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# An American In Paris: Defining American Interests in Post Cold War Europe

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




An American in Paris:  
Defining American Interests in Post-Cold War Europe

A Thesis for the University Honors Program

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## ABSTRACT

For the last fifty years or so, the members of the field of political science have studied the phenomenon known as the Cold War. It has fascinated many scholars and almost demands attention. The reason is this: the Cold War, even though some would argue that it was a governmental affair, affected so much more than military policy. Economies were built around it. Loyalties were built around it. The world divided around it.

Most people could not have imagined the end of the Cold War ten years ago. Even now it is difficult to truly grasp the reality of the situation. That is the impetus for this study. It is an attempt to define the realities of a post-Cold War world. More specifically, it is an attempt to define the foreign policy realities for America in the post-Cold War era.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Western Kentucky University Honors Program for affording myself and students like me the opportunity to engage in this kind of academic scholarship. I would also like to thank them for making me finish it. Deep appreciation of their patience goes out to Dr. Walker Rutledge and especially my husband, Mr. Lance Hereford.

## AN AMERICAN IN PARIS: Defining American Interests in Post-Cold War Europe

At the end of World War II, another war began-- the Cold War. This was a conflict that divided the known world into basically two camps: East and West. To be with the West meant supporting the United States and democracy. To be with the East meant to support the Soviet Union and communism. This battle lasted half a century. It was more than just a battle between ideologies. It was a battle of control over a sphere of influence.

The destruction caused by WW II left the once great powers of Europe financially strapped and physically bankrupt. Two nations stepped forward to restore the balance of power-- the United States and the Soviet Union. Although they had been allied together against the German threat, the two countries turned against each other as both struggled to become dominant.

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sought to gain the loyalties of and influence over other countries in their area. Western Europe became the ally of the U.S., but the Soviet Union helped form the Eastern Bloc, which constituted the eastern part of Europe. Most other countries of the world had some kind of connection to either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. as they sought either support from or protection against one of the super-powers.

Organizations were formed to solidify these connections. Most of the Western world

bound together through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Eastern powers of Europe created the Warsaw Pact, which tied them together and to the Soviet Union. A bipolar order was created by the extreme division between West and East.

Now, however, the bipolar structure has been destroyed. The world is no longer two opposing sides competing to dominate the other. The world is now many sides acting sometimes together, sometimes alone, but always in their own best interests. This brings to the surface the focus of this paper: If America was one of the powers in the bipolar world, what happens now that it is not a bi-polar world? Specifically, how does America relate to its allies in Europe? If each country is now free to act in its own interest rather than being concerned with the alliances of the bi-polar order, what is in the interest of the United States?

## AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

When speaking of American interests, this research concentrates on defining specific areas of policy. To try to lay out the particulars of every aspect of American foreign policy concerning Europe would be an almost impossible task. What follows is an overview of areas in need of immediate attention.

### SECURITY and STABILITY

Security and stability are the foci of the question "What are American interests?" Security is defined as "something that secures or makes safe; protection; defense".<sup>1</sup> In the context of American interests, it specifically refers to military security. Stability is defined as "resistance to change, especially sudden change or deterioration."<sup>2</sup> This encompasses America's maintaining a measure of order on a global level by participating in diplomatic institutions which promote peace and negotiation as alternatives to war and conflict. Security and stability are dependent upon each other. However, they are accomplished in different manners because of their nature, and must be dealt with separately.

During the Cold War the answers to questions of security and stability interests were clear cut for the United States: to contain communism and the Soviet threat, to protect Western Europe, and to promote democracy throughout the world. These goals were evident because of the bipolar order which cast the bad guys against the good guys, right against wrong. America was the protector and defender of democracy, freedom, and prosperity.

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<sup>1</sup>"Security," Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language. 1989 ed.

<sup>2</sup>"Stability," Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language. 1989 ed.



Practically any means to obtain that goal was considered acceptable to both the American government and the American people because the threat of communism was so clear and overriding. U.S. commitment to NATO and the United Nations was rarely questioned because the benefits of these commitments were plain: security and stability.

The position of power the United States held because of the Cold War was unmatched by even the other superpower, the Soviet Union. America was connected to Europe by the most powerful institutions in existence. The Bretton Woods system kept Europe at least partially economically dependent upon America for a large portion of the Cold War conflict. NATO was partially an instrument of the United States' will. There was opposition, to be sure, but since only America possessed the infrastructure and the nuclear might to deter the Soviet Union, it had enormous influence.

However, interests have not remained so obvious. The order the bilateral system provided is no longer in place. Europe and America are now struggling to reestablish that order. "In a phrase, the power in Europe is imbalanced."<sup>3</sup> The sacrifices of the Cold War were clearly worth the price for the prizes received. Today the question is whether the investment is still worth the cost.

The current debate has been going on since the end of the Cold War, which was symbolized by the dissolution of the Soviet Union over Christmas, 1991. Since the breakdown of the Soviet system, a well-defined, indisputable course of action like that of the Cold War period has not surfaced. The standstill is not over one little detail. If it were, the problem could be easily fixed. Rather, the standstill is due to a disagreement over the basic

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<sup>3</sup>Steven D. Boilard, "America's Role," unpublished manuscript, 284.

direction of American involvement in the post-Cold War world. In the past the debate was voiced in terms of isolationism vs. internationalism, but in a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor, George Moffet uses the labels "unilateralists" and "multilateralists" instead of isolationists and internationalists.<sup>4</sup> These terms better fit the discussion of American interests as translated into American actions.

### UNILATERALISTS

The unilateralists, such as Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, "tend to define US interests more narrowly than multilateralists . . ." <sup>5</sup> and to promote independent action by the United States in areas that are clearly in America's interests. Instead of waiting for UN or NATO approval, the only approval America would need to act when and where it wished would be American approval.

Entanglement in a multinational organization such as the UN restricts America's ability to act alone and also may commit the U.S. to a cause or conflict in which it sees no American objective. Another unilateralist argument is that America has earned the right to act on its own as a global leader. Since "we," the leaders of the Western world, won the Cold war, we should gain the spoils.

Republican Senator Robert Dole defends the neo-isolationist tendency of members of his party as a reaction to "irresponsible" internationalism, as in Somalia.<sup>6</sup> Josef Joffe claims

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<sup>4</sup>George Moffett, "US Debates Role in the World- Concert or Solo?" Christian Science Monitor, 14 Mar. 1995: 1.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>6</sup>Josef Joffe, "No room for Rough Riders," U. S. News and World Report 6 Mar. 1995: 70.

the opposite. Joffe feels unilateralism "(i)s a revolt against the messy world inherited from the cold war, when interests were clear, when the nasties were known, when allies rarely refused a call from Washington."<sup>7</sup> The analogy is used comparing America to Gulliver. He is tied to the world by a "myriad of strings."<sup>8</sup> Breaking those strings would do nothing but show his brute force. Instead, he should demonstrate real strength through leadership.

### MULTILATERALISTS

Multilateralists want America to remain involved internationally through the established institutions. Moffett's article puts President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher in this camp. "They say the US should advance its interests by acting alone, when necessary, but in concert with other nations, when possible, through international organizations like the United Nations and NATO."<sup>9</sup>

Multilateralism is the "new world order" former President George Bush spoke of at the end of the Cold War. This new order is based upon cooperation and interdependence among nations that act upon mutual interests for a common goal. Instead of the zero sum game of the Cold War, the new world order offers a positive sum game in which all parties may benefit. In the multilateralist viewpoint the question of American interests is, as Henry R. Nau states,

How can the U.S. and the other Western countries nurture this trend and help to transform the world from hostile blocs of competing political and economic systems (the cold

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 18.

war) to a common community of pluralist and prosperous states (the new Europe whole and free)?"<sup>10</sup> Stating the question in this way allows it to encompass both security and stability.

### The UNITED NATIONS and NATO

One answer to Nau's question may lie in the stability institution, the United Nations. The UN would be an effective body for easing the transformation of the hostile bipolar order into a peaceful, cooperative order. Upon its creation in 1945, the aims of the new organization were to encourage the maintenance of international peace and security, to promote cooperation in solving social and economic problems, and to develop friendly relations among all nations.

The beginning of the Cold War, however, quickly hampered the attainment of these goals, for it brought to an end the spirit of cooperation among nations that had existed during the war years. Now that the hostile environment of the Cold War is dissipating, it is possible for the United Nations to reassert itself in the role for which it was originally designed. A somewhat recent example of the possible future role of the United Nations was its involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis. Although the bulk of the manpower and money came from the United States, this operation proved it is possible for multilateral action to be effective and beneficial.

NATO as a security institution may also hold answers to Henry Nau's question. The unilateralists question why permanent American presence is needed in Europe if the objectives of the Cold War have been fulfilled. Europe should become responsible for its own security

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<sup>10</sup>Henry R. Nau. "Rethinking Economics, Politics, and Security in Europe," Reshaping Western Security: The United States Faces a United Europe, ed. Richard N. Perle (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1991) 12.

instead of continuing to depend upon the United States. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann from the Hoover Institute promote this idea and suggest that America should gradually lessen its involvement in NATO.<sup>11</sup> Over the next decade or so America should phase out its monopoly on decision making and "accept an equal partnership with an independent Europe."<sup>12</sup> Duignan and Gann also feel that NATO is no longer as needed because of the strong leadership in Russia.<sup>13</sup> A stable Russia headed by a responsible statesman like Boris Yeltsin eases Duignan and Gann's worries.

Unfortunately, Russia does not appear the stable defender of democracy the West had hoped it to be. The presence of military "peacekeepers" in former Soviet republics (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan) had many observers wondering about possible imperialistic aims, but Russia's recent actions within its own borders leave the new Russian democracy and its leader on shaky ground.

The Russian invasion of the breakaway republic Chechnya has damaged Yeltsin's credibility and put his reputation as a democratic leader at stake.<sup>14</sup> The argument by Yeltsin and many unilateralists that NATO need not expand for fear of a future Russian military

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<sup>11</sup>Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, The United States and the New Europe 1985-1992. (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1992) 30.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 31.

<sup>14</sup>Alan Cooperman, Jan Cienski, and Julie Corwin, "Shooting Down Yeltsin," U.S. News and World Report. 26 Dec 1994: 42.

threat is undermined by "every second of film of burning homes and dead bodies"<sup>15</sup> coming from Chechnya.

The other purpose of NATO was to assimilate a recovering Germany into Europe.<sup>16</sup> Germany, at the time NATO was established, was the greatest threat to freedom in modern history. Ensuring that this awesome power never again be released paralleled the need to thwart the Soviet threat. With Germany divided, most of Europe could breathe more easily. The reunification of Germany, although hailed as the first step toward the end of the Cold War, caused concern.

The likelihood of Germany's again attempting military dominance is very slim, but the possibility still exists. American presence in Europe may be the very deterrent Germany needs to keep it on the path of democracy. Lawrence Kaplan does not see Germany as a potential military threat to Europe, but it could become an economic threat.<sup>17</sup> The power Germany possesses through its stable economic system and strong mark may allow the nation to take Europe in directions it may not want to go.<sup>18</sup> Economic dominance is just as real a threat as military dominance, if not more.

Germany no longer has the military might to take over the world, but it has the potential economic might. The Soviet Union no longer exists, but Russia cannot completely

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>16</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74.1 (1995): 42.

<sup>17</sup>Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Implications for the United States," European Security without the Soviet Union eds. Stuart Croft and Phil Williams (London: Frank Carr & Co. LTD., 1992) 143.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

ignore its past or resist the urge to re-establish its former power. This means that NATO's objectives have not been fulfilled. They have been altered by the circumstances the end of the Cold War produced, but the need for NATO and America's commitment to it still remains. The unilateralist argument is insufficient.

#### AMERICA'S BEST INTEREST

America should not withdraw from international institutions to concentrate solely on national problems. Questions remain. What should America do? And what is in America's best interest? The burdens of attempting to police the world alone would be too great for the United States to bear. Costs of supporting Europe's and other regions' security over the past decades, while necessary and beneficial, have made it impossible for America to continue to do so. Withdrawing and then finding it necessary to act alone would be too costly. However, it must be conceded that continuing to carry the burden of other nations is also too costly. An equal distribution of responsibility and cost between the United States and Europe would allow both unilateralist and multilateralist objectives to be achieved. However, there is another question to be addressed: would such a partnership be in the interest of Europe?

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Just as with American interests, it is important to define the interests of Europe, for they ultimately decide European actions. When "Europe" is mentioned in this study, it refers to the members of the European Union. Because the paper deals with the United States as one entity, it is appropriate to deal with Europe as one entity. It is recognized, however, that the influence of the individual states of the European Union is of great significance, and due attention will be given to the particular interests of certain members. Further justification for the use of Europe as one instead of Europe as many is also in the history of the European Union. It shows the gradual change that allowed Europe to think of itself as one.

### EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union started as a primarily economic structure after the collapse in 1954 of the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community that came out of the EDC. These two institutions would have placed more responsibility upon Europe for its own defense through NATO and facilitated political integration among member states. Unfortunately, not even the sponsor of the EDC (France) could completely agree with the aims of the proposal. It failed to ratify the EDC, and the European Political Community died with it.<sup>1</sup>

The initiative to integrate was not quelled entirely with the defeat of the EDC. In June of 1955, the Messina Conference discussed future possibilities for further European integration, and the Spaak Committee was formed to report at a later date on those

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<sup>1</sup>Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, 2nd ed (London: Longman Group Limited, 1995) 61.



possibilities. When the Spaak Report came out in March 1956, it gained almost unanimous approval. Approximately one year later the ideas of the Spaak Committee had been translated into an agreement among the Six (France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg).<sup>2</sup> The Treaty of Rome, signed in March 1957, by the Six approved the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The objectives of the EEC, as laid out in the treaty, were as follows:

. . . by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations between the States belonging to it.<sup>3</sup>

The aims were basically economic, but the wording suggests that political and social integration were also intended. In fact, the basic political objective of the treaty as stated in the preamble was to achieve "an ever closer union among the European peoples."<sup>4</sup> Progress in this area, however, had been slow and painful at best until 1985.

#### SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

Although the EEC had a promising start toward integration, along the way there were many starts and stops. It was not until 1985 that the European Council (established in 1974 at

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 75.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., loc. cit., 75.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., loc. cit., 212.

the Paris summit) agreed upon renewed action toward the goal of integration. The Single European Act, coming into effect in 1987, was a return to the original goal of a common market as intended by the Treaty of Rome, but also made it impossible to avoid the question of political integration.<sup>5</sup> SEA spoke of improving living and working conditions, formulating environmental policy, and raising health standards. It also shifted the balance of power within the EEC toward the community institutions and away from member states. Within the Single European Act was a reference to the European Political Cooperation (EPC). It suggested that member states should formulate a European foreign policy and collaborate closely on security issues.<sup>6</sup> The target date of 1992 was chosen as the goal for a common market. All of this was a step toward the European Union.

In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty, which constructed a more extensive political framework for the EC,<sup>7</sup> was approved by the European Council, and a timetable for the adoption of European and Monetary Union (EMU) was sanctioned. By 1993 both a single European market and the European Union (EU) were in existence. Although obstacles block the scheduled implementation of EMU and there is the inevitable disagreement among member states, it is clear that the trend toward economic, political, and social integration of Europe is strong. The European Union facilitates the formation of what former President Mikhail Gorbachev called a "common European home."

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 232.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 233-234.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 242.

## GERMANY the NATION-STATE

Although Europe is more and more becoming an integrated economic and political society, there is nevertheless a power struggle between the states. Again, this is a product of the changes produced by the end of the Cold War. One such change was the re-emergence of the nation-state of Germany.

"On 3 October 1990 Germany re-entered European politics as a great power."<sup>8</sup> While in many respects the reunification of Germany was an event to be celebrated, it also caused much ambivalence among the states of Europe. There is a historically grounded fear that a "unified and sovereign Germany might once again abuse its hegemonial power."<sup>9</sup> However, there is also a forty-year history of the Federal Republic as a successful trading state and proponent of international interdependence. This makes it unlikely that Germany would return to a nationalist policy that reduced Europe and Germany to rubble twice. "Germans have learnt their historical lesson once and for all."<sup>10</sup> But the changes reunification has had on Germany are significant and could eventually change Germany's role in the EU and the world arena.

Bruno Schoch, from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, in his essay "Germany Assumes a Dominant Position in the 'European House,'" discusses five areas of change in Germany because of unification. The Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany, signed

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<sup>8</sup>Eberhard Schulz, "Die Doppelkrise im Baltikum und am Golf," Europa-Archiv 46:3 (1991): 78.

<sup>9</sup>Bruno Schoch, "Germany Assumes a Dominant Position in the 'European House,'" In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe, eds. Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 187.

<sup>10</sup>*ibid.*

September 12, 1990, gave Germany back its full sovereignty in international law. Thus, it is no longer subject to restrictions placed upon it by the victors of World War II. Germany's position as an economic leader was strengthened by unification. Economic prospects are good for the united Germany even as it deals with the costs of integrating the economy of its eastern half. Territorially, Germany has increased by almost a third and has become the most populous state in Europe, besides Russia, with a population of approximately 79 million.<sup>11</sup> If power is interpreted on a basis of territory and demographics, as realists often claim, then Germany has increased in power as well as in size. Fourthly, the same historical event that allowed the unification of Germany facilitates the disintegration of the Eastern bloc. Both occur for the same reason, the desire for self-determination.<sup>12</sup>

Lastly, because of its economic power, Germany "has become the most important political partner of the United States and the (former) Soviet Union."<sup>13</sup> In a time when economic strength "has begun to replace military resources as the currency of international power,"<sup>14</sup> Germany is having to rapidly become a "partner in leadership."<sup>15</sup> Now that the Soviet Union is gone and the United States is considered a hegemon in decline, Germany is emerging as the next hegemon to fill the void. France and Britain are nervous about the rising of Germany as the next superpower, especially since their edge as victors over

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 190-191.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 191.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 190.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., loc. cit. 192.

Germany was destroyed by the Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany. Germany is now seen as a model for former COMECON states. "The path back to Europe leads through Germany" for eastern states on the road toward economic transformation.<sup>16</sup>

All these factors increase Germany's power and consequentially its influence over events, not just within the European Union framework, but in the world political arena. In the area of integration, Schoch lists several factors which helped integration before Germany's unification. First, disregarding national interests was easy for Germany because it had already forfeited the majority of its sovereignty and was eager to prove it had no nationalistic tendencies whatsoever. Secondly, the long East-West conflict had disciplined Europeans to disregard old rivalries and concentrate on what was good for Europe in the face of the Soviet threat. The rise of a bipolar order based on two semi-European superpowers lessened the importance of individual European states. And lastly, there was a basic economic, demographic, and territorial balance among Britain, France, Italy, and Germany which aided integration.<sup>17</sup>

However, the bipolar order that created these favorable integration conditions does not exist any longer. It is possible that attempts at integration will reveal differences in national interests that were put aside during the Cold War. One such example is the difficulty in finding a consensus on a course of action in Yugoslavia. Another example is the variance in readiness to accept Eastern European countries into the fold and provide them with assistance.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 193.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 199.

Without a mutually agreed upon course of action, a strong nation could impose its will upon them-- to their detriment.

With Germany reunited, it is possible for it to use its increased power to lead Europe in directions it does not wish to go. As mentioned in the section on US interests, Lawrence Kaplan sees that as a real possibility while dismissing the possibility of military aggression from Germany.<sup>18</sup> Another way in which Germany may exert undue influence is through the European Parliament (EP). Out of 567 seats, Germany holds 99.<sup>19</sup> This is not a majority, to be sure, but it is more than any other member state of the EP. With its economic strength and rising world power status, Germany could use its influence to acquire votes and dominate the European Union.

#### REUNIFICATION of EUROPE

Not all view the prospects for integration with a new Germany so dimly. Eduard Shevardnadze sees the reunification of Germany as symbolic for the reunification of Europe.<sup>20</sup> The progress made since the union of west and east Germany in the EU is plain to be seen by the Maastricht Treaty and its move toward European Political Cooperation. Other nations are being considered for membership in the EU, such as the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and former eastern bloc states. Shevardnadze

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<sup>18</sup>Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Implications for the United States," European Security without the Soviet Union, eds. Stuart Croft and Phil Williams (London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD., 1992) 143.

<sup>19</sup>Urwin, 246.

<sup>20</sup>Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreword, In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe, eds. Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) viii.

believes "It is Europe that faces the noble task of showing the rest of the world that the further progress of our civilization is possible only on the basis of universal human values."<sup>21</sup>

It is the uniqueness of the European Union that will allow it to attain Shevardnadze's goal. Vladimir Zouev lists several outstanding qualities of the EU which separate it from all other existing structures. It has the greatest economic potential and is the largest economic bloc. It has the advantages of free trade and transnational cooperation. It has regulation of national economies. It established a common basis of law. It has a steady level of political predictability. It defends interests of member states. And most importantly, the EU has captured a golden mean between market and regulation and economic and political elements in its system.<sup>22</sup> Unlike NATO, which must now re-examine its mission and purpose with the collapse of the bipolar order, the EU is the most stable and solid institution left.<sup>23</sup>

#### An AMERICAN in PARIS

Since Germany is such a strong power and the EU such a strong institution, why should it any longer be necessary for Europe to depend on America? Some say there is no need for the United States to continue its presence in Europe, either militarily or politically, because America is on a downward slide. Europe should break ties with the US before it is too late. Franco-German cooperation and integration can replace and eliminate the need for

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., xi.

<sup>22</sup>Vladimir Zouev, "The European Community: Nucleus of European Integration?" In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe, eds. Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 259-262.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 260.

US involvement.<sup>24</sup> European critics say the US resents European efforts to become more independent and America "must accept an equal partnership with an independent Europe."<sup>25</sup> Pierre Lellouche of the French National Assembly states that "there is a clear divorce between the European interests and American interests."<sup>26</sup>

Others, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, disagree, claiming that "It is axiomatic that the security of America and Europe are linked."<sup>27</sup> For the same reasons the United States has an interest in remaining involved in Europe, Europe has an interest in keeping America involved. The Soviet threat is gone, but the Russian threat is not. Russia's democracy is shaky at best, and its democratic leader appears to be less statesmanlike with every news story of the conflict in Chechnya.<sup>28</sup> Also, as mentioned earlier, Germany may or may not remain the stable bastion of democracy it has been in the past. The full effect of unification will not be seen for years to come, and it may not be the effect the rest of Europe wants.

Another common interest is the former Soviet satellites. Although some say it is best for Europe and the EU not to include these states because of the instability they might cause within the European community, it is almost certain that without assistance these states will move backwards, not forwards. In order to maintain stability and security, Europe must aid

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<sup>24</sup>Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, The United States and the New Europe: 1985-1992 (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1992) 31-32.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>26</sup>Nightline. "Are NATO and the U. N. Relevant?" 28 Nov. 1994.

<sup>27</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74:1 (1995): 26.

<sup>28</sup>Aian Cooperman, Jan Cienski, and Julie Corwin, "Shooting Down Yeltsin," U. S. News and World Report 26 Dec. 1994: 44.



these states into the democratic fold. America has the same incentive to aid and assist the former Eastern bloc.

Though Europe can probably handle military conflicts within its own theater (the conflict in Bosnia indicates to the contrary), for Europe to act outside its area would require American assistance. Europe simply does not possess equal military resources with the United States. Only the United States has the established infrastructure to act out of area.<sup>29</sup> It is just as much in Europe's interests to keep America involved in Europe as it is in America's interests.

This is not to say that Europe should not aspire to become more independent from the United States. Even though the US possesses a greater military structure, the cost of that structure is enormous. For Europe to take some of the security burden off America would probably please unilateralists in America. In order to do this, Europe must increase its military capabilities. One suggestion is that the Western European Union (WEU) be expanded within the EU. This would help to create a European military pillar distinct from that of NATO. However, even if Europe does build its pillar, it will have to be connected to America.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Kaplan, 144.

<sup>30</sup>"The Defense of Europe: It can't be done alone," The Economist 25 Feb. 1995: 21.

## CONCLUSIONS

It is in the interest of both the US and the EU for cooperation through multilateral organizations to continue. It is clear that continued cooperation enhances the security and stability of both parties. The unilateralist view that America should withdraw from such institutions as NATO is flawed; instead, America must use NATO to try to provide leadership during the chaotic period after the Cold War. As Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann have argued, "NATO is not merely a military but also a political alliance with a long-established machinery for transnational cooperation."<sup>1</sup> It would only add to the disorder to abandon this institution.

It is also in Europe's interest to play a greater role in its own defense. Indeed, the expansion of the European defense pillar, the WEU, is the best course. First, it would allow Europe to have its own means of defense and ability to act without US approval. It would be intended to work independently of, not against, NATO. And second, it would mean burden sharing so that the US would not bear all the weight.<sup>2</sup> Europe would then be provided with the independence it has felt missing since the world wars and the economic devastation that followed. The WEU can also serve as a bridge or crossroads organization between the EU and NATO.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, The United States and the New Europe: 1985-1992 (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1992) 33.

<sup>2</sup>Rupert Pengelley, "Propping the European Pillar," International Defense Review May 1994.

<sup>3</sup>Willem Van Eckelen, "The Western European Union's Role in the Emergence of a New European Security Order," European Security without the Soviet Union, eds. Stuart Croft and Phil Williams (London: Frank Carr & Co. LTD., 1992) 147.

As for policy implementation, this paper could not begin to cover the topic. There will need to be a gradual integration of NATO and WEU because of the lack of European infrastructure and military supplies. The EU and the WEU will need to cooperate closely to build a European identity and a European defense. The US will likewise have to re-examine its policies in the face of an independent Europe and its new stature in a multi-polar world.

The international scene is no longer stagnated by the East-West conflict. All the institutions discussed must be willing to embrace change in order to survive a new world order. This change, however, is what the western world has been anticipating for decades and offers an opportunity for the West to truly step forward and lead. As Eduard Shevardnadze says, it the West "that faces the noble task of showing the rest of the world that the further progress of our civilization is possible only on the basis of the universal human values."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Shevardnadze, ix.

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