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# Case Study from Inside a Presidential Campaign in the 100th New Hampshire Primary: Analyzing the Hillary for New Hampshire Field Organization

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## CASE STUDY FROM INSIDE A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN THE 100TH NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY: ANALYZING THE HILLARY FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE FIELD ORGANIZATION

A Capstone Experience/Thesis Project
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts wit
Honors College Graduate Distinction at Western Kentucky University

By

Christopher P. McKenna

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Western Kentucky University

2016

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ABSTRACT

On the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the New Hampshire primary, this case study analyzes a high

profile political campaign in order to add to the discussion on the extent to which

campaigns matter. The New Hampshire Primary is disproportionately important in the

nomination process as the nation's first primary; therefore, it is vital candidates perform

well in the Granite State. I use my experience as a fellow on former Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton's campaign in the Democratic Primary to critically analyze the campaign

organization in New Hampshire. This case study will attempt to answer how Secretary

Clinton's field organization affected the results of the New Hampshire primary and add

to the conversation on if, when, and to what extent campaigns matter.

Keywords: New Hampshire Primary, Nomination Process, Campaign, Field

Organizations, Grassroots, Direct-voter-contact

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I would also like to thank the Political Science department, faculty, and staff. I have had the pleasure of taking classes with a number of professors who have all challenged my ability to analyze situations and ask hard questions. In particular, I am grateful for the support of Dr. Scott Lasley, Dr. Joel Turner, and Dr. Timothy Rich for supporting this project and my development as a scholar.

Lastly, this project would not have been possible without my experience on the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign. I am very grateful for those who made the fellowship available. I am also thankful for those who made campaigning in the New Hampshire Primary a lifelong memory.

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## FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field 1: Political Science

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#### CHAPTER 1

#### INTRODUCTION

The United States holds more elections than any other democracy in the world.

Americans have the ability to vote for positions ranging from local School Board to

President of the United States. The number of elected positions and short terms of service
lead to frequent elections, and consequently, frequent campaigns. The scale of political
campaigns vary based on the office and not every position needs to run a campaign.

However, every campaign has the same goal: to mobilize voters and win an election.

Campaigns were typically conducted by armies of volunteers canvassing neighborhoods and talking to voters. Today, the rise in technology has turned the focus of campaign strategies from grassroots to netroots. Twenty-four hour news cycles and constant access to the internet has changed how campaigns communicate with voters and how people receive information about candidates, but a focus on knocking on doors and distributing leaflets still remains. This method of direct-voter-contact, conducted by the field organization, is often touted as the most important factors to political campaigns. Campaign manuals assert that "field wins" over everything else, and political reporters and pundits constantly compare the strength of candidate's field organizations when

predicting results.<sup>1</sup> After my experience working in the New Hampshire Primary I believe the power of field organizations and their impact on electoral results are overstated. Field organizations can have an influence, particularly in close elections, but it is impossible to claim that they are the sole or most important aspect of the campaign. The Clinton campaign brought in more volunteers and contacted more voters than the Sanders campaign, yet, lost by 22% of the vote.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, business tycoon Donald Trump's field organization was almost non-existent in New Hampshire but he commanded 35% of the vote.<sup>3</sup> There must be another factor more significant than field organization influencing these results. My study analyzes specific elements of the Secretary Clinton's field organization and makes suggestions based on what could have been improved; however, I am skeptical that even a flawless field organization could have overcome the popularity of the winning candidate.

#### **DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER**

The Rosetta Stone of this research came from Columbia researchers Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, whose survey of likely Ohio voters in the 1944 Presidential
election found that campaigns only reinforced voting predispositions or activated silent
predispositions.<sup>4</sup> In their findings, few voters switched their preference between May and
October, showing that general election campaigns were largely irrelevant. Exit polling

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Voter Contact Manuel: Field Wins Campaigns" *Democratic GAIN*. 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Bump, Phillip "Who's got the best ground game in New Hampshire? We may never know". The Washington Post. February 9, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Murray, Sara. "Trump's flashy Granite State ground game". CNN Politics. February 8, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lazarsfeld, et al. *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1954.

from the New Hampshire Democratic primary showed that over 50% of voters had their minds decided over a month before the primary.<sup>5</sup> These voters could have decided based on predispositions of the candidates or by earlier campaigning. Regardless, that population was not affected by the last four weeks of campaigning up to Election Day. This research was supported by a later publication, *The American Voter*, which showed people vote along party lines and were not persuaded by a campaign.<sup>6</sup> The partisanship factor should be less influential in a primary when both candidates are within the same party.

There remain other important indicators of voting behavior besides partisanship. In his publication, *The Responsible Electorate*, V. O. King suggests that voters based on their reflection of the past four years. If so, this too would diminish the effectiveness of a temporary political campaign. Then in *The Gamble*, John Sides and Lynn Vavreck argue that elections are overwhelmingly controlled by "fundamentals" which are established well before Election Day. These fundamentals are factors which the candidates themselves have no control over like their opponent, the endorsements they receive, the balance of the electorate, and the shape of the economy. Sides and Vavreck argue that it is difficult to out-campaign these contextual factors, even more so because other candidates' campaigns will neutralize your campaign if both are competing equally. Overall, literature on the effectiveness of campaigns is cynical about any significant

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> "New Hampshire Exit Polls" *The New York Times.* Web. 9 Feb 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Campbell, Angus. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 1960

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Key, V.O. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960.* Belknap: Harvard University. 1968

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Sides, J. and Vavreck, L. *The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential Election.* NJ: Princeton University Press. 2013

relationship. These studies focused predominantly on presidential elections and general elections which represents only a small portion of elections in the US.

There are arguments supporting the effectiveness of political campaigns. If exit polls show 53% of the electorate knew their vote a month before Election Day, that implies 47% were yet to decide and were potentially influenced by the campaign.

Campaigns are also much more significant in primaries when partisanship is a not a factor. Primaries are driven not by partisan affiliation, but by expectations and policy preferences according to Larry Bartel, who points out how successful primary campaigns benefitting from early victories and momentum.

Evidence shows campaigns do have an effect on election results in the right circumstances. Campaigns will likely have the largest effect on non-partisan, low-turnout elections. The New Hampshire primary is less influenced by party identification but has relatively high turnout. With partisanship aside the campaigns in the 2016 New Hampshire primary should have a higher effect on the outcomes than we would see in most other campaigns.

#### MY PERSPECTIVE

As a fellow on the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign from December 2015 – February 9, 2016, I worked on the field staff of the highly regarded "Clinton Machine". My position on the campaign was voluntary and my tasks were conducting direct voter

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Bartels, Larry. *Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns*. Vol. 79, No. 3 (1985): 804-815.

contact (i.e. knocking on doors, making phone calls), data entry, and miscellaneous administrative duties. As a volunteer I had limited access to the number of doors knocked, phones called, and volunteers recruited by the campaign organization but this information was collected and utilized for setting goals. I was also not involved in strategic decision-making. This paper is focused from my experience in the field, so many of the decisions made by the campaign headquarters in Brooklyn go beyond the scope of this study.

For this study I utilized my experience, campaign materials, and interviews from campaign staff and volunteers to analyze the strategies employed by the Hillary for New Hampshire field organization. This study from within the campaign should provide a new perspective for the discussion on when and how political campaigns matter. I witnessed an organization, which I believe was an excellent example of a grassroots campaign, lose by twenty-two percent. The inability of Clinton's campaign to win after speaking to more voters than her opponent suggests that there are hard limitations to the effectiveness of field organizations.

#### CHAPTER 2

#### **NEW HAMPSHIRE**

New Hampshire has a unique political climate. The relatively small state has the third largest legislative body in the democratic world, does not vote consistently for one party, and is home to one of the biggest libertarian movements in the country. <sup>10</sup> The Granite State has traditionally been a Republican stronghold amongst its New England neighbors. The Republican Party has generally controlled the Governorship, Senate, and Congressional seats for the last 150 years; however, today the tendency to lean-right has dissolved. Each party controls one seat in the United States Senate, one in the House of Representatives, and the Governor, Maggie Hassan, is a Democrat. While New Hampshire supported George W. Bush in 2000, it voted for John Kerry in 2004 and Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. Republicans won big in the 2010 midterm elections, but in recent national elections Democrats have had much more success. <sup>11</sup>

Local elections in New Hampshire are still in flux but favor Republicans. The Republican Party currently controls the State Senate and House of Representatives, has done so for all but six years since 1992.<sup>12</sup> The Senate is comprised of only 24 seats. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> "New Hampshire House Facts" New Hampshire General Court. 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Dugan, Andrew. "The State of New Hampshire: Politically in Flux". Gallup. Oct 24, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> "New Hampshire House of Representatives" *Ballotpedia*. N.d. https://ballotpedia.org/New Hampshire House of Representatives#History

house has 400 seats to represent the 1.3 million person population. Members of the House are re-elected every two years and receive only \$200 for their term; therefore, it is much more a service to your community then it is a career.<sup>13</sup>

One of the more interesting political demographics in the New Hampshire electorate is the "Free Staters". The Free State movement is a group of people, nearly 11,000 on an online petition and several hundred who have moved to New Hampshire, organizing to create a libertarian paradise. <sup>14</sup> Their goal is to take advantage of the largely accessible House of Representatives in order to create new laws following their ideology. This demographic posed little influence to the Democratic Primary but certainly adheres to the uniqueness of New Hampshire and wholeheartedly follows the state's motto "Live Free or Die".

If New Hampshire is at a crossroads politically, the opposite can be said about the states demographics. The population is 94% white, has less unemployment than the national average, and significantly less poverty. In regards to the nomination process these statistics were not in Secretary Clinton's favor. She could usually bank on the support of minority populations which carried her through southern states. Drug abuse was the most important issue to New Hampshire then jobs, and the economy. These issues would alter the candidates' platforms and brought over-prescription and addiction therapy into more serious campaigning conversations.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> "New Hampshire House Facts" New Hampshire General Court. 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Murphey, Time. "Meet the Libertarian Utopians Trying to Take Over New Hampshire". *Mother Jones*. Oct. 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> "Quick Facts: New Hampshire" United States Census Bureau. N.d.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> DiStaso, John. "WMUR poll: Drug abuse now most serious problem facing NH" WMUR. Oct 7, 2015.

#### THE PRIMARY

New Hampshire residents take pride in hosting the first primary in the presidential election cycle. For Democrats, the state awards 24 delegates determined by raw, popular vote and 8 more "superdelegates". These superdelegates are usually individuals who are involved in the party and seen as the party's protectors. Their vote at the convention is not tied to or affected by the primary results like most other delegates.

Despite New Hampshire's small population and delegate count the primary receives a disproportionate amount of time and attention from candidates and media. Being first, New Hampshire has developed a reputation as a signal for how the rest of the election may go. This has been the case since the late 1970's after the McGovern-Fraser reforms (1968) transferred control over the party's nomination from party bosses to the electorate and made primaries, which used to be beauty pageants, more significant.<sup>17</sup>

This year will be the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the New Hampshire primary –first held March 14, 1916.<sup>18</sup> The contest in 1916 was a full week later than Indiana's and was on the same day as Wisconsin's so it tied for the second primary held that year.<sup>19</sup> Since then, New Hampshire has maintained its first-in-the-nation tradition. In order to do so the state passed legislation in 1979 setting the date as the first Tuesday in March and at least one week before any other primary. The language was later revised to reserve the ability to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Cohen et al, *The Party Decides*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> "New Hampshire Primary Fast Facts" *The New Hampshire Primary*. Web. 11 Mar, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Smith, Andrew E. & Moore, David W. "Five Myths About the New Hampshire Primary" *The Washington Post.* February 5, 2016.

set the date with the secretary of state. Today, after revisions to protect from encroaching states the legislation reads:

The presidential primary election shall be held on the second Tuesday in March or on a date selected by the secretary of state which is 7 days or more immediately preceding the date on which any other state shall hold a similar election, whichever is earlier, of each year when a president of the United States is to be elected or the year previous<sup>20</sup>

The Granite State is used to forecast the rest of the party's nomination process. While it is not always an accurate predictor, New Hampshire does narrow the field of candidates competing. A strong performance in Iowa or New Hampshire is critical for continuing in the rest of the primary season. No Republican candidate in the last 40 years has lost both states and received the GOP nomination. Only one candidate in either party has lost both and become President, Bill Clinton.<sup>21</sup> When President Clinton failed to win either of the first two states in 1992 he did finish a few points above what polls predicted for his New Hampshire performance.<sup>22</sup> His relatively strong performance was enough to propel him forward into the southern states where he would have an edge and also earn the nickname "comeback kid".<sup>23</sup>

In another instance, a surprising New Hampshire performance by anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy from Minnesota led to incumbent President Lyndon Johnson dropping out of the race. As the sitting President, Johnson was favored by a number of endorsers and the party machine but only earned 49% of the vote to McCarthy's 42%<sup>24</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> "New Hampshire Codes 653:9 Presidential Primary Election" *New Hampshire General Court.* August 8, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Montanaro, Domenico. "How Predictive Are Iowa And New Hampshire?" NPR. January 31, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Toner, Robin. "THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: New Hampshire; BUSH JARRED IN FIRST PRIMARY; TSONGAS WINS DEMOCRATIC VOTE". *The New York Times*. February 19, 1992.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Rudin, Ken "Remembering Eugene McCarthy". NPR. December 16, 2005

The results of the New Hampshire Primary showed President Johnson's support weakening and he suspended his campaign two weeks later before any other primaries.

The importance of a strong finish in New Hampshire makes it a popular place for candidates to visit. In my experience I found that Granite Staters expect to see candidates in person and are often underwhelmed by the opportunity. Senator Sanders and Secretary Clinton both spent a significant amount of time in the state. According to NBC Chicago the candidates held 93 and 86 events respectively. Secretary Clinton also had a team of surrogates trekking through New Hampshire and speaking on her behalf including Senators Al Franken and Corey Booker, Governors Terry McAuliffe and Howard Dean, and her husband President Bill Clinton. Surrogates could be used to persuade voters or a means to bring more volunteers into the office and expand the organization.

The Clinton campaign understood that New Hampshire Primary results are important so they opened a large amount of field offices in order to perform well.

Common practice suggests grassroots campaigning is the most effective way to persuade and mobilize voters; therefore, the field organizations should be emphasized in important states like New Hampshire. Indiana has five times the population of New Hampshire and more electoral delegates but less than half the amount of field offices. That suggests the campaign is more focused on grassroots campaigning in New Hampshire than other states. A deeper examination of the effectiveness of Clinton's campaign organization will

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Fortier, Marc. "Interactive: 2016 New Hampshire Primary Candidate Tracker" *NBC Chicago*. Dec, 13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> "Hillary for America". *Democracy in Action*. Accessed May, 1 2016.

help to address any differences the emphasis on field organizations and grassroots campaigning made on the results.

#### THE STATE OF THE RACE

The New Hampshire primary had a significant impact on both party's in the 2016 nomination process. The Republican Party which began with a 16-candidate field narrowed to 9 by New Hampshire. Several of the candidates who were trailing nationally relied on support in New Hampshire to keep their campaigns alive. Among the Republican candidates that invested heavily in New Hampshire were Governors Chris Christie (NJ), John Kasich (OH), and Jeb Bush (FL). These three combined for a total of 490 events in the Granite State since June, 2014.<sup>27</sup> These events, commonly called town halls, were designed to maximize the amount of voters candidates had the opportunity to come into contact with. Following the ideology of grassroots campaigning, meeting more voters should theoretically have led to more electoral support. However, of those three candidates one received 7% of the vote and another received 11%.<sup>28</sup> The voting results suggest the town halls did not have as significant role in voter preference or mobility as anticipated.

Three Republican candidates, Governors Jim Gilmore and Chris Christie, and former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, dropped out immediately after New Hampshire when all failed to reach the 10% threshold for winning delegates. Governor

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> "2016 New Hampshire Primary Results" *NHPR*. February 10, 2016.

Bush also had a relatively disappointing performance and only earned 11% of the vote.<sup>29</sup> He suspended his campaign in the following two weeks after similar results in South Carolina. Governor Kasich, who earned 15% of the vote, framed the results as a victory and remained in the race.<sup>30</sup> Governor Kasich did not receive a remarkably high portion of the vote and only received four delegates, but at the time he was polling between second and third in New Hampshire and in single-digits nationally.<sup>31</sup> A strong, second place finish that defied most expectations provided his campaign some strength and legitimacy to continue. The winner of the New Hampshire Primary, Businessman Donald Trump, is now poised to be the Republican Party's nominee.

Secretary Clinton and Senator Sanders from neighboring Vermont were the only two major candidates left competing for the Democratic Party's nomination. An aggregation of polls showed a close election between the two until Sanders began to pull away in January.<sup>32</sup> Both candidates had history with New Hampshire that would shape the way the campaign progressed.

Senator Sanders' enjoyed a near "home-field advantage" during the race despite not actually being from New Hampshire. In conversations with voters I found that many felt obligated to vote for Sanders because they either had a personal relationship with him or because he was from the state next-door. Vermont is very similar geographically and demographically, but politically it is much more progressive than New Hampshire. New Hampshire Democrats have a tendency to back candidates from neighboring states. Since

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> "New Hampshire Primary Results" *The New York Times*. April 18. 2016.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> "New Hampshire 2016 Republican Primary" Real Clear Politics. Feb. 9, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> "New Hampshire 2016 Democratic Primary" Real Clear Politics. Feb. 9, 2016.

1968, every year a Democrat from Massachusetts, Vermont, or Maine that ran for president has won the New Hampshire primary. This list includes Senator Edmund Muskie, Governor Michael Dukakis, Senator Paul Tsongas, Senator John Kerry, and finally Senator Sanders. The two exceptions to this "friendly-neighbor" trend are Senator Ted Kennedy who lost to incumbent President Jimmy Carter, and Governor Howard Dean from Vermont who lost to John Kerry from Massachusetts.

The relationship suggests a candidate from a neighboring state will win New Hampshire unless running against a candidate from another neighboring state. This is just a small sample and all candidates considered were already relatively popular. It would be unfair to allocate all of Senator Sanders' support to being from Vermont, but it should definitely be considered a factor in the race.

Secretary Clinton had her own advantages in New Hampshire. She had a winning campaign organization in the Granite State in 2008, and her husband President Bill Clinton had an organization there years before. Clinton was an underdog going into the New Hampshire primary in 2008. Though she led national polls for months before the nomination process started, then-Senator Obama eclipsed her support in New Hampshire and led by 8 points just one month before the primary. After winning the Iowa Caucus, President Obama gained even stronger support and was poised to win New Hampshire. The record-setting voter turnout tipped the scales in favor of Clinton in New Hampshire, 2008.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> "New Hampshire Democratic Party" Real Clear Politics. Jan 8, 2008.

The official turnout was 287,556 which is 65,000 more votes than the previous record set in 2004.<sup>34</sup> The demographics that turned-out the most were women (57%) and people over 40 years of age (67%).<sup>35</sup> Secretary Clinton commanded the support from both of those demographics which are the same base supporters for her 2016 campaign. Secretary Clinton also won among those who thought experience was the most important trait, the economy was the biggest issue, and those who thought "the candidate cares about people like me" was important.

After coming in third in Iowa and losing the women's vote, the win in New Hampshire put the Clinton campaign on a more positive trajectory into the long nomination process. Having that previous experience campaigning and competing in New Hampshire eased the process of establishing an organization in 2016. After President Bill Clinton's comeback in 1992 and win in 1996 the family has reportedly maintained a good relationship with the state which Secretary Clinton often referenced in speeches.

As you know my husband and I are pretty fond of this state. We have made friends starting back in 1991 who have been with us year after year; they are people we care about, people we know that are making a difference in this state. I just got to give your Governor a big hug as she was heading out the door.<sup>36</sup>

The Clinton campaign used these connections to help establish and strengthen the New Hampshire organization. Individuals who were friends or supporters of the Clintons helped locate important campaign office spaces and identified community leaders. Secretary Clinton also received endorsements from New Hampshire Governor

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Montanaro, Domenico. "New Hampshire Turnout Breaks Records, But Not on the Democratic Side" *NPR*. February 10, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> "Profile of the New Hampshire Primary Voters" *The New York Times.* N.d.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Clinton, Hillary "Get Out To Vote" Nashua Town Hall. January, 30 2016.

Maggie Hassan, Senator Jeanne Shaheen,, and several Democratic state senators.<sup>37</sup> These endorsements provided local expertise and the opportunity to directly influence votes. Governor Hassan and Shaheen are very popular among Granite State Democrats and their support of Secretary Clinton is not trivial. On several occasions I observed endorsers inspire volunteers before a canvass or speaking to crowds on why Clinton was the best candidate.

Senator Sanders distanced himself in polls in the last 6-8 weeks peaking at nearly a 20 point lead less than a week before the primary.<sup>38</sup> In reaction to the polls the Clinton campaign continued to compete in the state but changed their messaging to embrace the uphill battle.

A lot of political pundits have been opining, as political pundits do, that I should have just skipped coming to New Hampshire because, well, you know, their argument is –and it's got – it's got some strength to it. Their argument is, look, you are behind here. I am. You're in your opponent's backyard. I just could not ever skip New Hampshire.<sup>39</sup>

Secretary Clinton had always been the frontrunner in the campaign –including in New Hampshire— through the summer and fall of 2015. The Clinton campaign repositioning itself as the underdog was a strategic move to brace for defeat. Like Governor Kasich, managing expectations would be vital for benefitting even from a loss in New Hampshire. Secretary Clinton's comment referenced above makes Senator Sanders' victory seem inevitable. Setting the expectations low makes it more difficult for Sanders to gain momentum from a victory and allows Secretary Clinton's campaign to

<sup>39</sup> Clinton, Hillary "Clinton, Sanders Face Off in New Hampshire". CNN Transcripts. February 3, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Bycoffee, Andrew. "The Endorsement Primary" FiveThirtyEight. March 23, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> "New Hampshire Democratic Primary". Real Clear Politics Polls.

embrace any performance that was better than expected. Regardless of the messaging, the campaign sent staff from headquarters in Brooklyn to New Hampshire in a last-stitch effort to knock doors and make phone calls to mobilize voters. The family also spent the last week in New Hampshire hosting get-out-the-vote events across the state. It was clear the campaign was competing until the very end whether their goal was to win or lessen the blow of an unavoidable loss.

The New Hampshire primary yields the perfect scenario for my study. New Hampshire is a state where retail politics still rule, and voters expect to receive contact from the campaigns. A well-organized field staff should reveal the best campaign tactics and what degree, if any, the campaign made a difference in the election. Secretary Clinton anticipated running for president again in 2016, so her campaign should ideally be well-organized. Finally, party identification is typically the most significant trait people base their vote on. With partisanship aside in an open-primary voter persuasion and mobilization efforts could theoretically have a larger effect on the results. These factors are good context for my study on the effectiveness of the field organizations.

#### CHAPTER 3

#### THE FIELD ORGANIZATION

The "campaign organization" refers to nearly all departments and responsibilities of a campaign. The finance, communications, technology, and legal offices are all part of the organization that helps the candidate win an election. The cliché idea of knocking on doors, making phone calls, and distributing yard signs that people often associate with political campaigns are methods of direct voter contact conducted by the field organization.

The field organization's main purpose is to build the network of supporters, persuade potential voters, and get the right people out on Election Day. Field operatives' offices are scattered across the state or district, not in the campaign headquarters. These offices are usually temporary or rented spaces decorated with homemade signs and leftover pizzas. Their primary purpose is to administer direct voter contact by sending volunteers out to canvas or bringing people in for phonebanks.

According to former Hillary for New Hampshire fellow Marcus Stevens, "the field office was a place where all of our staff and volunteers could come together and work for our candidate. It helps puts names to faces and create a community within the campaign". <sup>40</sup> Volunteers had a number of reasons to spend their time making unpaid

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Stevenson, Marcus. Interview with the Author, Apr 4, 2016. Transcript.

phone calls for the candidate. Some were motivated by the issues and other by the social interactions. Thus, field offices became not only a location to launch canvases, but also a setting for people to socialize, or "fulfill their civic duty" by volunteering.

#### THE PEOPLE IN THE FIELD

The staff running field operations for political campaigns are typically a very specific demographic of people. Those who work on campaigns are young, mobile, and have no significant commitments. Campaigns usually require relocating and are incredibly time and attention consuming, so they can be unhealthy for anyone with serious relationships. Organizers in the Hillary for New Hampshire Dover office were on average 23 years old and a recent college graduate. That was typical for all campaign offices across the state.

A campaign organizer is an entry-level job on a field organization that does not demand a significant amount of previous experience. Organizers work in field offices and are responsible for recruiting of volunteers and speaking with voters. One study of campaign organizers found that in a sample: 62% were single, 82% were college graduates, and 17% had advanced degrees. This study is relatively dated and it is likely that the demographics have changed at least slightly (potentially even more would have college degrees) but it serves as a testament to the type of person who works on a campaign staff. The qualifications of an organizer on the Hillary for America campaign have little required skills or background. Applicants should: have a great attitude and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Kayden, Xandra. Campaign Organizations. Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Copmany. 1978

energy, be well-organized, have experience building coalitions, and be committed to electing Hillary Clinton.<sup>42</sup> These positions are relatively low-skill, high-commitment jobs, usually filled by recent college graduates.

Fellows are another important position on the field organization. In my experience, and the experience of two other fellows on the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign, the position was responsible for canvasing, conducting phone calls, entering data, and recruiting more volunteers in order to grow the network. Fellows are typically a few years younger than organizers and serve as their apprentices. Campaigns are incredibly task-oriented which means fellows are often responsible for doing the same jobs repetitively. They are not a part of any decision making but are granted with more responsibility, and empowered more than an average volunteer. The field organization was able to reach a significantly higher amount of voters utilizing fellows. We were held to goals of knocking on 315 doors and making over 500 calls a week. There were over forty fellows across the state and the efforts of all of these college-age volunteers together could have had an impact on a close election.

Surrogates are not particularly part of the organization, but they are brought in almost like a contractor to serve a unique role on the campaigns. Surrogates are substitute speakers who advocate on the candidates behalf. Though Secretary Clinton often spoke at three events a day, it is impossible for her to be in two places at the same time. Surrogates assumed a role to bring more people from the community into the field offices to either persuade them to support Secretary Clinton or activate new volunteers.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> "Organizers" Hillary for America. April 4, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Vance, Megan. Interview with the author. April 6, 2016.

Secretary Clinton's campaign, similar to her 2008 efforts and other candidates before her, used her family as surrogates to speak on her behalf. President Bill Clinton and Chelsea Clinton both held individual events around the state to express why they were, unsurprisingly, supporting Secretary Clinton. Other than family, Clinton also had an army of big name surrogates in politics and entertainment. Just a few were: Governors Howard Dean and Terry McAuliffe, Senators Al Franken and Corey Booker, Congresswoman Gabby Giffords, and pop-culture icons Abby Wambach and Lena Dunham.

Surrogates benefit a campaign by expanding the amount of people the organization comes into contact with. Abby Wambach brought in over fifty people who would likely have not visited the campaigns office otherwise. Whether the people in the audience were persuaded to vote, or if they signed up to canvas with the campaign, the surrogate attracted them in ways the field organization would not have been able to otherwise.

Often times the individuals who were invited to see surrogates were typically already known supporters; undecided voters were welcomed but not marketed to as much. The surrogate's speech was a recital of the campaigns message and an encouragement to sign up for more canvass or phone bank shifts. If increasing volunteerism was the only goal I think the surrogates were effective, but only marginally. Every event was designed to have attendees either make phone calls or canvas immediately before or after. We were able to contact significantly more voters on the nights Bill Clinton, Howard Dean, or Terry McAulife held events in the office. However, we were had to constantly train new volunteers who came to see candidates, and the

surrogates influence did not endure. The amount of canvas shifts did go up for already regular volunteers, but the retention rate of new volunteers was not high. So, although surrogates have an effect of the voter-contact rate for the day they visited, the contacts on that date may not have been high-quality and the lasting influence of surrogate's speeches is questionable.

The last important part of the field organization is the state level directors. Mike Vlacich was the director of the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign. Vlacich previously managed Jeanne Shaheen's reelection campaign and served as the Executive Director of the New Hampshire Democratic Party. The Communications Director and Political Director also held their same respective positions on the Shaheen for Senate election in 2014 and leadership roles in the New Hampshire Democratic Party. The Shaheen election in 2014 was close, but still a win in a midterm election which few Democrats did well. The individuals running Clinton's campaign in New Hampshire all had extensive experience campaigning in the New Hampshire electorate. The organization was clearly able to bring in the best political minds. From organizers, to surrogates, and campaign directors, the Clinton campaign had the knowledge and resources to run a strong ground campaign.

#### HOW IS THE FIELD STAFF ORGANIZED

There have been multiple phases of campaign styles over time. The first two developed were the personal and professional campaigns. A personal campaign has a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Seelye, Katherine. "In New Hampshire, Jeanne Shaheen Beats Scott Brown to Keep Senate Seat" *New York Times.* Nov. 4 2014.

relatively homogenous staff of organizers who have some background in campaigns and are willing to mold to the candidates direction and organization.<sup>45</sup> A professionalized campaign emphasizes distinctions between levels of decision makers, access to all newcampaign technologies, and clear task-specialized positions. 46 Organizers in personalized campaigns are chosen based on their background and similarity to the candidate. On the other hand, staff for a professional campaign are chosen based on their ability to perform a task.

The professional era of campaigns introduced campaign "consultants" who have played a huge role in running campaigns ever since. Consultants work for campaigns as a trade and are experts hired for running operations. The 1980's political party's control over candidates and campaigns dwindled as the number of political consultants grew, but also because consultants were bringing new technologies and strategies to candidates that parties never invested in.<sup>47</sup> Today quality consultants are highly sought after positions. Enough so that being a consultant led to Dick Morris, George Stephanopoulos, and Lee Atwater becoming household names. Consultants run campaigns as a profession and are placed at the head of organizations which are typically, very hierarchical.

#### HOW DECISIONS ARE MADE

The Clinton campaign met every description of what a professional campaign should be. Organizers were all experienced and dedicated to the candidate and the

45 "Campaign Organizations"

46 Ibid. pg. 7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Johnson, Jason. *Political Consultants and Campaigns*. Philadelphia: Westview Press. 2012

decision-making process was clear and hierarchical. The organization was designed so decisions were made by a few people at the top, and the field was responsible for implementing those decisions. This strategy allows every field office in the state to be coordinated and spread the same message. This is reinforced by both morning and nightly calls every day to ensure every office is operating well and meeting goals. Calls were also utilized to share tactics between field offices and build a sense of comradery within the organization.

The Campaign's messaging, scripts, and organizer's goals were all controlled at the state level or higher. Goals set by the state directors hold the whole organization to the same standard and demand a high quality performance but could potentially have taken regional differences into account more. Goals for "number of doors knocked" and "number of volunteers recruited" were adjusted for urban areas like Manchester or rural areas like Keen, but that was the extent to any difference in treatment of regions.

Literature suggests that in modern campaigns the information is available to target certain sub-populations with different messages. More focus on regional differences within the state could have emphasized these differences and utilized microtargeting. Microtargeting in New Hampshire was either non-existent or conducted outside the field offices, possibly by direct-mailings. At times the campaigns did seem overly hierarchical. One fellow commenting on the decision making process said:

I believe the system was fairly hierarchical. Field offices across New Hampshire seemed to have good relationships, but everyone seemed to be following orders and have no idea why it was happening or what would happen next. There was definitely a lack of communications between each different ranking<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> "Stevens, Marcus interview"

Ultimately, lack of regional autonomy would not have caused a significant difference in election results –especially 22%–and to an extent hierarchy should be expected, especially on a campaign of this magnitude. The field organization brought in a significant amount of volunteers and evidence shows they reached more New Hampshire residents than Sanders campaign. <sup>49</sup> This suggests having a more robust field organization does not in itself guarantee a successful campaign. In fact, the 22% difference suggests the Clinton's field organization had a very weak effect compared to other factors in this election. Running a successful campaign does not guarantee a victory. I believe the Clinton campaign had the best people in the field and performed well, but evidence suggests the results were not determined by field offices or persuasion conversations with voters.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Tsai, Diane and Frizzel, Sam. "Follow Clinton and Sanders Supports As They Knock On Doors in New Hampshire". *Time.* Jan. 18 2016.

#### CHAPTER 4

#### GET OUT THE VOTE

Brandon Todd wore holes in his shoes and shed 22 pounds by canvassing neighborhoods campaigning for the Washington D.C. Ward 4 Council seat. In an interview he told the Washington Post his strategy was "Knocking on doors, meeting voters, making sure they turn out to the polls". <sup>50</sup> Brandon understood that winning support from voters was not the only step of an election; he also had to get people out to the polls. That last step of the campaign which candidates focus on mobilizing voters is called "Get out the vote" (GOTV).

One volunteer at a GOTV training seminar in Dover, New Hampshire testified about her experience on the Clinton campaign eight years prior. According to her, the Obama team thought they had the election won after Iowa. On Election Day they were playing football in the streets while Clinton's campaign spent the afternoon reminding people to vote and driving them to the polls. Clinton ultimately won that election by a narrow margin which the volunteer assumed was because of their GOTV effort. Though her story was inspiring it is difficult to statistically show how the results of that election were determined by the Clinton campaign's mobilizing efforts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Hauslohner, Abigail "In Ward 4, candidate repeats proven strategy of knocking on doors" *The Washington Post*. April 4, 2015.

GOTV only focuses on mobilizing a section of the electorate –those who you are confident will vote for you. It is clear that GOTV efforts will only make a relevant difference in extremely close campaigns, and often times, it is hard for even a strong campaign GOTV-effort to make that difference because theoretically the other candidate will be mobilizing their voters as well. In the case of Kentucky's 2015 Gubernatorial primary, out of 214,000 votes cast, businessman Matt Bevin won by a slim margin of 83 votes. <sup>51</sup> In this case the next candidate, James Comer, could have potentially won by mobilizing just 100 more people to vote. GOTV efforts will have more impact on close elections that rely on turnout, the effect they have on blowout elections is negligent.

#### **VOTER IDENTIFICATION**

A campaign may purchase information on individual's voter registration and likely voting patterns. Using voter information campaigns decide who to contact through canvassing and phone banks. In New Hampshire, the Clinton campaign targeted democrats and independents. Independents in the Granite State are officially called "undeclared" and make up about 40% of the states electorate.<sup>52</sup>

Campaigns are structured differently for primaries than general elections. Party ID is not flawless, but helpful for assuming which candidate an individual is likely to vote for in a general election. Discovering candidate preference has to be more sophisticated in a primary campaign. The field organization had access to volunteer lists

<sup>51</sup> Arnold, Joe "Bevin declares victory, Comer not conceding after recanvass". WHAS 11. May 28, 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Healy, Patrick and Flegenheimer, Matt. "New Hampshire Independents May Control the Fates of Trump and Sanders" *The New York Times*. Dec 30, 2015.

for the 2008 Clinton or Obama campaigns and donor lists, but occasionally former volunteers changed their mind and supported Senator Sanders. The most effective way we identified our supporters was simply asking via a neighborhood canvas or phone call.

I was in New Hampshire for eight weeks, the last two of which were during GOTV. The former six weeks I canvassed but with a different script. These early voter contact scripts focused on voter preference and persuasion; finding out which candidate voters are planning on supporting and convincing those who were undecided. After months of refining the campaign had a good idea of was planning on voting in their favor. The GOTV efforts focused on ensuring those voters make it to the polls.

#### **GOTV MESSAGING**

Voters in New Hampshire do not typically forget when Election Day is after months of campaigning, media, and candidate attention. Republican turnout of 284,120 votes was the highest in the primary's history, far beyond the previous record of 248,475.<sup>53</sup> Democrat's turnout was 250,974 votes which was *second* highest in history. That is nearly 30,000 votes behind the record-setting 2008 election, but still over 30,000 votes above 2004 primary which is the third highest turnout in history. The reason people do not vote is more likely because they do not feel compelled to than because they don't know how or when, but a portion of population still falls into that category.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Montanaro, Domenico. "New Hampshire Turnout Breaks Records, But Not on the Democratic Side" *NPR*. February 10, 2016.

Campaigns need to send messages that convince potential voters to take action and cast their ballot. There is a different type of messaging appropriate for GOTV compared to the rest of the campaign. GOTV literature (*image 1*) focuses on getting people to vote. The Hillary for New Hampshire GOTV-specific campaign materials focused on making it easier by providing the location of their polling station, voter ID laws, and other important information. That language should be utilized in the week before Election Day, but for the rest of the campaign the language should be focused on convincing undecided voters to support your candidate.

To an extent, however, the language content in GOTV messaging does not matter, the quality is significantly more important. Donald Green and Alan Gerber found when conducting phone calls to mobilize voters, the message –whether civil liberty, close election, neighborhood solidarity— is not as impactful as the delivery. Further experiments support the findings. Regardless of the content of the message, the most important factor of its effectiveness is how personal it is; whether it is delivered conversationally or rather robotically.

#### HOW TO GET-OUT-THE-VOTE

Candidates and consultants are constantly trying to maximize resources like time and financing. Campaigns often turn into big games of opportunity costs deciding what the most effective allocation of resources is "one part mailings to three parts phone calls" or "two parts television to two parts phone calls"? The rule of thumb is the more personal

 $^{\rm 54}$  "Lessons from GOTV Experiments". YALE Institution for Social and Policy Studies.

the method of contact, the better.<sup>55</sup> Since the turn of the century there has been a big increase in randomized experiments that show the effect of each GOTV method. The tests were synthesized best by Professors Donald Green and Alan Gerber from Yale University in their book *Get Out The Vote: How To Increase Voter Turnout*.

Green and Gerber are leading researchers in the field of voter mobilization. Their studies compare four methods of voter mobilization: door-to-door canvases, leaflets, direct mail, and phone banks to determine which is most effective. One of the largest of randomized experiments, conducted by Donald Green and Alan Gerber, tested all GOTV efforts and compared turnout of a control group who received no form of voter mobilization contact to those who received phone calls, direct mailings, or contact by door-to-door canvasing. Green and Gerber found an 8.8% increase in voter turnout among voters who received any contact with a 2.6% standard error. <sup>56</sup> Therefore, studies do show that GOTV drives can increase turnout. Which GOTV method should be used depends on the election and resources available to the campaign.

### CANVASING

Walking door-to-door through neighborhoods seems inherently old-fashioned when a television add could connect with more people in thirty seconds than a canvasser could in a month. It is without question that technology is changing the way campaigns broadcast to audiences. Hillary Clinton has nearly 6 million Twitter 'followers' and 3

<sup>55</sup> Green, Donald and Gerber, Alan. *Get Out The Vote*. Washington DC: Brookings Institute. 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Ibid. 115

million members on her Facebook page that receive updates from her or the campaign. But we still walk for hours through neighborhoods, so obviously there *has to be* benefits or campaigns should not still be doing it. Canvasing was the most preferred way to contact voters on the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign, and according to Green and Gerber, canvassing is the most effective way to mobilize voters.<sup>57</sup>

A study conducted by David Nickerson showed that canvassing yielded a 7.1% increase with a standard error of 2%.<sup>58</sup> Nickerson's study included data from 6 different cities to ensure that the results were not affected by location or competitiveness of the election. Instead, the largest factors on the effectiveness of canvasing were whether the area typically had high or low turnout and whether the canvassers talked to likely voters or not.<sup>59</sup> The study also suggests that it is hardest to significantly improve voting rates in areas that have remarkably high or low voting rates. Green and Gerber looked at a number of studies in their research and an aggregating of the results suggests that canvasing has a 5.2% effect on voter mobilization with a 1% standard error.<sup>60</sup>

Canvassing may be the slowest method of connecting with voters, a normal canvas reaches about twelve voters per hour, but it is the most effective in terms of mobilizing voters. A potential voter having a face-to-face conversation with a member of the campaign creates a personal relationship with the campaign which might be enough to persuade them to vote, and preferably, for that candidate. Personal stories and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Green and Gerber. Get Out The Vote. Pg. 35

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Nickerson, David. "Memo on the Effectiveness of Messages Used in Door-to-Door Canvassing Prior to the 2001 Elections" unpublished ms. Yale University. 2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Green and Gerber. Get Out The Vote. pg. 115

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Ibid. 117

<sup>61</sup> Green and Geber. Get Out The Vote. pg. 94

testimonies from the supporter on why they are supporting a candidate are more compelling and relatable than a radio advertisement too.

Campaign literature recommends a number of practical tools such as utilizing unions and college students as canvassers, canvassing as a means for recruiting more volunteers, using a canvas to collect contact information of supporters, and even having the candidate themselves canvas with a predetermined route. 62 Organizers on Secretary Clinton's campaign had either previous campaign experience or training which would have made them aware of these tips. The campaign benefitted from labor and teachers unions from Boston, college students back from winter break, and even aids sent from their congressman's office on Capitol Hill. The most common demographic of canvassers on Clinton's campaign, representative of her most common supports, were people over forty and often women. Over the course of the campaign the Secretary Clinton's organization reached more voters than Sanders'. 63 However, during the GOTV phase we concentrated solely on supporters, which, even with remarkable turnout would not have been enough to win the election

#### PHONE-BANKING

Phone calls allow the campaign to reach more potential voters in less time than canvassing and are often favored by volunteers who are either uncomfortable or incapable of walking door-to-door. It was the campaign's second most preferred way to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Shea, Daniel and Burton Michael John. *Campaign Craft*. Westport, CT: Paeger Publishers. 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> "New Hampshire: Trump and Sanders Hold Leads" *Monomouth University*. February 7, 2016.

contact voters because it retained some personal connection though less so then canvassing. Phone calls are also extremely cost-effective. They are relatively cheap and can be held anywhere from field offices to volunteer's living rooms. In the GOTV phase, the campaign wanted to ensure it contacted every likely voter in their database. While canvassing would be the most effective method of mobilizing those voters, it would be hard to reach every voter on Election Day without the use of phone calls.

Phone calls are a staple of political campaigns, so logically they would be an effective tool for mobilizing voters, but this is only true in some cases. The degree to which phone calls improve voter turnout depends on how personal the message is. Like canvassing, a personal conversation between a voter and a campaign volunteer or staffer can create a relationship strong enough to mobilize a voter. That effect is not seen when phone calls are prerecorded "robo calls" or calls from hired from a commercial phone bank. Studies show robo-calls make no distinguishable difference in voter mobilization, and commercial phone banks effect is so close to zero (about 250 calls for 1 additional vote) that it is insignificant.<sup>64</sup>

Phone calls made by volunteers had a much more significant, but their impact on voter mobilization is difficult to predict. An aggregation of studies shows volunteer phone-banks will turn out 1 additional vote for every 35 calls, yet some studies have shown as little as 1 vote per 50 calls.<sup>65</sup> The benefit of volunteers is that they are more relatable than robo-calls and commercial phone banks, but in my experience, even

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Arceneux, Kevin *"Two Large-Scale Field Experiments using Phone Calls to Get Out The Vote"* unpublished: Yale University. 2003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Green and Gerber. *Get Out the Vote.* pg. 75

volunteers who followed the script too tightly seem to have little impact. Even if they believed in the message, a phone call will have effect if the volunteer repeats a script "Hello, today were speaking with Granite Staters like yourself about the first-in-thenation primary [...] Hillary Clinton cares about the issues that keep you up at night". Research supports that more conversational calls tend to have a greater impact on voters. 66 Campaigns can encourage volunteers to be conversational but they do not want to allow them to go off message.

Volunteer phone-banks will have a positive effect on GOTV efforts, but only if a significant amount of calls are made. At the rate of 1 vote to 35 calls, a campaign would need to make at least 35,000 calls to turn out 1,000 votes. This obstacle would be more difficult for a local election to overcome but Secretary Clinton's campaign should have been able to make significantly more than 35,000 with their number of volunteers. The entire field organization called voters every night from 5:00-9:00 and more volunteers made calls during the day. The Clinton campaign reached a lot of likely voters in New Hampshire. Turnout was high but 30,000 votes short of turnout in 2008, so the campaign *may* have been able to turn out more New Hampshire voters, but it would not have been significant enough to overcome Sanders support.

Phone calls can have a more significant role in the voter-identification phase. Though a call may not be incredibly significant for mobilizing voters, it is a very quick and efficient way to expand your list of supporters. As an organization we still called voters from 5:00-9:00 before the GOTV phase. During that time we asked if they knew

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Ibid. pg 69

who they were planning on supporting and used that data to mine for more volunteers or prepare for GOTV.

### OTHER METHODS OF GOTV MOBILIZATION

While canvassing and phone calls were the most common ways Clinton campaign conducted direct-voter-contact they are certainly not the only strategies. Two other methods of mobilizing voters were literature drops and direct mail. The Hillary for New Hampshire campaign rarely used literature drops and direct mailings were not typically conducted by the field office. Therefore I will address the effectiveness of literature drops in comparison to canvassing and phonebanks.

Dropping a piece of literature at someone's doorstep is very similar to canvassing. Both require the volunteer to walk door-to-door, but the drop does not provide the face-to-face conversation that makes canvassing meaningful. A literature drop loses personality but is more convenient –similar to phone calls. Dropping literature at doorsteps can also be done at virtually any time of the day, and can be conducted by volunteers who are otherwise not comfortable enough to have a one-on-one conversation with a voter.

Current studies show that dropping or hanging leaflets on doors will lead to a small, yet statistically significant result of about 1 additional vote for 66 leaflets on the doors of registered voters.<sup>67</sup> This experiment took place during a partisan election and is one of the only experiments with a significant enough sample size. Distributing leaflets to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Friedruchs, Ryan. "Mobilizing 18-35 Year Old Voters" unpublished: Harvard University. 2003

voter's doorsteps will have a significantly smaller result on voter mobilization than canvassing or phone calls but should not be ignored completely.

The Hillary for New Hampshire campaign utilized a literature drop on the eve of Election Day. Every house labeled as a likely voter received a door hanger with the information on their polling location and required voter ID laws (*image 1*). This information was practical, not persuasive. A literature drop in this scenario would most likely be cost-effective because it allowed the campaign to reach more voters in less time. In a smaller election with fewer voting targets it would be wise to canvas as many houses as possible, but the larger the sample of voter targets consequently makes a literature drop more logical.

Canvassing, phone calls, and literature drops are all effective at voter mobilization to an extent, but regardless of the amount of people the Clinton campaign was able to contact in the GOTV stage, there would not be a significant effect on the election results. According to Donald Green, a top-notch, flawless field organization could bump a candidate eight-twelve percentage points. <sup>68</sup> The Sanders' campaign was above twelve points in the polls before the election. Secretary Clinton's campaign conducted a strong GOTV effort and contacted every voter in their universe, but there was no way a GOTV field operation could have overcome the difference in support in New Hampshire. In other states such as Iowa and Missouri the election came down to .2% and the GOTV efforts would have played a much more significant role. Voter mobilization can play a role in elections, but it cannot alone determine election results.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Bump, Phillip "Who's got the best ground game in New Hampshire? We may never know". *The Washington Post*. February 9, 2016.

# CHAPTER 5

# **CAMPAIGN MESSAGING**

Messaging is a vital component of any political campaign. The purpose of messaging is to communicate who a candidate is and why potential voters should elect him or her over their opponent, or, "raising consciousness and persuading the electorate". <sup>69</sup> There are several theories created by political scientists and campaign operatives on how campaign messages are formed, the extent to which a candidate and volunteer should "stick to the message", and how messaging effects election outcomes. I will address all of these questions in the context of the Secretary Clinton's messaging and how it was applied in the field. Though online messaging has become increasingly more important, it is not pertinent for this case study.

## HOW MESSAGES ARE CREATED

Paul Tulley, prominent Democratic Party strategist, made simple matrix on how campaigns should organize their message. The message basically relies on the answer to four questions: what you say about you, what they say about you, what you say about

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Johnson, Jason. *Political Consultants*. Pg. 53

them, and what they say about them.<sup>70</sup> This allows candidates to draw, and voters to understand, a clear comparisons between both sides. Another political consultant, Ron Faucheux, believes messages may be based on four pillars: candidates' strengths, ideological and partisan differences (liberal vs. conservative), the situational context (change vs. status quo), or a combination of the first three.<sup>71</sup> This aligns with Tulley's matrix but includes some specific language on what messaging should be focusing on.

In the case of the 2016 Democratic primary, Secretary Clinton's message had elements of all three of Faucheux's pillars but focused on candidate strengths.

Specifically, the campaign focused on Secretary Clinton's qualifications and experience. There are many pieces of evidence in the literature referencing her work as the First Lady, United States Senator, and Secretary of State (see image 2-4). The Clinton campaign also emphasized her pragmatism in relationship to Senator Sanders' idealism.

She often used the phrase "I am a progressive who likes to get things done" and positioned herself as the candidate most likely to be elected against a Republican in November. However, because it was a primary the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign did not focus on creating cleavages between herself and her opponent. Negative messaging in the nomination process, especially before the first primary, could alienate part of the Democratic electorate which is vital for a general election. As the campaign progressed after New Hampshire the messaging on both sides did become increasingly

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Pelosi, Christine. *Campaign Boot Camp: Basic training for future leaders*. Sausalito, CA: Polipoint Press. 2007

<sup>71</sup> Johnson, Jason. Political Consultants. Pg. 59

negative and polarizing, but generally the campaign message focused on Clinton's strengths that make her stand out as a candidate.

### **MESSAGING TRAITS**

The public associates certain traits with different political parties and candidates which impact the way people perceive each group. Republicans are seen as strong leaders and more moral, and Democrats are seen as compassionate and empathetic. <sup>72</sup> It is important for a campaign to identify what traits the candidate possesses and what traits are important to the electorate. Campaign messages should emphasize those traits that bridge the gap between what the candidate has and public wants.

The four main traits voters judge their candidates on are competence, integrity, empathy, and leadership. These traits are used by voters as judgements on whether candidates are fit to serve. Exit polls in New Hampshire asked voters which candidate qualities were most important to them. The results show that 36% of people voted based on the candidates experience and ability to win in November, and Secretary Clinton won a large majority of those voters. Another 61% said the most important qualities were "the candidate cares about people like me" and that the candidate is "honest and trustworthy". Senator Sanders won almost all voters in those demographics. Helieve care and trust match the traits of empathy and integrity, as do experience and ability-to-win for competence and leadership. Therefore, the population was split on the four most

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Ceaser, James W., and Andrew E. Busch. *The Perfect Tie.* Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 2001

<sup>73</sup> Johnson, Jason. Political Consultants and Campaigns. Pg. 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> "New Hampshire Exit Polls" *The New York Times.* February 9, 2016.

important traits, but a significant amount thought the traits Senator Sanders held were most important for a candidate.

Gender is another important candidate trait for elections. Studies show that the average voter perceives women as more competent on "feminine" issues such as education and civil rights, but less competent on issues like foreign affairs and the military. This sobering fact means that in some policy areas, Hillary Clinton would usually be deemed less qualified than her male counterpart based on gender alone. In 2005 a survey of 100 political insiders identified one specific barrier to her campaign as "overcoming gender in foreign policy". This was not the case in the 2016 election after Clinton served as Secretary of State.

In the past Secretary Clinton has tried to manage the public's perceptions of her aptitude in foreign policy. In the Senate, she tried to create a hawkish persona by joining the Armed Forces Committee and supporting military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, actions that political operatives believe were to strengthen her image for an eventual Presidential campaign. Some of those actions have ironically come back to negatively impact her campaign in 2016.

An important takeaway is that campaigns need to understand what traits are important to voters and frame their candidate to resemble those traits. In regards to field organizations, volunteers knocking on doors should stick to emphasizing traits their candidate possesses. For Clinton, that message was her experience which is one of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Rosenwasser, Shirley M., et al. *Attitudes Towards Women and Men in Politics*. Political Psychology: 8, no. 2. 191- 200. Accessed May 1, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Johnson, Jason. Political Consultants and Campaigns. Pg. 21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Bevan, Tom. "Hillary the Hawk" *Real Clear Politics*. July 22, 2006.

four important traits. An effective communications team and field organization will not always be able to change the way the public perceives a candidate. Clinton has been in the public eye for over twenty years, she is a household name and, whether positive or negative, people have their preconceived opinions about her. Therefore, even the most convincing campaign flyers and passionate volunteers would have trouble overcoming voters preset notions about the candidate. Senator Sanders on the other hand was less-known, even in New Hampshire, and had room to establish his identity as a candidate and how he fit important traits. The significance of Secretary Clintons public perception was captured well in the exit polls and definitely a factor in the campaign.

### STAYING ON MESSAGE

Campaign messaging should create a simple theme, image, or idea that voters can identify with the candidate. For Secretary Clinton that message was her experience and ability to win. Once the message is created it should be consistently used by all levels of the organization, at all times. Political operatives and scholars believe message consistency can determine campaign success or failure. Staying on message helps reinforce a candidate's identity and positioning, whereas getting off message jeopardizes the public's perception and trust. Some political scientists believe President Obama's victory over Senator John McCain was due in large part to his ability to stick with a consistent, positive message. Obama's campaign used the words "hope" and "change"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Johnson, Jason. *Political Consultants and Campaigns*. pg. 67

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Ibid. 67

to illustrate his promise to diverge from the status quo and Bush years. Senator McCain's message was inconsistent and dependent on public polling.<sup>80</sup>

### MESSAGING CONSISTENCY & HILLARY FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE

The campaigns message should be employed by campaign staff, surrogates, volunteers, and campaign literature. Campaign literature is developed internally and thus, expected to follow this rule of consistency. Looking at campaign resources (*images 3-4*) the similarities are remarkable. A New Hampshire campaign flyer used in the months pre-December 2015 reads "I've spent my life fighting for children, families, and our country. And I am not stopping now" Another campaign flyer used between December and late January of 2016 read "I have been fighting for families and children my entire life and I am not going to stop now" There are many similarities between the pieces of literature which should be perceived as sign of good campaign management. Reinforcing the same ideas or slogans like President Obama's "hope", and "change", allow potential voters to remember the candidate and campaign better.

Endorsements can also be used to reinforce a campaigns message. Secretary

Clinton received a number of endorsements before the New Hampshire primary from

politicians and newspapers. These endorsements are not part of the official campaign

organization but by using the same language they support and reemphasize the message.

<sup>80</sup> "Campaign Themes, Strategies, and Developments" *The Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research*. n.d.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Image 3 in appendix

<sup>82</sup> Image 4 in appendix

*Image 2* is a piece of literature used by the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign with an aggregation of important endorsements focused, like other campaign flyers, on her experience. "Only one Democratic candidate for president is truly qualified to hold the job: Hillary Clinton". <sup>83</sup> The campaign produced this piece of literature so it could be selective and use quotes that matched its message, but the Concord Monitor used language that sounded remarkably similar to the campaign.

Volunteers that canvassed door-to-door were representatives of the campaign and were provided a script to ensure they stayed on message. The script, like other campaign materials emphasized Secretary Clinton's experience and ability to win in a general –not surprising seeing as it was written by the campaign organization.

Hillary Clinton has a lifetime of experience fighting for families and she'll work to build an economy that benefits all Americans –not just those at the top [...] American families have a lot at stake in this election. We can't afford a Republican president, like Donald Trump or Ted Cruz, who would rip away all the progress we've made in the past few years<sup>84</sup>

It is difficult to monitor the extent volunteers follow these scripts if they make phone calls in a different room than campaign staffers or canvas neighborhoods by themselves. This never proved to be a huge issue for the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign, but we had volunteers who were a little more cavalier. CNN followed a Clinton volunteer on a canvas in Nashua and published some of her interactions.

<sup>83</sup> Image 2 in appendix

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> "Vermont Phone Bank Script". Hillary for New Hampshire. Accessed Feb. 23

We need a winnable candidate [...] Bernie is great... but we don't live in a world where there's a realistic chance for Bernie to win [...] if she doesn't win the primary you can hand over the keys, the White House keys, to the Republicans.<sup>85</sup>

The campaign would not endorse this type of language. It emphasizes Secretary Clinton's ability to win in November but frames her as a pragmatic vote, not a candidate the volunteer believes in. The Hillary for New Hampshire campaign did emphasize pragmatism, but the message was more encompassing, compelling, and focused on Secretary Clinton. The campaign also encouraged volunteers to refer to Bernie as Senator Sanders. Regardless of the language, the volunteer was not way off message and did no damage to the field organization or campaign. The literature of the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign was incredibly consistent, and even when volunteers proved less consistent, their actions did not account for the campaigns loss.

## TARGETING MESSAGES

The campaign stressed Secretary Clinton's experience and ability to "get things done" throughout the entirety of the primary, but emphasized different issues depending on the state they were currently competing in. In New Hampshire it was the importance of addressing heroin overdoses sweeping the nation and ravaging the Granite state. In Florida the campaign concentrated on immigration reforms and composed more tweets in Spanish. Then finally in South Carolina the campaign focused on gun control in response to a shooting that occurred the summer before. These are all great examples of targeting

85 Spodak, Cassie. "Knocking on doors in New Hampshire" CNN Politics. February 4, 2016.

the audience. The campaign understood what was most important to voters and benefited by calling attention to those issues.

Every piece of literature that came through my field office had contact information for Hillary for New Hampshire and was obviously produced exclusively for the state. However, I do not believe the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign targeted clusters of voters within the state enough. Microtargeting of specific groups within areas has emerged in the modern campaign as a result of more robust voter databases. Given the information the Clinton campaign had access to and the fact that the state directors had all run large campaigns in New Hampshire before I would have expected a more intricate system of microtargeting. If it was present, it was conducting through either direct mail or email and not the field organization. Furthermore, often times the field organization collects information on voter's identity and preferences which is used to target voters. In the six weeks I canvassed before GOTV the campaign collected no such information.

Throughout the nomination process Secretary Clinton has typically performed better among minority voters. That demographic would not help her significantly with the 94% white population in New Hampshire. <sup>86</sup> I believe the campaign could have targeted those affected by stagnating economic growth and increasing income inequality. New England has the highest growth rates of inequality in the nation. <sup>87</sup> Manufacturing and low-skilled jobs left the relatively expensive region and created a bigger gap between the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> "Quick Facts: New Hampshire" *United States Census Bureau*. N.d. http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/33,00

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Gittell, Ross and Rudokas, Jason. "New England Has the Highest Increase in Income Disparity in the Nation". *Carsey Institute*. No. 4. 2007.

shrinking middle class and well-educated population. New Hampshire is relatively equal, but inequality is growing faster than any state in New England or across the nation. <sup>88</sup> Growth in the post-recession era has gone disproportionately to high-income earners. Middle class incomes are stagnant, and incomes of the poor are not going down but their relative position to the top is getting worse. An astonishing 32% of voters said the most important issue to them was income inequality, and another 33% said it was the economy or jobs. <sup>89</sup> Senator Sanders' campaign could have highlighted these issues to an extent, making them more important, but it was clear they were already important to Granite State voters.

Image 3 & 4 show great infographs on the stagnant wages but the voter needs to look to find that information. I argue that the campaign should have trained volunteers to focus on inequality or designed different literature for certain neighborhoods. This could potentially be interpreted as pandering for votes, but part of Clinton's campaign was addressing economic inequality. She just didn't emphasize inequality enough where she should have in New Hampshire. Economic differences between neighborhoods are glaring and the campaign had enough information and experience to identify them.

Sanders controlled the people who emphasized income inequality but he also based his campaign messaging on that issue. I think if Clinton's field organization more aggressively combatted the issue it would had some effect on voter's preference.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Sanders, Bob. "N\H's income inequality fastest-growing in U.S." *New Hampshire Business Review*. July 23, 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> "New Hampshire Exit Polls" The New York Times. February 9, 2016.

### CHAPTER 6

### **TECHNOLOGY**

It is clear that technology is changing the way political campaigns operate. Political pundits often reference Barack Obama, then Bernie Sanders, ability to harness a large internet following and turn that into campaign donations and votes. The field organization, which seems like an antithesis of technology, continues to knock on doors instead of focusing on these new "netroots". Campaign filed organizations have not ignored advances in technology; rather, good campaigns have utilized them to strengthen the organization.

New telephone apps allow canvassers to have access to walk lists, voter survey questionnaires, updated voter data, and maps. 90 This technology is accessible on volunteers' phones and eliminates the need for paper-and-pen lists. This is an improvement in more than just convenience. Canvassing apps allow volunteers to pull up specific voter-related information at the door. This may include previous conversations with the campaign, volunteer history, or issues that are important to the voter to enhance the conversation. 91 Canvassers can add their own notes for future contacts creating a much more systematic way of knowing individual voters. That information is used not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> "Ground Game® is a groundbreaking battle-tested mobile canvassing app" *Moonshadow Mobile*. Web address

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Murphey, Time "Inside the Obama teams hardrive" *MotherJones.* n.d.

only by the field campaign, but also to send out specific issue-related emails or direct mail. 92 The Obama campaign's app made it possible for someone to complete a canvas shift without ever entering the campaigns office, and even tracked how active volunteers were to incite a competition over who could do the most. 93 The excitement and convenience is useful for motivating volunteers to do more.

Canvassing apps allow data to be uploaded to the voter database instantly as opposed to having a volunteer enter each piece of information individually at the end of the night. The Clinton campaign used the latter method. Information gathered from our canvases was recorded on sheets of paper which would later be entered by a volunteer or member on staff. Despite the time consuming nature of paper sheets, they also did not allow the campaign to collect the depth of information an app would have. The Clinton campaigns voter identification from the field would not measure up well to the Obama campaign.

Campaigns are testing messages on control groups to find out which ones were most compelling. The Obama campaign created over 500 ads and tested them with online sample voters in a focus group to determine which to use. 94 A similar method was used to determine what messages were most effective for fundraising and selling merchandise. The Obama campaign also had a focus group of 100 undecided voters it would show material, sometimes controversial, to see if it changed people views of the candidates.<sup>95</sup> This would indicate how issues would be perceived by the mass public. Testing the

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Issenberg, Sasha. "How Obama Used Big Data to Rally Voters, Part 1". MIT Technology Review. Dec 16,

<sup>94 &</sup>quot;How Obama Used Big Data"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> "Ibid.

effectiveness of messages before broadcasting them to larger markets allows the campaign to maximize its effects. This testing would not have been done by the field office; however, I did not see the results if said testing was being used by Clinton's campaign. Besides a shift from persuasion conversations to GOTV, there was not change to messaging when I was in New Hampshire. Changes to messaging could have been seen more through social media, emails, and direct mailings.

The biggest setback to the Clinton field organization was the lack of resources available for canvassers. Considering the size and expected sophistication for the Clinton campaign, I assumed they would have the most effective tools. Using an app a canvasser has the ability to know what issues are important to a voter, whether manufacturing jobs or the price of prescription medicine, before they knock on their door and curtail the conversation accordingly. Instead canvassers on the Clinton campaign were provided relatively primitive information in and a very dated way of collecting it. Regardless of real-time information and access to voters' history, the campaign collected data with sheets of paper and tally-marks which is a time-expensive inefficiency that could have been easily avoided.

#### CHAPTER 7

### **ANALYSIS**

For the amount of resources the Hillary for New Hampshire staff and volunteers invested into the campaign the results were more than disappointing. The campaign theoretically had all the components it needed to be successful. The field organization had the best political minds, the most volunteers, and a consistent campaign message; but, could the campaign have been successful without winning? There was room for improvements, like the use of technology and depth of voter identification, but these factors would not have negated the 22% margin. The campaign was competing against contextual influences, what Sides and Vavreck called 'fundamentals', which controlled the outcome well before Election Day. These fundamentals in New Hampshire seemed to favor Senator Sanders. The campaign was not only competing to overcome those disadvantages, but also to out-campaign Sanders. Even if Secretary Clinton had a flawless organization in New Hampshire it would be in part neutralized by Sanders' campaign competing. Based on the number of volunteers and voter contacts the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign was effective, but could not overcome the other factors in the race.

### OTHER FACTORS IN THE ELECTION

Senator Sanders began to pull away from Clinton in the polls in December, two months before the primary. The support for Sanders only grew from December to February resembling the bandwagon effect of performance in primaries. <sup>96</sup> Momentum, especially in the nomination process, is crucial. After Sanders began to pull away in December it would have been hard to close the gap no matter how strong the Clinton campaign's field organization was.

The explosion of support for Senator Sanders was not just felt in New Hampshire. When he began his campaign he was polling at about 3% nationally. <sup>97</sup> Since then, his national polling has come within single digits of Secretary Clinton's at times. This reinforces the fact that Sanders support was not only a New Hampshire phenomenon – though being a neighbor still helped him in the Granite State. National polls also suggest Senator Sanders support could not be attributed to his field organization. Sanders support increased steadily for months before the election when he only had offices in a handful of states.

Another factor in the campaign was the candidates themselves. United States campaigns have become increasingly candidate-centered as opposed to party-centered. Instead of focusing on party affiliation the electorate emphasizes candidate's individual attributes, or, traits. This transition was caused by change in campaign advertising, an increase in resources available to elected officials for constituent services, and an

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Bartels, Larry. Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating Campaigns. 1985.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> "2016 Democratic Presidential Nomination" Real Clear Politics. n.d.

increase in direct primaries. <sup>98</sup>Voting on traits made a commanding difference in this election. One-half of New Hampshire voters thought only Senator Sanders was trustworthy, and Sanders won 92% of voters who thought trust was the most important trait. <sup>99</sup> Apprehension with Secretary Clinton's trustworthiness was as apparent in my conversations with voters as it was in the exit polls. In my experience that was the first, and often only, reservation people had with Clinton. Secretary Clinton was far too well known for her campaign to change the public's perception of her.

Field organizations can definitely have an effect on campaign results in the right context; but, in this particular election a national wave of support for Senator Sanders, proximity to Vermont, and the candidate's characteristics were the most important factors. The field had no control over and little ability to change any of these variables. So, though the field organization is influential, especially on individual voters, it is far from the only important factor in campaigns.

## **IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CAMPAIGNS**

A lot of what went wrong for Hillary for New Hampshire was outside the campaign's control. A campaign cannot influence variables like which traits their candidate possesses, what issues are important to the electorate, and who they are running

<sup>98</sup> Hirano, Shigeo and Snyder, James M. "The Direct Primary and Candidate-Centered Voting in U.S. Elections" *Columbia University*. 2012.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> "New Hampshire Exit Polls" The New York Times. Web. 9 Feb 2016.

against. Successful campaigns will recognize these contextual factors and use strategic messaging to adjust to meet them.

Campaigns and field organizations do have control over voter mobilization.

Direct-voter-contact is proven to be able to get-out-the-vote. A well-organized GOTV has the ability to impact a close election, but it is important to keep in mind that the opponent's campaign is likely also conducting GOTV and neutralizing your efforts. The best method of voter contact is always the most personal one, but deciding which to use depends on the extent of the campaign's resources. Canvasing is much more effective than phone calls or leaflets, but much more time consuming.

Phone calls are vital for voter identification which is the pre-GOTV phase. One way the Clinton campaign could have been improved is to increase the depth of information canvassers were collecting from voters. Individual's stances on issues are important for targeting specific literature to voters and understanding who to mobilize during GOTV. The other way the Clinton campaign could be improved was expanding their use of campaigning technology. Canvassers should have been using more advanced resources to collect voter information. This information helps the canvasser have more informed conversations with potential voters and makes it easier for the campaign to collect information on the electorate.

Campaigns are in a period of rapid change due to advancing technology. Though it seems like an anomaly, Donald Trump's ability to win primaries with virtually no ground game will be a watershed moment for political strategists. It is easy to assume media and technology will play an even bigger role in campaigns in the years to come but

recently there has been a resurgence of grassroots campaigning particularly on the Democratic side. Though the most robust field organizations will not always ensure a victory, as proven by the Hillary for New Hampshire campaign, grassroots will make a difference in the right circumstances and will remain a vital element of campaigns.

Image 1: GOTV Door Hanger






Image 2: GOTV Literature






Image 3: Persuasion Literate Pre-December






Image 4: December-January Persuasion Literature





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