The Golden Fields of Santo Domingo: A Historical Analysis of America's Obsession with the Dominican Republic During the Nineteenth century

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Approved by  

[Signatures]
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated in loving memory of my mother, Sarah Pennington, who taught me the love of reading, and to her mother, Bessie Hazlewood, who taught me the love of history, and to my grandmother, Thelma Pennington, who taught me the love of myself. I will see you both when I get there, and have I got stories to tell you!
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With my hat off to Thoreau, no work of this magnitude is done alone. What began as a question on how to preserve an antique book has resulted in this work. For that inspiration, I am indebted to Drs. Robert Berkhofer and Patricia Minter of the History Department at Western Kentucky University. But, I can’t let Dr. Minter off the hook that easily, because it is she who was also my faculty advisor for this project. I am indebted to her many hours of tirelessly laboring over my inability to put abstract ideas into concrete language, and I thank her from the bottom of my heart. Speaking of language, I am also grateful to Walker Rutledge of the English Department for his grammar editing and basically having to put up with someone who thought that he could write in the first place. To Dr. Marion B. Lucas of the History Department, my second reader, I thank you for your comments and suggestions.

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I have seen the birth of classics in history: the publication of the historical research of Mr. Charles Callan Tansill sitting alongside the perfect companion, Melvin Knight, with his additional and valuable bibliography and commentary, and, of course, the innumerable contributions of Mr. Howard H. Bell, Mr. William Javier Nelson, and Dr. Mary Treudley. I had the honor of reading the works of Mr. Samuel Hazard who, though possibly biased toward Dominican annexation, provided a wealth of anthropological data and historical facts. But, there are a chosen few graduate students who would write of this time in history, and all, despite their political bias, told the story accurately, provided even more revealing bibliographies, and told the story with such conviction that it inspired me. To these people, I am deeply indebted and grateful.

Finally, to all my family and friends who, for over a year now, have been unable to have a conversation with me for more than fifteen minutes before I have to talk about Santo Domingo or bat guano, thank you for your patience and support during my antisocial stages of writing.

As far as writing is concerned, I owe my last word to someone who can say it better than I. I give you the words of William Henry Seward:

*Most of the world would be surprised to know how few of our thoughts are really original with ourselves. What we write and say is, for the most part, a kind of mosaic*
interweaving of ideas and recollections gathered out of other people’s talk or books. The combination and rearrangement of them is about all we can call our own.
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In this work, the term "Santo Domingo" denotes one of three places: Santo Domingo City, the province of Santo Domingo, or the island country of Santo Domingo. Early history is the history of Santo Domingo City. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the term also meant the provincial division of land in the southeastern quadrant of the island that incorporated Santo Domingo City. When the Spanish were in control of most, if not all, of the island, the name Santo Domingo designated this kingdom. It not only included Santo Domingo City, the hub of activity in early Spanish American history, but it also included the vast grasslands and the island itself. It included the coastal areas and, to the Spanish, most of the water surrounding the island. This territorial explanation may help explain what some may consider aberrant behavior on the part of populations who, when feeling especially challenged, commissioned pirates and privateers to stop the vessels of other countries in what they considered Dominican waters.

The complication in the definition of a country’s border bears some further explanation. Historically, the border of a country extended the distance that a cannon could shoot a ball from the shore at low tide. This is the origin of the marine league that measured approximately three miles (Jules Verne fans may note that 20,000 leagues under the sea are therefore impossible). However, most powerful nations at this time also considered that any island within the three-mile limit of another island was justification to extend their boundaries even further. The purchase of Alaska with its extensive array of islets, some of which constituted no more than a stepping stone to another rock on the ocean’s surface, presented the first definitive case in what constituted a border of a
country. Alta Vela, with the comic obsession with bat manure aside, would present a most tenuous understanding of the length that nations will go to extend their borders. Alta Vela was at least fifteen miles from the Dominican shore, but Spain attempted to include it within the borders of the Republic. The United States disagreed with this interpretation for one reason or another. Today, Alta Vela is considered part of the Dominican Republic.

While the reader can safely contend that every nation argued for their own benefit, there existed an international understanding of what constituted (for lack of a better phrase) “fair play.” Echoing its early modern heritage of the fifteenth century, nations argued and fought each other according to understood rules of behavior. These rules were a form of checks and balances against a demagogue who thought that he could rule the world regardless of the rights of any citizen and thus destroy the power of the nation that he led. The United States historically did not follow these understood rules of behavior.

Throughout the history of the Dominican Republic, the actions of the United States were, according to the reader’s viewpoint, either sympathetic or opportunistic. The fact that the Dominican Republic is no better than it was in the nineteenth century may shed some light on what effects American diplomacy had on the island. At no time, however, can the reader accuse the United States of being so concerned with the inhabitants of the island that they operated with discretion. William Henry Seward would say the right words concerning the weakness of the island, but he would not do anything substantial to help the country. The picture of thoughtless American politicians playing with the emotions of a desperate island nation that they considered physically inferior is
not erroneous. It can safely be argued that “playing fair” throughout this history was not a consideration of the United States.

The history of the American obsession with the Dominican Republic during the nineteenth century, albeit no matter how forgotten or ignored, is a disturbing echo. It is a period when the business interests of the United States looked upon “inferior” nations as being “uncivilized,” lacking the modern and convenient encumbrances of the Industrial Age. These countries were the prime targets for a rhetoric that suggested that the United States was a benefactor to the world at the same time that it was a powerful nation. Its power lay in the capitalistic hegemony of the Monroe Doctrine.

Reality was something else, however. In what can only be described as a “strut,” the United States played the rooster with the hens. During the 1870s, the United States was literally running out of paying customers within the continent because our country produced a surplus, and supply exceeded demand. The American Industrial Revolution revealed a paradigm that Great Britain, France, and Spain realized all too well from their earlier histories. In order for private business interests to continue to accumulate wealth, they had to secure more markets. Secretary of State Seward, a genius with this conundrum, was the master showman.

Historians rightly avoid personal judgment. There is a difference, however, in making a judgment based on personal ideologies and a judgment based on fact. The facts are that the United States, during its obsession of the nineteenth century, acted according to that obsession. Obsession disregards both the people obsessed and the desired object. When reading this history, the reader is confounded with mixed patriotic emotions for his
own country and the realization that his own country may be opportunistic regardless of
the rights of any other human being, American or otherwise.

Business executives and leaders may applaud the genius of American ingenuity in
dealing with the Dominican Republic. People impressed with the end result and big
numbers would concur. People fearful of losing all that they have earned through what
they consider “hard work” might also agree. Nevertheless, the facts speak louder than any
capitalistic bravado that may emanate throughout this globe. It may even be rightly
argued that the legacy of the nineteenth century concerning the Dominican Republic is
how the United States deals with nations today—when the United States deals with a
nation now, how “backward” does our nation consider the “other”? How “backward” is a
nation that still believes in reasonable human behavior? The United States appears to
consider anyone not of their interests as “backward.”

The history of the Dominican Republic is the continuing history of private business
attempting to control the American Government regardless of its effects on the common
American citizen or any citizen thus affected. Arguably, the common American citizen did
not know or care about the history of the Dominican Republic. They looked to the
Government for answers because they governed them. Certain rights were afforded to
American citizens, that most Americans did not consider as violating the rights of any
other human being. Nor did the American citizen, in his attempt to make it in America,
care about anyone else at this time.

Private business was there to reassure the American public that they were looking
after their interests. They promised grand dreams and a better way of life, at the expense
of someone, usually of color or status, for a low price. Private interest appealed to the
comfort of its constituents and they reaped a grand reward for their efforts. They played on the fears of settlers and made an enormous amount of money doing it. What the American population did not realize is that private interests grew richer at the expense of the American public and all others in the way.
INTRODUCTION

A friend and I were watching television the other day when an inevitable commercial interrupted our viewing pleasure. On television was baseball great Sammy Sosa advertising that everyone needed to explore the wonders of the Dominican Republic. My friend turned to me and asked, “Where in the world is the Dominican Republic?”

This seemingly innocuous question jolted me into a realization that very few Americans know anything about this island republic or its worldwide historical influence both in the past and in the recent present. Nor does most of the world know the connection between the Dominican Republic and the United States in American history. In fact, the absence of Caribbean history in most American textbooks, with the possible exception of Cuba, intrigued me.

The beginning of what we consider the written history of the Western Hemisphere began in the Dominican Republic, particularly Santo Domingo City. From its humble genesis as a colonization port for Christopher Columbus in 1493, Santo Domingo has commanded the attention of the world with its rich resources and strategic location for the last five hundred years. England, Spain, and France have traded possession of the island
over this period, and the United States courted the idea of territorial protection during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had no congressional problem sending American military personnel to the island and taking over the government during the early twentieth century. What is unique in American history is that very few people can explain why these two Presidents were able to do this. In fact, the history of Santo Domingo involves the origins of so many philosophies that we take for granted that its lack of educational exposure is a message in itself.

Why is there no current history of Santo Domingo? One reason, of course, is that it was never told in an interesting enough manner that anyone, aside from history students, wanted to hear it. The other reason is that no one realizes that Santo Domingo’s history is our history and that the things we say and do now have roots in that island’s history. Dominican history was never told as a straightforward tale with its irony and plot twists that are so inevitable in a good story. The classic writers of Dominican history have a bad habit of going from one seemingly significant event to another without connecting these events into one coherent story, from the beginning to the end. The careful reader will note that my footnotes bounce from one series of pages to another, and that is no accident.

More profound, however, is the ideology that suggests that knowledge’s magic may include some simple sleight-of-hand. The history of Santo Domingo is often overshadowed by seemingly more exciting stories of the American Revolution, the Civil War, or the French Revolution, but the slave rebellion of 1791 is unmatched in its warlike grandeur. I omitted many a gory detail for the sake of historical simplicity. Political
intrigue on the Dominican island was no less grandiose than the rambunctious American Congress of the same time.

The history of Santo Domingo had its song and dance in such characters as William Leslie Cazneau and Joseph Warren Fabens. Students may remember these two gentlemen and their fascination with camels, but their machinations on the island would profoundly affect American diplomatic relations with several nations well into the twentieth century. Through what can only be termed “hucksterism,” these two characters promised gold fields, rich soil and a tropical climate, and enormous profit potentials to anyone who would only come and exploit this island paradise. The legend of Cibao, a region in the interior of Santo Domingo supposedly full of gold, eluded Columbus. By 1600, all the known gold on the island was depleted, but Fabens and Cazneau did not let such facts stop them.

Santo Domingo also beckoned to another group of people who would look at the island as a haven. Here, free African Americans could escape the memory and the abuse of their former masters and rule themselves without White intercession. Indeed, the history of their emigration and the abolitionist movements in Santo Domingo are one. At first, southern, slave-owning states looked at the island in fear. Freed Africans roaming from the continent across the Caribbean and then back again was more than most southerners could handle. But then, these same fearful men looked at the island as a vast slave state that would balance their chances against the formidable power of the free northern states. When abolition was a fact, the Southerners then saw the island as a paradise where former slaves could work as indentured servants or tenant farmers.
Not all of Dominican history is so serious. A sense of humor will be helpful when reading of the exploits of Fabens and Cazneau, the crossed communication paths, the obvious charades performed in many diplomatic circles, and the completely erroneous newspaper accounts to the facts. The American obsession with guano during the period between 1830 and 1880, though a serious study, yields many a smile or laugh. Finally, the history of Santo Domingo adds new dimensions to American personalities that have, at times, been venerated. The exploits of such notables as William Henry Seward, Charles Sumner, Thomas Jefferson, and even Abraham Lincoln, though not always flattering, give us more perspective on some well-worn notions about their character and integrity in both domestic and foreign politics.

So, come with me on a Dominican adventure spanning five hundred years and culminating with an American obsession for an island whose fields of gold beckoned all wayward travelers. It is a history that would influence the world profoundly from the landing of Columbus to the present day.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SANTO DOMINGO

Santo Domingo had the notoriety of being the first place upon which Christopher Columbus landed on his famous first voyage to what he thought was the East Indies. Upon landing in 1492, he encountered the friendly Arawaks, a society who came to the island to escape the Caribs of South America. He erroneously termed them “Indians,” and described them as “precious” and noted that they would make worthy servants of the Iberian government. Columbus had lost his flagship, the Santa Maria, and he used the timbers from the shipwreck to build a garrison that he called La Navidad on his newly christened island of Española (later corrupted by the English into Hispaniola). With twenty enslaved Arawaks, he left thirty men and returned to what is now Spain with good news and gifts for Queen Isabella. The queen responded rather aghast to Columbus’ gift of slaves with something akin to “How dare you enslave my vassals!” Meanwhile, back in the New World, the Caciques slew the inhabitants of Columbus’ garrison in response to having been ill treated by the conquistadors. According to the Bureau of the American Republics, when Columbus returned in 1493 with several new colonists, he built a new town near what is now Santo Domingo City and called it Isabella.
Spanish conquistadors defined their conquests by what can be rightly described as planting Spanish civilization into an unknown area and incorporating the indigenous population as a new part of the complex. For all intents and purposes, these new cities were miniature fiefs replicating what was familiar in Medieval Iberia. Because slavery was a common characteristic of this society, the Caribs were viewed with that motive in mind. Unfortunately, most conquistadors lacked the necessary geographical knowledge on what made a city tenable, and many cities fell due to tropical disease such as malaria and the decimation of the indigenous populations. The Caribbean populations were for the most part hunters and foragers and could not adapt to a stratified system that required their intensive labor and dependence on others for their sustenance. As a result, vast numbers of Caribs committed suicide, were literally worked to death, or died at the hands of imported diseases. As early as 1505, the importation of slaves was necessary to supplement the needed labor in the mines and inevitable sugar and coffee plantations.

Santo Domingo, however, survived and prospered for a time despite these deprivations, and, in 1525, historian Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo compared it favorably with Barcelona. Santo Domingo was, in fact, the first official city in the New World. Founded in August of 1496, the city became the blueprint for all cities thereafter, having the standard gridlock pattern of Santa Fe, Granada, where Isabella and Ferdinand stationed their troops against the Moors. Already a city of firsts, Santo Domingo also housed the first University of the New World (1540), the first cathedral, the first audiencia, and it was the home of the governor of the island. Rebuilt after a devastating hurricane in 1511, Santo Domingo was the center of Spanish life and politics in the New World for years to come. This was, in large part, due to the arrival of Nicolas de
Ovando in 1502 as Santo Domingo’s first governor. Bringing still more settlers, Ovando established the *encomienda* and *repartimiento* labor systems that continued to decrease the indigenous population and furthered the need for imported African slaves. Prosperity continued with Ovando’s successor, Diego Columbus, the son of Hispaniola’s founder.11

In several important ways, the price of prosperity would eventually lead to the decline in the importance of Santo Domingo. First, virtually continuous rebellion of the native Americans under the leadership of able Caciques troubled both governors until they subjugated the Caciques in 1533. It was estimated that an original population of three to five million inhabitants was reduced to approximately four thousand by this year.12 Again, as a consequence of the decline in the indigenous population, the need for slavery increased, as did the preponderance for slave revolts. Under Governor Diego Colon, 1520 and 1523 witnessed two such revolts which “inaugurated the scenes of turmoil and bloodshed of three centuries afterwards.”13 Being a profitable colony, Santo Domingo became the port-of-call for all travelers and shipments and eventually became the port-of-departure for various expeditions to other lands in search of gold and other riches. This dispersion created a decrease in the power and prestige of Santo Domingo almost immediately, particularly under the shadows of such great empires as those in Mexico and eventually Cuba.14 The mines were depleted of their silver and gold; Spain neglected her colony in typical fashion of the time; and the Church rapidly pushed the population aside as it accumulated land through tithes, trusts, and loans. Finally, Santo Domingo was also the site of trade rivalries with the French and the English empires. This rivalry produced pirates and buccaneers who would raid the city and plunder its ships. Eventually, Sir Francis Drake would subjugate the island in 1586 after annihilating the town.15 And, yet,
Santo Domingo, despite its economic and prestigious downfall, remained of great strategic and diplomatic importance. This strategic importance would haunt the island with proprietary wars between rival nations for control of its wealth of resources. The first war was waged over wild cattle.

Evidence came early in the seventeenth century that Spain could no longer prevent the infringement of rival countries—including the British, the French, and the Dutch—nor could she maintain control of what she laid claim. On this island roamed thousands of wild cattle introduced by Columbus in 1493. In 1600, Spaniards in Santo Domingo began a campaign against intruding cattle poachers by stopping ships. Naturally, neither the British nor the French appreciated this plea, and they began their own military campaign. Meanwhile, Cardinal Richelieu in France promised free passage in exchange for three years labor to anyone who would go to Santo Domingo. Those that went under this program were known as engages, and upon landing they would suffer the beatings, torture, and other similar treatment meted to the indigenous populations and African slaves for their allotted time debt. Not to be outdone by a rival, the British followed suit. The Spaniards became so alarmed that in 1630 they commissioned a pirate named Frederic of Toledo to destroy the outpost of these two rival nations at the isle of St. Christopher. Those who survived teamed with some Dutch refugees who had already met the Spaniards and the trio established a pirate outpost at the Isle of Tortuga. A trinity of classes emerged; those who remained on the island became the planters, those who established their “business” on the open sea the pirates, and those who hunted the wild cattle and attacked the mainland of Santo Domingo became the buccaneers.
In 1638, Spain once again responded by attacking the planters of Tortuga, but they forgot to leave a garrison to secure the island. Then in 1639, the Tortuga pirates selected an English gentleman named Willis to recover the island from the Spanish. The French took great offense at being under the leadership of an Englishman, and thus the British were asked to leave quietly. The Spaniards then attacked again and remembered to leave a garrison. By this time, pirates were everywhere, including De Rossy, a former pirate from France, still upset about the capture of St. Christopher; he attacked the Spaniards, once again capturing Tortuga for the French. In 1664, the historically significant West India Company took official possession of the Isle of Tortuga and eventually the western section of Hispaniola, occupied by cattle-hunting buccaneers.16

In 1666, several epidemics ravaged the populations. Ironically, despite these epidemics, the Flemish expressed an interest in the islands also, and those surviving planters on Tortuga began trading with them in earnest. The French sought a monopoly of trade in Tortuga and began a campaign to hang those Flemish investors who disagreed with this policy. No longer expressing such a fervent interest in the islands, the Flemish left. Meanwhile, the wealthy provincials of Anjou and Brittany saw the islands as new prime real estate and began to move in throngs.17

The French rapidly increased their holdings in Santo Domingo pushing out further east and south, depositing large numbers of African slaves wherever they instituted new plantations and established a garrison to protect the island. A seemingly insignificant move at this time, this would later emerge as an important one in the nineteenth century. Under Governor D'Ogeron, the island prospered. Women were shipped to the island to lure its inhabitants to stay. D'Ogeron commissioned pirates to attack the Spanish who
were now engaged in battle with the Portuguese, so it was not difficult for the pirates to spread inland without reproach from the Spaniards. The wealthy residents of Tortuga saw the seaside of Santo Domingo as a haven of plantations for tobacco, corn, sugar, and coffee. More settlers arrived as the colony continued its economic growth. Guerrilla warfare between the Spanish and the French continued. D’Ogeron died, and his nephew, De Pouancy, the succeeding governor, became fearful that he could not maintain the safety of Samana Bay and thus ordered its vacancy to limit smuggling.¹⁸

Samana Bay, a cul-de-sac in the northwest corner of the Dominican Republic, was the departure point for Columbus on his first return to the Iberian coast. On the 22nd of November 1493, Columbus returned to this bay on his second voyage with seventeen ships, 1200 men, and enough supplies to establish a permanent colony, including horses and the historically significant cattle. Originally discovered to be a logical springboard for ships to debark to other islands, particularly Cuba, or to the homeland, Samana Bay would become an arena of intense interest to major nations for its strategic naval position and coal reserves. Eventually, Samana Bay would become the official entry port for the Dominican Republic. In 1674, D’Ogeron had sent troops to protect the bay from insurgency, but the Spanish could not prevail against the reinforcements. With the abandonment of the port by De Pouancy, the bay was unattended, however, and thus opened to exploitative “entrepreneurs.”

France, realizing that the best way to compete with its rivals was to use their successful techniques, had begun to ship an enormous number of African slaves to the islands of Tortuga and the western section of Santo Domingo. Unfortunately for
everyone, the French had also copied the abuse put upon these slaves, and, in 1678, the
first of several slave rebellions took place. The slave leader was Padrejan, an African chief
who, having killed his Spanish master, had fled to Tortuga for refuge; but fearing to be captured and punished some day by the Spaniards, and seeing the discontent of the negroes on the French plantations, he resolved to make use of this as a means to restore him to favour with his former masters. 19

Padrejan thus attacked French plantations, causing an enormous amount of rancor with the masters. They appealed to Governor De Pouancy who, in typical fashion of the day, commissioned pirates to hunt and kill the African chief. The pirates did this with success, but being few in numbers and not what the French considered desirable characters for citizenry, they were released from their duty and ignored. Unfortunately, they were scattered among the mainland planters, who were now in a dispute with the West India Company for their severe restrictions on the shipment of tobacco. What would then occur would be the second great battle between rival nations, an international war over tobacco.

The philosophy of colonial powers during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was one that allowed the fledgling colonies to grow accustomed to their new environment and establish an economy, unfettered by restrictions of the homeland, assuring its success. In exchange for this salutary neglect, the colonies would, at soon as physically possible, ship precious specie. Once successful in this endeavor, the mainland would then institute the necessary laws and regulations that would protect their investments on other shores and on the open seas. Among the first laws were statutes to protect the various shipping monopolies that were instituted. Mother countries would regulate trade, naturally, to their advantage and the colonies were to abide by these regulations as good colonies were apt to do.
Although looking great on paper, the reality was different. Because thousands of miles of ocean separated the mainland and the colony, communication was slow, and the motherland fostered salutary neglect, the colonists often grew angry and rebelled in one form or another. This became especially true when new regulations were shipped to the colonists that affected their ability to turn what they considered a fair profit. In essence, privateering flourished because the colonists could get away with it, and any attempt by the motherland to curb this activity met with anger and resistance.

In 1684, this anger coalesced with the arrival of a new governor from France by the name of De Cussy and the arrival of two commissioners whose duties included the establishment of supreme councils for better “regulation” of the colony. Planters, distressed with the restrictions on tobacco which would nationalize large farms at the expense of the independent owners of Santo Domingo and Tortuga, appealed to the new governor without success. Not to be outsmarted, the planters destroyed not their tobacco crops, but in fear of further monopolistic manipulations, destroyed their cotton and indigo crops, and began to raise cocoa instead. This crop had been around since the days of Governor D’Ogeron, and independent owners were becoming quite wealthy. Also, at this time, the mainland of Santo Domingo was so popular with planters that the entire island of Tortuga became deserted. The city of Port de Paix thus became the central hub of economic activity during this period.

In 1685, Louis XIV issued the infamous Code Noir. The “Black Law,” as it would become popularly known, afforded to owners of slaves the legitimacy that they needed to justify their existence legally as exploiters. Four years later, France and Spain were at war with each other, with France once again employing the use of pirates and “freebooters”
against the Spanish. Being a typical fight in which one side would take over territory, pillage it, and then lose it to the other side, the two rivals finally met at the Battle of Sabana Real on January 21, 1691. Here, the Spaniards slaughtered their French enemies, killing Governor De Cussy and laying waste to all French territory. The island of St. Christopher was also attacked by the English at this time and removed from French control.

In 1691, the Court of France replaced the dead De Cussy with a governor named Du Cosse, who arrived at Santo Domingo to find it virtually uninhabited. In due course, he rebuilt the town, encouraged the growing of indigo—much to the delight of the West India Company—and he even led a successful attack on the island of Jamaica, held by the English. From this campaign, De Cosse acquired not only victory against the British but three thousand slaves and all the indigo that the island produced. Not surprisingly, the English did not take this attack quietly; indeed, they united with the Spaniards against the French and attacked several cities, including Port de Paix. Meanwhile, the French received reinforcements from the island of St. Croix. In 1697, war ended and the celebrated Peace of Ryswick was signed.

In essence, the Peace of Ryswick granted Spain the territory that it had originally settled and gave France the western territory that it had maintained for several years. The Spanish section would be officially known as Santo Domingo and the western section known as Haiti. But, not all was peaceful. The Spanish government, almost bankrupt from its various wars, entanglements with pirates, trade rivalries, and domestic problems, by all accounts deserted the island. Santo Domingo City, according to the census of 1730, had merely five hundred inhabitants, all destitute.
The cycle continued on the French side of the island. The infamous wild cattle were hunted to near extinction, only to be replaced by the Spanish-raised cattle later. The French then decided to raise tobacco and they, too, encountered a home office that began to monopolize the crop into private, large corporations at the expense of the private farmer. In due course, the French in protest would raise other crops, particularly indigo. The number of slaves increased, new tracts were added behind the original coastal grants and the number of large plantations increased. It was during this time that someone came up with the idea of raising sugar on these large plantations, and the history of the island would be forever changed with this crop.\textsuperscript{20}

Since sugar demanded even more land than tobacco or indigo, the French inhabitants began to incorporate more of the interior for this single purpose. Ironically, the need for cattle increased disproportionately with this growth, but the French, despite instructions from the home office to learn to raise the beasts, did not acclimate to the business of husbandry. Santo Domingo, thus, would supply the cattle to the French in exchange for grazing lands in the French territory at a fair market price. This grazing land became the nebulous boundary between the two territories, and disputes over ownership would follow.

Despite a calamitous year in 1716, the sugar plantations flourished, and many planters became extremely wealthy.\textsuperscript{21} Cocoa and indigo continued to be major secondary crops. After the West India Company was granted permission to trade in slaves from Guinea, three thousand per year were shipped to the American islands. The West India Company, a board of independent businessmen and wealthy members of the army and naval forces of France, owned large tracts of land in Haiti. Then individuals hoped that
their further investments in the slave trade would increase agricultural production. Unfortunately for the original planters, this meant that the company had sole discretion in the pricing of slaves, and another monopoly occurred. The company also had the power to determine where a limited number of slaves would be assigned, and, naturally, their lands became of prime importance. In 1726, farmers could not pay the balance due the West India Company for slaves because their crop had again failed again. When the West India Company arrived demanding their money, the colonists burned their warehouses and protested the exorbitant prices they were forced to pay for labor. Although they did not protest their allegiance to the French king, the colonists instead had their governor arrested for being a representative of this tyranny. Finally, in 1728, as a result of this rebellion and the enormous labor involved in suppressing it, the West India Company no longer had a monopoly on the slave trade.\textsuperscript{22}

With the slave monopoly dissolved, the French government was then free to trade with whoever had the necessary provisions to supply the ever-growing slave plantations. They continued the majority of their trade with the original planters and the cattlemen of Spain, but on a secondary scale, the French began to trade with North American colonists, exchanging sugar, molasses, and more importantly, rum for fish, salt meat, and provisions. More significantly, they traded surplus Guinea slaves at competitive prices.\textsuperscript{23} It was not an understatement to say that the value of the body and soul of the African slave was entirely dependent on the market value of rum during this period.

Again, under the realities of mercantilism, trade between Haiti and the British colonists flourished, despite the efforts of the London Board of Trade to curb this activity. So successful was the new venture, in fact, that in 1767, the French government
established Mole-Saint-Nicolas as a free port where North American colonists could trade for molasses and rum. But economic reality and the need to feed the growing slave population demanded even more trade.

Not to be outdone by its rival once again, the French government attempted to take advantage of the successful trade between the island and the North Americans. In 1769, all Haitian ports were opened to American colonists and American flour (considered superior to British flour) was added to the list of allowed products into Mole-Saint-Nicolas. In 1778, France entered into a formal agreement with England over the growing trade. Despite the revocation of this formal agreement in 1783, President John Adams wrote to an acquaintance of his stating that if any formal government forbade the trade between the United States and the Caribbean that it would occur clandestinely despite the legal restrictions. The Navigation Laws, requiring English goods to be shipped on English ships, had been ignored so long in the name of economic desire that any restrictions by any home country fell on deaf ears. The Marquis de Lafayette of American Revolution fame would be appointed later by John Adams to negotiate with the French over any trade disagreements, but with the understanding that trade would exist regardless of any formal decisions made by either side. France issued another formal agreement on August 30, 1784, opening ports in Haiti but restricting the import of American flour. American colonists protested, leading Thomas Jefferson to write James Monroe, in 1785, that the French were being difficult and immovable. Illegal smuggling between British colonists and Haiti increased despite France's attempts to stop it.24

The colonists soon learned to distill rum from molasses shipped from Haiti and to use their rum in the trade for Guinea slaves. Rum was then being used as the standard
trade item with Native Americans. In turn, the profit from cheap rum could be used to buy more molasses from Haiti. Haitian sugar undersold British sugar, and despite further attempts from England to curb the contraband trade with search warrants, the industries flourished. An enormous shortage of food in France during 1788 only increased the need for contraband trade.

During this period, Santo Domingo developed erratically. Those who invested wisely on their plantations had an incredible wealth. In essence, they owned the last fiefs. They were lords over their houses and land; they had a court, distinguished guests, and an incredible number of slaves. They pledged loyalty to the home government, and they became wealthy beyond even twentieth-century excesses. They dictated the law and the religion of the island, but they were loyal to the dictates of the supreme head provided that he agreed with the consortium of the wealthy colonists.

Investment was high on the island. Ancient mines were reopened, yielding copper and iron instead of silver and gold. Residents of the nearby Canary Islands saw Santo Domingo as a haven for entrepreneurial growth. Various wars between the English and the Portuguese and between Spain and Naples allowed privateering to grow immeasurably. The cattle business expanded as the French demanded more food for their slaves. Despite a devastating earthquake in 1751, the population of this island grew, particularly in the case of the slave population, as towns were rebuilt. Charles III issued liberal commerce legislation that effectively opened Spanish ports to all trade from neighboring islands. Despite its weakened state of affairs, the eastern section of Santo Domingo actually increased her boundaries westward, much to the chagrin of the French. A border dispute was inevitable.
On February 29, 1776, Charles III calculated the official border. He then opened it to free trade between the two colonies, and also abolished monopoly-trading ports. Santo Domingo City and Samana Bay were refurbished and opened to a thriving economy. This, once again, piqued the interest of the American colonies. By July, 1790, when Sylvanus Bourne, the first American consul to Santo Domingo, presented his credentials at the port of Cap Francais, imports and exports between the two colonies exceeded five million in eighteenth-century dollars. The consulate was not well-received nor recognized, however, with the French government thinking that Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson had overstepped his bounds in interpreting the fine print of a consular agreement. Bourne returned to the new United States that July and officially resigned his commission, but not before writing to Secretary Jefferson that he feared a civil war between the island’s mulatto and white populations was inevitable. On August 22, 1791, the night’s events would forever change the course of Dominican and world history.

Like its British rival of fifteen years earlier, the French government had a civil war on its hands. The French Revolution of 1789 had a profound impact on the Haitian colony. For years, Haiti had been viewed as the number-one colony for the French. Secretly, Napoleon had planned on using the Louisiana territory as the foundation of his Mississippi Valley empire on the American continent and Haiti as its chief port of entry. Louisiana, Napoleon envisioned, would then protect Haiti militarily. But French control of the colony weakened as it internal government collapsed during the Revolution. Duly enlightened of the situation, Jefferson took advantage of the moment, though he would deny it officially. Civil war in Haiti was an inevitable consequence of the shift in power between the trading nations.
On the night of August 22, 1791, slaves began a national insurrection across Haiti with the murdering of their masters. Thirty years earlier, the French government had been alarmed to note that an epidemic of suicide among its slave population resulted from their rape by masters and overseers. As early as 1685, Louis XIV lamented that a new race, the mulatto, would gain political power and wreak havoc on the colonial system in Haiti. He instituted the Code Noir as a means of controlling the sexual behavior of masters and overseers, but to no avail. More lamentable, however, was the French government’s refusal to recognize freed slaves. Though he may have purchased or earned his freedom, a former slave was still considered by the home office as public property, in essence, a slave of France itself.31 Further cruelty, as was normal for colonial slave systems32, only heightened the anger of the slave population, which responded, with a night of massacres.

Ironically, the insurrection of the slave and mulatto populations was a direct result of attempts by the white colonials to free themselves from what they thought was the tyranny of

a metropolis so far away, which, as they thought, interfered with the proper development of their interests, commercial as well as agricultural, and controlled by a Governor not chosen from among themselves, but sent from Paris, while they were debarred from sharing in the offices that their own success had created.33

Not only had the American Revolution fueled these fires of independence within the colonial planters, but also the weakness of the French government during its own revolution would enhance the colonists’ desire to govern themselves. At no time, however, did the French colonists ever give the predicament of the slave or mulatto
populations serious consideration. During this period of economic growth, mulattos had become quite wealthy despite their absence of political authority.

On August 27, 1789, the French National Assembly accepted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and wrote a new constitution, which created for France a constitutional monarchy with a one-house legislature. In September, "the Massaic club, composed of wealthy colonial planters, organized in the French capitol," entered Santo Domingo with the revolutionary themes of "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality," extolling "the startling doctrines of the equal political rights of all men, which were then so boldly enunciated in the face of tyrannical despotisms and the immemorial assumptions of the feudal aristocracies of the old world." These ideals affected the thoughts of the entire hierarchy from colonial dignitaries, military officers, French government agents, and rich planters to the petit blancs, or poor whites. Within weeks, Creoles, children of the peninsular founders, who in Santo Domingo erected poles "surmounted by the cap of Liberty" and "statues to the goddess of Liberty;"

in their impatience to grasp these precious prerogatives, they momentarily forgot their colonial dependence on France, and spontaneously came together in a general assembly, at a small town of St. Domingo, called St. Marc; and proceeded to deliberate seriously about taking upon themselves all the attributes of national sovereignty and independence.35

During this time, wealthy mulattos were often educated in the most famous seminaries of France. Upon returning to Santo Domingo, these well-educated men were "burdened with duties by the State, without being invested with corresponding political privileges" amidst the stirring philosophies of the new and enlightened Rights of Man. Like the Whites before them, they envisioned "this great tumult that now swept over the island" as a "propitious opportunity to agitate with the rest of the free men of the colony
for the removal of their political disabilities. A mulatto gentleman entered the colonial assembly at St. Marc and petitioned the assembly to allow mulattos as members. He was promptly hanged.

The colonial assembly at St. Marc then sent deputies to France "to present the result of its deliberations to the National Assembly; and to ask that august body to confer on the colony the right of self-government." At the same time, a group of mulattos drafted a statement "in behalf of their caste in the colony" and sent it along with their own deputies, among them being James and Vincent Ogé, and Jean Chevanne, to the French National Assembly. The mulatto deputies received an audience with the President of the Assembly, and the President assured them that no citizen "shall vainly reclaim their rights before the assembly of the representatives of the French people."

With this assurance in hand, the mulatto deputies visited members of the Abolition Society of Paris, otherwise known as Les Amis des Noirs, or Friends of the Blacks. This organization emphasized the plight of African slaves and promoted what may be considered one of the first abolitionist movements. The deputies argued that their case was one of simple justice for mulattos, and the society agreed. Charles De Lameth, "one of the zealous patrons of that society, and an active member of the National Assembly," as well as a colonial slaveholder, agreed to speak before the Supreme Legislature on behalf of the mulatto contingency. De Lameth testified before the National Assembly that although he was "one of the greatest proprietors of St. Domingo" he would sooner lose all that he possessed and declare himself "in favor of admitting the men of color to the rights of citizenship; and in favor of the freedom of the blacks" before he would "lose sight of principles so sacred to justice and humanity."
De Lameth presented the Assembly a statement drafted by the deputies declaring that mulattos owned "one-third of the real estate, and one-fourth of the personal effects of the island." The statement also reflected an ideology that the mulatto population could be used as a balance of power "against the high pretensions of the haughty planters on the one hand, and the seditious spirit of the poor whites on the other." Finally, the deputies' statement offered one additional fact. Mulattos, in Santo Domingo, had paid six million francs to the National Treasury "to be employed in liquidating the debt of their common country."641

On March 8, 1790, the National Assembly issued a decree granting equal citizenship to all citizens of Haiti regardless of color and recognized the right of colonial assemblies to exist. The colonial assembly at St. Marc responded to the decree with a resolve to "die rather than share equal political rights with a bastard race." In open rebellion, the colonial general assembly published a constitution for an independent island nation. As a convoluted response, the French national guard divided its loyalties between the planter patriots on one hand and the aristocrats who supported French rule on the other. The lower classes, including mulattos and slaves, sided against the wealthy planters. Les Amis des Noirs supported the French National Assembly, while the planters who then resided in Paris amidst the pomp and luxury, supported an independent Haiti.

The Colonial Assembly at St. Marc then heard that the Colonial Assembly at Port-au-Prince supported the equal rights proclamation of the French National Assembly and declared them traitors to the cause. St. Marc organized a militia and sent it to Port-au-Prince to "reorganize" the resisting section. Then Governor Peynier requested aid from the man-of-war The Leopard to prevent the Colonial Assembly at St. Marc from
instituting civil war on an island attempting to grasp independence. Hearing that they
would be firing on “patriots,” the crew of the man-of-war refused to comply with the
governor’s orders. The governor responded with the ordering of his army to disband the
rebel colonial bases. Members of the Colonial Assembly managed to hitch a ride on *The
Leopard* to France and petitioned the National Assembly for legitimacy. They were all
promptly arrested and declared traitors of the French government. Governor Peynier
quickly reorganized his government when a mulatto by the name of James Ogé entered his
office and demanded the recognition of the mulatto population.\(^42\)

One of the mulatto deputies, Vincent Ogé, anticipated this response. Securing an
appointment by Les Amis des Noirs as Commissioner of France, Ogé was instructed to
return to Santo Domingo and "superintend the execution of the decree" of March 8, 1790.
Before Ogé left for the island, however, the Prince of Limbourg of Holland decorated him
as Lieutenant Colonel under the order of the Lion.\(^43\)

Ogé and his brothers landed at Santo Domingo and immediately chose a
contingency of two hundred as bodyguards. Fearing "any attempt at a cowardly
assassination from any lawless or ruthless desperadoes of oppression in the colony," Ogé
approached the Colonial Assembly at St. Marc. He then informed them of his commission
and the decree of the French National Assembly. The Colonial Assembly, then being the
officially recognized legislative authority on the island, was required to enact an ordinance
that required that "the people of colour born of free parents shall be admitted to the
primary and colonial Assemblies of the future, if they have the requisite qualifications."\(^44\)
Ogé, "being aware of their pro-slavery prejudices," endeavored to conciliate the Colonial
Assembly by stating that the decree of March 8, 1790, granted citizenship only to free men,
regardless of color, not "blacks in servitude." Ogé added that mulattos did not "desire to acknowledge their equality."\textsuperscript{45}

The Colonial Assembly surrounded and attacked Ogé and his contingency of over two hundred. Ogé took refuge in Santo Domingo City under what he hoped would be Spanish protection, but, upon the request of General Blanchelande, Spain gave up Ogé and his supporters on the condition that the Assembly spare his life. Ogé was promptly taken before Blanchelande, Peynier, and the Provincial Assembly and underwent a mock trial. Found guilty of treasonous acts, James Ogé and twenty surviving bodyguards were hanged. Vincent Ogé and Jean Chevanne were "broken alive on the wheel."\textsuperscript{46}

On September 30, 1791, the French National Assembly dissolved to make way for the new Legislative Assembly. The next day, the Legislative Assembly met for the first time with 745 members elected by "active citizens," composed mainly of the Jacobins, the Gironde, and other revolutionary clubs. Prior to its dissolution, the National Assembly, desiring to appease the colonial planters, transmitted "a chapter of instructions" to the governor in Santo Domingo. The article stated, "That every person of the age of twenty-five and upwards, possessing property or having resided two years in the colony and paid taxes, should be permitted to vote in the formation of the colonial assembly." \textsuperscript{47}

The colonial planters, in typical fashion, were in open rebellion against the French government and declared "open season" on mulattos. Under the leadership of a mulatto by the name of Jean Francois and a slave named Boukmann, an African insurrection occurred against the town of Cape Francois. The insurrectionists marched under the banner of a dead white baby on a spearhead and headed for the cape. When the mulattos in town heard of the marching slaves and the devastation in their wake, they demanded
firearms from the white planters to help stave the incoming disaster. The planters promptly killed the mulattos, claiming that they had instigated the rebellion, and then set about to defeat the slaves. Added to this confusion was the instigation by the minority whites that caused the slaves to think that they were fighting for the arrested whites in Paris. The island was laid to waste quickly. 48

Almost immediately, France appealed to the United States for military assistance. Jefferson granted the request amidst the misgivings of the French Minister to the United States who feared that the United States had an ulterior motive for meddling in Haitian politics. At the same time, French refugees were escaping to the island of Jamaica, which was under the control of the British Empire. When the French arrived with munitions in Haiti, their help was refused, and the patriots instead applied for aid from Jamaica. Lord Effingham, the governor of Jamaica, sent supplies and a man-of-war. Following an agreement of allegiance between England and the French patriots, the governor sent another ship and quickly took over Mole-Saint-Nicolas and Port-au-Prince in 1794. Secretary of State Jefferson then became alarmed at the British presence in the Caribbean.49

Jefferson had two fears, actually. The first was the very real possibility of the need for American military intervention in Haiti on behalf of the new French government, which Jefferson esteemed. The other was the slave rebellion on an island not too distant from Southern slave-holding states. Washington and Jefferson feared that the South would not hold too well with the idea of an island nation being controlled by former slaves. By then, on March 28, 1792, mulattos and slaves were united in defeating the white population. On April 4, 1792, the French National Assembly issued the Declaration of Equality in
which they declared that all free people, regardless of color, were citizens of Haiti and legally able to hold office in the newly recognized colonial assemblies. Paris sent 6000 troops and three new commissioners to effect new government. When the Massaia Club entered Santo Domingo with ideas of “Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality,” Jefferson wrote that he was pleased, and he applauded the French government in conjunction with the rebelling slave and mulatto population.\(^{50}\) Interpreting the Declaration of Equality as the same as being free, the mulattos separated from the slaves and helped defeat what resistance was left among the white patriots. Mulattos were then used against the slave rebellion under the leadership of Rigaud, a mulatto general. The slave revolt ended and, in May, England and France were at war with each other.

Chaos and confusion were the order of the day. During this time, what few whites could escape did so either to British Jamaica or the American coast. The governor of Jamaica then seized Santo Domingo City from the French. As a response, the French immediately freed any slave who volunteered to join the army. After getting their munitions, the African slaves responded by retreating into the mountains and establishing their own republic under the leadership of Jean Francois, Rigaud, and Biassou, his lieutenant.\(^ {51}\)

The Spanish section of Santo Domingo had a dilemma concerning the freedom of French slaves. To protect their own slave-based economy, the Spanish secretly supplied guerrillas to Francois under the guise of supporting the King against the patriots. In return, the French promised to give Santo Domingo all the slaves captured during the war, which the Spanish then sold in Puerto Rico and Cuba. The rebelling slaves received gold and cattle. In 1793, upon the death of Louis XVI, the slaves denounced all loyalty to
France and moved to the Spanish side. In gratitude, Charles IV granted commissions to Francois as a general, Biassou as field marshal, and a gentleman by the name of Toussaint as colonel. England and Spain now divided the island between them against the French. Unfortunately for both countries, the slaves were being led by Rigaud on the French side and Toussaint on the English and Spanish side. When battles were out of balance against the French, Rigaud would merely offer Toussaint a position of general if he would fight for him. With Toussaint’s help, the city of Port de Paix fell and the Spanish were forced to cede their section of the island to the French. The Peace of Basle in 1795 made it official.52

Toussaint, who then took the last name of L’Ouverture, to signify that he planned on opening doors to the future for former slaves, became the supreme head of the army and, in effect, the country. After Toussaint and the English made peace and formed a treaty of commerce, the British left the island. Following a horrific battle in Santo Domingo City, Toussaint legally became the leader of an independent country. Forced to evacuate, many rich Creoles fled to British colonies or to the United States.

Jefferson feared a flood of freed African slaves would inundate the American coastline. Virginia, the Carolinas, and the Louisiana territory enacted laws that prevented the migration of “free people of color from Hispaniola and other French islands.” Fearing the effects that freed slaves might have on the psyche of American slaves, the United States was also reacting to animosities from the French. The XYZ affair and the French conduct toward American vessels in the Caribbean meant that the United States might go to war with France.53 In 1799, President John Adams wooed Toussaint by sending a consul named Jacob Mayer to him to secure free trade with Haiti.
At the same time, the French government, now under Napoleon Bonaparte, sent a consul to investigate the power base of Toussaint. The French consul determined that Toussaint was indeed in full power but that he needed to crush the power of Rigaud in order to establish his permanency. Because Rigaud had been on friendly terms with the United States, Toussaint knew he had to do something. He sent a letter to Adams noting that American ships refused to sail into Haiti; he then sent his confidante, Joseph Buneil, to woo Adams. President Adams and Congress responded by sending chosen man-of-war ships to a port in Haiti, and by the legislation of the Acts of February 9, 1799. These Acts would open free trade with Haiti as soon as Adams was assured that privateers would not attack American vessels. In due course, Adams would commission Edward Stevens as Consul General to Cape Francais to speak with Toussaint about this issue.54

As the newly appointed leader of Haiti, Toussaint faced several obstacles to his being the undisputed head. He still had to contend with the power base of Rigaud, as well as the infringement by the French and the British. England controlled important cities such as Mole-Saint-Nicolas and Port-au-Prince, but England was also expending an enormous sum of money and troops in other colonies such as St. Vincent and Jamaica. The French government sent a consul that would badger Toussaint with French affairs that he deemed restrictive. Toussaint temporarily teamed with Rigaud against the English. The British sent troops to Port-au-Prince, but because the English knew that evacuation of the city was the only option, they began to discuss terms with Toussaint. British troops were still holding Mole-Saint-Nicolas, yet they soon learned that the occupation was detrimental not only to the British treasury but also threatening to British citizens in neighboring Jamaica whom they feared would be attacked if Toussaint was sufficiently
irritated. Upon visiting Toussaint, the British presented him with a silver service compliments of the King of England and offered to leave Santo Domingo alone if Toussaint would leave Jamaica alone. Both parties agreed to the treaty.55

Seeing the need to remove the troublesome French from the island, Toussaint spread a rumor that they were trying to reinstitute slavery. With his army behind him, Toussaint approached the French consul and demanded that he leave the island. Before quickly leaving, however, the consul told Rigaud that Toussaint was an English puppet and that he was next in line to be overthrown. Another civil war would be inevitable, and Thomas Jefferson would teeter between his allegiance to Toussaint and his passion for all things French. Alexander Hamilton would give him suggestions that were best not written down. Napoleon, also, was having problems with the new leader.

Though Toussaint had the advantage of numbers, Rigaud had the financial and military backing of the French government. At this time, France regarded civil war in the colony as an advantage. With anarchy, the colony would be ripe for the incursion of French troops sent over to restore order. Upon their arrival, Rigaud could be labelled a traitor and the French government could merely replace him with someone more obedient to the crown. Toussaint needed the backing of the United States in order to assure that basic foodstuffs continued to flow within the island. Rigaud, along with other mulatto chiefs, helped defend Savannah against the attacks by the French on American trade. Thus, diplomatic relations with Santo Domingo became a political debate for the United States.

President Adams, Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton all felt that the civil war in Santo Domingo was temporary and that France would regain control of the island. Too
much support for Toussaint would strain relations with France even further. No support would likely cause the island to fall into turmoil, thus aggravating France’s chance of governing again. The logical choice was for President Adams to send Dr. Edward Stevens as Consul General to Santo Domingo. Toussaint, eager to accept any aid from the United States, acceded to several requests made by Stevens, including the protection of American interests within the island and the guarantee of safe trade. Adams also saw the need to correspond with the English government concerning this agreement, but, by now, Britain had published the treaty made with Toussaint for free trade.

All three major powers operated under one general fear: Santo Domingo could become an independent island nation with a former slave as its leader. Formally, the United States entertained no such notion at this time, but all were fearful of the possibility. Commerce between the colony and the United States was now firmly established, and the American government was dependent on the cheap molasses, coffee, and tobacco. Trade with England and France was stabilized temporarily. Despite his fears, President Adams could not forgo the opportunity, and under the banner of humanitarian aid to a starving island, he sent warships to aid Toussaint against Rigaud at the city of Jacmel. Ironically, starvation was the method that Toussaint used to liquidate his opponent. On March 11, 1800, Toussaint became the unofficial leader of Santo Domingo. With Rigaud out of the picture, the United States would only have to deal with Toussaint. Later that same year, President Adams opened trade to all ports within the island.⁵⁶

France, still at war with the United States, remained a problem. Dr. Stevens wrote to President Adams stating he felt that French influence on the island was waning and Toussaint took the cue. In February 1801, Toussaint’s position as unopposed leader of
Santo Domingo was cemented upon his subjugation of the former Spanish section of the colony and the removal of Roume, the French consul. Trade with the American government increased, and the world watched as the island celebrated its new victory under the protection of the United States. ⁵⁷

On September 30, 1800, the United States and France signed a peace treaty. A year later, a peace treaty between England and France would give Napoleon the freedom he needed to pursue his dream of incorporating Santo Domingo with the Louisiana Territory to form his Mississippi Valley empire. Realizing the island's dependence on the United States for food and France's inability to supply what Santo Domingo needed, Napoleon saw the Louisiana Territory as an obvious choice whereby he could supply the colony with all that it required and prevent dependence upon the Americans. Despite the Peace of Morfontaine, Napoleon also viewed the territory as an effective buffer should France go to war with the United States again. To the Americans, however, since Napoleon was a stable leader in a country that historically supported its efforts, it could dissolve formal relations with Toussaint. The President replaced Dr. Stevens with a figurehead consul general and then instructed all American representatives to disengage trade with anyone besides the French. Despite this restriction, Toussaint managed to receive munitions from American businessmen. ⁵⁸ Napoleon saw Toussaint as the only obstacle to his dream of empire. He sent his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, and at least twenty thousand troops, with instructions to destroy Toussaint’s power base. Leclerc was also instructed to continue free trade with the United States, but only until he established his position as the new leader of Santo Domingo. Leclerc would then cease diplomatic relations with the Americans, and Napoleon would pursue the development of the
Louisiana Territory. In due time, Toussaint was defeated and Leclerc took dominion. Despite Napoleon's instructions, though, Leclerc was forced to trade with the United States for provisions during his leadership. But two other problems faced Leclerc in his attempt to follow Napoleon's dream. One was a gentleman by the name of Dessalines, a lieutenant of Toussaint's. The other problem was more profound and permanently destroyed Napoleon's dream of a Mississippi Valley empire: yellow fever.

By the fourth quarter of 1802, Leclerc reported that he had lost twenty-nine thousand men to yellow fever.\textsuperscript{59} In November, Leclerc himself would die and his replacement, Rochambeau, would prove to be ineffective in countering the efforts of Dessalines. Having gone to war with England and needing funds to supply his war machine, Napoleon sold the Louisiana Territory to the United States. By January 1, 1804, the island colony declared its independence under Dessalines and renamed itself Haiti. Trade with the United States then flourished.

Once again, the United States had a dilemma. President Jefferson sided with France in her war against Britain under the formal auspices of being angry with England over the violation of neutral shipping laws. Grateful for the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson also wanted the Florida territory, an acquisition that he thought possible with the help of the French. Eventually, he attempted to pass a bill that would prohibit trade with Haiti, for he feared that continued relations with the island would anger Napoleon. In 1806, a bill barely passed Congress banning trade with Haiti. The opposition came from northern businessmen who had enjoyed the profits of free trade. Support for the bill primarily came from southern states that feared that continued trade with a country headed by a former slave would jeopardize the tenuous system of slavery within the United States. However,
by 1809, Federalist businessmen were once again trading with Haiti, due largely to official neglect in legislating the restrictions.

That same year, another development occurred that would forever change the status of the newly independent island. Spain, with help from England, wrested control of its former possession of Spanish Santo Domingo from Dessalines. Dessalines had been assassinated, apparently as a result of an internal dispute over power. Trade relations with the United States were strained at best as various personalities vied for leadership of the island. Eventually, Spanish Santo Domingo engaged one Henri Christophe, another lieutenant of Toussaint’s, as its leader until his suicide in 1820. Renaming himself King Henry I, Christophe did not recognize American commercial agents sent to the island because he had amassed a debt to the United States that he could not repay. Haiti, on the other hand, elected a mulatto leader by the name of Pétion, who remained in power until his death in 1818. Pétion received American commercial agents, and trade between the two former colonies increased.\(^6^0\)

At no time during this period would the United States recognize an independent Haiti. Since 1781, successful trade negotiations between the two countries had increased their mutual dependence upon each other, but the U.S. had always fallen short of recognizing the island as an independent entity. Diplomatic ties with Western nations had negated any chance of this recognition. But in 1820, that relationship would change with the election of Jean-Pierre Boyer as the unified island’s new president. Boyer had a dream that would affect the United States in ways that it would not comprehend for years to come.
In 1804, Dessalines had begun a campaign to return Haitian immigrants to the island. James Monroe reported that Dessalines offered citizens escaping from the various civil wars and immigrating to the United States forty dollars if they would return under his leadership. By the 1820’s, when free African Americans were establishing societies to help immigrants return to the island, Boyer began his dream of repopulating his country with disembodied citizens. Thousands of free African Americans sailed to Haiti under Boyer’s liberal terms, but many, having lived in the industrial North, returned to American shores when they realized that they were unsuited for agricultural work. Boyer also demanded that the United States recognize Haiti as a free and independent nation or find its preferred-nation status in jeopardy. He strengthened this threat by courting France and England with preferential trade agreements.

The United States had reached a political impasse by the end of the 1820s. Witnessing the unhindered international movement of free African Americans, Southern slave owners panicked. President Andrew Jackson’s refusal to recognize Haiti’s independence worried Northern businessmen, who had an enormous investment in trade with the island. Abolitionist groups rose in response to slavery, and a sectionalist attitude was slowly developed. Party politics were abrasive at best, and the chance of winning a majority vote on any legislation proved difficult. How the United States approached this dilemma would greatly influence American diplomacy in Santo Domingo.
UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY TOWARDS SANTO DOMINGO

AND THE TRIPARTITE INTERVENTION

The period between 1821 and 1843 has perhaps been one of the most overlooked periods in American history in terms of foreign policy. Arguably, the United States and its existence as an economic competitor were at stake. Before the Revolutionary War, under the philosophy of free trade, America engaged in trade negotiations with other nations in its “pursuit of happiness.” The success of capitalism hinged on its ability to persuade other nations that they were being treated fairly and equitably. The rise of Jean-Pierre Boyer as the leader of the Republic of Haiti tested this thesis.

Boyer anticipated that Haitian émigrés would return to the island, envisioning a united Haiti under a banner of peace and prosperity. He originally sought artisans and craftsmen and pledged free passage, support for four months, and thirty-six acres for every twelve laborers of Haitian origin to return to his island. Sixteen thousand responded to Boyer’s plea for reunification.63

On November 12, 1825, Secretary of State Henry Clay received a letter from Salazar, the Colombian minister. Andrew Jackson was preparing for the Panama Congress, and when Salazar suggested that the primary topic of discussion should be the
official recognition of Haiti as an independent nation, Jackson refused to entertain the
notion. Slave-owning states were concerned with an increasing Haitian influence that
might encourage their slaves to rebel. That concern erupted in the Senate when a Mr.
Hayne from South Carolina pronounced,

Our policy with regard to Hayti is plain. We never can acknowledge her independence. Other states will do as they please—but let us take
the high ground, that these questions belong to a class, which the peace
and safety of a large portion of our Union forbids us even to discuss.
Let our government direct all our ministers in South America and
Mexico to protest against the independence of Hayti. But let us not go
into council on the slave trade and Hayti.64

Other fears were also apparent in the Senate that day. Senator Berrien of Georgia
compared intercourse with Haiti with the introduction of a "moral contagion, compared
with which physical pestilence, in the utmost imaginable degree of its horrors, would be
light and insignificant"; therefore, self-preservation precluded the admission of Haitian
immigrants. Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri agreed. He concluded that

the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be exhibited among them. It will not permit
black consuls and ambassadors to establish themselves in our cities,
and to parade through our country, and give their fellow blacks in
the United States, proof in hand of the honors which await them,
for a like successful effort on their part. It will not permit the fact
to be seen, and told, that for the murder of their masters and
mistresses, they are to find friends among the white people of these
United States.65

Petitions from Northern businessmen flooded the House of Representatives,
however. An abolitionist movement was under way, and John Quincy Adams was busy
fighting the gag-rule debate in the House. Secretary of State Henry Clay thought that
recognition was inevitable and necessary if the United States were to continue trading with
Haiti.
Commercial agents were nevertheless sent to Haiti. Disagreeing with the American Congress, France and England entered into favorable agreements with Haiti, recognizing her independence. Upset with the American indecision, President Boyer of Haiti soon dismissed the commercial agents, and the United States was without a representative for the next five years. Eventually tenuous negotiations resumed and something strange occurred in the minds of the Southern congressmen. They began to rethink their position on the Haitian issue and came to the conclusion that recognition of Haitian independence was treasonous. On December 18, 1838, Hugh Swinton Legare made an impassioned speech in which he stated that trade with Haiti was a "paltry commerce of a horde of barbarians" and that the United States was courting abolition within its own boundaries, a decision "not for the benefit of commerce, but for the ruin of the South." To Legare and others, since this amounted to nothing less than treason, the flames of sectionalism were lit. But economic reality also became apparent. Debts to Northern merchants in Haiti were still unpaid, and tenuous relations with American agents on the island concerned them. In 1843, John Quincy Adams, speaking to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, resolved that the United States should send a consul immediately to recover the claim being made by the merchants.

Another political problem aggravated the United States when dealing with Boyer. In 1821, the Spanish relinquished their claim to Santo Domingo, which was still inhabited primarily by European whites—in power with mulatto adjuncts within the government. In his hopes of a unified island, Boyer entered Santo Domingo six weeks after the United States recognized its independence from Spain. Apparently unable or unwilling to promote another civil war, Spain ceded the colony to Boyer, under whom it was
controlled until 1843. France and England expressed their discomfort with this arrangement and waited for an opportune time to intervene. The idea of a nation being controlled by a former slave was difficult enough for the Southern slave-holding states to accept; but when they witnessed an expansionist movement on Boyer’s part their fears only increased.

Southern fears were not unfounded. News of Boyer’s escapades reached the United States and Northern-educated African Americans were particularly interested in this news. Influenced by nationalist activities in Paris, free Black political activity in the North increased. Celebrating such heroes as Santiago, “the intrepid Maroon chief,” and “the daring deeds of dreadless heroism performed by a Toussaint, a Dessalines, a Riguad, and a Christophe,” activists of the so-called Negro Nationalism movement began to stir. Their philosophy was simple; they condemned those blacks and whites who worshiped with slaveholders; they laid intricate plans to take black problems out of white jurisdiction; they talked of frontier American communities where they would not be under white suzerainty; they insisted on equality before the law; they considered the American nation and people indebted to the black man for services rendered and for deprivation endured; they spoke of America being saved by the black man if it was to be saved at all. And there were those who would gladly have seen a revolution if it would accomplish their goals.

The movement grew into an effort to find a sympathetic country “where Negro potential for government would have full sway, where a black nation might blossom forth, where black pride would be unimpeded.” The movement’s philosophy evolved into a thesis in which projects pertaining to blacks must be headed by blacks, that blacks must shoulder the full burden of their own self-betterment; that they must exercise their political potential by developing a government
independent of the white man’s supervision; that they must have a land “where Ethiopia might stretch forth her hand.”

By 1850, Reverend James Theodore Holly, then twenty-one, approached the American Colonization Society with a request to be trained in a medically related profession so that he might emigrate to the colony at Liberia. Within a year, Reverend Holly worked for an organization in Toronto that promoted colonization of freed African Americans in Canadian territory and the British West Indies. Critics contended, however, that Canada was not sympathetic to any American, regardless of color. Three years later, Holly became interested in the Protestant Episcopal Church and the National Emigration Convention in Cleveland, Ohio. In another year, he was a deacon in the Church and went to Haiti to determine if it suited the needs of African American citizens desiring emigration.

Southern expansionists, however, had another plan for the Caribbean islands. Fearing that the abolition of slavery in the tropics would provide a place for slaves to escape, they hoped to annex the islands. The South especially favored Cuba as a buffer zone, but eventually looked at the entire Antilles as the New South. In 1861, to promote this policy of southern expansionism, an organization called the Knights of the Golden Circle formed. On the eve of the Civil War, the Knights of the Golden Circle numbered sixty thousand.

Northern businessmen worried about trade arrangements that had been made under the auspices of a mother country that no longer existed. For twenty-one years, they had to deal directly with Boyer, and enforcement of debt repayment was difficult.
From an internal perspective, certain segments of Santo Domingo understood this dilemma. Three groups, all intertwined in their political and economic relationships, began to raise their voices in protest. Elite merchants worried that a tenuous relationship with the controlling powers would cause an economic disaster. Governmental opponents, usually under the manipulation of one nation or another, promoted a resistance movement against Boyer's policies of aggression, particularly in former Spanish Santo Domingo. African-American and mulatto personalities also vied for power in the newly liberated island nation in the hope of furthering their individual agendas. Civil war, once again, appeared inevitable.

The Monroe Doctrine, first instituted in 1823 with the hope of securing American supremacy in the American continents, also caused some frustration, particularly with France, England, and Spain, and in certain segments of Santo Domingo that were looking overseas for help in stabilizing their government. In one of the most ironic interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine (and total disregard for retiring President Washington's warning of entangling alliances), the United States entertained the idea of a tripartite solution to the ever-burgeoning problem within Santo Domingo. The year 1843 marked the time when the United States expressed an official and formal interest in Santo Domingo, specifically in the area surrounding Samana Bay.

The fact that the Dominican Republic was a pawn in an international game of chess became evident in 1843. Entrepreneurial and political insurgents within Spanish Santo Domingo approached French representatives in Port-au-Prince with a solution. These leaders offered Samana Bay in exchange for military assistance in a revolt against the
Haitian government. The French favored the solution and prepared their fleet to embark to Santo Domingo City, but Great Britain and others, which already knew about the informal agreement, protested. France declined to fulfill her side of the arrangement, fearing that Britain would occupy the northern section of the island if they occupied Santo Domingo City.

Members of the Santo Domingo community also disagreed with this arrangement. Wealthy families, including the Santanas, wanted Santo Domingo free from Haitian rule also, but they felt that the best way to achieve this was under the protection of a major power other than one that favored the Haitians. Pedro Santana, son of Don Pedro Santana, one of the liberators of Santo Domingo from French rule, joined Juan Pablo Duarte in a Dominican independence movement. On March 24, 1843, Duarte marched into Santo Domingo City demanding constitutional and administrative reform from then President Charles Herard. On February 27, 1844, Duarte’s revolutionaries gained control of Santo Domingo and thus declared the independence of the Dominican Republic. When Duarte refused the presidency, Santana, an ambitious general, marched into Santo Domingo on July 12, 1844, and declared himself the President of the new Republic. Santana then exiled Duarte and other liberal revolutionaries from the city.

Santana sent Dr. Jose M. Camiñero as the country’s first official public envoy to the United States. On January 6, 1845, Dr. Camiñero arrived in Washington to announce the independence of the Dominican Republic and to request American recognition. Santana feared French protection and worried that Haitian insurgency was inevitable. Secretary of State John C. Calhoun received Dr. Camiñero for then President John Tyler. Under Tyler’s orders, Calhoun questioned Camiñero on the state of his government. The
envoy quickly declared that a government composed of a minority of mostly white, educated, and wealthy landowners was then controlling Santo Domingo. Dr. Camiñero’s comments neglected to inform Calhoun that President Santana was of Spanish heritage.80

In February 1845, the President sent John Hogan on a six-month investigation of the island to determine if the Dominican government was indeed solvent. Mr. Hogan’s report proved popular. In it, he reported the abundance of natural resources, including gold and silver mines and the presence of coal, and commented on the government, climate, economy, and even the religious nature of the inhabitants, as being favorable for recognition. Mr. Hogan also hinted in his report that a certain bay might be offered in the deal as a naval base if official recognition were forthcoming. The report also emphasized the hopes of the Dominican government, particularly Santana, to eventually occupy the entire island under one ruler.81 This report became the first spark in igniting American interest in the affairs of the Dominican Republic.

In May of the same year, newly elected President James K. Polk received Mr. Hogan’s report, but he and his Secretary of State, James Buchanan, worried that conditions were changing far too rapidly on the island. While Santana occupied Santo Domingo, Haiti was involved in a civil war against Herard. Polk had also discovered that Santana was courting other Western powers, particularly Spain, for protection. The United States thus ordered Lieutenant David Dixon Porter to Santo Domingo as another special American agent. He was not well-received by President Santana, who was not only surprised that another agent had been sent, but also disappointed that Mr. Porter was not bringing official recognition by the United States. Porter eased Santana’s fears and managed to get approval for another investigative excursion throughout Santo Domingo.
Mr. Porter’s report was more mixed in its opinions. While Samana Bay intrigued him as a potential naval base, the area itself was infested with mosquitoes and poisonous reptiles. Mr. Porter was reluctant to emphasize Santo Domingo’s potential as a new government or as a major nation. The report also mentioned political abuses by Santana, but Porter was impressed with the ability of the small nation to resist both Haitian and French rule. Porter was amazed that Santo Domingo had allowed “black generals” to rule them for so long. One aspect of Porter’s report intrigued the notions of opportunistic members of the United States; however, and that was the abundance of natural resources that could be successfully exploited by independent entrepreneurs.
THE INTEREST OF THE PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR
IN THE AFFAIRS OF SANTO DOMINGO

The "ancient law of supply and demand," as Tansill referred to it, had always
governed the history of Santo Domingo and its relations with numerous nations. In
February 1846, Spanish warships sailing in Dominican waters alarmed President Polk to
the extent that he considered the appointment of another commercial agent to the country
in the hopes of attaining satisfactory arrangements for the exploitation of its abundant
natural resources. The Mexican war of May 1846, however, prevented Polk from doing
so until February 18, 1847, when he appointed Francis Harrison. Harrison toured the
island, and, before his death of yellow fever the following year, reported that French
warships were scouring the Dominican shores and making "extensive" surveys of Samana
Bay.83 International competition for the natural resources of Santo Domingo was, once
again, rampant.

Jonathan Elliot replaced Harrison, but another event foreshadowed the coming
trade relationship with the United States. In August 1848, Santana resigned as President
of the Dominican Republic. His replacement was General Manuel Jimenez, but in May of
1849, an invasion of the Haitian army into Dominican territory questioned this authority.
Opponents of Jimenez, like Baez, favored French intervention, but the President appealed to Elliot for American protection. Great Britain also expressed interest in the “advantages of British control.”

Alarmed by rumors that Great Britain was seeking the possession of Samana Bay, the United States first telegraphed George Bancroft, the American Minister at London, and requested confirmation of the rumors. Before receiving an answer, however, Secretary of State John M. Clayton appointed Benjamin E. Green to go to Santo Domingo and assess the situation in person. If the rumors were true, Mr. Green was to inform the United States of the conditions of cession of Samana Bay to Great Britain. If the rumors were false, Mr. Green was then, by all means possible, to encourage the Dominican Republic to resist any idea of British acquisition. He was also expected to investigate the island and determine if the reports made by Hogan and Porter were indeed accurate. If they were, then Mr. Green was to entreat the government to sign a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, and then determine the possibility of acquiring Samana Bay, “suitable as a stopping place for the United States steamers, and as a place of deposit for coal to be used by them.” In exchange for the bay, the United States would loan a “considerable” amount of money, give one or two steamers to Santo Domingo, and establish a postal system between the island and the United States. Santo Domingo would further be requested to allow American businessmen, Green being one of them, and their families (ironically called “colonists”) to conduct mining, lumbering, and agricultural projects surrounding the bay. The United States also requested that the incoming entrepreneurs be guarded by an independent military organization composed of their own choosing.

On September 17, 1849, before leaving for Santo Domingo, Green wrote to
Nicolas Julia, a Dominican capitalist. This correspondence marked the beginning of the Dominican Mining Company, with Green and Julia as co-owners.\textsuperscript{86}

Unfortunately, when Mr. Green arrived in Santo Domingo, he discovered that Jimenez had fled the city and had been replaced by President Buenaventura Baez, a noted French sympathizer. Still concerned with British interests, Green had to contend with the French enthusiasm as well. He immediately began conversations with Manuel Del Monte, the Foreign Minister for the Dominican Republic. They discussed the implications of the Monroe Doctrine, the apparent disastrous effects of European intervention in the economies of the Caribbean, and the possibility of protection and, more importantly, annexation by the United States. Mr. Green’s question became the first official overture by the United States toward annexing the Dominican Republic.

Del Monte accepted the annexation idea, but Mr. Green promptly cautioned that he had not received official instructions to authorize the annexation, but rather, he had the power to recognize the government and the nation. On January 4, 1850, Benjamin Green wrote to Secretary of State Clayton and spoke of the developments up to that moment. He also warned Clayton, “I desire to escape as soon as possible from this ungenial climate.”\textsuperscript{87} On January 24, the Foreign Minister formally requested intervention by the United States on behalf of President Baez. Mr. Green could not guarantee that Americans would agree to this. The Dominican government then requested military assistance in toppling the Haitian government. Again, Mr. Green gave no guarantees. At this point, the Dominican government issued separate requests to the United States, Spain, and France for intervention against the threat of the Haitian government, and the tripartite coalition attempted a conciliatory agreement between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{88}
There were ulterior motives as well. Mr. Green would be one of those "colonists" who engaged in private business under the protection of a private army sanctioned by the American government. His dreams included the continuous acquisition of lands surrounding Samana Bay, and, with his father, the colonization of the island with Americans. Eventually, Santo Domingo would be Americanized and annexation would prove particularly appealing to Southern states, which wanted to see slavery reinstated on the island, thus balancing the power with newly acquired states in the American West. Unfortunately for Mr. Green, Baez did not accept these ideas because they reminded him of the problems encountered by Americans in Texas with the attempt to introduce slavery, ironically echoing similar thoughts made by Lord Palmerston.89

It was then that Mr. Green went to Haiti in an attempt to recover approximately half a million dollars in debts owed to American businesses. The Haitian emperor, Faustin Elie Soulouque, also known as Faustin I, who harbored both fears of any non-Haitian influence and hopes of controlling the entire island, claimed no knowledge of the debts and ordered an investigation. Mr. Green also demanded that Haiti recognize its American commercial agent and issued a warning that the United States would not stand by while Faustin’s empire intimidated the Dominican Republic. His message was met with less than enthusiasm. Immediately behind Mr. Green came the French and British ministers. Secretary of State Clayton then changed his message and assured them that the United States had no intention of annexing Santo Domingo, but instead requested co-operation with their two countries in the pacification of the island.

Upon the untimely death of President Taylor in 1850, Daniel Webster replaced Clayton as Secretary of State and appointed Robert M. Walsh as special agent to the
Haitian government. Mr. Walsh was not popular in Haiti, nor was he kind in his
description of Emperor Faustin I as “stout and short and very black, with an unpleasant
expression and a carriage that does not grace a throne. He is ignorant in the extreme but
has begun to learn to read and write and is said to exhibit commendable diligence in his
studies.”90 The United States gave Walsh no real power. France and Great Britain,
however, had the power to blockade Haitian ports unless the government ceased all
hostilities against the Dominican Republic. Eventually, all three governments insisted that
the emperor curtail his behavior, but his response was overheard to be that he would let
the three "plenipotentiaries" amuse themselves and then he would rid the country of them.
He then appointed four commissioners to delay them an additional four months. Finally,
Faustin agreed to cease hostilities for the time, and the three nations were content.
America increased its courtship with the Dominican Republic, which only incensed the
emperor more.91

Other developments occurred that would influence the American stance on this
problem. On May 1, 1851, Mr. Walsh left Haiti for Santo Domingo, where he held an exit
interview with President Baez. Baez was upset that the three nations had not succeeded in
guaranteeing peace between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, but Mr. Walsh was not
impressed with this “bright mulatto, a sort of guinea nigger.”92

On May 7, 1851, American Consul to Puerto Rico William Tracy wrote to
Secretary of State Daniel Webster complaining that he was ill.93 Three weeks later, Lord
Palmerston instructed Sir Henry Bulwer, British Minister to the United States to invite the
American government in joining the British and the French in submitting a proposal to
Emperor Faustin I of Haiti. The proposal instructed the Emperor to give the tripartite
nations twelve months notice before invading the Dominican Republic. In June, Bulwer wrote to Secretary of State Webster and informed him of Lord Palmerston's proposal. Webster suggested that the President was favorable to the proposals, but Congress would have to be notified if the American navy were to be involved.94

During the first week of July, Sir Henry Bulwer became concerned with reports from New York that some 2500 American "adventurers" were ready to "colonize" the Dominican Republic, only to also learn that they were actually "military 'auxiliaries."95 On July 2, 1851, Bulwer wrote to Thomas R. Usher, British consul at Port-au-Prince, and enclosed a clipping from the July 1851 issue of the New York Herald, which announced that the Dominican government offered tracts of land in Santo Domingo territory to anyone willing to emigrate to the Dominican Republic and "aid in protecting the country from an invasion."96 President Baez had his own itinerary, and it was argued that American intervention would be used until his government was stable and then discarded in lieu of more favorable relationships, specifically with Spain.

Despite a lack of Spanish intervention, the two significant leaders of Santo Domingo, Baez and Santana, were of Spanish heritage. Both were from landed gentry, Baez having been educated in the French university system, which may explain his affinity to all things French. Santana came from a wealthy family in Santo Domingo City, but had been raised in areas consistently fought over between major powers, particularly the French, and suffered through the poverty of a nation torn between international jealousies. Despite his family's eventual rise in wealth and status, Santana was decidedly in favor of Spanish control of Santo Domingo. Haiti, on the other hand, feared all things pertaining to slavery, which it associated with Spanish dominion. But Spain soon proved that it
could not afford to maintain any significant hold on the island. As a result, the continued Dominican courting of American interests, who advocated the establishment of slavery as part of its new economic development within Santo Domingo territory, concerned the Haitian government.

Questions arose as to Faustin’s real motives. On August 9, 1851, Britain and France ordered warships to patrol Cape Haytien and to discover what Faustin’s intentions might be. The warships sailed into the harbor, and following a severe storm, the British Devastation discovered a load of munitions on a marooned Haitian vessel. The Haitian Foreign Minister admitted guilt. Faustin was, indeed, intent on the invasion of the Dominican Republic. Upon discovering this piece of news, both British and French governments issued requests to the United States that a tripartite intervention was necessary and that American naval ships should be sent immediately. The United States agreed.⁹⁷

During the Presidency of Franklin Pierce, American imperialism and expansionism exploded. Under his administration, America supported at least one insurrection in Latin America per year. The intent was simple. Using the concept of “divide and rule,” the United States attempted to annex more potential slave holding states, in a country of ever-increasing abolitionist states.⁹⁸

On June 15, 1852, Jonathan Elliot wrote Daniel Webster and complained that “the climate was fatal.”⁹⁹ This seemingly innocuous statement commented on a situation that progressively grew worse throughout the Caribbean and eventually affected the United States both in diplomatic consistency and expansion.
On March 4, 1853, Eliot wrote from Santo Domingo to the Secretary of State that Raybaud, the French Consul-General, was expected to arrive on the island with the intention of establishing a treaty of commerce with the Dominicans, and then sending a French army to be stationed at Samana Bay. Four days later, Humphrey Marshall, American Commercial Agent at Macao, wrote to Secretary of State Edward Everett warning him of the British plan to move Chinese laborers into the West Indies. Marshall believed that this introduction of "Coolie" labor would disastrously affect the economic base of Southern planting states and several "institutions of the republics of South America." Among the fears mentioned was the character of Chinese laborers. They were farmers used to hard labor and exposure, and they had implicit knowledge of rice, cotton, and sugar and of how to "compel from the earth the maximum production." Above all, a Chinese laborer required an annual expenditure of only eighty dollars, "a much cheaper rate than slave labor." Marshall knew that American farmers were unable to compete with such a cheap and productive labor force.

On April 25, 1853, Ussher wrote to Webster concerning a French vessel that had arrived in Port-au-Prince from Santo Domingo City. The ship contained a French consul and a commissioner from the Dominican Republic. Both appealed to Faustin for conciliation between the two countries, and when that proved unsuccessful, the French consul returned to Santo Domingo, having been instructed to sign a treaty of commerce between France and the Dominican Republic with Samana Bay being ceded to the French government. On May 33, Eliot echoed Usher’s warning. The next day, C. A. Deolton wrote to Secretary of State Webster and informed him that American Consul to Puerto Rico William Tracy had died “in service.”

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When asked to confirm or deny the rumor that France was attempting to acquire Samana Bay, the French Minister at Washington stated that it was entirely possible that the allegations were based on fact. Secretary of State Edward Everett wrote to the American Minister at Paris that he and the United States were displeased with any allegations that France may be attempting to acquire Samana Bay. He also iterated that the American government was in no way interested in dominion over the Caribbean island. Three weeks later, the United States ordered John P. Kennedy, the Secretary of the Navy, to patrol Santo Domingo and speak with the American consul. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs then quickly assured the United States that the accusation of their design to occupy Samana Bay was a “fable.”

During the summer of 1853, a yellow fever epidemic struck the city of New Orleans. In his “History of the Epidemic Yellow Fever of New Orleans, La., in 1853,” Dr. E. D. Fenner resisted the idea that the epidemic had arrived on vessels from the West Indies. He did, however, acknowledge the common belief that “this fever was brought to us by vessels from Rio de Janeiro.”

On November 18, 1853, President Franklin Pierce offered John Parsons the position of American consul to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Parsons refused; claiming his poor health would only be worsened by “such a climate.” By the end of the month, the Secretary of State felt obliged to send Special Agent General William L. Cazneau to the Dominican Republic with instructions to investigate the condition of both governments, their apparent hostilities, and if any other nation had recognized their independence. Along with these instructions, the Secretary included an article by one R. A. Parrish, Jr. The article, entitled “The Goldfields of Santo Domingo,” extolled Santo Domingo as
“unquestionably destined to stand foremost amidst all the Gold producing regions of the globe. Within five days distance of New York, this inestimable formation—easy of access, & easy of acquisition—is at this moment, idly awaiting for its development, the advent of the people of the States.” Cazneau’s interests were piqued, echoing his former history as a land speculator in Texas. After landing, he decided to live on the island permanently.¹⁰⁷

Cazneau’s first official dispatch to Secretary of State Marcy was not until January 23, 1854. In it, Cazneau defended both Haiti and the Dominican Republic in their various covert relationships with France and Spain because of the lack of proper attention by the United States, specifically in economic terms. Cazneau knew, after “mature consideration,” that relationships between the United States and the island would be successful if attempted. He also reminded the Secretary of the abundant resources available for exploitation on the island.¹⁰⁸ Now that a sympathetic Santana had overthrown Baez for the President’s seat, Cazneau felt that this would be an opportune time to court relations with the Dominican Republic.

On February 21, 1854, John Bigelow, owner of the New York Herald Post, visiting in St. Thomas, printed an article about Cazneau’s apparent mission. More importantly, Bigelow commented that Mr. Cazneau was the “husband of ‘Cora Montgomery,’” who had proceeded to the island a month before her husband. Mr. Bigelow added that Mrs. Cazneau “has not hesitated to assure the people of St. Domingo, that the country would belong to the United States in six months.”¹⁰⁹ Bigelow was also alarmed at the “arrows of death flying around at a fearful rate.” These “arrows of death” were the first ramifications of a cholera epidemic.¹¹⁰
By May, Horace Greeley, owner of the New York *Evening Post*, added association and innuendo to the attack upon Mrs. Cazneau:

It may be well for the public to know something more of this commissioner. It is no other than the redoubtable and immaculate Cora Montgomery, alias Mrs. Storm, formerly editress of the *Sin*, and companion-in-arms of Beach the elder, with whom she visited Cuba and other foreign parts in times gone by. At the close of that engagement, she became a follower of the American army in the Mexican war, where she may have had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of Brigadier-General Pierce, and produce an impression of which this appointment is one of the fruits.\textsuperscript{111}

The following day, the *Evening Post* hinted at other nefarious characteristics in Mrs. Cazneau's husband. Cazneau responded by charging that the paper was working with Faustin "for the destruction of the white population of the island," and suppressing truths that would allow the American people to recognize the Dominican Republic.

Thomas J. Green added a glowing character study of Cazneau, and the paper printed an editorial that stated that Mr. Cazneau knew that, of a population of seventy-five to hundred thousand Dominicans, only about two hundred and fifty were white.\textsuperscript{112}

Amidst all of this character assassination was the fact that Santana courted Spain for possible annexation. Great Britain looked at the United States' stance in the Caribbean and her apparent support of Russia in the Crimean War while the Americans denounced what they perceived to be British attempts to control the seas. Spain owed Britain money; which the British wanted to be paid. England granted aid to the Spanish in fear that the United States had designs upon Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine was, once again, being put to the test.

Other problems arose that affected America's ability to negotiate with Santana. Cazneau returned to the United States with dreams of convincing Congress of the
necessity of annexing the Dominican Republic. Among his supporters in this adventure were Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury Guthrie, and Jefferson Davis of the War Department. On May 23, 1854, Senator Douglas introduced a resolution “that the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to inquire into the expediency of recognizing the independence of the republic of Dominica, and of opening diplomatic intercourse with the same.”113 Ironically, it was the abolitionists that voted against such a proposal. They feared that the slave-holding Southern states would take advantage of this opportunity to use the Dominican Republic as a new slave state. Abolitionists also feared that such recognition would irritate Haiti. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts wrote to his friend John Bigelow of his uneasiness toward the Douglas resolution.

President Pierce’s cabinet dropped the idea, and instead decided to send Cazneau back to the Dominican Republic with instructions to negotiate the purchase of Samana Bay. They, however, made a fatal error. Sent with Cazneau was one Captain George B. McClellan.

On June 30, 1854, American Consul to Antigua Higinbotham wrote to Secretary of State Marcy and confirmed that an epidemic had struck the island six moths earlier. Following the merchant traffic, and “hopping from port to port,” the epidemic killed six thousand Antiguans within the six-month period.114

On July 17, Cazneau and McClellan arrived in Santo Domingo. Within a week, Cazneau reported two problems to Secretary of State Marcy. First, he reported that the “Europeans here labor incessantly to instill into the Dominicans a belief that their domain will be seized, the native whites set aside, and the blacks enslaved if Americans gain a foothold.”115 The other problem was McClellan. Despite Cazneau’s instructions to wait until he procured permission from the Dominican government to survey Samana Bay,
McClellan wrote two days later that he was running out of supplies and patience. He did not care whether the Dominicans gave or withheld permission, and proceeded to survey the bay. Not only did McClellan distrust what he perceived as a weak nation, but he also feared that France and England would attempt to prevent the survey. To McClellan, secrecy was the key to success, coupled with the illusion that the United States was still disinterested in annexing the Dominican Island. If the survey were completed, then other nations would have to deal with this new fact.

Cazneau responded by iterating that patience was the key to securing permission. McClellan and Commander Newton disagreed. Cazneau, once again, warned them not to begin surveying. Ten days later, McClellan wrote to Cazneau informing him that the survey was almost completed. News of the survey leaked to the Anti-American party on the island, and they accused Cazneau of “intending to take the country, and that Genl. Santana was conspiring to betray the colored population into slavery.” A member of the Dominican Cabinet heard of the survey and told Sir Robert Schomburgk, the British consul, that the United States attempted to establish coal depots in Samana Bay under a new treaty. The Cabinet member also informed Schomburgk that American emigrants were ready to enter the island and enslave it. Schomburgk wrote to Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, and suggested that two English or French warships in Samana Bay might change the mind of the Americans.

Schomburgk then visited President Santana and reminded him that Haiti would invade his country if it were not for the French and the British. He protested the granting of a coal depot to the United States and expressed his fear that the Dominican Republic was about to be invaded by American settlers to the displacement of Santana’s people. 116
On September 2, 1854, John Bigelow proceeded to print a list of Dominican officials as well as their pedigrees in his paper. The pedigrees showed that all the leaders of the new republic were "men of color, including Bonaventura Baez, the "founder of the political existence of the Dominicans." Baez, according to the article, "is a descendent of African blood in both lines. His mother is dead; she was a slave to his father."117 Five days later, the Dominican Minister of Foreign Relations informed Cazneau that President Santana had agreed to let the United States establish a coaling station for mail steamers. The next day, Schomburgk and the French Consul filed a joint protest with the Minister of Foreign Relations. Schomburgk then visited Samana Bay and discovered McClellan's survey and desires to purchase land for a coaling station.

Panic ensued. Schomburgk discovered that Santana had not presented the treaty before the Dominican Congress adjourned. He also noted an increase in American coinage floating around the island and concluded that Cazneau had bribed Santana. Rumors that Santana was in the process of overthrowing the Congress and establishing a dictatorship added to the chaos. When the British Consul asked Santana for confirmation, he did not receive a satisfactory answer. Another rumor surfaced which claimed that the United States' survey was a precursor to more warships arriving in an attempt to invade Cuba. The British Minister at Washington asked Marcy for verification, and he informed the Minister that he should not be surprised if more American warships entered Samana Bay. The Minister also informed Marcy that Cazneau and his Irish wife not only incited insurrection against Spain in Cuba, but that they had implied that the United States wished to annex Cuba along with the Dominicans. Marcy replied that he had not talked to Mrs. Cazneau.
On October 5, 1854, Cazneau concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with President Santana. The treaty contained no provision for the sale of Samana Bay as a naval station, but a personal note to Cazneau informed him that Santana was not against the idea. Schomburgk was furious. He wrote to Lord Clarendon and asked permission to board an English warship and sail to Samana Bay. Raybaud, the French charge d’affaires, arrived from Port-au-Prince and informed Schomburgk that France was ready to aid in preventing the Americans from acquiring the naval base. Lord Clarendon wrote to Schomburgk and instructed him to file an official protest to the Minister of Foreign Relations on behalf of France and England in not being informed of these negotiations. Clarendon also again hinted that Haiti was next door with forty thousand “negroes” who would not “leave a drop of white blood on the island.” In November, French warships landed in Samana Bay.

Cazneau protested what he viewed as European nations preventing American liberty according to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Schomburgk wrote to Lord Clarendon that Cazneau was uneducated and knew nothing of international affairs. He also iterated to Mr. Crampton, the British Minister at Washington, that it was obvious that Cazneau and his wife had bribed Santana. During all of this, the American Commissioner withdrew the treaty of amity and commerce. Cazneau then became furious and requested that the Dominican Congress return the treaty. The British Consul informed the Dominican Congress that under current American law, anyone of color landing in the United States was subject to arrest. The Dominican Congress thus informed Cazneau that if Americans were allowed to freely enter their island, then Dominicans should be conferred the same rights upon landing in America. Cazneau wrote to the Dominican
Congress requesting that the treaty be withdrawn, knowing that the United States would not allow such a concession. The Dominican Congress responded by withdrawing the old treaty and writing a new one in which the amendment to allow free travel of Dominicans in America was attached. During this, Schomburgk and Raybaud informed the Dominican Republic that they forbade the treaty and concessions of land or revenue to the United States. Cazneau informed the Dominican Congress that certain members of its assembly were puppets of foreign nations and that the United States had the power of redress against the injustices being inflicted upon it by the Dominican Congress. Schomburgk and Raybaud interpreted Cazneau’s comments as a threat of war.

Secretary of State Marcy then instructed Cazneau to return to the United States, abandoning any hope of a successful treaty. Before leaving on June 9, 1855, Cazneau wrote that France and England were “undoubtedly co-operating with Hayti and the negro party headed by Baez to extinguish the Dominican Republic and convert the whole island into an African dependency,” and to “check the advance of American principles and restrict the scope of American enterprise in the Antilles.”

During the summer of that year, a yellow fever or cholera epidemic struck the city of Norfolk, Virginia, beginning with the lower classes who lived close to the harbor. Presbyterian minister George Armstrong, who witnessed the epidemic in Norfolk, suggested that the disease arrived on the steamer, the Ben Franklin, which had just arrived from St. Thomas. A cholera epidemic had also hit St. Thomas, leaving one tenth of its population dead. Houses and buildings on the harbor were burned to prevent the spreading of the disease, but by the end of the epidemic, eleven of the sixteen ministers were dead, hundreds of citizens were buried in mass graves, and at least sixty children
were orphaned. Armstrong stated that "it entered the door of the opulent, as well as the indigent, and insatiably hurls into the grave the good and virtuous, the amiable and the gentle, the irreproachable infant and the discreet of mature years." Prior to this epidemic, Alexander F. Vache, health officer for the state of New York, delivered his "Letters on Yellow Fever, The Cholera, and Quarantine." Vache believed that yellow fever arrived by "the liberation of a poison from the holds of vessels," and he was convinced that the fever had arrived in Havana from African vessels transporting the disease to "wherever there is commercial intercourse."120

On September 13, 1855, American Consul to Havana William Robertson wrote Secretary of State Marcy a rather mysterious note in which he explained that "Los Chinos saben mucho (The Chinese know much.)." Without explanation for this phrase, Robertson added that the Cubans "do not appear to see the danger."121

In the autumn of 1855, returning from an unsuccessful negotiation with Haiti to open her ports to African-American emigration, James Theodore Holly delivered a lecture before the Literary Society of Colored Young Men in New Haven, Connecticut. "The task that I propose to myself in the present lecture," Holly began, "is an earnest attempt to defend the inherent capabilities of the negro race, for self-government and civilized progress." Holly believed that the "great mass of the Caucasian race still deem the negro as entirely destitute of those qualities, on which they selfishly predicate their own superiority." Furthermore, within the American population, complacent Whites "who profess to believe the truths, 'That God is no respector of persons;' and that 'He has made of one blood, all the nations that dwell upon the face of the earth'" were "overawed by the overpowering influence of the contrary sentiment. This sentiment unnerves their hands
and palsies their tongue; and no pen is wielded or voice heard, among that race of men, which fearlessly and boldly places the negro side by side with the white man, as his equal in all respects." But, James Theodore Holly was not finished. Further complicating the plight of African Americans was

a large number of the noisy agitators of the present day, who would persuade themselves and the world, that they are really christian philanthropists, to that overwhelming crowd who openly traduce the negro; because too many of these pseudo-humanitarians have lurking in their heart of hearts, a secret infidelity in regard to the real equality of the black man, which is ever ready to manifest in concealed sting. 123 Holly used the revolutionary history of Haiti as a model whereby "a race of almost dehumanized men--made so by an oppressive slavery of three centuries--arose from their slumber of ages, and redressed their own unparalleled wrongs with a terrible hand in the name of God and humanity." Furthermore, Holly believed that

Never before, in all the annals of the world's history, did a nation of abject and chattel slaves arise in the terrific might of their resuscitated manhood, and regenerate, redeem, and disenthral themselves: by taking their station at one gigantic bound, as an independent nation, among the sovereigns of the world. 124

Holly then proceeded to list his heroes from the history of Haitian independence. He began with the 500,000 "negro" slaves who portrayed "stern self-possession amid the furious excitement of the whites" during the influence of the Jacobite notions of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" in Santo Domingo. Holly defended those who "silently waited" as a "brilliant illustration of the capacity of the race for self-government." 125 Holly turned to the "free men of color," the mulatto population and lauded that they, too, "remained entirely passive during the first stage of this revolutionary effervescence," only to seize upon the opportunity of sending their own deputies to the French National Assembly and
securing the decree of March 8, 1790.

Holly continued his celebration of African-American heroes in Haiti with a rendition of the martyrdom of Vincent Oge and his cohorts. Turning then to Boukman, the leader of the slave insurgents, Holly enumerated his exploits and his ultimate capture and execution by the Colonial General Assembly. Holly stated that when this occurred, "the capacity of the race to furnish leaders equal to any emergency, was again demonstrated." He listed a "triumvirate of negro and mulatto chieftains" who succeeded in the struggle that began with the martyrdom of Oge and Boukman, namely Jean Francois, Biassou, and Jeannot. Holly told how these "black slaves and free men of color went over to the cause of Spain, and used her to subserve their purpose in driving France not only to re-enact her previous decree in relation to the men of color; but also to proclaim the immediate emancipation of the blacks, and to invest them with equal political rights."\(^{126}\)

Holly related the heroic rise to power of Toussaint L'Ouverture, a black, and of Rigaud, a mulatto. Toussaint, according to Holly, "proved himself the regenerator and savior of his country," as well as an able leader. Under his leadership, Holly contended, Toussaint established commercial relations between that island and foreign nations; and he is said to be the first statesman of modern times, who promulgated the doctrine of free trade and reduced it to practice. He also desired to secure a constitutional government to St. Domingo, and for this purpose he assembled around him a select council of the most eminent men in the colony, who drew up a form of constitution under his supervision and approval, and which he transmitted, with a commendatory letter to Napoleon Bonaparte, then First Consul of France, in order to obtain the sanction of the imperial government.\(^{127}\)

Toussaint's crowning achievement, according to Holly, was the enactment of the Rural
Code. With slavery abolished on the island, Toussaint believed that the first priority of its newly freed citizens was to re-establish its production levels on par with those levels produced under the former slave economy. Toussaint, Holly contended, established a wage system; and the Rural Code ordained that every able-bodied citizen should work either for a private employer or, if such employment was unfeasible, then for the government. The Rural Code not only prescribed working hours and days, but it contained legislation guaranteeing "terms of agreement and compensation between employer and employed," and established rural magistrates and police to execute the new decree. Holly added:

Nobody need fear being starved for want of work to support themselves, as is often the case among the laborers of Europe, and is fast coming to pass in the densely populated communities of this country, where labor is left to take care of itself under the private exploitation of mercenary capitalists.\textsuperscript{128}

Holly compared the "negro genius of Toussaint" against Britain's apparent inability to effect "that high degree of prosperity in Hayti." Holly blamed the "miserable shuffling in establishing Coolie and Chinese apprenticeship--that semi-system of slavery--in order to gratify the prejudices of her pro-slavery colonial planters" and the prolific use of "absentee landlordism" as deterrents to British supremacy.\textsuperscript{129}

Holly's lecture then turned to Jean Jacques Dessalines, "the never-to-be-forgotten self-emancipated black slave." Holly excused Dessalines' "efficient organization of an army of 60,000 men to defend the country against invaders--the erection of immense fortifications, and the effort to unite and consolidate the Spanish part of the Island in one government with the French portion over which he presided" as "necessary to preserve the freedom and independence of his country."\textsuperscript{130} Despite the "sorrowful evidence of
division" between Christophe and Petion, Holly contended that they both displayed "conservative good sense which fully exhibits the negroes ability to take care of himself" when they would unite against common foes invading the island and "in the contemptuous manner that both chiefs rejected the peridious overtures of Bonaparte."\textsuperscript{131}

What Holly would call "the most astonishing evidence of the perfection of the black race ... in the art of self-government, during the short period of twenty years of independence" was revealed in the administration of Jean-Pierre Boyer.\textsuperscript{132} Under his administration, Holly enumerated, Boyer codified the entire body of law on the island; introduced a "project of emigration, for the purpose of inducing the colored people of the United States to remove to Hayti, in order to replenish and accelerate the growth of the Haytian population"; and promoted industry on the island with the formation of a mahogany saw mill at St. Marc, another saw mill at Port-au-Prince, and a tanning company. These three industries, according to Holly, spent $45,000 "in preparations for carrying on the business" and "in the purchase of the necessary machinery from France."\textsuperscript{133}

After what Holly termed "slight manifestations of disorder" following the death of Boyer, the administrations of Guerrier, Pierrot, and Riviere "followed each other in quick and rather chaotic succession," but "the work of industrial progress did not abate." Haiti purchased two steamers, established a model farm under the auspices of an agricultural expert from France, and began extensive rebuilding of Santo Domingo using "English architects, carpenters, and stone masons." Under the administration of Emperor Faustin I, Holly proclaimed that Haiti had a navy of twenty armed vessels, had erected thirteen steam sugar mills, and improved and extended the system of education including "a house of industry erected at Port-au-Prince, for the purpose of instructing boys in the mechanic
Holly then lambasted the United States government. Compared to the "security for personal liberty and the general welfare of the governed, among the monarchical negroes of Hayti where the rulers are held individually responsible for their public acts," America was a "bastard democracy."<sup>135</sup> Holly declared

The American people under a republican form of government manifest their want of a love of true liberty, when they permit a vagabond set of politicians, whose character for rowdism disgraces the nation, to enact such an odious law as the Fugitive Slave bill, violating the writ of Habeus Corpus [sic], and other sacred guarantees of the Constitution;--and then tamely submit to this high handed outrage, because such unprincipled scoundrels voted in their insane revelry, that it must be the Supreme Law of the land.

Holly contended that if the Northern states had the "real love of liberty" there would be no need for "that morally spineless class of politicians, who need decision of character, when they get to Washington, to legislate for freedom."<sup>136</sup>

Having presented "the preceding array of facts and arguments to establish, before the world, the negro's equality with the white man in carrying forward the great principles of self-government and civilized progress," Holly's object was not only to raise the consciousness of African Americans of "their own inherent dignity," but to use that self-respect as a springboard for "those great deeds which the age and the race now demand at their hands."<sup>137</sup> Haiti was not only an independent island governed by African Americans and men of color, but "in natural advantages, [was] the Eden of America, and the garden spot of the world" capable of a population of over ten million. With this in mind, Holly proclaimed

It becomes then an important question for the negro race in America to well consider the weighty responsibility that the present exigency devolves upon them, to contribute to the continued advancement of this negro
nationality of the New World until its glory and renown shall overspread and cover the whole earth, and redeem and regenerate by its influence in the future, the benighted Fatherland of the race in Africa.\textsuperscript{138}

Holly believed that if Haiti, a "powerful and civilized negro sovereignty," could exist, then "this fact will solve all questions respecting the negro, whether they be those of slavery, prejudice, or proscription." Holly further declared that a "concentration and combination of the negro race, of the Western Hemisphere in Hayti, can produce just such a national development."\textsuperscript{139}

Holly concluded his speech with the observation that emigration to Haiti was possible because Providence had ordained "a point for gaining an easy access to that island." He urged his brethren to "enlist in this high pathway of duty, while the watchwords that shall cheer and inspire us in our noble and glorious undertaking, shall be the soul-stirring anthem of GOD and HUMANITY."\textsuperscript{140}

In April 1855, the first ships containing Chinese immigrant laborers entered the West Indies at the port of Havana, Cuba, under the British plan of colonization.\textsuperscript{141} In October, Secretary Marcy appointed Johnathan Elliott as commercial agent to Santo Domingo with strict instructions to ratify a treaty without the amendment on Dominican emigration. The concept of "Dominicans, in the United States, of all complexions on the same footing as citizens of the United States" would not be entertained, "it being contrary to the feeling of a large proportion of our citizens." Mr. Elliott was also instructed to acquire one Samana Bay as a naval station.\textsuperscript{142}

On November 20-22, 1855, the First State Convention of the Colored Citizens of the State of California met in Sacramento in the Colored Methodist Church. The Sacramento Democratic State Journal would report the proceedings. At the meeting, the
population of African Americans in California was estimated to be around five thousand.\textsuperscript{143}

On December 3 1855, American Consul to San Juan Latimer confirmed that a cholera epidemic had invaded Puerto Rico. Within three months, 6492 were dead and 15,677 were ill.\textsuperscript{144} In that same month, Mr. Elliott and the Dominican Congress attempted to write a treaty of amity, commerce, navigation, and extradition, but a Haitian invasion delayed completion until March of 1856.\textsuperscript{145} Samana Bay remained Dominican property. Mr. Elliott then wrote to Secretary Marcy suggesting that the United States could acquire Samana Bay if it would “protect the Republic from the consequences.” The treaty would never by ratified by the United States. Critics claimed that it looked too much like the amended treaty. Others were reminded of the events surrounding the first attempt at a treaty.\textsuperscript{146}

Spain, greatly concerned with American intentions in Cuba and even more defensive of its territories following the Ostend Manifesto, sent St. Segovia as its chargé d’affaires to Santo Domingo. Upon landing in December of 1855, Segovia stated that war with the United States was inevitable and would be better fought on Dominican soil rather than Cuban. Segovia also suggested to the Dominican Congress that if they refused to ratify the American treaty, then Spain might attach the nation as a protectorate with an army. Segovia also looked forward to the “consequences that might occur in making opposition to the United States.”\textsuperscript{147} Nevertheless, Mr. Elliott and the Dominican Congress signed the treaty. Mr. Elliott then wrote Secretary Marcy again stating that Samana Bay could be acquired if the United States took interest in the protection of the island from any consequences in getting it. Elliott returned to Washington in hopes of
persuading Marcy to send two warships with him back to the Dominican Republic and ask for Samana Bay. 148

James Theodore Holly repeated his 1855 New Haven speech during the summer of 1856 in Ohio, Michigan, and "Canada West." The next year, the Afric-American [sic] Printing Company, in association with the Board of Publication at the National Emigration Council, printed the speech and entitled it "A Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for Self-Government, and Civilized Progress as Demonstrated by Historical Events of the Haytian Revolution; and the Subsequent Act of That People Since Their National Independence." 149

On July 18, 1856, Mr. Eliot reported that the consuls from Spain, England, and France secretly met with the Dominican Cabinet to persuade them to disregard the treaty with the United States. At the same time, he reported that Baez had replaced Santana with the help of the three nations. Anti-American demonstrations and threats marked the next six months. On October 30, 1856, mobs paraded in front of the American agency in Santo Domingo and pulled down "the flagstaff and National Sign." On November 22, a mob attempted to kill the American Commercial Agent and his family. They were saved by Captain Dunlop of the British frigate Tartar. Every night, mobs, screaming "Down with the Yankees, down with the Eagle," paraded the streets trampling on the American flag. 150

On December 17, 1856, US Marine Dr. G. Van Archen, "on mission to establish a marine hospital" at the harbor of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, wrote to Secretary of State Lewis Cass. He reported that the harbor "is one of the filthiest that can be imagined. Dead animals are allowed to remain on the street, and the garbage of the house and offall of the
market generates a stench." Rainwater, he explained, then washed the filth into the harbor. Lakes stagnated in the backcountry. Van Archen declared Port-au-Prince to be a "death trap for visiting American seamen," not only because of the presence of yellow fever on the island, but also because it meant certain death to seamen when coupled with venereal disease. At the harbor were several houses of prostitution, including one owned by Madame Dey, an American mulatto. Van Archen suggested that the moral imperative was to build a marine hospital as soon as possible, claiming Haiti "rather likes yellow fever, as a sort of national defense against foreigners."151

During this time, six thousand Chinese laborers entered the port of Havana, Cuba. Congress soon discovered that "some of the nation's first-class clipper ships were involved in the trade" of carrying Chinese immigrants to the West Indies. In one illegal port, Swatow, China, "American ships carried away nearly one-half of the coolie labor brought into America." The report cited the Norway, a ship that carried over two thousand Chinese overseas.152

On March 9, 1857, Elliot wrote to Secretary of State Marcy and complained that "there is no safety here for either our Citizens or their property." By November 7, Elliot wrote that he had been warned not to travel unarmed or at night. On April 21, 1858, Elliot wrote new Secretary of State Cass that a "prominent Dominican official" had attempted to assassinate his wife. When Elliot protested in front of the Dominican Minister of Justice, Elliot's wife and the wife of the Minister of Justice began to scream at each other in public.153 On May 12, 1858, American Consul to Trinidad Edward Marache wrote to Secretary of State Cass and resigned his position for health reasons. According to Marache, two of the last three Consuls had resigned for health problems.154
These activities did not go unnoticed by the French and the English. Fearful of American intervention, Spain recalled Segovia, thus leaving Baez without force. Baez resorted to the printing of potentially worthless paper money—an action that ruined the planters and the speculators in tobacco. Discontent followed and people intimated at revolution.155 Santana and the United States took advantage of this situation, and seized Santo Domingo. Santana then starved the government into submission. On January 31, 1859, with the aid of Commodore John M. McIntosh and the American warship *Colorado*, Santana became President of the Dominican Republic once again.156

On March 21, 1859, Elliott wrote to Secretary of State Cass under President Buchanan, that the time was ripe to discuss, once again, the possibility of acquiring a depot for merchant steamers and naval vessels at or around Samana Bay. He also recommended that he handle the negotiations instead of a special government agent to the Dominican Republic. Unknown to Elliott at the time, Mr. Cazneau visited the White House and spoke to President Buchanan and Secretary Cass about the possibility of establishing Samana Bay as a free port. They “discussed in a spirit of private and personal confidence, quite apart from any present thought of making it a national measure.” In essence, Cazneau stated that “with or without aid of my government, I shall continue to work for its accomplishment.” He also stated that he booked passage to Santo Domingo where he would remain “until Samana is a free port, or the Dominican Republic is reduced to a Spanish dependency.” The news of Spanish interest in an island so close to Cuba disturbed the President and the Secretary.157

Other people had another agenda. In May 1859, James Redpath, Scottish-born American journalist, abolitionist, and “proven friend of the Negro” warned the National
Emigration Convention at Cleveland to forgo emigration to Haiti until “the President of Haiti had clarified the policy of the newly established republic.”\textsuperscript{158} Haiti had just overthrown Faustin I and installed Fabre Geffrard as President of the Republic.\textsuperscript{159} Redpath made three separate trips to Haiti during the years between 1859-1860 and later received the position as Chief Agent of the Haitian Bureau of Emigration. He wrote a book, \textit{A Guide to Hayti}, in which he described the innumerable advantages of those industrious souls who came to the island and established business interests. This emigration by African Americans “would also form a cordon of ‘free labor’ to surround the South, ‘like a Scorpion girded by fire.’”\textsuperscript{160} He urged African Americans “to emigrate to Haiti for the purpose of defeating the South on the Liverpool Exchange with their abundant harvests of tobacco, sugar ‘to drive Louisiana out of every market in the world,’ cotton and rice to ‘bury Wilmington, Charleston and Savannah out of sight.’”\textsuperscript{160} Redpath also petitioned the new Spanish government for guarantees to African American emigrants. The government assured Redpath the “freedom of worship, access to the land, liberal political privileges, and free passage to the island if desired.”\textsuperscript{161}

On April 7, 1859, the new Secretary of State appointed Cazneau as special commissioner to Santo Domingo. His only instructions were to investigate what was happening and to keep the idea of making Samana Bay a free port secret. By June, he wrote Cass declaring the island abundant with natural resources and hinting that negotiations for Samana Bay were underway. On October 17, Cazneau wrote that Samana Bay had been opened to American commerce. By February of the next year, Cazneau predicted that private American investors would most likely invest a million dollars on the island within the year. Cass reported back to Cazneau that President
Buchanon was seriously considering annexation. In November 1859, American Consul to Puerto Rico Charles de Ronserey wrote to Secretary of State Cass and complained that he suffered from dysentery with "copious bleeding."\textsuperscript{162}

In 1860, another book piqued interest in the distinct possibility that private business interests were ready to take advantage of the situation. A gentleman by the name of W. S. Courtney wrote \textit{The Gold Fields of St. Domingo} as a travel-book. Courtney extolled the island of Santo Domingo as one filled with gold, a unique climate, and fertile savannahs and hills. He also countered two rumors that might affect one's decision to rush down to the island and take advantage of all of its richness. The ravages of yellow fever, he contended, were mostly the product of hearsay; and even if someone fell to the dreaded disease, timely medical administration would remove the ailment. Courtney also denounced rumors of savage hurricanes beating the coasts of Santo Domingo, claiming that they were easily predictable in their behavior. On February 23, 1860, Captain S. R. Kimball, of the Baltimore schooner \textit{Boston}, landed and took possession of an island off the southern coast of Dominica known as Alta Vela.

Prior to Cazneau's appointment, Santana wrote to Madrid requesting a "closer understanding." Almost immediately, munitions, money, and military advisors arrived in Santo Domingo. By March of 1860, Cazneau reported that the Spanish had notified the Dominican cabinet that it planned to proceed with annexation proposals. By July of that year, Cazneau reported the presence of some fifteen hundred Spaniards settling in Santo Domingo, the presence of commissioners furthering annexation plans, and the arrival of three more Spanish ships loaded with additional settlers.\textsuperscript{163} Cazneau received neither
official reply nor instructions concerning his warnings. By then, secession interrupted American foreign policy.

On June 9, 1860, Santo Domingo City issued the Immigration Ordinance. Article I provided for the formation of a four-member Board of Immigration in the capital city of each province as well as in Samana and Puerto Plata. Article III enumerated the functions of the Board, which included finding “the easiest and cheapest way of bringing immigrants to the country.” This article also restricted emigration to those of the agricultural class or “those following some craft, profession, or useful form of labor,” and provided food, lodging, and materials to new colonists who were unable to contract with private individuals. The ordinance also stipulated that “those who agree with private persons shall be under a contract” as well.164

On July 14, 1860, The Weekly Anglo-African of New York published Letter I of what would eventually become A Summer on the Borders of the Caribbean Sea by J. Dennis Harris. Harris believed in African-American emigration, but not from any grand philosophical view. In 1858, Harris wrote to Missouri Representative Frank P. Blair, Jr. and expressed his interest in Blair’s colonization plan for emigrants in Central America. That same year, Harris attended the Convention of Colored Men of Ohio, and by the next year, he was involved in the Central America Land Company.165 His letters, based on his travel experiences in Haiti during 1860, were intended to be serialized as a form of advertisement to potential colonists going to Central America. In Letter II of his book, Harris wrote his thesis:

in the opinion of the writer, as is generally known, the destiny of the island is union;--one in government, wants, and interest, brought about by the introduction of the English language, and by other peaceful and
benignant means; such language, wants, and interests to be introduced by the emigration hither of North Americans,—some white, but principally colored. England, France, and many other independent nations of the world, have acknowledged and formed liberal treaties with the weak little Republic, but I hope you do not suppose the government of the United States could be guilty of anything that looks like generosity.

God grant that I may never die in the United States of America.166

Harris' reasoning behind the emigration to Haiti was simple. He contended, "For any people to maintain their rights, they must constitute an essential part of the ruling element of the country in which they live."167 Harris understood that though "the law might establish a political equality" between freed African Americans and Whites, "the old feeling would survive, and would still exclaim with the San Domingo planters when the French Assembly freed the mulattoes in 1791, 'We would rather die than share our political rights with a bastard and degenerate race.'168 Harris only hoped that the United States was stable enough to protect "a few intelligent and industrious colored families" who could colonize some spot within the Gulf of Mexico or upon its shores, and there live usefully and respected; while gradually an accurate knowledge of the advantages of such a settlement would be spread among their friends in the United States, and, as they developed their capacities for labor and society, not only attract their free brethren to follow, but enable the well-disposed slaveholders to see an easy and simple solution of the question which so deeply perplexes them, "What should we do with the emancipated slaves?"169

During the autumn of 1860, after receiving assurances from the Spanish government of Santo Domingo that American emigrants were guaranteed democratic rights, James Redpath recruited James Theodore Holly initially to a lecture circuit of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey area. Holly later aided "the actual settlements in Haiti." Redpath then appointed John Brown, Jr., son of John Brown of Harpers Ferry fame, as
emigration officer to Canada, and J. Dennis Harris, recently returned from Haiti, as
emigration officer to Ohio. By November 1860, Harris reported that he received a
favorable welcome in Cleveland. Redpath also appointed resident agents in New York
and Washington, DC, as well as the Atlantic seaboard states.\textsuperscript{170}

On December 20, 1860, South Carolina passed the Ordnance of Secession
declaring the Union dissolved. By the time newly elected President Abraham Lincoln took
the Oath of Office on March 4, 1861, six more states had seceded. On February 27, 1861,
Martin J. Crawford, a commissioner appointed by the Confederacy to the United States,
sought an audience with the newly elected President asking for official recognition of the
new government. Secretary of State William H. Seward met with Dr. Gwin, Senator from
California and confidante to Jefferson Davis, to discuss amicable negotiations.\textsuperscript{171}

On March 6, 1861, American Consul to Swatow, China, William Breck wrote to
Secretary of State Seward reporting that between forty and fifty thousand Chinese
emigrants left for Havana and the Chincha Islands.\textsuperscript{172} On March 7, 1861, eleven days
before Spain annexed the Dominican Republic, Cazneau, Joseph W. Fabens, and an
unnamed gentleman who recently arrived in Santo Domingo City, visited the Dominican
Minister of Finance Ricart y Torres and requested concessions in the removal of bat guano
from an island known as Alta Vela. The Dominican Minister soon learned, however, that
these three gentlemen were interested in other things as well. Before the meeting
concluded, they offered the Minister a loan of five hundred pesos “bearing a small rate of
interest and running for a long term,” and the guarantee of an immigration program,
financed wholly by the three gentlemen, that would send thousands of disheartened
Americans, tired of the internal chaos of their own country, to the island. In exchange for
these guarantees, the gentlemen requested

the exclusive privilege of opening up the navigation of the Yuna and Yaque Rivers (the two principal rivers of the island); permission to establish a shipyard to be built by immigrants; the rights of exploitation of the coal and all other mines in the Republic, and a concession of some leagues of agricultural land along the banks of the Yuna and Yaque rivers for the purpose of establishing agricultural colonies. 173

Apparently, these three gentlemen met with some success. Fourteen years earlier, on February 17, 1848, the state of New York passed legislation that authorized “the formation of the Corporations for Manufacturing, Mining, Mechanical, or Chemical purposes.” On October 1, 1862, the American West India Company incorporated under this law. What was unusual was that their stock of one million dollars, divided into ten thousand shares, was payable in “real estate, rights and privileges in Santo Domingo. This property,” they asserted, “was carefully examined and valued by competent parties, prior to purchase by the Company, and pronounced to be of great value....” The company also promised that land values would increase because of the further operations of the company. Among the Trustees listed was William L. Cazneau, former U.S. Special Envoy to the Dominican Republic. The secretary of the company was Joseph W. Fabens of No. 6 Pine Street, New York City. 174

On March 8, 1861, the commissioners of the Confederacy to the United States satisfied that negotiations with Seward would be successful, proposed a twenty-day deadline for an official response to their request for recognition. Seward agreed. Twenty days later, Lincoln, showing “considerable emotion,” announced that General Winfield Scott had recommended the surrender of Ft. Pickens and Ft. Sumpter to Confederate insurgents. 175 On March 18, 1861, in the presence of Cuban warships, troops, and
Spanish authorities, President Santana announced that Spain annexed the Dominican Republic.  

Amidst the expansionist emigration policies of James Theodore Holly and the National Emigration Convention of Cleveland, Ohio, an anti-emigration movement had been forming under the tutelage of Frederick Douglass. Douglass, an escaped slave who was educated in the North and the editor of the *Douglass' Monthly*, an abolitionist newspaper, was a consistent opponent of emigration for any purpose. "Nevertheless when pressed," critics contended, "he had always recognized the right of the individual to choose his own home." Moreover, "if emigration were to take place at all, it should be to a nearby area so that the impact on the slaveholding south would be thereby intensified."  

Douglass then became disappointed with the President's inability to "commit himself or his party to emancipation of the slave or the uplift of the free Negro." Douglass began accepting full-page advertisements from the Haitian government for American immigrants. In April 1861, upon the invitation of the Haitian government, Douglass decided to visit the island to "evaluate the possibilities of many American blacks making their homes in that country," but the onset of the Civil War prevented his doing so. This political shift influenced some of Douglass' most loyal followers and "defenders of the stay-at-home philosophy." William J. Watkins, chief aide to Douglass, began a lecture circuit for the Haitian movement. William Wells Brown, "a loyal follower of William Lloyd Garrison and radical abolitionists," and Reverend J. B. Smith, once "a supporter of a rival emigrationist organization, the African Civilization Society," both toured and touted Haitian emigration.
Within the first six months of 1861, seven colonies of African-American emigrants were established in Haiti, among them the Rochester colony and the New Haven Colony, but by April, the United States was embroiled in the Civil War and in May, the Spanish annexed the Dominican Republic. Redpath, once again, suspended emigration to Haiti for fear of reprisals to African Americans crossing the Gulf of Mexico. Critics who did not agree with Redpath endorsed a more aggressive approach. On July 6, John W. Stokes, an agent in Toronto, advocated and envisioned "colored people of the United States and Canada as flocking to Haiti to defend the Negro nation against the Spanish." Once Haiti was liberated, then "Porto Rico and Cuba could be added to the free Negro group in the Caribbean, and slaveholding Spain thus discomfited."\(^{179}\)

By the summer of 1861, meetings had been held in Kalamazoo and Baltimore. In New York City, the Haitian Agricultural Emigration Association began weekly meetings, and reports from Ohio confirmed a group in Riley preparing to leave for Haiti. One E. P. Walker suggested "using British vessels to avoid putting the emigrants at the mercy of those ships operating under letters of marque granted by the Confederacy," as well as "ships to the ports of the great Lakes so that emigrants could be spared the tiring rail journey to Atlantic loading stations." Letters from the Western states, particularly California, requested information and displayed a readiness to emigrate.\(^{180}\)

On August 3, 1861, J. B. Smith reported from Pennsylvania that the "people are tired of living on promises based upon groundless imaginations and forlorn hopes." Smith also warned, "Don't tell me to wait a century for the accomplishment of a thing here that I may more effectually do in a score of years somewhere else. We are tired of being led by the blind, and have concluded to change our policy." Smith toured Lewistown,
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opinions on what the country was to do with the thousands of freed slaves. Three days later, Attorney-General Edward Bates wrote President Lincoln advising "the propriety of seeking to make treaties with the American governments within the tropics, and with the European powers which have colonies within the tropics, with a view to obtaining safe and convenient places of refuge for the free colored population of this country."

On September 30, a circular stating the intent of the American government to seek safe colonies for the emigration of freed African Americans was sent to United States Ministers at London, Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen. The circular stipulated that emigration would be voluntary. Lord John Russell declined the proposition on behalf of the British West Indies. The remainder of the Ministers replied that such a project was impracticable. On November 18, Seward wrote, "it may be hoped, nevertheless, that we are drawing near to the discovery of a feasible policy which will solve, perhaps, the most difficult political problem that has occurred in the progress of civilization on the American continent."

Possibilities were narrowed to three locations. Preliminary reports suggested that "lands near the harbor of Chiriqui, in the state of Panama" were under dispute of ownership and definitely unsuited for colonization purposes. New Grenada was no better. Finally, Ile à Vaché, an island off the coast of Haiti, was chosen as the first settlement for newly freed American emigrants.

On March 18, 1863, American Consul to Antigua Galody wrote to the Governor of the island and requested that he allow the importation of American freedmen in response to the recent "Coolie" colonization efforts. His logic was simple: the Chinese were ignorant, vicious, and treacherous. Not only was there less prejudice toward the
African Americans on the island, but the freedmen were also Christian. Claiming that it was "scientific to harmonize society," the Consul argued that freedmen were preferable to "disharmonious" Chinese laborers.\(^{188}\)

In April, by special arrangement and under the protection of the United States, nearly five hundred newly freed African Americans sailed for Ile à Vaché. Within a few months, a large percentage of the emigrants died from hunger and sickness. By March of the next year, the American government returned the remaining survivors of the colony to the United States.

On May 21, 1863, American Consul to Trinidad George Hogg wrote to Secretary of State Seward requesting a leave of absence. Hogg feared that his post "would cost him his life." On June 12, 1863, the Anti-Emigration League published an article in their periodical, *The Liberator*, warning African Americans to stay in the United States because of an epidemic in Haiti. On the same day, Hogg resigned his post because his "present health indicated a dying state." The next day, Alexander Jourdan reported that Hogg was dead. On December 22, 1863, American Consul to Puerto Rico John Jay Hyde wrote to Secretary of State Seward and resigned for health reasons.\(^{189}\)

A subtle, yet very defined policy emerged as the United States became more interested in the Dominican island. Concerned with the influx of free states, powerful leaders in the South, including Green, infiltrated Santo Domingo with ideas of free trade and protection, while planning the annexation of the island as the newest slave-holding state. But, circumstances proved otherwise. Unstable governments and civil war throughout the Caribbean made it tenuous at best. Coupled with this instability, England
and France, concerned with the idea of armed “colonists” in the United States ready to embark to Santo Domingo, saw fit to discourage the island from seeking protection from the United States.

The United States, when confronted with this reality hedged around the truth as to its motives. But, so did England and France. In reality, all three nations juggled Santo Domingo in their attempt to control the precarious position of the island. In the pursuit of free trade, these three countries wrestled over possession of the island while its leaders jockeyed for top position from within.

Sectionalism within the United States reared its head as Congress and national leaders debated the recognition of Santo Domingo. At the same time, African American leaders looked to the island as a possible new home for freed slaves as they fueled fires for emigration from the United States. Cazneau looked at Santo Domingo with less than admirable motives in mind, but at no time can it be said that he acted without official sanction from the American Government.

Other problems lurked in the background as well. In horror, the South watched as cheap Chinese labor flooded the Caribbean under the British plan of colonization while free Black leaders promoted the island as a haven from White rule. In what can only be termed “chaos,” the United States scrambled for a foothold in Santo Domingo as England and France rushed to prevent this encroachment. But all was in vain. As soon as an ambassador landed on the island or a colonist prepared to get rich in the Caribbean, they were struck by something more insidious than greed—deadly diseases. No matter what the machinations or motives were, the United States encountered an enemy that it could not fight when it entered Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, or any other island in the Gulf of
Mexico. As soon as a commissioner would set up office, he often died before any consistent policy could be established. Often, official posts were frequently vacant as the United States attempted to replace ever-increasing numbers of dying plenipotentiaries. In his defense, Cazneau was one of many private individuals who faced the reality that they were the only "official" voice of the United States when death took government commissioners from the island. Cazneau, however, was intelligent and opportunistic enough to take advantage of this problem, but not before encountering the problem of Spain's courtship with Santana.

Complications continued. Within a few short months, the United States watched in dread as its most dangerous history unfolded. Nevertheless, amidst these problems came other events that added to the confusion.
THE ALTA VELA AFFAIR,
THE AMERICAN WEST INDIA COMPANY FIASCO,
AND SEWARD'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON SPAIN

Three events, with timetables that clashed amidst the chaos of an impending Civil War and the Spanish annexation of the Dominican Republic, occurred at approximately the same time. These events not only succeeded in creating additional internal jealousies and problems for the United States, but they also determined foreign policy for years to come. This foreign policy strained relations with other major powers and the economic status of Santo Domingo never recovered as a result of it.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the 1860s, Americans expanded ever westward. Often viewed as Jefferson's dream of an enlightened agricultural country that spread from one ocean shore to the other, the United States moved westward and south for other important reasons as well. By 1831, the Detroit Courier published a song that lamented the condition of Massachusetts's soil as only being good enough for "taxation and manure." Publisher and economist Henry C. Carey lamented the condition of the soil in Virginia and the Carolinas, comparing them to the "deserted,
crumbling sugar plantations of Jamaica, the skeletons of a prosperous era gone by.” The governor of Virginia, Henry A. Wise, agreed with Carey, and “bewailed the tenant and skinned land, which made everyone in the Old Dominion poor.” In 1858, the South Carolina State Agricultural Convention considered what was to become of the “ruins of abandoned tidewater mansions, empty churches, and vacated fields, whose owners had packed up lock, stock, barrel ... and moved west.”

Soil erosion notwithstanding, several politicians worried about the effects of an American population moving westward on their established systems of power and influence. In 1842, William H. Seward, then governor of New York, promoted innovation in agricultural techniques in order to protect the “stability and permanence” of their institutions. Not only did the governor of Virginia agree, but also so did Secretary of State Marcy, who believed that soil fertility was the key to the stability of the eastern states.

The economist Henry Carey echoed these sentiments in his 1847 report, The Past, The Present, and The Future. Carey predicted dire consequences would result if crops continued to move westward. Eastern cultural prominence and international prestige in trading would be the first two casualties. Carey even went so far as to blame the search for land, due to depleted soil, as the root cause of the pressure on the population in the Mexican border region that resulted in the Mexican War.

By this time, Great Britain underwent a second agricultural revolution. According to American agronomists, the key to their success was in the use of guano, bat manure, for soil replenishment. France imitated the British, and began full-scale trade in guano. A German chemist, Justus von Leibig, performed a chemical analysis on guano and
our country employed in the trade of the Pacific.” The captain requested protection
against a possible attack by Peru.

Fearing that the English might desire to claim the islands for their own
monopolistic endeavors and never questioning Jewitt’s fear of a Venezuelan attack,
Webster approached President Fillmore with the dilemma. Webster requested that the
Navy send a vessel to the Lobos for protection, and then he wrote Jewitt of his decision.

In what can only be considered the most uncelebrated of circumstances, in 1852, the
United States officially claimed the Lobos Islands—the first territory outside their
contiguous boundaries. With the guarantee of naval protection on the islands, New
York and Boston merchants set sail for the Lobos.

Claiming that they had owned the islands since 1842 during their colonial period,
the Peruvian Minister in Washington complained to Webster. On three separate
occasions, Webster ignored the complaint and steadfastly held to the claim by Morrell
made ten years earlier. On August 16, Captain Jewitt reported that “thirty American
vessels and their crews, numbering more than four hundred,” were around the islands to
pursue the “large interests of our citizens,” and he was concerned about the possibility of a
Peruvian invasion. On August 2, the Peruvian council of state requested arms from its
government to defend against the recent American invasion of the Lobos Islands. The
commercial agent in Lima, John Randolph Clay, urged the United States to come to some
negotiations, as the Peruvians were willing to seek a settlement on the issue.

Unfortunately for Jewitt, Webster had contacted British Prime Minister Lord
Palmerston who did not back down on his country’s interest in the islands. In lieu of this,
Webster changed his approach to the problem. On August 21, 1852, Webster wrote a
letter to Captain Jewitt accusing him of misleading him as to what was actually occurring. The same day, Webster wrote to Peruvian Minister Osma and steadfastly defended the occupation of the Lobos, claiming that other Americans had laid claim to the islands as early as 1793, and he questioned the validity of Peru's 1842 claim. Webster argued that international maritime law recognized the offshore jurisdiction of any nation to be one marine league or "the distance of a cannon-shot from the shore at low tide." On the "simple ground of contiguity," Peru could not claim jurisdiction over a group of islands that were more than a marine league, or over three miles, from the Peruvian coast. Webster, however, hinted at the possibility of a joint ownership in the islands, "a kind of open door policy toward guano deposits." Webster also assured the council that America had recalled its ships.

To make matters worse, on September 13, 1852, the New York Times published an article that hinted at an unsavory connection between American and British guano interests. President Fillmore was angry, and his relationship with Webster deteriorated. Before his resignation, Webster wrote to Clay and emphasized the need for the United States to show Peru that "the present monopoly trade and price was as injurious to her as it is to the rest of the world."

Peru responded with an anti-American campaign. The government asked its citizens for help in exterminating "the hated race." American property, personnel, and interests in Peru were now in danger of confiscation or worse. Clay wrote to the American government for instructions. His reply came in October, when he was instructed to apologize to the Peruvian government and to deny any desire by the United States' government to claim any territories occupied by Peru. Clay was to assure the
Peruvians that the United States was more concerned with Peru’s “social stability, its credit abroad, and the maintenance of the present government” in their country. The United States recognized that if Peru went to war over this issue, then it might go bankrupt and lead to revolution. Economically, this was an unacceptable risk in the maintenance of supply and demand. Great Britain, it was feared, would then enter Peru and confiscate the monopoly in guano trading. Above all other considerations, the thought of the British having the advantage was completely unacceptable to the United States; the thought of further offensive measures against Britain, amidst the chaos of sectionalism within the United States, was also unrealistic.

However in the 1850s, the United States still wanted and needed guano and the Chincha Islands became an almost unbearable temptation to adventurous businessmen. Clay had already noted that fully three-quarters of all guano exported by Peru went to the United States, and that private American interests were loading, carrying, and selling it to this country through the monopoly of the Barreda Brothers. Without the monopoly, merchants thought that they could supply the United States with a cheaper product if they could just establish another way of doing it. Again, Peru did not agree.

Amidst rumors that the South was looking at Santo Domingo as a way to secure a large slave-holding population and thus equate their representation in American government, Senator John Clay of Delaware petitioned the United States to purchase the Chincha Islands from Peru. The House Committee on Commerce agreed and petitioned the government to levy a tariff on guano that would, they hoped, force Peru into some sort of settlement.
At the same time, a French engineer had surmised that the guano on the Chinchas might last another twenty years. Peru was in the midst of a revolution, and Commercial Agent Clay suggested that the United States might purchase the islands for around seventy million dollars. The United States thought the price exorbitant. Information from the Galapagos Islands off the coast of Ecuador revealed guano there and the United States attempted to buy or at least acquire enough concessions to mine. Two gentlemen, both from Louisiana, landed on the islands and asked Secretary of State William L. Marcy for official support of their claims to the island.

On August 18, 1854, Marcy wrote to Philo White, the charges d'affaires for the United States in Ecuador, to support the American claim and to offer two or three million dollars to the government in exchange for mining rights or for outright possession of the Galapagos. The Ecuadorian government responded with a request for a loan of three million dollars and the protection of the entire island by United States armed forces in exchange for one-fifth of the islands' guano resources. Furthermore, the proposal established the price of guano at one dollar less than the price set forth by Peru. The original claimants apparently vacated the premises because they knew that the amount of guano on the islands was nominal. The entire agreement died of neglect by Secretary of State Marcy.²⁰¹

By then, the pursuit of cheaper methods for the acquisition and selling of guano was the Holy Grail for American merchants. Private interests, particularly those in New York, Baltimore, and Boston, were backing exploration ventures in the Caribbean and around South America. Competition for this product would result in tangled alliances by private companies with international governments against their own countrymen who also
sought less expensive ways of profiting from guano. The best example of this came with
the discovery of manure on Aves Island off the coast of Venezuela.

Two rival companies, Shelton and Company and Delano and Lang of Boston,
sailed to Aves Island to mine guano. Shortly, the Venezuelan government sent a ship to
remove the encroaching miners and assert her dominion over the island. What was
unusual was that yet another benefactor, the Philadelphia Guano Company, aided the
Venezuelan government.

In 1854, Shelton and Company sued the Philadelphia Guano Company. Shelton’s
arguments were simple. The island had not been inhabited for two hundred years;
therefore, the island was not only considered derelict and unclaimed, but Shelton got there
first. There existed a Spanish claim for possession from the Colonial period. If the
Philadelphia Guano Company had arranged an agreement with the Venezuelan
government beforehand, then a problem in the interpretation of international commerce as
pertaining to the United States would have to be defined and investigated.

In 1859, as part of the negotiations, the US State Department sent a
representative. Soon, the Philadelphia Guano Company had a monopoly in exports from
Venezuela, and Secretary of State Marcy would receive $105,000 for Shelton’s loss. The
Lobos affair had taught industrious entrepreneurs that the United States could not be
relied upon for official protection of any claims presented to them. Two years earlier,
President Pierce revealed that as long as he was President, the United States would not
establish colonies anywhere in the world. He preferred outright purchase or lease of the
Galapagos and the Chincha Islands.\textsuperscript{202}
Critics claimed that the United States became a “eunuch nation,” weak in its protection of exploration vessels. Another company, the American Guano Company of New York, owned by A. G. Benson, asked the Federal government for protection of exploratory digging on the small islands of Baker and Jarvis in the Caribbean. They asked for what would be termed “affirmative action.” Though the Secretary of State had been informed that the guano deposits on these islands were relatively worthless, the American Guano Company pleaded with Congress that the islands were valuable and subject to encroachment by “more enterprising nations, who dutifully looked after the commercial and agricultural interests of their people.” The company warned Congress that inactivity on their part would lead to self-destruction, echoing the feelings of some that the United States was indeed a “eunuch nation.” Their representative was none other than New York Senator William H. Seward, later Lincoln’s Secretary of State. The Guano Act of 1856 passed the Senate and the House of Representatives with little or no discussion as to its worldwide repercussions.203

The Guano Act of 1856 stated that any American who discovered guano on any rock, island, or key that was "not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other Government," could take "peaceable" possession, occupy it, and, "at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States." As soon as possible, the claimant needed to file an affidavit with the Department of State describing the island and its location, and to show proof that no other government controlled the area or that anyone lived on it. The law also required proof that the land was claimed in the name of the United States. Once the President and Congress were satisfied that all conditions for possession had been met, the
claimant was then free to extract and sell the guano to the citizens of the United States. 204

Few critics feared the consequences of giving the President sole power of protection. One critic, Henry S. Sanford, remembering the Aves incident, claimed that the new act would convert the Presidency into a “great political Guano Huckster shop.” Jefferson Davis, then Senator from Mississippi and Secretary of War, wanted the act repealed in fear that it proposed a precedent in “establishing little colonies” in a country that had historically expanded contiguously. 205

But, something else happened as well. Despite the fact that President Pierce had ultimate control over the recognition and rightful claim of a guano island, it was the private businessmen who would be the architects of expansionism. Imperialistic sentiments were prominent in these exploratory missions. Upon landing on the Aves, the captain hoisted the American flag and then built tenements and wharves. James W. Jennett, upon landing on Arenas Island, erected a building, a flagstaff, and dug a well. Jarvis Island had been officially claimed as American territory and a year later, Washington Island was claimed “in the name of the United States of America and for the American Guano Company.” 206 The Navy also became increasingly interested in guano islands as possible naval bases and coaling stations. And businessmen were always quick to point to the advantages in the anchorage around their islands for possible naval improvements. Mr. Seward, of course, approved of the claims, viewing them as stepping stones in his goal of world economic dominance for the United States.

Claimants of guano islands became dextrous in their advertisements to Congress. The Swan Islands claimed by Duff Green, father of Benjamin E. Green, and Joseph W. Fabens, were memorialized as a “good holding ground for larger vessels.” The islands
could also become a first-rate naval station, a coal depot, more profitable than St. Thomas
in the Danish West Indies, a stopover for American steamers, and a good place for a
marine hospital if the United States would only underwrite the adventure. The
American government was not persuaded, but this tactic would prove tempting to future
presidents.

In 1857, Peter Duncan, an independent “American citizen,” wrote to Secretary of
State Lewis Cass claiming that he had landed on Navassa Island, thirty miles off the coast
of Haiti, and found it uninhabited. He requested a certificate of title “showing that all the
conditions set forth in the Act had been complied with.” The Secretary of State deemed
the claim valid. Duncan would eventually assign his claim over to Edward K. Cooper,
who began guano-mining operations shortly thereafter. Haiti sent armed forces to prevent
Mr. Cooper’s mining and vigorously protested to the United States that Navassa had
traditionally been regarded as a rendezvous for Haitian fishermen. President James
Buchanan, nevertheless, authorized the sending of American warships to “uphold the
rights of the American claimant. Haiti withdrew its claim against Navassa.

On February 23, 1860, Captain S. B. Kimball, of the schooner Boston, owned by
Abraham B. Patterson and Prudence de Murguendo of Baltimore, landed and took
possession of Alta Vela, an island fifteen and a half miles off the coast of Santo Domingo.
Kimball and his crew set up their mining operation and began to remove guano from the
island. On April 8, when a Spanish warship stopped at the island, a Spanish officer asked
Kimball what was occurring. Kimball told the officer, who apparently seemed satisfied
with the response and left. On May 14, Patterson and Murguendo wrote to Secretary of
State Lewis Cass and announced the possession of the island. On July 16, they forwarded
to Secretary Cass an affidavit from Captain Kimball attesting to the possession of Alta Vela. On September 4, the Dominican schooner *Merced* landed at Alta Vela and, after determining what was occurring, managed to acquire a sample of the guano for testing. The ship returned to Santo Domingo.

After chemical analysis of the guano revealed its purity and potentially economic boon to Santo Domingo, a Dominican official went to Alta Vela with instructions to "order the Americans to withdraw at once." The workers refused, and the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to Special Agent to the American Government William Cazneau. Though the island was unoccupied when Kimball landed on Alta Vela, the Minister contended, the Dominican Republic had always considered the island "an appanage of the republic."

On October 13, 1860, Cazneau wrote to Secretary Cass and reported that Alta Vela was a "desert sandpit which the whole world previously neglected" until the United States revealed its potential by spending an enormous sum of money to mine there. The Dominican Cabinet assured Cazneau that "amicable" negotiations were possible. But Cazneau saw the Spanish deputies arriving in Santo Domingo, and felt that he was being played for a puppet. Cazneau told Cass that he feared there was "imminent danger that American interests at Alta Vela may be destroyed."

Ten days later, two Dominican ships, the *Merced* and the *Degado*, landed at Alta Vela and ordered all Americans to vacate the premises and leave their equipment. As with the Aves Island incident, another American special interest group, T. R. Webster and Company, which had been granted sole mining rights in Alta Vela for the Dominican government, had prompted the Dominicans. Troops landed on the island, confiscated
the mining equipment, and arrested the workers. Four days later, equipment and workers were turned over to Cazneau in Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{213}

On November 6, 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected the sixteenth President of the United States. Neither President Buchanan nor Secretary of State Cass had acted on the Alta Vela claims of Patterson and Murguiendo. On November 17, Cazneau wrote to Secretary Cass and reported the arrest and return of the Captain and crew of the \textit{Boston}.

On January 8, 1861, Patterson and Murguiendo appealed to then Secretary of State Black and protested the actions of the Dominican government. Black responded that if the claim were legitimate, the United States was ready to protect it, but he alluded to another company that had been informed the previous June that the island was Dominican property. He would write to Cazneau to determine the legitimacy of all claims.\textsuperscript{214}

On January 15, Black wrote to Cazneau and instructed him to interview the Dominican Cabinet and determine on what grounds the government laid claim to Alta Vela. Cazneau would not respond for a month. On February 19, he wrote to Secretary Black, and although Cazneau understood the treaty of 1855 in which Alta Vela and Beata were considered part of the Azua province, he intimated that the “American explorers had, in their repeated visits to the cay, always found it desolate, unused, and, to all appearances, outside of the care and charge which is the usual evidence of settled jurisdictions with any recognized government.” Cazneau concluded that since Haiti, “which exercises the only visible jurisdiction in that neighborhood,” had left them alone while they mined guano, that the workers felt that they were working as “tenants-at-will of
the government of Hayti, rather than trespassers on the soil and sovereignty of the Dominican Republic."²¹⁵

By March 6, President Lincoln had sworn in William H. Seward as Secretary of State, replacing Jeremiah S. Black. Patterson and Murguiedo then hired former Secretary Black as their personal attorney to represent them before the United States. On March 27, 1861, Black officially complained to Seward on behalf of his clients. His arguments were remarkably similar to Cazneaux’s observations. Black contended that Patterson and Murguiedo discovered the deposits of guano on the island. It was barren, destitute of water, and worthless for everything but the guano ... It had never been inhabited or occupied for any purpose. Neither the Dominican government nor any other had ever exercised or claimed authority or jurisdiction over it.

Black also knew how to pique Seward’s international interests. He added that the character of our government at home and abroad would suffer very seriously by a failure to perform its full duty in this case. Such a failure would be at once ascribed to our domestic troubles. I need not say how important it is just at the present time to avoid any act or omission which might imply a confession of weakness.²¹⁶

Already concerned with the incursion of Spain in Santo Domingo, Seward asked President Lincoln for a declaration of war against Spain. The next day, Seward wrote to Tassara, the Spanish Minister at Washington, and informed him that the actions of Spanish officials in Santo Domingo were to be regarded as “manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican Republic or any part of the American continent or islands, with a prompt, persistent, and if possible, effective resistance.”²¹⁷ Clearly, Seward
felt that Alta Vela and other guano islands were now American enterprises worthy of their protection. Lincoln, however, did not agree with Seward that an international war would unite the country and thus prevent the secession of the Confederacy. Seward backed down, and Spain established the Dominican Republic as a protectorate.

Businessmen from New York, Baltimore, and Boston had expressed concern about the possibility of a disruption in their interstate network because of sectionalist threats. Already by early 1862, Lincoln called for three hundred thousand troops to squash Confederate attempts at disunity. By then, ten states had seceded from the Union or were in the process of doing so. Napoleon’s desire to annex Mexico became apparent and Southern farmers worried that their entire economic system was about to be torn asunder by the Northern Government of the United States. Political, business, and public rhetoric shifted from expansionism to imperialism. Since the adventures in guano had produced lukewarm results, other avenues would have to be investigated.

On October 1, 1862, the American West India Company opened its doors for business with a million dollars in stock. The members of the board of trustees included Hiram Ketchum, of New York and the Los Lobos Island affair; William L. Cazneau, late U. S. Special Envoy; Richard B. Kimball, a novelist; Joseph W. Fabens, who attempted to court the Navy into underwriting Swan Island; and George F. Dunning, former Superintendent of the U. S. Assay Office. Together, these men acquired “by purchase and bond, a clear and indisputable title to some of the most inviting districts upon the Island.” In his letter, President Ketchum noted that in “the vicinity of Palenque, reaching to Santo Domingo City, the Company owns large tracts of land, some of it being thickly covered
with a growth of woods of a very valuable description, consisting of mahogany, the best known in commerce, lignumvitae, logwood, and fustic.” The prospectus informed the reader that this would be the principal business of the company. However, further reading revealed that the company had also “secured by bond the control of a large portion of the copper region on the south side, which, it is believed, fully equals the famous copper-bearing district of the south of Cuba,” the purchase of the entire townships of Azomante and Palenque to be “surveyed into suitable lots and homesteads, for distribution among actual settlers and members of the Company at a small advance on cost,” and the purchase of Esmerelda and Sylvain with the intent of subdividing the fifty acres adjacent to the capital into an upper-class community. “There is no doubt,” asserted the prospectus, “that this enterprise will be a source of great profit to the Company.”

The Company also hinted to other advantages in moving to the Dominican Republic. Those who did not wish to work for the Company could find “highly remunerative occupation in the cultivation of the soil,” particularly in the production of cotton. Mr. Ketchum thought that the “absorbing problem of where our cotton is to come from may thus be satisfactorily solved.” He later intimated that Santo Domingo’s soil was not depleted, “as there are in some of our Southern States.” With this prospectus, the Company had assured interested investors in the advantages of giving up hope on the United States’ acquisition of Cuba and had answered fears of the future of Southern cotton economies.

Other conveniences for would-be settlers were also taken into account by the Company. Ships and trading posts would be established “for the supply of settlers and others, the most essential commodities of life, and also a proper assortment of the best and
most necessary implements of agriculture... It is expected that a large and profitable commercial business will thus be done.” By special arrangements with the Dominican, albeit Spanish, government, settlers were under limited restrictions and would not pay taxes for ten years. The government would also allow the exportation of ready-made housing, cattle, implements, food, etc. to be brought into the country without duty. The Company as a service would provide these items.\textsuperscript{221}

On February 13, 1863, Cazneau wrote to Mr. Ketchum that the first settlers had arrived in Azomante and were extremely satisfied that they had availed of the company’s enterprises. The prospectus also contained letters from other settlers, including M. Rose, a Tennessee cotton planter, expressing their satisfaction in moving to the Dominican Republic. But Mr. Rose and another gentleman, F. Eichholz from Texas, were the only Southern men to go to Santo Domingo. All others were from New England, and the entire enterprise at Azomante was under the supervision of F. H. Dupont of New York.\textsuperscript{222}

Meanwhile, Mr. Fabens had been busy selling the Company to other investors. In 1863, he presented a paper on the “Resources of Santo Domingo” to the American Geographical and Statistical Society of New York. Amidst his celebration of Columbus and an enlightened empire, Fabens quickly added that the Spanish government, with the “moral and political equality of races guaranteed, and the fairest promise of a most liberal and enlightened policy of government,” invited his Company to “try on an extensive scale the oft-discussed experiment of free black labor in the tropics.” Fabens viewed this as the solution to “one of the great industrial problems of the age.”\textsuperscript{223} He also wrote a book that same year, entitled \textit{In the Tropics}, though he did not give his name as author, but received royalties from its sale nevertheless. A masterpiece of advertisement for its time, with a
preface written by Mr. Kimball, the book pretended to be a travel book written by a traveller who became not only impressed with the great history and resources of the island, but someone equally impressed with the “new” Spanish government. According to this well-informed traveller, the Spanish wished to promote public education, religious toleration, health, and liberal tax laws for foreign investors.

In his preface, Mr. Kimball compared the writings of Fabens to “the finer passages of Defoe.” But amidst this fanfare, Mr. Kimball pointed out two interesting advantages to settling in Santo Domingo. One reason, of course, was the adventure of living in a new world. “The record of his daily routine on his little estancia of forty acres is so minute in detail, “ Kimball wrote, “and so interesting by its freshness, that we find ourselves unconsciously sharing all the hopes and fears of the young American farmer.” Kimball continued, “We are anxious about the success of every experiment, and rejoice at every turn of good fortune which befalls him.”

But the American farmer had something else in which to invest. Kimball then misquoted Fabens: “The most manly workers I have seen in this country are white men. Under the warm sun of the tropics, white working men and machinery will yet open the grandest field of civilization ever realized.” Kimball warned the reader to contemplate this sentence well and understand the implications.

On April 6, 1863, William G. Jaeger, American Consul to Santo Domingo, wrote to Mr. Seward that the original settlers intended to return to the United States “by the first conveyance, cursing in their hearts the ‘West India Company’ of Fabens and Cazneau, and more particularly the Spaniards in St. Domingo.” They had apparently been discouraged with the many revolutions that resulted in Spanish possession of the island. Not to be deterred, the company had planted a thousand acres in cotton on some of its Azomante
territory. Mr. Ketchum wrote to J. P. Ussher, Secretary of the Interior, and requested permission “to carry the skilled labor of our Southern freedmen to the Company’s plantation.” Ussher responded that the President saw no problem with this, but he did recommend that free colored laborers “be taken from among the large number of that class of persons to be found within the District of Columbia” in order that military commanders elsewhere would not be crossed, preventing some embarrassment with the company and the United States government.\(^{227}\) To the Secretary of the Interior, the Company could become a liquidation house for recently emancipated African Americans. To Americans, the problem of what to do with millions of freed slaves was simple: ship them to the Dominican Republic as cotton laborers and then establish the most advantageous relations with the island to assure that profits and production were not hindered in the New Cotton South of Azomante.

On July 2, 1863, Jaeger wrote that of the fourteen succeeding colonists sent by the American West India Company, two had returned to the United States, nine had died of yellow fever, and the remaining three in Santo Domingo were sick and not expected to live.\(^{228}\) The Company faced the embarrassment of having in their possession written testimonies from satisfied customers who had recently died or were dying. Added to this, the Civil War continued, and freed African Americans were not being shipped to the Dominican Republic, because the Emancipation Proclamation actually freed slaves in States of rebellion which did not consider themselves part of the United States. On May 31, 1864, in response to these problems, Mr. Cazneau submitted a report to the American West India Company and reported that despite “the discouraging effects of this extraordinary war, the proceedings of the company during the year 1863, have trebled the
original value of its extensive domains.” Palenque, a deserted township of unsold lots, was proclaimed “completely free and intact for immediate settlement.” He also noted that he had secured additional tracts of land in Palenque, “relieved from the squatters, whose huts and fields seriously interfered with any regular plan of improvement.” On March 4, 1865, Cazneau reported to Ketchum in an updated prospectus that

the new government will not only confirm all previous grants and concessions, but will doubtless add to them others, of incalculable importance to the Company.

The revolution being now happily at an end, and affairs on the island having assumed a peaceful and permanent aspect, the company proposes to recommence operations, on its enlarged field of action.

For this purpose, its capital stock will be increased from one million to two million dollars, divided as before into shares of one hundred dollars each.229

The Dominican concessions were cancelled for non-fulfilment of terms and the company folded with a loss of a few thousand dollars in publicity.230 But like the mythical phoenix, the company would arise from the ashes within the year as the San Domingo Cotton Company with Cazneau as owner.231

That same year, Fabens reissued his In the Tropics under the title Life in Santo Domingo, By a Settler. The Supplementary Chapter by the Editor stated that “a movement has been set on foot which will rapidly change the whole face of Santo Domingo by opening up the island to the free commerce of the world, and by furnishing increased facilities for emigration from the United States to that quarter.” Fabens referred to the formation of a new company, the Samana Bay Company of Santo Domingo “by a number of our leading capitalists.” Fabens added that the Spanish Government had “granted to it extraordinary privileges” which included the right “to prosecute various
internal improvements” and “to sustain itself in a state of proper independence.” While Fabens claimed that the object of the company was “purely industrial,” he referred to immigration as being necessary for the development of the island’s resources. “The emigrant from our shores,” he contended, “has now an increased incentive for leaving, because he will go literally among his countrymen, and will receive protection and all necessary aids in founding his new home.” Two other goals of the company were “the introduction of superior methods of agriculture, and facilities for rapid intercommunication.”

By then, it became plain that Fabens and Cazneau were diversifying. Two new companies, the San Domingo Cotton Company and the Samana Bay Company, resulted from reorganization. The two men, both noted for their past land deals in Texas, appeared to be reproducing the scenario in Santo Domingo.

Complications emerged. In August 1863, Dominican insurgents, protesting Spanish dominion, marched to Santo Domingo. On September 14, General Jose Salcedo would proclaim the restoration of the Dominican Republic, and he would be named President of the Provisional Government. A gentleman by the name of William Clark was sent to the United States as a special agent to ask for support of the “Dominican cause.” Secretary of State Seward chose to remain neutral. On December 27, Jaeger would write to Seward and report the destruction of the estate of William Cazneau. By this time, Santana, asked by the Spanish to quell the insurgencies, retired. In 1864, Pedro Santana, three-time President of the Dominican Republic, died.

On February 1, 1864, the Provisional Government sent Pablo Pujol to Washington to request an interview with Mr. Seward who agreed to an appointment for three days
later. On February 4, Seward did not show. Two days later, Pujol wrote another note, wondering why Mr. Seward refused to acknowledge the Commissioner of the Dominican Republic. He then proceeded to remind Mr. Seward of the proper way to receive representatives from unrecognized governments, and then showed how European nations illustrated this propriety when they received agents from the Confederate States of America. This apparently angered Mr. Seward because Mr. Pujol’s request for another interview was not entertained.\textsuperscript{234}

In March 1865, General Pedro Antonio Pimentel announced that he was President of the Provisional Government, following the assassination of General Salcedo. Shortly, Dominican General Jose Maria Cabral would announce his ascension to the office, following the escape of Pimentel. On July 20, 1865, the last of the Spanish troops left the Dominican Republic. After forty-four months of occupation, 7084 Spanish, Cuban, and Haitian soldiers were dead.\textsuperscript{235} Budget estimates for a continued occupation exceeded $240 million.\textsuperscript{236}

On April 9, 1865, Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House. Five days later, on April 14, a gentleman by the name of Powell attempted to assassinate William H. Seward, who was recuperating in his house from a broken jaw. At approximately the same time, John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s Theatre.\textsuperscript{237}

On August 14, 1865, American Commercial Agent to Santo Domingo, Paul T. Jones wrote to Seward and expressed his fondness for President Cabral, and suggested that negotiations for Samana Bay as a naval base could be conducted. On September 6, Mrs. Cora Montgomery Cazneau wrote to then Secretary of the Interior James Harlan
“with reference to the establishment of a ‘free zone’ on the island of Santo Domingo.” 238 In her letter, Mrs. Cazneau reminded Secretary Harlan of her husband’s enterprises during his tenure as Special Agent during 1859-1860 in which his company attempted to aid the Dominican Republic in its fight against “the projected submission to Spain, ... and from the union with Hayti and the supremacy of the negro race.” She also wrote that Cabral was anxious to offer the Bay of Manzanill as a neutral naval station to the United States as well as a “Banda Neutral,” a strip of land surrounding the bay that would be open to all free nations for colonization. Mrs. Cazneau also assured that all dealings with the Dominican Republic would be advantageous so long as everything was kept secret. 239

Harlan immediately dispatched the letter to Seward, and around December of that year, Seward, his son Frederick W. Seward, the assistant Secretary, Seward’s wife, and her sister boarded the United States man-of-war the De Soto and headed for St. Thomas. 240

On November 1, 1865, President Cabral sent a letter to Buenaventura Baez, who was then living on the island of Curacao. The letter suggested that a popular movement in Santo Domingo desired Baez to return and take over the presidency. Four days later, Baez responded with gratitude, but he requested that a more official invitation be sent. On November 14, the Dominican National Assembly officially invited Baez to take over the Presidency for the third time. On December 8, he was inaugurated as President. 241

Earlier in the year, Seward had suggested to General Raasloff, Dutch Minister at Washington, that the United States was interested in the purchase of St. Thomas, St. John, and Santa Cruz Islands. Seward, preparing for his island-hopping adventure, had just received news that the new Dutch Minister was more responsive. After three days in St. Thomas, the De Soto headed for Santa Cruz.
The return trip began with a stopover in Santo Domingo, where Mr. Cazneau greeted Seward. Also on the island was a gentleman by the name of Davis Hatch, an American businessman conducting affairs in Santo Domingo. Mr. Hatch reported later that Cazneau secured Seward away from any other Americans in hopes of talking with him exclusively. Mr. Hatch also intimated that Cazneau had been notoriously vehement in his insults of Mr. Seward, and that he wanted Seward away from any American whom might contradict Mr. Cazneau.²⁴²

Seward met with Cazneau, who introduced him to President Baez. Apparently, Cazneau needed Baez to believe that he was still an important influence in the United States, and by bringing Seward to his office, Cazneau must have been successful in convincing Baez. Seward and Baez exchanged courtesies, and then Seward enumerated the desires of the United States in acquiring “buttresses,” countries adjacent to the American shores that would guarantee the growth of its empire. Seward felt that the United States had no choice but to recognize the independence of the Dominican Republic in order to guarantee these buttresses.²⁴³ After a short jaunt to Port-au-Prince, where Seward met H. E. Peck, the American consul, and informed him that “We want a Naval Station in the West Indies, and we must and will have one,” Seward and his crew then went on to Havana where the party was entertained by the Captain-General of Cuba. By January 28, 1866, Seward was back in Washington.²⁴⁴ It not only became readily apparent that the United States was interested in Santo Domingo, but, it also became equally apparent that Seward would be the architect of the movement.

The next day after Seward arrived in Washington, he received a communiqué from Cazneau. Cazneau assured Seward that Baez was a statesman who was interested in
promoting American enterprise. In his letter, Cazneau stated, "Several competent engineers are already at work in behalf of numerous capitalists in the United States, exploring the mineral districts, examining road-ways, etc. It would not surprise me to see a million of dollars invested by American citizens under the liberal mining and colonization laws of this Republic before the close of the current year."\textsuperscript{245} In February, Baez wrote to President Johnson himself and requested official recognition and amity. But a week earlier, January 30, 1866, President Andrew Johnson, in his State of the Union address, spoke before the Senate and the House of Representatives and intimated that "the commercial interests of our country would be promoted by a formal recognition of the independence of the Dominican Republic."\textsuperscript{246} This became the first time that the President of the United States officially requested Congress to recognize the independence of the Dominican Republic.

President Johnson also nominated Mr. Cazneau as the United States Commissioner and Consul General to the Dominican Republic during this address. It was then that Haiti became concerned with this appointment. Haiti feared that Cazneau was deliberating on negotiations that echoed his tenure of 1859-1860 when he attempted to secure Samana Bay as a naval station. Consul Peck assured Haiti that Seward had expressed an ideology that the United States would not secure any naval base by force and that Mr. Cazneau's political viewpoints had changed and he no longer believed that "territorial enlargement is essential to the development of any of our institutions."\textsuperscript{247} Clearly, the differing messages presented to Peck by Seward and from Peck to the Foreign Minister of Affairs in Haiti revealed hidden agendas.
On February 28, 1866, American Commercial Agent Paul T. Jones wrote to Seward that a “strong undercurrent” was “setting against the government” of President Baez. By March 7, Jones wrote that French and British consuls in Santo Domingo considered the Baez government unstable.248

On April 9, 1866, Mrs. Cora Montgomery Cazneau wrote another letter, which she apparently delivered in person, to Seward. She explained that President Baez was “soundly American” and that the difficulty in times past to successful negotiations had been in the appointment of American commissioners who were intemperate. She also iterated the fact that every vessel that landed in Santo Domingo contained multitudes of Americans in search of riches through mining. “Our people,” she wrote, “will open up a second California here within two years, and those who make fortunes here may thank Mr. Seward’s visit and President Johnson’s message about the Dominican republic for it, for they opened the hearts and souls of the Dominicans.”249

On April 16, 1866, Seward wrote to Cazneau and informed him that the Senate had not officially recognized Cazneau as the Consul General or as the Commissioner. Apparently, Mr. Hatch had informed sufficient members of the Congress of Cazneau’s past and of his dubious character. The delay for appointment had been intentional, and Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, who had received the letter from Mr. Hatch by way of Seward, was spearheading the campaign against Cazneau.250

On April 26, 1866, President Baez, reacting to an insurrection in Cibao province thought to have been organized by Cabral, wrote to then acting Minister of the Interior Pedro Antonio Pimentel, “As a servant of my country I came to fulfill the wishes of the great majority. If, however, a respectable minority wish me to withdraw from power, I am
disposed to satisfy them, being convinced that in this manner also I will serve my country by preventing bloodshed." Unknown to Baez at the time, Pimentel was in fact a cohort of Cabral. When he arrived in Cibao, he immediately informed the province that President Baez was ready to leave the country. In what can only be described as strange circumstances, Pimentel was arrested for his comments about Baez, but he escaped only to take refuge in Santo Domingo City. Having been arrested by Baez' people, pursued by them when he escaped, Pimentel was then protected by Baez' government, "carrying out its determination of avoiding bloodshed." Moreover, Pimentel became acting President while Baez remained in the capital city. Meanwhile, Cabral entered Santo Domingo City, deposed Pimentel, and arrested several generals. The brother of former President Baez was even arrested and jailed for two years "subject to an infernal treatment of exquisite torture." Legally, however, Baez was still officially the President.

On May 28, 1866, the Dominican Republic, still under the persuasion of Baez, granted a concession to Mr. William L. Cazneau for "the introduction of immigrants into the provinces of Santo Domingo and Azua, and the establishment of colonies along the frontier of the republic." Later that night and well into the next morning, insurgents surrounded the capital and forced Baez to leave office. Cabral charged Baez with using the country for his own benefit. Baez sought protection in the home of the French consul to Santo Domingo, and he remained there until given permission to go into exile.

The month of June 1866 would prove to be an echo of a former time in which the Tripartite Alliance exerted its control. On June 10, Cazneau wrote to Seward praising Baez who "earnestly labored to bring the vast natural wealth of this soil into the sphere of American enterprise." It must be remembered that Cazneau was not acting on any official
behalf, but simply as an American investor in whom Baez confided. Both were interested in mineral deposits and land speculation, and apparently American Commercial Agent Jones could not get along with Baez.  

Six days later, Lord Clarendon wrote to French Consul to Washington Sir Frederick Bruce and intimated that Haiti and the Dominican Republic could peacefully coexist if the United States and Great Britain worked together. The Haitian Minister in London concurred, and Bruce was instructed to speak to Seward about the matter. Lord Clarendon also hinted at interest by the French Consul in Santo Domingo to be included in the process. But Seward, after council by then President Ulysses S. Grant, decided that the Dominican Republic was still unstable in its provisional government. If the United States deduced that reorganization by the Republic was advantageous, then the President would happily consider a tripartite influence if circumstances arose.  

Apparently influenced by Cazneau’s remarks that Cabral favored the protection of American enterprise on the island, the United States appointed J. Somers Smith as the new Commercial Agent to Santo Domingo. Somers arrived in August and engaged in a conversation with Cabral concerning the state of his government and the economy of the Republic. Cabral responded that the Dominican Republic was “poor indeed” and asked if the United States could help with a loan. The next day, Somers sent the Minister of Finance, who interrogated Cabral about the specifics of the loan. Cabral asked for a million dollars, but when asked what indemnity the island could provide, Cabral answered that Samana Bay had coal mines. The Minister of Finance was not impressed, saying that better coal could be mined in the United States. He then asked if Samana Bay could be given over as a naval base, and Cabral thought it could be done. Critics of Cabral,
including M. M. Gautier, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and a sympathizer to Baez, would later claim that through misgovernment, Cabral intended to sell Samana Bay and divide the proceeds amongst himself and his cabinet and then leave the country after robbing the island of its revenues.\textsuperscript{260}

On September 27, 1866, Cabral's government issued a concession to Mr. Davis Hatch for "working the rock-salt mines in the commune of Neyba, and the construction of a railroad from the coast at Barahona to said salt mines."\textsuperscript{261} Mr. Hatch would name his company the Santo Domingo Mining and Commercial Company. Two years earlier, Peter F. Stout wrote a prospectus for the company entitled "Descriptions of the Rock Salt Mines in San Domingo, 1864."\textsuperscript{262}

On November 5, 1866, the Dominican government issued a grant to the Industrial Progress Company, also known as the joint-stock company of the Society for Industrial Progress, to "work a copper mine, Cobro, commune of San Cristobal." Cobro was actually a section known as "Cercado del Cobre" in the jurisdiction of San Cristoval.\textsuperscript{263} The Society for Industrial Progress was, in fact, a company controlled by Joseph Fabens with Cazneau as its representative and agent.\textsuperscript{264}

On November 8, 1866, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jose G. Garcia wrote to Seward and requested the advance of a loan for one million dollars and the shipment of heavy artillery to replace pieces destroyed during the Spanish occupation. The same day, J. Somers Smith wrote to Seward intimating that the Dominican Republic had spoken to him requesting a loan of one or two million dollars and the ability to purchase on credit 10,000 arms, 100 cannon, and "a few heavy guns." In exchange, the government would extend the use of Samana Bay coalmines and two small islands within the bay known as
Levantado and Carenero for whatever purposes both parties could agree. Smith concluded that the Levantado and Carenero Keys would make a good naval station and coaling station respectively; during the Spanish occupation, these keys had been used for that very purpose. Seward, with both letters in his possession, not surprisingly, became excited at the prospects concerning Samana Bay.

On December 3, 1866, then Secretary of War under both Lincoln and Johnson, Edwin M. Stanton wrote to the Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who a year earlier had commented that Seward seemed to be hiding something concerning his receipt of Cora Montgomery Cazneau’s letter of September 6, 1865. The letter instructed Welles to meet with Stanton and Seward, and upon his arrival, they questioned his ability to negotiate the purchase or lease Samana Bay. Welles responded by saying that the United States had always leased coaling stations from the Dominican Republic, “but this was done prudently, carefully, and at little cost.” Stanton then read what Welles considered to be an “indefinite” law that gave him powers to purchase or lease Samana Bay. Welles disagreed with Stanton and told Seward that outright purchase or lease should go before the Senate for agreement. Seward “doubted” the possibility and “Stanton objected to going to the Senate first. The result was, the subject was postponed until Cabinet-meeting tomorrow.”

The next day, Welles, despite the overriding approval of most of the Cabinet after Seward and Stanton “pressed it strongly,” raised objections. He raised four points: Samana Bay was a haven for tropical diseases; the bay was thirty miles deep and would require an enormous amount of time to embark in the case of an emergency; there were
too few inhabitants and no discernible markets; and the Treasury of the United States could ill afford the purchase or even the lease at that time.\textsuperscript{268}

On December 5, with Presidential and Cabinet approval, Seward wrote to J. Somers Smith and intimated that a negotiation for the lease of Samana Bay should continue in a "confidential manner." Seward, in what can only be considered an act of intense determination, then approached the Republican leader Thaddeus Stevens with a request to support legislation or an appropriation for the lease. Seward and Stevens had become bitter rivals after Stevens labelled him President Johnson's "chief clown," but Seward had been re-elected by the American people and was now determined to acquire Samana Bay. When Seward entered the House of Representatives and sat with Stevens and spoke on friendly terms, the session apparently was shocked. News of Seward's invitation to Stevens to visit him at his house made headlines in the New York \textit{Tribune}. Within a day or two, Stevens was back in the House requesting an extra appropriation for "special services."\textsuperscript{269}

On December 13, 1866, Stevens formally proposed the "deficiency bill," requesting the sum of $250,000 for the "contingent expenses of foreign intercourse." Pennsylvania Representative Glenni W. Scofield moved to strike the bill, and Stevens rose and stated that, despite the personal animosity he felt for Seward, he could not negate the necessity of this money. He then hinted that the amount was probably insufficient, but he felt that Congress should at least begin the process. British Minister to the United States Sir Frederick Bruce wrote to the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs Lord Stanley that Congress had just passed a bill requesting $250,000 for "some secret purpose of general interest." Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, in an interview with Seward, thought the
price of two million dollars was extreme, but Seward told him that "we ought to be liberal and not take advantage of a poor, weak neighbor who was in need."\textsuperscript{270}

On December 17, Seward wrote to his son, Frederick W. Seward, the Assistant Secretary of State, with instructions to sail to the Dominican Republic and negotiate for the procurement of Samana Bay in exchange for money and arms. For assistance, Seward would send Vice-Admiral David D. Porter who, in 1846, had been commissioned by then President Polk as an executive agent to the Dominican Republic. Porter agreed with Welles' reluctance and feared that Samana Bay was unsuitable for a naval base because the entrance was difficult and could be easily blockaded. After an interview with Seward, "he changed his mind."\textsuperscript{271} In a letter dated February 7, 1867, Porter also remarked to Seward that the Dominicans "showed the tendency of the African race to run to seed when left to provide for themselves," but with the "good example set them by the 'white folks,' for whom they have the highest respect, they could be made a more serviceable population." As Seward prepared Porter's comments for Congress, the Vice-Admiral asked him to exclude these comments because they "might be quoted to my prejudice by some of those in the Senate who may have darkey on the brain!"\textsuperscript{272}
ENTANGLING ALLIANCES

On March 27, 1866, former Secretary of State Jeremiah S. Black, representing the claim of Abraham B. Patterson and Prudence de Murguiendo and their right to mine guano from the island of Alta Vela, presented to the State Department "a statement of the material facts" concerning his clients' claim. On April 2, Black personally explained the case to Secretary of State Seward and asked for proper restitution. In turn, Seward asked Black for a delay of "any forcible interference on account of our conditions with reference to the Southern insurrection." The next day, Judge Jeremiah Black wrote to Seward exclaiming, "This morning the President proclaims that we have peace in all our borders. Let me hope that this will be accompanied with justice and right to our citizens." Seward apparently ignored the letter.²⁷³

On October 17, Black again wrote to Seward and reminded him that Patterson and Murguiendo had been removed from Alta Vela by a government "who had no more right to it than the Emperor of China or the King of Dahomey." Black, however, was assured that Seward "will do what is proper to give them the justice which up to this time they have not received." Again Seward did not respond. Judge Black and other members of the law firm Black, Lamon and Company, including Ward H. Lamon and Chauncey F.
Black, son of Jeremiah S. Black, wrote continually to the State Department for over a year with no results.\textsuperscript{274}

It was during this time, on January 19, 1867, that Frederic W. Seward, who was the Assistant Secretary of State and the son of William Seward, landed at Santo Domingo City with Vice-Admiral Porter to conduct negotiations for the cession of Samana Bay to the United States. At the same time, Secretary of State Seward urged the Danish Government "to accept the proposals of the American Government to the purchase of the Danish West Indies." By February 8, 1867, Frederic Seward returned to the United States with a treaty of amity, commerce, navigation, and extradition. In due course, Jeremiah Black asked Frederic Seward about the Alta Vela affair. Frederic Seward told Jeremiah Black that "he had sent or requested Com. Porter to stop at Alta Vela, and report to him whether or not there was guano on the Island; that he did report, stating that there was no guano on the Island."\textsuperscript{275}

The day that Frederic Seward returned, he and his father visited Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and reported their failure at acquiring Samana Bay. The same day, American Commercial Agent to Santo Domingo J. Somers Smith wrote to Secretary Seward and informed him that because of the Dominican Government's "deficiency of funds to carry on the government," Cabral was ready and willing to "accede to the offers of the United States." Smith urged Seward to open the negotiations, once again.\textsuperscript{276}

On February 23, British Vice-Consul to Puerto Plata Theodore Farrington wrote to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Stanley advising him that Dominican President Cabral was in dire straits and needed money to run his government. Farrington stated that he had been approached by members of the Dominican Congress who intimated
that President Cabral would give Britain Samana Bay and land surrounding the bay for fifty years at thirty thousand pounds "under specific conditions." Lord Stanley responded that the British Government thought that openly purchasing Samana Bay, just as the United States was attempting to do, was undesirable. However, if Farrington wanted to establish a "mercantile scheme," then the British Government would support it.²⁷⁷

Three days later, Frederic Seward responded to Agent Smith's suggestions. He authorized Smith to reopen negotiations with Cabral. If the Dominican Government saw cession of Samana Bay as a violation of their constitution, then Seward suggested that the Government amend their constitution. If this was impracticable, then Smith should secure a ninety-nine year lease. Above all else, however, Smith should secure the right of the American Government to hoist their flag and build any fortifications deemed necessary by the United States. If the Dominican Government wished to cede the Bay, then Smith was authorized to offer no more than two million dollars, half in cash and half in munitions. If a lease were indicated then Smith was to offer no more than one million dollars "payable in like manner."²⁷⁸

On March 7, 1867, Elwood Cooper wrote to Pennsylvania Senator Thaddeus Stevens stressing "the importance of Samana Bay as a naval station." He also included a clipping from the Opinion Nationale, a Paris newspaper, indicating the uneasiness in France over the negotiations between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Paris considered the negotiations "ambitious schemes" which "menace the legitimate and secular rights of Europe as well as the interests of those nationalities which have already been formed."²⁷⁹

On March 19, 1867, the Santo Domingo Congress authorized a concession to
Senor Felix Montecatini of Baltimore for a "mining circuit" in Cuayo, San Cristobal.\textsuperscript{280}

The next day, the United States Senate agreed to the treaty of amity, commerce, navigation, and extradition between the United States and the Dominican Government.\textsuperscript{281}

On March 22, the British Admiralty declared that they were no longer interested in acquiring Samana Bay as a naval station. A week later, on March 29, the British Colonial Office ruled that they would "on no account be party to an enterprise of this kind."\textsuperscript{282} The next day, the treaty for the purchase of Alaska was in the United States Senate. By the end of the month, Secretary Seward was "urging the Danish Government to accept the proposals of the American Government relative to the purchase of the Virgin Islands."

Seward, indeed, appeared to be, according to Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles, "almost a monomaniac on the subject of territorial acquisition."\textsuperscript{283}

On April 8, 1867, Agent Smith wrote to Secretary Seward declaring that Dominican President Cabral was "postponing the question" of Samana Bay in fear that "it might make a pretext for a revolutionary movement." The next day, the Senate ratified the treaty for the purchase of Alaska. On May 8, 1867, Secretary Seward wrote back to Agent Smith stating that if "the Dominican government shall not have decided to accept the proposal of the United States in one of the forms in which it is expressed, you will desist from further prosecution of the business, and will give notice to the President that the proposals of the United States are no longer in force."\textsuperscript{284}

Secretary Seward apparently became quite frustrated with the delays in negotiations. He approached George Bancroft, who was on his way to Berlin as United States Minister to Prussia, and "instructed him to approach the Spanish Government with reference to the cession of the islands of Culebra and Culebrita" off the coast of Puerto
Rico. On May 29, Seward wrote Bancroft instructing him to hand all official instructions to American Minister to Spain John P. Hale at Madrid, and to "render him such advice, assistance and co-operation, unofficially, as you may be able to give." Seward recommended that his instructions and the actions of Bancroft and Hale be kept confidential. He also warned that all proceedings were tentative to "parallel negotiations" occurring concerning Santo Domingo and the Danish West Indies, and they could be stopped. Seward also suggested to Bancroft and Hale that negotiations in the Caribbean were a way for the United States to solve inequities in American presence within "that quarter." On May 31, the Dominican Congress held a secret session to discuss the granting of a naval base to the United States. In the course of their discussion, the Congress refused to amend their constitution to allow the sale of "national territory." Cession or lease were the only options left available to the United States.

On June 7, 1867, P. H. Sullivan, a financial backer for Patterson and Murguiendo, wrote to Black, Lamon and Company with some interesting news. Sullivan, after talking with G. E. White, the agent of Thomas A. R. Webster and Company of New York, discovered that Secretary of State Seward had written to them declaring that "the title to the island of Alta Vela is entirely in the Dominican Government, and that no other government or party have any lawful claim in it." Therefore, Thomas A. R. Webster and Company of New York could enter into a concession agreement with the Dominican Republic and begin mining operations on Alta Vela as soon as the Dominican Cabinet approved such a measure. Apparently mining had already begun on Alta Vela by Webster and Company because Mr. Sullivan stated that the "New York firm seems very secure in their position, as I learn they are now trying to charter a vessel to take a cargo to England.
by way of experiment.\footnote{288}

Black, Lamon and Company decided that it was time to have an interview with Secretary of State Seward. "Colonel" Lamon made an appointment to meet Seward on June 14. Upon arriving, Lamon did not see the Secretary of State, who was busily having E. Peshine Smith, Examiner of Claims for the State Department, develop a report concerning the jurisdiction of Alta Vela. Mr. Smith, a Republican, was a former employee of Thurlow Weed as the editor of the Albany \textit{Evening Journal}. Mr. Weed, an "intimate friend and political henchman" of Secretary of State Seward, also had a large financial interest in Thomas A. R. Webster and Company.\footnote{289}

Three days later, Mr. Lamon received a memorandum from E. Peshine Smith in which he agreed with Halleck's \textit{International Law} concerning islands lying near the coast of mainland countries. These islands were to be regarded as dependencies of the mainland, "unless some one else has acquired title to them by virtue of discovery, colonization, purchase, conquest, or some recognized mode of territorial acquisition. The ownership and occupation of the mainland included the adjacent islands, even though no positive acts of ownership may have been exercised over them." In Smith's opinion, even though he admitted that he did not know how far Alta Vela was from the mainland of Santo Domingo, "its occupation by strangers would menace the security of both."\footnote{290} Secretary Seward wrote to Agent Smith in Santo Domingo declaring that the United States was "incapable of entertaining an ungenerous thought or design against the Republic." The delay by the Dominican Government had caused the United States to look elsewhere, namely the Danish West Indies.\footnote{291}

On July 12, 1867, the Santo Domingo Congress granted two mining concessions in
the commune of San Cristobal to Mr. William L. Cazneau. The concessions granted permission to extract materials from a copper mine in Mano Matuey, Cambita, and a copper mine at "Loma de la Boca de Diamante." On July 15, American Minister to Spain John P. Hale wrote to Secretary Seward that, considering the mood of the Spanish government, he and Minister George Bancroft thought it best not to discuss the matter of cession of the islands off Puerto Rico. Minister Bancroft had written Seward three days earlier with the same sentiments.

On July 19, Judge Black met with President Andrew Johnson and presented a lengthy memorial on behalf of Patterson and Murguiendo. According to Black, President Johnson stated that this case was "entirely new" to him, that he had "manifestly never heard of the matter before." Three days later, Judge Black sent a letter to President Andrew Johnson requesting that the President "send a vessel to Alta Vela, and put Messrs. Patterson and Murguiendo into possession."

Two days later, on July 24, P. H. Sullivan wrote to Chauncey Black and stated that Thomas A. R. Webster and Company now had in their possession the letter, dated eighteen months earlier, from Secretary of State Seward. Mr. Seward claimed, according to the letter, "that the title to Alta Vela rests entirely in the Dominican government." Moreover, Mr. Seward advised them on "how to proceed in their business so as not to impair the force of their contract with the Dominicans." The new firm, Root, Webster, Clark and Company, began negotiations with the Spanish government. About the same time, Judge Black received an unsigned memorandum from the State Department stating that the President had accepted "the conclusions of a report made by the Bureau of Claims on the subject of the island in question." The memorandum was dated July 18. Within a
few days, Black had been informed by President Johnson that the memorandum "never could have been officially before" him "in such a way as to make any impression" upon his mind.\textsuperscript{295}

On July 31, President Johnson formally ratified a treaty of amity, commerce, navigation and extradition with the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{296} Three days later, the Santo Domingo Congress granted another concession to Senor Felix Montecatini of Baltimore "for building a railroad from the banks of the Ozama River to Cuayo-Medina, in San Cristoval."\textsuperscript{297}

Unknown to most Americans at the time, great private enterprises were underway in Santo Domingo. Cazneau now had mining concessions in the San Cristoval province, and Senor Montecatini would supply the railroad from these mines down to the harbor at Cuayo-Medina. But there would be more acquisitions by the industrious Cazneau and Fabens in the near future.

On August 7, 1867, Jeremiah Black wrote to President Andrew Johnson concerning the unsigned memorandum. Black argued, "Even the vague and indefinite statement of the memorandum that you accepted some conclusion of some report concerning the island of Alta Vela, is not true in point of fact." Though Black brought "no charges of wilful falsehood against anybody," he had two points of disagreement with the President. First, two facts contradicted themselves. President Johnson could not have "accepted the conclusion" of a report on July 18, when the day after, the President told Judge Black that he had never heard of Alta Vela or the case concerning the island. Secondly, the President informed him that the memorandum was never before him. Black came to one conclusion: "It is morally impossible that you, with the facts of the case
before you, could have done otherwise than order the restitution of the island to its
owners. You are wholly incapable of sanctioning, directly or indirectly, a naked robbery
like this.\footnote{298}

The next day, Secretary Seward wrote to Minister Bancroft telling him that it was
not a good time for the United States to pursue the Culebra and Culebrita Islands. Two
days later, Seward wrote to Minister Hale with the same message.\footnote{299} On August 12,
1867, Abraham Patterson wrote to Jeremiah Black stating that a “respectable party” in
Baltimore had approached him. This group offered to "send down an armed force to
repossess the island of Alta Vela if a 'fair interest in the Guano' on the island could be
offered in exchange for this assistance."\footnote{300} Negotiations for Samana Bay and its two keys
were in limbo; specific sectors of private enterprise were now willing to risk war for
possession of valuable islands; and President Johnson, under the manipulative eye of
Secretary Seward, was being officially questioned for the first time.

Seward then called upon E. Peshine Smith to make a supplemental report
concerning the specific claims of Patterson and Murguindo. The report, dated September
19, 1867, contended that any islands adjacent to the mainland were within the boundaries
of that country. While Smith was aware of the three-mile limit generally accepted as
international law, he questioned its reality in view of the recent purchase of Alaska, which
contained the Aleutian Islands, extending fifteen hundred miles into the ocean with more
than three miles distance between the individuals islets. Furthermore, if Cazneau were to
be believed, then Haitian fishermen who occupied Beata, the island between Alta Vela and
the mainland, did nothing to prevent Kimball’s mining of guano from Alta Vela. This
suggested that Haiti, not the Dominican Republic, had jurisdiction over Beata. "This kind
of occupation," Smith contended, "was enough, for an island of that character, to take it out of the category of land without any proprietor and open to the first occupant."301

To knowledgeable people of this time, the case was over. Remembering that the United States intervened in the Aves incident and Secretary of State John Clayton received over $100,000 in damages, and remembering how the "do-nothing" administration of James Buchanan had sent American warships to Navassa Island to protect the mining rights of Edward K. Cooper, critics contended that E. Peshine Smith was wrong and that Secretary of State Seward "could adopt a very firm policy towards the Dominican Government and demand either that the rights of Patterson and Murguendo be respected or that a large indemnity be paid for the damages they had sustained." If the Dominican Republic could or would not pay the indemnity, then Secretary of State Seward could seize Samana Bay. "Protracted and futile negotiations" for the purchase or lease of the Bay would end, and Seward could recommend to Congress the necessary "appropriation to satisfy the claim of Patterson and Murguendo."302

On October 2, 1867, Joseph W. Fabens wrote to Secretary Seward stating that he had just returned to New York from a visit to the Dominican Republic. If the United States were still interested in securing Samana Bay, then Fabens saw "no serious obstacle in the way." Fabens, however, felt that a better naval station could be had at the Bay of Monte Cristo, "the gateway through which, under the protecting folds of the Stars and Stripes, a stream of emigration would set into this beautiful valley of the Yague, making of Santo Domingo the garden of America." Prior to writing this letter, Fabens and William L. Cazneau had decided "that the outstanding need in the Dominican Republic was a better system of transportation." In order to meet this need, Fabens and Cazneau
imported some thirty camels and set them to work in the Monte Christo area. For a while Fabens was most enthusiastic over the prospect of better transportation facilities through the employment of camels. 

Fabens was already famous for his unsuccessful attempt to use the animals in the Western states during the Civil War. On October 8, Agent J. Somers Smith wrote to Frederic Seward intimating that negotiations for the lease of Samana Bay could be reopened. Smith did warn, however, that "avaricious politicians" might attempt to steal the money unless specific restrictions in payment were made.

On October 12, 1867, P. H. Sullivan wrote to Black, Lamon and Company informing them that he had "reports here that the New York parties are now removing from Alta Vela 2,000 tons of guano per month." Sullivan also stated that "Mr. Seward has been the guest of Thurlow Weed, and the former gentleman has left for his residence at Auburn." On October 24, the Santo Domingo Congress granted a mining "concession to Senores Cambiaso & Co., for the working of a copper mine at a place called Cuayo, Medina, Upper Haina, San Cristobal." The same day, the United States and Denmark signed a treaty for the purchase of the Virgin Islands. On October 28, Frederic Seward wrote to J. Somers Smith to inform him that there would be no further negotiations on the purchase of Samana Bay.

Four days later, on October 29 and 30, a hurricane swept through the Caribbean, killing over five hundred citizens of St. Thomas Island, destroying the sugar and coffee crops in Puerto Rico, and destroying millions of dollars in property in Santo Domingo. Almost immediately following these, massive earthquakes causing enormous tidal waves added to the destruction.

On November 8, Agent J. Somers Smith wrote to Secretary Seward detailing a
visit from Dominican President Cabral's nephew, Ramon Fiallo. Fiallo was also the former Secretary of the Treasury, and he was particularly interested in the lease of Samana Bay. Fiallo asked Smith if the United States would protect Santo Domingo from an invasion from Haiti. Smith stated that he could not promise anything.\textsuperscript{310} On November 20, Agent Smith again wrote to Secretary Seward declaring that the majority of the citizens in Cibao and the Southern and Eastern provinces, as well as "such important personages as Generals Luperon and Pimentel had signified their approval of the lease." Smith added that Ramon Fiallo suggested that the lease run twenty-five years with the United States having "control and jurisdiction of the entire Peninsula, keys, waters and public property, the use of the mines, and everything as contained in the proposal made by Hon. F. W. Seward in January last." Fiallo also fixed the price at two million dollars payable over time with an additional $100,000 that would not be mentioned in the terms of the convention but would be used for "special purposes."\textsuperscript{311}

Other evidence of Seward's ulterior motives concerning Alta Vela surfaced compliments of Prudence de Murguiendo in a letter to Chauncey Black dated December 6, 1867. Murguiendo reminded Black that Frederic Seward had assured his father that Vice-Admiral Porter had surveyed Alta Vela and found no guano on the island. "We found, on investigation," Murguiendo contended, "that he, Com. Porter, only passed within six miles of the Island." Murguiendo also reminded Chauncey Black that Secretary of State Seward had promised the island to Black's father the previous summer. When asked for the island Seward presumably exclaimed, "It's the Island you want is it? I thought you wanted damages. The Island is yours and you shall have it." Murguiendo then wrote Washington Congressman John F. Coyle, a friend of Black, Lamon and Company, and asked for his
assistance. Coyle spoke with President Johnson, who assured him that immediate action would be taken on the matter.\textsuperscript{312}

On December 8, 1867, the British Consul to Santo Domingo David Leon wrote British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Stanley expressing his fear that the "serious financial depression in the Dominican Republic might lead President Cabral to sell or lease to the United States some portion of Dominican territory." Aside from "the exhausted state of the public Treasury," there were "disturbances caused by Mr. Baez's party." Already, "several secret meetings of Members of Congress" were discussing the "eventual transfer of Samana Bay to the American Government."\textsuperscript{313}

On December 16, Agent J. Somers Smith wrote to Secretary Seward detailing his concern "relative to the expediency of sending a Dominican commissioner to the United States to negotiate for the lease of Samana." The next day, Smith wrote to Seward introducing Don Pablo Pujol as "the agent of the Dominican Government entrusted with the mission of arranging terms with the American Government."\textsuperscript{314} Three years earlier, Seward ignored Pujol's entreaties for recognition of General Jose Salcedo's Provisional Government.

The following day, December 18, William Cazneau wrote to Secretary Seward stating that

The way has never before been so completely open for the accomplishment of your wishes. It now rests with you and the President alone to conclude a treaty as beneficial to this republic as it will be popular with our people and honorable to the enlightened statesmanship that creates this new landmark in American history.\textsuperscript{315}

The next day, British consul David Leon wrote to Lord Stanley declaring that President Cabral, angered at the Congressional opposition to the sale or lease of Samana Bay,
"dissolved the Dominican Legislature and assumed dictatorial powers. He was now in favor of some concessions to the American Government with reference to Samana Bay and had dispatched Pablo Pujol to Washington to initiate negotiations looking towards some settlement of this question."316

Amidst this flurry of activity, it became inevitable that communications would cross along the five-day route of mail steamships. Three days before Agent Smith wrote Secretary Seward introducing Don Pablo Pujol, Secretary Seward wrote a letter, dated December 13, to Agent Smith purporting that the Dominican Republic, having signed a treaty with Haiti, refused to negotiate on Samana Bay. President Cabral declared that under no terms would the Dominican government "transfer the Peninsula of Samana to the United States." Under these circumstances, Seward felt that entertaining Ramon Fiallo's suggestions without being "first furnished with authentic evidence of powers of negotiation conferred upon him by the Government of the Dominican Republic" would be "incompatible with the self-respect of this Government." If, indeed, Fiallo were legitimate, the United States, according to Seward, could not entertain negotiations for leases in terms of years. "The United States could not consent to be a tenant to any foreign power," he said, and the United States could not consent to any lease agreement when it would be inconvenient to relinquish the Bay at a later date.317

On December 26, 1867, Chauncey Black wrote to President Johnson informing him that "a new company has been formed in New York on the basis of the pretended lease to Webster and Company, for the purpose of plundering that Island of its guano. In one day alone they chartered ten vessels to go there and carry away the property which as clearly belong to our clients." Black added that "Cabral (who was President several days
ago), and other officials of that country are largely interested in the stock of the new company." Black also told Johnson that his company had heard "that a Commissioner is on his way from St. Domingo to treat with us for the transfer of Samana Bay." Three days later, Judge Black, his son Chauncey, and John F. Coyle visited the President. Coyle assured the President of the difficulty in holding back Patterson and Murguindo from asking for restitution from Congress, but Johnson assured Coyle that he had asked Secretary Seward for all papers produced by his Department concerning the matter. Mr. Coyle feared that Seward would not relinquish all the necessary documents requested by President Johnson and therefore asked the President if Black, Lamon and Company could inspect the documents when they arrived. The President promised that they could. That same day, Mr. Coyle wrote to P. H. Sullivan and Prudence Murguindo that he feared that all concerned claimants would be "sold out to purchase Samana."318

On January 3, 1868, the New York Tribune's special correspondent in Havanna reported that General Pablo Pujol was expected to visit the United States, and "endeavor to close the Bay of Samana negotiation upon the basis of $300,000 annual rent for the term of 99 years."319 On January 6, Secretary Seward wrote to General Nathaniel P. Banks, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, introducing General Pablo Pujol as the plenipotentiary of the Dominican Republic. Seward believed that "there was a pressing need of a conference between him [Banks] and the Dominican representative."320

On January 8, 1868, Dominican "plenipotentiary" General Pablo Pujol wrote to Secretary of State Seward that he was in Washington to discuss the lease of Samana Bay and its peninsula. The Dominican Government agreed to ten points, which included
"perfect and exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction" for twenty-five years over the peninsula and the Bay of Samana and keys and ports of the bay, with one exception, and the exclusive right to log and mine these areas. The total cost was one million down and seven and a half million over the next twenty-four years. The down payment in gold was to be shipped on a boat to Santo Domingo City. The treaty also requested arms and a guarantee from the United States to protect them from their enemies.\textsuperscript{321}

Two days later, January 10, the Washington \textit{Daily National Intelligencer}, in discussing the claims of Patterson and Murguiente, published an article which questioned the "principle of national honor" in "buying and selling with the Government of St. Domingo until it has restored that island to our jurisdiction"?\textsuperscript{322} The same day, Secretary Seward wrote Pablo Pujol accepting the description of the property under consideration for lease. However, Seward had problems with everything else. He argued that the United States needed either a one-time cession lease "with unqualified and unrestricted sovereignty and property, both of domain and dominion, over the land and waters to be ceded for the term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years" with the understanding that the Dominican Government had the "privilege of free access through the Bay of Samana to the ports and keys which lie on the southern shore of the Bay, and within a mile from that shore." The payment conditions were patently "inadmissible," as well as the sending of a vessel with a million dollars in gold coin. Finally, the United States could not enter into an agreement for the protection of the Dominican Government against its enemies, because it had never entered into a treaty of alliance with anyone since the birth of the United States.\textsuperscript{323}

The next day, January 11, Seward "made an official report to President Johnson."
Seward thought it "inexpedient" to conclude a lease agreement with the Dominican Republic "without consulting the Senate of the United States thereupon." While Seward thought that the combined acquisitions of St. Thomas and St. John Islands along with the Bay of Samana would be, "in a political view," advantageous to the United States, the Senate might not agree. If Seward had to make a choice, he would choose the St. Thomas and St. John treaty because it offered "advantages to the United States superior to those which Samana offers upon the terms proposed by the Dominican Republic." The same day, the New York Tribune wrote, "the feeling in Congress and outside seems to be almost in favor of rejecting the St. Thomas treaty, and substituting Samana. The Dominican Commissioner is said to have made a favorable impression here in regard to the value of Samana to the United States.

On January 13, the United States Senate, where certain Republicans had received claims from Patterson and Murguiendo, adopted a formal resolution requesting the President to furnish all documents pertaining to the Alta Vela affair. Five days later, plenipotentiary Pujol wrote to Secretary Seward that the Dominican Government was more than willing to adopt the following amendments to the Samana Bay lease agreement:

1. The lease would be fixed at ninety-nine years instead of the twenty to fifty years.
2. In lieu of a million-dollar downpayment, with annual payments thereafter, the Dominican Government would receive two million dollars in gold.
3. In lieu of outright protection from Dominican enemies, the Dominican Government, if attacked, would delegate its full powers of government subordinate to the United States Supreme Court by "submitting to its arbitrament, as long as they had a voice in the arbitrament."
4. The United States, "engaging in such cases," would provide "effective and impartial co-operation, that in these manner arrangements may be made in conformity with law and equity."
A week later, Seward replied that he agreed to reducing the lease from nine hundred and ninety-nine years to ninety-nine years, and to the payment of two million dollars—one million dollars in gold down and one million dollars in munitions, "both payable and deliverable in the United States." Submitting disputes to the United States Supreme Court was unconstitutional, Seward added, because the Court had only the power to review laws, not arbitrate trade negotiations.\textsuperscript{328}

On January 22, 1868, Messrs. F. Shumacher and Louis P. Angenard of Baltimore purchased from Mr. Felix Montecatini among other things the franchise of making and using a railway from the landing on the river Ozama near San Carlos, crossing the Haina and terminating at Cuayo Medina, in conformity to the concession granted to him by the preceding administration, August 3d, 1867, but the surveys for which had for unavoidable cause not been made, and said franchise therefore forfeited.\textsuperscript{329}

On January 25, 1868, plenipotentiary Pujol wrote to Secretary Seward requesting a compromise payment of $1.5 million in gold and half a million in "armaments, munitions, clothing for troops, one or two vessels, printing presses, etc." Pujol also requested, once the American Senate approved the treaty, that $200,000 be paid "without waiting for the ratification by the constitutional authorities of Santo Domingo."\textsuperscript{330} Before the end of the month, a revolution erupted against Cabral. On February 4, 1868, Pujol wrote to Seward stating that he was willing to agree to the terms that he had offered in his letter dated January 20.\textsuperscript{331} Three days later, Agent Smith wrote Secretary Seward reporting that after waiting weeks for favorable news from Washington with reference to the lease of Samana Bay, the supporters of the existing administration abandoned all hope of resisting the advance of the revolutionary armies." A provisional government was established amidst
rumors that Buenaventura Baez would be asked to return as President.\textsuperscript{332}

On February 12, the President presented to Congress the State Department file supposedly containing all documents pertinent to the Alta Vela guano claim. Immediately after this, Colonel J. W. Shaffer, another associate of Black, Lamon and Company discovered that Seward had not included some "important and pertinent documents." These included the first letter by William Cazneau which described the damages incurred by the Alta Vela miners upon their arrest, a certain despatch from the American consul to Puerto Rico, a private report to Seward by Patterson, and a piece of correspondence that revealed Thurlow Weed as having a financial interest in Root, Webster and Clark. On February 20, P. H. Sullivan wrote to Chauncey Black and expressed his fears that all concerned were "up a spout certain."\textsuperscript{333}

On February 24, 1868, amidst growing suspicion of executive motives, the House of Representatives agreed to a resolution calling for the impeachment trial of the President of the United States Andrew Johnson. The House advised President Johnson to seek competent counsel; and, despite Seward's opposition, the President desired Judge Jeremiah S. Black as his counsel.

On March 6, 1868, Black, Lamon and Company wrote to President Johnson complaining that their clients were ever-increasingly being robbed "of their property by the company which holds possession of the island under the auspices of Mr. Seward." With the letter, the firm enclosed a "memorial from Patterson and Murgiendo; a formal memorandum setting forth the former practice of the Department of State with reference to guano islands, and a draft of a proposed order placing the island of Alta Vela once more in possession of the Baltimore claimants."\textsuperscript{334}
The same day, plenipotentiary Pujol wrote Seward for the last time reporting that Cabral was forced to relinquish the presidential office and requesting Seward to "cause the suspension by the Senate of the recognition of the Treaty which the undersigned had the honor of adjusting with Seward." Within two days, President Johnson appointed Jeremiah Black as his personal counsel. The same day, March 8, Baez wrote Agent Smith from Curacao convinced that it was imperative to continue with the "most intimate relations with the United States, as it is very evident that in the course of a few years, this Island, with Cuba and Puerto Rico, are destined to become a part of the great Republic." As soon as he was back in the President's seat, Baez would be "prepared to lease Samana, should the United States still be disposed to treat on that subject."

During all of this, Chauncey Black became impatient for President Johnson to do something. Under the association of C. H. Winder and J. W. Shaffer, Black began to entertain the thoughts of certain influential Republican Congressmen. On March 9, Shaffer visited General Benjamin F. Butler and secured a letter that stated,

I am clearly of the opinion that under the claim of the United States, its citizens have the exclusive right to take guano from Alto Vela. I have never been able to understand why the Executive did not long since assert the rights of the government, and sustain the rightful claim of its citizens to the possession of the island in the most forcible manner consistent with the dignity and honor of the nation.

Shaffer then went to Representative General John A. Logan, who wrote, "I concur in the opinion above expressed by General Butler." Representative General James A. Garfield signed under Logan's note, "And I, J. A. Garfield." The same day, the Maryland House of Delegates had passed a unanimous resolution upholding the rights of Patterson and Murguindo.
Shaffer brought the letter to the office of Black, Lamon and Company. He showed it to Chauncey Black, who then wrote another letter to the President, enclosing the Butler letter to show that "these gentlemen have long understood this case and appreciated the scandalous attitude in which Mr. Seward's management has placed the Government." Black added, "I do not expect the views of these gentlemen to materially affect your judgment. I merely submit them to show that men of all classes and all parties are scandalized by the shameful wrongs which the Government as well as our clients have been made to suffer in the history of this affair." Chauncey Black then wrote to P. H. Sullivan and expressed his hopes that the President would soon make a decision concerning the claims. Black wrote to Sullivan again the next day stating, "President is studying Alta Vela. I put in radical endorsements last night."338

Two days later, on March 12, Chauncey Black wrote the President, again warning him that he was growing impatient. In another two days, Chauncey's father visited the President in one more attempt to satisfy his clients. At the same time, Chauncey Black had secured additional signatures to the Butler letter from Thaddeus Stevens, John A. Bingham, James G. Blaine, J. K. Moorehead, and W. K. Koontz. With these signatures, Black had four of the seven directors of Johnson's impeachment trial on the side of Patterson and Murguendo, and they were pressing President Johnson to satisfy the claim. Black had also secured a letter signed by the Maryland Congress favoring the Alta Vela clients.

On March 14, Jeremiah Black wrote another letter to President Johnson. He plainly stated that if Johnson would not act, "It literally compels me to decline acting as your counsel, not because I am unwilling to continue but because I cannot." Black then
added, "I am compelled to take the misfortune of your adverse action or inaction coupled with superadded calamity of retiring from the impeachment case."  

On March 18, 1868, Agent J. Somers Smith wrote Secretary Seward requesting "full powers" to conclude a treaty with the Dominican Government who believed it imperative to negotiate with the United States for a lease of Samana Bay. The Maryland Senate passed a unanimous resolution requesting President Johnson to give "immediate and efficient protection" to the Alta Vela claimants, and to formally request Santo Domingo to compensate for their losses. Jeremiah Black, after discovering that the President had not responded to his request for a naval vessel to Alta Vela and reclaim possession of the island for his clients, wrote to President Johnson and resigned his position as private counsel during the impeachment trial. On March 22, the President received a letter from his friend, Simeon Johnson, who was also a close friend of Jeremiah Black. Simeon Johnson warned the President of "Mr. Seward's craftiness" and "dishonest behaviour."

Newspapers on the eastern coast began to pick up the debate. On March 24, 1868, the Baltimore Sun claimed that the breach between Jeremiah Black and the President was due to Johnson's refusal to send a naval ship "to proceed to and take possession of the Island of Alta Vela." Black retorted in the New York Tribune that he did not retire from Johnson's counsel because of complications with the defense, but because Secretary of State Seward "interfered and prevented" settlement of the Alta Vela affair. On March 26, the New York Herald plainly stated that "politicians in Santo Domingo," after determining the purity of the guano from the sample tested by the Dominican Government, ejected Patterson and Murgiendo and "secured a recognition of
their claim to the island from Mr. Seward." The journal added "that the company installed under this privilege were Mr. Thurlow Weed and company," and apparently it was "a big job, or Thurlow Weed would not be in it." Three days later, March 29, Buenaventura Baez landed at Santo Domingo City.

During the first week of April, amidst rumors that Secretary of State Seward had made a handsome and personal profit from the purchase of Alaska, Jeremiah Black decided to write a letter to Representative James A. Garfield and provide further explanation of the Alta Vela situation. The letter was picked up and printed in two newspapers, the Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, a journal notoriously unfriendly towards Jeremiah Black, and the Philadelphia Daily News. In the letter, after a rendition of the history of the Alta Vela affair, Black stated,

Mr. Seward asserts that the sufferers in this case are not entitled either to restitution of the property, or to the damages for the losses inflicted upon them ... He is either ignorant that law and common interests required the Dominicans to give warning of their title, or else he acts in total disregard of the obvious principle. On the one supposition he is mentally, and on the other he is morally, unfit for his place.

The Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser commented that although they did not personally like Jeremiah Black, "his testimony of Mr. Seward's tricky character is but a repetition of what has after been recorded by those brought into personal or political contact with him."

On April 8, Agent Smith wrote to Secretary Seward informing him that after declaring to Baez that the United States was unwilling to merely lease Samana Bay, Baez saw no problem with the Dominican Government amending their Constitution to allow the sale of Dominican territory. To Agent Smith, Baez appeared to have "a more friendly
attitude than any preceding administration." Since March 29, President Baez had met with William Cazneau and Joseph Fabens several times, and they decided that Fabens needed to go to the United States. On April 2, Baez wrote to Joseph Fabens asking him to assure his friends and countrymen, "who may desire to come to this Republic upon any enterprise whether agricultural, telegraphic, or other pursuits which may tend to develop the spirit of industry, which has so much fallen off, that I will receive them with all kindness, and will protect them with all my power." On April 18, Cazneau wrote to Secretary Seward advising him that Joseph Fabens was to arrive in Washington to "inform the American Government of the anxious desire of Baez to co-operate to the fullest extent with the United States." Cazneau said that he was so impressed with the new leader that he had personally recommended that Baez "assume dictatorial powers and proceed at once to the regeneration of the Dominican Republic." Cazneau intimated that the island possessed a "great gold bearing territory which the introduction of American skill and capital is sure to develop speedily." A treaty with Baez would give the United States "a new and extended field of enterprise, and a very prolific source of national wealth."

The same day, Dominican Secretary of Foreign Relations Manuel M. Gautier prepared Joseph Fabens for his trip to Washington. Gautier was unable to determine the exact relationship between the United States and former President Cabral and Pujol so he instructed Fabens to "insinuate" himself with Seward and find out everything concerning former negotiations with Santo Domingo and to not do anything that the present government's enemies could use against him.

On April 24, 1868, Thomas A. R. Nelson, one of the counsels for the absent President Johnson, objected during the impeachment trial to references made concerning
the reason that Jeremiah Black had resigned as the President's counsel. He presented the Butler letter and accused the signers of "exerting pressure upon the President in behalf of these clients." Nelson added, "The island of Alta Vela, or the claim for damages, is said to amount in value to more than a million dollars, and it is quite likely than an extensive speculation is on foot." Nelson claimed that the letter put the President between "Scylla and Charybdis." If Johnson declared war on Santo Domingo, then the American public would think that it was under duress by radical Republican Representatives; if he did nothing, then his counsel, Mr. Black, would become exasperated and quit.347

Butler then rose and addressed Nelson's complaint. He told how he had been in the office of Black, Lamon and Company with the Attorney General, when Mr. Black discussed the Alta Vela claim. Black asked Butler his opinion on the matter, and Mr. Shaffer approached him for a legal opinion of the case. The next thing that he knew was that his opinion was published in the New York Herald as being the opinion of the President. Butler then delivered into evidence an affidavit from Chauncey Black, which rebuked the allegations of exerting undo pressure on the President of the United States. When heated debate over presentation of the letter into evidence ensued, Senator Charles Sumner made a motion accusing Mr. Nelson of using "disorderly words" and "provoking a duel."348

On April 27, 1868, the Baltimore Sun printed an editorial stating that it "would be difficult to find on record a more admirable example of lofty and uncompromising devotion to principle, and there is not a true man in all the land whose respect for the President will not be increased by [that devotion]." The next day, Jeremiah Black wrote to the President and stated that Seward's "White House reporter for the Baltimore Sun and
New York *World* is manifestly under his influence, and the publisher of the *Commercial Advertiser* is known to be his *alter ego*. Through them he makes certain statements by which he expects to operate indirectly on you." On April 29, 1868, the New York *Tribune* wrote

The history of politics the world over may be searched in vain for a parallel to this imbecility. Think of it! Territory wrested from our ownership—our flag torn down and trampled on by ragged-breached Spanish half-breeds—our citizens robbed of their property and flung into prison for pursuing a useful business under the authority and guarantees of an act of Congress.349

On April 30, 1868, the House of Representatives discussed the Alta Vela affair. New York Representative James Brooks adopted a resolution demanding that Butler, Stevens, Logan, and Bingham come before Congress and explain why they signed the letter. The House refused to adopt the resolution. The next day, Mr. Brooks failed to have a similar resolution passed. Brooks' reasoning included the idea that the "Butler letters were calculated to have upon his mind either the influence of intimidation or the influence of persuasion, or some other influence to be properly described by some stronger word than 'persuasion.'" Brooks added, "The claim is very large, of vast magnitude, amounting to more than a million dollars, as some say to two or three millions."350

Despite the House's veto of the Brooks resolution, several of the signers rose and defended their actions. Representative Logan countered that the only thing that they signed was a "mere opinion as to the right of this Government to protect its citizens in taking guano from the island of Alta Vela." Representative Garfield defended his actions by stating that hundreds of papers are signed every day by friends of other Representatives without being "a party to any scheme."351
On May 1, 1868, the Philadelphia Daily News stated, "The depth of turpitude exhibited in this attempt to make money by operating upon the fears of the President of the United States, and threatening him with expulsion from his office, it is difficult to conceive." Three days later, the New York Times suggested that the Butler letter "neither vindicated the purity of their motives nor the propriety of their conduct."

Regardless of whether or not the radical Republicans intimidated the President, they did influence another body, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Their investigation revealed the following persuasive points:

1. Patterson and Murguiendo were on the island for seven months. During this time, "St. Domingo never asserted a title to the island in question. When the miners were removed from the island, it was without notice or warning, as is customary in international affairs, but with 'sudden violence.'"

2. Prior to Patterson's and Murguiendo's claims, "there was no occupancy previous to that of the American claimants." No one was interested in the island until these miners discovered its rich resources.

3. Alta Vela is fifteen and a half miles from the nearest cape of Santo Domingo, well beyond the marine league or three-mile limit.

4. The incidents involving the Aves Islands and Navassa Island are "conclusive and authoritative precedents for this one."

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded that "the case is too clear to allow of the least hesitation. St. Domingo was guilty of an inexcusable outrage upon the rights of the memorialists and a gross insult to the United States." The House Committee on Foreign Affairs did not conclude that Secretary of State William Seward had secretly conspired with a private company, under the protection of a foreign government, to forcibly eject American citizens from their private enterprise, for either personal gain or the gain of personal acquaintances. Nor did the Committee conclude that President Andrew Johnson had allowed Seward to conduct these nefarious affairs, or, at the very
least, lied about any knowledge of Seward's activities.

On May 5, 1868, Joseph Fabens wrote Seward and announced his arrival in New York. With him was a letter from Buenaventura Baez dated April 2, which urged the need for emigration to Santo Domingo along with the industrial accouterments that go along with it. Echoing the prospectus of the America West India Company, Baez invited the United States on a campaign of economic imperialism. Not finished, Baez sent Felix Delmonte, the Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, to speak with American Commercial Agent J. Somers Smith. Delmonte informed Smith that Baez was willing to accept the proposal made by the Assistant Secretary Frederic Seward when he was in Santo Domingo City. Mr. Smith offered to send his own son to the United States with the request and, if ratified, he would return with one hundred thousand in gold on a steamer to the harbor of Santo Domingo. Mr. Smith's son missed the boat by one day and the deal collapsed.354

Smith wrote Seward with the message that Baez was still intent on selling Samana Bay for two million dollars, one million in gold and one million in like kind, specifically arms. Baez requested that a negotiation group be sent along with three warships to protect the stability of his government.355 The impeachment trial against President Johnson had just finished, and Seward confronted additional resistance in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the Danish agreement of the Virgin Islands. Seward had also spent most of the year securing acceptance of the Alaskan purchase. On July 8, Seward wrote Smith and encouraged him to cease any negotiations with Baez over Samana Bay at the time.

On July 3, 1868, apparently without Seward's knowledge, the Dominican
Congress, under the supervision of President Baez, granted a concession to Joseph Warren Fabens for the "geological and mineralogical exploration and survey of the different provinces and districts of the Dominican Republic." "Colonel" Fabens was the representative of one "General" William L. Cazneau, who apparently had been "promoted." Their enterprise was named the Santo Domingo Company, and among its sponsors were "such prominent financiers as William L. Halsey, Cyrus McCormick, Ben Holliday, John Young, and Samuel L. Barlow."336 The agreement was simple. Fabens would conduct a geological survey of the entire island under the auspices of a "chief geologist" of Fabens' choice. Fabens chose "Professor" William L. Gabb. For payment, Fabens would receive on behalf of his partner, Mr. Cazneau and the Santo Domingo Company, from President Baez and his government, one fifth of the island that was considered to be government lands. Mr. Fabens could therefore claim any land that was not already being mined or privately owned, but he also knew that Baez was a French sympathizer and therefore would probably follow the French rule of mining, which allowed mining underneath private property. Cazneau and M. M. Gautier, Minister of Foreign Relations, signed the agreement.357

Three years later, the Santo Domingo Commission of Inquiry discovered that on the same day that the geological survey was conceded, Gautier and Cazneau signed another secret agreement. The agreement stated that in any discussion over the jurisdiction of mining lands of which the Dominican Republic might be interested, the Government would defer to the primary interests and desires of Joseph W. Fabens.358 On this date, the Dominican Government granted the control of one fifth of their most valuable commodities on the island to J. W. Fabens, under the instruction and economic
backing of William Cazneau.

In the same month, Fabens was back in Washington. On July 25, 1868, Fabens wrote to then ailing Thaddeus Stevens and apologized for interrupting him. But, if Mr. Stevens were able, Mr. Fabens was more than willing to let him submit a report to his friends concerning the Samana concessions. Fabens, ever mindful of the plight of others and particularly attentive to the fact that the congressman was in ill health, enclosed a resolution in Mr. Stevens' name that would take care of the problem. It read:

WHEREAS, the West India Islands naturally gravitate towards the United States, and ought to be included, when practicable, in the commercial and political systems of this Republic, therefore,

Resolved, that the West India Islands, or such of them as may from time to time desire to be annexed to the United States, ought to be and will be received; provided always that no proceeding shall, in that case, be adopted which shall be inconsistent with a proper regard to national economy or shall involve war, or any breach of international law. 359

On August 8, 1868, the New York Herald published an editorial, which stated that "President Baez is signalizing his administration by a most liberal and progressive policy."

The article also contended that there was "no doubt that he has the warm support of every man of intelligence and enterprise in the country." Following this diatribe, the paper mentioned such rumors as gold being on the island, and a copper mine in the Haina, "which is said to be quite as promising as the celebrated copper district ... of Cuba." 360

Five days later, Representative Thaddeus Stevens sat for an interview with his son, Simon, that would be recorded in the New York Tribune from his deathbed. Mr. Stevens was quoted as saying of Mr. Seward, "His purchase of Alaska was the biggest thing in his life, and if he could have purchased Samana it would have been the crowning event of his whole career." 361 On August 11, 1868, radical Republican, abolitionist, and author of
Reconstruction, Thaddeus Stevens died.

The day before Stevens’ death, American Commercial Agent to Haiti Edward P. Hollister wrote to Secretary Seward. He informed him that Haitian President Sylvain Salnave offered the bay of Mole-Saint-Nicolas as a naval station in exchange for the repayment of a Haitian debt to France and a defensive alliance with his Government. Neither President Johnson nor Secretary Seward ever seriously entertained these conditions.\textsuperscript{362}

On August 14, Fabens wrote to Seward and explained the new geological concessions between him and the Dominican Republic. Five days later, Seward would remark to Fabens that is was “especially gratifying to see that citizens of the United States take so deep an interest in developing the resources of a sister Republic.” On September 5, Fabens thanked Seward for his interest and iterated the dominant resources of the island. Baez went so far as to congratulate President Andrew Johnson on his ability to triumph over an impeachment trial on August 18.\textsuperscript{363}

Then, something unusual happened. On August 31, Seward wrote to American Commercial Agent J. Somers Smith and intimated that negotiations with the Dominican Republic should cease because Seward did not think it prudent to pursue them at the time. Seward would comment on “complications so numerous and so grave” that negotiations with Santo Domingo would be gravely affected. He basically instructed Smith to discontinue the negotiations. Baez and Gautier, for all intents and purposes, panicked and sought any means to make money elsewhere. In desperation, they began to issue governmental concessions to enterprising entrepreneurs.

On October 7, 1868, the Dominican Government issued a concession to “R. M.
Funkhouser, formerly president of the Chamber of Commerce of St. Louis, United States’
to “Mr. John P. O’Sullivan, their attorney-in-fact,” to establish a series of mail packets
between the Dominican Republic and the ports of New York and New Orleans. The
steamers would not only carry the mail, but also “all kinds of merchandise and mineral
products between said ports.” Funkhouser, on behalf of O’Sullivan, would also establish a
mail packet with St. Thomas Island, according to the agreement, which did not specify
how the Dominican Government would control the commerce of another nation’s territory
(St. Thomas Island was still Danish). In lieu of the great expense propounded upon
private American interests, the Dominican Government also agreed to pay back fifteen
percent of all expenses incurred in the development. The Dominican Government also
granted to Funkhouser the permission to build “coal depots, wharves, and warehouses”
upon the port of Santo Domingo City. The Government also agreed to supply any
necessary medicines at no charge to combat the diseases of the island; and, the
Government also granted free citizenship to anyone who disembarked from the boats for
emigration. The concession would last for twenty-one years. 364

“Before the raising of the American flag,” Funkhouser sold the concession to a
company known formerly as Spofford & Tileston. The company’s special agent was none
other than Joseph Warren Fabens. Eugenio Garcia, alcalde of Samana, warned the
government that such a grant was not legal. In an interview by the Commission of Inquiry
three years later, Garcia confessed that the municipality had been deceived into believing
that they were leasing property to the United States, “that it was for the benefit of the
United States and to promote immigration.” Fabens and O’Sullivan now rented over a
half mile of beachfront property on Samana Bay. Joseph Fabens’ son, Franklin, would
reveal that his father would receive property in exchange for his services as special agent for Spofford & Tileston.  

Fifteen days later, on October 22, the Dominican correspondent to the New York Times reported that another “hope for Mr. Baez is the sale of Samana to the United States for $2,000,000. Col. Fabens, who is now in Washington, is said to be the agent of Baez for that purpose, and, in fact, it is asserted that the bargain is already closed between Fabens and Mr. Seward.” Two days later, President Baez would ask Smith to send his son to the United States again for another boat of gold.  

On November 17, 1868, Seward wrote to J. Somers Smith, before his son would arrive in the United States, that Baez’ request for annexation was, in his opinion, an act of war, because of the opposition party in the Dominican Republic, and thus the proposal should fall within the confines of Congress. Seward asserted that “it would be difficult to distinguish it from the attempt which was made during our recent civil war by Spain to re-annex the Dominican Republic to her own dominion by means of an illegal arrangement.”  

Baez was unmoved and he sent Eugene Smith to discuss the matter with Seward. After some preliminary study, Seward set the matter before President Johnson. On December 9, 1868, President Johnson spoke during his Fourth State of the Union Address. The President emphasized that “the time has arrived when even so direct a proceeding as a proposition for an annexation of the two Republics of the island of St. Domingo would not only received the consent of the people interested, but would also give satisfaction to all other foreign nations.” No record exists revealing what Smith discussed with Seward that caused such a radical pivot in thought.
Two days later, American Commercial Agent J. Somers Smith wrote to Seward informing him that Baez had conducted an informal survey of key political members in Santo Domingo and throughout the island and discovered that all were congenial to the idea of annexation. With this evidence in hand, Baez once again requested the presence of three American warships. On the 19th, Baez affirmed his desire for annexation and thought that his survey was enough to prevent the proposal from qualifying as an act of war. If satisfied with this, the United States could then send one warship containing three hundred thousand dollars and Samana Bay was theirs. The Dominican Republic would then apply for annexation, and if that failed, the bay was still up for sale along the terms presented by Frederick Seward during his visit to the island.

Apparently, things were moving too quickly in Santo Domingo. The United States knew that revolutionary forces were congregating against President Baez. On December 22, Minister of Foreign Relations Manuel Delmonte wrote to Smith and asked if things would be different if all the provinces hoisted the American Flag and proclaimed themselves loyal subjects to annexation with the United States. Delmonte intimated that even if Baez were deposed, the country still desired annexation regardless of who their leader would be. On January 2, Delmonte repeated this message to Smith and even considered annexation as the solution to several international incidents involving European powers. Annexation by the United States, according to Delmonte, would silence such opposition.\textsuperscript{369}

During this time, a copy of President Johnson's speech arrived in Santo Domingo City. On January 8, 1869, Baez wrote to the President stating that "the sentiments of a Nation were never so well interpreted as they were on that occasion by Your Excellency;
and that such are the sentiments of an immense majority of the inhabitants of our Country, which has been depleted too long by the oppression of anarchy.” Baez then chose an American citizen living in Santo Domingo, Louis P. Augenard, to speak with Seward personally on behalf of the Dominican President. 370

Meanwhile, Joseph Warren Fabens had a conversation with Foreign Minister M. M. Gautier, who requested that Fabens speak with Seward as well. During this time, however, Fabens had heard from General Benjamin F. Butler that the United States Government has disbursed about $100,000 as a partial payment for the purchases of St. Thomas Island and Samana Bay. Apparently, Fabens was concerned that negotiations were occurring elsewhere without his approval. Seward then informed Butler that the money was not from a Government account but rather a private one, and that the United States officially had no desire to purchase either St. Thomas or Samana Bay. Before this assurance was made known, Fabens had already rushed to Washington and talked to Butler.

Fabens would report to a cohort of his, C. K. Garrison, who had financial interests in the Samana Bay property, that Butler was very interested in the Dominican project. Butler even went so far as to ascertain his “share of the scheme.” Apparently, Fabens came up with a satisfactory percentage, because Butler then agreed to support a resolution in Congress that would supply protection to the Dominican Republic. Butler then spoke with Seward who promised to send an American warship to Santo Domingo to “assist these importunate imperialists.” 371

These “importunate imperialists” were none other than the Samana Bay Company, consisting of Fabens, Garrison, and other entrepreneurs, including the political assistance
of Mr. Butler and the backing of President Baez and his Foreign Minister of Finance M. M. Gautier. In order to present a resolution to Congress, proof of the Dominican Republic’s desire for protection was needed. Fabens immediately sent a letter to Seward and Butler from Gautier expressing such sentiments. On January 12, 1869, Nathaniel P. Banks, a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, presented a resolution that authorized President Johnson to extend protection not only to the Dominican Republic but Haiti as well. The United States was authorized in “assisting them to establish permanent republican institutions whenever those Governments, or either one of them, shall apply to the United States for its protection.” The resolution was contingent upon the President and the House of Representatives co-operating and using no money from the Treasury during this process. Banks was also quick to point out that protection would probably mean nothing more than sending a warship to Santo Domingo to warn possible revolutionaries that it would be better if they waited for the next election before disturbing the peace.372

Several representatives questioned the proposal. Banks remarked that such action was not an entangling alliance, but merely an attempt by the United States to guarantee the “maintenance of good government in the Island of San Domingo by the people of the island.” Even though there was no precedent for such an action, Banks assured the Committee that the United States was “in an age when new action is required, and this is one of those instances.” When questioned whether such a resolution meant the annexation of the Dominican Republic and Haiti as United States territory, Banks remarked that “the committee had no such idea.”373

Ohio Representative Columbus Delano was not convinced. Aside from the fact
that protecting Santo Domingo during possible future rebellions was, in effect, an act of war, Delano worried that maybe Haiti did not want to be protected by the United States. Delano thought it better to incorporate nations and then protect them, instead of going out “as a protector of other nations who are struggling among themselves for self-government,” a practice which would basically result in the “overthrow of our institutions and [bringing] ruin to our nation.” After more discussion, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs failed to pass the resolution by a considerable margin for consideration by Congress.374 For all intents and purposes, the annexation of the Dominican Republic was a dead issue.

On January 26, Baez had Augenard visit Seward again. The same day, Commercial Agent to Haiti Hollister wrote to Seward emphasizing that the political climate in Haiti did not favor annexation.375 Three days later, Seward spoke with Nathaniel Banks and informed him that Augenard was in Washington. This time, instead of requesting military or financial aid, Baez was willing to allow Congress to “waive all preliminary stipulations” and instead accept the Dominican Republic under the “discretion and friendship of the United States.” Basically, Baez insisted on the annexation of his country as soon as possible. Although Augenard’s request was official, Seward informed Banks that, for the time being, such information should be kept confidential.376

On January 30, Seward wrote to President Johnson and informed him that Haiti had expressed a desire to be annexed with the Dominican Republic to the United States. He also remarked that the “continual presence of visitors in the Republic and in the Republic of Hayti, who have pressed the public mind with arguments and persuasion for the extension of a protectorate as an expedient of annexation of each of those republics,
and also for their annexation itself, is universally stated by the public press without contradiction.\textsuperscript{377}

Banks had originally balked at the idea of annexation and knew that it would be political suicide to reverse his decision from the last resolution. On February 1, 1869, Indiana Representative Godlove S. Orth introduced to Congress a resolution allowing the Dominican Republic to be “admitted to the Union as a territory of the United States, to be called the Territory of San Domingo.” The Republic would institute a “republican form of territorial government” that would be incorporated into the Constitution of the United States. Orth also stated that the resolution had the backing of the majority of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The resolution was defeated by a margin of two to one.

The same day, “Mr. Edward H. Hartmont, in virtue of his contract with the republic,” would establish a “railway from Santiago to Monte Cristo, or the railway to some point near the Yuna River” or “to some point on the bay of Manzanilla.”\textsuperscript{378} It was not certain how the Dominican Republic could issue a concession for a railroad in Haitian territory.

Three days later, February 4, Joseph Medill, editor of the Chicago\textit{ Tribune}, expansionist, and long-time friend of Nathaniel Banks, wrote Banks and urged him to “go ahead with the negotiation. It is a magnificent Island, and in our hands would be worth untold millions to commerce.” The next day, Seward wrote to Banks and informed him that he had letters from members of the Dominican Government that he desired to show him or any other member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Apparently, one of the obstacles to winning the vote on annexation was the assumption of the Dominican debt, the amount that no one really knew. Seward had assured the Committee that the
debt probably did not exceed a half million dollars. He now had letters to prove it. The same day, Colonel Fabens wrote to Banks, assuring him that the Dominican debt was no larger than a half million dollars. Fabens also enclosed photographs of Dominican sites of interest along with a letter from Baez, and he reminded Banks that he was still waiting for a copy of the United States Constitution so that Baez could look at it.379

Three questions remained unanswered during the final days of President Johnson's administration. There was first the matter of a $100,000 payment to somebody in Santo Domingo from someone closely associated with the Government of the United States. Fabens was fearful that he and his Santo Domingo Company were being railroaded by other private interests which had the advantageous backing of the United States Government. Clearly, there were conflicting interests in the annexation of the Dominican Republic. The second question concerned the desire to annex Haiti when all negotiations to this point were solely with the Dominican Government. Seward, after receiving disappointing news from Commercial Agent Hollister, went so far as to lie to President Johnson, stating that Haiti was more than willing to be annexed with the Dominican Republic. The third question involved how much Seward had financially invested in private interests. Where, all of a sudden, was Mr. Thurlow Weed?

On March 3, 1869, the people of the United States once again requested the services of General Ulysses S. Grant, this time, as Commander-in-Chief of a unified nation. On May 18, 1869, encouraged by the report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Jeremiah Black wrote the incoming Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and requested that the new President decide on the case that his former predecessor chose to ignore. That same day, Fish presented "all the documents and pertinent correspondence"
concerning the Alta Vela affair before the President. After "due consideration," President Ulysses S. Grant concluded that there existed "no sufficient reason" to reconsider "the conclusions heretofore reached." For all intents and purposes, the Alta Vela affair ended. All suspicions aside, one fact would be revealed within two years when Grant sent the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo. Sometime between October 7, 1868, and May 8, 1869, the government of Santo Domingo granted permission to one Senor Pedro Antonio Delgado "to take guano from Alta Vela." Also, during this time, this permission was "annulled by a resolution of the government, with the consent of the senate." On May 8, 1869, the Dominican government granted a concession "to Mr. Edward H. Hartmont for taking guano from Alta Vela, in connection with the contract for a loan." That same month, "Professor" William L. Gabb and seven assistants began their geological survey of the Dominican Republic for Cazneau and Fabens. In four months, they finished surveying the province of Santo Domingo. On May 1, 1869, Edward Hartmont, returning as General-Consul of the Dominican Republic to England, arrived in London with a contract loaning roughly two million dollars to President Bacz. Peter Lawson and Company, whose American agent was none other than Spofford & Tileston, would handle the loan. On the 4th of July, the Dominican Republic issued a charter to "Messrs. Edward Prime and Edward P. Hollister" for "the establishment of a national bank." Among the financial backers of this enterprise were William Cazneau, Joseph Fabens, and Spofford & Tileston. Mr. Fabens was also an associate of Edward Hartmont.

On July 8, 1869, William L. Cazneau received, on behalf of the Santo Domingo Company, a concession for a mining grant "situated on the Upper Haina, commune of San
Cristobal, province of Santo Domingo, called ‘Buenaventura.’” The mining circuit incorporated “140 superficial square kilometers,” and the company was guaranteed the right to “work the same, have the benefit of and freely dispose of its products as it shall see fit.” By August, Cazneau petitioned the Dominican Government for one-fifth of the public land in the province of Conception de la Vaga, incorporating 323 square kilometers between the rivers Camu and Timenoa, following the completion of a geological survey in that province.
OBSESSION, PANIC, AND A DANGEROUS LEGACY

Looking back to the earlier Santo Domingo era, in 1908, California Senator Cornelius Cole wrote in his Memoirs that President Ulysses S. Grant first became interested in the Dominican Republic upon a visit by “Judge” Peter J. O’Sullivan, the ex-Minister to Bogota. Next to William Cazneau, O’Sullivan had become quite famous in Santo Domingo. On January 15, 1870, the New York Tribune described him as opportunistic, arguing that where a canal or railroad were discussed, O’Sullivan was “sure to control some land or place necessary to be secured before the projects can be carried out.” The Tribune also described him as the “chief if not the only banker of Santo Domingo.”

Also in 1870, a movement was afoot promoting the idea of an isthmian canal, and in defense of Mr. O’Sullivan, Senator Cole realized the opportunities for his state if such a canal were built. Debate continued as to whether Cole introduced O’Sullivan or President Buenaventura Baez sent him to President Grant, but Cole was known to be a staunch supporter of annexation. Tansill argued that annexation was now linked to the isthmian debate, and other notables in Grant’s Cabinet were definitely supporters of the idea. Admiral Daniel Ammen, an “intimate friend of President Grant,” was an avid supporter of
the isthmian canal and the procurement of naval bases throughout the Caribbean. In
Ammen’s mind, Santo Domingo, or more specifically Samana Bay, would prove to be a
strategic naval outpost to protect such a canal.\textsuperscript{388}

While several historians have focused their attention upon the “buoyant
personality” of General Orville E. Babcock, military secretary to President Grant, it was
probably the advice of his best friend, Admiral Ammen, that persuaded Grant towards
annexation. Grant’s son, Jesse R. Grant, stated that Ammen and Grant discussed
Dominican acquisition “night after night.”\textsuperscript{389} In Babcock’s defense, Jesse R. Grant,
described him as “a member of the family” who had served under Grant in the Civil War;
but, his association with Fabens and Cazneau, and his anxious desire to promote “a project
that promised alluring financial rewards,” may have been dangerous politics.\textsuperscript{390} President
Grant may have embraced the idea that he could make some money off Dominican
annexation, just, as apparently, Seward had.

Grant was aware of the Santo Domingo project before he became President. As
General of the Union Army, Grant was for a time, in 1867, Secretary of War \textit{ad interim}.
He “frequently attended Cabinet meetings and so possessed first-hand knowledge of the
Johnson Administration’s major activities” and Seward’s arguments for annexation.\textsuperscript{391}
Arguably, “when his personal relations with Johnson rapidly deteriorated,” Grant may not
have known what was going on in Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{392} Yet, on January 6, 1869, Joseph
Fabens wrote to C. K. Garrison informing him that General Benjamin F. Butler would visit
Grant and seek “his friendly cooperation for a protectorate resolution.” The previous
year, Butler had accepted a certain percentage of the profits from Fabens in the Santo
Domingo Company in exchange for his help in promoting Dominican annexation to Congress.  

According to the New York journal *The Independent*, Samuel G. Howe stated that President Grant received “an envoy to solicit his attention” to Dominican annexation. “The envoy,” according to Howe, “made little impression upon the President. After some time another came and succeeded in awakening his interest.” The first envoy was none other than “Judge” Peter J. O’Sullivan, a “smooth, fluent individual” exerting “great influence with President Baez,” and the second envoy was General Butler, on behalf of Fabens and Cazneau. O’Sullivan, a financier from New York, did not impress President Grant as much as a fellow General who had lost a leg in the protection of the Union’s victorious Army.

President Grant also surrounded himself with other notables who supported annexation. Admiral David D. Porter, who as a young lieutenant in 1846, had surveyed Santo Domingo for President Polk, was still around and proved quite influential in his desire for a naval base in Samana Bay, having been heavily influenced by former Secretary of State William Seward. Nathaniel P. Banks, a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and a friend of Seward’s, was now a staunch supporter of annexation. Secretary of War John A. Rawlins was also excited with the possibilities. Congressman and General John A. Logan, who signed a letter on behalf of Patterson and Murguiendo and the Alta Vela affair, was among Grant’s close friends and a known supporter of annexation.  

What occurred was a conglomeration of interests from differing political views—including both friends of Seward and friends of Grant. Logan, an annexation proponent,
would perhaps disagree with the apparent commercial interests of Butler over why the United States should be interested in Santo Domingo. Indeed, Tansill contended that America’s need for a naval base to protect an isthmian canal was as important as the private manipulation of Cazneau and Fabens and their cohorts. While he was quick to portray Cazneau and Fabens as ardent promoters “of many unsavory schemes to attract American capital to the Dominican Republic,” Tansill erroneously submitted that it was mainly because of these two gentlemen that the United States failed in its attempt to annex Santo Domingo.  

Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, Chairman of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs and one of the remaining radical Republicans, had increasingly become incensed with Seward and anything that smacked of his influence. His disagreements with Seward during the negotiations for the first attempt at annexation were common knowledge. Almost immediately, he hated the manipulations of Joseph Fabens and anything that smelled of capitalists’ notions. While Mr. Sumner was not perfect, his attitude toward the frenzy over the Dominican acquisition concerned him greatly. In February of 1869, one month before President Grant would take office; Secretary of State William H. Seward would call Senator Sumner “a damned fool.”

Private businesses and their machinations could not be ignored, however, amidst a flurry of patriotism. Tansill argued that Grant was not one of those individuals who “conquered adversity and founded empires.” He also argued that imperialism was a “creative effort,” and an individual who supported such a scheme was labeled as a “genius.” Tansill, however, did not believe that Grant fulfilled the bill as a politician, despite his heroism in the Civil War.
On March 11, 1869, President Grant invited Hamilton Fish to be his Secretary of State. Mr. Fish was wealthy, and President Grant, “with that deference to wealth and social distinction that is so characteristic of many persons of humble background,” requested the aid of Mr. Fish. With a “heavy heart” and “little taste and less fitness,” Mr. Fish agreed to the position. Mr. Fish, former governor of New York and friend to Senator Charles Sumner, apparently believed that he could be a moderate mediator between Grant’s developing obsession with all things Dominican and Sumner’s growing distaste for such an obsession.

A dichotomy occurred. No one would deny that President Ulysses S. Grant was a great General during the Civil War. He had accepted the resignation of Robert E. Lee and thus ended what this country would consider its most dangerous moment. Grant was a hero in the eyes of the American public. In one hundred and thirty years, Grant would be portrayed as one of most incompetent leaders of what would be considered the greatest nation in the world at the time. What happened?

The belief that wealthy Americans saw a strong leader and a hero of the Civil War as a possible figurehead to promote their private interests was real. Grant, if he changed his mind, might have been considered incompetent if he disagreed. Evidence, thus far, indicated that several people influenced President Grant, but the evidence also indicated that President Grant was not considered a good President because he did not recognize what was important, namely private interests. An ideology appeared that equated American strength with the apparent strength of private companies. President Grant did not seem to recognize that fact. This would become quickly evident.
Another problem developed that would change the face of the annexation debate. On February 15, 1869, in response to Nathaniel Banks' request for information concerning the national debt of the Dominican Republic, Secretary Seward wrote to American Commercial Agent J. Somers Smith informing him that Banks had chosen Joseph Fabens to return to Santo Domingo and gather the necessary data. On March 9, Somers wrote back to Seward and indicated that President Baez was "very much displeased at Mr. Fabens representing himself as an accredited Agent of this Republic." Ten days later, Dominican Minister of Justice Felix Delmonte sent the new Secretary of State Fish a report on the conditions of the Dominican Republic. Somers sent his own report. Fabens also prepared a report and returned to New York long enough to telegraph Banks that everything was in order and "fully arranged."\(^{403}\)

On April 1, Fabens submitted his report to Secretary Fish, which contained the usual glowing recommendation that the country was ripe for annexation. On April 5, Fabens visited Secretary Fish and showed him a release from the Dominican Government with a desire for annexation. Fish responded that he was "not inclined to entertain this scheme favorably." Two days later, Edward Prime, Jr., one of the negotiators of the Santo Domingo National Bank, wrote to Fish claiming the Dominican population to be in favor of annexation. He was also quick to point out that the island's "commercial advantages are beyond comparison."\(^{404}\)

On April 9, British Minister to Santo Domingo City David Leon wrote to British Secretary of State Lord Stanley informing him that annexation procedures between the United States and the Dominican Republic had been initiated. On April 21, Fabens wrote to Fish and expressed a desire for the United States to lease a portion of Samana Bay,
which he thought could be had for $100,000. The next day, Fabens wrote to William Cazneau and informed him that he had visited with Secretary Fish, who seemed "much interested" and claimed he would co-operate with other such notables as Congressmen Logan and Banks, Secretary Rawlins, and even President Grant to push the proposal through Congress. The Assistant Secretary of State J. C. Bancroft Davis wrote a letter to John Bigelow, owner of the New York Evening Post, complaining that his office was "beset by a parcel of speculators, among whom is Fabens." On April 30, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Clarendon wrote to British Minister to the United States Sir Edward Thornton requesting any information on annexation procedures between the Dominican Republic and the United States.

On May 1, 1869, Edward Hartmont, formerly known as Edmond Hertzberg of Luxembourg, contracted a loan on behalf of Spofford & Tileston to President Baez. The initial payment of roughly $250,000 was to be paid upon signing the contract. Hartmont was allowed to deduct $500,000 from the original loan of two million dollars for commission. Fabens would receive $5,000 for his services as American agent for Hartmont.

Baez's desperation for money became all too apparent with this loan. His issuance of more paper money on top of the money issued by former President Cabral worsened the economic situation in the Dominican Republic. The terms of the loan were ridiculous by any banking standards of the day. Hartmont agreed to pay Baez the remaining $1.3 million by the end of the year. Each year, Hartmont would deduct an annuity of $295,000, so theoretically in four years; Hartmont would have all the money. The loan was contracted, however, for twenty-five years with an interest rate of six percent. Hartmont
did not pay the remainder of the loan by the end of the year. The Dominican Government would later claim that they only received $190,000 and in twenty-five years would owe Spofford & Tileston over $6 million. Even more ridiculous was how the loan was to be repaid by the Dominican Government. All proceeds from Santo Domingo’s customs houses, all import and export duties of Santo Domingo and Puerto Plata, and the right to hold a first mortgage on coal mining and forestry around Samana Bay were turned over as a guarantee of repayment. Hartmont would also receive exclusive rights to the mining of Alta Vela guano deposits, which were estimated to yield three million tons a year.408

On May 17, British Minister Thornton wrote to Lord Clarendon stating that he had spoken to Secretary Fish about the possibility of annexation. Fish had assured Thornton that the United States “had no intention whatever of yielding to these intercessions” and he doubted that President Grant was interested at all in Samana Bay.409 On May 18, Commercial Agent Smith wrote to President Baez. Smith was concerned that, in one moment, Baez was seeking annexation to the United States and, in another moment, was contracting a loan with a British firm. Baez assured Smith that the loan was only a temporary measure to guarantee that his Administration could continue until the United States saved his country “from impending disaster.” Smith reported his findings to Secretary Fish.410

On May 22, Fabens, on behalf of Spofford & Tileston, invited Nathaniel Banks and other members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to take a trip to the Dominican Republic in one of its steamships, the Tybee. For reasons unknown, the groups refused the trip. The ever-obstinate Fabens would hold the steamer for several days in case they changed their minds.411
On June 2, Secretary Fish decided it was time to send a special agent to the Dominican Republic and investigate the resources, debt, and public sentiment of the people. Fish chose Benjamin P. Hunt, but poor health prevented his going. Fabens heard of this and immediately jumped on the Tybee and went to see Baez. Two days later, Fabens would be proposing a toast to Baez at a Government-sponsored breakfast for visiting dignitaries.\(^{412}\)

On June 17, D. R. Keim arrived in Santo Domingo. Keim was a reporter for the New York Herald, owned by James Gordon Bennett, a supporter of annexation. Bennett instructed Keim to go and interview Baez and to return with letters of support that would be published in his paper to arouse public support for the project. Keim also returned with a letter from Baez to President Grant, expressing the desire for annexation.\(^{413}\)

On June 21, Commercial Agent Smith visited Baez and Delmonte, explaining the delay in annexation proceedings. Smith claimed that such agents as Fabens and Augenard were making a mess of the project. Baez "immediately declared that neither Augenard nor Fabens had been authorized to carry on negotiations leading to annexation." Baez proposed that from that moment on, all matters concerning annexation should be confidential. He also requested two warships and $200,000 for the immediate possession of Samana Bay while the process of annexation was laid before the United States. The next day, M. M. Gautier, on behalf of Baez, urged Fabens to return to the United States and push for annexation.\(^{414}\)

Sometime during the month of June, General Gregorio Luperon, a revolutionary intent on deposing Baez as President, sailed on the ship Telegrafo apparently in an attempt to harass mail ships along the Dominican coast. Baez ordered two schooners to capture
the Telegrafo, but in the exchange of gunfire, the Tybee, belonging to Spofford & Tileston, was slightly damaged. 415

On July 1, Fabens wrote a letter to Charles Sumner explaining that immediate annexation of the Dominican Republic would prevent enormous bloodshed, inspire “confidence in the law-abiding and industrious portion of the community,” and prevent the Dominican Government from “lapsing into anarchy.” Eight days later, Fabens wrote to Secretary Fish requesting that he send an agent to Santo Domingo to present “a true and accurate report of the present situation of that island.”416 The same day, Dominican Secretary of Foreign Relations Gautier wrote to Secretary Fish complaining of activities by General Gregorio Luperon and requesting a munitions steamer in order to capture and destroy the Telegrafo. The next day, July 10, President Grant ordered Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson to instruct Commander E. K. Owen to hunt and capture the Telegrafo and bring the ship to Baltimore.417 However, Luperon sold the ship and fled.418

Four days later, Secretary Fish instructed General Orville E. Babcock to go to the Dominican Republic and seek information on whether the country’s population were disposed favorably towards the people of the United States, and whether the Government was stable or unstable, military or civil. Babcock was also to determine the strength of the country’s revenue, the interest of other nations in the island, and a general report of the condition and resources of the Dominican Republic. President Grant would send a letter recommending Babcock to Baez. Commander Owen was also instructed to remain along the Dominican coast and support Babcock with his warship.419

On July 17, 1869, the Tybee left New York for Santo Domingo with General Babcock. Along for the ride were Joseph Fabens, California Senator Cornelius Cole, and
“Judge” Peter O’Sullivan. Upon landing, they would meet William Cazneau, who Baez thought would be beneficial as an interpreter for Babcock. Shortly Baez, Fabens, and Cazneau would meet with Babcock. Minister Gautier would also be included in the negotiations. Although Babcock informed Baez that he had no power to make a treaty of annexation, he could negotiate an informal outline that Grant and Fish could formalize.\textsuperscript{420}

The intermingling of private, government, commercial, and military interests in Santo Domingo was now complete. President Grant, ever mindful of American military security and deeply interested in an isthmian canal in the Caribbean, was also concerned with the security of investments made by influential and powerful American businessmen. The most powerful of these investments were from Spofford and Tileston, the National Bank, and the steamship line.\textsuperscript{421} Baez and Gautier, also concerned with security, worried that Luperon or Cabral might attempt to depose the present Administration or aid Haiti in another revolution. An isthmian canal and the need for a naval base would enhance property values in Santo Domingo, and that interested Fabens, Cazneau, O’Sullivan, and Cole.

On August 29, Secretary of Navy Robeson ordered another warship to leave Key West and head for Santo Domingo in an attempt to capture the Telegrafo. Senator Charles Sumner heard of this and became infuriated.\textsuperscript{422} On September 2, the Dominican Government extended the concession to Edward Prime, Jr. and Edward P. Hollister for the National Bank of Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{423} The same day, Commercial Agent Smith wrote to Secretary Fish “condemning the speculation and intrigues of Cazneau and Fabens. He similarly expressed his fear that the United States was being involved in the republic’s revolutionary politics.”\textsuperscript{424}
On September 4, 1869, Babcock and Gautier signed an informal agreement containing six “bases.” First, the agreement provided for a treaty of annexation; if the Dominican Republic wished annexation, then the United States would be obligated to pay $1.5 million to liquidate its debt. The first point also stipulated that President Grant would keep the idea of annexation confidential until he was assured of a majority in Congress. Second, if the Senate was hostile to annexation, Samana Bay could be purchased for $2 million. Third, President Grant would authorize the payment of $100,000 in gold and $50,000 in munitions to “defray the unavoidable expenses of the State.” Fourth, while the negotiations for annexation were ongoing, the United States would guarantee “the safety of the country and of the government against every foreign aggression or machination.” The fifth and sixth bases were legal definitions.325

The same day, Gautier wrote to Fish praising Babcock. Two days before, however, Commercial Agent Smith had written Fish expressing doubts concerning Babcock’s refusal to work with him and instead surrounding himself with Fabens and Cazneau.426

On September 9, the Dominican Government issued a concession to “Mr. Federick H. Fischer, of the city and State of New York, for building a railroad from the city of Santiago de los Caballeros to the banks of the Yuna River, or to any point on the peninsula of Samana.”427 This railroad, as well as the other proposed line, was to be built and connect the various mining districts that Fabens and Cazneau hoped to yield.

On September 16, the American Minister at Port-au-Prince E. D. Bassett wrote to Secretary Fish informing him that Haitian President Salnave requested Washington to send
an envoy to discuss a treaty of alliance and the possibility of a loan of several million dollars. In return, the United States could purchase or lease Mole-Saint-Nicolas.\footnote{428}

On October 16, 1869, Secretary Fish drafted two treaties with the Dominican Republic. The first one provided for the annexation of the island and the payment of $1.5 million to liquidate the Government’s debt. A proviso demanded that no concessions of land and industry should be granted, nor should the Dominican Republic incur further debt while negotiations were underway. The American Government would also provide $100,000 in gold coin and $50,000 in arms to relieve immediate needs. The second treaty provided a ninety-nine year lease of Samana Bay as security for the $150,000. It also provided that, at any time, should the United States desire to purchase Samana Bay, it could do so for $2 million in gold.\footnote{429}

Four days later, General Babcock informed Secretary Fish that he and President Grant thought it best to replace American Commercial Agent J. Somers Smith because of his aspersions toward Fabens and Cazneau. Apparently, Baez and other Dominican officials had complained to Babcock that Smith “had been very obnoxious” to them. The President chose Major Raymond H. Perry as his replacement. On November 2, Haitian President Salnave sent General Alexander Tate to Washington to negotiate a loan and the cession of Mole-Saint-Nicolas. The next day, Perry left for the Dominican Republic on the Tybee. Among the ship’s passengers was Joseph Fabens who quickly informed Perry on how he should conduct the negotiations for annexation; and, if successful, he could amass a “rapid fortune.”\footnote{430}

On November 16, Perry arrived in Santo Domingo. Upon his exit, Smith informed Perry that William Cazneau had originated the annexation proposal and was “running the
whole thing.” After he left, Cazneau and Baez visited the new American Commercial Agent. Cazneau told Perry that if he were cooperative, then he would receive a “fine plantation and opportunities to handle money for men in New York City.” Several times, Perry told Cazneau that he was not interested in money but in developing a reputation as a good Commercial Agent.431

On November 18, Grant sent Babcock back to Santo Domingo with the two treaties, which he would negotiate and Perry would sign on behalf of the United States. That morning, Commercial Agent Perry was having breakfast with Joseph Fabens who informed him that Babcock was to arrive shortly. The following morning and for the next several days, Babcock, along with Generals Delos B. Sackett and Rufus Ingalls as interpreters, went go to the house of President Baez where he negotiated with him, Gautier, Delmonte, Cazneau, and Fabens. It would later be learned that Babcock had informed Perry that he supported Cazneau and Fabens because of their “large interests on the Island.” Cazneau would inform Perry that Babcock and Ingalls had interests in real estate in the Dominican Republic as well, and that he and Fabens originated the idea of annexation. On November 29, 1869, the British Minister at Washington informed Lord Clarendon about Babcock’s arrival in Santo Domingo. The same day, Perry and Gautier signed a treaty for the lease of Samana Bay.432

The events of December 1869 proved to be enormously important. During the month, former Dominican President Cabral led a revolution against the Haitian President Sylvain Salnave, who he turned over to Nissage Saget. Saget would assume the role of Haitian President and Salnave was shot by a firing squad following a “trial.”433 Salnave had been an ally of Baez who, realizing “his enemies’ position markedly strengthened”
appealed to President Grant. By February, seven American warships were sailing in Dominican and Haitian waters.” Sometime during the month, Secretary Fish had convinced British Minister Edward Thornton that the United States was negotiating to acquire Samana Bay as an American naval station, but not to annex the Dominican Republic.

During the course of negotiations between Babcock and Baez, Baez offered to give him a piece of property in gratitude of his capturing the Telegrafa and for getting rid of the obnoxious J. Somers Smith. Cazneau and Baez also requested that two treaties of annexation be drafted, one for the United States and one for the Dominican people which neither wanted to show to the Dominican Senate. Baez and Cazneau only wanted the treaty for lease of Samana Bay to be shown to the Dominican Senate, and not the American Senate. Neither attempt convinced Babcock. Baez went ahead and received the authority to sign a lease for Samana Bay from his senate; and, on December 4, 1869, Babcock, Ingalls, and Sackett sailed to Samana Bay and hoisted the American flag and took formal possession of the bay. The day before, President Baez informed Babcock that he did not think that Mr. Hartmont was going to pay the remainder of the loan, but if he did, Baez would hold the money until the United States ratified the treaties. Baez also received $100,000 in gold and $47,229.91 worth of war materials. Colonel Fabens "assumed custody of the flag" at Samana Bay as well as the "sundry monies and properties belonging to the United States government."

On December 21, President Grant called a Cabinet meeting to discuss Babcock’s return with a treaty for annexation and the acquisition of Samana Bay. Grant suggested that the treaty for annexation be kept secret until the Hartmont loan had expired at the end
of the month, but he saw no problem with releasing the treaty for the lease of Samana Bay to the public. In his defense, Grant feared that if the English banking house learned of the treaty, then they would immediately remit the balance of the loan and receive concessions of the island that would destroy the treaty’s chance of being passed by the US Senate. By the next day, New York newspapers and Wall Street were abuzz over the lease of Samana Bay. By the end of the month, an angry Senator Charles Sumner visited the White House to discuss the manner with President Grant.439

Prior to Sumner’s visit, Secretary Fish had received two communiqués from Commercial Agent Perry, dated December 10 and 28, alluding to his suspicion that certain elements involved in the negotiations of the treaties were less than honorable. The day before Sumner arrived at the White House, Joseph Fabens wrote Secretary Fish that the Dominican population was anxious for annexation; and, in fact, when he went to church the Sunday following the raising of the American flag at Samana Bay, the preacher explained what “great political change” was about to take place. “The scene,” according to Fabens, “was very touching, for the whole congregation of several hundred were responding with tears and sobs of grateful joy.”440

Throughout the negotiations, Sumner had received news concerning the manipulations of Fabens and Cazneau for personal monetary gain and was growing quite suspicious of the entire process. During Grant’s Cabinet meeting, the names of Cazneau and Fabens were prominent and suspicion pervaded.441 On the first Sunday of January 1870, President Grant would interrupt Sumner at his house asking for support of the treaty for annexation. Grant would send General Babcock the next day, but before Babcock finished reading the preamble where Babcock called himself the “Aid-de-Camp
of His Excellency General Ulysses S. Grant,” Sumner had his doubts. When Babcock added that “His Excellency General Grant, President of the United States, promises privately to use all his influence in that the idea of annexing the Dominican Republic to the United States may acquire such a degree of popularity among the members of Congress as will be necessary for its accomplishment,” Sumner was livid at the prospect of Grant becoming a “lobbyist to bring about annexation to Congress” and apparently threw Babcock out of his house.442

On January 9, 1870, the New York Herald printed a paragraph stating that the treaties of annexation and lease of Samana Bay would “soon be laid before the Senate.” The next day, President Grant presented the treaties to the US Senate.443 Either President Grant did not know how Senator Sumner treated Babcock, which is highly unlikely considering their intimate relationship, or the President deemed it necessary to pursue annexation regardless of its opposition by certain influential members of Congress, namely Sumner.

On January 15, 1870, American Minister at Port-au-Prince E. D. Bassett wrote to Secretary Fish concerned for his life. On January 18, 1870, Commander E. K. Owen wrote to Secretary of the Navy Robeson complaining of conditions in Haiti. Much hatred towards Americans was evident; Haitians were insulting American officials, particularly American Minister Robeson, and the American flag.444

January 25, 1870 marked the beginning of the end for annexation ratification by the Senate. Samuel L. Barlow, a member of the Santo Domingo Company, wrote to Delaware Senator Thomas F. Bayard, a Democrat and staunch anti-imperialist. In his letter, Barlow espoused to Bayard the advantages of Dominican annexation as well as the
advantages of annexing “the other islands on our coast.” Barlow argued that the United States needed additional islands “to produce sugar, coffee, indigo, and in fact all of the productions of the Tropics, which we now import.” Barlow’s erred when he told Bayard, “I have already a large investment in land, part of which, when we own it, I mean to use and occupy.” On February 1 and March 28, Barlow again wrote to Bayard telling him that “he did not care just what method was used in acquiring Santo Domingo, ‘whether by Treaty, or under the Admiralty as flotsam or jetsam.’” He reminded Bayard, “you know I have a personal interest.”

On February 4, Secretary Fish wrote to Robeson instructing him to notify the Haitian Government that the United States would cease all relations if they did not remove Haitian revolutionaries from the Dominican Republic. Already fearful for his life, Robeson instead instructed Rear-Admiral C. H. Poor to notify the Haitian Government for him. On February 10, with his ships the Severn and Dictator, Poor informed the Government that since negotiations were underway with Santo Domingo that any “interference of attack therefore by vessels under the Haytien or any other Flag upon Dominicans during the pendency of said negotiations, will be considered an act of hostility to the Flag of the United States, and will provoke hostility in return.” Nine days later, Robeson instructed Commodore Joseph F. Green to tarry around Samana Bay and to “use the force at your command to resist any attempts by enemies of the Dominican Republic to invade the Dominican territory by land or sea, so far as your power can reach them.”

Two days later, on February 21, the US Senate passed a resolution demanding all the paperwork pertaining to the arrest of Davis Hatch. Sometime during these negotiations, the Dominican Government arrested American citizen Davis Hatch for
revolutionary activities. Hatch “was jailed and sentenced to death for complicity with the rebellion.”\textsuperscript{447} Further investigation revealed that General Babcock, Cazneau, and Fabens had Hatch, who previously complained of Cazneau’s behavior with Frederic Seward, detained in fear that his remarks would jeopardize the annexation treaty.\textsuperscript{448} On February 20, 1870, Commercial Agent Perry wrote Secretary Fish announcing that in front of President Baez, when Cazneau boasted that he was in “direct communication with the President of the United States,” Perry called him a “trickster and a dishonest man.”\textsuperscript{449} Twelve days earlier, Perry contended that Cazneau and Fabens detained Davis Hatch “for certain selfish and financial reasons known to themselves.”\textsuperscript{450} On February 21, the US Senate passed a resolution asking for all paperwork concerning the Hatch incident.\textsuperscript{451}

Sumner, apparently concerned with the constitutionality of American naval maneuvers and probably the arrest of Mr. Hatch, voiced his opposition. At this time, Joseph Fabens thought it best to visit Sumner and explain to him the advantages of annexation, and if still not convinced, Sumner should draft a treaty that was suitable to him and President Baez. Sumner informed Fabens that he was completely against annexation “on any terms.” Sumner then asked Fabens a fatal question: Would annexation stop with Santo Domingo? Fabens, in his wisdom, told Sumner that the United States must have Haiti, also. Sumner asked, “And is that all?” Fabens replied that “in the nature of things” the United States must “absorb Porto Rico, Jamaica, Cuba, the Windward Islands, and indeed, all of the West Indies.”

On March 8, Commercial Agent Perry demanded from the Dominican Government the release of Davis Hatch. The next day, Perry wrote another note to Minister Gautier demanding a prompt reply. The following day, Gautier responded by saying that the “best
principles of equality and justice” guided their arrest of Hatch, but he also admitted detaining Hatch “to prevent inciting public opinion in New York against annexation.” A week later, March 17, Hatch was released. The day before, the Dominican Republic granted Cazneau the title of “Dominican Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary” with instructions to do whatever was necessary in the “best interest of both countries.” Two days before that, March 14, President Grant informed the Senate that the six-month deadline for ratification of the treaties for Dominican annexation would expire on March 29, 1870. Secretary Fish was upset that Grant had not consulted with him about this, and he questioned Grant as to his confidence in his position. Grant apologized and blamed his secretary for the oversight. The next day, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted five to two against the treaty, and it was sent to the Senate.

On March 24, the New York Herald printed a statement by William Cazneau stating

As an economical, acclimated and perfectly manageable industrial power, already on the field where it is needed, and which can instantly be made highly remunerative to American capital and enterprise, I consider the colored working population of this island one of its most valuable features in view of annexation. There is not a man too many of this class, and presence near the coffee and sugar lands, ... will treble the price and productive value of those fine regions from the first year in which systematic farming is introduced in them.

In the same paper, an editorial suggested that the “Old Man of the Sea” Sumner should be thrown overboard because he was “a croaker, and obstacle, and a dead weight in our noble ship of state.”
Two days later, the Washington *Morning Chronicle* leaked information concerning the secret debate within the Senate, which began on March 24. Senator Sumner apparently spoke against the treaty emphasizing that annexation would only encourage the United States to seek further islands within the Caribbean which would complicate matters with European powers, however, Sumner saw no reason why another European power wanted to purchase Samana Bay. Sumner was concerned with the public debt of the island and the chance of revolution following the vote. Finally, Sumner suggested that “annexation would impair the predominance of the colored race in the West Indies and therefore would be unjust to it.”

Following Sumner’s speech, Indiana Senator Oliver P. Morton delivered the counterpoint stating that the Dominican Republic’s resources far outweighed any potential problems. During his speech, Morton stood behind a table of products from the island, including a large block of salt mined by Mr. Davis Hatch which all the Senators took turns licking as they crowded around the table. Soon, the distinguished Senators were playing tug-of-war with a Dominican hemp rope. Other more serious speeches followed, but on March 29, the time limit for treaty negotiations expired and the resolution was set aside. It became quite clear that the majority of the Senate did not support the annexation treaty, but Joseph Fabens and President Grant were not finished.

On April 2, Fabens visited Secretary Fish informing him that President Baez had sent him as the “Envoy Extraordinary of the Dominican Republic.” When Fish asked for his credentials, Fabens stated that he gave them to President Grant, and Secretary Fish informed him that he had no right to “present himself to the President except through the Secretary of State.” Fish informed him that he had “laid the basis for the charge that the
Dominican treaties had been negotiated ‘outside the regular channels.’” Fabens next visited General Babcock and informed him of all that had occurred. Four days later, President Grant took full responsibility for Fabens’ behavior.\textsuperscript{459}

On April 7, Perry wrote to the Dominican Senate that William Cazneaux, despite the agreement with the Dominican Republic that they would not concede any property or incur another debt during the negotiations, had petitioned not only for a grant of 200,000 acres of the public lands of the Dominican Republic but also for the privilege of introducing for the next two years 2,000 immigrants, 500 of them for the province of Santo Domingo and the balance for the frontier. Each of these immigrants was to receive 100 acres of land. Cazneaux reserved to himself the right to control administration of these lands granted to immigrants, and he was to be the owner of any mines discovered on this same property.\textsuperscript{460}

On April 27, Fabens went to Washington and had a long conference with President Grant.\textsuperscript{461}

On May 3, Minister Gautier wrote to Perry complaining about his note to the Dominican Senate. The next day, Cazneaux complained to Perry that he had “altogether misapprehended the case” and he told Perry that he was overstepping his bounds as Commercial Agent. That same day, Fabens wrote to Minister Gautier stating that President Grant was “almost certain of carrying the annexation treaty by a 2/3 vote.” He then wrote a letter to William Cazneaux stating that he had spoken for four hours with Senator Sumner, who saw the error of his ways, but “with or without him we intend to succeed.”\textsuperscript{462} On May 6, Cazneaux wrote to Perry again informing him that his “neglect of due official reticence has brought on a premature disclosure of facts that for the public interest should have been held strictly confidential for the present.”\textsuperscript{463} The next day,
Fabens, in hopes of arousing public sentiment towards annexation, organized a mass meeting for May 12 at the Cooper Institute of New York City where several speakers lauded the gold fields of the Dominican Republic. On May 9, Minister Gautier wrote to American Commercial Agent Perry informing him that diplomatic relations between him and the Dominican Republic were suspended.

On May 14, Secretary Fish signed an article extending the time limit for annexation negotiations until July 1, 1870. Two days later, Minister Gautier wrote to Secretary Fish defending Fabens and lamenting that Agent Perry had caused the Dominican Republic the “most profound grief.” Gautier claimed that Perry, during a debate with him, had slapped him and then ran to his office claiming diplomatic immunity. Perry had just left the island and was on his way to Washington to discuss the action of Fabens and Cazneau. The next day, Cazneau wrote to Secretary Fish attacking Perry as a man of “reckless and violent impulses” who had a “rough contempt for the colored citizens.” Cazneau requested that Perry not be allowed to return to the Dominican Republic.

On May 29, the New York Herald published an editorial stating that Secretary Fish was “too conservative and timid” and did not support his President. The Herald suggested that Fish resign, because he was “under the influence of Mr. Sumner.” Rumors abounded that Congressman Benjamin Butler might replace Fish if he resigned.

On May 31, 1870, President Grant submitted a letter to the Senate. Grant stated that he felt “an unusual anxiety of this treaty,” because he believed that “it will redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery.” Grant guaranteed that the “doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties,” and he deemed “it proper to assert
the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power.” Santo Domingo, Grant contended, “voluntarily sought this annexation. It is a weak power, numbering probably less than 120,000 souls, and yet possessing one of the riches territories under the sun, capable of supporting a population of 10,000,000 people in luxury.” Grant also stated that he believed that another European power had offered to purchase Samana Bay for $2 million. The President also extolled the advantages of possession geographically, militarily, and commercially. “San Domingo,” he stated, “with its stable government, under which her immense resources can be developed, will give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers not now on the island.” Grant also argued that “Porto Rico and Cuba will have to abolish slavery, as a measure of self-preservation to retain their laborers.”

The same day, Harpers Weekly protested the annexation because “commercial circles” feared that it would lead to a war with Haiti. Two days before, Senator Charles Sumner attacked Grant’s annexation project in the New York Herald. The same day, Edward L. Godkin, editor of the Nation, stated in an editorial, “The first duty of the American Union is to its own people. As long as there is ignorance, poverty, and corruption within its own borders, it owes it not less to civilization than to its own influence and fame not to saddle itself with fresh loads of responsibility.” Godkin went on to suggest that he did not favor the assimilation of “ignorant Catholic Spanish negroes,” but he did favor, however, Canadian annexation as Sumner did, because they were White, English-speaking peoples.

On June 1, American Agent Perry arrived in Washington and met with Secretary Fish. Perry quickly denounced Fabens, Cazneau, and that “damned rascal” Babcock, who
was using the President’s name to cover up a scheme whereby they would all get rich.\textsuperscript{473} The same day, Fish was to meet with Fabens who had requested an appointment on May 28. Before Fabens arrived, however, Senator Cornelius Cole and “Judge” Peter O’Sullivan arrived in the office expressing the desire for the United States to authorize a loan for the Dominican Government. Fish informed them that a loan at this time would violate the terms of the annexation treaty against incurring additional debt. As soon as they left, Fabens entered the Secretary’s office with the same request. He also showed Fish a copy of a letter from Hartmont & Co. intimating that their loan with the Dominican Government was valid and that they were willing to accept Samana Bay as an annuity towards the loan. Fish was not interested and Fabens left.\textsuperscript{474}

On June 7, 1870, Commercial Agent Perry wrote what was perhaps the most important letter of his career. He informed Secretary Fish of the arrest of Hatch and swore that Babcock told him not to do anything about it, because Hatch would destroy any chance of ratification of the treaty. In the same letter, Perry informed Fish that Baez and Gautier told him that if annexation did not succeed, they feared for their lives. They asked the United States for more warships. When he asked Cazneau about his fears concerning the need for a plebiscite of public approval in Dominica, Cazneau assured Perry that he had Baez “between his thumb and finger” and would immediately have Baez propose a vote. On February 16, the Dominican Republic issued a decree announcing that a plebiscite would be held three days later. Perry noted that musicians began parading in the streets of Santo Domingo and several demonstrations announcing the advantages of annexation. Perry stated that on several occasions, Baez and Gautier swore they would shoot or exile anyone who was against annexation, and on other occasions he saw Baez
shaking his fist at comrades who did not favor annexation, swearing that they too would be exiled from the island. Numbers concerning the vote were, at best, manipulated.\textsuperscript{475} Admiral Poor, on his ship \textit{Severn}, landed in Santo Domingo and met with Baez in case there was a problem with the vote. The \textit{Dictator} and another ship, the \textit{Swatara}, were already in Samana Bay, and another gunboat anchored on the Yuna River.\textsuperscript{476}

The “great business” as Cazneau referred to it deteriorated rapidly. On June 13, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations summoned General Babcock to explain why he had unnecessarily detained Davis Hatch. Babcock denied that he had done it to prevent Hatch from voicing his opposition to the annexation treaty. Agent Perry stood up and called Babcock a liar. The committee also looked at evidence concerning the activities of Joseph Fabens.\textsuperscript{477} Following his visit with Secretary Fish, Fabens wrote him another letter complaining that the Dominican Government was in dire financial straits and he was concerned that further delay in the treaty negotiations might be “fatal” to this financial emergency.\textsuperscript{478} Some-time after this, the National Bank of Santo Domingo collapsed in bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{479}

On June 29, 1870, the debate resumed on Dominican annexation in the Senate. Sumner sat in the assembly and said nothing. The next day, June 30, 1870, the Senate called for a vote on the treaty and the result was a tie, 28 to 28, far short of the two-thirds majority required to ratify annexation.\textsuperscript{480} The treaty for the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States was dead. On August 29, President Baez wrote to President Grant requesting information concerning the vote. It would take Grant seventeen days to respond to Baez, but he promised to do what he could.\textsuperscript{481}
On December 2, Fabens wrote to Secretary Fish informing him that he had just appointed William M. Ringwood as Consul General of the Dominican Republic. The next day, Fish replied that Fabens had no authority to make such an appointment. On December 6, Fabens responded to Fish by stating that he received a commission by Baez as Minister Plenipotentiary “to make a new treaty of annexation” for the Dominican Government and “to look after its interests generally in this country.” Two days later, Fabens was in the Secretary’s office where Fish informed him that, since no treaty was being negotiated at the present, his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary were of no “immediate value.”  

On December 5, while Fabens was occupying the attention of Fish, President Grant presented his State of the Union Address. Grant lauded the advantages of annexation and ask for a joint resolution to appoint a special commission to go to the Dominican Republic and negotiate a treaty “for the acquisition of that island.” Four days later, Senator Sumner presented a resolution demanding all “papers and correspondence relating to the proposed annexation of the Dominican portion of the island of Santo Domingo.”  

On December 12, 1870, Indiana Senator Oliver Morton “introduced a resolution authorizing the President to appoint three commissioners” who would go to the Dominican Republic, conduct a complete survey of the island and determine the desire of the inhabitants towards annexation. On December 20, Senator William A Buckingham suggested that the matter be turned over to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mr. Morton disagreed intimating that someone in that Committee showed great disfavor for the annexation. Sumner stood up and claimed that the President was attempting to
displace him from the Committee. The next day, Sumner charged that Mr. Morton’s resolution would result in the commitment of the United States into a “dance of blood. It is a new step in a measure of violence. Several steps have already been taken, and Congress is now summoned to take another.”  

Sumner continued attacking the President and his expansionist policies. Newspapers got into the foray attacking Sumner. Debate continued until December 22, when the Senate voted on the resolution. By a vote of 32 to 9, the Senate agreed to send it to the House of Representatives with their approval. On January 9, the House reviewed the resolution with minor problems between Benjamin Butler and James Garfield, but passed it with a vote of 108 to 76.  

But, there was a problem. The House added a resolution to the original measure. Their amendment provided that nothing in the resolution “shall be held, understood, or construed as committing Congress to the policy of annexing the territory of said republic of Dominica.” The next day, the Morton resolution and its amendment passed with 123 to 63. The following day, the Senate agreed. On January 12, President Grant approved the joint measure and appointed Dr. Samuel G. Howe, former Senator Benjamin F. Wade, and Cornell University President Andrew D. White as the official members of the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo.  

On January 17, 1871, the Commission of Inquiry left New York and, on January 24, they landed at Samana Bay. For the next seventy days they conducted geological, mineralogical, and topographical surveys. They conducted interviews with over seventy people, and inquired into the social, political, and economic conditions of the island. They were particularly interested in the Dominican view on American annexation and their
attitude towards Haiti. They looked into the national debt and the Government’s concessions to private interests, namely Fabens and O’Sullivan, and Spofford & Tileston.

On March 27, Sumner made a speech to not only an adjourned Senate, but also a courtroom full of people. The audience applauded him as he walked down to the dais. Sumner believed that President Grant had exceeded his Constitutional limit of the war powers. It was “plain that the Navy of the United States, acting under orders from Washington, has been engaged in measures of violence, and of belligerent intervention, being war, without the authority of Congress.” On March 29, the results of the plebiscite arrived in Washington. According to the treaty for annexation, the United States would extend protection to the Dominican Republic until the plebiscite was completed.

On April 5, 1871, President Grant wrote a letter to Congress presenting the report of the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo. President Grant defended himself stating that when he first became President he did not “dream of instituting any steps for the acquisition of insular possessions,” but he also believed that this continent, which apparently included islands in the Caribbean, was big enough to protect those people desiring it. He continued, “Soon after my inauguration as President I was waited upon by an agent of President Baez with a proposition to annex the republic of San Domingo to the United States.” Grant also contended that when the treaty failed last time, it was because the Senate had met in secret amidst allegations “calculated to prejudice the merits of the case.” He now submitted the Commission of Inquiry’s report to the people of the United States for their consideration.487

On June 8, 1871, the Senate failed to pass any resolution towards annexation. The House of Representatives did not even have to look at it. For all intents and purposes,
annexation was dead. President Grant, President Baez, General Babcock, Senator Cole, Minister Gautier, General Benjamin Butler, General Cazneau, Colonel Fabens, Judge O’Sullivan—all failed. The steamship line owned by Spofford & Tileston and O’Sullivan went bankrupt. $^{488}$ The Hartmont loan had expired and Alta Vela was empty. The lease on Samana Bay expired on July 1, 1871 with no renewal, at which time the American flag was removed from the bay of Santo Domingo.
CONCLUSION

A few significant events occurred following the failure of Dominican annexation. Senator Sumner was premature in assuming that President Grant had overstepped his war powers, but it was not long before the Commander-in-Chief did so. As early as December 1871, Grant ordered ships to Dominican waters to protect the Government from reported insurgencies. Fish warned him as early as March of the same year that American warships in Dominican waters violated the agreement's deadline. As late as February 1872, Grant ordered Secretary of the Navy Robeson to investigate the movements of Cabral. Since the treaty with Santo Domingo had lapsed, these were impeachable offenses which some considered more important than those imposed on former President Johnson.

On April 10, 1872, at approximately four o'clock in the afternoon, former Secretary of State William Henry Seward died. He spent his retirement traveling the world, writing his autobiography, and entertaining old friends. During his travels, he especially enjoyed Alaska, and he even had an audience with the Pope in Rome. China welcomed him with a ceremony reserved for international dignitaries, as did Mexico. In India, he entered the city of Putteela in a coach pulled by six white horses while his family followed on the backs of elephants. While in Alaska, Seward lamented that two
projects were still unfinished when he left office: “the extinguishment of the colonial system in the West Indies and the construction of a ship canal, adequate to modern navigation, across the Isthmus of Panama.”

Around 1871, William Leslie Cazneau and his infamous wife moved to Jamaica. “General” Cazneau died in 1876 and his wife was killed in a shipwreck off Cape Hatteras in December 1878. They had no children and their obituaries did not make it into American newspapers. In the year prior to Mrs. Cazneau’s death, a book was published by her own company entitled Our Winter Eden—Pen Pictures of the Tropics, with an Appendix Containing the Seward-Samana Mystery, Now First Made Public. Typical of the travelogues of the day, Mrs. Cazneau’s book nevertheless entertained the question as to whether “the average class of young working farmers, men worth little or no capital beyond their own good habits, sound training, and a fair outfit of agricultural implements, [could] expect to win for themselves a healthy, pleasant and paying homestead in the West Indies.” Mrs. Cazneau heartily endorsed the work of the American West India Company in supplying the property and materials that would be needed for such a successful venture.

Her Appendix to the book, however, was more intriguing. Entitled “Secretary Seward’s Samana Mystery: A Leaf of History Heretofore Unwritten,” the additional text blamed Secretary of State Seward for the failure of acquiring Samana Bay for the United States as a free port—“free to all nations and forever neutral of war.” According to Mrs. Cazneau, at no time did the Dominican Republic ever entertain the idea of selling Samana Bay. Instead the island country offered the United States on three separate occasions the ability to control “its surest aegis of protection,” and Seward ignored this
distinction and “on that disregarded shoal his hopes of Samana were completely wrecked.”

Perhaps more damaging was Mrs. Cazneau’s depiction of Secretary Seward’s unannounced visit to the Dominican Republic and to President Baez during his fateful trip to St. Thomas Island. According to her, the Secretary visited William Cazneau at his Esmerelda residence where they discussed the current political situation in Santo Domingo concerning acquisition. Apparently satisfied, Seward then met with President Baez and his cabinet. When he departed, Seward shook hands with Baez and stated, “I hope before long these very hands may be set to a treaty which will ensure a prosperous repose to your Republic.” Baez departed with “God grant it.” Unfortunately for both parties, Cabral deposed Baez shortly thereafter.

The Appendix also alluded to the “semi-official letter from Washington, announcing that the American cabinet had decided to offer two millions of dollars for Samana—and about the same time came a notice that the president had nominated Cazneau as Consul-General.” Mrs. Cazneau, however, was quick to remind her readers that the Consul-General notification was intended as a complement certainly, but it was a barren one, as Cazneau had just taken the lead in a mining enterprise which he considered of more value than any official appointment, and he notified his friends at Washington to that effect.

What little biography exists on William Cazneau listed him as an entrepreneur, a diplomat, and a lobbyist that “influenced the reorientation of US policy in the Caribbean area from territorial imperialism to commercial expansionism.” His interests were cited as the “annexation and commercial exploitation of Cuba, Texas colonization near the
Mexican border, business investments in the Dominican Republic, and claims to guano deposits at Swan Island off the Central American coast.\textsuperscript{499}

Also in 1878, President Baez, seeing his Government’s toppling to Cabral’s revolutionary forces, and realizing that the United States was not going to help, fled Santo Domingo and went to Puerto Rico. He took with him “$70,000 extorted from local merchants and $300,000 stolen from civil servants and soldiers.”\textsuperscript{500}

The Hartmont Loan caused such a series of financial disasters that critics argued that the Dominican Republic has yet to recover from them. Initially, these disasters caused Samuel G. Howe, former member of the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo, to join the Samana Bay Company in an attempt to salvage the concessions. He failed, also.\textsuperscript{501} Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson dealt with military problems associated with these financial manipulations on the island. William H. Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy was a direct result of the Hartmont Loan. An extensive history of this period would prove quite informative.

More intriguing, however, is the ideology that Santo Domingo, a small island nation that historians largely have ignored, had such a major influence on world history. The first international war involving Santo Domingo was over wild cattle, followed by conflicts over tobacco and indigo. The obsession over bat guano on Alta Vela and other islands almost resulted in international wars with Peru and Spain. The lure of the island’s resources affected governmental decisions during the American Revolution, its Civil War, and quite possibly the Mexican War. The French Revolution affected both sides of the
Atlantic, and Santo Domingo was central to Napoleon’s plan for a North American empire. England and Spain would fight among themselves for Dominican dominance.

Interest in the Dominican Republic affected every President of the United States. Thomas Jefferson was particularly interested in Santo Domingo as a possible haven for African Americans if they became free. Jefferson believed in abolition, but he did not believe that freed slaves and former masters could live in peace in the same country. President Abraham Lincoln, so noted for an apparent emancipatory philosophy, feared the same thing, as was evident in his failed Ile a Vache experiment. It can safely be argued that Andrew Johnson’s involvement with the Alta Vela incident probably had more to do with his impeachment than party politics. The suspicion that he was merely a puppet of Secretary William Seward and his expansionist endeavors only heightened the debate. How much this affected President Ulysses S. Grant needs to be examined further, but what is clear is that Dominican annexation began a series of accusations against the competency of Grant as President.

The obsession even affected notoriously inactive Administrations. Both Presidents James Buchanan and Millard Fillmore would increase the American interest in Santo Domingo with the appointment of commercial agents and the enactment of legislation that promoted private interests on the island. The Guano Act of 1856, under Pierce, was perhaps one of the most unknown yet most influential pieces of legislation of its day. Territorial acquisition began during these supposedly uneventful periods with the acquisition of the Lobos Islands in 1852 under the Fillmore Administration, a virtually unknown piece of American history. The ultimate irony, of course, is that Filmore became
the first President to flush a toilet in the White House during a period when obsession for fecal matter was paramount.

During four short years, the Presidency of Franklin Pierce would leave a legacy of expansionism that has not truly abated to this day. The international race for unclaimed territory was in full swing and commercial interests in the Caribbean only increased. At times, conflicts between competing nations increased to epic proportions. The immigration of Chinese laborers into the Caribbean irrevocably challenged the profitability of slavery. The Monroe Doctrine underwent definitional expansion as well.

On the other side of the shore, the leaders of the Dominican Republic changed the course of their island just as profoundly. The history of Santo Domingo was a microcosm of a larger arena. Arguably, in 1493, when Columbus left a garrison of thirty men to secure Isabella, the Caciques, angry at their treatment by Spanish insurgents, began a campaign of slave rebellions that continued unabated well into the nineteenth century. In 1678, Padrejan, an African chief, led the first major rebellion causing further integration of the island’s population. The activities surrounding the Declaration of the Rights of Man echoed a recent American Revolution. The great slave rebellion of 1791 marked the appearance of such illustrious personalities as the Oge brothers and Toussaint L’Ouverture who would be responsible for great change on the island, including the ousting of the French which caused the United States great discomfort. Spanish dominion in the Caribbean caused diplomatic conflicts that continued up to America’s Civil War and beyond.

In 1804, Dessalines began a campaign of immigration of freed Africans into Haiti. By 1823, President Boyer not only strengthened this campaign, but he also challenged the
diplomacy of the United States in the process. His desire to have his country recognized as an independent nation, and the free-flowing migration of Africans throughout North America, concerned slave owners and northern businessmen equally. The birth of abolitionism had its roots in this movement.

But, undoubtedly, the competing leaderships of three-time President Pedro Santana and four-time President Buenaventura Baez had more profound effects on American diplomacy than any other period in Dominican history. Regardless of their personal political ties and nefarious governmental manipulations, both leaders grew weary of constant revolutions that had beset their island and they sought protection from more dominant powers in hope of stabilizing their economies. They promoted their island’s natural resources, which unfortunately included human laborers, the “salubrious” Caribbean climate, and the financial opportunities for enterprising entrepreneurs. Their involvement with such infamous personalities as Benjamin Green, William Cazneau, Joseph Fabens, Edward Hartmont, and Peter O’Sullivan immersed four major powers in international and domestic intrigue that forever changed the course of Dominican and world history. In an almost-panicked attempt to increase their nation’s productivity, Santana and Baez involved their island nation in more political intrigue than they imagined and, in the end, the Dominican Republic incurred even more debt.

From the Administrations of John Tyler to Rutherford B. Hayes, these two Dominican leaders influenced American policy both abroad and on the continent for good or for ill. One thing is certain; however, the machinations of Santana and Baez enhanced ever-expanding notions of annexation and protection. These leaders were not incompetent former slaves, as some argued in the United States, but rather educated and
experienced individuals. By late-20th century standards, their techniques were irregular at best and downright violent or illegal at worst. They learned international diplomacy early in their lives and they used it well. And they were shrewd businessmen, though arguably not good judges of character.

In the end, most international contemporaries of Santana and Baez considered both to be well educated, always finely if not ornately dressed, well mannered in international diplomacy and etiquette, and very patriotic. The evidence also indicates that, at times, this surprised the Americans. Though one could argue ethnocentric biases, and some American Commercial Agents were notorious for them, one must realize that Santo Domingo was still a seemingly wild and unknown place to most Americans at that time. The shock of meeting a well dressed, well mannered, educated, civilized talking dark man altered many preconceptions.

Those preconceptions resulted from an attitude that plagued the history of Santo Domingo as well—racism. From the beginning of its written history, Santo Domingo faced it. The year 1492, growing in importance as more history is unearthed, marked the beginning of slavery on the island. Columbus saw the Arawaks as worthy slaves of the Crown. He viewed the indigenous population as a commodity with a soul. Within thirteen years, African slaves were on the island. By 1730, the value of a Guinea slave and a keg of rum were equal. Jefferson worried that France, a treasured ally in trade, might lose a foothold in the Caribbean and his emphasis on Santo Domingo, as a possible haven for freed Africans was probably deliberate. Jefferson's fear of a potential slaughter between former masters and newly freed slaves amidst international conflicts may well be one reason why he did not support manumission officially.
Boyer’s emigration campaign worried slave states profoundly. Santo Domingo, with its leaders of apparent African descent, encouraged their own slaves into rebellion and migration to the island. Freed Africans roaming to and from the continent and the Caribbean frustrated this fear.

Something else occurred as well. America’s industry was growing, trade increased, and business looked to new markets for an ever-increasing demand for exotic items. With its apparent abundant resources, Santo Domingo became a speculator’s dream. But the dream required an enormous labor force and the Dominican Island did not have it. At first, these speculators envisioned Santo Domingo as a giant slave state that would tip the balance in the South’s favor. With the abolition of slavery, entrepreneurs saw the island as a haven for freed slaves who could be encouraged to migrate to Santo Domingo and work as sharecroppers or tenement farmers. The potential profits were enormous. This campaign continued well after the Grant Administration.

This idea had support. The hatred between former slaves and masters that Jefferson feared was real. Freed African Americans promoted the idea of establishing a new nation for former slaves where no White man ruled or influenced them, and the Caribbean was a worthy competitor in the scheme. Luminaries such as James Holly, James Redpath, J. Dennis Harris and Frederick Douglass loomed large in these emigration campaigns. Speaking circuits and literature promoted the idea throughout the United States and across the Atlantic. President Abraham Lincoln would get into the act with solicitations for international cooperation to seclude areas conducive to emigration. When that did not work, he personally oversaw the ill-fated emigration of five hundred African Americans to Ile a Vache. This period in American history is worthy of more research.
Enterprising individuals and industrious groups, eager for expansion into global markets, saw the tropical island, with its seemingly perfect climate of three growing seasons, and its small population being led by very unstable governments, as a pecuniary paradise. They saw a burgeoning economy ripe for revitalization and anxious to make a deal in exchange for gold coin. These potential investors were lured by tales of gold, though it had been supposedly depleted by then. Lumber and coal were Santo Domingo’s biggest assets at the time. Rich topsoil sometimes a foot deep could raise sugar, corn, cotton, tobacco, indigo, and all manner of fruits, vegetables, and grains. The speculators envisioned large plantations owned by wealthy White investors with a labor force of indentured African Americans, the American version of the hacienda system. Further capital was earned in supplying all that a free African American would need to begin homesteading and farming. Unbeknownst to the worker, indentured servitude was forever. Cheap labor yielded huge profits.

But, investments required more protection than just a promise of an easy profit at the expense of others. For markets to thrive they must be in areas with stable governments. Expansionists such as William H. Seward viewed it a “moral duty” for the United States to protect private American interests in foreign nations. Discretion, however, did not necessarily follow this formula. Seward’s obsession to promote free enterprise is not new information, nor is his vision of a global economic empire with the United States at its center. Was Seward the “monomaniac of territorial acquisition” whom his Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles described? Was Seward visionary or merely wise enough to recognize the cumulative events that unfolded before him and opportunistic.
enough to take advantage of them? And finally, how financially involved was Seward in Dominican politics?

Seward envisioned the United States at the hub of a one-world economy with one currency, the American dollar. Telegraph lines would encircle the earth connecting the world into a global network of communication. American ships and trains would transport commodities from around the world to consumers everywhere. He also viewed certain possessions as stepping stones vital to this enterprise. Seward liked to use the word "buttresses" when describing foreign territory that fit into his expansionist ideas. Eventually, Seward defined the American continent as not only including the Caribbean islands, but also any territory frequented by American investors. Though Santo Domingo eluded him, Seward amassed an enormous amount of territory for his country.

The concept of a one-world economic supernation was not novel, but the early limitation in the knowledge of geography somewhat narrowed the definition. Ancient history is replete with empire building. What made Seward’s vision unique was that it was, for the first time, truly global in scope with an effective, albeit tremendously expensive, communication network that virtually guaranteed the instantaneous exchange of ideas and information necessary to maintain global dominance.

Did Seward gain personal financial gain from all of this? Seward left his position as Secretary of State a wealthy man. He became the first international personality to make a trip around the world, a very expensive endeavor. He lived on Lafayette Square across from the White House, a very wealthy neighborhood at the time. His biographer, Bancroft, described him as capable of lavishing many pleasant s upon his guests. By comparison, President Grant was destitute by the end of his Administration.
There is a good chance that the $100,000 from a private account that left Washington and went to Alta Vela was an investment by Seward in Thurlow Weed’s guano mining enterprise. Further research is required on this, but what is evident are Seward’s machinations concerning the Alta Vela affair at the expense of Patterson and Murguiendo for the financial benefit of a personal friend. Also questionable were the findings of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which did not officially determine this fact, but instead blamed the Government of Santo Domingo.

Against this backdrop are the notorious characters of Joseph Fabens and William Cazneau with their assorted cohorts and speculative companies. From their debut in Texas real estate schemes to their eventual arrival in Santo Domingo, these two men played an incredibly complex role in the relations between not only the United States and Santo Domingo, but other international governments as well. According to the evidence, their critics were legion. Their motives, though lofty in prose, were always questionable in activity. Their organizations were loosely formed nebulous entities with official titles. And, their desire for monetary gain was apparently insatiable. They alluded to fields full of gold, rich land for the taking, and unimagined profits. Their advertising circulars verged on works of art for their style and imagination. They could turn a good tale twisting facts and figures to their comparative advantage; and they were quite adept at piquing the interests of enterprising businessmen seeking new venues of economic expansion.

But Fabens, Cazneau and others were also capable of manipulating weak governments and tempting desperate officials into financial concessions that wrecked national economies for the sake of their personal gain. Evidence hints that their real estate
speculation in Texas may have triggered a westward expansion that ultimately contributed to the Mexican War. Nevertheless, their specific dealings in the Dominican Republic are revealing in the extent to which they were willing to protect their investments. Today, the Dominican Republic requires presidential approval before foreign investors can purchase property, unless a majority of Dominican citizens own the company. Presidential approval is also required before foreign individuals or corporations become mortgagees of real property in the Dominican Republic. In this respect, nothing has changed.

One of the great-unanswered questions, however, is what happened to Joseph Fabens after annexation failed? For all intents and purposes, this notorious personality of expansionist hucksterism disappeared from history without a trace or a lead. He apparently did not publish anything after 1873. Did he, like William Cazneau and former President Baez, pack up what money he could salvage and leave the island to its own devices? There were rumors to the effect that William Cazneau went to Jamaica for that purpose, but more research is obviously needed in this area to answer such questions.

Political manipulations aside, other factors worked against a coherent plan of annexation and economic expansion in Santo Domingo. Exotic diseases wreaked havoc on consular and commercial offices in several locations throughout the Caribbean making it tenuous at best to maintain a coherent and consistent policy with foreign nations. Earlier, yellow fever destroyed any attempt by Napoleon to acquire an empire in the North American sphere. Colonization and emigration efforts met with countless failures due to tropical diseases that literally decimated whole populations. Other natural disasters such as earthquakes and tidal waves added to the chaos. The effects of guano mining and its
effects on the transmission of such destructive diseases as cholera and dysentery throughout the West Indian trade routes needs further research as well.

In virtually every source researched, the word "salubrious" was used to define the climate of Santo Domingo. Basically, what this means is that Santo Domingo’s climate did not suffer from acute temperature variation. A morning rain would give way to a day of sunshine and an average temperature of eighty degrees. But, colonists found it difficult to adjust to such a climate having been acclimated to weather that fluctuated with the seasons, and compromised their immune systems. In defense of Fabens and Cazneau, they never realized this and it is no wonder that the first colonists brought over by the American West India Company could not cope with the new environment. African emigrants seemed to fare better in this climate as evidenced by the existence of colonies in Santo Domingo that were present from the days of Dessalines and Boyer.

Ultimately, the one factor that proved most disastrous to Santo Domingo’s attempt at annexation was timing. Communication and transportation, though highly advanced, were still too slow and cumbersome. Telegraphs did not appear on Santo Domingo until after the Grant Administration; messages had to be sent through nearby Jamaica. The telephone’s effectiveness was too early in its development. Seward’s global economy lacked cheap communication technology to become a reality. Mail packets typically took at least five days and communications between government offices and territorial ones often crossed in their paths to the diplomatic embarrassment of many an official.

Financially, the United States was spending more money that was reasonable considering the devastation of the Civil War and the expense of Reconstruction. Many a
Senator used the defense of a depleted Treasury against annexation. Annexation of Santo Domingo had its own unique financial risks and many influential Americans were afraid the investment might be compromised in the future. Congress already worried that they had spent far too much money for Alaska; its potential was then still unknown.

Many involved in Dominican affairs alluded to the strategic importance of Santo Domingo and particularly Samana Bay as an enormously important aspect of Dominican history and this bears some discussion. In 1493, Columbus landed in Samana Bay with colonists, seed, animals, and supplies and the bay figured prominently in Dominican history until today. It evolved from a harbor of immigration to a departure point for further exploration and colonization. For decades, Spain used its two tiny keys as a coaling station and a naval base. With rumors of an isthmian canal connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific, the strategic importance of Samana Bay regained popularity. Timing was still a problem. No one really knew for sure where the canal would be built or if it would be built at all. Without a definite location in mind, many influential Americans could not understand why there was a need to rush into annexation with a country beset with revolution, despite its possible naval advantages. And, Mr. Seward had died.

Steamship design advanced and the coal of Samana Bay was of a lower quality than the new ships required. Initially, Admiral Porter did not like Samana Bay claiming that it was too long and the entrance too narrow. Eventually, he preferred sails to fossil fuel as a means of transportation. Inevitably, larger ships were unable to enter the Bay.

But bad timing claimed its worst victims in President Baez, Minister Gautier, Cazneau, and Fabens. Indeed, time ran out for this group. The economy, which depended on the generosity of the United States, collapsed in neglect. Baez saw his government
failing amidst enemies waiting for a weakness to show itself. The Hartmont Loan did not come through as well. Panic-stricken, Cazneau and Fabens attempted to persuade the United States of the urgency of the matter, but they met formidable obstacles in the persons of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner.

Hamilton Fish was no proponent of annexation, but he was loyal to his President’s wishes as far as the law would allow, or that is what the evidence suggested. In his defense, Fish had other problems on his mind as well. The *Alabama* Claims occupied his attention often and Fish worried that if Grant and Sumner were allies then negotiations with England would be difficult. Both Grant and Sumner were notoriously anti-British in this matter. Friction between these two gentlemen might improve the situation. It would also harm annexation proceedings and thus prevent Fish from compromising his position against acquiring the Dominican Republic. Fish and Sumner were also close friends and they shared many ideologies concerning the role of the United States in expansion. Fish must be complemented for his delicate balancing act in lieu of so many different political viewpoints.

Fish saw through the charades of Cazneau and Fabens as well. He was patient with a Dominican Minister who did not quite understand American law. During his eight years as Secretary of State, the only new territorial interests that he had to really worry about, aside from the Dominican Republic, was Hawaii.

Charles Sumner was an expansionist from a different pattern than Seward. Although Seward and Sumner were actually friends, they differed in the means to achieve the end. Both favored the annexation of Canada, but when Seward went on a territorial shopping spree and ignored Canada, Sumner questioned his sanity. When Grant proposed
Dominican annexation, he had two reasons to disagree. Sumner was involved in a campaign of his own to annex Canada at the time and, quite frankly, he did not like the President at all. When Sumner learned of Grant's association with Cazneau and Fabens, the debate for Dominican annexation was over for him.

But, much research indicated that Sumner was a thorough man who would investigate every side to a story before submitting it to discussion in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He could answer any question concerning any resolution that passed through his hands. Known for a sonorous voice, he spoke with intelligence and logic. The whole Dominican affair smacked of hucksterism and risky financial endeavors. In Sumner's mind, if Cazneau and Fabens were involved, then something was wrong with the enterprise, and ultimately if Grant was involved with these two then something was definitely wrong. Evidence also indicates that Sumner preferred Canadians and their territory because they were White, English-speaking peoples. Sumner was also on the Committee of Foreign Affairs during the Alta Vela incident.

Certain unknown pieces of evidence, namely the Congressional copy of the Commissioners' Report, a writer's volume of his travels to Santo Domingo with the Commission of Inquiry, and Joseph Fabens' abridged version of his In The Tropics, were discovered that should be addressed. Despite all evidence that annexation was dead, President Grant still sent the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo. Was a last-minute appeal by President Baez enough to justify spending the money for a commission to arrive in the Dominican Republic? Hindsight dictated otherwise, but Grant does achieve something new by doing this. Grant hoped that once the commission returned
that a joint Congress would decide on annexation from the report. This was the first time that a President requested this type of vote on a subject that did not involve acts of war.

But, the Commission found items of interest that other special agents could not. They had access to the deed book, one of the few books that Cabral did not confiscate on his last raid of the city, in which the names of Fabens, Cazneau, and O’Sullivan were prominent. The connection between the Industrial Progress Company and Fabens’ geological survey and the Samana Bay Company can be deduced from the Commission’s report. The Commission would also find the concession permitting Edward Hartmont to mine guano from Alta Vela, a discovery with profound effects. Interviews with over seventy citizens, including Fabens’ son, revealed irregularities in how land was leased to industrious entrepreneurs. Grant must have realized that when the Commission returned, the evidence was too damaging and he gave up the fight for annexation.

One of the passengers on the trip was Samuel Hazard, an independent correspondent who was known to prefer those things British. In 1873, he recorded his travels in a book entitled Santo Domingo, Past and Present: With a Glance at Hayti. Though long considered unworthy of much attention by preeminent scholars, this book has lasted the test of time. Current archaeological evidence suggests that Mr. Hazard’s ethnographies of the indigenous populations are perhaps the most accurate available. His descriptions of the island and its resources are without the usual advertising bent most often seen in travel novels. He is, however, rather ethnocentric in his descriptions of “lazy natives,” and he did support the acquisition of Samana Bay. Further study of this book is recommended, and besides, the book is beautifully printed.
One additional piece of evidence that, though minor in detail, is in danger of disappearing from the historical record. In 1873, Joseph Fabens anonymously reissued In the Tropics under the new title, *Life in Santo Domingo, By a Settler*. One copy of this book is known to exist, and that is the problem. The only difference between these two books, aside from the cover page, is the addition of a one-page chapter at the end of the reissued book, which announced the formation of the Samana Bay Company, a company erroneously thought by Melvin Knight to have been started by Samuel G. Howe. This page is loose. This book does not need to continue in circulation and needs to be preserved. It is currently housed in the Morris Library at Carbondale, Illinois.

But, what this page does is make another connection that has never been explored. Fabens, Cazneau, and O’Sullivan, along with some prominent Senators and Congressmen were involved in a prospecting company known as the Samana Bay Company, which was intimately tied to the Industrial Progress Company and the geological survey then being conducted on the island. Fabens and Cazneau owned one-fifth of the island according to the agreement. According to Knight, Samuel Howe and Cornell University Andrew D. White, another member of the Commission, were extremely upset with the disastrous effects of the Hartmont Loan and attempted to salvage it. This eventually led to another series of loans that would also prove disastrous and to the eventual Dollar Diplomacy and the American military occupations of 1914 and 1917.583

How involved was the Commission with the speculative business of Cazneau and Fabens? How much did President Ulysses S. Grant have to do with this? After all, he personally appointed the Commissioners, and Howe apparently returned to Santo Domingo and wrote White on a regular, if not frenzied, basis. What we do know is that
the Samana Bay Company failed in its attempt to salvage the Hartmont Loan, but what we also know is that colonization and emigration schemes continued despite the failure of annexation by the United States well past Grant's Administration. The final loose page in Fabens' book proved it. And, we know that Grant was destitute following his Presidency, so we may assume that Grant went bankrupt and it is difficult to absolve a President because he followed the rules of elite businessmen. Everyone involved probably lost money.

Santo Domingo really has not changed that much since this period in history, and that is another problem. It still claims Spanish heritage, but English is prevalent. Development of oceanfront property is still the island's number one industry, followed by ecotourism. Whale watching is a big attraction these days. The island boasts over 10,000 hotel rooms and many restaurants. Gold and silver finally have been discovered in the legendary Cibao region and mining is in progress, literally removing whole mountains to do it. Current scientific research indicates that these developments will ultimately destroy the island's natural resources.

The Dominican people still export sugar, cocoa, and other agricultural products, but the electronic industry is moving in. There are, of course, the beaches. According to the webpage of the Consulate of the Dominican Republic, the island boasts five hundred years of history and still claims to be the most beautiful place on the earth with more trees per capita than any other place in the world. Of course, further development will compromise that statement. Recently, the island received another title to add to its list.
Santo Domingo, the first city of the New World, was designated the *Paternity of Humanity*. 
APPENDIX

I. Dominican agreement for Samana Bay

This synopsis of the Dominican’s negotiations of January 8, 1868, as presented on behalf of President Cabral by General Pablo Pujol to Secretary Seward, is included because it shows the extent to which the Government was willing to go to concede its island as a protectorate of the United States. The negotiations also show just how little attention is actually paid to details between these two nations. The Dominican Government agreed to the following terms:

1. The lease would include the peninsula and the Bay of Samana and keys and ports of the bay, with the exception of those "which lie on the Southern Shore up to a mile of distance from it."
2. The lease will last between twenty and fifty years.
3. The United States will have "perfect and exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction through that time over the territories and waters above mentioned."
4. The United States will also have the right "to cut, use, and carry away building timber, to mine, use, and carry away mineral coal, and any other mineral which may be found in the leased territory during the time agreed upon."
5. Any minerals extracted shall be subject to mining laws in force.
6. The United States shall "use and occupy all the public grounds, places, establishments, that my be found in the leased territory."
7. The Dominican Republic shall "retain the free use of the waters of the Bay."
8. The United States shall pay the sum of one million dollars as a down
payment and $300,000 annually thereafter.
9. The United States shall furnish the Dominican Republic with six
100-pound guns and "other fixtures."
10. Upon signature of the lease, the United States shall send a vessel
with a million dollars in gold to the Dominican Government.
11. The United States shall protect the Dominican government from
"any difficulties" that may be "superinduced" by any foreign nation.
12. The Dominican Government shall have the right to "possess every
kind of property in the leased territory, preserving their citizenship."504
II. THE FINAL PAGE OF FABEN'S

LIFE IN SANTO DOMINGO, BY A SETTLER

Below is the final chapter appended to Joseph Fabens' former publication, In the Tropics, under the new title Life in Santo Domingo, By a Settler. These pages show the formation of the Samana Bay Company.

Since the earlier editions of this work were published, a movement has been set on foot which will rapidly change the whole face of Santo Domingo by opening up the island to the free commerce of the world, and by furnishing increased facilities for emigration from the United States to that quarter. We refer to the Samana Bay Company of Santo Domingo, inaugurated in this country, with head-quarters in the City of New York, on a large and comprehensive scale, by a number of our leading capitalists.

This company has had granted to it extraordinary privileges by the Government of Santo Domingo, including the right to prosecute various internal improvements. It has, also, powers that will enable the company to sustain itself in a state of proper independence.

The objects of the company are purely industrial—without political aim or significance—having reference to the development of the resources of the island by means of commerce, immigration, the introduction of superior methods of agriculture, and facilities for rapid intercommunication.

The emigrant from our shores has now an increased incentive for leaving, because he will go literally among his countrymen, and will receive protection and all necessary aids in founding his new home.

We can assure all who propose taking up their abode in the island for the purpose of husbandry, that they may rely as implicitly on the monthly directions contained in this volume as they would on any formal guide or manual. 505
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DISSERTATIONS


Adderly, Kenneth B. “The Reaction of President Ulysses S. Grant to the Santo Domingo


1 After five hundred years of research, historians still cannot agree on when Columbus landed in the New World. Our calendars mark the date as October 11. Yet, in 1892, the Bureau of the American Republics: Santo Domingo, printed in Washington, D.C., stated, "The first landing of Columbus on that island was made on December 6, 1492, on the coast of what is now a part of the Republic of Haiti, a few miles west of the Dominican boundary ... (1)." Perhaps the most overlooked and underrated historical source, Almost a Territory by William Javier Nelson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), listed Columbus’ landing on October 12, 1492 on 229.


3 Christopher Columbus, The Four Voyages of Christopher Columbus, trans. J.M. Cohen, 56.


7 Burkholder & Johnson, Colonial Latin America, 184.

8 Bureau of American Republics: Santo Domingo, 2; Almost a Territory, 22; Jefferson’s Reaction, 1.

Howard Zinn in his People’s History of the United States argued for an earlier date of 1503, and I am inclined to agree.

9 Colonial Latin America, 184.

10 Ibid., 37.

11 One of the more colorful governors of Santo Domingo, Diego Columbus, along with Ovando, established his city as the pre-eminent colony in the New World, though his reputation for abuse of the Arawaks was notorious. A traveler to the islands, in 1873, remarked how he admired the ruins of the governor’s mansion during his tour. See Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo, Past and Present: With a Glance at Hayti, 46.

12 Almost a Territory, 23; Bureau of American Republics, 2.

13 Bureau of American Republics, 2.

14 Almost a Territory, 23.

15 Ibid., 24.

16 For excellent ethnographic studies of these three classes and for an entertaining history of Santo Domingo during this period, the best source by far is Samuel Hazard’s Santo Domingo: Past and Present: Washington: 1873, 68-79.

17 Santo Domingo: Past and Present, 81-82.

18 Ibid., 80-84.

19 Ibid., 84.
It is still not known what happened to the sugar cane of that year, except that none produced over the entire island. Apparently, the entire crop rotted and the year was a total loss for the French colony (Hazard, 90). Some historians are now arguing that a mini-Ice Age occurred which froze many crops in mid-production during this time period. Other authors argue that molds and blights were prevalent during an unseasonably wet period.


Tansill, Charles Callan. The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873, 1.

Tansill, 1-4.


The United States and Santo Domingo, 5.

In Twentieth-Century Dollars, a poor person earned $300,000. The wealthiest of this period would literally put Bill Gates to shame. During the period of the early 1730’s to the 1850’s, an enormous amount of wealth was produced.


The United States and Santo Domingo, 6-7.

Jefferson’s Reaction, 4-6.

Santo Domingo: Past and Present, 107-111.

One of the more interesting complaints of colonial excesses was filed before then Governor de Rohan in 1766. A colonist complained of “orgies that these voluptuous colonists had given themselves up to in midnight balls, in the midst of which, the lights extinguished, each man used the woman he had seized at random.” Fearing that Haiti was ripe for open revolt, Prince de Rohan considered such complaints as seditious and often ignored them. See Santo Domingo: Past and Present, 112.

Santo Domingo: Past and Present, 115.

62 Treadley, 223.
63 Ibid., 224.
64 Treadley, 225-226.
65 Ibid., 226.
66 Ibid., 230.
67 Ibid., 231.
68 Ibid., 232.
70 Ibid., 1.
71 Ibid., 1-2.
72 Ibid., 2.
73 Ibid., 9.
75 Bell, 10.
76 Erb, 1.
77 Almost a Territory, 28.
78 Historians have debated this thesis, also. Tansill believed that Santana favored French intervention (124), but Nelson argued that Santana was far too anti-Haitian to allow the French any control of Santo Domingo (37). What can not be neglected, however, is the personal vision of a very ambitious Santana.
79 There is some disagreement as to dates here. Dr. Treadley stated that Caminero arrived in December of 1844 (*United States and Santo Domingo*, 234). Nelson, in *Almost a Territory*, citing Tansill, stated that the earliest possible date was 6 January (47).
80 Almost a Territory, 37.
81 Tansill, 126.
82 Ibid., 127-129.
83 Ibid., 129-139.
84 Ibid., 131.
85 Ibid., 133-134.
87 Boland, 64.
88 Tansill, 134-136.
89 Treadley, 237-238.
91 Ibid., 242-243.
92 Tansill, 165-166. It is also ironic to note that Walsh’s critics still considered him an able man despite his “feelings towards the Negro Race more or less natural to a Virginian.” Walsh also believed that the only real way to compel Haiti of American intentions was in sending warships (Tansill, 164).
93 Boland, 64.
94 Tansill, 166-167.
95 Ibid., 167.
96 Ibid., 168.
97 Ibid., 170.
98 Almost a Territory, 42.
99 Boland, 63.
100 Tansill, 174.
101 Boland, 59.
Eliot also wrote to Santana that same day in response to a request to propose annexation to the United States. Eliot urged Santana to wait on his proposal until the new administration had acclimated to the office. See Tansill, 175.

Boland, 64.
Tansill, 169-173.
Boland, 61.
Ibid., 64.
Tansill, 175-176. Rumors abounded that Cazneau chose Santo Domingo as his permanent residence because it was safer than living in Eagle Pass, Texas, where his financial enemies also resided.

Ibid., 176-177.
Ibid., 179.
Boland, 63-64.
Tansill, 179.
Ibid., 180.
Treudley, 246.
Boland, 63.
Tansill, 185.
Ibid., 189-190.
Treudley, 247, Tansill, 134, 189-190.
Tansill, 195-196.
Ibid., 203; Treudley, 250.
Ibid., 61-62.
Ibid., 60.
Bell, 21-22.
Ibid.
Ibid., 23-25.
Ibid., 29-30.
Ibid., 42.
Ibid., 45.
Ibid., 46-47.
Ibid., 47-48.
Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 54-55.
Ibid., 55.
Ibid., 58.
Ibid., 58-59.
Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 62.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid.
Ibid., 65-66.
Ibid., 66.
Boland, 59.
Treudley, 250.
Bell, 4, 15.
Boland, 63.
Treudley, 250.
Tansill, 204.
Treudley, 251.
Tansill, 205.
Bell, 19.
Tansill, 206.
Boland 63, 80.
152 Ibid., 60.
153 Tansill, 296-297.
154 Boland, 64.
155 Muir, 13.
156 Tansill, 207-208.
157 Ibid., 208-209.
158 Bell, 2-3.
159 Ibid., 15.
160 Boland, 54.
161 Bell, 3.
162 Ibid., 64.
163 Treudley, 251-254; Tansill, 212.
164 Ibid., 105-106.
165 Ibid., 11.
166 Ibid., 87-88.
167 Ibid., 176.
168 Ibid., 73.
169 Ibid., 74-75.
170 Ibid., 4.
172 Boland, 60.
174 Report of the West India Company, 1 October 1862, 1-2.
175 Bancroft, William H. Seward, 125.
176 Treudley, 254; Tansill, 212.
177 Bell, 3.
178 Ibid., 3-4, 15.
179 Ibid., 6-7.
180 Ibid., 5-6.
181 Ibid., 5.
182 Ibid., 8.
183 Ibid., 7-8.
184 Boland, 64.
185 Bancroft, 346.
186 Ibid., 347.
187 Ibid.
188 Boland, 60.
189 Ibid., 64.
190 Boland, 2.
191 Ibid., 2-3.
192 Ibid., 3-5. The phrase “gospel of guano” is not as far-fetched as one would believe. Apparently, in many speeches concerning the miraculous effects of guano, speakers would use the verse in 1 Samuel 2:8, “He raiseth up the poor out of the dust, and lifteth up the beggar from the dunghill, to set them among princes, and to make them inherit the throne of glory: for the pillars of the earth are the Lord’s, and He hath set the world upon them.” See Boland, 5. Indeed, miracles were attributed to bat manure.
193 One journal reported a boy who fell asleep in a guano barn and awoke eight feet tall. Another declared that the mast of a guano-laden ship, after being caught in a storm, grew evergreen foliage, the deck was covered in shrubbery, a cherry table bore fruit, and crab apples grew on the pump handles. See Boland, 6-7.
194 Ibid., 7.
195 Ibid., 8-9.
Apparently, this fear was not ungrounded. Newspapers across the country had published reports of British interest in the islands. Benson admitted that this was the reason he approached Webster in the first place (Boland, 71).

Paolino rightly considers Alaska to be “the first noncontiguous addition to the United States,” but it was not the first attempt at new territory, but rather the first permanent territory (204). The United States ceded the Lobos Islands back to Peru.

Ibid., 9-12.

Tansill, 305-395.

Boland, 12-13.

Ibid., 16-19.

Ibid., 22-23.

Ibid., 24-25.

Tansill, 290.

Boland, 27-30.

Ibid., 31.

Ibid., 32.

Tansill, 305-306.

Ibid., 292.

Ibid.

Ibid., 291-291, 335.

Boland, 32.

Tansill, 292.

Tansill, 292-293.

Ibid., 294.

Black to Seward, March 27, 1861, Guano Papers, MS Dept. of State, cited in Tansill, 294-295.

Ibid., 214 (italics mine).

Paolino makes the suggestion that Seward was more concerned with foreign affairs and found the Civil War a vexation to this end. See 205.

Report of the American West India Company, 5-6, 9-10.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 6, 8, 10-11.

Ibid., 12-13.


There are three known extant copies of Fabens’ writings on these subjects, all of which are very similar. Aside from his speech to the American Geographical and Statistical Society of New York and his ghost-written book, there was apparently an article entitled “Santo Domingo,” which appeared in a farming journal known as The Arbor (v. 61, March 1863, 259).


Ibid., 7-8.


Almost a Territory, 49.

Report of the American West India Company, 15-16.


Knight, 8.


Tansill, 220.

Ibid., 220-222.


Ibid., 157.
There is disagreement about when Seward arrived in St. Thomas. Discussions on purchasing the island were tabled until the end of 1865 with the arrival of a more sympathetic Dutch Foreign Minister in Washington. Bancroft, in his two-volume biography of Seward, does not specify when Seward arrived. Tansill states that Seward arrived on St. Thomas Island on 9 January, 1866, and was in Santo Domingo by 14 January (226). The receipt of a letter from Mrs. Cora Montgomery Cazneau to Seward via Secretary James Harlan, dated 6 September, 1865, was ignored in Bancroft's biography.

Why he felt the need to divulge this information is unknown.
See Tansill, 250.

321 Ibid., 250-251.
322 Ibid., 310.
323 Ibid., 252-253.
324 Ibid., 253.
325 Ibid., 250.
326 Ibid., 310.
327 Ibid., 253-254.
328 Ibid., 254.

Wade, 185-187.

Ibid., 187.

Tansill, 265.

Ibid., 263.

Ibid., 265.

Ibid., 280.

Ibid., 266.

Wade, 188.

Ibid., 211-212, 217.

Tansill, 268.

Ibid.

Ibid., 269-270.

Ibid., 271-272.

Ibid., 272.

Ibid.

Ibid., 274-276.

Ibid., 276.

Ibid., 277.

Ibid., 280.

Ibid., 277-278.

Ibid., 279-280.

Wade, 194.

Tansill, 282-283.

Ibid., 336-337.
Ibid., 374, 378.  
Ibid., 392.  
Erb, 12.  
Tansill, 374-375.  
Ibid., 378-379.  
Knight, 11. See also, New York Herald, January 10, 1870.  
Erb, 11.  
Tansill, 380-381.  
Ibid., 382-383.  
Adlerly, Reaction of Grant, 12-13.  
Tansill, 389. Adlerly erroneously made the statement, “Before he [Grant] left he promised to have General Babcock send the documents concerning annexation to the Senator, but it was never done.” Adlerly also incorrectly submitted that Commercial Agent Perry wrote to Fish in 1864. The date was See “Reaction of Grant,” 14.  
Tansill, 389.  
Ibid., 375, 392.  
Ibid., 390.  
Erb, 12. See also Tansill, 393.  
Erb, 13.  
Tansill, 395.  
Ibid., 401.  
Ibid., 400.  
Ibid., 403.  
Ibid., 401. See also Erb, 14.  
Ibid., 402-403.  
Ibid., 403.  
Tansill, 399.  
Ibid., 407.  
Ibid., 406.  
Ibid., 403, 407.  
Ibid., 393-394.  
Ibid., 402.  
Ibid., 408.  
Ibid.  
Ibid., 402.  
Ibid., 407-409.  
Ibid., 409.  
Ibid., 403.  
Ibid., 410-411.  
Ibid.  
Ibid., 420.  
Erb, Appendix II, vii-ix.  
Ibid., 20.  
Ibid., 20-21.  
Tansill, 410.  
Ibid., 413.  
Ibid., 398.  
Erb, 12-13.  
Tansill, 411.  
Ibid., 413.  
Knight, 15.  
Tansill, 421-422.  
Ibid., 427-428.
Ibid., 428-429.
Ibid.
Ibid., 430-431.
Ibid., 431-436.
Ibid., 436.
Wade, 1-3.
Knight, 16.
Erb, 15. See also Tansill, 461-462.
Bancroft says April; Paolino says October.
Bancroft, 514-526.
Paolino, 144.
Ibid., 121. Italic author’s.
Ibid., 122. Italics author’s.
Ibid., 125-126.
Ibid., 126.
Erb, 15.
Knight, 15.
Knight, 15.
Tansill, 250-251.