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PREFACE

While often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts of students should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully will encourage scholarly research by students and provide a means by which their efforts will be recognized. Phi Alpha Theta is greatly indebted to the History Department of Western Kentucky University headed by Dr. Richard Troutman. We are grateful to our Consulting Editors, Dr. Charles Bussey, Dr. Carol Crowe Carraco, and Dr. David Lee, for their assistance in this project. We also thank the Student Editorial Committee consisting of Mark Lega, Alan Lescallet, and Terry Tatum. A special thanks goes to Mr. Tom Foster for designing our cover. For her tireless and exacting effort Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typist, Ms. Medora Ann Woodward. Our most profound debt of gratitude goes to the contributing writers--those who were published and those who were not--that constitute a group which forms the heart of any publication.

Eta Pi Chapter
Phi Alpha Theta
Western Kentucky University
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THE WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT:
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"...no race of men can rise above their mothers. The suffrage movement is an effort to elevate the entire race by elevating its womanhood."

Nellie Nugent Somerville,
President of the Mississippi Suffrage Association

If feminism is defined as the belief that women are human beings and entitled to the same opportunities for self-expression as men, then America has sheltered a feminist bias from the beginning. In both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foreign travelers remarked on the freedom given to women in America. "A paradise for women," one eighteenth-century German called America, and toward the close of the nineteenth century Lord Bryce wrote that in the United States "it is easier for women to find a career, to obtain work of an intellectual as of a commercial kind, than in any part of Europe."¹

Certainly the long history of a frontier in America helps to explain this feminist bias. In a society being shaped out of a wilderness, women were active and important contributors to the process of settlement and civilization. In addition, because women have been scarce in America they have been highly valued. During almost the whole of the colonial period men outnumbered women, and even in the nineteenth century women remained scarce in the West. For example, as late as 1865 there were three men for each woman in California; in Colorado the ratio was as high as 20 to 1. Such differences in the sex ratio undoubtedly account for the West's favorable attitude toward women as in an Oregon law of 1850 that granted land to single women and, even more significant for the time, to married women; or in the willingness for Western territories like Wyoming (1869) and Utah (1870) to grant the suffrage to women long before other regions where the sex ratio was more nearly equal.²

But if the frontier experience of America helped to create a vague feminist bias that granted women more privileges than in settled Europe, the really powerful force changing women's place had little to do with the frontier or the newness of the country. It was the industrial revolution that provided the stimulus to women's hopes for equality of opportunity, encouraging the first stage in the changing position of women—the removal of legal and customary barriers to women's full participation in the activities of the world.³

Judy Bussell
Women, of course, have always had a role in the economic productivity of the nation. Before the coming of the machine they worked in their homes to produce the food and clothing which their families needed, and they reared the children, nursed the sick and took care of the aged. Farm wives helped in the fields and barns, and trademen's wives were often found in the family shop. But as the country became more industrialized many home tasks were taken over by commercial enterprise. Mass production made it easier and often cheaper to purchase the family's greatest needs in the form of processed foods and manufactured goods. Because the new factory system needed workers, women and even children were encouraged to seek employment.

Today it is universally recognized that men work outside the home. But before the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, the great majority of men and women were co-workers on the land and in the home. The coming of machine production changed all that. For a time, it is true, many unmarried women and children—the surplus labor of the day—were the principal support of the new factory system, but only temporarily. By the middle of the nineteenth century the bulk of industrial labor was male. The coming of the factory and the city thus wholly changed the nature of men's work. For the first time in history, work for most men was something done outside the family, psychologically as well as physically separated from the home.

The same industrial process that separated work and home also provided the opportunities for women to follow men out of the home. For that reason the feminist movement, both socially and intellectually, was a direct result of the industrial changes of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, just as the new industrial system was reshaping the nature of rural men who came under its influence, so it reshaped the nature of women.

The process began with the home, which, in the early years of industrialization, was still the site of most women's work. Because of high land values, the city home was smaller than the farm house, and with less work for children, the size of the urban family was smaller than the rural. Moreover, work in the urban home changed. Machines in factories now performed many of the tasks that had long been women's. In truth, the feminist movement began not when women felt a desire for men's jobs, but when men in factories began to take away women's traditional work. Factory-produced clothing, commercial laundries, prepared foods (e.g. prepared cereals, canned vegetables, condensed milk, bakery bread) were already available in the years after the Civil War. Toward the end of the century an advanced feminist like Charlotte Perkins Gilman, impressed by the increasing departure of women's chores from the middle-class home, predicted that the whole kitchen would soon be gone.

The most direct way in which industrialization altered the social function of women was by providing work for women outside
the home. Production by machine, of course, widened enormously the uses to which women's labor could be put once physical strength was no longer a consideration. And toward the end of the century, as business enterprises grew and record-keeping, communications and public relations expanded, new opportunities for women opened up in business offices. The telephone operator, the typist, the clerical worker and the stenographer now took places beside the seamstress, the cotton mill operator and the teacher.8

As workers outside the home, women buried the Victorian stereotype of the lady under a mountain of reality.9 After all, it was difficult to argue that women as a sex were weak, timid, incompetent, fragile vessels of spirituality when thousands of them could be seen trudging to work in the early hours of the day in any city of the nation.10

Feminists, such as Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who gathered at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 for the first women's convention, were far removed from the mainstream of American life.11 Many had participated in the abolitionist struggle, demonstrating by their actions there the extent to which they deviated from prevailing norms of female behavior. Attacking the tradition that men and women should occupy totally separate spheres of activity, they demanded a drastic revision of the values and laws governing relationships between the sexes, and immediately launched an assault on all forms of discrimination. Their efforts were greeted with ridicule and contempt. The Worchester Telegram denounced the Seneca Falls Convention as an attempt at "insurrection," and a Buffalo paper referred to it as "revolutionary." Women's rights advocates were generally dismissed as a "class of wild enthusiasts and visionaries" and received little popular backing.12

The early feminists took an uncompromising stand on almost all issues and set out to eliminate the rigid division of labor between men and women. Suffrage constituted only one of a long series of demands.13

The radical nature of the early feminist movement was revealed in the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions passed by the women at Seneca Falls. In the nineteenth century, females were not allowed to testify in court, hold title to property, establish businesses, or sign papers as witnesses. Beginning with the assertion that "all men and women are created equal," the Declaration proceeded to indict mankind for its "history of repeated injuries and usurpations" toward women. The delegates charged that men had denied them political representation, made them "civilly dead," refused them the right to own their own property, and "oppressed them on all sides." Hardly an area existed, the feminists concluded, where man had not consciously endeavored to "destroy woman's confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life."14
To counter the oppression which they observed, women's rights leaders proposed the elimination of all barriers separating the activities of the two sexes. Henceforth, they declared, any law which restricted woman's freedom or placed her in a position inferior to men had "no force or authority." Proclaiming the "identity of the race in capabilities and responsibilities," they demanded the "overthrow of the monopoly of the pulpit," equal access to education, the trades, and professions, an end to the double standard, and the right to move in "the enlarged sphere" which their Creator had assigned them. God had made men and women equal, the feminists asserted, and the treatment of one sex as different from and less equal than the other ran "contrary to the great precept of nature."  

For much of the remainder of the nineteenth century, women's rights leaders continued to press for sweeping social change. The suffrage became a more prominent issue after Congress failed to recognize women's right to vote in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but many feminists persisted in tracing female inequality to the sexual division of labor in society and warned against thinking of the franchise as a cure-all. Speaking through a journal entitled The Revolution, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a founder of the women's rights movement, dismissed the suffrage as a "superficial and fragmentary" question. "The ballot touches only those interests, either of men and women, which take their roots in political questions," Stanton and her followers declared in 1869. "But woman's chief discontent is not with her political, but with her social, and particularly her marital bondage."  

Stanton and her allies attacked economic discrimination, urged reform of the divorce laws, and in the 1890's organized a monumental effort to write a Woman's Bible to counteract the widespread theological assumption that females were the weak and inferior sex. Perhaps the most significant figure in the woman's movement during the nineteenth century, Stanton supported acquisition of the vote as a partial step toward achieving freedom, but her broader aim remained "to make woman a self-supporting equal partner with man in the state, the Church and the home."  

This radical persuasion received its most thorough definition at the turn of the century in the works of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Although Gilman wrote primarily for a twentieth-century audience, she articulated more brilliantly than anyone else the point of view held by many of the founders of feminism. A writer and lecturer who had been through an unhappy early marriage, Gilman approached her subject with the same disaffection from traditional mores which characterized the women in Seneca Falls and elaborated the sentiments expressed there into a social and economic analysis. Her treatise on Women and Economics (1898) was hailed by the Nation as "the most significant utterance on the subject since Mill's The Subjection of Women," and her writings to this day constitute the most important feminist assessment of women's position in America.
At the heart of Gilman's analysis was her contention that all the roles a female was permitted to play derived from her sexual functions. A man might pursue a variety of activities—build a career, enter politics, join a fraternal organization. But a woman could only marry and have children. In effect, sex became a female's economic way of life; while "men worked to live... women mated to live..." A man might conquer the world in a hundred ways, but for a woman there was only "a single channel, a single choice. Wealth, power, social distinction, fame... all, must come to her through a small gold ring."19

Woman's human impulses to grow and to create were stifled. Men were denied true companions because their wives shared nothing in common with them. And children were psychologically deprived as a result of being dominated by mothers who had never been allowed to grow to mental maturity. A nation which expected to maximize the potential of all its citizens depended upon each individual pursuing his or her talents. Yet social convention dictated that half the race perform nothing but menial household tasks. The sexual division of labor thus not only dulled women's minds and limited their horizons; it also robbed the country of the full utilization of its human resources.20

Gilman concluded that women could achieve freedom only when they gained economic equality with men. The suffrage represented one step in the right direction and received Gilman's endorsement. Work, Gilman believed, was "the essential process of human life," and until women shared in that process on an equal basis with men, they would remain "near-sighted, near-minded," and inferior.21

To achieve her goal, Gilman relied primarily on the power of reason and the forces of specialization which were changing the national economy. The home, she argued, was frightfully inefficient. Women were no more suited or contented to be "house servants and house keepers than all men would be." The talents of some women qualified them to be specialists in cooking, cleaning, or child care. But the talents of others could be best utilized outside the home in business and the professions. With most women liberated from domestic chores, marriage would evolve into a partnership of equals; individual human beings would maximize their diverse abilities, and society would be free of the crippling effects of a dual system of labor. The result "would be a world of men and women humanly related, as well as sexually related, working together as they were meant to do, for the common good of all."22

Despite its brilliance, Gilman's analysis was weak in several areas. She neglected to mention the depersonalization which might accompany institutionalized child care and food preparation, and she failed to see that the nuclear family might have positive as well as negative attributes. More important, she assumed that even after women had adopted a life style closer to that of men and
had become equal partners in the quest for jobs and status, they would continue to exhibit primarily the domestic virtues of warmth and nurture—a desirable goal, perhaps, but a logical inconsistency considering her previous contention that male and female differences were basically a product of contrasting environmental conditioning. Nevertheless, Gilman's arguments represented the full elaboration of the feminist impulse. More than anyone else, she understood the social implications of the doctrines articulated at Seneca Falls.23

Long before Gilman's views drew public attention, however, it was clear that the changes which she and Stanton advocated had little chance of being accepted. In criticizing the nuclear family, marriage, and the church, feminists like Gilman were attacking institutions to which most people were deeply devoted. Woman's place could not be changed without altering the family and forcing a radical revision of a whole set of social relationships. Yet most Americans reacted to such a prospect with understandable hostility. The idea of woman's "sphere" was one of the cornerstones of society.24

The feminists did not help their cause when they allowed themselves to be identified with proposals to liberalize sexual morality. In the 1870's Victoria Woodhull, a friend of Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, endorsed free love and licensed prostitution in her weekly newspaper. Advocacy of sexual freedom was bad enough, but Woodhull then went on to create a public uproar by charging that the respectable reformer Henry Ward Beecher was having a love affair with Elizabeth Tilton. Beecher instituted a libel suit, prolonging the public uproar, and prominent feminists rushed to Woodhull's defense. Horace Greely, among others, had previously stated that he could not support the feminists because they were too closely tied to the cause of free love. Now, Woodhull's declarations, and her widely publicized association with feminists, appeared to confirm Greely's allegations, and added one more weapon to the anti-feminist arsenal.25

Such episodes inevitably took their toll. As the century wore on, it became increasingly obvious that if the woman's movement continued to advocate serious change in marriage and the family, it would be dismissed as a radical group and charged with trying to destroy the moral fiber of the nation.26

In the woman's movement, the forces of compromise gradually gained increased strength. The years after the Civil War saw feminism divided into different camps—the "conservative" American Woman's Suffrage Association, which was concerned almost exclusively with winning the ballot, and the "liberal" National Woman's Suffrage Association, which was committed to more far-reaching institutional change. By the end of the century, the degree of opposition to more radical feminist demands had made the liberal position defenseless, and in 1890 the two wings of the movement
reunited as the National American Woman's Suffrage Association (NAWSA) concerned primarily with the goal of winning the suffrage--the most respectable and limited feminist demand.27

At the same time, women's-rights leaders shifted from an "argument from justice" to an "argument from expediency." Elizabeth Cady Stanton, at various times, had used the expediency argument, and later women's-rights advocates never abandoned the argument from justice. But by the turn of the century there was a shift in the balance between the two positions. Instead of emphasizing the inalienable rights of females as individuals, the feminists tended to emphasize the utility of the ballot as an agent for reforming society. And rather than base their appeal on the similarity of men and women as human beings, they underlined the unchangeable differences which distinguished the sexes and gave to each a uniqueness in politics.28

The positions the suffragists took on such issues as immigration, race, and religion reflected the extent to which they shared prevailing public opinion. In 1894 Carrie Chapman Catt joined those protesting the influx of foreigners and warned against the effort of undesirables to ravage the nation's wealth. "There is but one way to avert danger," Mrs. Catt declared: "Cut off the vote of the slums and give it to women...."29 A year earlier the suffrage convention had blatantly appealed to nativist fears by calling attention to the fact that "there are more white women who can read and write than all negro voters; more American women who can read and write than all foreign voters." Woman suffrage, the convention suggested, "would settle the vexed question of rule by illiteracy" and ensure the perpetuation of the American way of life.30

With the advent of Progressivism, the strategy of consensus bore fruit. The suffragists had already defined the vote for women as a means of humanizing government, and in a period of generalized commitment to "reform," they were able to identify their own cause with the larger effort to extend democracy and eliminate social injustice. Progressivism meant a great many things to different people, but in large part it represented an effort to clean up the most obvious causes of corruption, disease, and poverty. Within such a context, the suffragists argued convincingly that extension of the franchise to females would help in the task of improving society. To a remarkable extent, the society at large defined the goals of Progressivism in the same way, and as a result, the suffragists succeeded in making the vote for women a prominent item on the agenda of reform.31

Female reformers, of course, played a decisive part in shaping Progressivism through their involvement in the social welfare movement. Women like Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and Florence Kelley started the settlement houses which sprouted up in urban America
during the 1890's, and then carried their ideas and experience into national organizations dedicated to securing legislative change. For such women, suffrage and the cause of social welfare were forever tied together. Committed to building better neighborhoods and improving the conditions of workers in sweatshops and factories, they realized that they could accomplish little without political power. Woman suffrage thus became a natural concern of reformers who hoped to mobilize an independent political constituency which would force party bosses into action. The vote for females, the reformers believed, would add a sympathetic bloc to the electorate and provide the leverage necessary to secure social-welfare legislation.32

Progressivism also provided a vehicle by which millions of hitherto uninvolved middle-class women became politicized. During the years between 1895 and 1915, Robert Wilbe has written, almost every established group within the new middle-class "experienced its formative growth toward self-consciousness."33

A look at progressivism in the Southern suffrage movement of the nineteenth century is noteworthy because in the South the image of the lady took deep root and had far-reaching social consequences. The social role of women was unusually confining there. One result was that southern women became in time a distinct type among American women. Another was that their efforts to free themselves were more complex than those of women elsewhere.34

"She wants the vote to use as a lever, and so do I," said the heroine of a Virginia novel, "but behind it all...I am fighting for plain recognition of an equal humanity."35 A Kentucky suffragist wrote,

There are many women in the South gifted with genius and endowed with faculties for glorious work, who are struggling to free themselves from the austerity of those environments which 'the masses of average men' have fixed for them.36

Suffrage more than any other aspect of the feminist movement became the symbol of women's emancipation. Partly this was because, historically, voting had been associated with the idea of equal rights, partly because it was a general goal upon which women with many different specific purposes could agree.37

To its opponents as well, "woman suffrage" meant more than women voting. The thrust of the nineteenth century had been toward a broader franchise. But for every suffragist who linked the vote to her humanity, there were men (and also women) who equated ballots for females with a terrifying threat to society.38 In 1909 one Robert Holland summed up male fears in an article in
the Sewanee Review. Society forbade suffrage to women, Holland asserted. Female honor, he argued, was incompatible with voting. "Her finer being has thus far refined Society by keeping out of its turmoil." Unless the unseemly demand for "rights" ceased, he predicted, women would gradually grow ugly and coarse. Strife would characterize family life, and in the end there would be utter disaster, since "the first principle of religion is obedience. The woman who does not obey her husband will not obey God who enjoins her submission."39

Men were not alone in opposing suffrage in the South. Substantial numbers of southern women were slow to see any advantage to themselves and were afraid to believe in something which displeased men. One woman wrote, "Every southern woman has a protection and champion in every southern man." Two decades later another wrote that southern women did not want the vote because they wanted "to preserve in their daughters the salient characteristics of a past generation." Giving women the vote, she said, would lead to divisions and dissensions in the home, hitherto "the source of all good in the state." The glory of womanhood has been "her purity, her superiority to man in the possession of a higher moral sense and standard. Why risk this precious certainty for a doubtful good?"40

The South was slow to develop an organized suffrage movement. In 1848 the women who met at Seneca Falls had included the right to vote in their list of demands. Because many of the early suffragists were abolitionists, the idea of woman's rights was a curse in the South.41

Signs of suffrage sentiment appeared here and there in the South in the first decade after the war. In 1869 suffrage resolutions were presented to constitutional conventions in Texas and Arkansas. A woman's rights convention was held in Columbia, South Carolina, in 1870 with the blessing of the Reconstruction government. In 1876 a Mississippi woman addressed the Democratic Convention, assembled in Nashville, in behalf of woman suffrage.42

These flurries of suffrage sentiment did not represent a large body of opinion. A report from Alabama in the third volume of the History of Woman Suffrage, published in 1886, noted that women there were "awake on the temperance question" but unprepared for suffrage. As late as 1897 a national organizer traveling in Mississippi wrote bitterly that suffrage was often seen as a "heresy that has a real devil in it." and that "death and education have much to do in this southland."43

Through the seventies and eighties, however, a few tireless women kept the fires alive. In Kentucky the four Clay sisters—Mary, Anne, Sallie, and Laura—were virtually a suffrage organization in themselves. In Tennessee, Elizabeth Avery Meriwether, described as "the chief representative of liberal thought in Tennessee,"
was a hardy soul who had survived a difficult period as a war
refugee and had returned to Memphis after the war to establish
and edit her own newspaper, called The Tablet. 44

These early suffragists did not need a "movement" to bring
them to the cause. Two things they had in common: a strong sense
of their own capacities and the ability to be self-starting.
Some of them had begun to show maverick tendencies before the war.
Those who were old enough had faced the war itself with independence
and courage and afterward were prepared for the ridicule and scorn
often directed at "strong-minded" women. Indeed, some of them
seemed to gain positive satisfaction from being different; involve­
ment in the suffrage struggle gave them an independence and an
identity which they found much to their liking. 45

Suffrage organizations did not limit themselves to the single
cause of the ballot. The record shows southern suffragists to
have been engaged in a wide variety of reform efforts. The New
Orleans Equal Rights Association, for example, took the lead
first in the anti-lottery campaign and then in securing modern
sewage and drainage and a pure water supply. In addition to their
concern for temperance, child labor, and the working conditions
of women, suffrage groups worked for women's colleges, for laws
which would permit women to serve on school boards, for tuberculosis
control, for prenatal clinics, and for modification in the age
of consent. 46

Despite its significance in training numbers of women in
politics, despite the symbolism that it developed for women in
search of a new life-style, the organized effort to attain woman
suffrage was less effective in the South than in almost any other
part of the country. When the Nineteenth Amendment passed
the Congress and was sent to the states for ratification, only Texas,
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas among southern states voted to
accept it. Women mounted vigorous campaigns in all the other
states, but were defeated. They wasted little time in regret.
They accepted suffrage as a gift from fellow citizens outside
the South and went promptly to work to give meaning to the new­
found right. 47
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2Ibid.
3Ibid., 194.
4Ibid., 144-145.
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6Ibid., 194-195.
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8Ibid., 196.
9Ibid.
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13The American Woman, 3-4.
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16The American Woman, 5.
21The American Woman, 8.

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25 The American Woman, 11.

26 Ibid., 11-12.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 12.


30 Kraditor, 131, 172.

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33 History of the Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs, 1898-1936 (Dallas, 1937), 1-14.

34 Anne Firor Scott, The Southern Lady (Chicago, 1970), (Preface) x, xi.

35 Mary Johnston, Hagar (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 331.

36 The Southern Lady, 165.

37 Ibid., 166.

38 Ibid., 165-166.


41 The Southern Lady, 170.

43 Ella Harrison to Carrie Chapman Catt, 18 and 27 March 1897, Ella Harrison Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College.

44 The Southern Lady, 173.


46 Nellie Nugent Somerville, Notes for history of Women Suffrage Movement in Mississippi, Somerville—in Howorth Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe.

47 The Southern Lady, 184.
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RFK AND CIVIL RIGHTS
"1961: IT HAD ONLY JUST BEGUN"

Some men see things as they are and say why.
I dream things that never were and say why not.

When Robert Kennedy became Attorney General of the United States in January, 1961, he was not well acquainted with the wants and needs of American Negroes. But Kennedy, "a man of constant growth and change," soon developed an acute sensitivity of the need for improved civil rights and dedicated much of his remaining years to that goal. The manner in which he approached the issue from 1961 until his death in 1968 is of great significance. Instead of agonizing over why the country had reached such a crucial level, he concerned himself with developing and initiating new ideas and programs to alleviate existing situations. Although considered ruthless, unyielding and insensitive at times, Robert Kennedy came to be the embodiment of the phrase he frequently borrowed from George Bernard Shaw: "Some men see things as they are and say why. I dream things that never were and say why not." Consequently this direction of thinking was to offer hope and encouragement for both blacks and whites in this country.

A foundation for this approach appears in Kennedy's first public address on the issue of civil rights. After serving as Attorney General for only three months, the 35-year-old Massachusetts native accepted an invitation to address the Honor's Day convocation at the University of Georgia Law School in Athens, Georgia. His "blueprint for civil rights," as Thomas Hopkins appropriately named it, also was his first formal address on any subject since becoming Attorney General. With the aide of his speech writers, Kennedy prepared for almost two months prior to the speaking engagement on May 6, 1961, and according to Hopkins, "they could take satisfaction in a job well done."2

It now seems important to ask whether or not Kennedy's speech was as effective as it was well-prepared. Racial discrimination towards black Americans has been pervasive ever since the first slaves were brought to this country in the early 1600's. Through the years, countless men have championed the cause, but why is it that only a certain few are remembered? Three reasons come to mind: 1) They were a "first" in one way or another; 2) They said "the right thing in the right way at the right time and place"; and 3) Their efforts resulted in positive action. An application of these factors to Kennedy's civil rights address sheds insight on his success and his "visionary approach" to the problem which makes him long remembered.

Beverly Davenport
Let us turn to the speech itself to note the materials and methods he employed to accomplish his purpose. Although it was customary in the early 1960's to condemn segregation in the North, Kennedy was the first high ranking governmental official to do so in the South. It seems evident that this fact alone would have a definite effect on the audience. The "touchy subject" of civil rights, as it was described in a Newsweek magazine article, was one of the most salient issues of the time. It was even more salient to the people of Athens, Georgia, than to those in other parts of the country. Only months prior to Kennedy's address, nearly 600 University of Georgia students participated in riots and demonstrations because Negro students Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes were allowed matriculation at the school. The two were suspended for "their own safety" following the demonstrations but were later allowed to return and finally graduate in June, 1963. They were the first blacks to achieve such a distinction at the University of Georgia. With these events still fresh in the audience's mind, Kennedy had the monumental task of presenting his ideas in an acceptable manner to a somewhat hostile audience. But in his words, "to have chosen any other subject would have been hypocritical." It seems inevitable that such a controversial subject would be met with opposition. Shortly before he arrived, the police arrested five fundamentalist ministers who were picketing with signs that read, "The Bible teaches separation." During the night young boys had painted the sidewalks with "Yankee go home," but this was washed off before Kennedy arrived the next morning. According to The New York Times, Georgia politicians "were notable by their absence," because they heard Kennedy would talk about civil rights.

Here was a high ranking government official advocating civil rights reform before an overwhelmingly southern white audience who had witnessed demonstrations only months before. This encounter was truly a first. With the issues of civil rights coming to the forefront in almost all areas of the country today, such an endeavor might seem insignificant. But Kennedy's remarks came on the eve of what later turned out to be a moral revolution. At the early, most crucial stages, almost all remarks were tempered with restraint. Few were quite so bold quite so early in quite the same situation.

Organization played a vital role in the success of Kennedy's speech. In the introduction, he used the common ground approach with an added bit of humor to capture the audience's attention. After congratulating the honor students, Kennedy related a personal experience of award winning. He said he was named the student with the fifth best sense of humor in his graduating class from the University of Virginia Law School. This, according to Jay Cox, "eased a lot of tension." Cox was president of the
Advisory Council of the Law School who had visited Kennedy early in March and had asked him to speak. This off-the-cuff remark did not appear in the formal text but did contribute to the overall effect. He used another common ground approach to open his formal text. Talking of his recent presentation of the Young American Medal for Bravery to Donald McGregor, Kennedy complimented him as "one of a long line of Georgians who have by their courage set an outstanding example for their fellow Americans." He followed this with a note of humor by saying that he could not find any kinfolk in Georgia, a task which many called a prerequisite to speaking there. This touch of humor and regional interest may, as Cox observed, have helped ease the tension and make the audience more receptive to further comments. Briefly he addressed two areas of major concern which fell under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department: organized crime and "illegal practices by the amateurs." He touched upon these only lightly. They merely served as a warm-up to the third area "that affects us all the most directly--civil rights." The remainder of the speech was addressed to civil rights which comprised nearly two-thirds of the entire presentation. Although an emotional subject, Kennedy wisely chose not to use emotional appeals. Instead he turned to logic in his quest for gaining acceptance and adherence to his philosophy. "Bob recognized the need for dramatic manifestations of civil rights work but also the need for a very basic and pragmatic approach to the political problem involved," said John Seigenthaler, Kennedy campaign aide and now editor of the Nashville Tennessean. The young Attorney General explained the civil rights issue as a matter of law, and he emphasized the preeminence of law in a democracy. By presenting this enthymeme, he expected his audience to infer that abiding by civil rights decisions was imperative for the continuation of a democracy. He quoted his brother by saying "law is the strongest link between man and freedom." "Respect for the law," he said, "is the meaning of Law Day, and every day must be Law Day or else our society will collapse." He continued this line of reasoning by saying "I happen to believe that the 1954 (Supreme Court) decision was right. But my belief does not matter--it is the law. Some of you may believe the decision was wrong. That does not matter. It is the law. And we both respect the law." Speaking to an audience of 1,600 alumni and students of the University of Georgia Law School, Kennedy was appealing to their sense of values and respect for the law.

Another important psychological factor was Kennedy's appeal to the needs of the audience. In case of further demonstrations and riots, Georgians and other Americans needed to know how the Justice Department would act or what would be their role. Kennedy fulfilled this need by explaining:

I hold a constitutional office of the United States Government, and I shall perform the duty I have sworn to undertake ... we will not make or interpret
the laws. We shall enforce them vigorously, without regional bias or political slant . . . we will not persecute. We will prosecute.\textsuperscript{14}

This response served to condition the audience for future Justice Department actions. He fulfilled another need by offering hope in time of despair:

For on this generation of Americans falls the full burden of proving to the world that we really mean it when we say all men are created free and equal before the law. All of us might wish at times that we lived in a more tranquil world, but we don't. And if our times are difficult and perplexing, so are they challenging and filled with opportunity.\textsuperscript{15}

He skillfully employed his brother's much used aphorism "every danger is an opportunity."\textsuperscript{16} During a crisis situation, hope stands as a unifying force. Kennedy's attempt to pass this hope along to his audience elicited positive responses. University of Georgia student Charlayne Hunter represented the Atlanta Inquirer and was the only Negro present. In an interview with Thomas Hopkins in September of 1962, she said that "the memory of the Attorney General's speech gave her courage to continue during periods of discouragement."\textsuperscript{17} The Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., praised the speech as "a symbol the White South needs today."\textsuperscript{18} Not only was this an offer of hope to blacks, but to every American who believed in justice before the law. He offered this hope in the form of challenges and opportunities that could result from the situation.

Most interesting of Kennedy's psychological appeals was his referral to the famous Georgian Henry Grady who also had talked about liberty and respect for the law. It is not ironic that he would have chosen such a person to quote. No doubt, this was another psychological ploy to gain acceptance from his audience. Grady was the first southerner to ever speak before the prestigious New England Society in New York. Kennedy was the first high ranking official to speak about civil rights in the South. Some seventy years prior to Kennedy's speaking engagement, Grady coined the phrase "The New South" and gave his last formal address on the subject when speaking in Kennedy's home state of Massachusetts. Kennedy delivered his first civil rights speech in Grady's hometown of Athens, Georgia. There are other interesting similarities between the two. Both spokesmen of human liberty had attended the University of Virginia; Kennedy graduated from the Law School, while Grady completed a year of graduate study. Both were of Irish descent and both died in the prime of their lives --- Kennedy at age 42, Grady at age 39. During their lifetimes and after, both represented a cause and symbolized a new spirit. Each envisaged a brighter future for the people of this country.
Whether planned or not, Kennedy's text followed the same pattern as Grady's "New South" speech. Like Grady, Kennedy opened his speech on a humorous note but spoke seriously of the matter at hand for the remainder of the time. "He spoke with a directness, a simplicity, and a depth of feeling..." says Marvin Bauer of Grady. The same could be said of Kennedy.

Both alluded to the hope of "a common brotherhood for the American people." Bauer says Grady realized the need for the cultivation of an attitude. Perhaps Kennedy also realized this --- an attitude of respect for the law as well as for all human beings regardless of race, color or creed.

Whether or not Kennedy developed his entire text around Grady's is unknown. Certainly he was aware of the factors contributing to Grady's success since he employed similar ones. According to a University of Georgia professor, "it was a stroke of genius" to quote Grady, especially in his hometown of Athens. Kennedy closed his speech by reminding the audience that one of their own had also declared that America stood for human liberty. Placement of that quotation is also significant. It was in the closing that Kennedy quoted from Grady's speech. Thus he left his audience with something to think about. He summarized the major theme of his address by using the words of one already held in high esteem by his audience. An application of Osgood and Tannebaum's congruity theory would allow one to assume that he enhanced his own ethos by this gesture.

Also noteworthy in the speech is Kennedy's use of language. Throughout the text, he used short, direct and clear statements. "Our position is quite clear," he said. "We are upholding the law." According to educator Richard Neistadt, "Bob much more than Jack, had his drive to the direct approach." This situation proved to be no exception, and his audience seemed appreciative of this calculated gesture. "Never before, in all its travail of by-gone years, has the South heard so honest and understandable a speech from any Cabinet member," observed Ralph McGill, publisher of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution. The Philadelphia Inquirer referred to it as a "notable speech because of what he said and where he said it." The New York Times went even further by saying "Mr Kennedy's text used firm language and his voice was even firmer as he delivered it." The following excerpt is an example of this firmness.

...in all cases --- I say to you today that if the orders of the court are circumvented, the Department of Justice will act. We will not stand by or be aloof. We will move.

It was his intention in the May 6th speech to make public his approach to the civil rights problem. It would be important to avoid confusing and ambiguous terms that could be misinterpreted.
Flowery, vague, or perplexing language would have served only as a deterrent. There is evidence that Kennedy was aware of this fact. He spent the entire day before the speech going over it word by word, trying to predict the reaction to each word and phrase until he was satisfied that every word conveyed exactly the meaning he intended. Undoubtedly, he realized the importance of saying the "right thing in the right way at the right time and place."

The final factor put forth to determine a speech or speaker's success is whether or not one's efforts result in positive action. It is for this reason more than any other that Kennedy's speech was a success. Just as he had promised, the Justice Department moved; they did not stand aloof when crisis situations arose. There is little doubt that his "blueprint" eventually was put into action. Only weeks after the speech was given, federal agents began investigating civil rights complaints; public schools began initiating desegregation, and the federal government as a whole became more attentive to the problem at hand. These actions did not come as a result of Kennedy's speech, yet his words served to forewarn or condition his audience for these events. The Attorney General's words offered encouragement and strengthened the will to advocate a change for those who saw discrimination as an injustice of the law. The well-known Freedom Rides resulted from those courageous enough to pursue their aims. Because of the pressure of those incidents, hearings began on August 1 of the same year; on September 1 the decision was made that, on October 1, all seating in buses would be without reference to race, color or creed, and that all carriers would have to have that sign in their buses. In all terminals the "colored" and "white" signs had to come down from above the fountains and restrooms. The next summer federal government intervened again to "enforce civil rights statutes" as Kennedy had promised. Violent protests arose when a young black named James Meredith tried to enter the University of Mississippi in Oxford, Mississippi. According to Meredith, "Bobby Kennedy was the main man in determining that these steps be taken. Had they not made the decisions they made, the course of my life would have been different. His decisions kept me alive."

Bobby Kennedy, in the name of the federal government, intervened again and again --- when Martin Luther King was jailed, when Birmingham police unleashed dogs on Negro demonstrators, and when violent racial riots erupted in major cities across the country. Kennedy's pledge to uphold the law became evident. He went so far as to visit the scenes of disruption in Birmingham and Mississippi. By submerging himself into the issue, Kennedy was able to become more sympathetic and sensitive to the civil rights cause. His concern and leadership during those incidents became even more apparent as he worked through the legislative system. With his help and prodding, along with President Johnson's and others, more progressive legislation in the area of civil rights was passed in the mid-1960's than in all previous
years combined. Years of strife were to continue which eventually resulted in the death of Kennedy in June of 1968. Had he not been so vigilant by offering his "why not" approach, the country might have moved even slower. Undoubtedly, one man alone cannot be given credit for the moral revolution this country witnessed the past decade, especially since civil rights is still an acute problem eleven years later. But had he not "dreamed things that never were," we might not have been able to experience much of the progress made thus far.
NOTES


5Thomas A. Hopkins, Rights for Americans: The Speeches of Robert F. Kennedy, p. 3.

6Ibid., p. 13.


10Kennedy, p. 483.


12Kennedy, p. 482.

13Kennedy, p. 484.

14Ibid., p. 485.

15Ibid.


18Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 388.


22 Kennedy, p. 483.

23 American Journey, The Times of Robert Kennedy, p. 128.


25 Ibid.

26 Anthony Lewis, p. 1.

27 Kennedy, p. 484.


29 American Journey, The Times of Robert Kennedy, p. 103.

30 Ibid., p. 105.
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THE ELECTION DISPUTE OF 1876

During the Gilded Age many of the attitudes toward politics and politicians seemed to be those of contempt and distrust. Much of the populace considered those who worked in this ignominious profession of politics to be in the same category with crooks, swindlers and the vultures who controlled big businesses. These judgements were not without some foundation as illustrated in the 1876 Presidential election.

The Presidential election of 1876 commenced and proceeded like most national elections; but before a winner would be declared, it was destined to be the most controversial and complicated election in United States history. The candidates involved in this magnificent display of corruption and rascality were Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and his Democratic opponent, Samuel J. Tilden.1 Rutherford B. Hayes, "the Great Unknown," was nominated by the Republicans because he had not been blemished by the scandals which marked Grant's administration.2 In contrast, Samuel Tilden was nominated by the Democrats because he had a reputation as a reformer.3 Although the candidates were very different, the platforms or issues on which they ran were quite similar. Both parties were guilty of using mudslinging tactics with demagoguery as the chief campaign tool.4

It was a "dirty" campaign, but this was to be expected because both parties were desperate--the Republicans were in power and they wanted to stay in power; the Democrats, especially in the South, were determined to regain power and ostracize the so-called carpetbaggers and "Negro-lovers." The "machines" in both parties obviously felt the end justified the means, as illustrated by their campaign tactics in the Southern states. The Democrats intended to win by ignoring the laws and the Constitution concerning Negro suffrage. In effect, they would continue utilizing the age-old technique of intimidation. The Republicans intended, if necessary, to win by using--or abusing--the law on rejecting votes. Essentially this law allowed votes to be rejected on the grounds that intimidation was used. Thus the Republicans could use the returning boards to their advantage and expect federal protection in the process.5

In the bitter struggle for the Presidency of 1876, both Hayes and Tilden gave no speeches themselves; instead, they let other people do their campaigning, which, of course, made any illegal activities by their parties much easier.6 The two parties were very evenly divided, so a close election was predicted.7

Brady Kellems
Corruption was evidently expected because President Grant approved the increase of federal troops in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida to protect Negro suffrage, and in effect, gain support for the Republicans.  

After the polls had closed on the evening of November 7, Tilden and his running mate, Hendricks, seemingly had won the election by a landslide. Tilden had quickly amassed a large majority of the popular vote and had a substantial lead in the Electoral College. The next day newspapers across the country announced Tilden victorious in the Presidential election— even Hayes, himself, conceded defeat. But many strong, "hard-headed" Republicans were not ready to concede defeat because four states—Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and Oregon—had not sent in their electoral certificates and the Republicans controlled the political machinery in the three Southern states. The Republicans in their search for some type of support, some change in the election returns, some indication that Hayes might have a chance to win, received at The New York Times' office a dispatch from Dan Magone, chairman of the New York State Democratic Committee, containing the following inquiry: "Please give your estimate of the electoral votes secured for Tilden. Answer at once." This simple inquiry suggested that the Democrats were still uncertain about the election. The Republican party leaders seized this opportunity immediately and within a few hours Zach Chandler, chairman of the Republican National Committee, sent a telegram to Republican party leaders in Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana telling them "Hayes is elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. Can you hold your state? Answer at once." The Republicans knew the only chance they had was to claim the election first and substantiate the claim afterward. So when Chandler's reply came from the contested states, he announced: "Hayes has 185 electoral votes and is elected." This statement set off a chain of events within both parties. Abram S. Hewitt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, sent leading men—Republicans as well as Democrats—to South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana to see that a fair count was made, and the returns honestly canvassed. The next day President Grant requested leading Republicans only to go to the disputed states; therefore, two sets of "visiting statesmen" went to the states in doubt. Although the superficial reason these Republican "visiting statesmen" went to the disputed states was to assure the legality, they were in effect, to promote the illegality of the returning boards in order to benefit their party. Consequently, all four states—Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina and Oregon—submitted two sets of electoral returns, one by the Republicans and one by the Democrats. The dispute over the Oregon electoral votes stemmed from a technicality. One of the Republican electors held a small
postmastership, which disqualified him under the federal Constitution. In the dispute over the electoral votes of the four states both parties were accusing the other of wrongdoings. It is interesting to note that in the Southern states the two major parties, rather than denying that they had cheated, were justifying what they were doing by pointing out the unscrupulous acts of the other. Therefore, power rather than mathematics was to decide this election. A contest after the contest, a test of party strength--this was the meaning of the Hayes-Tilden election dispute of 1876. When the election came down to the wire, it depended on which of the two sets of returns would be accepted from the three disputed states: Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana. But how was the dispute to be settled?

On December 6, the Electoral College awarded the disputed votes to Hayes. Almost immediately the Democrats challenged the returning board decisions on the grounds that the Republicans had used fraudulent methods to attain the votes. Basically the situation was: Both parties maintained that their set of electoral returns were the legitimate certificates; therefore, both parties claimed victory. Eventually the two parties came to a deadlock in the dispute.

However, the American people were tired of the dispute and wanted an end to it. Only twelve years had passed since the Civil War and they were not ready for another one. The Constitution gave the President of the Senate the power to open the certificates, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, and to count the votes. But what if there were more than one certificate from a state? The Constitution, implicit as it is, gave no specific guidelines on the subject. Therefore, how was the dispute to be settled?

Naturally both parties offered resolutions. The Republicans maintained the decision rests in the Supreme Court. This method was clearly the most expeditious from a legalistic standpoint, but it was also the most beneficial to the Republicans since the majority of the Supreme Court members were Republicans. The Democrats held the decision was legally in the two houses of Congress. Since the Democrats controlled the house, this would probably give the election to Tilden. Finally, in January, 1877, Congress appointed an Electoral Commission to decide which votes should go to Tilden and which for Hayes. The Commission would be composed of fifteen members: five Senators, five Representatives and five Supreme Court Justices. The Commission would have seven Republicans, seven Democrats and one Independent; but during the debate in Congress over the Electoral Count Act the one Independent, Justice David Davis, was elected to the Senate. So Joseph P. Bradley, a Republican, was appointed as the fifth Justice to serve on the Commission, thus giving the Republicans an eight to seven majority. Consequently, all
four of the disputed states were awarded to Hayes by a vote of eight to seven. The Democrats, of course, would not accept this and threatened to use a filibuster to prevent the completion of the electoral count.

Finally, on February 26 and 27 a series of secret conferences were held between Southern Democrats and representatives for Hayes. The "Wormley House Bargain" superficially stated that the Republicans would officially end Reconstruction in the South and in return the Democrats would support Hayes' administration. But the inner arrangements had the following stipulations: withdrawal of federal troops from the South, which in effect would return the Democrats to power in their states; aid for internal improvements; a federal subsidy for the Texas and Pacific Railway, which would connect the South with the West and enhance economical growth; and at least one Cabinet seat in the Hayes' administration. In return the Southern Democrats would make sure enough Democrats were absent from the new meeting of Congress to allow the Republicans to organize the House and elect a Hayes spokesman, James Garfield, as Speaker; also they would abstain from a filibuster, which would give the Presidency to Hayes. In the end Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel Tilden by a majority of one electoral vote (185-184). On March 2, 1877, just 56 hours before Inauguration Day, Hayes was formally announced as winner of the election.

The election dispute of 1876 was caused by corruption and rascality within and without the political system. Hayes and Tilden were probably scrupulous men, in so far as politicians are allowed to be scrupulous. They were morally helpless and were really nothing more than tools manipulated by their parties. The methods of attaining or retaining the Presidency had little to do directly with Hayes or Tilden. But indirectly both were involved. Most historians now believe that the states of Louisiana and Florida were carried by Tilden, but when one considers the intimidation employed by the Democrats and the fraudulent actions of the Republicans, the electoral controversy can still be disputed.

It is the opinion of this researcher that Hayes was the best possible choice between the two candidates. If Tilden had won, it would have postponed business prosperity and industrial progress in that immigration would have been prevented. Furthermore, a Democratic victory would have been detrimental to Negro suffrage. It is doubtful that Tilden would have gone against the tide of his party to unleash the invisible chains on Negro rights. As far as the corruption goes both parties were guilty to some extent. The corruption in the electoral system in 1876 dealt a heavy blow to both parties, and in general, to the American political system itself. The climax of the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876 was the electoral dispute, but the significance was that it brought an end to the sectional power struggle and produced a more unified nation.
NOTES

1The candidates for Vice-President were Republican William Wheeler of New York chosen because the Republicans needed votes from New York and the surrounding states and Thomas Hendricks, a Democrat from Indiana, selected because he was acceptable to "soft-money" advocates.


3Ibid., 808.


5Ibid., 304.

6Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt: with some account of Peter Cooper (New York, 1935), 305.


11Eckenrode, Hayes - statesman, 180.

12Flick, S. J. Tilden, 325.


14Eckenrode, Hayes - statesman, 180.

15C. Van Woodward, Reunion and Reaction (Boston, 1959), 18.

16Hewitt also introduced a resolution calling for a Congressional investigation into the canvassing boards. Cong. Record, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., V (Washington, 1878), Part I, T1-16.

17Nevins, Abram Hewitt, 324.
Many Democrat extremists (and Republican extremists as well) intended to use force, if necessary, to put their man in the White House. Barnard, Hayes, 341-45.


Nevins, Abram Hewitt, 348-49.

Davison, Presidency of Hayes, 43.

Frederick Treavor Hill, "The Hayes-Tilden Contest - a Political Arbitration," Harper's Magazine, CXIV (March, 1907), 559

Ibid., 562.


These conferences were named the "Wormley House Conferences." The name was derived partly from the fact that they were held at the Wormley Hotel. Nevins, Abram Hewitt, 382.

Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, 7-8.

Davison, Presidency of Hayes, 44.

Barnard, Hayes, 304.

Nevins, Abram Hewitt, 324.

Davison, Presidency of Hayes, 41.
Before ascertaining facts surrounding the causes and effects of this political dispute, the researcher considered it essential to study the opposing candidates. Fundamental in understanding Rutherford B. Hayes and also as a source to the dispute itself was Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes and His America (New York, 1967). Alexander Clarence Flick, Samuel J. Tilden: a Study in Political Sagacity (Port Washington, N.Y., 1963), was instrumental in studying Samuel Tilden.

Very useful in studying Hayes' role in the political arena was Hamilton J. Eckenrode, Rutherford B. Hayes - Statesman of Reunion (Port Washington, N.Y., 1957). Portions of this book dealing with the campaign and election of 1876 seemed to contain diligent efforts to be unpartizan; and in general seemed to succeed. Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt: With Some Account of Peter Cooper (New York, 1935), was of the utmost importance in determining Tilden's part - and more significantly the Democrats surrounding him - in the election. This source contained many important facts, even though it leaned toward the Democrats. Also important, but to a lesser degree, in researching the role of the Democratic leaders was the published correspondence of Samuel Tilden, John Bigelow, ed., Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J. Tilden (New York, 1971), 2 vols. Albert Gibson, A Political Crime (New York, 1969), is the "official" Tilden summary, written by a participant in some of the secret maneuvering for Tilden. But for the purpose of this paper it was of limited use, except for ascertaining certain facts regarding Grant's use of the military.

Kenneth E. Davison, The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes (Westport, Conn., 1972), supplied some general information. Especially was it useful in studying results of the disputed election. Also, C. Van Woodward, Reunion and Reaction (Boston, 1966), supplied a great deal of material regarding the compromise reached by the two parties. Other than this the source offered no material.

Of great use in ascertaining the legal decisions concerning the electoral returns of the disputed states was Frederick Trevor Hill, "The Hayes-Tilden Contest - A Political Arbitration," Harper's Magazine, CXIV (March, 1907), 557-67. A general understanding of the election dispute was contributed by Louis Kleber, "The Presidential Election of 1876," History Today, 20 (Nov. 1970), 806-13. But this was of little specific use. Franny Z. Lovell Bone, "Louisiana in the Disputed Election of 1876," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 15 (January and April 1932) 234-265, offered some understanding of Louisiana's part in the dispute, but was of little use.

Also of limited use was the Congressional Record, 44 Cong., 2 Sess., 5 (1877), which contained little material regarding the electoral investigations.
I. A. J. P. TAYLOR: GADFLY HISTORIAN

Contemporary historians have the same problem that contemporary artists have always had: everyone knows they are here, but nobody wants to admit their worth. This is especially true for those would-be maverick historians that refuse to toto and lift on the commands of the profession's establishment.

Alan John Percivale Taylor was born on March 25, 1906, the only son of a well-to-do Radical-Liberal cotton manufacturer in Southport, Lancashire, England.1 His early education was spent in the solemn atmosphere of a Quaker school in York, where he was a good, if not always model, student. From these surroundings Taylor gained admittance to Oriel College, Oxford, where he prided himself for being the entire college's only Labour club member.2

Upon Taylor's 1927 graduation with a B. A. in history (accomplished with First Class Honours) he set out for Vienna to study diplomatic history under the tutelage of A. F. Pribram. In 1930, still only twenty-four years old, Taylor accepted the position of lecturer in modern history at Manchester.3 Taylor, who secured his Master's degree in 1932, remained at Manchester until 1938 when he was appointed as a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford and became a well-received lecturer in international history. Though he has never been awarded a university chair, A. J. P. Taylor has been Ford's lecturer in English history, 1955-56; Leslie Stephens' lecturer, Cambridge, 1961-62; and in 1956 was elected to the British Academy.4

Taylor is a lover of music, wine, food, and old buildings.5 He is a superb television performer, often appearing on the B.B.C. broadcasts of Brains Trust and Free Speech (even though he despises the broadcasting corporation and calls public television "cultural dictatorship").6 Taylor's outspoken leftist views are well known in England, owing to his notoriety as an uninhibited columnist, a flare that cost him a full professorship at London University when he refused to trade in his journalism for the chair.7 It would not have been the best trade possible, for by his own admission he makes substantially more money from journalism than he does from teaching or writing history.8

And what of Taylor's writing of history? That it sells is no secret, but why it sells is somewhat mystifying to many of his critical colleagues. It would do them well to take more

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notice of the Taylor-style (at least on this point). One
reviewer recently remarked that Taylor had never been known
to use a superfluuous word or "write an inelegant sentence."9
Others have noted his "vigorous prose"10 and "relentless staccato
of short sentences."11 Taylor certainly owns and uses his
consummate writing skills to their full advantages. Numerous
references are available concerning his liveliness, wit, clarity
of narrative, and idiosyncratic charm. In 1955, in an anonymous
New Yorker review of Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918,
it was written that, "Perhaps not since Gibbon has a descent into
the maelstrom been chronicled with so much style and wit."12 It
is a distinctive style, and one that has so far endured numerous
hostile reactions from some quarters. It is what makes A. J. P.
Taylor more readable than ninety-nine percent of his contemporaries;
it is as Hugh Brogan calls it, "the Taylor sparkle."13

If Taylor's professional colleagues all agree on the
readability of his history, there is a divergence of opinion
concerning the advisability of reading it seriously. It has
been noted that Taylor is a meticulous researcher, especially
concerning his works Struggle For Mastery in Europe and more
recently Beaverbrook.14 He is never faulted for taking sim­
plistic views and is much praised for his freshness of approach.
It is this freshness that has at times led to conflicts with
his contemporaries.

The reviews of his work Politics in Wartime and Other Essays
are illustrative of this point. George Lichtheim in New Statesman
wrote about the contents being silly and (when in regard to
Hitler) perverse.15 F. H. Hinsley on the New York Review of
Books regards Taylor as "deficient in the historical imagination."16
Yet at this same time P. W. Filby in Library Journal delights in
Taylor's "history with a smile."17 Newsweek described Taylor's
work as "vigorous... with color, cogency and a kind of acid and
grumbling charm."18

It seems, as Edward Segal has written, that Taylor has won
respect for his brilliance and originality while provoking
indignation at those alleged vices of too much wit and too great
a penchant for startling statements.19 Perhaps Taylor extracts
too great a proportion of irony and humor where the more
professional historian sees conspiracy and drama? What is it
that so irritates his critics? How is he seen by them? What
are his answers?

A. J. P. Taylor offers no formulas, but he does assert
that there are permanent regulations in history. Throughout
his works one reads phrases like "the logic of events" and "by
an inevitable logic."20 He has written that:

Certainly...history has its own logical laws. But
these laws resemble rather those by which flood-water
flows into hitherto unseen channels and forces itself
finally to an unpredictable sea.21
Notice that Taylor lays no claim to realizing historical logic, but only that it exists. Eight years after having written the above passage Taylor remained of the same mind; in a letter to Ved Mehta he wrote, "I have no theories of history and I know nothing of them."22

H. R. Trevor-Roper has claimed that Taylor is "not noted for consistency."23 It is a charge that could be hurled at Taylor's critics, Trevor-Roper not excluded. In English History 1914-1945 Taylor made it clear that he believed that the people are better than the governors and that the best politicians are those that identify with the people, that the people's enemies are civil servants, intellectuals, and capitalists.24 Yet Trevor-Roper can write that Taylor "does not believe that human agents matter much in history."25 Indeed? Taylor is no doubt a democrat with a deep faith in the ultimate good sense of the people.26

This faith has led to the labeling of Taylor as the English populist historian, and led him to be criticized for making Chaplin more relevant in the inter-war years than Virginia Woolf.27 Taylor does not deny the indictment. He is first a concerned citizen and secondly a historian. On this he has said that however professionally dedicated, the historian "remains primarily a citizen. To turn from political responsibility to dedication is to open the door to tyranny and measurable barbarism."28

The acceptance of responsibility would seem to be laudable, even to academics that perform their tasks in hollow libraries behind dirty manuscripts. The problem for Taylor and his critics is that he assumes responsibility for the present and refuses the professional responsibility of confirming consensus evaluation. In reply Taylor says:

"Historians have to state the truth as they see it without worrying whether it shocks or confirms existing prejudices. Maybe I assumed this too innocently...I do not come to history as a judge.29"

In addition to his refusal to bow before the consensus opinion of his counterparts, Taylor goes one step farther. He refuses to even start from the position that the consensus is correct. What has been called intellectual frivolity smacks of determination to defy the would-be historian's hierarchy until proven wrong. Taylor refuses to become sterile in his studies. "There is," writes Taylor, "nothing more agreeable than to make peace with the Establishment, and nothing more corrupting."30

Taylor's rebelliousness places his view of history at odds with Western (and especially British) culture. For men of the West are confident that constitutional order, pragmatic convention,
and the rule of law are all important. The brash and the deviant, such as Taylor and his views, are held at arm's length and ignored lest they upset the balance--all the more reason for efficient historians to read him.

II. CRITICISM OF THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND TAYLOR'S DEFENSE

In 1961 the most controversial of A. J. P. Taylor's books appeared. It was attacked mightily by prominent men who saw, or thought they saw, an absolution of Hitler within its pages. First some of the critics and then Mr. Taylor's defense of his work.

F. H. Soward in Canadian Forum: "The author goes to the extreme to give Hitler the benefit of the doubt and to flay his opponents." And Robert Spencer in Canadian Historical Review detects "factual errors, mis-statements concerning Hitler's policy, apparent contradiction, misuse of evidence, and especially a complete distortion of the personality of Hitler."32

Many American reviewers were less kind. S. W. Halperin in the Chicago Sunday Tribune accused Taylor of giving comfort to the neo-Nazis and "the forces of evil everywhere." This in addition to questioning the integrity of the author's research.33 E. S. Pisko writing for the Christian Science Monitor noted what he thought to be a juggling of facts in a "grotesque attempt to stand history on its head... he has been writing about a Hitler who never existed."34 G. A. Craig also saw value in the book for those who would "rehabilitate the Fuhrer's reputation," and sighs that "one almost regrets having to note that its brilliance is exceeded by its perverseness."35

James Joll, writing for Spectator admonishes the reader to be leary; that whatever he reads, Hitler was too "more wicked... in principle and doctrine than any other contemporary statesman."36 A. L. Rouse is especially damning. Rowe condemns Taylor as being irresponsible in scholarship and judgment, and warns the reader that the book is "flawed from top to bottom and offers an exemplary instance of how history should not be written."37

On a more specific level, Raymond Sontag in the American Historical Review takes pains to show how Taylor has manipulated evidence in regards to the fall of Prague in Spring, 1939.38 Edward Segel in 1964 in Review of Politics charges Taylor on two counts, first, that he lacks respect for sources other than diplomatic; and second, that within the documents he goes to, he is highly selective. Segel makes a strong argument against Taylor for dismissing Hitler's antics as play-acting.39

Time magazine, not missing a beat in its role as the establishment weekly, draws the weak conclusion that even
"Taylor states the case for appeasing Hitler and for resisting him...his sympathies obviously lie with the appeasers." Less scathingly, and more diplomatically, Harry Pitt of the University of South Carolina has said, "It's completely wrong, but you can't prove it."

The most interesting attacks came from fellow Oxford don, H. R. Trevor-Roper. On the heels of the book's publication, Trevor-Roper wrote a biting eight-page review in the July, 1961 issue of Encounter. Within that review Trevor-Roper attacked Taylor for everything from arrogance to sloppy research to Khrushchev's belligerence towards the West.

This attack was too much for Taylor and in September's Encounter he replied, ending his remarks by noting that "the Regins Professor's methods of quotation might...do harm to his reputation as a serious historian, if he had one." To which Trevor-Roper took the next two pages in order to answer, "I am unmoved." The contest spread to other journals and included a standoff television debate.

Lest a false impression be given, note that A. J. P. Taylor was not without some defenders. H. E. Barnes wrote in May, 1962 that Origins was "notable and salutary" for provoking thought concerning the circumstances leading to the Second World War. Barnes noted also something that the book's critics seem to forget; Taylor's reputation (well known until 1961) as a most consistent and unabashed Germanophobe. It was this, said Barnes, that lends the work's revisionism strengths. "This fact...would seem to reflect integrity and courage rather than past phobias and partisanship."

Herbert Butterfield, author of The Whig Interpretation of History told Ved Mehta that:

"Origins represents a later stage in the development of historiography--namely the very difficult point where one begins to go over the story without always having in mind the way that the story ended."

And though it cannot be certain, Mehta believes that Lewis Namier, the most reputable of historians, would have sided with Taylor. (Mehta bases this on the long conversation he had with Namier shortly before the historian's death.)

Taylor defended himself most fully in Origins second edition by adding a chapter entitled "Second Thoughts." This chapter plus the "Preface to the American Reader" constitutes the bulk of Taylor's defense.

On the question of appeasement, Taylor has replied:
Some English critics of this book complained that I had "apologized" for Hitler or for the appeaser. Nothing could be further from my thoughts. I have a clear record here. I was addressing public meetings against appeasement—and a very uphill work it was—when my critics were confining their activities to the seclusions of Oxford common rooms.49

On the subject of Hitler's vindication, Taylor blasted those who complained that his work did such a thing. For Taylor this was no argument. History was not for use against the enemies of mankind. If the record disproves a legend, it would be better to blame those who perpetrated the legend as ignorant, rather than ignore the latest evidence. Taylor goes on to argue that destroying Hitlerian legends is a service to truth and not a vindication of whatever evil the Fuehrer caused to occur.

Taylor debunks the idea of Hitler as a second Attila with a long-term coherent plan for enslaving Europe, or at least the entire eastern half of the continent. Noting that Hitler speculated about what he was doing, Taylor claims that the record offers no proof of a plan beyond opportunism. As an example, Taylor points out that few believe Hitler worked out some elaborate plan to come to power. Does this revision vindicate Hitler? No, says Taylor, it only discredits Papen and his associates. "It is...revisions...for the sake of historical truth."

Taylor points out also that Burton Klein, an economist for RAND corporation backs up the "no-plan" thesis in a 1959 study. If Hitler had a time-table for aggression, his failure to place the nation on a war-footing is a puzzle. Taylor notes Klein has concluded that "Until the spring of 1936, rearmament was largely a myth."50

Taylor goes further to draw a parallel between Hitler's waiting for the opportunity to seize iron-control of Germany and waiting for opportunities later on in international affairs. Taylor cites Fritz Tobias' Reichstagbrand (1962) as shooting to pieces the legend that has grown around the Reichstag fire. Hitler, says Tobias (and Taylor), was taken by surprise—and retreated.

Hitler is seen as only a moderate compared to his predecessors in regards to lebensraum by Taylor. This is a hard place to attack Taylor, because as he points out, Mein Kampf only devotes seven of seven hundred pages to the discussion. It should also be noted that available published writings of Hitler, excluding Mein Kampf, place no undue stress on this traditional German goal.51
The Taylor argument rests not on the belief that Hitler was not evil, but on the absence in the diplomatic documents that he plotted his doings on a chart or graph of some type. Taylor admits to Hitler's wickedness, he rejects as myth that Hitler controlled his own (and Europe's) destiny.\textsuperscript{52} In another place Taylor has noted that:

If you regard a plan as a great vision, then, of course, Hitler did have a plan—a lunatic vision. But if you define plan as I do, a plan of day-to-day moves, then Hitler didn't have one.\textsuperscript{53}

In a mood of reflection, after the storm over Origins, Taylor related what he felt the problem was that led to such strong denunciation.

The trouble with my book may be that in a number of places I left my own side very weak. I tend to think that if I have written one or two sentences...that's enough...I know I know...and I know other people know; after all, I didn't write my book to be read as the only book on the origins of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{54}
APPENDIX

LIST OF TAYLOR'S WORKS

The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy, 1847-1849, Manchester University Press, 1934.

Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859-1866, MacMillan, 1935.

Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885, MacMillan, 1938.


From Napoleon to Stalin, Hamish Hamilton, 1950.

Rumours of Wars, Hamish Hamilton, 1952.


From Sarajevo to Potsdam, Thames and Hudson, 1966, Harcourt, 1967.


Contributor to Sunday Express, Observer, New Statesman, and other publications.
NOTES


3Ibid., 531; Contemporary Authors, 1132.


8Mehta, Fly, 180.

9Mark Arnold-Foster, New Statesman, 89 (April 18, 1975), 516.


12New Yorker, 30 (Feb. 5, 1955), 113.


15George Lichtheim, New Statesman, 68 (Sept. 25, 1964), 454.


18Newsweek, 65 (March 1, 1965), 88.


41 Quoted by Marion B. Lucas of Western Kentucky University during interview with this paper's author.


45 *Newsweek*, 58 (July 31, 1961), 72.


47 Mehta, *Fly*, 250.


51 The reader should note the paucity of space given to the subject in the readily available *Hitler's Secret Book* (New York, 1961), Gottfried Feder's *Hitler's Official Programme* (New York, 1971), and Eberhard Jackel's *Hitler's Weltanschauung* (Middletown, Conn., 1972).


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Times Literary Supplement, April 21, 1961.
THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THOSE "WISE MEN OF THE EAST"

The Hartford Convention aroused great emotion for many years after the War of 1812. Its supporters considered it to be a convention of statesmen, attempting to save the Union from democratic excesses, while its critics felt it was a gathering of traitors, bent on destroying that same Union. In actuality, the Hartford Convention was the last effort of the Federalist Party to remain an important factor in national politics.

When the War of 1812 began, New England Federalists refused to support the Madison administration's war efforts with either money or vocal support. As the war continued with no end in sight, the New Englanders became restless. When Congress enacted an embargo in 1813 to halt the flourishing New England trade with the enemy, Federalist patience ceased; and murmurings of rebellion began to run throughout the commercial and shipping towns of Massachusetts.¹

The movement for a New England convention began in Massachusetts, but not in Boston, as would seem likely. According to Noah Webster, "The first proposals for a convention proceeded from the people in their primary assemblies. Not one person in Boston had any concern in those proposals." Instead, the Hampshire County town of Northampton originated the idea. Several of the town's leading men, unhappy with the war's progress and the embargo, invited a number of leading citizens from surrounding towns to discuss the prevailing conditions and to make their sentiments known to the Massachusetts General Court. The invitation, dated January 5, 1814, requested a meeting on January 19 at Northampton "for the purpose of a free and dispassionate discussion touching our public concerns."²

At this meeting, a circular letter was authorized to be sent to all towns in Hampdon, Franklin, and Hampshire counties. The letter listed several complaints against Madison's government; they included the embargo's unconstitutionality and the hardships created by it, and the lack of proper representation in Congress for the commercial states. It also suggested that town meetings

"address memorials to the General Court...petitioning that honorable body to propose a convention of all the Northern and Commercial States, ... for procuring such alterations in the federal constitution as will give the Northern States a due proportion of representation, and secure them from the future exercise of powers injurious to their commercial interests."³

Raymond T. Tatum
This letter was soon spread throughout most of Massachusetts. Over forty towns sent memorials to the General Court requesting action for their grievances. Northampton and Hatfield asked that constitutional amendments favoring New England be proposed, either by a convention or by any suitable means. Amherst urged the legislature "to take the most vigorous and decisive measures" to restore peace. Newbury refused to rule out violence; "We call on our State legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges to assert which our fathers died, and to defend which we profess ourselves ready to resist unto blood." Every memorial listed the hated embargo as a major grievance. 

Popular excitement had reached a level that Federalist leaders found difficult to control. In the General Court, order was hard to maintain when extremist Federalists praising Great Britain, vilifying the administration, and proposing radical measures, such as secession, were loudly applauded by the public galleries. Harrison Gray Otis, a Boston legislator and a Central Committeeman in the Federalist Party, was given the task of smothering the agitation, although he was, as one observer said, "without the slightest taste for political martyrdom." He supported the doctrine of secession in the Court chamber, but added that the time was not right for such an extreme action. With the help of other moderates, plans for a convention were postponed, at least temporarily.

In early February, a special committee issued a report on the town memorials. It rejected a petition to Congress on the grounds that such an action was utterly futile, and stated that the embargo was unconstitutional and therefore void. A New England Convention to propose constitutional amendments was approved, but it recommended that public approval be obtained first in the spring state elections.

The Republican candidate for governor, Samuel Dexter, was a moderate Federalist who disapproved of the proposed convention. The election became a referendum on the convention. With 55 percent of the vote going to the Federalist, Caleb Strong, the convention received a vote of confidence. In the legislative election held soon afterwards, Federalists gained a majority of 204 in the lower house.

The convention had been approved by the voters. But, in the meantime, President Madison had allowed Congress to repeal the embargo, dampening the popular clamor for the convention. With public agitation reduced, and with Otis arguing that a convention might harm the peace negotiations at Ghent, the party leadership ignored demands for an early meeting. The General Court met that summer, and took no action. All seemed calm.

That calm was broken by the expansion of the war during the summer of 1814. British military engagements along the New
England coastline began in July; in August, Washington was burned, and Maine invaded, with the British occupying United States territory from Canada south to the Penobscot River. It was rumored that a British force, led by General Rowland Hill, was preparing to leave Britain to invade New England. Fueled by the deteriorating situation, demands for a separate peace and secession joined existing complaints over the Massachusetts government's inaction. Thus pressured by external invasion and internal rebellion, the Federalist state leaders went ahead with convention plans. In early September, Governor Strong ordered the General Court back into special session to adopt such measures as "the present dangerous state of public affairs may render expedient."9

Before the special session began, Federalist leaders devised a plan of action. They had to satisfy the public, whose language was "high toned and menacing," according to Otis. But few wanted outright secession; most party leaders were moderates who still had hopes of regaining power in Washington. Of all the demands listed by the public, the convention scheme alone seemed "constitutional and peaceable." To save the special session from indecision or from producing violent measures, leading members of the Federalist caucus and the Central Committee decided to support "the sentiments of our country friends" in favor of a convention in order to keep it from becoming too radical.10

A cautious, low-keyed speech by Governor Strong at the opening session of the General Court on October 17 was referred to a joint committee chaired by Otis. By careful prearrangement, moderates dominated this committee. The legislature received its report the next day. This paper, known as "Otis's Report" after its author, urged the state to withhold its taxes from the federal treasury in order to support its own defense against the British. It also stated that the Constitution had failed to provide New England with the rights and benefits expected from it, and therefore required immediate change. To bring about this change, the report proposed a convention "between those states the affinity of whose interests is closest" which would meet in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 15, 1814. This convention would devise a system of common defense for New England and would "enable delegates from those states... to lay the foundation for a radical reform in the national compact..." The report ended with several resolutions, one of which called for the appointment of delegates to the convention.11

Radicals tried to add several more extreme measures, but failed. John Lowell believed that the convention would be too moderate, but his was the minority view. House members did commit the delegation to support constitutional amendments rectifying abuses in slave representation and the congressional power to lay embargoes.12
On October 18, "Otis's Report" was approved by wide margins in both houses--22 to 12 in the Senate and 260 to 90 in the House--with a number of Republican legislators refusing to vote. Approval was then given to send the report and letters of invitation to the other New England states.13

The vocal minorities in both houses submitted protests against the convention. The Senate protest stated "No state should enter into any compact or agreement with another without the consent of Congress." The House protest, signed by 75 legislators, felt that "However disguised or designed," this convention would "prepare the way for a separation and division of the Union." The Federalist majority refused to record either protest, deeming them "disrespectful."14

When the Connecticut legislature received its invitation, it was referred, as usual, to a committee. The committee report denounced the Madison administration's attachment to Napoleon and its abandonment of New England defense. It compared the peace, when "our cities and villages exhibited indications of increasing wealth," to existence during the war, when "the fleets of a powerful enemy hover on our coasts; blockade our harbours; and threaten our towns and citizens with fire and desolation." The committee approved of the convention, and asked that delegates from Connecticut be appointed to confer on those subjects proposed by Massachusetts, plus "any other subjects which may come before them." The Connecticut legislature approved this report by a vote of 153 to 36.15

The Rhode Island legislative committee that handled the Massachusetts invitation confined itself to a discussion of the military situation and the federal government's failure to protect the state. It asked that delegates be sent to confer on "the best means of co-operating for our mutual defense" and on the best way of restoring the people's "rights and privileges" under the Constitution. The vote in the assembly was 39 to 28 in favor; as in Massachusetts, a Republican protest was not entered into the records.16

New Hampshire and Vermont did not approve of the convention as expected. In New Hampshire, a combination of the legislature's adjournment, Republican control of the governor's council, and indifference on the part of most Federalist leaders made formal participation impossible. However, party organizations in two counties along the Connecticut River went ahead and appointed a couple of delegates to the convention. The British invasion of Lake Champlain during the summer had put an end to partisan bickering in Vermont. The Federalist governor there believed that the war was a defensive one now, and should be supported by everyone. The Federalist-controlled legislature rejected the invitation unanimously. But, as in New Hampshire, one county sent its own delegate.17 The abstention of Vermont and New
Hampshire, plus the presence of vocal minorities in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, weakened the convention, because it showed that not even New England was united behind it.

Advice, much of it conflicting, soon descended on the convention delegates. Gouverneur Morris urged them to support an autonomous New England confederacy, while Thomas Pickering, a prominent Federalist extremist, wanted the West forced out of the Union, restoring the eastern commercial states to the pre-eminence that they had once enjoyed. Lowell wanted the Constitution suspended and New England declared neutral for the remainder of the war. At the same time, moderation was urged by others, Robert Goodloe Harper of Baltimore warned that southern Federalists would not tolerate New England obstructionism. A couple of middle-state Federalists argued against the convention; Oliver Wolcott believed it to be unconstitutional, while Rufus King feared that it might, horror of horrors, satisfy public opinion. 18

The delegates to the Hartford Convention had a good deal of pressure placed on their shoulders. They numbered 26 and represented the political and legal expertise of New England Federalism. All were political activists and leaders of their communities. Twenty-one were lawyers, with the remainder merchants; twenty-two were college graduates, and nine had served as judges. The average age was 52. They were mature and responsible men, not the sort to risk both neck and property in an abortive rebellion. 19

Massachusetts sent the largest delegation: twelve. George Cabot, a founder of the Federalist Party and a former United States Senator from Massachusetts, had stepped out of retirement to head the delegation. He distrusted democracy, but had mellowed with years and served as a restraining influence at the convention. His presence in the delegation did not please extremist Federalists at all; both Pickering and Lowell saw Cabot as a man "most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a delegate." He was skeptical of human nature, asking a friend once, "Why can't you and I let the world ruin itself its own way?" He became a delegate, he said, "to keep you young hotheads from getting into mischief." Cabot was clearly not a maker of revolutions. 20

Most other Massachusetts delegates were also moderates. Harrison Gray Otis had led the moderates in the General Court, and proved to be a moderate influence at Hartford. A successful lawyer and the bearer of a distinguished Massachusetts name, Otis was an eloquent speaker and possessed great charm. Joseph Lyman, a leading figure at the Northampton meetings in January, 1814, was a delegate, as was Timothy Bigelow, the speaker of the Massachusetts House. Nathan Dane, the author of the 1787 North- west Ordinance, Stephen Longfellow, father of the poet, and
William Prescott, father of the historian, also attended. Joshua Thomas, Samuel Sumner Wilde, George Bliss, Daniel Waldo, and Hodijah Baylies rounded out the list. All but Bigelow and Bliss were considered moderates. 21

The Connecticut delegation was led by Lieutenant-Governor Chauncey Goodrich, a veteran congressman and one-time major of Hartford. James Hillhouse was treasurer of Yale; he had fought in the Revolution, and had served in Congress for 20 years. The oldest delegate at Hartford was John Treadwell, who had served in the Continental Congress and both houses of the Connecticut legislature, and had been both governor and lieutenant-governor of Connecticut. Zephaniah Swift and Nathaniel Smith had served in Congress, and were now the chief justice and an associate justice, respectively, of the state Supreme Court. Calvin Goddard had spent four years in Congress and 17 years as major of Norwich, and was appointed to the state Supreme Court shortly after the convention. Roger Minot Sherman was a reputable lawyer and legislator. The Connecticut delegation was seen as "a collection of sedate, temperate, serious, and. . .generally wise men." 22

The Rhode Island delegation did not have as much experience in national politics as the other two delegations had. This can perhaps be explained by Rhode Island's previous disdain for unified state action. Daniel Lyman, Rhode Island's chief justice, had been a major during the Revolution, and was now the president of the Society of the Cincinnati. Samuel Ward was the son of the founder of Brown University, and had fought with Benedict Arnold in the unsuccessful 1775 expedition against Quebec. Benjamin Hazard and Edward Manton were state legislators. 23

The representative from Cheshire County, New Hampshire, Benjamin West, was known as a "refuser of offices." He had been elected to the Articles of Confederation Congress, the state constitutional convention, and the United States House of Representatives, and had refused all three. The other New Hampshire delegate, Miles Olcott of Grafton County, was a lawyer. William Hall, a merchant from Bellow Falls, Vermont, completed the list of convention delegates. 24

On the morning of December 15, all but two of the delegates had assembled in Hartford for the opening session of the convention. The Connecticut State House Council Chamber had been placed at their disposal by the legislature. Cabot was unanimously elected president of the body, and Theodore Dwight, the editor of the Connecticut Mirror, was the unanimous choice as secretary. 25 Otis, Hillhouse, and Lyman were appointed to the credentials committee, which verified everyone's credentials. A rules committee, composed of Goddard, Bigelow, and Lyman, was then named, and the assembly was adjourned until that afternoon. When they reconvened, the rules drawn up by the committee were approved. Most were
either trivial or inoffensive; however, the second rule gave the delegates a great deal of grief later on. It read, "The most inviolable secrecy shall be observed by each member of this Convention, including the Secretary, as to all propositions, debates, and proceedings thereof, until this injunction shall be suspended or altered." The arguments for secrecy later given by the delegates were custom—the Constitutional Convention had met in private—and speed—business could be handled much faster without outside pressure. But with the country at war and with Republican distrust of the convention prevalent, secrecy was unwise. The public immediately assumed that the delegates were hiding treasonable debate. This accusation haunted the delegates and their work for many years.26

After the approval of rules, a committee of five was appointed to prepare a list of "proper" subjects for discussion. Goodrich, Otis, Daniel Lyman, Swift, and Dane were appointed.27

The next day, Ward arrived from Rhode Island, and was seated. The committee of five then submitted its report of discussion topics. It listed the constitutional question of militia command, the issue of federal reimbursement for the expenses of mobilized militia not under federal command, the constitutionality of military conscription, the general expenses of the war, and the matter of state defense.28

Two days of discussion followed. A number of delegates wanted to include a set of constitutional amendments, which the report had not mentioned. Several, such as Hillhouse and Bigelow wanted extremr action taken than desired by the moderates. On the 19th, Cabot appointed a committee to draft a set of proposals for adoption. The committee members were Smith, Otis, Goddard, West, and Hazard, with the more outspoken members pointedly excluded. The next day, this committee submitted its report, which was similar to the December 16 report and did not include any amendments. Debate went on until December 24, when the report was approved, but with six amendments added to the original. This report, with the addition of another amendment on December 29, was the basis for the final convention report.29

On December 21, a committee of seven had been appointed to prepare a final convention report. Otis was the chairman, and was joined by Smith, Sherman, Dane, Prescott, West, and Hazard. This committee received the adopted proposals on the 24th and went to work. The convention, waiting for the final draft, had little to do between December 26 and 30, except admit Hall of Vermont on the 28th. On Friday, December 30, the final report was ready for discussion. Examined paragraph by paragraph, the first eight pages were returned to the committee for revision on the 31st. Finally, on the afternoon of January 3, 1815, the report was approved by the entire convention. Wrapping up unfinished business, the Hartford Convention adjourned on January 5.30
During the convention's meetings, public opinion had been greatly aroused by its secrecy. This secrecy seems to have been kept very strictly; other Federalists knew as little about the convention proceedings as the Republicans. Their hopes were high, though. In a letter to Pickering, Gouverneur Morris wrote that his "eyes are fixed on a star in the East, which... he believed to be the dayspring of freedom and glory." The Boston Columbian Centinel, on December 28, asked the convention to free New England from "the tyrannical oppression" of the Republicans.31

The Republican newspapers also had comments to make about the convention. According to the Hartford American Mercury, Hartford bystanders had expressions of loathing and disgust as the delegates assembled December 15. The American flag was displayed at half-mast, three meetinghouses tolled their bells solemnly, and "appropriate (funeral) marches" were played in the streets. According to the Mercury, the delegates appeared melancholy and fearful while walking the streets, rarely looking up except when passing a tree or some object from which a person could be hanged.32 The Boston Patriot recommended arresting the delegates as traitors at the first overt act of treason, but the Kentucky Gazette believed that the Federalists would not put the government to that much trouble, calling them "fools and cowards--and as such will never risk any other punishment than that of being heartily laughed at."33

Despite the sneers, the administration worried about the convention and the possibility of revolt. A young Kentuckian, Major Thomas T. Jessup, was stationed with his regiment at Hartford during the convention. Officially there to recruit, he also had orders to watch the convention for any overt signs of rebellion. With his troops and New York troops under Governor Daniel Tompkins, the administration was prepared to crush any sign of revolt.34

The final report of the Hartford Convention was published in an extra of the Hartford Courant on January 6. It was soon reprinted by a number of newspapers, including the Lexington Western Monitor, and as a pamphlet.35 In its opening paragraphs, the report acknowledged the difficulties faced by the delegates in finding constitutional means of ending federal oppression and enacting reforms without "disappointing the hopes of a suffering and injured people." Reform through legitimate channels might seem irksome, "but when corruption existed throughout the government, no quick means of relief existed" without recourse to direct and open resistance..." which should be avoided. Some might regard the evils surrounding them as "intrinsic and incurable defects in the constitution." But the convention did not agree, and urged moderation for several reasons. After all, the Constitution had worked nicely under "a wise and virtuous" government--in other words, under Federalists. The existing troubles had been caused by the incompetence, corruption, and
oppression of the Republicans. Therefore, these officials should be replaced. "But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change the Constitution would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution." Also, the Napoleonic wars had misled many people into supporting France. With Napoleon now conquered, these citizens would realize that America's true interests rested with Great Britain. A third reason for moderation was the war itself. The convention felt if the Union had to separate, it should be by common consent during peacetime, instead of violently while at war.\textsuperscript{36}

The report was phrased in such a way as to placate both sides. The extremists were encouraged to think that the Convention supported their views, but not their timing. Moderates, on the other hand, were given the impression that the extremist viewpoint had been rejected. The desire to conciliate both sides and hold the party together was strong.\textsuperscript{37}

The Madison administration's military policy was discussed next. The division of the country into military districts and the use of army conscription were denounced as unconstitutional. The delegates admitted that the president had the power to take command of the state militias under certain circumstances, but argued that the states could ignore a presidential summons if they wished. The states were encouraged to uphold their authority against encroachment by the national government.\textsuperscript{38}

The report now turns to New England defense. By diverting manpower and supplies in a futile attempt to conquer Canada, the administration had "left the exposed and vulnerable parts of the country destitute of all the efficient means of defense." The lack of federal troops had forced the states to depend on their militias. The administration had refused to pay the expenses of militias not under federal control. This expense placed a strain on state finances, because they were paying to the federal treasury at the same time. Because the national government was on the verge of bankruptcy, New England expected little improvement in federal defense. Therefore, they suggested that "these states... be allowed to assume their own defense, by the militia or other troops." To pay for this defense, "a reasonable portion" of the federal taxes raised in the states should be retained by them.\textsuperscript{39}

The next two pages were basically a Federalist party manifesto. It is a list of Republican practices that they believe have led the country to ruin. The most important objection was the Republicans' use of "local jealousies and ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union, the controul [sic] of public affairs in perpetual succession." Another objection was the exclusion of Federalists from the national government by the Republicans. The convention also disapproved of the Republicans' "unconstitutional" interference with the courts, their mishandling of the economy, and the use of patronage as a political tool. An important New England objection included was the destruction of "the balance of power which
existed among the original states" by the admission of new states. The convention also disliked the appointment of naturalized citizens to high office, the Republicans' tilt toward France at Great Britain's expense, and the attempt to use commerce as "an instrument of coercion and war."\textsuperscript{40}

In order to correct these constitutional errors, the convention proposed seven constitutional amendments, limited to "essential" matters. The stated object of the amendments was "to strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the union of the states. . . ." The first amendment would have abolished the three-fifths compromise, and would have based direct taxes and representation in the House of Representatives—and therefore the Electoral College—on the number of free inhabitants in each state. The second "indispensable" amendment would have required a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress to admit new states to the Union, giving the commercial, Federalist states a veto over the creation of new states. The third and fourth amendments would have limited an embargo to 60 days, and would have required a two-thirds vote of Congress to ban commercial relations between the United States and another country.\textsuperscript{41}

The fifth amendment would have required a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress for a declaration of war. The Federalists argued that the war had been started by the western states, which were not in danger of invasion or blockade, unlike the coastal states. A sixth amendment would have barred naturalized citizens from sitting in Congress or from holding any civil office in the government. The last amendment would have restricted a president to a single term of office, and would have forbidden the election of presidents from the same state for successive terms. "A president whose political career is limited to a single election, may find no other interest. . . . than that of making it glorious to himself, and beneficial to his country."\textsuperscript{42}

The report concluded with a number of resolutions. The first one recommended that the New England states adopt all measures needed to protect their people from unconstitutional acts passed by Congress. A second resolution urged these states to petition Congress for approval of the defense recommendations made by the convention, while the third recommended the creation of state armies. The next resolution asked that New England approve the amendments listed and submit them to other states for adoption. If Congress failed to act on the Federalist grievances, there should be a second New England convention, to be held at Boston on the third Thursday of June, 1815. If a crisis should arise before then, Cabot, Goodrich, and Lyman were authorized to call another meeting of the delegates at Boston. Last of all are the delegates' signatures, with Massachusetts heading the list.\textsuperscript{43}

Federalist reaction to the convention report was mixed. Pickering and Lowell considered it to be too moderate, while
others felt that a constitutional convention should have been called. Arthur Bryant of Northampton wrote his son, William Cullen, "Our Federalists were much disappointed, saying that they dared not adopt any energetic measures, but would go on in the way of supplication. . . ." But the majority of the Federalists applauded the "moderate but firm" report. Governor Strong and Senator Gore of Massachusetts, John Jay, and Daniel Webster were just a few of the report's admirers. In Philadelphia, the following toast was made at a Washington's Birthday dinner: "The Hartford Convention, the dignified apostles of the true political faith!"  

Republicans generally were relieved by the convention's moderation. The organ of the administration, the National Intelligencer, felt that "the proceedings are tempered with more moderation than was to have been expected." Several newspapers needled the convention delegates; the Montreal Courant and Herald called them "the Hucksters in Chief of the United States." The Kentucky Gazette seems to have summed up Republican sentiment nicely; "The mountain has neither bro't forth a mouse, nor terminated in a volcano."  

By January 18, when the Massachusetts General Court met for its winter session, Federalist spirits had been raised considerably. In his opening speech, Governor Strong praised the convention for preventing a "fatal excess" of extremism. The legislature quickly approved a resolution stating that it did "highly approve" the delegates' work. The Connecticut legislature also approved the report. But Rhode Island and New Hampshire took no action on it, and ten other states rejected it.  

When the General Court approved the convention report, it also authorized a commission of three to go to Washington to arrange for the transfer of defense responsibilities from the federal government to Massachusetts. Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas H. Perkins, and William Sullivan were chosen. They left Boston on February 3, two days after learning of Jackson's victory at New Orleans, and arrived in Washington on the 13th. The very next day, the capital learned that the Treaty of Ghent had been signed on December 24, 1814. The war was over, making the commissioners' trip irrelevant. Ridiculed by the opposition press, they remained long enough to argue their claims before a skeptical administration, and then returned home.  

Connecticut had also sent a couple of commissioners, Calvin Goddard and Nathaniel Terry, to Washington. But they arrived there after news of the peace treaty had arrived, and managed to avoid the ridicule heaped on the Massachusetts delegates. 

With the war over, Republican newspapers and wits lampooned and satirized the Hartford Convention unmercifully. One story had a British officer taking a ride in the Connecticut countryside, where he met two British deserters. Asked where they were
going, they replied, "the Hartford Convention." Hearing this story, a Hartford citizen remarked, "then they lied, for the Hartford Convention never deserted from his majesty's service."50

The Hartford Convention was the dying gasp of the Federalist Party. Outside of New England, only remnants of the party remained. The War of 1812 had given the New England Federalists a new vitality, but it was only temporary, America was changing; Jacksonian democracy would appear in the not-so-distant future, and there was no longer room for a party of the rich and well-born.
Epitaph of the Hartford Convention

Missing.

Three well looking, responsible men, who appear to be travelling towards Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's Hotel, in Baltimore, on Monday evening last, and have not since been heard of. They were observed to be very melancholy on hearing the news of peace, and one of them was heard to say, with a great sigh, "Poor Caleb Strong." They took with them their saddle-bags, so that no apprehension is entertained of their having an intention to make away with themselves. Whoever will give any information to the Hartford Convention of the fate of these unfortunate and tristful gentlemen by letter (post paid) will confer a favor upon humanity.

The newspapers, particularly the Federal newspapers, are requested to publish this advertisement in a conspicuous place, and send their bills to the Hartford Convention.

P.S. One of the gentlemen was called Titus Oates, or some such name. [Source: the New York National Advocate]
NOTES

1James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York, 1970), 313.


3Ibid., 102.


5Banner, Hartford Convention, 317-318.

6Ibid., 319.

7Ibid., 320.

8Ibid., 320-321.

9Ibid., 321; William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters, and Public Events (Boston, 1834), 333.

10Banner, Hartford Convention, 322-323.

11Ibid., 324; Adams, History of United States, VIII, 224-225.

12Banner, Hartford Convention, 324-325.

13Ibid., 325-326.

14Niles' Weekly Register, VII (Nov. 12, 1814), 154-155; Lexington Kentucky Gazette, Nov. 21, 1814.


16Adams, History of United States, VIII, 227; Buckley, Hartford Convention, 9; Dwight, Hartford Convention, 351.

17Banner, Hartford Convention, 328; Niles' Weekly Register, VII (Nov. 19, 1814), 167.

18Banner, Hartford Convention, 329-331.

19Francis F. Beirne, The War of 1812 (New York, 1949), 328-329; Banner, Hartford Convention, 326; Buckley, Hartford Convention, 10-11.
Buckley, Hartford Convention, 11; Adams, History of United States, 290-292; Beirne, War of 1812, 327-328.

Buckley, Hartford Convention, 11-12; Dwight, Hartford Convention, 351; Banner, Hartford Convention, 327.


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Ibid., 14-15.

Dwight, Hartford Convention, 383-386.

Ibid., 387.

Ibid.; Banner, Hartford Convention, 336.

Dwight, Hartford Convention, 388-391; Banner, Hartford Convention, 336-337.

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Niles' Weekly Register, VII (Dec. 24, 1814), 270; Buckley, Hartford Convention, 14-15.

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Benson J. Lossing, "The Hartford Convention," Harper's, XXV (July 1862), 222.

Beirne, War of 1812, 330; Lexington Western Monitor, Feb. 3, 10, 1815.

Dwight, Hartford Convention, 352-356; Buckley, Hartford Convention, 18-19.

Buckley, Hartford Convention, 19.

Ibid.

Dwight, Hartford Convention, 362-366.

Ibid., 367-370.

Ibid., 370-372.
42Ibid., 373-375.

43Ibid., 376-379.


45Niles' Weekly Register, VIII (March 4, 1815), 430.

46Beirne, War of 1812, 331-332; Niles' Weekly Register, VIII (March 4, 1815), 429; Lexington Kentucky Gazette, Jan. 23, 1815.

47Adams, History of United States, 301; Banner, Hartford Convention, 346-347.

48Banner, Hartford Convention, 347-348.

49Buckley, Hartford Convention, 26.

50Niles' Weekly Register, VIII (Supplement), 191.
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Western Monitor. Lexington. Feb. 3, 10, 1815.