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Freedom to Vote in Kenya: Effects of Perceived Corruption, Levels of Political Trust, and Fear of Political Violence and Intimidation

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FREEDOM TO VOTE IN KENYA: EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED CORRUPTION, LEVELS OF POLITICAL TRUST, AND FEAR OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION

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To understand attitudes about voting in Kenya, this study examines Kenyan voters' feelings of freedom to vote according to their own will and without pressure. More specifically it seeks to determine the extent to which these feelings are affected by 1) perception of corruption, 2) levels of trust in the government, 3) fear of political violence and intimidation, and 4) ethnic identity. Rational choice theory and an insider-outsider perspective are applied to examine the issue from a theoretical framework. Previous research conducted in relation to voting behavior and perception of corruption, trust in government, and ethnicity, among other things, are considered. This study uses secondary data collected by the Afrobarometer in 2008, and bivaraite and multivariate analysis are employed.

Logistic regression models are used to examine the extent to which certain variables explain feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference. The results from the logistic regression analyses show that both trust in government and fear of being subject to political violence and intimidation affect Kenyan voters' feelings of freedom to vote according to their personal preference. These results support two

hypotheses. First, Kenyan voters will feel freer to vote according to their own preference as their levels of trust in the government increase. Second, Kenyan voters' feelings of freedom to vote will be negatively associated with fear of being subject to political violence and intimidation.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The African Union Commission is seriously preoccupied with the recent
happenings in Kenya due to the presidential elections as well as the violence that
followed the announcement of the results. The Commission reiterates its
attachment to democratic principles as stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the
African Union and in the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and
Governance, particularly when it comes to free, fair, and transparent elections, in
conformity to the Declaration of the Union on the principles governing
democratic elections in Africa. (Addis Ababa December 31, 2007)

The term "democracy" can be traced back to the ancient Greek word

"demokratia," which meant people-power, and it has developed over the centuries to have

a wide range of definitions and variations. At the core of the principles of democracy

there is wide consensus that a democracy refers to "government of the people by the

people for the people," as Abraham Lincoln envisioned it (Cartledge 2009

[www.bbc.co.uk]). As history evolves, there has been a widespread trend towards global

democratization, but some countries have been slower in this process than others. While

countries such as the United States and France can trace their transformation toward

democracy centuries back hundreds of years, most countries in Africa can go only as far

as a few decades in tracing their attempt at becoming democratic countries. This study

looks at one such country in Africa, Kenya, whose recent push towards becoming a

democracy has proven to be a challenging task, as she experienced a wave of violence

after the 2007 national elections.

At the heart of a Democracy lies a country's electoral system and its ability to conduct free and fair elections. In referring to what a democratic electoral system should look like, the United Nation's articles state that:

> The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. (United Nations 2010 [www.un.org; Article 21])

Since its independence, Kenya has envisioned having free and fair elections such as those described by the UN articles, but like many countries in the same situation, corruption has found its way deep into the roots of the government, and it has made it nearly impossible for Kenya to attain free and fair democratic elections thus far. The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) deals in large part with corruption, but fails to give it a clear and specific definition. Instead corruption is described as a phenomenon that "undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to governmental instability (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2010. [www.unodc.org; para. 1])" The UNODC instead defines corruption through describing it:

> Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2010[www.unodc.org; para.1])

The purpose of this study is to measure the extent to which citizens of Kenya feel free to vote according to their own will, without reservations and without fear of political intimidation and violence. Furthermore, this study seeks to find the extent to which these feelings of freedom to vote according to one's own preference are affected by levels of trust in the government, levels of perceived corruption in the government, and personal

views on whether the past elections of 2007 were free and fair. Last but not least, this study seeks to determine whether belonging to a dominant ethnic group in Kenya plays a significant role in voters' freedom to vote, and, if so, to what extent.

This study uses the data of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Kenya in 2008. The Afrobarometer is now on its fourth round, and much research has been conducted on topics that closely relate to this study. However, the results gathered from this research will be unique in that none of the studies previously done with these data have looked at Kenya's citizenry's feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference without pressure. With this said, topics such as voting behavior and attitudes and issues such as perceived corruption and political trust have been an area of extensive study for political scientists and other professional scholars. In addition, much research relating to Kenya and neighboring countries has focused on ethnicity and its defining role in different social and political issues.

This study analyzes previous research conducted on these various issues in hopes of shedding light on the main focus of this study. More specifically the studies included in the review look at previous research conducted on voting behavior and the effects that perceived corruption and political trust have on voters. A close look at what researchers have found on ethnicity as it is related to voting in Kenya is also considered. The literature review is followed by the theoretical frameworks considered and those by a detailed description of the methodology that was employed. Next is an analysis of the results and a concluding section devoted to reflection on the results of this study. However, first consider a brief note on why this study is pertinent and in need of investigation.

After multiple failed attempts at true, fair, and democratic elections, the instability and fragmentation of Kenya's national government manifested itself in a case of violent political riots shortly after the 2007 elections. Results from previous studies of the Afrobarometer Survey suggest that citizens of Kenya felt that little progress was made in tackling corruption after the 2002 elections (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006), and most of them thought that either some problems or major problems would follow the 2007 elections (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008). If the people of Kenya were able to accurately predict the violence that was to follow as the 2007 elections progressed, how does this affect the way these people vote and how they feel about their personal freedom to express their opinion through voting? Did the extent of their perception of corruption in which the government is involved affect their voting behavior? Does their level of trust in the government affect how they feel about their freedom to vote? Moreover, are they fearful of being subject to political violence and intimidation, and, if so, to what extent does this affect how they feel about the extent of their freedom to voice their opinion through the process of voting? Last, how are all these factors related to and affected by ethnic identity? Does being a member of a dominant tribe in Kenya trump all other factors when it comes to voting? Or, do voters consider their own opinion and put ethnic politics aside when it comes to voting? It is these questions that have triggered my curiosity and encouraged me to pursue this research project.

Voting freedom is fundamental for a country to carry out fair and free elections and, thus, take a step closer to becoming a democratic state. This issue has various theoretical implications. The section that follows discusses two theoretical perspectives to

make sense of the issue at hand and later the results of this particular study. First a

rational-choice-theoretical framework combined with a theory of residues is employed to

aid in better understanding voters' behavior and attitudes. Advocates of this perspective

contend that human behavior is rational and based on careful analysis of costs and

benefits. While this theoretical approach is the central theory behind the premises of this

research, a necessity to analyze the role of ethnic identity last led me to consider a second

theory, the insider-outsider theory. This theory analyzes the issue at hand by placing

focus on the individual voters and their status in relation to individual accessibility to

information. The insider-outsider perspective also examines perception of corruption, but

it ties it to voters' attitudes by analyzing the voter as the unit of analysis. The following

chapter goes into further inquiry of the three theoretical approaches mentioned thus far.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The electoral history of Kenya can be described as a long struggle for power

overshadowed by an ethnically fragmented population and fueled by a long history of

ethnic conflict. The purpose of this study is to try to make sense of the voting behavior of

Kenyan citizens and to shed light on the dynamics that influence voters' freedom to

express their opinions during presidential elections. More specifically, the goal of this

research is to focus on Kenya's voting population and to analyze their views on the levels

of corruption in the government, their trust in the government, and their fear of being

subject to political violence or intimidation in order to address a broader issue, freedom

to vote according to one's personal preference during national elections in Kenya. The

section that follows analyzes this issue through a theoretical framework in order to better

comprehend the implications of the research question. First, a rational choice theory will

be considered to examine certain factors affecting voting behavior. This will be followed

by a careful analysis of the insider-outsider perspective, which will aid in explaining the

role that ethnic identity plays in individuals' overall decision-making process in voting.

A Rational Choice Approach and Pareto's Theory of Residues

Vilfredo Pareto ([1916] 1935) analyzes human behavior through his theory of

residues and derivations. He argues that human action is not necessarily rational but that

people use theories and explanations in order to make actions seem logical. Moreover, he

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contends that there are underlying sentiments and feelings that directly affect human behavior and, that in many cases, these come before the rational explanation. Pareto ([1916] 1935) argues that it is these sentiments that shape the explanations by which people rationalize their actions. He calls these sentiments "residues," and the explanations by which humans rationalize action the "derivations" (Pareto). According to Pareto, residues are found somewhere between human instinct and the belief systems that help people rationalize action. These sentiments are not a reflection of human instincts but a manifestation of them, and, thus, whether people are conscious about them or not, residues affect human behavior (Pareto [1916] 1935).

I adopt this theoretical framework only to acknowledge that rationalization of action can be rooted in deeper sentiments, whether conscious or unconscious. This is done to recognize Pareto's notion of residues and combine it with a rational-choice approach, which together will serve as the theoretical framework by which the issue under study will be analyzed. I deviate from Pareto's theory because he argues that most action is not rational and that instead theories and explanations serve only to make action appear rational (Pareto). Instead I adopt a rational-choice theory approach because, while I agree that there may be unconscious sentiments that affect action, Pareto does not provide any evidence that action is not rational. As further explained in the following section, rational-choice theory asserts that people analyze potential behavior through a rational process, which people use to make final decisions to act one way or another.

By combining Pareto's idea of residues with a rational-choice approach, it will be illustrated that when a person engages in a rational analysis of costs and benefits, this analysis is affected by deeper sentiments that must be taken into account. These deeper

sentiments, or notion of residues, combined with the rational-choice theory approach can be used to explain the effect that both trust in government and perceived corruption as well as fear (of political violence) can have on a person's feelings of freedom to vote according to personal views and his or her overall voting behavior.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory, as defined by Peter Abell (2009:1):

> invites us to understand individual actors (which in specified circumstances may be collectivities of one sort or another) as acting, or more likely interacting, in a manner such that they can be deemed to be doing the best they can for themselves, given their objectives, resources, and circumstances, as they see them.

In other words, the modern rational-choice theory explains human behavior in terms of cost-benefit analysis. It contends that human beings are rational, and decisions and actions are preceded by a cost-benefit analysis of possible outcomes and rewards.

George Homans (1958) introduces this notion in his exchange theory with his "rationality proposition," in which he argues that humans rate behaviors in terms of how rewarding they will be; whether a person decides to perform an action will depend on his or her perception of the probability that he or she will succeed. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) extended Homan's theory by introducing the comparison levels of alternatives. They argued that human beings rate behavior on a scale from most rewarding to most costly, and they are constantly comparing options and alternatives in terms of their perceived rate of costs and rewards of each. They believe that all behavior is guided by this comparison of alternatives and that humans are constantly looking for something better. Political scientists have since found a way to apply this approach to voting behavior, mainly by looking for patterns that explain why people vote and why they do not.

Rational-Behavior Theory of Voting Participation

Feddersen (2004) uses rational choice theory to analyze the paradox of not voting. He explains that there is widespread evidence suggesting that the probability that an individual vote can actually change an election outcome is extremely small (Feddersen 2004; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). This means that, if people voted only for the purpose of making a difference in an election outcome, very few would show up to vote. However, many people do, in fact, show up and put up with a variety of inconveniences to vote. Like many other scholars, Feddersen (2004) feels that this paradox can be explained through a theory of rational choice. Durden and Gaynor (1987) follow this theoretical framework in analyzing voting behavior. They suggest that voting is a rational action, and that people will vote when the benefits will exceed the costs.

There are many factors that can be considered as costs and benefits to voters. Multiple researchers agree that a sense of civic obligation or duty acts as a strong reward or factor pushing people to vote. (Blais 2000; Durden and Gaynor 1987; Feddersen 2004; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Another possible factor that can act as a reward or motivation to vote is the argument that those who feel that voting is their given right will vote regardless of what the cost or outcome might be (Durden and Gaynor 1987). With this said, people who feel morally obligated to take advantage of their voting rights still have to make a choice in terms of how they vote, and different factors can persuade them to vote one way or another. For example, there are groups of people that share political views and beliefs, who can be mobilized in masses by leaders. From this, members of the groups can be affected by peer pressure, so to speak, and they not only fulfill a civic duty to vote but an obligation to vote a specific way. This type of mobilization is said to be

caused by the leaders themselves who place social pressure on the citizens. (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999; Uhlander 1989). As portrayed thus far, the decision making-process behind voting behavior is an extremely complex one. What follows is an application of the theoretical implications made thus far to the research question under study.

Applied Theory: Residues and Rational-Choice Approach Combined

The focus of this study is to analyze the extent to which Kenyan voters feel free to vote according to their own will. Furthermore, how is their freedom to express their own opinion through voting affected by their perception of levels of corruption in the government, their trust in the government, and their fear of being subjected to political violence? To better understand this issue, it is imperative to analyze it through a theoretical framework. Thus far, Pareto's ([1916] 1935) theory of residues and a rational choice theory have been examined independently. Now, through combining the two perspectives I will analyze the question under consideration.

Following a rational-choice approach as applied to voting behavior would imply that voters, when making a decision about their voting behavior, will first analyze the costs and benefits previously explained. Some of the costs include finding a way to get to the voting booth, being stigmatized for not complying with social pressure, and the chance of becoming a victim of political violence. Some of the benefits include the fulfillment of civic duty, taking advantage of a given right, and social acceptance. Adding Pareto's notion of residues would imply that there are certain sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that precede this rational weighing of costs and benefits. That is where perception of corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence come in. All three of these are personal feelings or attitudes that play roles in shaping the way

an individual will go about analyzing costs and benefits. This is illustrated through the following example.

A person is in a voting booth and is trying to decide for whom to vote. This voter has three options, Candidate A, Candidate B, and Candidate C. This voter prefers Candidate B, but Candidate A seems to be the more popular choice. In making the final decision, whether to vote for Candidate A or B, this voter will analyze the possible costs and possible benefits of voting for each candidate. This is where the so called "residues," or sentiments preceding this decision, become critical. If this person has low levels of trust in government, perceives high levels of corruption, or is afraid of being subject to political violence, he or she will be more likely to feel threatened by costs such as falling victim to political crimes. He or she may feel that, given the circumstances, the costs outweigh the gains. On the other hand, having positive attitudes about the government and having little fear of becoming a victim of political violence will decrease the amount of importance placed on such costs and, thus, will increase the chance that the voter will feel free to vote for whom he or she prefers.

Insider-Outsider Perspective: Perceived Levels of Corruption and Voting Attitudes

In trying to understand voting behavior in Kenya, it is important to not only understand voting patterns and theoretical implications but to really grasp the current situation specific to the time and place under consideration. In Kenya's case ethnic divisions are so deeply imprinted in the culture that one could not properly analyze the elections without paying close attention to how ethnic identity will affect individuals' voting behavior. Thus far I have considered how perception of corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence affect the decision-making process involved in

voting. However, in Kenya's case all of this is subject to change when ethnic identity is added to the equation. An insider-outsider perspective will be used to better understand the effect that ethnicity has on voting behavior.

The insider-outsider perspective analyzes individuals with respect to the access that they have to political figures. This theory is based on the idea that having access to political figures gives individuals certain advantages over those who do not have access. For this reason proponents of this theory argue that attitudes about the government, such as perceived levels of corruption, vary depending on whether a citizen is considered an insider or an outsider (Chang and Kerr 2009). Those who have preferential access to political figures are considered to be insiders, and those who lack this access are the outsiders. The main argument behind this theory is that insiders tend to feel that political parties and institutions have lower levels of corruption, while outsiders feel the opposite and tend to be less content with the overall institution. Chang and Kerr argue that insiders will perceive lower levels of corruption because they are less likely to look for information in relation to government corruption. Many insiders have a strong loyalty to their political figure or party. Chang and Kerr argue that, if insiders come across such information, they will disregard it on the grounds of lack of reliability. In other words, they will choose not to believe it.

Using the insider-outsider perspective to analyze Kenya can have some important implications. Because Kenya's political world is so distinctively divided by ethnic groups, having insider or outsider status will depend largely on the ethnic group or tribe to which voters belong and the ethnic group that is currently in control, and, thus, so will attitudes about the government. Following this train of thought, a voter's ethnic identity

will play an important role in determining the status as either insider or outsider. Thus, a voter who belongs to the same ethnic group as the party currently in control will have different opinions about the government from one who belongs to the opposing party's ethnic group. This is best illustrated by an example.

There are two voters, Voter 1 and Voter 2. Voter 1 belongs to ethnic tribe X ,and Voter 2 belongs to ethnic tribe Y. Each voter has three options; Candidate A, Candidate B, and Candidate C. The current president, who happens to be Candidate A, belongs to ethnic tribe X. The week before the elections there is a media outbreak in which it is speculated that the current president, Candidate A, is to blame for a violent attempt to intimidate the opposition leader, Candidate B. Candidate B belongs to ethnic group Y, the same as that of Voter 2. The question is whether there will be a difference in attitudes between voters 1 and 2 and whether this difference affected by the voters' ethnicity?

Framing this question under the insider- outsider perspective, the answer to both parts of this question is yes. Because Voter 1 belongs to the same ethnic tribe as Candidate A, he will have more access to this party or information about this party; and due to these advantages and possibly his loyalty, he will be less likely to believe that Candidate A was to blame for unlawful behavior. On the other hand, voter 2, who belongs to the opposition tribal group that was violently threatened, has no inside information as to the kind of activity in which candidate A's party is engaged, and so he or she believes the speculations about Candidate A. In turn, Voter 2 has less trust in the current president, (also Candidate A), perceives higher levels of corruption in the government, and is more afraid of political violence than Voter 1 is. As explained through the insider-outsider perspective and portrayed through this example, ethnic

identity plays a critical role in the political and social world of Kenya, and, thus, it is crucial to this study.

Conclusion

The process of explaining voting behavior through a theoretical framework is a complex task. It becomes even more challenging when targeting a country such as Kenya, where specific factors such as ethnic identity play such an active role in voters' lives. The purpose of this research is to understand what factors play a role in Kenyan voters' personal feelings about their freedom to vote according to their own will and without pressure. This chapter places the issue under multiple theoretical perspectives to aid in the analysis of the complex issue. First a rational-choice theory accompanied by Pareto's ([1916] 1935) theory of residues was used to better understand certain attitudinal factors, and second, an insider-outsider perspective was utilized to shed light on the complexity of ethnic belonging in Kenya and the role that it might play in voters' behavior. The chapter that follows is a review of previous literature relating to voting behavior and other key issues in this study.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

As briefly discussed in Chapter I, this study focuses on feelings of freedom to vote according to one's own will among Kenyan voters. Through this study I seek to find out the extent to which five specific factors affect how Kenyans feel about their freedom to express their personal views through voting. The factors considered include perceived corruption in the government, trust in the national government, fear of political violence and intimidation, ethnicity, and whether voters feel that the 2007 elections were free and fair.

This section highlights important research previously conducted on areas related to this study. The first section describes the political situation and key past elections in Kenya. This section is followed by a brief overview of previous research on corruption and political trust. Finally, the last two sections will look at voting behavior, with the last section placing emphasis on voting as it relates to ethnicity.

Road to Democracy: Past Elections

Kenya's electoral history has shown that the road to becoming a free and independent state does not occur without struggle. Although attaining its independence in 1963, the second half of the 20th century in Kenya is evidence that democracy is far from easy to achieve and even harder to maintain. Kenya's first attempt at a multi-party government was not made until 1992, thirty years after its independence. Although the

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government was formed of multiple coalitions, it was extremely fragmented; and the elections were far from fair and democratic (Throup 1993). The 1992 elections brought hope of democracy to Kenyans, who were growing increasingly disenchanted with President Daniel Arap Moi, who had been in power since 1978. Even though an effort was made at having fair and democratic elections in 1992, they did not happen without political killings.

The government that was formed from the 1992 general elections was deeply fragmented, mainly due to the facts that the elections were a product of violence between opposition groups and the end result was achieved through fixed elections (Throup 1993). As a result President Moi remained in power, but the legitimacy of his power was weakened while the opposition parties were extremely fragmented and volatile, which combination made for a very inefficient government (Throup). The elections of 1992 shed light on the nature of an electoral process that was supposed to be fair and just. After a failed attempt to use their free will to get rid of President Moi and form a new government, these elections left many citizens of Kenya disillusioned (Throup). President Moi ruled Kenya until stepping down in 2002 (CIA The World Factbook 2010).

The 2002 elections in Kenya marked what was meant to be a turn toward democracy and an end to an era of corruption within the national government. A new government was formed with a new leader in office, and by 2003 there was a 78 percent rate of satisfaction with democracy among the citizens of Kenya (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 25 2006). This positive outlook, however, did not last long. By 2005 the same survey showed a drop to a 53 percent rate of satisfaction with democracy (Afrobaromerter Briefing Paper No 25 2006). Although the 2002 elections were won on

an anticorruption campaign (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008), a briefing paper published by Afrobarometer, "Corruption in Kenya, 2005: Is NARC Fulfilling Its Campaign Promise?" suggests that Kenya's end to corruption is yet to come. After analyzing the results from the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Kenya in 2005, these researchers have concluded that the citizens of Kenya do not feel that there has been very much progress, if any, in the alleged efforts made by the government to tackle corruption (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006). Further research from the same institution conducted on the following elections showed little improvement.

Briefing paper, "Ethnicity and Violence in the 2007 Elections in Kenya," (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006) looks at the results of a detailed survey that was given to citizens of Kenya immediately before the elections took place. This was done to gain an insight into voters' intentions and feelings toward violence and corruption in relation to the upcoming elections. In this survey the respondents were asked whether they felt that the elections were going to be free and fair, and 70 percent of the respondents said that they "expected some problems," while around 50 percent "expected major problems or worse" (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008).

Public Opinion and Attitudes: Perceived Corruption and Political Trust

In analyzing voting freedom it is imperative to take a close look at corruption and the role it plays in affecting voters. One of the hypotheses of this study contends that voters of Kenya will feel less free to vote according to their own will if they feel that there is a high level of corruption in the government. In other words, perceived corruption will have a negative effect on feelings of freedom to vote without reservation. As defined by Chang and Kerr (2009:4) perceived corruption refers to "the degree to which citizens

believe that a political actor or entity is involved in corrupt practices." Corruption, in contrast, refers to the "the abuse of public power for some private benefit," as defined by Canache and Allison (2005:91). Chang and Kerr (2009) make a key point in stressing the importance of conceptualizing the perception of corruption and differentiating it from corruption. Whether or not there really is corruption in government does not matter in terms of voting behavior if the people are not aware of it. Consequently, in this study I account only for the perceived levels of corruption because it is the perception of the amount of corruption in which the government is involved that affects how people feel about voting.

Findings by Seligson (2002) and Treisman (2007) suggest that perceived corruption is not linked to real corruption through evidence so it is important to take into account the fact that citizens' personal estimates of the amount of corruption and the actual amount of corruption are by no means equal. Canache and Allison (2005) further discuss this issue, and they make two important points in relation to the necessity for the distinction between perceived corruption and actual corruption. First, they stress the need for citizens to be able to have an accurate perception of actual corruption. If voters thought all politicians were corrupt, democracy and democratic elections would be pointless. Second, it is imperative that citizens are able to aim their perception of corruption accurately and at the right people; otherwise the democratic political system would again be undermined.

This study focuses specifically on the perception that citizens have of the amount of corruption that goes on in the Kenyan government. Although much research has been conducted on corruption, few studies relate it to feelings of freedom to vote according to

one's own personal views. Research has been conducted, however, linking corruption

with trust in government, another key variable. Canache and Allison's (2005) study

connects perception of corruption with public opinion, arguing that the former can have a

significant effect on the latter, and it can ultimately affect democratic processes such as

elections. This type of research portrays the magnitude of the role that public opinion and

attitudes can have on the electoral outcomes, thus showing the importance of the topic

under study.

In a study done in Mexico, Morris (1991) focused specifically on perception of

corruption, and he finds a strong relationship between perception of the existence of

corruption and low trust in government. Della Porta (2000) finds that citizens' trust in

government and its capacity to meet the people's needs is undermined greatly by

corruption. Although the direct relationship between corruption and trust in government

is not the focus of this study, I hypothesize that both of these factors are associated with

citizens' feelings of personal freedom to vote. In terms of political trust, I suspect that it

plays a significant role in shaping people's feelings about voting and their voting

behavior. Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) tested whether attitudes such as political trust

have a significant effect on voting participation in Africa, and they did not find a

significant relationship. Their results are consistent with previous findings on the same

topic (Bratton 1999). These results do not undermine the hypotheses of this study because

I do not seek to determine whether attitudes such as political trust affect voting

participation. Rather, I am interested in finding the extent to which these attitudes affect

how citizens of Kenya feel about their freedom to vote. The fact that political trust is not

a significant factor driving voters to the booths is important to keep in mind, but it does

not tell us whether deciding for whom to vote is affected by these attitudes once at the booth.

Although previous research suggests that political trust does not affect whether a person decides to vote or not, whether to vote and how to vote are two completely different decisions. Consequently, I still hypothesize that political trust does affect voters' feelings about their freedom to express their opinion through voting, even if political trust is not related to the initial decision process that voters undergo when deciding to vote or not to vote. Thus, in relation to these findings, I hope to find out whether political trust affects the way people feel about their freedom to vote as they wish.

Some of these studies previously mentioned also analyze variables that will be included as control variables in this study. Canache and Allison (2005) find that, in their study of Latin American countries, factors such as sex, age, education, and social class are all significantly associated with perception of corruption. This study will control for all those variables in order to see whether they help explain feelings of freedom to vote. The following section looks at previous research relating to voting behavior.

Voting Behavior

Voting behavior and patterns in voting have been a focus of study for scholars across the board of disciplines, and extensive literature exists on the issue from research conducted on a variety of different countries. There seems to be widespread consensus that, as Keunzi and Lambright (2005:14) point out, "political efficacy is regularly linked to political participation." In an earlier study done in the United States, Palfrey and Poole's (1987) findings support this claim, arguing that levels of political knowledge are significantly correlated with an individual's likelihood to vote. Furthermore, they find

that there is a positive relationship between political knowledge and predictability in voting behavior. That is, voting behavior is far more predictable for individuals who are informed than for those who are uninformed.

Previous studies have been done relating to voting in Africa, and they find that there is not a difference in levels of political knowledge between voters and nonvoters (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). The fact that these findings are supported by multiple researchers is puzzling because it does not comply with the patterns found by previous research in relation to political knowledge and voting participation. Kuenzi and Lambright explain that this could be logically explained if voting in Africa is driven by outside forces such as patronage and other forces that mobilize voters. These outside factors make voting behavior in Africa unique in that political knowledge cannot be used as an accurate measure of political participation, nor can one rely on it to predict voting patterns. Instead, to understand Kenya's voting behavior, other factors must be taken into account.

In Kenya factors affecting voting behavior include vote buying and clientelism among other things. Kramon (2009) argues that, after studying survey data from the 2002 elections, vote buying is very much a pertinent force affecting voter turnout in Kenyan elections. This is important to take into consideration. To learn the extent to which voters in Kenya feel free to express their own opinion through voting, I assume that they are voting freely in the first place. I assume this because Kenya's electoral system is driven by democratic values; but, in the case in which people are forced to vote, I expect that this will be manifested in answers to the survey question relating to feelings about freedom to voice one's own opinion through voting. The way I rationalize this is that, if

people are being forced to vote, they will be forced to do so one way or another, thereby not being free to vote according to their own will. Thus, I do not find whether someone is being motivated to participate in elections a necessary variable in my study, but I do urge future research to look into the topic.

This is also true for other motivating factors such as clientelism; previous research suggests that some form of patron-client relationship in which favors are granted in exchange for votes is popular among African voters (Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Young 2009). With this said, Lindberg and Morrison challenge the notion that forces of clientelism are still significantly affecting voting behavior. Although future research is needed in this area, for the purpose of this study I assume that, if clientelism is present and significant in Kenyan elections, respondents will portray this through answering truthfully when asked about their voting behavior and freedom to vote according to their own personal views.

Another crucial factor of this research is the notion of ethnic voting. Lindberg and Morrison find that, like clientelism, a significant amount of Ghanians' voting behavior is motivated by ethnicity. Much research has been conducted on the issue of ethnicity in Africa, which is mentioned in the following section.

Ethnicity and Voting

As proven by the 2007 post-election violence, ethnic identity is a major issue in Kenya today and quite relevant in any study relating to the national elections. Because ethnic identity is such an influential factor in Kenyan politics, it is only fair that it plays a major role in shaping the research question of this study, and without paying close attention to its effect on voting behavior this study would be incomplete.

According to the CIA World Factbook (2010), Kenya's population is 39 million people. Although there are more than 70 different ethnic groups in Kenya, 70 percent of the population belongs to the five biggest ethnic groups. The largest ethnic group is Kikuyu, which constitutes about 22 percent of the total population; the next four biggest groups are Luo (14%), Luhya(13%), Kalenjin (12%), and Kamba (11%) (CIA The World… 2010). Kenya's ethnic groups can be divided into three broad linguistic groups, the Bantu, the Nilotes, and the Cushites (CIA The World… 2010). The Kikuyu fall into the Bantu category, and although they make up a mere fifth of the total population, they are overwhelmingly dominant in terms of representation and influence in the political realm (African Studies Center 2010). It is worth noting that Kenya's first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, as well as the current president, Mwai Kibaki, both belong to the Kikuyu ethnic group (African Studies Center 2010).

As mentioned briefly in the previous section, Kenya's first true attempt at a democratic government came with elections in 1992. One of the consequences of having multiparty elections for the first time in 1992 was ethnic grouping in voting behavior, and this became a pattern mirrored in the 1997 elections (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). This has led many to believe that Kenya's elections revolve mainly around cultural and ethnic factors. This is known as an "ethnic census," a term coined by Donald Horowitz (1985), and it refers to elections that take place as a mere formality and are easily predicted because of ethnic cohesions (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008:3). Many scholars agree that ethnic identity is the single major factor affecting voting behavior in societies that are extremely fragmented ethnically (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).

With this said, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) argue that the 2002 elections as well as the 2007 elections in Kenya have shown that ethnicity is not the only important factor affecting Kenyans and their voting patterns. While the researchers do not completely disregard ethnicity as a driving factor in voting behavior, they find that it is neither the only factor nor necessarily the most important one. In their study they find that policy issues sometimes trump ethnic background in making voting decisions, especially among people who do not identify themselves in terms of ethnic groups within Kenya.

Norris and Mattes' (2003) earlier study supports these findings. They agree that ethnolinguistic factors are major players in voting behavior, but they are interested in finding the extent to which this holds true and whether structural factors play an equivalent role in party identification. Although Kenya was not included in their study, their findings suggest that ethnic and linguistic factors do influence party identification and voting behavior significantly in many countries in Africa, but not all. Other recent studies have found that issues relating to the national economy and personal-economic well being trump ethnic identity in some African countries (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).

Feelings of Freedom to Vote: Unanswered Questions

Canache and Allison (2005) find evidence that perception of corruption has a direct and significant effect on public opinion and on the way people vote. From this they conclude that elected officials that engage in politically corrupt activities do so at their own risk because according to their results citizens that acknowledge corruption would vote against it. I, however, wonder whether there are other factors in addition to that perceived corruption and political support. Do citizens who think that there are high levels of corruption fear voting freely? In other words, does perception of corruption as

well as fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation affect the way voters feel about being free to vote without reservation? In addition, does political trust and one's ethnic identity play a role in affecting voters' opinion, aside from their knowledge about corruption within the government? These are among the main questions that this research seeks to answer.

Conclusion

The topic of voting has been a popular area of research for decades. Because African countries have recently made a transition toward democratization, research specific to this continent is limited. Much of the research conducted thus far has been done using the data from the Afrobarometer Survey. The focus of my study looks at feelings of freedom to vote according to one's own will and the extent to which this is affected by perception of corruption, trust in the government, fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation, and ethnic identity. While much research has been done on most of these topics individually, I have yet to find studies that connect any of these studies with my dependent variable.

In summary, most research conducted suggests that African countries are struggling to keep the process of democratization smooth and peaceful. Corruption has been a part of many of these governments since the beginning, and it will take more than one peaceful election to change this. Studies are needed in all areas related to voting behavior. In addition, because of the changing nature of the governments, comparative research will be needed in the future. The following section describes the methodology employed in this study.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH METHODS

In this chapter I give a description of the data and the survey that were used for this study. Next is a brief section stating the hypotheses of my research, which is followed by a detailed description of the dependent and independent variables. This section ends with an explanation of the analysis employed.

Data

This research study utilizes data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer Survey collected in Kenya. Afrobarometer is an independent project that collects data from African countries to gain insight into their political, social, and economic lives. The Afrobarometer surveys and collects data in waves, and for this project I will use the most recent 2008 wave, which is composed of 1,104 respondents.

To collect the data, Afrobarometer uses in-depth interviews as well as surveys provided to national probability samples. The goal of this project was to gather data regarding sociopolitical issues in relation to national elections from a representative national sample of the voting population in Kenya. The respondents were asked to answer more than 100 questions, whereby the 331 variables that make up the dataset were created. This study analyzes the relationship between freedom to vote without pressure and perception of corruption, trust in national government, fear of being subject to

political violence and intimidation, ethnicity, and whether or not the participants feel that the last elections were free and fair.

Hypotheses

Five initial hypotheses were drawn regarding the relationships between the dependent variable and each independent variable:

H1: Kenyan voters will be more likely to feel free to vote for whom they choose if they have a low perception of corruption within the government.

H2: The higher the level of Kenyan voters' trust in the government is, the more likely it is that they will feel free to vote for whom they choose without pressure.

H3: The more Kenyan voters fear being subject to political violence or intimidation, the less likely they are to feel free to vote for whom they choose.

H4: Kenyan voters who believe that in their country elections are free and fair will be more likely to feel free to vote for whom they chose without pressure.

H5: Members of the four dominant Kenyan tribes feel freer to vote according to their own preference than do members of other ethnic groups.

The data in Table 1 show the descriptive statistics of the six variables used in this study. This table includes the dependent variable, the five independent variables, and the control variables. It is directly followed by a brief description of each variable, beginning with the dependent variable.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	obs.	Mean	St. Dev	Var.	Median	Min	Max.
Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote	1088	.79	.40	.16	1.00	.00	1.00
Perceived Corruption	915	.00	.88	.78	-.121	-2.11	2.47
Trust in Government	1029	.00	.84	.71	0.00	-1.72	1.61
Fear of Political Violence and Intimidation	1094	1.18	1.2	1.25	1.00	.00	3.00
Dominant Tribe	1097	.35	.48	.23	0.00	.00	1.00
2007 Free and Fair	1081	1.78	.77	.59	2.00	1.00	3.00

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used in this research is "Freedom to choose for whom to vote." The original question in the survey asked "in this country, how free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 10)." This variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable. This was done because in its original form, some of the response categories were very small. The response categories of the original variable include 1. "Not at all free," 2. "Not very free," 3. "Somewhat free," 4. "Completely free." As shown in Table 2, the first three response categories, "not at all free," "not very free," and "somewhat free" were combined into "not completely free," which together represent 20.3 percent of the respondents. The "completely free" response category was left intact representing 79.4 percent of the participants. This variable includes 1,088 respondents of the original 1,104, with the missing values making

up a small 1.4 percent. The descriptive statistics of this variable are shown on Table 1,

and include a mean of .79 and a standard deviation of .40. The section that follows

discusses the independent variables.

Table 2. Frequency Distribution: Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote

Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not Completely Free	224	20.3	20.6
Completely Free	864	79.4	100.0
Total	1088	98.6	

Independent Variables

This study will include five independent variables. The first is perceived

corruption; the second is trust in government; the third is fear of political intimidation or

violence; the fourth is ethnicity; and the last one is free and fair elections.

Perceived Corruption

The first independent variable is "perceived corruption in the government," which

was created by combining four variables. To measure perceived corruption I used four

questions that asked the participants about their views on the amount of corruption

currently present in a particular office/institution in the government: "How many of the

following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough

about them to say. (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 24)"

Q1: The President and Officials in His Office?

Q2: The Prime Minister and Officials in His Office?

Q3: Members of Parliament?

Q4: Government Officials?

All the questions have the same valid response categories which were "none,"
"some of them," "most of them," and "all of them." The fact that these variables are all
measured in the same way allows me to easily combine them and calculate an average to
create the scale "perceived corruption in government." However, to create this scale, it
must be shown that the questions that I want to combine are related to each other and that
the scale would be unidimensional. The first requirement is met through the reliability
test conducted. This was done to check how closely related the variables of the group are
to each other. The data in Table 2 in Appendix A show that the Chronbach's alpha for
this group of variables is .771, which is evidence that there is internal reliability as
anything above .70 is an acceptable reliability coefficient (Santos 1999). In other words,
the variables are highly related to each other.

The second requirement was met through factor analysis, which checks the
dimensionality of the group of variables. The data in Table 3 show the total variance
explained by the group of variables. We can see that the Eigen-value in the first
component is the only one above one, and it accounts for 46.053 percent of the variance.
This is evidence that the scale is unidimensional. For more details on this test see
Appendix A.

The valid response categories for all four variables were the same, and included:
"none," "some of them," "most of them," "all of them," and "don't know." For frequency
distributions of each of these variables please see Appendix C. This scale includes 915
participants and has a standard deviation of .88. More details on the descriptive statistics
of this scale can be found in Table 1.

Table 3. Total Variance Explained

Comp Onents	Initial Eigen Values			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %
1	2.374	59.351	59.351	1.842	46.053	46.053
2	0.702	17.546	76.897			
3	0.492	12.301	89.197			
4	0.432	10.803	100			

Trust in Government

The second independent variable is "trust in government." This variable was created by the same process as was used to create the "perceived corruption" scale. It is a compilation of a set of questions asked in the survey in relation to political trust. The four original questions combined all ask the same question about different political leaders/institutions. The survey asked, "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 23)"

Q1: The President?

Q2: The Prime Minster?

Q3: Parliament?

Q4: The Electoral Commission of Kenya?

The valid response categories for all five questions are the same, and they include: "not at all," "just a little," "somewhat," "a lot," and "don't know/haven't heard enough." For frequency distributions of each of these variables see Appendix D. The same process was followed to ensure reliability and unidimensionality. The data in Table 2 of Appendix B show that the variables are related to each other with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.687.

The group of variables is shown to be unidimensional through the factor analysis statistics shown by the data in Table 4. The Eigen value of the first component is the only

one above one. Furthermore, component one is responsible for 36.626 percent of the

variance. For more details on this test see Appendix B. This scale includes 1,029

participants, and has a standard deviation of .88. More details on the descriptive statistics

of this scale can be found on Table 1.

Table 4. Total Variance Explained

Comp Onents	Initial Eigen Values			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %
1	2.075	51.869	51.869	1.465	36.626	36.626
2	.897	22.432	74.301			
3	.568	14.195	88.496			
4	.460	11.504	100			

Fear of Political Violence or Intimidation

The third independent variable included in this analysis is "fear of political

violence or intimidation," which measures the extent to which people fear being

subjected to political violence or intimidation. The original survey question asked the

respondents the following question: "During election campaigns in this country, how

much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?

(Afrobarometer Codebook p. 22)" The valid response categories for this variable are: "a

lot," "somewhat," "a little bit," "not at all."

Table 5. Frequency Distribution: Fear of Political Violence/Intimidation

Fear of Political Violence/Intimidation	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
A lot	413	37.8	37.8
Somewhat	265	24.2	62
A little bit	225	20.6	82.5
Not at all	191	17.5	100
Total	1094	100	

The data in Table 5 show the frequency distributions of this variable. A total of 1,094 participants was included in this variable, leaving out .9 percent as missing values. Descriptive statistics for this variable can be found in Table 1 and include a mean of 1.18 and a standard deviation of 1.11.

Dominant Tribe

"Dominant Tribe" is the fourth independent variable used in this research. The original survey question asked the participants "What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group." (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 47) The response categories of the original variable include over twenty different tribes. For this study a dummy variable was created, but a frequency distribution table can be found in Appendix E. The dummy variable created is a dichotomous variable, with one category being a combination of the dominant tribal groups in Kenya and the other category a combination of nondominant tribes. The "dominant tribes" category includes the Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru , and Embu tribes. A total of 1,097 participants were included in this dummy variable, leaving out .6 percent as missing values. The data in Table 6 show the frequency distribution of this variable. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1 and include a mean of 0.35 and a standard deviation of 0.48.

Table 6. Frequency Distribution: Dominant Tribes

Dominant Tribes	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Non-Dominant Tribes	709	64.2	64.2
Dominant Tribes (Kikuyu,Kamba, Meru, and Embu)	388	35.4	99.4
Total	1097	99.4	

Free and Fair Elections 2007

The fifth and last independent variable included in this research is "Free and Fair Elections." This variable measures the extent to which voters in Kenya feel that the past elections held in Kenya in 2007 were free and fair. The original survey asked the participants, "On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in 2007?" (Afrobarometer Codebook 2008: 39) The original response categories for this question include: 1. "not free and fair," 2. free and fair, with major problems," 3. "free and fair, but with minor problems," and 4. "completely free and fair." This variable was recoded by combining the categories "free and fair, with minor problems" and "completely free and fair" into one category. This was done because "completely free" alone accounted for only an extremely small percentage of the total population.

The data in Table 7 show the frequency distributions of this variable. This variable includes 1,081 participants and has a mean of 1.78 and a standard deviation of 0.77. For more details on the descriptive statistics of this variable see Table 1. A brief description of additional control variables follows.

Table 7. Frequency Distribution: Free and Fair Elections 2007

Elections Free and Fair	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Not Free and Fair	463	42.8	42.8
Free and Fair, with Major Problems	394	36.4	79.3
Free and Fair, with Minor Problems or Completely Free	224	20.7	100
Total	1081	100	

Control Variables

Thus far a description of the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis of this research has been provided. Besides these, three control variables were also included in the analysis, which include "education," "gender," and "age." Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics of each.

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables

	obs.	Mean	St. Dev	Variance	Median	Min	Max.
Education	1100	3.77	1.808	3.271	4.00	0	9
Gender	1104	1.50	.500	2.50	2.00	1	2
Age	1100	35.0309	12.35621	152.676	32.000	18	67

The first control variable, education, includes 1,100 participants, and the original survey asked the respondents "what is the highest level of education you have completed? (Afrobarometer Codebook 2008:49)" The response categories range from "no formal schooling" to "post-graduate." For details on the frequency distribution of this variable see Table 2 in Appendix F. The data in Table 8 show that the descriptive statistics of this variable include a mean of 3.77 and a standard deviation of 1.81.

The next control variable included in this research is gender. The original survey asked the participants to indicate their gender, and all 1,104 respondents were included in this variable. The response categories included "male" and "female," with males making up 49.8 percent of the total population and females 50.2 percent. A frequency distribution table can be found in Table 1 in Appendix F. Table 8 indicates that this variable has a mean of 1.50 and a standard deviation of .50.

Last, the variable "age" was used as a control variable. The original survey question asked the respondents to indicate their age, and 1,100 participants were included

in this variable. The response categories ranged from "18" to "95," but this variable was recoded into categories ranging from "18" – "67" due to the low number of cases that indicated being an age older than 67. For a frequency distribution of this variable see Table 3 in Appendix F. The data in Table 8 show that the variable age has a mean of 35.03 and a standard deviation of 12.36.

Analysis

As stated previously, in conducting this research I sought to find out the extent to which citizens of Kenya feel free to vote for whom they choose without pressure during national elections. In addition, I want to know what role certain factors, the independent variables, play in establishing these feelings of freedom or lack thereof. To obtain these results I have conducted both bivariate and multivariate analyses. First I used a correlation matrix to determine the individual relationship between the dependent variable and each independent variable. Second, I conducted logistic regression analysis to predict the extent to which the combination of the independent variables explains freedom to vote in Kenya according to one's preference and without pressure.

As explained by Dayton (1992), logistic regression analysis is best suited for "research situations in which the outcome variable is categorical. [www.bus.utk.edu; para. 1]" LRA works by basing the probabilities on the values of the dependent variable; and because it is the case for most situations, the dependent variable is assumed to be dichotomous. For this study the dependent variable, feelings of freedom to vote in Kenya, is a dichotomous variable, and so logistic regression analysis was employed.

Four different logistic regression models were conducted. Model 1 includes only the independent variables that relate to attitudes. Model 2 combines the attitudinal and

demographic variables. Model 3 also includes squared variables of perceived corruption and perceived trust. This is done as a requirement for Model 4, which has two additional interaction terms. To run a regression model with interaction terms, one must first check to see whether the squared terms of the variable affect the model (Ganzach 1998). The squared terms included in Model 3 are of perceived corruption and trust in government.

Then, in Model 4 perceived corruption and trust in government are combined with dominant tribe to create two interaction terms. This is done to account for the possible effect that dominant tribe might have on the results. As established by the theory section and the review of literature, ethnicity is a major player in Kenyan elections. In this study the centrality of ethnicity is portrayed through H5, in which being a member of a dominant tribe is the key factor. Thus, by creating interaction terms of dominant tribe, Model 4 accounts for the possible effect produced by voters who are both, a member of a dominant tribe in Kenyan, and, either perceive high levels of corruption or have high levels of trust in the government.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSES

In short, this study seeks to determine the extent to which certain attitudinal and demographic factors play a role in Kenyan voters' feelings of freedom to vote without pressure. This chapter takes a closer look at both the bivariate and multivariate analyses used to test the hypotheses. More important, this chapter includes a detailed explanation of the results of the analyses to determine whether my hypotheses are supported by the data. Finally, these results are used to draw some conclusions and make implications about the topic under research. The bivariate analysis is the first test of the hypotheses.

Bivariate Analysis: Correlation Matrix

First a correlation matrix was created to examine the bivariate relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The data in Table 9 show the correlations between the attitudinal independent variables and feelings of freedom to vote. Attitudinal variables refer to perceived corruption, trust in government, fear of political violence and intimidation, and perception of free and fair elections in 2007.

The data in Table 9 show that none of the correlations between the dependent variable and the independent variables are significant. However, it does show that all independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Each relationship is significant at the .001 level except that between perceived corruption and fear of political violence or intimidation, which is significant at the .01 level. The data in Table 9 also

show that the relationships between perceived corruption and the rest of the attitudinal

variables are all negative, which means that as voters perceive more corruption there is a

decrease in trust in the government, fear of being subject to political violence or

intimidation, and the chances that they thought the 2007 elections would be free and fair

prior to taking place. The strongest of these relationships is the one between perceived

corruption and trust in government, with a Pearson's Correlation of -.384. The fact that

the relationship between perceived corruption and fear of political violence and

intimidation is negative is interesting because it suggests that when perceived corruption

is high, fear is low or vice versa. With this said, this relationship is weak, with a Person's

correlation of -.100.

Table 9. Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable and Attitudinal Variables

		Freedom to Vote	Perceived Corruption	Trust in Gov.	Fear Pol. Violence	Free/Fair 2007
Freedom to Vote	Pearson's R	1	-.010	.040	-.026	-.005
	Sig. 2-tail		.754	.200	.393	.858
	N	1088	903	1017	1080	1067
Perceived Corruption	Pearson's R	-.010	1	-.384	-.100	-.162
	Sig. 2-tail	.754		***.000	**.002	***.000
	N	903	915	883	907	902
Trust in Gov.	Pearson's R	.040	-.384	1	.126	.270
	Sig. 2-tail	.200	***.000		***.000	***.000
	N	1017	883	1029	1021	1013
Fear Pol. Violence	Pearson's R	-.026	-.100	.126	1	.106
	Sig. 2-tail	.393	**.002	***.000		***.001
	N	1080	907	1021	1094	1071
Free/Fair 2007	Pearson's R	-.005	-.162	.270	.106	1
	Sig. 2-tail	.858	***.000	***.000	***.001	
	N	1067	902	1013	1071	

NOTE: $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$

The data in Table 10 show the correlation matrix between the demographic and

the attitudinal variables. First, they indicate that freedom to vote is significantly and

positively correlated with education at the .01 level with a p-value of .006. This implies

that the higher the level of education that voters have completed, the freer they will feel

to vote according to their own will.

Table 10. Correlation Matrix: Demographic and Attitudinal Variables

		Freedom to Vote	Perceived Corruption	Trust in Gov.	Fear Pol. Violence	Free/Fair 2007
Dominant Tribe	Pearson's R	.007	.126	.066	.090	.249
	Sig. 2-tail	.809	***.000	*.036	**.003	***.000
	N	1081	909	1022	1087	1074
Education	Pearson's R	.083	.105	-.140	.063	.039
	Sig. 2-tail	**.006	***.001	***.000	*.037	.194
	N	1085	911	1026	1093	1090
Gender	Pearson's R	-.044	-.023	.006	.015	-.042
	Sig. 2-tail	.151	.484	.837	.630	.168
	N	1088	915	1029	1097	1094
Age	Pearson's R	-.032	-.040	.090	-.042	.047
	Sig. 2-tail	.287	.231	**.004	.161	.120
	N	1084	912	1026	1093	1090

NOTE: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$

Another important variable included in Table 10 is dominant tribe. As described

in the previous chapter, the variable of dominant tribe divides voters into those who

belong to the four main ethnic tribes in Kenya and those who do not. Although the

correlation matrix table does not show an association between dominant tribe and the

dependent variable, it does show that belonging to a dominant tribe in Kenya is

significantly associated with all attitudinal variables included in the study. In addition, the

data in Table 10 show that trust in government is positively correlated with all

demographic variables except gender. This implies that being older, having higher levels

of education completed, and belonging to a dominant tribe are all associated with having

more trust in the government.

Table 11 is a continuation of the correlation matrix, portraying the correlations between the demographic variables and how they are correlated with each other. The data in Table 11 show that being a member of a dominant tribe is correlated only with education, which suggests that those who have higher education are more likely to belong to a dominant tribe in Kenya. This relationship is very weak, with a Pearson's correlation of .063, but it is significant at the .05 level with a p-value of. 037. Education, gender, and age are all associated with each other and are significant at the .001 level. All three relationships are negative but weak, which suggests that, in Kenya, both males and younger people achieve higher levels of education.

Table 11. Correlation Matrix: Demographic Variables

		Dominant Tribe	Education	Gender	Age
Dominant Tribe	Pearson's R	1	.063	.015	-.042
	Sig. 2-tail		*.037	.630	.161
	N	1097	1093	1097	1093
Education	Pearson's R	.063	1	-.114	-.203
	Sig.	*.037		***.000	***.000
	N	1093	1100	1100	1096
Gender	Pearson's R	.015	-.114	1	-.130
	Sig.	.630	***.000		***.000
	N	1097	1100	1104	1100
Age	Pearson's R	-.042	-.203	-.130	1
	Sig.	.161	***.000	***.000	
	N	1093	1096	1100	1100

NOTE: $^*p < .05,$ $^{**}p < .01,$ $^{***}p < .001$

Multivariate Analysis: Logistic Regression

Next, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to help predict the extent to which the combination of independent variables explains the dependent variable, freedom to vote according to one's own will and without pressure. Logistic regression models were conducted to obtain more accurate results. The reason they are more accurate is that,

unlike bivariate analysis, logistic regression models help predict the effect that an

independent variable has on the dependent variable while holding the rest of the

independent variables constant. In other words, while a correlation matrix can account for

only one relationship at the time, logistic regression takes into consideration all the

independent variables simultaneously, thus producing more accurate results. The data in

Table 12 show the four logistic regression models conducted in this study.

Table 12. Logistic Regression (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Freedom to Vote)	O.R. / se	O.R. / se	O.R. / se	O.R. / se
Perceived Corruption	1.059	1.022	1.034	1.142
	(.107)	(.109)	(.122)	(.151)
Trust in Gov.	*1.303	*1.278	*1.305	1.149
	(.118)	(.119)	(.125)	(.147)
Fear Pol. Violence	.867	*.855	*.851	.844
	(.078)	(.079)	(.080)	(.081)
Free Fair 2007	.906	.927	.923	*.890
	(.120)	(.125)	(.125)	(.125)
Dominant Tribe		1.030	1.024	1.096
		(.196)	(.198)	(.204)
Education		1.083	1.087	1.076
		(.051)	(.052)	(.052)
Gender		.792	.801	.793
		(.178)	(.179)	(.180)
Age		1.001	1.002	1.000
		(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
$Trust^2$			1.117	1.121
			(.114)	(.115)
$Corruption^2$			.984	1.020
			.076	.082
Etrust				1.486
				0.256
Ecorruption				0.779
				0.239
Pseudo R-Squared	.015	0.022	0.023	0.034

Model 1

The first logistic regression model includes only the attitudinal independent variables. Among these are perceived corruption, trust in government, fear of political violence and intimidation, and free and fair elections in 2007. When only these variables are included, the results support only one of my hypotheses. Trust in government has an odds ratio of 1.303 and is statistically significant at the .05 level. This means that for every one unit increase in trust in government, there is a 30.3 percent increase in the odds of feeling free to vote according to personal preference. These results support H2, which states that voters in Kenya who have higher levels of trust in the government will feel freer to vote according to their own will.

Model 2

Model 2 is a combination of the attitudinal variables and the demographic variables. The results in Model 2 support both H2 and H3.

First, trust in government has an odds ratio of 1.278, which suggests that for every one unit increase in trust, there is a 27.8 percent increase in the odds that voters will feel free to vote according to their own will without pressure. This shows a small decrease of 2.2 percent in the odds ratio from that suggested in Model 1. The fact that the difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is small justifies having Model 2 because it shows that even when adding three variables to the model, the results still hold true, and they vary only slightly. In addition, Model 2 differs from Model 1 in that it not only supports H1 but also H3. The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 could be due to the inter-correlation between the attitudinal and demographic variables. Thus, when controlling for demographics, Model 2 reveals a new relationship.

More specifically Model 2 shows that fear of political violence and intimidation is statistically significant at the .05 level. This variable has an odds ratio of .855, which suggests that for every one unit increase in fear there is a 14.5 percent lesser odds that voters will feel that yes, they are free to vote according to their own will. These results support H3, in which I hypothesize that voters in Kenya will feel freer to vote according to their own will when they are not afraid of being subject to political violence and intimidation. It is interesting that these results are not consistent with the correlation matrix, which suggests that there is no association between fear of political violence and the dependent variable. This could also be due to the intercorrelation between the independent variables. Thus, even though the bivariate analysis suggests that a relationship between feelings of freedom to vote and fear of political violence is not significant, the relationship is revealed through multivariate analysis.

Model 3 and Model 4

Model 3 includes the squared terms of both perceived corruption and trust in government. According to Ganzach (1998), to run a regression model with interaction terms, one must first check the effects that the squared terms would have on the model. Thus, Model 3 serves the purpose of fulfilling the requirements necessary to include interaction terms in Model 4.

Model 4 includes all of the independent variables, the squared terms of perceived corruption and trust in government, and two interaction terms of dominant tribe. The squared terms were included because, as argued by Ganzach (1998:621), "including quadric terms affords protection against type I and type II errors associated with the estimation of interaction when the true model includes quadric terms."

An interaction term is calculated by multiplying two variables together. For this study the purpose of the interaction terms is to see whether there is any added effect for being a member of a dominant tribe, and it is calculated by multiplying two variables together. The first interaction term is seen in Table 12 as "Etrust," and the purpose behind it is to check to see if there is any added effect for being both a member of a dominant tribe and having high levels of trust in the government. The second interaction term is "Ecorruption." The purpose of this term is to check to see if being both a member of a dominant tribe and perceiving high levels of corruption affect the model. Although dominant tribe is not significant in the previous models, interaction terms were still included because all of the previous models suggest that trust in government is significant.

Model 4 shows that, when the two interaction terms are included, the results change. Trust in government, which was significant in all the previous models, is no longer significant. Furthermore, fear of political violence and intimidation, which was shown to be statistically significant in Model 2 and Model 3, is also no longer statistically significant. Instead, with the inclusion of the interaction terms, the variable relating to the 2007 elections' freedom and fairness becomes statistically significant at the .05 level, and it has an odds ratio of .890. This means that, according to Model 4, for every one unit increase in the variable "free and fair elections in 2007" there are 11 percent lesser odds that voters will feel free to vote according to their will and without pressure. These results contradict H4, in which I initially hypothesized that those who responded that the 2007 elections would be free and fair would feel freer to vote according to their own will.

The section that follows goes into further inquiry about the results of this study and the

implications made by them as well as the conclusions drawn.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Kenya, like many other African countries, has a long history of political turmoil. Much of it is rooted in the power struggles between ethnic tribes. For decades now, and since first becoming an independent state in 1963, Kenya has begun the process of democratizing its elections with the goal of joining the Western world in the practice of free and fair elections. To this day Kenya has yet to see elections that are not only democratic but also peaceful. With this said, progress has been made, and the violence that resulted from the 2007 elections is proof that the Kenyans are more than ever fed up with tyranny and they demand freedom to choose their leaders. It was these violent events after the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya that inspired me to do this study.

By doing this research I hoped to gain insight into Kenyan voters' feelings of freedom to vote for whom they choose and without pressure. Moreover, I wanted to find out the extent to which Kenyans' feelings about their freedom to express their opinion through voting is affected by: (a.) perception of corruption in the government; (b.) levels of trust in the government; (c.) fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation; (d.) ethnic identity; and, last, (e.) whether voters thought that the 2007 elections would be free and fair before they took place. With these variables in mind, I hypothesized that feelings of freedom to vote in Kenya would increase if:

H1: voters perceive low levels of corruption in the government;

H2: voters have high levels of trust in the government;

H3: voters are not afraid of being subject to political violence or intimidation;

H4: voters believed that the 2007 elections would be free and fair before they took

place; and

H5: voters belong to one of the four dominant tribes.

To do this research I have used the data set from the survey collected by the

Afrobarometer in 2008. I conducted both bivarite and multivariate analysis. More

specifically I used a correlation matrix to look at the independent relationships between

the variables, and then I conducted logistic-regression analysis to determine what factors

help explain feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference. Four different

models were included in the logistic regression. The model that best represents this study

is Model 2 because it includes all of the independent variables and reveals which of my

hypotheses are supported. Models 3 and 4 were conducted for the purpose of checking to

see whether the interaction term of dominant tribe would help explain feelings of

freedom to vote according to personal preference, and the results suggest that interaction

term of dominant tribe did not play a significant role.

Model 2 suggests that both trust in the government and fear of being subject to

political violence and intimidation help predict voters' perception of freedom to vote

according to their own preference, and these results support H2 and H3 of this study.

Moreover, the results of Model 2 suggest that Kenyan voters' feelings of freedom to vote

according to their own preference increase if their levels of trust in the government also

increase and if their fear of being subject to political violence and intimidation decreases.

The fact that perception of corruption does not help explain feelings of freedom to vote is interesting. According to the bivariate analysis, perceived corruption is correlated with all the attitudinal independent variables as well as with dominant tribe and education. With this said, none of the logistic regression models suggests that perceived corruption is an explanatory variable of feelings of freedom to vote. These results reject H1, and no previous literature was found that linked or rejected a relationship between feelings of freedom to vote and perception of corruption. However, the negative relationship between perceived corruption and trust in government found by Della Porta (2000) is supported by the results of this study. Even though perceived corruption was not found to be a direct explanatory factor of feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference, because the consistency of previous results are confirmed by this study, I suspect that perceived corruption plays a big role in voting behavior, and I urge future research be done on this topic.

Another hypothesis that is rejected by the multivariate results is H5. According to Model 2, being a member of a dominant tribe is not a good predictor of freedom to vote in Kenya. This is surprising to me for the following reasons. First, the bivariate results show that, like perceived corruption, the variable dominant tribe is correlated with all of the attitudinal independent variables as well as education. Second, and more important, according to previous research, ethnicity is a very important factor shaping elections in Kenya. Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) argue that ethnic grouping in voting behavior was responsible for the outcomes of both the 1992 and 1997 elections. They also argued that ethnic identity is the most important factor influencing voting behavior when it comes to elections in ethnically fragmented societies, and they are in agreement with other

scholars. What is interesting is that Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) found that in the 2002 and 2007 elections in Kenya, ethnicity was an important factor influencing voting behavior but no longer the only important one.

An important implication can be suggested by comparing the results of this study with those of previous research. Bratton and Kimenyi's (2008) results suggest a decrease in the importance of ethnicity in voting behavior from 1992 and 1997 to 2002 and 2007. My results further confirm this pattern, with an even larger decrease. This is true to the extent that, according to this study, whether voters belong to a dominant tribe or not no longer plays an explanatory role in voting behavior, at least not as it did before. If these results are accurate, this could mean that a very important change is taking place in Kenya. That is, if voting behavior in Kenya no longer revolves around ethnic identity and tribal politics, this could mean a very positive social change. Moreover, it would mean that Kenya is overcoming a major challenge when it comes to achieving the goal of having democratic and peaceful elections.

Although the results have not supported all of the hypotheses of this study, the research question under consideration remains how is Kenyans' freedom to express their own opinion through voting affected by their perception of levels of corruption in the government, their levels of trust in the government, their fear of becoming subject to political violence or intimidation, and, last, whether they belong to a dominant ethnic tribe.

This research question was framed under two theoretical perspectives. First, a rational-choice approach combined with Pareto's ([1916] 1935) theory of residues and derivations was applied. The implications made through the first theoretical approach

suggested that, when making decisions about voting, voters would analyze the situation in term of costs and benefits first, and then they would choose the path that is less costly and most beneficial. By adding Pareto's ([1916] 1935) notion of residues, it was recognized that there are certain sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that play a role in shaping the analysis of costs and benefits. The sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that I considered are perceived corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence or intimidation. After the analysis was conducted, the results supported all but the stipulation about perception of corruption. This means that, while perception of corruption does not appear to be a driving factor in explaining the way voters in Kenya feel about their freedom to express their opinion through voting, other factors such as trust in government and fear of political violence do.

The second theoretical approach that was applied to help explain the issue at hand was the insider-outsider perspective. By using this perspective I contended that, because Kenya's political arena has been dominated by ethnic feuds for decades, voters' feelings about different political parties and figures would vary depending on the ethnic tribe to which they claimed alliance and, in turn, would affect how they felt about voting. The results of this study do not support the implications made by this theory because they suggest that whether a voter belongs to one of the dominant tribes in Kenya or not does not affect how they feel about their freedom to vote. The fact that the theoretical implications initially made in this research are not supported by the results suggests a positive change in that Kenyans are no longer constrained by ethnic boundaries in terms of voting. With this said, this study does have its limitations, and future research needs to be conducted to check the reliability of the results.

First, the dependent variable, freedom to vote without pressure, was recoded into a dichotomous variable. This had to be done because of the disparity in the number of cases across the response categories. As a result, three response categories "not at all free," "not very free," and "somewhat free" were combined into "not completely free." This is methodologically justified in Chapter IV, but future research should take this into consideration. Next because the survey was collected in 2008, very little research has been conducted. Thus, while the data are up to date, there is little research to back up the findings of this study. Last, I strongly urge future research to look further into the issue of ethnicity and voting behavior in Kenya. Although special attention was paid to the effect that ethnicity might have on voting behavior, this was not the sole purpose of this study. Thus, future researchers might consider making ethnicity the central focus. Even though the results of this study do not support previous research in deeming ethnicity a key factor in explaining voting behavior, it should still be considered in future research.

APPENDIX A

Independent Variable: Perceived Corruption

Reliability Test

Table 1. Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max./Min.
Item Means	1.387	1.190	1.541	.351	1.295
Item Variances	.553	.528	.572	.044	1.084
Interitem Covariances	.253	.207	.307	.100	1.480
Interitem Correlations	.457	.373	.539	.166	1.446

Table 2. Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.771	4

Table 3. Summary Item Statistics

	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	.025	4
Item Variances	.000	4
Interitem Covariances	.001	4
Interitem Correlations	.005	4

Factor Analysis

Table 4. Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Corruption: Office of the Presidency	.379	.505
Corruption: Office of the Prime Minister	.345	.451
Corruption: Members of Parliament	.390	.525
Corruption: Government Officials	.293	.361

Table 5. Total Variance Explained

Comp Onents	Initial Eigen Values			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %
1	2.374	59.351	59.351	1.842	46.053	46.053
2	0.702	17.546	76.897			
3	0.492	12.301	89.197			
4	0.432	10.803	100			

Independent Variable: Trust in Government

Reliability Test

Table 1. Summary Item Statistics

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Max./Min.
Item Means	1.491	.804	1.926	1.122	2.397
Item Variances	1.046	.998	1.106	.108	1.109
Interitem Covariances	.371	.155	.490	.335	3.168
Interitem Correlations	.355	.149	.451	.303	3.036

Table 2. Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.687	4

Table 3. Summary Item Statistics

	Variance	N of Items
Item Means	.235	4
Item Variances	.002	4
Interitem Covariances	.014	4
Interitem Correlations	.015	4

Factor Analysis

Table 4. Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Trust President	.331	.519
Trust Prime Minister	.262	.308
Trust Parliament/National Assembly	.280	.379
Trust Electoral Commission	.226	.259

Table 5. Total Variance Explained

Comp Onents	Initial Eigen Values			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %
1	2.075	51.869	51.869	1.465	36.626	36.626
2	.897	22.432	74.301			
3	.568	14.195	88.496			
4	.460	11.504	100			

APPENDIX C

Frequency Distributions: Perceived Corruption

Table 1. Corruption: Office of the Presidency

Value Label	Corruption: Office of the Presidency	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	1	0.09	0.09
0	None	83	7.52	7.61
1	Some of Them	604	54.71	62.32
2	Most of Them	221	20.02	82.34
3	All of Them	92	8.33	90.67
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	103	9.33	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 2. Corruption: Office of the Prime Minister

Value Label	Corruption: Office of the Prime minister	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	1	0.09	0.09
0	None	139	12.59	12.68
1	Some of Them	555	50.27	62.95
2	Most of Them	182	16.49	79.44
3	All of Them	62	5.62	85.05
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	165	14.95	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 3. Corruption: Government Officials

Value Label	Corruption: Government Officials	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	2	0.18	0.18
0	None	44	3.99	4.17
1	Some of Them	497	45.02	49.18
2	Most of Them	400	36.23	85.42
3	All of Them	105	9.51	94.93
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	56	5.07	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 4. Corruption: Members of Parliament

Value Label	Corruption: Members of Parliament	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	3	0.27	0.27
0	None	51	4.62	4.89
1	Some of Them	521	47.19	52.08
2	Most of Them	368	33.33	85.42
3	All of Them	90	8.15	93.57
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	71	6.43	100
	Total	1104	100	

APPENDIX D

Frequency Distributions: Trust in Government

Table 1. Trust President

Value Label	Trust President	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	3	0.27	0.27
0	Not at All	167	15.13	15.4
1	Just a Little	297	26.9	42.3
2	Somewhat	294	26.63	68.93
3	A Lot	332	30.07	99
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	11	1	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 2. Trust Prime Minister

Value Label	Trust Prime Minister	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	1	0.09	0.09
0	Not at All	120	10.87	10.96
1	Just a Little	221	20.02	30.98
2	Somewhat	336	30.43	61.41
3	A Lot	385	34.87	96.29
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	41	3.71	
	Total	1104	1104	

Table 3. Trust Prime Minister/National Assembly

Value Label	Trust Parliament/National Assembly	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	4	0.36	0.36
0	Not at all	184	16.67	17.03
1	Just a little	333	30.16	47.19
2	Somewhat	335	30.34	77.54
3	A Lot	220	19.93	97.46
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	28	2.54	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 4. Trust in National Electoral Commission

Value Label	Trust in National Electoral Commission	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	3	0.27	0.27
0	Not at All	581	52.63	52.9
1	Just a Little	209	18.93	71.83
2	Somewhat	173	15.67	87.5
3	A Lot	108	9.78	97.28
9	Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough	30	2.72	100
	Total	1104	100	

Frequency Distributions: Dominant Tribe

Table 1. Tribe/Ethnic Group

Value Label	Q79 Tribe/Ethnic Group	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	6	0.54	0.54
300	Kikuyu	208	18.84	19.38
301	Luo	135	12.23	31.61
302	Luhya	136	12.32	43.93
303	Kamba	116	10.51	54.44
304	Meru	55	4.98	59.42
305	Kisii	66	5.98	65.4
306	Kalenjin	128	11.59	76.99
307	Masai	21	1.9	78.89
308	Mijikenda	32	2.9	81.79
309	Taita	27	2.45	84.24
310	Somali	96	8.7	92.93
311	Pokot	12	1.09	94.02
312	Turkana	9	0.82	94.84
313	Bajuni	3	0.27	95.11
315	Teso	8	0.72	95.83
317	Embu	9	0.82	96.65
318	Borana	2	0.18	96.83
320	Arab	3	0.27	97.1
321	Swahili	4	0.36	97.46
322	Indian	2	0.18	97.64
323	Gabra	7	0.63	98.28
990	Kenyan Only or "Doesn't Think of Self in Those Terms"	6	0.54	98.82
995	Others	12	1.09	99.91
998	Refused	1	0.09	100
	Total	1104	100	

Frequency Distributions: Control Variables

Table 1. Gender

Value Label	Gender	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	Male	550	49.82	49.82
2	Female	554	50.18	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 2. Education

Value Label	Education	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-1	Missing	4	0.36	0.36
0	No Formal Schooling	63	5.71	6.07
1	Informal Schooling Only	24	2.17	8.24
2	Some Primary Schooling	202	18.3	26.54
3	Primary School Completed	216	19.57	46.11
4	Some Secondary School/High School	163	14.76	60.87
5	Secondary School Completed/High School	244	22.1	82.97
6	Post-Secondary Qualifications, Not University	151	13.68	96.65
7	Some University	10	0.91	97.55
8	University Completed	23	2.08	99.64
9	Post Graduate	4	0.36	100
	Total	1104	100	

Table 3. Age

Age	Freq.	Percent	Cum.	Age	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
18	26	2.36	2.36	51	7	0.63	87.77
19	34	3.08	5.43	52	13	1.18	88.95
20	37	3.35	8.79	53	4	0.36	89.31
21	17	1.54	10.33	54	6	0.54	89.86
22	44	3.99	14.31	55	5	0.45	90.31
23	35	3.17	17.48	56	14	1.27	91.58
24	33	2.99	20.47	57	6	0.54	92.12
25	54	4.89	25.36	58	14	1.27	93.39
26	40	3.62	28.99	59	2	0.18	93.57
27	33	2.99	31.97	60	15	1.36	94.93
28	52	4.71	36.68	61	4	0.36	95.29
29	37	3.35	40.04	62	4	0.36	95.65
30	57	5.16	45.2	63	7	0.63	96.29
31	24	2.17	47.37	64	2	0.18	96.47
32	45	4.08	51.45	65	7	0.63	97.1
33	26	2.36	53.8	66	1	0.09	97.19
34	21	1.9	55.71	67+	27	2.4	99.59
35	42	3.8	59.51	Don't Know	4	0.31	100
36	30	2.72	62.23	Total	1104	100	
37	27	2.45	64.67				
38	25	2.26	66.94				
39	10	0.91	67.84				
40	42	3.8	71.65				
41	25	2.26	73.91				
42	22	1.99	75.91				
43	13	1.18	77.08				
44	12	1.09	78.17				
45	26	2.36	80.53				
46	13	1.18	81.7				
47	13	1.18	82.88				
48	14	1.27	84.15				
49	15	1.36	85.51				
50	18	1.63	87.14				

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