F(1, 1292) = 1711.58, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .58$. Results indicated that consistent distribution of punishment to the punished athlete (M = 4.13, SD = 1.01) was perceived as more fair to teammates than was conditional distribution of punishment (M = 1.78, SD = .98). Finally, a significant main effect for decision maker was revealed, F(1, 1292) = 7.81, P < .01, P = .01. Results indicated that punishment decided by the coach (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57) was perceived as less fair than punishment decided by team captains (P = 1.57).

The ANOVA revealed three significant interactions. First, there was an interaction between violation severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 21.26, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .02$. Second, there was an interaction between punishment severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 16.46, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Third, there was a three way interaction between violation severity, punishment severity, and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 12.44, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. These three interactions each accounted for less than 2% of the explained variance; thus, they have little practical significance.

Justice Perceptions of Punishment Fairness to Team Fans

The ANOVA table for justice perceptions of punishment fairness for team fans may be found in Appendix C. Results revealed two significant main effects. First, a significant main effect for punishment severity supported Hypothesis 3b, which stated that severe punishment would be perceived as less fair to fans than would moderate punishment, F(1, 1292) = 13.98, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that severe

punishment (M = 3.01, SD = 1.33) was perceived as less fair than moderate punishment (M = 3.27, SD = 1.32) to team fans. However, this effect accounted for only 1% of the explained variance. Second, a significant main effect was revealed for consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 374.85, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .23$. Results indicated that consistent distribution of punishment (M = 3.76, SD = 1.18) was perceived as more fair to team fans than was conditional distribution of punishment (M = 2.52, SD = 1.17).

The ANOVA revealed four significant interactions. First, there was an interaction between violation severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 38.41, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .03$. Second, there was an interaction between punishment severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 16.30, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Third, there was a three way interaction between violation severity, punishment severity, and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 16.19, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Finally, there was a four way interaction between punishment severity, consistency of punishment, decision maker, and gender, F(1, 1292) = 9.46, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. These four interactions each accounted for less than 4% of the explained variance; thus, they have little practical significance. *Justice Perceptions of Procedural Fairness to the Punished Athlete*

The ANOVA table for justice perceptions of procedural fairness to the punished athlete may be found in Appendix C. Results revealed two significant main effects. First, a significant main effect was found for punishment severity, F(1, 1292) = 7.76, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that processes resulting in severe punishment (M = 3.17, SD = 1.43) were perceived as less fair than processes resulting in moderate punishment (M = 3.35, SD = 1.44) to the punished athlete; however, this effect accounted for less than 1% of the explained variance. A second significant main effect was found for consistency of

punishment, F(1, 1292) = 782.10, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .38$. Results indicated that consistent punishment processes (M = 4.15, SD = 1.02) were perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than were conditional punishment processes (M = 2.37, SD = 1.22). No other main effects were significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4a, which stated that autocratic procedures would be perceived as less fair to the punished athletes than would participative procedures, was not supported, F(1, 1292) = .03, p = .85.

The ANOVA revealed two significant interactions. First, there was an interaction between violation severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 17.07, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Second, there was a three way interaction between punishment severity, consistency of punishment, and decision maker, F(1, 1292) = 7.26, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. These interactions each accounted for only 1% of the explained variance; thus, they have little practical significance.

Justice Perceptions of Procedural Fairness to Teammates

The ANOVA table for justice perceptions of procedural fairness for teammates may be found in Appendix C. Results revealed one significant main effect, for consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 1425.94, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .53$. Results indicated that consistent punishment processes (M = 4.13, SD = 1.00) were perceived as more fair to teammates than were conditional punishment processes (M = 1.95, SD = 1.05). No other main effects were significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4b, which stated that autocratic procedures would be perceived as less fair to teammates than would participative procedures, was not supported, F(1, 1292) = 4.65, p = .03.

The ANOVA revealed three significant interactions. First, there was an interaction between violation severity and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) =

10.91, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. Second, there was an interaction between consistency of punishment and decision maker, F(1, 1292) = 10.98, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. Third, there was an interaction between decision maker and gender, F(1, 1292) = 7.86, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. These interactions each accounted for only 1% of the explained variance; thus, they have little practical significance.

Perceptions of Deterrence to Future Misconduct for the Punished Athlete

The ANOVA table for perceptions of deterrence to future misconduct for the punished athlete can be found in Appendix C. Results revealed two significant main effects. First, in support of Hypothesis 1b, which stated consistent punishment would be more likely to deter future violations by the punished athlete than would conditional punishment, there was a significant main effect, F(1, 1292) = 1393.75, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .53$. Results indicated that consistent distribution of punishment (M = 4.02, SD = 1.06) was perceived as more likely to deter the punished athlete than was conditional punishment (M = 1.79, SD = 1.06). Second, a significant main effect for violation severity was revealed, F(1, 1292) = 16.58, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that punishment for moderate violations (M = 3.05, SD = 1.56) were more likely to deter future violations by the punished athlete than was punishment for severe violations (M = 2.76, SD = 1.51); however, this effect accounted for only 1% of the explained variance. No other main effects were significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3c, which stated that severe punishment would be more likely to deter future rule violations by the punished athlete than would moderate punishment, was not supported, F(1, 1292) = 2.38, p = .12. The ANOVA revealed no significant interactions.

Perceptions of Deterrence to Future Misconduct for Teammates

The ANOVA table for perceptions of deterrence to future misconduct for teammates can be found in Appendix C. Results revealed three significant main effects. First, in support of Hypothesis 1c, which stated that consistent punishment would be more likely to deter future violations by teammates than would conditional punishment, there was a significant main effect, F(1, 1292) = 1535.19, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .55$. Results indicated that consistent distribution of punishment (M = 4.09, SD = 1.00) was perceived as more likely to deter teammates than was conditional punishment (M = 1.84, SD =1.03). Second, in support of Hypothesis 3d, which stated that severe punishment would be more likely to deter future rule violations by teammates than would moderate punishment, there was a significant main effect, F(1, 1292) = 12.22, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that severe punishment (M = 3.07, SD = 1.54) was perceived as more likely to deter future rule violations by teammates than was moderate punishment (M =2.85, SD = 1.48). However, this effect accounted for less than 2% of the explained variance and has little practical significance. Third, a significant main effect was revealed for violation severity, F(1, 1292) = 8.84, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. Results indicated that moderate violations (M = 3.07, SD = 1.53) committed by the punished athlete were more likely to deter future violations by teammates than were severe violations (M = 2.85, SD= 1.50); however, this effect accounted for less than 1% of the explained variance.

The ANOVA revealed one significant interaction, a three way interaction between violation severity, punishment severity, and consistency of punishment, F(1, 1292) = 9.04, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .01$. This interaction has little practical significance as it accounted for less than 1% of the explained variance.

Fan Identification and Perceptions of Fairness for Severe Punishment

Data for severe punishment scenarios only were used to calculate correlations between SSIS score and three dependent variables: justice perceptions of fairness to the punished athlete (r = .07), justice perceptions of fairness to teammates (r = .03), and justice perceptions of fairness to team fans (r = .02). None of these correlations were significant. Thus, Hypothesis 5, which stated that there would be a negative relationship between fan identification and perceived fairness for severe punishment, was not supported.

Additionally, data for all scenarios were used to correlate the SSIS score with each dependent variable. Results indicated a significant correlation between the SSIS score and justice perceptions of procedural fairness to the punished athlete, r = .06, p < .05; however, the correlation has little practical significance as it accounted for less than 1% of the explained variance. No other correlations reached significance. A table of the SSIS and dependent variable correlation coefficients may be found in Appendix D.

Discussion

Research on organizational justice has examined perceptions of justice and fairness in the workplace. Scant prior research has explored the constructs associated with organizational justice in relation to the team setting. Shoenfelt and Bucur (2002) found that consistent punishment applied to all members of a team, including the star player, was perceived as more fair than was conditional treatment for the star player. They also found that punishment applied for severe violations was perceived to be more fair than for moderate violations and that severe punishment was most likely to deter both the punished athlete and teammates from future misconduct. Further, Shoenfelt and Clark's (2002) findings suggested that autocratic procedures used to determine severe punishment were viewed as significantly less fair than were participative decisions. The present study examined these same factors in relation to perceptions of fairness and likely deterrence. Procedural and distributive justice principles were applied to an intercollegiate sport team setting by manipulating consistency of punishment, violation severity, punishment severity, and decision maker. The present study dealt with fan perceptions whereas the Shoenfelt studies dealt with perceptions of athletes. The discussion is arranged in the order of hypotheses and additional findings based on consistency of punishment; the hypothesis based on violation severity; hypotheses based on punishment severity; hypotheses based on perceptions of procedural fairness; and finally, the hypothesis based on the relationship between fan identification and perceived fairness of punishment severity.

Consistency of Punishment

Hypothesis 1a, which stated that punishment consistent with team rules would be perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than conditional punishment, was supported. Consistent with findings from Shoenfelt and Bucur (2002), the current results suggested that punishment was perceived to be more fair to the punished athlete (i.e., a star player) when he or she received punishment that was consistent with the team rules. Giving the star player preferential treatment was perceived as less fair to that player. Although not hypothesized, main effects for consistency also were found for the two other dependent variables, perceptions of punishment fairness to teammates and perceptions of punishment fairness to fans. Results indicated that punishment is perceived to be more fair to teammates and fans when the star player received punishment that was consistent with the team rules. Furthermore, these main effects explained substantial variance in the dependent variables (i.e., for fairness of punishment to the athlete $\eta^2 = .43$; for fairness to teammates $\eta^2 = .58$; and for fairness to fans $\eta^2 = .23$).

Hypothesis 1a was based on the principles of equity theory (Adams, 1965), but the main effects for perceptions of punishment fairness to teammates and fans also can be explained by equity theory. According to equity theory, consistency is a determining factor in the social comparison process in which an individual evaluates the equity of his or her outcomes in relation to those of a referent other. This same process occurs with individuals who observe others receiving outcomes, including punishment. Observers evaluate whether the punished individual was treated similarly to others who committed a similar violation in the past. For example, Trevino (1992) found both individuals and observers perceived consistently applied punishment as more fair than punishment that

was more or less severe depending upon who received it. In the present study, participants perceived consistent punishment to be more fair than preferential treatment for the punished athlete, teammates, and team fans. These findings suggest that principles associated with consistency are important in fairness perceptions in an intercollegiate team setting, as they are in the organizational setting.

In the sport team setting, consistently administered punishment may be an important component in establishing effective punishment. Players will compare their outcomes to both what they believe they contribute and thus should receive, as well as their outcomes in relation to other team members. In instances where the player does not believe his or her outcomes are fair in relation to their inputs, the player may demonstrate detrimental behaviors and attitudes (Jordan et al., 2004). This is similar to findings from the organizational setting in which individuals may become angered or display other negative emotions because they do not believe punishment was administered consistently (Ball & Sims, 1991). Negative outcomes that can be expected from conditionally applied punishment can be prevented and replaced by positive outcomes that may be expected from consistently applied punishment. For example, when the principles that promote organizational justice are applied to a sport team by the coach, team members likely will demonstrate improved attitudes and behavior. These improved attitudes and behavior likely will lead to increased performance, commitment to the team, satisfaction with the team, team unity, and an increase in enjoyment for the activity in which members are participating (Chelladurai, 2001).

Hypothesis 1b, which stated that consistent punishment would be more likely to deter future violations by the punished athlete than would conditional punishment, was

supported. Results indicated that consistently distributed punishment was more likely to deter future misconduct by the punished athlete than was conditional punishment. Additionally, Hypothesis 1c, which stated that consistent punishment would be more likely to deter future violations by teammates than would conditional punishment, was supported. Results suggested that consistently distributed punishment was perceived as more likely to deter future misconduct by teammates than was conditional punishment. As with perceptions of fairness, consistency explained a substantial amount of the variance in perceived deterrence to both the athlete ($\eta^2 = .53$) and teammates ($\eta^2 = .55$).

Hypotheses 1b and 1c were based on the principles of deterrence theory.

According to deterrence theory, individuals are likely to be deterred from misconduct because of the perceived risks associated with the misconduct (Meier & Johnson, 1977).

The perceived risk (i.e., punishment) is intended to present an aversive event or remove a positive event following an unwanted response to decrease the likelihood that behavior will occur again. Both the punished athlete and other teammates must determine if the punishment associated with an infraction outweighs its potential benefit. If it does not, the punished athlete and observers (i.e., teammates), likely will be deterred from committing the violation in the future. The current findings support the primary objective of any punishment; that is, consistent punishment will deter future misconduct.

Trevino (1992) found in an organizational setting that co-workers who observed an individual being punished reported that they would be less likely to engage in a similar behavior. This vicarious effect of punishment may hold true regardless of the actual severity of the punishment. For example, Parke and Walters (1967, as cited in Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980) found that if a clear rationale was provided, low intensity punishment

was as effective as intense punishment. The current results indicated severe punishment was perceived as more likely to deter future rule violations by teammates than was moderate punishment, but the effect size was small. Thus, on a practical level, the current findings are consistent with those of Parke and Walters. Results from the current study indicated that if the rules clearly state the punishment for an infraction and that punishment is applied consistently regardless of a team member's status, a clear message is sent to both the punished athlete and other team members and is likely to deter future misconduct.

No hypotheses addressed consistency in relation to procedural fairness. However, main effects of consistency were found for perceptions of procedural fairness to the punished athlete as well as for perceptions of procedural fairness to teammates. Results suggested that consistent punishment processes are perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than were conditional punishment processes. Additionally, consistent punishment processes were perceived as more fair to teammates. These findings support the literature on procedural fairness that maintains that the means, or processes, by which the decision is determined is as important as the ends, or outcome, when determining perceptions of fairness (Jordan et al., 2004). Furthermore, consistently applied processes were identified by Levanthal (1980) as a necessary component for perceived fairness.

In sum, in a team setting there likely will be instances where rules are violated and discipline is administered. If the punished individual and observers perceive that a consistent process was used to determine punishment and that the punishment was consistently applied for all team members, they will be inclined to accept the punishment as fair. Perceptions of fairness are integral in establishing a sense of trust and respect,

which is important in any team setting and, perhaps, even more so in an athletic team setting where each member's contribution is essential to team success. All members of the team likely will benefit from the use of fair procedures; on the other hand, unfair punishment to any one member of the group may undermine perceptions of fairness for other team members.

Violation Severity

Hypothesis 2, which stated that punishment for severe violations would be perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than would punishment for moderate violations, was not supported. Results suggested that fans do not perceive punishment as more fair when it is for a severe violation than when it is for a moderate violation. A possible explanation for this finding is that, regardless of the severity of the violation, fans believed that violating any rule was against team policy and should be subject to punishment. If this were the case, it would be consistent with the just world principle (Ball et al., 1994), that is, the belief that people will receive the rewards and punishment they deserve. Individuals with this belief are likely to view punishment as just. If one violates a rule, they should expect to be punished regardless of the severity of the violation.

Punishment Severity

Hypothesis 3a, which stated that severe punishment would be perceived as less fair to teammates than would moderate punishment, was partially supported. Results indicated that severe punishment was seen as less fair than moderate punishment to teammates; however, this effect accounted for little of the variance in fairness perceptions and, as such, has little practical implication. Hypothesis 3b, which stated that severe

punishment would be perceived as less fair to fans than would moderate punishment, likewise was partially supported. Results indicated that severe punishment was seen as less fair than was moderate punishment to fans; however, this effect also accounted for little of the variance in fairness perceptions and, as such, has little practical implication.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b were based on the idea that severe punishment, in this case dismissal from the team, would be perceived as less fair to teammates and fans because the star player would no longer be able to contribute to the team's performance in competition, likely resulting in the team performing less well than when the star player was participating. In this situation, teammates would be negatively impacted because their team would perform at a lower level because of the star's absence. Likewise, fans who want the team to do well would be negatively impacted when the star is unable to participate. Boise (1965, as cited in Rosen & Jerdee, 1974) found that disciplinary decisions often are affected by the extent to which an employee is valued by the organization. Contrary to our expectations and to Boise's findings, fans in the current study reported that it was more fair to teammates and to fans to consistently administer punishment even when the punishment is severe and results in loosing the star player.

Hypothesis 3c, which stated that severe punishment would be more likely to deter future rule violations by the punished athlete than would moderate punishment, was not supported. Inconsistent with findings from Shoenfelt and Bucur (2002), the current results indicated that severe punishment was not a greater deterrent to future offenses than was moderate punishment. Hypothesis 3d, which stated that severe punishment would be more likely to deter future rule violations by teammates than would moderate punishment, was partially supported. This result is consistent with findings from

Shoenfelt and Bucur that suggested a player severely punished for committing a rule violation was more likely to deter other team members from committing future misconduct than a player who was moderately punished. In the current study, this effect explained little of the variance in deterrence and, as such, has little practical implication.

Hypotheses 3c and 3d were based on the principle of punishment, that is, the implementation of an aversive event will deter the same or similar event from reoccurring in the future. Results from the current study are inconsistent with the literature on punishment. For example, Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) indicated that relatively intense punishment has been found to produce the greatest effectiveness in deterring future misconduct. Likewise, Arvey and Jones (1985, as cited in Trevino, 1992) indicated that observers are likely to be deterred from committing an infraction if they witnessed another individual being punished for a similar behavior. Additionally, the extent to which the observers view the punished individual as similar to them will also increase deterrence. Therefore, it was surprising in the current study that severe punishment was not perceived as a greater deterrent than moderate punishment to future misconduct by the punished athlete and teammates.

Perceptions of Procedural Fairness

Hypothesis 4a, which stated that autocratic procedures would be perceived as less fair to the punished athlete than would participative procedures, was not supported. Thus, inconsistent with findings from Shoenfelt and Clark (2002), results from the current study suggested that outcomes determined by participative decision making (i.e., team captains) were not perceived as more fair to the punished athlete than were outcomes determined by autocratic decision making (i.e., coach). Additionally, Hypothesis 4b, which stated

that, autocratic procedures would be perceived as less fair to teammates than would participative procedures, was not supported. Also inconsistent with findings from Shoenfelt and Clark, the results from the current study suggested that outcomes determined by participative decision making (i.e., team captains) were not perceived as more fair to teammates than were outcomes determined by autocratic decision making (i.e., coach).

One explanation for this finding may be the hierarchal structure of the athletic team. Coaches hold the ultimate responsibility for all members of the team; they often are held responsible for the team success or failure. The structure of an athletic team may be more analogous to a military structure than to the typical organizational structure. In the military, autocratic decisions are the norm; low ranking soldiers do not expect to participate in most decisions. Similarly, athletes on a team likely expect the coach to make autocratic decisions in most situations. Accordingly, autocratic disciplinary decisions made by the coach are perceived as equally fair to athletes and teammates as decisions made by team captains.

Fan Identification and Perceived Fairness of Punishment Severity.

Hypothesis 5, which stated that there would be a negative relationship between fan identification and perceived fairness of severe punishment (i.e., SSIS will be negatively correlated with fairness of severe punishment), was not supported. In fact, fan identification was not related to fairness perceptions related to the punished athlete, teammates, or fans.

Highly identified fans view their team as an extension of themselves (Wann, 1997) and, as a result, the team's performance will likely affect the fan's self-concept.

This reasoning behind Hypothesis 5 was similar to that for Hypotheses 3a and 3b, that is, punishment that prevented the star player from participating (i.e., severe punishment) would be perceived as less fair than other punishment. It was expected that more highly identified fans would want the team to perform well more than less identified fans and the star player likely was key to this happening. Thus, regardless of the rule violated, highly identified fans would not want the star player to receive the severe punishment, dismissal from the team. However, this is not what was found in the current study. Fan identification was not related to perceptions of fairness. Interestingly, Wann indicated he would not expect any relationship between team identification and punishment severity (D. Wann, personal communication, February 28, 2009). Wann offered no specific explanation for his expectations, but they proved to be correct.

Implications

The present study has contributed to the research on the organizational justice constructs of procedural and distributive justice as they relate to punishment in an athletic team setting. This study examined the impact of consistency of punishment, violation severity, punishment severity, and decision making in relation to perceptions of punishment fairness, procedural fairness, and deterrence to future misconduct. The current findings indicated that consistent punishment is perceived by fans to be more fair than conditional punishment to the punished athlete, teammates, and fans. Consistent punishment also was perceived as more likely than conditional punishment to deter future violations by the punished athlete and teammates. The results suggested that severe punishment was perceived as less fair to teammates and fans than was moderate punishment; however, further research should be conducted to examine this dynamic as

this effect accounted for only a small amount of the variance in fairness perceptions. The results also suggested that severe punishment for committing a rule violation was more likely to deter other team members from committing future misconduct than was moderate punishment. However, again, this effect explained little of the variance in perceived deterrence of misconduct.

As was previously indicated, there frequently are instances of misconduct in intercollegiate athletic team settings. In some instances, star players are given preferential treatment. The present research indicated that inconsistencies in applying punishment based on status likely will have a negative effect on fairness perceptions in an athletic setting just as it does in an organizational setting. Intercollegiate athletics are unique in the sense that there are many outside observers, most notably fans, who pay close attention to athlete misconduct and its subsequent outcome. The current research indicated that, if coaches are interested in fan perceptions of fairness, punishment should be consistently applied according to team rules for all players regardless of their status on the team.

Concerns and Future Research

There are several potential limitations of the present study that should be noted. First, the majority of participants were students enrolled in introductory to psychology courses. Data also were collected from fans attending sporting events; however, fans comprised a relatively small part of the sample. Second, related to the first limitation, the fans that participated in the current study represented a range of fan identification as measured by the SSIS; thus, the participants in the current study might better be classified as spectators rather than fans (Wann, 1997). Third, participants responded to only four of

the 16 scenarios. There are two implications from this: (a) this was not a complete randomized design, and (b) participants may have become bored or fatigued as they completed the scenarios, introducing error into their responses. Fourth, some of the participants may not have fully understood the directions, or they may have failed to comprehend the situations presented in the scenarios. The manipulation check helped to ensure these problems did not affect the data as responses for 25 of the original 379 participants were discarded because they failed the manipulation check on three or four of their scenarios. Fifth, the current study used only two specific examples of violations and punishment. These examples were previously calibrated to ensure they represented severe and moderate punishment. Yet, it would be of interest to determine if the same results would be obtained using different examples of the specific violations and punishment included in the scenario. Finally, it would be of interest to conduct this study with a different sample of participants. Specifically, it would be interesting to determine if highly identified fans responded in the same manner as the range of spectators and fans in the current study. Future research also could examine the effect of participants reading the scenario as if it was happening to the star player of their favorite team, as indicated on the Sport Spectator Identification Scale.

Conclusion

The present study examined procedural and distributive justice outcomes of punishment in an athletic team setting. The results indicated that consistent punishment is perceived as more fair than conditional punishment to the punished athlete, teammates, and fans. Consistent punishment was perceived as more likely than conditional punishment to deter future misconduct by the punished athlete and teammates.

Findings indicating the importance of consistency to fairness perceptions are consistent with the organizational justice literature, and suggest that principles derived in traditional organizations may apply in athletic team settings. However, the current study did not find that severe punishment would be more likely to deter future misconduct by the punished athlete and teammates. This finding was inconsistent with the research literature on punishment.

Punishment plays an important role in organizations as it helps guide individuals in determining what acceptable and unacceptable behavior is. This guidance is useful in effective team functioning. The effectiveness of punishment relies heavily on perceptions of both the individual being punished and observers. Factors that influence perceptions of fairness play an important role in the effectiveness of discipline in an organizational setting. Accordingly, this line of research warrants further investigations.

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Appendix A

HSRB Approval



A LEADING AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WITH INTERNATIONAL REACH HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD

In future correspondence, please refer to HS09-165, March 19, 2009

Lauren Gruchala c/o Dr. Betsy Shoenfelt Psychology WKU

Lauren Gruchala:

Your research project, Fans Perceptions of Justice in Team Disciplinary Decisions, was reviewed by the HSRB and it has been determined that risks to subjects are: (1) minimized and reasonable; and that (2) research procedures are consistent with a sound research design and do not expose the subjects to unnecessary risk. Reviewers determined that: (1) benefits to subjects are considered along with the importance of the topic and that outcomes are reasonable; (2) selection of subjects is equitable; and (3) the purposes of the research and the research setting is amenable to subjects' welfare and producing desired outcomes; that indications of coercion or prejudice are absent, and that participation is clearly voluntary.

1. In addition, the IRB found that you need to orient participants as follows: (1) signed informed consent is not required; (2) Provision is made for collecting, using and storing data in a manner that protects the safety and privacy of the subjects and the confidentiality of the data. (3) Appropriate safeguards are included to protect the rights and welfare of the subjects.

This project is therefore approved at the Expedited Review Level until March 19, 2010.

2. Please note that the institution is not responsible for any actions regarding this protocol before approval. If you expand the project at a later date to use other instruments please re-apply. Copies of your request for human subjects review, your application, and this approval, are maintained in the Office of Sponsored Programs at the above address. Please report any changes to this approved protocol to this office. A Continuing Review protocol will be sent to you in the future to determine the status of the project. Also, please use the stamped from that accompanies this letter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Mooney, M.S.T.M. Compliance Manager Office of Sponsored Programs Western Kentucky University APPROVED A

EXEMPT EXPEDITED FU

DATE APPROVED 3/19/09

HSRB APPLICATION # 09-165

Appendix B

Data Collection Protocol

Western Kentucky University Preamble / Cover Letter

Project Title: Fan Perceptions of Justice in Team Disciplinary Decisions

Investigator: Lauren Gruchala, Department of Psychology, WKU

lauren.gruchala360@wku.edu

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Betsy Shoenfelt, Department of Psychology, WKU Phone:

745-4418

This letter is to inform you about consenting to serve as a participant in the research investigation entitled: Fan Perceptions of Justice in Team Disciplinary Decisions. The nature and general purpose of the study were explained to you by Lauren Gruchala, from the Psychology Department.

You should now understand the purpose of this research is to investigate fan perceptions of punishment in intercollegiate athletic team settings and that the research procedures involve a hypothetical, yet realistic scenario to be read with several questions following the scenario.

There are no potential risks to participants in the study.

You should now understand that your participation is voluntary, that all information is confidential, and your identity will not be revealed. You are free to withdraw consent and to discontinue participation in the study at any time without penalty; any questions you may have about the study will be answered by the researcher named above or by an authorized representative.

Western Kentucky University and the investigator named above have responsibility for ensuring that participants in research projects conducted under institutional auspices are safeguarded from injury or harm resulting from such participation. If appropriate, the person named above may be contacted for remedy or assistance for any possible consequences from such activities.

COMPLETION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE IMPLIES CONSENT.

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD
Paul Mooney, Compliance Coordinator
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652

FAN PERCEPTIONS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC TEAM FAIRNESS STUDY

Thank you in advance for your participation. This study focuses on fans perceptions of justice regarding team disciplinary decisions.

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION:

As researchers, we are sometimes interested in determining if certain groups respond differently (e.g., males vs. females, older vs. younger, football vs. basketball fans, etc.) To make these comparisons, we need you to complete the demographic information below. Your responses are anonymous (i.e., your name should *not* be recorded on this sheet). No individual responses will be reported; only overall/group responses will be reported.

Please complete the following demographic information. 1. Athletic Event Attending (e.g., WKU Football)								
2. Student Nonstudent 3. Gender:MaleFemale								
4. Age:Years 5. Ethnicity:African AmericanAsianHispanicWhit	teOther							
FAN INFORMATION: Please list YOUR FAVORITE SPORT TEAM on the line: in an individual sport such as auto racing or figure skating). Please be very descriptive in your response (e.g., the Atlanta following questions based on your feelings for the team you listed. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers.								an individual swer the
	Not impor	tant					V	ery important
1. How important to YOU is it that the team listed above wins?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2. How important is being a fan of the team listed above to YOU?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Not at all	a fan					Ve	ry much a fan
3. How strongly do YOU see YOURSELF as a fan of the team listed above?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
4. How strongly do your FRIENDS see YOU as a fan of the team listed above?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Never						Alı	nost everyday
5. During the season, how closely do you follow the team listed above via ANY of the following: a) in person/on television, b) on the radio, c) television news/newspaper, or d) the Internet?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Do not di	slike					Disl	ike very much
6. How much do you dislike the greatest rivals of the team listed above?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Never							Always
7. How often do YOU display the team's name or insignia at your place of work, where you live, or on your clothing?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

DIRECTIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING PAGES

The following pages contain 4 brief hypothetical, but realistic scenarios depicting a star intercollegiate athlete from a fictional university committing a violation of a team rule and receiving punishment. Each scenario is slightly different. Please *carefully* read each scenario and answer the questions that follow with your honest opinion. The researcher will then collect all of the questionnaires. Thank you for your participation in this important research!

Scenario: Chris is an intercollegiate athlete at State University. Chris is the star of the team and was selected all-conference for the last two seasons. Before the last game, Chris failed a drug test. The team rules state that the punishment for this type of team infraction is dismissal from the team. Because the rules are applied equally to all team members, the coach dismissed Chris from the team even though Chris is the star player.

Please answer the following 11 questions concerning the scenario. For the first 2 questions, fill in the blanks based on the information in the scenario.

1.)	In this situation what rule was violated?in the blank)	(fill
	In this situation what punishment was implemented?the blank)	(fill
3.)	Was the punishment in accordance with team rules? (circle one) No	Yes
4.)	Who decided what punishment should be implemented? (circle one) Team Captains	Coach
	r items 5 to 11, please respond by marking the answer to the right of the item that loresents your honest opinion. Please use the following scale.	oest

SD =**Strongly Disagree**

D = Disagree

N = Neutral

A =Agree

SA =**Strongly Agree**

Punishment can be viewed from 3 perspectives: from the perspective of the punished athlete, from the perspective of the other players on the team, and from the fan's perspective.

Mark your answers here

5.) In terms of <i>fairness to the player</i> who violated the rule, the disciplinary action was fair.	SD	D	N	A	SA
6.) In terms of <i>fairness to the player</i> who violated the rule, the process used to decide the disciplinary action was fair.	SD	D	N	A	SA
7.) In terms of <i>fairness to the rest of the team</i> , the disciplinary action was fair.	SD	D	N	A	SA
8.) In terms of <i>fairness to the rest of the team</i> , the process used to decide the disciplinary action was fair.	SD	D	N	A	SA
9.) In terms of <i>fairness to team fans</i> , the disciplinary action was fair.	SD	D	N	A	SA

10.) The discipline in this situation is likely to deter <i>future misconduct</i> by the athlete who committed the rule violation .	SD	D	N	A	SA
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Please answer the following 11 questions concerning the scenario. For the first 2 questions, fill in the blanks based on the information in the scenario.

1.) In this situation what rule was violated?in the blank)		(fill
2.) In this situation what punishment was implemented?in the blank)		(fill
3.) Was the punishment in accordance with team rules? (circle one)	No	Yes
4.) Who decided what punishment should be implemented? (circle one)	Team Captains	Coach

For items 5 to 11, please respond by marking the answer to the right of the item that best represents your honest opinion. Please use the following scale.

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Please answer the following 11 questions concerning the scenario.	For the first 2 questions, fill
in the blanks based on the information in the scenario.	

1.) In this situation what rule was violated? in the blank)	_(fill
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Mark vour	answers here
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Scenario: Chris is an intercollegiate athlete at State University. Chris is the star of the team and was selected all-conference for the last two seasons. Before the last game, Chris was <u>late to practice, unexcused</u>. The team rules state that the punishment for this type of team infraction is <u>dismissal from the team</u>. Because the <u>rules are applied equally</u> to all team members, <u>the coach dismissed</u> Chris from the team even though Chris is the star player.

Please answer the following 11 questions concerning the scenario. For the first 2 questions, fill in the blanks based on the information in the scenario.

1.) In this situation what rule was violated? in the blank)	(fill
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Appendix C

ANOVA Tables for Fairness of Punishment to Athlete, Fairness of Punishment to Teammates, Fairness of Punishment to Fans, Fairness of Procedure to Athlete, Fairness of Procedure to Teammates, Deterrence to Athlete, and Deterrence to Teammates

VioSev = Violation Severity PunSev = Punishment Severity Con = Consistency of Punishment DecMak = Decision Maker

Note: Abbreviations defined above are applicable to all Tables in Appendix C

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Justice Perceptions of Punishment Fairness to the Punished Athlete

Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Corrected Model 1370.441a 31 44.208 37.716 .000 Intercept 12909.439 1 12909.439 11013.658 .000 VioSev 7.434 1 7.434 6.342 .012 PunSev 17.857 1 17.857 15.235 .000 Con 1103.336 1 1103.336 941.308 .000 DecMak 3.208 1 3.208 2.737 .098 Gender 1.577 1 1.577 1.346 .246 VioSev * PunSev 6.628 1 6.628 5.655 .018 VioSev * PunSev 6.628 1 6.628 5.655 .018 VioSev * DecMak .930 1 .930 .793 .373 VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079		Type III Sum					Partial Eta
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PunSev 17.857 1 17.857 15.235 .000 Con 1103.336 1 1103.336 941.308 .000 DecMak 3.208 1 3.208 2.737 .098 Gender 1.577 1 1.577 1.346 .246 VioSev * PunSev 6.628 1 6.628 5.655 .018 VioSev * Con 63.183 1 63.183 53.904 .000 VioSev * DecMak .930 1 .930 .793 .373 VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 3.301 .257 .61	Intercept	12909.439	1	12909.439	11013.658	.000	.897
Con 1103.336 1 1103.336 941.308 .000 DecMak 3.208 1 3.208 2.737 .098 Gender 1.577 1 1.577 1.346 .246 VioSev * PunSev 6.628 1 6.628 5.655 .018 VioSev * Con 63.183 1 63.183 53.904 .000 VioSev * DecMak .930 1 .930 .793 .373 VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079 .000 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 <t< td=""><td>VioSev</td><td>7.434</td><td>1</td><td>7.434</td><td>6.342</td><td>.012</td><td>.005</td></t<>	VioSev	7.434	1	7.434	6.342	.012	.005
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VioSev * PunSev 6.628 1 6.628 5.655 .018 VioSev * Con 63.183 1 63.183 53.904 .000 VioSev * DecMak .930 1 .930 .793 .373 VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079 .000 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 <t< td=""><td>DecMak</td><td>3.208</td><td>1</td><td>3.208</td><td>2.737</td><td>.098</td><td>.002</td></t<>	DecMak	3.208	1	3.208	2.737	.098	.002
VioSev * Con 63.183 1 63.183 53.904 .000 VioSev * DecMak .930 1 .930 .793 .373 VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079 .000 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender 301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1	Gender	1.577	1	1.577	1.346	.246	.001
VioSev * DecMak .930 1 .930 .793 .373 VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079 .000 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * PunSev	6.628	1	6.628	5.655	.018	.004
VioSev * Gender .570 1 .570 .486 .486 PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079 .000 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * Con	63.183	1	63.183	53.904	.000	.041
PunSev * Con 24.707 1 24.707 21.079 .000 PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * DecMak	.930	1	.930	.793	.373	.001
PunSev * DecMak .098 1 .098 .083 .773 PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * Gender	.570	1	.570	.486	.486	.000
PunSev * Gender 4.146 1 4.146 3.537 .060 Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	PunSev * Con	24.707	1	24.707	21.079	.000	.016
Con * DecMak 4.075 1 4.075 3.476 .062 Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	PunSev * DecMak	.098	1	.098	.083	.773	.000
Con * Gender 5.951 1 5.951 5.077 .024 DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	PunSev * Gender	4.146	1	4.146	3.537	.060	.003
DecMak * Gender .301 1 .301 .257 .613 VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	Con * DecMak	4.075	1	4.075	3.476	.062	.003
VioSev * PunSev * Con 22.192 1 22.192 18.933 .000 VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	Con * Gender	5.951	1	5.951	5.077	.024	.004
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak 1.437 1 1.437 1.226 .268 VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	DecMak * Gender	.301	1	.301	.257	.613	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Gender .033 1 .033 .028 .867 VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * PunSev * Con	22.192	1	22.192	18.933	.000	.015
VioSev * Con * DecMak 3.051E-5 1 3.051E-5 .000 .996 VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * PunSev * DecMak	1.437	1	1.437	1.226	.268	.001
VioSev * Con * Gender .391 1 .391 .334 .564	VioSev * PunSev * Gender	.033	1	.033	.028	.867	.000
	VioSev * Con * DecMak	3.051E-5	1	3.051E-5	.000	.996	.000
VioSev * DecMak * Gender .001 1 .001 .001 .972	VioSev * Con * Gender	.391	1	.391	.334	.564	.000
	VioSev * DecMak * Gender	.001	1	.001	.001	.972	.000

PunSev * Con * DecMak	.378	1	.378	.322	.570	.000
PunSev * Con * Gender	1.054	1	1.054	.900	.343	.001
PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.169	1	.169	.144	.705	.000
Con * DecMak * Gender	.357	1	.357	.305	.581	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	2.439	1	2.439	2.081	.149	.002
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	.005	1	.005	.005	.946	.000
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	1.219	1	1.219	1.040	.308	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	3.779	1	3.779	3.224	.073	.003
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.044	1	.044	.038	.846	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.058	1	.058	.049	.825	.000
Error	1478.056	1261	1.172			
Total	16239.000	1293				
Corrected Total	2848.497	1292				

a. R Squared = .481 (Adjusted R Squared = .468)

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Justice Perceptions of Punishment Fairness to Teammates

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	1876.686 ^a	31	60.538	61.134	.000	.600
Intercept	10849.164	1	10849.164	10955.920	.000	.897
VioSev	.309	1	.309	.312	.576	.000
PunSev	7.713	1	7.713	7.789	.005	.006
Con	1694.899	1	1694.899	1711.577	.000	.576
DecMak	7.734	1	7.734	7.810	.005	.006
Gender	.366	1	.366	.370	.543	.000
VioSev * PunSev	3.768	1	3.768	3.805	.051	.003
VioSev * Con	21.051	1	21.051	21.258	.000	.017
VioSev * DecMak	.114	1	.114	.115	.735	.000
VioSev * Gender	1.802	1	1.802	1.820	.178	.001
PunSev * Con	16.303	1	16.303	16.464	.000	.013
PunSev * DecMak	.013	1	.013	.013	.909	.000
PunSev * Gender	2.825	1	2.825	2.853	.091	.002
Con * DecMak	2.370	1	2.370	2.393	.122	.002
Con * Gender	1.313	1	1.313	1.326	.250	.001
DecMak * Gender	2.240	1	2.240	2.262	.133	.002
VioSev * PunSev * Con	12.314	1	12.314	12.436	.000	.010
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak	.015	1	.015	.015	.901	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Gender	1.621	1	1.621	1.637	.201	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak	.251	1	.251	.254	.615	.000
VioSev * Con * Gender	.032	1	.032	.032	.858	.000
VioSev * DecMak * Gender	.028	1	.028	.028	.867	.000
PunSev * Con * DecMak	.539	1	.539	.545	.461	.000
PunSev * Con * Gender	.255	1	.255	.258	.612	.000
PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.795	1	.795	.803	.370	.001
Con * DecMak * Gender	.013	1	.013	.013	.910	.000

VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	.100	1	.100	.101	.751	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	1.280	1	1.280	1.292	.256	.001
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	2.001	1	2.001	2.021	.155	.002
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	1.728	1	1.728	1.745	.187	.001
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	1.759	1	1.759	1.777	.183	.001
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.104	1	.104	.105	.745	.000
Error	1248.713	1261	.990			
Total	14417.000	1293				
Corrected Total	3125.398	1292				

a. R Squared = .600 (Adjusted R Squared = .591)

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Justice Perceptions of Punishment Fairness to Team Fans

				•		Partial
	Type III Sum of					Eta
Source	Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Squared
Corrected Model	667.788 ^a	31	21.542	16.831	.000	.293
Intercept	12245.189	1	12245.189	9567.768	.000	.884
VioSev	.175	1	.175	.137	.712	.000
PunSev	17.887	1	17.887	13.976	.000	.011
Con	479.745	1	479.745	374.848	.000	.229
DecMak	.694	1	.694	.542	.462	.000
Gender	.505	1	.505	.394	.530	.000
VioSev * PunSev	3.370	1	3.370	2.633	.105	.002
VioSev * Con	49.155	1	49.155	38.407	.000	.030
VioSev * DecMak	.001	1	.001	.001	.979	.000
VioSev * Gender	.084	1	.084	.066	.798	.000
PunSev * Con	20.862	1	20.862	16.300	.000	.013
PunSev * DecMak	.024	1	.024	.018	.892	.000
PunSev * Gender	1.506	1	1.506	1.176	.278	.001
Con * DecMak	6.072	1	6.072	4.745	.030	.004
Con * Gender	1.052	1	1.052	.822	.365	.001
DecMak * Gender	.028	1	.028	.022	.883	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con	20.722	1	20.722	16.191	.000	.013
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak	.001	1	.001	.001	.979	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Gender	.926	1	.926	.723	.395	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak	.000	1	.000	.000	.987	.000
VioSev * Con * Gender	.278	1	.278	.217	.641	.000
VioSev * DecMak * Gender	1.473	1	1.473	1.151	.284	.001
PunSev * Con * DecMak	3.109	1	3.109	2.429	.119	.002
PunSev * Con * Gender	.322	1	.322	.252	.616	.000
PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.970	1	.970	.758	.384	.001
Con * DecMak * Gender	.103	1	.103	.080	.777	.000

VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	3.462	1	3.462	2.705	.100	.002
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	.042	1	.042	.033	.856	.000
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	1.914	1	1.914	1.496	.222	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	2.228	1	2.228	1.741	.187	.001
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	12.104	1	12.104	9.458	.002	.007
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.102	1	.102	.080	.778	.000
Error	1613.875	1261	1.280			
Total	15030.000	1293				
Corrected Total	2281.663	1292				

a. R Squared = .293 (Adjusted R Squared = .275)

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Justice Perceptions of Procedural Fairness to the Punished Athlete

	Type III Sum of					Partial Eta
Source	Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Squared
Corrected Model	1114.521 ^a	31	35.952	29.190	.000	.418
Intercept	13198.170	1	13198.170	10715.759	.000	.895
VioSev	.045	1	.045	.037	.848	.000
PunSev	9.552	1	9.552	7.756	.005	.006
Con	963.273	1	963.273	782.094	.000	.383
DecMak	.042	1	.042	.034	.853	.000
Gender	1.337	1	1.337	1.086	.298	.001
VioSev * PunSev	.039	1	.039	.031	.859	.000
VioSev * Con	21.027	1	21.027	17.072	.000	.013
VioSev * DecMak	.806	1	.806	.654	.419	.001
VioSev * Gender	.591	1	.591	.480	.488	.000
PunSev * Con	5.733	1	5.733	4.655	.031	.004
PunSev * DecMak	.074	1	.074	.060	.806	.000
PunSev * Gender	.780	1	.780	.633	.426	.001
Con * DecMak	7.313	1	7.313	5.938	.015	.005
Con * Gender	1.408	1	1.408	1.143	.285	.001
DecMak * Gender	4.725	1	4.725	3.836	.050	.003
VioSev * PunSev * Con	6.963	1	6.963	5.654	.018	.004
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak	.321	1	.321	.261	.610	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Gender	.380	1	.380	.308	.579	.000
VioSev * Con * DecMak	2.246	1	2.246	1.823	.177	.001
VioSev * Con * Gender	.149	1	.149	.121	.728	.000
VioSev * DecMak * Gender	.124	1	.124	.100	.751	.000
PunSev * Con * DecMak	8.944	1	8.944	7.262	.007	.006
PunSev * Con * Gender	3.359	1	3.359	2.727	.099	.002
PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.777	1	.777	.631	.427	.001
Con * DecMak * Gender	.880	1	.880	.714	.398	.001

VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	1.254	1	1.254	1.018	.313	.001
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	1.820	1	1.820	1.478	.224	.001
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	1.424	1	1.424	1.156	.283	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	3.427	1	3.427	2.783	.096	.002
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.169	1	.169	.137	.711	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.005	1	.005	.004	.949	.000
Error	1553.123	1261	1.232			
Total	16421.000	1293				
Corrected Total	2667.644	1292				

a. R Squared = .418 (Adjusted R Squared = .403)

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Justice Perceptions of Procedural Fairness to Teammates

	Type III Sum of					Partial Eta
Source	Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Squared
Corrected Model	1614.831 ^a	31	52.091	51.109	.000	.557
Intercept	11463.164	1	11463.164	11247.005	.000	.899
VioSev	.193	1	.193	.190	.663	.000
PunSev	1.768	1	1.768	1.735	.188	.001
Con	1453.345	1	1453.345	1425.940	.000	.531
DecMak	4.743	1	4.743	4.654	.031	.004
Gender	2.190	1	2.190	2.149	.143	.002
VioSev * PunSev	.485	1	.485	.476	.491	.000
VioSev * Con	11.118	1	11.118	10.908	.001	.009
VioSev * DecMak	.087	1	.087	.086	.770	.000
VioSev * Gender	.027	1	.027	.027	.870	.000
PunSev * Con	5.801	1	5.801	5.691	.017	.004
PunSev * DecMak	.016	1	.016	.015	.901	.000
PunSev * Gender	2.029	1	2.029	1.991	.158	.002
Con * DecMak	11.196	1	11.196	10.984	.001	.009
Con * Gender	1.687	1	1.687	1.655	.199	.001
DecMak * Gender	7.831	1	7.831	7.683	.006	.006
VioSev * PunSev * Con	.283	1	.283	.278	.598	.000
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak	.622	1	.622	.610	.435	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Gender	1.505	1	1.505	1.477	.225	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak	.050	1	.050	.049	.825	.000
VioSev * Con * Gender	.557	1	.557	.546	.460	.000
VioSev * DecMak * Gender	.147	1	.147	.144	.704	.000
PunSev * Con * DecMak	6.583	1	6.583	6.459	.011	.005
PunSev * Con * Gender	.112	1	.112	.110	.741	.000
PunSev * DecMak * Gender	2.435	1	2.435	2.389	.122	.002
Con * DecMak * Gender	.561	1	.561	.550	.458	.000

VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	.498	1	.498	.489	.485	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	.363	1	.363	.356	.551	.000
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.800	1	.800	.785	.376	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	2.579	1	2.579	2.531	.112	.002
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.018	1	.018	.018	.894	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.266	1	.266	.261	.609	.000
Error	1285.235	1261	1.019			
Total	14839.000	1293				
Corrected Total	2900.067	1292				-

a. R Squared = .557 (Adjusted R Squared = .546)

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Perceptions of Deterrence to Future Misconduct to the Punished Athlete

	Type III Sum of					Partial Eta
Source	Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Squared
Corrected Model	1665.677 ^a	31	53.732	48.618	.000	.544
Intercept	10380.393	1	10380.393	9392.559	.000	.882
VioSev	18.328	1	18.328	16.584	.000	.013
PunSev	2.629	1	2.629	2.379	.123	.002
Con	1540.332	1	1540.332	1393.749	.000	.525
DecMak	.391	1	.391	.354	.552	.000
Gender	.351	1	.351	.317	.573	.000
VioSev * PunSev	.381	1	.381	.344	.557	.000
VioSev * Con	5.680	1	5.680	5.139	.024	.004
VioSev * DecMak	.549	1	.549	.497	.481	.000
VioSev * Gender	.646	1	.646	.585	.445	.000
PunSev * Con	2.017	1	2.017	1.825	.177	.001
PunSev * DecMak	.055	1	.055	.050	.823	.000
PunSev * Gender	.098	1	.098	.088	.766	.000
Con * DecMak	.591	1	.591	.535	.465	.000
Con * Gender	1.158	1	1.158	1.047	.306	.001
DecMak * Gender	4.177	1	4.177	3.779	.052	.003
VioSev * PunSev * Con	5.283	1	5.283	4.781	.029	.004
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak	.043	1	.043	.039	.843	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Gender	.515	1	.515	.466	.495	.000
VioSev * Con * DecMak	3.266	1	3.266	2.955	.086	.002
VioSev * Con * Gender	1.212	1	1.212	1.096	.295	.001
VioSev * DecMak * Gender	1.306	1	1.306	1.181	.277	.001
PunSev * Con * DecMak	.990	1	.990	.896	.344	.001
PunSev * Con * Gender	1.584	1	1.584	1.433	.232	.001
PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.305	1	.305	.276	.600	.000
Con * DecMak * Gender	4.919	1	4.919	4.451	.035	.004

VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	.029	1	.029	.026	.872	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	4.289	1	4.289	3.881	.049	.003
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	.331	1	.331	.300	.584	.000
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.087	1	.087	.079	.779	.000
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.422	1	.422	.382	.537	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	1.074	1	1.074	.971	.325	.001
Error	1393.622	1261	1.105			
Total	13970.000	1293				
Corrected Total	3059.299	1292				

a. R Squared = .544 (Adjusted R Squared = .533)

Test of Between-Subject Effects

Analysis of Variance Summary for Perceptions of Deterrence to Future Misconduct to Teammates

Type III Sum of					Partial Eta
Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Squared
1680.647 ^a	31	54.214	53.518	.000	.568
10858.968	1	10858.968	10719.390	.000	.895
8.953	1	8.953	8.838	.003	.007
12.375	1	12.375	12.216	.000	.010
1555.178	1	1555.178	1535.189	.000	.549
.690	1	.690	.681	.409	.001
.507	1	.507	.501	.479	.000
3.055	1	3.055	3.015	.083	.002
1.055	1	1.055	1.041	.308	.001
.002	1	.002	.002	.962	.000
.474	1	.474	.468	.494	.000
5.496	1	5.496	5.425	.020	.004
.003	1	.003	.003	.959	.000
.008	1	.008	.008	.928	.000
.027	1	.027	.026	.871	.000
.342	1	.342	.337	.561	.000
.524	1	.524	.517	.472	.000
9.159	1	9.159	9.041	.003	.007
.035	1	.035	.034	.853	.000
.336	1	.336	.331	.565	.000
.439	1	.439	.433	.511	.000
.322	1	.322	.318	.573	.000
.032	1	.032	.031	.860	.000
2.307	1	2.307	2.277	.132	.002
1.303	1	1.303	1.286	.257	.001
.033	1	.033	.032	.857	.000
1.513	1	1.513	1.494	.222	.001
	\$\squares\$ 1680.647\(^a\) 10858.968 8.953 12.375 1555.178 .690 .507 3.055 1.055 .002 .474 5.496 .003 .008 .027 .342 .524 9.159 .035 .336 .439 .322 .032 2.307 1.303 .033	Squares df 1680.647a 31 10858.968 1 8.953 1 12.375 1 1555.178 1 .690 1 .507 1 3.055 1 1.055 1 .002 1 .474 1 5.496 1 .003 1 .008 1 .027 1 .342 1 .524 1 9.159 1 .035 1 .336 1 .439 1 .322 1 .032 1 1.303 1 .033 1	Squares df Mean Square 1680.647a 31 54.214 10858.968 1 10858.968 8.953 1 8.953 12.375 1 12.375 1555.178 1 1555.178 .690 1 .690 .507 1 .507 3.055 1 3.055 1.055 1 1.055 .002 1 .002 .474 1 .474 5.496 1 5.496 .003 1 .003 .008 1 .008 .027 1 .027 .342 1 .342 .524 1 .524 9.159 1 9.159 .035 1 .035 .336 1 .336 .439 1 .439 .322 1 .322 .032 1 .032 .230	Squares df Mean Square F 1680.647a 31 54.214 53.518 10858.968 1 10858.968 10719.390 8.953 1 8.953 8.838 12.375 1 12.375 12.216 1555.178 1 1555.178 1535.189 .690 1 .690 .681 .507 1 .507 .501 3.055 1 3.055 3.015 1.055 1 1.055 1.041 .002 1 .002 .002 .474 1 .474 .468 5.496 1 5.496 5.425 .003 1 .003 .003 .008 1 .008 .008 .027 1 .027 .026 .342 1 .342 .337 .524 1 .524 .517 9.159 1 9.159 9.041	Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1680.647a 31 54.214 53.518 .000 10858.968 1 10858.968 10719.390 .000 8.953 1 8.953 8.838 .003 12.375 1 12.375 12.216 .000 1555.178 1 1555.178 1535.189 .000 .690 1 .690 .681 .409 .507 1 .507 .501 .479 3.055 1 3.055 3.015 .083 1.055 1 1.055 1.041 .308 .002 1 .002 .002 .962 .474 1 .474 .468 .494 5.496 1 5.496 5.425 .020 .003 1 .003 .003 .959 .008 1 .008 .008 .928 .027 1 .027 .026

VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak	.026	1	.026	.025	.874	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * Gender	4.346	1	4.346	4.290	.039	.003
VioSev * PunSev * DecMak * Gender	1.897	1	1.897	1.872	.171	.001
VioSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.001	1	.001	.001	.973	.000
PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.058	1	.058	.057	.812	.000
VioSev * PunSev * Con * DecMak * Gender	.997	1	.997	.984	.321	.001
Error	1277.420	1261	1.013			
Total	14297.000	1293				
Corrected Total	2958.067	1292				

a. R Squared = .568 (Adjusted R Squared = .558)

Appendix D
Correlation Coefficients Between Sport Spectator Identification Scale Total and Dependent Variables
Correlation Coefficients Between Sport Spectator Identification Scale Total and Dependent Variables
Correlation Coefficients Between Sport Spectator Identification Scale Total and Dependent Variables
Correlation Coefficients Between Sport Spectator Identification Scale Total and Dependent Variables

Correlation Coefficients Between Sport Spectator Identification Scale Total and Dependent Variables

<u>Item</u>	SSIS Total ^{a *}	
1. Discipline Fair to Player	.04	
2. Discipline Fair to Teammates	.02	
3. Discipline Fair to Team Fan	.03	
4. Process Fair to Player	.06*	
5. Process Fair to Teammates	.02	
6. Deter Player	.03	
7. Deter Teammates	.02	

Note: a. Results were based on 301 participants that represented 1240 scenarios *p < .05