Some Barriers to Development in Cameroon, Kenya and Swaziland

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Some Barriers to Development in
Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland

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Some Barriers to Development in Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland

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In the study of development, researchers attempt to identify and measure the independent variables believed to influence economic growth and social development indicators in countries throughout the world. These researchers employ quantitative cross-national research methods, also known as the variable-oriented approach, while others may pursue a more case-oriented approach and examine a handful of countries employing a historical-comparative method. Education is a variable that has been identified in both of these research traditions to be positively related to the development of a country. However, when the effects of education on development are examined cross-nationally, it is clear that the countries of Africa have not experienced the same levels of economic growth as countries in other regions, such as in Latin America and Asia. To find out why Africa is not experiencing the same rate of growth as
other regions this study explored the barriers to educational attainment and economic development in a sample of three African countries: Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. A historical comparative approach was used to identify the historical factors giving rise to the present situation in each country. Each country’s political, economic, and geographic history is discussed to provide a context for the present-day situation. The research then examined how a variety of decisions made by each country’s leaders has shaped the ability of young children to attend school as well as shaping each country’s overall development. This research project found that HIV/AIDS, land distribution, and corruption were the primary barriers in all three countries that obstructed education from having a positive influence on development. Each country may not exhibit the same level of HIV/AIDS, land distribution, and corruption, but all three experience some form of these three inhibiting factors. The findings suggest that the factors stem from historical causes in each country as well as poor political decisions made by politicians and leaders over the last several decades. The study also concluded that the three inhibiting factors all work interdependently, and each problem cannot be solved independently. The barring factors mitigate any effect education has on the
development of the country by decreasing children’s ability to attend school and decreasing the country’s levels of human capital.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II and the dismantling of colonial empires throughout the world, the study of nation-state development in the social sciences has endeavored to identify the factors influencing economic growth, social progress, and the levels of political freedom and democratization. Development scholars have devoted considerable time and research to the effects of education, which researchers have demonstrated has a positive influence on economic and social growth within a country. For the lowest income countries of the world, expanding its educational system and increasing primary and secondary school enrollments can increase human-capital formation among their citizens, promoting higher standards of living and lower levels of extreme poverty. As educational attainment and literacy rates increase, countries are better able to attract multinational investors, thus providing employment opportunities for their citizens. For the last half-century, researchers throughout the world have tried to determine the effects educational
institutions have on shaping the development path for lower-income countries throughout the world (Bradshaw and Fuller 1996).

In an "ideal-type" model the positive effects of education on human development within a nation state seem almost logical and irrefutable. However, in reality, there are numerous impediments in the development path, and the effects of education on human development are not always positive, linear, and strong. Numerous factors such as government corruption, extreme poverty, and land-tenure issues may impede the progress that education can play in promoting development. It is necessary to uncover and understand the barriers hindering development so that the efforts and decisions of policy makers and government officials are not in vain. Moreover, with more than two billion people in the world living on less than two dollars per day, it is essential for researchers and policy makers to fully understand the barriers impeding economic, social, and political development throughout the world (World Bank 2007a).

Africa is an important area in the study of development because its nations are some of the poorest and least developed in the world today. Researchers have expressed many reasons as to why Africa is not developing
as quickly as other regions (Abrokwaa 1999; Fuller 1987; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Barclay 2004). However, much of the research does not examine the obstacles to development. These barriers slow the progress of many countries; and, when not addressed, these factors will continue to do so in the future.

A vast body of research and literature exists on the history of African countries and the limited successes and vast pitfalls influencing their development paths. This research is an exploratory study using historical-comparative methods in an attempt to better understand the barriers hindering human development. More specifically, this research seeks to identify some of the issues and problems that are preventing educational institutions from having a positive effect on human development in a sample of case studies.

The study explores the histories and the educational and development indicators for three African countries, Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland, to illuminate the factors within each that bar the effects of education on a variety of development indicators. Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland were chosen as the cases for this research because of their different colonial legacies and current government structure.
Using a historical-comparative method, the history and geopolitical context of each country will be examined to expose some of the factors that are currently barring the effects of education on a variety of development indicators today. World Bank data from 1990-2004 were used to highlight the changes in economic and educational development that have taken place over the last decade and a half. Data were also culled from a variety of existing historical-comparative studies as well as in-depth case studies focusing on Cameroon, Swaziland, and Kenya. Books and journal articles by scholars from a variety of academic disciplines as well as reports published by various international institutions, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, provided key insights into the demographic, medical, educational, social, and geopolitical issues facing each of these countries. This research is an attempt to synthesize the development indicators from the World Bank with this existing body of research on Cameroon, Swaziland, and Kenya in an attempt to better understand the complexities and difficulties in promoting educational attainment and literacy in the path toward development.

The results of this research suggest that each country has its own factors barring development, but similar patterns exist. Based on the historical-comparative
research discussed in the following chapters, access to viable and fruitful farmland appears to be a significant problem in all three of the countries in this study. A large sector of the population in these African countries relies on subsistence based farming, and the results of this research suggest that there are numerous impediments to development. Second, the detrimental effects of HIV/AIDS and the high infection rates in all three countries have influenced the ability of children in these countries to receive neither primary nor secondary school education. The high rates of infection have left many children orphaned or without parents, the absences of which eliminates any hope of a child being able to afford the school fees that exist for primary and/or secondary education. Finally, the results of this research suggest that very high levels of corruption continue to plague development efforts. While each country possesses its own unique historical legacies and contemporary challenges, these three general patterns appear to be limiting the possibilities of educational attainment and prevent education from having its hypothesized positive effect on development.

Past research indicates that, by strengthening educational institutions, development will occur in a low-
income country. This study reveals that the factors that bar the effects of education on development must be addressed if a country is to develop. Other countries in Africa need to be examined to find whether the conclusions in this study are generalizable to all of Africa. Future research should focus on the inhibiting factors in different countries in Africa and other regions of the world.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

When viewing a map of the world one will notice that the countries considered low-income were former colonies, were poverty stricken, and often have unstable governments or dictatorships. These low-income countries are striving to achieve a higher standard of living and a greater share of the world's income. Some former low-income states, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, have achieved great prosperity while others have not fared as well. Sub-Saharan Africa falls into the latter category of world development.

The former African colonies have not made the progress that former Latin American and Asian colonies have made. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest life expectancy in the world (World Bank 2007b). The vast majority of citizens residing within these countries survive on a dollar or two dollars a day. HIV/AIDS and malaria are rampant and often these countries experience unstable or corrupt governments that compound the already poor condition of the country. Today, social scientists are researching reasons why some areas are developing and
others are not. Understanding why Africa has not developed as quickly as other regions can help to guide development studies in the future.

After the colonial period ended in the 1950s, sociologists, economists, and political scientists have tried to explain and understand the factors associated with development. As a result of World War II, many colonial countries sought and eventually gained independence. As these countries formed their governments, they experimented with many governing structures such as democracies, one-party states, and authoritarian regimes. These same countries experimented with varying degrees of free-market capitalism, and many explored the possibility of a communist economic system. The United States government encouraged social scientists to study the development of these new nation-states so the West would not “lose” these countries to the communist Soviet Union.

**Modernization Theory**

The theory that emerged from scholars in the United States to explain development was modernization theory, which states that modernization takes a logical, linear path like a plane taking off (Rostow 1964). Modernization theorists believed that low-income countries were at an advantage because low-income countries had examples to
follow just by looking at previously successful countries. Low-income countries should mimic the actions that the high-income countries took to develop and should learn from their mistakes. Therefore, the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia should have followed the example of the high-income countries (the United States, Japan, and the other G8 nations) to develop.

Rostow (1964) demonstrated that development was like a plane taking off from an airport in which there are steps each country must take before development can take place. He identified five stages that a country must complete to develop successfully. In using the analogy of the plane, at first it is stationary and a country is traditional. Then the plane slowly begins to taxi, and a country begins to slowly expand markets and open new industries. Next Rostow explains that a plane will take off the runway and a country will have self-sustained growth by increasing capital in resources in the country. Once the plane has lifted off the ground and can stay in the air, the fourth stage is reached. A country at this stage will have an automatic rate of growth. In the final stage the plane will level off and bring its landing gear up; the country will be fully developed with a mass consumption economy.
Smelser (1964) agreed with Rostow's belief that low-income countries should mirror high-income countries when they begin to develop. Modernization leads to differentiation of labor and skills (e.g. Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim). When labor and skills are divided into specialized functions, the economy will run more efficiently; thus, development will occur. The high-income areas of the world have specialized so the low-income world should specialize as the high-income world has.

To illustrate some benefits to development Inkeless (1964) examined how modernization affects people. Modern men, according to Inkeless, shared openness to new experiences, held a belief in science, planned for the long term, wanted to be mobile in their occupations, wanted independence from authority figures, and were active in politics. Inkeless stated that education was the most important indicator of modern values. The exposure to the Western values and learning style developed "modern men." His work illustrates the belief that low-income countries can develop through educating and socializing their people to Western culture and institutions.

Modernization theory is an evolutionary stage that countries will undergo. Countries that develop will develop in phases, as Rostow's (1964) example of a plane
taking off the runway explained. Development is a homogenizing process because all countries will begin to look like one another as time goes on. Europe and America should be taken as the example of what development can occur and will occur for low-income countries. There is an assumption that modernization is irreversible and that development is desirable to being undeveloped. Development brings a better way of life and undeveloped countries should strive to achieve what others already have. Modernization theory also explains that development will not take place overnight but will take place in stages over an extended period of time.

Critics of modernization theory argue that European countries had different historical and ecological circumstances compared to the low-income countries of the 1950s that make it impossible for them to imitate their success. Moreover, countries can move forward and backward on a development scale; and, because of the capitalist world economy, countries at the bottom have been used as sources of raw materials and inexpensive labor, with the profits from such activities going to high-income countries and not being reinvested in the low-income countries (Wallerstein 1974a). Also, modernization theory was labeled as elitist because the theory states that low-
income countries can simply do what a high-income country has done to develop (Bodenheimer 1970). In the end modernization theory fell out of favor as a model practical for development.

**Dependency Theory**

The criticisms of modernization theory led to the formation of dependency theory. Dependency theory grew out of the work of Latin American scholars, who stated that development cannot happen while low-income countries are dependent on high-income countries for capital, technology, and resources (Blomstrom and Hette 1984; Frank 1967). According to dependency theory, low-income countries comprise a periphery that is dependent on high-income "core" countries for capital profits, and surplus flows from low-income to high-income countries. This dependence leads to greater underdevelopment for countries in the periphery (Dos Santos 1971). Core countries sell technology to peripheral countries to help countries develop, but the peripheral countries have to pay the core countries for the technology; therefore, profits of this new market go to core countries, while the periphery often experience higher levels of debt. By being dependent on high-income countries low-income countries will never fully develop the way that high-income countries have, but will
remain in a subordinate position in which the low-income countries will become underdeveloped (Frank 1967).

According to Dos Santos (1971) high-income countries are developing at the expense of low-income countries. Dos Santos explained that there is a structure to dependence, which follows a historical path of colonial, financial-industrial, and technological-industrial dependence. In colonial dependence a high-income country takes control of a low-income country's land and markets; thus, the high-income country acquires the wealth of the low-income country's resources. Low-income countries become dependent on the export of their raw materials and agriculture to high-income countries in the financial-industrial form of dependence. Next in the technology-industrial form of dependence, low-income countries become dependent on exporting their goods to high-income countries. High-income countries have a monopoly on how much a good should cost and can undercut the value of low-income countries' goods. High-income countries also control the technology that low-income countries need to produce and sell their goods; therefore, low-income countries become dependent on high-income countries to buy their goods and sell them the technology they need to compete.
Expanding on the dependent nature of low-income countries, Cardoso (1973) explained how low-income countries engage in associated-dependent development. Cardoso argued that foreign corporations are intertwined with the internal prosperity of the country in which they operate. The foreign corporations enable a low-income country to develop, but they develop because of the capital and employment opportunities that the company brings to the country. The internal situation of a low-income country does play a role in the development of the country, but foreign business drives the internal situation (Cardoso 1973).

The pessimism of dependency theory of the 1960s and 1970s was replaced by a famous “dependent development” of Evans (1983), in which low-income countries are developing, but they are developing because of high-income countries. As noted above, prior research has showed that low-income countries are dependent on high-income countries for technology and capital. The technology and capital that the high-income countries provide to the low-income countries facilitate what internal advancements the country can pursue. If a high-income country were to withdraw support from a low-income country, the low-income country would decline. However an increase in support from high-
income countries would increase development in the low-income country. The low-income countries of the world are developing by being dependent on the high-income countries.

Evans (1983) differed from many other dependency theorists because he illustrated how internal conditions play a role in development. A triple alliance is formed by local, state, and multinational capital. Evans argued that multinational corporations are attracted to the markets of low-income countries. The state provides incentives, such as subsidies and cheap labor, which will attract the outside capital necessary to develop the country. Meanwhile, the local capital would benefit from the new capital flowing into the area and be able to establish a niche in the market that would help the area to develop. Without the "triple alliance" working together development would not be possible.

Many dependency theorists state that dependency is an external condition. As Frank (1967) and Dos Santos (1971) illustrated, low-income countries become dependent on high-income countries through colonization and the high-income countries' control of technology, not through the internal resources and capital of the low-income country. The theory also demonstrates that dependency is based on economic conditions. Low-income countries would not be in
the position they were in if high-income countries did not control the market and the currency of the market. Being in a dependent position, many countries have to barrow money from the high-income countries and this leads to debt. Countries that have high levels of debt have to pay down the loan with money they often do not have. Therefore, the country borrows more money to keep its economy afloat while at the same time paying back the first loan; thus, the country becomes more dependent on high-income countries.

Critics of dependency theory argue that the theory is abstract and, at times, Marxist propaganda that treats all low-income countries the same (So 1990). The theory does not take into account internal conditions, such as political conditions and mass movements. While dependency theory does explain how external and geopolitical factors play a role in development, the theory does not explain how domestic political decisions shape or hinder the prospects for development.

The theory was developed in Latin America in response to modernization theory and the increasing influence of the United States. However, as many scholars have noted, many Asian countries were also colonies but were able to develop more rapidly than Latin American countries. The growth of
the Asian Dragons/Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore) shows that some countries, despite a high level of dependency in the 1950s-1960s, were able to develop economically and to expand human capital. By inviting multinational corporations into their countries the Asian Dragons/Tigers were able to produce jobs and investment opportunities that were not available before, and the countries developed quickly. Latin American countries, on the other hand, received loans to build factories and infrastructure. By receiving loans Latin America acquired huge levels of debt and slower development. The divergence between these Asian countries and Latin American countries in their levels of development suggests that dependency theory may help us explain only half the development puzzle by explaining external factors only. Dependency theory needed to adjust by examining internal and external factors influencing or hindering development within a world economy.

**World-System Theory**

Wallerstein (1979) extended the dependency school by developing world-system theory, which states that the world is ordered in world economy with core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral countries (Wallerstein 1979). The core countries are the high-income Western countries, the semi-
Peripheral middle-income countries consist mostly of those in Eastern Europe (i.e. former Soviet Union, and many South American countries), and the low-income peripheral countries of the world are located primarily in Africa and parts of Central America and Southeast Asia. World-system theory directs researchers to examine how core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral fit within an integrated world-economy.

Based on the strength and weakness of the world-economy core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries could move up or down based on their reaction to the current global market. If the global market weakens, a core country needs to maintain profits by increasing efficiency and gaining a monopoly in the market to stay on top. If the core country cannot do this, it may fall to the semiperiphery because it cannot maintain its profits in an economic downturn. At the same time, when the market is weak, semiperipheral and peripheral countries can "seize the chance" by buying technology cheaply and thus increase their future capital and strength in the market (Wallerstein 1974b).

World-System theory has produced a new global approach to studying development. The theory examines how global dynamics play a role in development for all nation-states.
The interaction between the core, periphery, and semiperiphery demonstrate that the global economy plays a significant role in how countries develop.

A criticism of world-system theory is that it does not take historically specific development within each nation state into account by lumping all countries into a world model (Zeitlin 1984). World-system theory fits all countries into a world level of analysis, but internal factors play a role in development of particular states. Because world-system theory is focused on the world level the theory does not take class conflict within the country into account (Zeitlin 1984). The theory also does not look at the production sphere of development to see what role the classes play in development.

**Human Capital Theory**

Modernization, dependency, and world-system theories illustrate how the internal conditions and external conditions of a country are all meaningful in the development process. More recent literature has suggested that countries can aid their development by strengthening institutions that will allow them to compete in the global-economy. Flora's community capitals model suggests that financial, natural, cultural, human, social, political, and built capital effect the development of a country (Flora,
Emery, Fey, and Bregendahl 2007). By strengthening each area a country will become vibrant and grow. Education is one of the factors that the community capital model has identified as building human capital, which will attract outside investment (financial capital) to assist a country to grow.

Human capital theory builds on the idea that a country's internal dynamics and its external relations with other countries helps to explain its level of development. Abrokwaa (1999:653) stated that "any form of acquired skills or knowledge that could be used to improve the individual's ability to perform productive work must be considered capital investments." Sachs (2005:244) explains human capital as, "health, nutrition, and skills needed for each person to be economically productive." Human-capital theorists believe that in order for a country to develop the people need to acquire skills that will be beneficial to promote outside investment.

As shown by the Asian Dragons/Tigers, countries can implement policies and invest in institutions such as education. Multinational corporations will then be attracted to the area because of the increase in human capital. As more corporations enter the area, more jobs will become available. An increase in employment increases
the income of the people in the area, which increases the standard of living in the area. After the standard of living increases the state can tax the population and put the tax revenue into social programs such as schools and increase human capital further.

Multinational and transnational corporations seek workforces that possess the human capital necessary to engage in the manufacturing process. Therefore, it is essential for nation states to have a robust primary and secondary education system to attract these investors. As secondary and primary education expand, the country will increase human capital; thus, the workforce of the country will be attractive to outside investors that will help the country grow.

After World War II Japan experienced rapid development because of their Tokugawa religion (Bellah 1957). Bellah found that the Tokugawa religion provided the core value of Japanese society. The religion was based on the good of the community and the whole, rather than the individual. After World War II the samurai of Japan turned themselves into entrepreneurs, not for profit but for the good of society. By becoming entrepreneurs for the good of society Japan was able to industrialize quickly and produce human
capital throughout Japan that was able to attract investment from high-income countries.

McClelland (1964) stated that entrepreneurs play a critical role in development. According to McClelland, entrepreneurs pursue achievement not profit. A low-income country can bolster its entrepreneurs by remaining in contact with the high-income countries. The diffusion of ideas will help entrepreneurs in low-income countries create new ideas and technologies that will assist in development and build social capital. The expansion of technologies and industries that the entrepreneurs will provide will increase the human capital in the low-income country.

Bellah's (1957) and McClelland's (1964) research is commonly described as part of modernization theory because they state that contact with the high-income countries is beneficial for development, but these studies also highlight the utility of human capital theory. The two studies show how internal actions by a low-income country can produce human capital through entrepreneurs and how external factors, such as investment by high-income countries, can help a low-income country to develop. The entrepreneurs need to be educated to attract outside
investment. Multinational corporations want literate and obedient workers that education will provide.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Barclay (2004) found that poor human capital formation in Africa could explain the region's lack of innovation, diffusion, and adaptation of new technologies. Oketch (2005) demonstrated that as countries develop they put more money into education, which increases human development and increases development further. By building human capital through education low-income countries are developing.

In fact, the Grameen Bank provides microcredit or small loans to impoverished communities in the hope that human capital and social capital will be produced and raise the community out of poverty. The bank lends money to women, and these women start a business in their community. Once the women begin to make a profit, the money is used to pay for their children's primary schooling.

Education has always been shown to have a positive effect on development. In his now classic work, Lipset (1959:482) believed that low education "predisposed individuals to favor extremist, intolerant, and transvaluational forms of political and religious behavior." Human capital theory states that school expansion fosters economic growth (Hage, Garnier, and
Fuller 1988). Sachs (2003:8) stated that, “the business environment, the social environment, the ecological environment, and the country’s strategy or lack of strategy with regard to science and technology” are four interlocking circles that produce economic results. All of these culminate in human capital, which is achieved through education.

Education has a greater effect on children from low-income countries than it does on children living in high-income countries (Fuller 1987). For many children in low-income countries school is the first time they are exposed to books and socialized in Western values. The children of the low-income countries grow and learn rapidly from being educated in formal schools and socialized in a world-economy. By being immersed in a standardized form of education children in low-income countries increase the human capital of their country that can help the country to develop.

Encouraging people to go to school can help the development process as Kenya has shown (Bradshaw and Fuller 1996). After independence Kenya bolstered her school attendance by offering food supplements, reducing the cost of school attendance, and expanding secondary school opportunities. It was believed that providing these
incentives would produce skilled graduates who would fill the jobs of the whites who were leaving after Kenya’s independence. The outcome of this policy failed due to a fragile economy in Kenya. The incentives were taken away, and Kenya remained a low-income county, but the incentives do show that the government plays an important role in educational attendance and attainment.

Governments can provide incentives to encourage school attendance, but Brown and Hunter (2004) illustrated that the type of government has an effect on education. Democracies provide a higher amount of spending on education than do other forms of governments (Brown and Hunter 2004). Higher levels of educational spending will produce higher levels of human capital, thus increasing development. Examining different forms of governance can explain some of the differences in development among low-income countries. Development studies need to take the type of government into account when studying development.

African development may be slower due to the agrarian structure of many areas. Agrarian societies resist democracy according to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992). Because the middle class is the driving force of democratization, the existence of a small middle class in most African countries has contributed to a slower rate of
economic growth compared to other regions. Exploring government and political systems in Africa needs to be examined further to understand the effect that education and the role of the government have on each other.

When explaining sub-Saharan Africa's development, Gereffi and Fonda (1992) explained that Africa is developing slowly because Africa depends on agriculture, and agricultural production could not keep pace with the increasing population. African industries use minimal technology and often employ low-skill workers (Gereffi and Fonda 1992). It is important to understand that internal as well as external factors drive development. Expanding education can increase human capital (Psacharopoluos 1995); internal factors will drive whether money is allocated to education, but external business or loans may be necessary to help a country expand educational spending.

Position in the global economic system, internal colonialism, and the underdevelopment of state structures are reasons behind the stratification within Latin America, which is the most stratified region in the world (Hoffman and Centeno 2003). Africa's stratification can be examined in the same way as Latin America's. Understanding that Africa is made up of many different groups of people will help to explain some of the differences among countries in
Africa. Viewing Africa historically and examining internal strife, state structures, and global position will help explain what effect education has in the development of the country. Examining countries' stratification as Hoffman and Centeno have done will provide information on whether universal education helps decrease stratification within a country.

Examining differences in development between low-income countries can bring to light some of the factors that promote or hinder development. Ramirez and Meyer (1980:369) state, "research in 'comparative education' consists in studies of education in individual countries with few direct comparisons." Studying education across countries can illuminate the differences in development that education affects. By viewing countries historically and taking the country's government type, poverty, and disease into account a clue to what development strategies work and which development strategies fail will emerge.

By examining three different countries in Africa a picture will emerge of what has hindered development in Africa. The history of the country will provide a context as to why the country is in its current global position. Comparisons of each country will help to show that each country, while unique, shares similar barriers to
development; thus, any educational development will be mitigated by the reaction of the government to these barriers.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODS

As discussed in the previous section, research has shown that education has a positive effect on development for low-income countries throughout the world. While quantitative studies have shown this relationship exists, prior research is limited in examining the barriers that may hinder, or prevent, education from having this positive influence on development. When conducting quantitative analyses on countries, researchers lose the context of each case, and the historical and geopolitical factors influencing development become less of a concern.

This study initially set out to examine the relationship between education and development in a sample of African countries using a historical-comparative approach. However, in the course of doing the inductive work necessary in a historical-comparative project like this one, troubling patterns began to emerge. Through this historical-comparative data collection, a variety of common social problems were identified, which represent significant challenges for a large number of developing
countries as they pursue increased levels of educational attainment and economic growth.

Given this context, this research will explore and identify the barriers to the effects of education on economic development in a sample of three African countries: Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. These countries were chosen because data were available, each possessed a unique colonial legacy with unique political structures today, and each country is from a different region on the continent of Africa.

Using a quantitative and qualitative historical comparison between the three countries will provide context for what role education plays in development. When speaking about combining quantitative and qualitative research, Booth (2004) states, "one methodology was incomplete without the other as they reciprocally contribute to better understanding of the other’s results" (p. xiv). An appreciation of the past is vital to our understanding of the present (Booth 2004). By using a quantitative and qualitative approach and by examining the countries historically, this research will provide a rich context showing the factors promoting and/or hindering development.
Historical comparisons employ the use of a case-oriented approach to the data. As Ragin (1987:35) states "comparativists who use case-oriented strategies often want to understand or interpret specific cases because of their intrinsic value." The goal behind using a case-oriented approach in this research is to interpret historical features that led to different or similar paths in the development of Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland.

Exploratory research using historical comparatives is conducted in three ways (Wickham-Crowley 1992). One way of using a historical comparative is to use successive cases to support a theoretical position. Another procedure is the use of cases to emphasize the differences. The third approach explores the differences and the similarities to try to isolate the true cause of an outcome. With the current study being exploratory, the third approach was used. The countries used in the study have both similarities and differences. Any barriers to development in the three countries was compared to highlight any barriers to the development of the country.

Comparative historical analysis will be used in this study to identify patterns across the three nations that led to their current situation. Quantitative research uses a variable approach, which provides a snapshot of what is
happening at the moment the data were collected. By utilizing historical-comparative qualitative methods, researchers can obtain insights into the patterns that exist within the quantitative data longitudinally.

A sequence of events is taken into account in the comparative historical approach (Schutt 2004). To understand the development of Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland, this analysis examined past events that led to each country’s present day status in the global economy. For example, if the quantitative data demonstrate that a country’s educational system is expanding, the hypothesis would be that the country’s corresponding development indicators, such as the Human Development Index and Gross-National Income per capita are also growing. The historical approach allows the researcher to dig further into the data and examine what laws, initiatives, social programs, social problems, or policies specifically aided the country’s growing educational system and its subsequent development or to help identify the factors intervening in this linkage.

Research has shown that different forms of government invest more money in education (Brown and Hunter 2004), and different forms of government can produce variation in development of entrepreneurs, which affects levels of human
capital (Inkeless 1964). For example, Cameroon has had the same president for many years and resembles a one-party democracy. Kenya possessed a one-party democracy for many years, but in the early 1990s additional political parties were allowed to put forth candidates for presidential elections. Finally, Swaziland's ruler is a monarch and is not chosen by a democratic process. These three countries currently have different government structures and unique relationships between government and civil society. Using these three countries as case studies and by exploring a comparative-historical approach, the research examined the factors hindering the effects of education on development.

Moreover, other researchers argue that natural resources and climate have a tremendous effect on development (Diamond 1999; Sachs 2005). Each country is located in a different area of Africa with different climates and natural resources. Cameroon is located in West Africa, Kenya is in East Africa, and Swaziland is located in Southern Africa. A natural disaster may skew the data of a country; thus, examining a country's ecological history could produce further information on the country's development. Countries with significant rainfall and good soil may be able to grow crops with minimal labor necessary from children, thus allowing them to go to
school. In other countries with a more arid climate children may be needed for labor and cannot attend school.

This research will use data from the World Bank from 1990-2004 for Swaziland, Kenya, and Cameroon in order to highlight some recent trends in their educational and development indicators. The World Bank is an institution made up of 184 member nations and two lending institutions --the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The World Bank provides loans and grants to developing countries in the aim of reducing global poverty and improving living standards in the developing nations. The World Bank data are the best available data source for development indicators because the World Bank is actively involved in this area and studies development indicators in order to determine what countries are in need of financial support. The World Bank produces a CD-ROM with world development indicators from 1960-2004. These data will be used to highlight the changes that have taken place in each country between 1990 and 2004.

Scholarly articles, books, news articles, and reports from international institutions were used to provide an idea of what trends were present in each country. These books and articles illustrated what challenges to
development are present in each country. After examining trends in education, such as educational spending, and development indicators, such as health expenditure, in the three countries under evaluation, the research will then utilize a historical-comparative approach by studying each country as a case study. By examining the three countries in this manner, the study will be able to illustrate what factors helped and what factors hindered the relationship between education and development.

Cases Under Consideration

In the following section the geography and history of each country will be presented to aid in understanding how the country developed into its current status. Each country has a unique history, but the past will help to guide what has hampered development in the present day. Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland will then be compared side by side to understand what has hindered development.

The Monarchy: Swaziland

Swaziland is a small country landlocked between South Africa to the west and Mozambique to the east. The country has an area of 6,705 square miles and is about the same size as Wales (Grotpeter 1975) or slightly smaller than New Jersey (U.S. Department of State 2006). The tiny size of Swaziland does not denote that the country is of little
significance. Swaziland has an abundance of water, fertile soil, and mineral resources that have made the country wealthy when compared to other sub-Saharan countries (Booth 2000).

**Economy and Geography.** The wealth of the country has, however, not flowed evenly throughout the population. The monarchy has established a trust called the Tibiyo takaNgwane that siphons vast sums of money into an account that is accessible to the king and his allies. Moreover, the European community is in control of large tracts of agricultural land and the manufacturing sector (Booth 2000). These two groups hold most of the wealth that Swaziland has accumulated since independence, leaving the majority of the population without access to economic resources.

Swaziland consists of four regions with distinct climates, soils, and resources. The U.S. Department of State 2006) lists Swaziland’s temperature as temperate to tropical. The four regions are parallel to each other extending east to west and are called the highveld, the middleveld, the lowveld, and the Lubombo plateau. The highveld is 6,000 feet to 3,500 feet above sea level and has high rainfall (Booth 2000). Swaziland is one of the world’s leading producers of softwood timber and pulp
because commercial forestry is ideal in this region. The middleveld is between 3,800 feet and 1,500 feet and has the largest population density in the country (Booth 2000). Mbabane, the capital of Swaziland with a population of 60,000, is located in the middleveld (U.S. Department of State 2006). The area receives plenty of rainfall, and cotton, maize, tobacco, pineapples, and rice are grown here (Grotpeter 1975). Between 1,000 and 500 feet is the lowveld (Booth 2000). The lowveld is used for cattle grazing and is the most irrigated region in Swaziland with sugar and citrus crops grown in the area. Low rainfall and a tropical climate in this region make it susceptible to drought, and habitation of this area is complicated by the presence of malaria and bilhariza (Booth 2000). The Lubombo plateau is similar to the middleveld in climate, altitude, and agriculture production.

The country's land falls into two categories: Swazi Nation Land (SNL) and Title Deed Land (TDL). SNL comprises 60 percent of the country and is held in trust by the king. The king allocates the land to chiefs who then allocate the land to homestead heads in traditional practices. The SNL is communal land and produces subsistence crops and cattle. TDL consists of 40 percent of the nation and is held by Swazis and Europeans. The deeds to this land date back to
1907 and produce nearly all of Swaziland's market crops and timber production. Most estates in the TDL are owned by foreign capital, while the monarchy controls the rest through the king's Tibiyo taka Ngwane fund.

The service sector, especially tourism, represents 32.6 percent of Swaziland's national income, with agriculture/forestry and manufacturing comprising an additional 21.4 percent and 20.1 percent respectively (U.S. State Department 2006). The figures are misleading because the king's Tibyo taka Ngwane fund is not included as part of Swaziland's income. The amount of money generated by the fund is secret, and only the king and his close allies know how much the fund is worth.

**Political History.** Between 1996 and 2006 a new constitution was being drafted in this small nation. The Ngwenyama (king) Mswati III believed that this new constitution was a step in the right direction for his kingdom because the constitution is based on culture and tradition (Kagwanja 2006). The king may have believed that the constitution was a solid step in the right direction, but he had opponents who claimed that the king's Dlamini clan was using tradition as a way to maintain a stranglehold on power. To understand the events that led to the new constitution and the opponents of it we must
understand what development occurred in Swaziland before it gained independence in 1968.

The earliest Swazi people (the Bembo-Nguni) settled in Lubombo, present day Mozambique (Grotpeter 1975). Unable to deal with the strength of the Zulu tribe the king Ngwane III moved his people to what is now modern day Swaziland in 1750. The people of Swaziland are referred to today as "kaNgwane (land of Ngwane) and bakaNgwane (people of Ngwane)" (Grotpeter 1975:116). The Zulu raids continued to disrupt Swazi life, and in 1836 King Mswati II rose to the throne and took action to prevent further attacks. Mswati II is known as, "the greatest of the Swazi fighting kings" (Grotpeter 1975:109). Swaziland’s name was received from the Europeans’ poor pronunciation of Mswati.

Mswati II consolidated tribes in the north and west of modern South Africa into Swaziland. He also played the role of a diplomat to help defeat the Zulus. Mswati II urged the British in South Africa to help in dealing with the Zulu raids. In exchange for help dealing with the threat, Mswati II allowed missionaries to settle along Swaziland’s borders (Booth 2000). Land was also given to the British to aid in ridding Swaziland of the Zulus, which led to the colonization of Swaziland after Mswati’s death in 1868.
Swaziland was not colonized immediately after the death of the Ngwenyama. Two successive kings came to power but proved to be weak and unable to deal with the growing influence of the Boers. Political infighting made the determination of the next king of Swaziland unclear, but in 1875 Mbandzeni Dlamini IV took the throne (Grotpeter 1975). The unclear legitimacy of his reign as Ngwenyama led Dlamini IV to look to the British to aid him in staying in power. He granted land, grazing, and monopoly rights to the British and to the South African Republic. After his death in 1889 Bhunu Dlamini V ascended to the throne, but his rule was short lived. Bhunu Dlamini V died four years later in 1899.

The death of the Ngwenyama left the next king of Swaziland in doubt, and in 1902 the British took over the administration of Swaziland (Potholm 1972). The Ndlovukazi (queen) Labotsibeni gained control of the weakened monarchy because Bhunu V's son, Sobhuza II, was only a child. The queen proved to be highly effective in holding the monarchy together and won allies in the south and east. In 1921 Sobhuza II took the monarchy from his mother and proved to be as effective as his mother in holding the crown together.
Sobhuza's effectiveness may be due to his education in western schools, in which he had a secondary education at Lovedale Missionary Institution in Cape Town (Booth 2004). The influence of Western values was evident from his dress and choice of advisors. He placed great importance on modern day education, which he believed would help his country become modern. A British commissioner agreed with Sobhuza saying that a national school would, "in time prove itself to be the most important factor in the civilization of the Swazi nation" (Booth 2004:34). The schools of the time were not of the same quality as those of the Europeans (Booth 2004) so Sobhuza believed a Swazi school needed to be created. In 1931 Sobhuza started an independently controlled Swazi school at Matsapha in the hope that education would lead to modernization.

As the years passed, it became evident to Sobhuza II and the British that independence was inevitable. The British announced that elections would be held in 1964 to aid in the transition to independence. Afraid of losing power in free elections, Sobhuza II started his own political party called the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM). The INM aligned itself with the United Swaziland Association (USA) a European-based political party. The two parties swept the election (Potholm 1972), and this newly
elected government was in charge of drafting the independence constitution of Swaziland. Sobhuza II broke off his alliance with the USA, and the party quickly found itself obsolete because at the same time Sobhuza co-opted the top political leaders in Swaziland. With no political opposition left in Swaziland, Sobhuza II placed the monarchy at the forefront of an independent Swaziland (Booth 2000).

The parliamentary system that was set up permitted Sobhuza II to nominate 6 of the 30 members of the assembly. The rest of the members were to be elected from eight three-member constituencies, which were from rural areas that were controlled by Sobhuza (Booth 2000). A 12-member senate was established in which Sobhuza II was to nominate half of the members, and the prime minister and the chief justice of Swaziland were appointed by the king. The king also was able to gain control of the mines that the British had held. Sobhuza set up a trust called the Tibiyo takaNgwane (Wealth of the Swazi Nation) with the wealth that the mines bestowed. The trust provided a large amount of capital for the monarchy to secure its position in the future.

Britain granted Swaziland independence on September 6, 1968 and Sobhuza continued to dominate the political
process until 1972. In the elections of 1972 a rival political party, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), won three seats in parliament. Sobhuza declared an emergency in 1973, saying there was a procedural problem in the elections and revoked the constitution and outlawed political parties (Matlosa 1998). The Royal Umbutfo Defense Force was created and stocked with men loyal to Sobhuza. The army ruled for the next five years until the new parliament was selected. In the new parliament the king selected the candidates and then open voting was held (Booth 2000).

Sobhuza's grip on power was now complete, and he ruled this way until his death from heart failure in 1982 (Matlosa 1998). His death was sudden, and there is speculation that he was murdered. With his sudden death came a period of uncertainty in Swaziland (Booth 2000). Sobhuza did not name his successor before his death but did put the queen and the Liqoqo in charge until a new successor would be named. The Liqoqo is a council that gives the king advice on matters that need his attention (Grotpeter 1975). A power struggle took place that pitted the members of the Liqoqo against people loyal to the royal family. Eventually in 1986 Sobhuza's son ascended to the
throne. Mswati III became the king of Swaziland and immediately experienced political unrest.

Many of the members of the Liqoqo were imprisoned or forced into exile, and at the same time South Africa began to move toward a democratic system. The people of Swaziland viewed the change in South Africa as a potential for change in Swaziland. The monarchy began to be viewed as authoritarian, and the people of Swaziland demanded a change (Booth 2000). After fighting to retain the monarchy, Mswati III agreed to draft a new constitution and established the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) in 1996. Mswati agreed to ratify the new constitution after many years of arguing and bargaining on June 26, 2005 (Kagwanja 2006). The new 164-page constitution left the monarchy intact and did not include a popular vote.

Statistics on Education and Development. As the discussion in the previous two sections showed, Swaziland has had a distinct and unique history. The country possesses farmland and a large tourist industry, which have developed over the last several decades under the leadership of various monarchies. While many African countries experimented with democracies, authoritarian regimes, and/or one party states, Swaziland maintained its monarchy-led government following its independence from
Britain. This history provides an important and necessary context when examining the effects of education on development in Swaziland.

Table 1 provides some basic education and development indicators for Swaziland between 1990 and 2004. As has been noted previously, these data were culled from the World Bank Development Indicators for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and the most recent year available 2004. It is unfortunate that, due to missing and/or incomplete data, the World Bank Development Indicators do not contain data over consistent periods of time for the years preceding 1990.

### Table 1: World Bank Data on Swaziland - 1990-2004 - Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Indicators</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>4,131</td>
<td>4,681</td>
<td>5,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</td>
<td>56.64</td>
<td>57.64</td>
<td>45.44</td>
<td>42.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, male (years)</td>
<td>54.40</td>
<td>55.40</td>
<td>45.03</td>
<td>42.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, female (years)</td>
<td>59.00</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>45.87</td>
<td>41.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>98.00</td>
<td>107.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, adult female</td>
<td>196.49</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, adult male</td>
<td>259.71</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>5.8^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.15#</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, total (DOD, current US$, in Millions)</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total debt service</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid per capita (current US$)</td>
<td>70.12</td>
<td>64.56</td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>104.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment, net inflows</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment, net outflows</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ages 0-14 (% of total)</td>
<td>47.14</td>
<td>46.35</td>
<td>43.85</td>
<td>41.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth (annual %)</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The development indicators from Table 1 provide a mixed message on the development of Swaziland. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Swaziland has increased from $3,919 (USD) in 1990 to $5,812 (USD) in 2004, a 48.5 percent increase in the fourteen-year period.

While the GDP of Swaziland has increased, Swaziland's life expectancy has decreased from 56.64 years in 1990 to...
42.21 years over the same time period of 1990-2004. Males are expected to live almost a year longer than females based on data from 2004. Given these trends it is also not surprising that infant mortality has increased dramatically from 78.00 per 1,000 in 1990 to 107.60 per 1,000 in 2004. As the country's life expectancy is decreasing, Swaziland's health expenditure has also decreased from 6.1 percent of GDP in 2000 to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2005. The number of physicians per 1,000 people has also decreased slightly from 0.18 in 2000 to 0.16 in 2004. All of these trends have contributed to the decline in population growth from 3.13 percent in 1990 to 1.29 percent in 2004.

The decrease in life expectancy has caught the attention of the world with aid per capita increasing from approximately $70.00 in 1990 to $104.07 dollars in 2004. Per capita aid was as low as $12.00 million in 2000. Over this same period of time, external debt has skyrocketed from $298 million in 1990 to $470 million in 2004. Foreign direct investment has dramatically decreased from 2000-2004, with net inflows falling from 6.55 percent to 2.86 percent of GDP and net outflows falling from 1.24 percent to 0.15 percent of GDP in the same period.

Based on these data, it would seem that Swaziland has not fared well over the last decade. How have educational
spending and other education-related measures fared over the same time period? Educational indicators in Swaziland show the same mixed message as development indicators. Public spending on education has increased as a percentage of GDP from 5.83 percent in 1991 to 6.24 percent in 2004. Primary school expenditure per student increased from 7.64 percent in 1991 to 10.99 percent of GDP in 2004. Between 2000 and 2003 secondary expenditure per student went from 28.67 percent to 47.45 percent of GDP. Literacy rates in Swaziland have also improved from 71.62 percent in 1990 to 79.56 percent in 2004. Primary school enrollment has increased from 74.70 percent in 1991 to 76.68 percent in 2003.

Despite these trends, problems do exist in Swaziland’s educational system. Primary completion has fallen from 64.32 percent in 2000 to 58.30 percent in 2003. Males and females have both experienced a drop in primary-school completion. Persistence to Grade 5 has decreased from 77.04 percent in 1991 to 73.86 percent in 2000. On a positive note Swaziland’s pupil to teacher ratio has fallen from 32.34 in 1991 to 31.20 in 2003.

**The Unitary State: Cameroon**

Cameroon is a triangular shaped country located in Western Africa on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. The
country has an area of 469,440 square miles and is slightly larger than California (CIA World Factbook 2007). Unlike other sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon has been politically stable for much of its history. However, the recent discovery of oil and a continuing feud with Nigeria may upset the stability of this country in the future. As Gros notes (2003:21), "Cameroon is one of the most ethnically plural countries in Black Africa; further, it is the only one with three colonial legacies, two of which continue to shape politics." In fact, Cameroon has over 250 ethnic groups living within the borders (Gros 2003:xv). Tension within Cameroon can be traced to its colonial history. Germany, France, and Great Britain all claimed Cameroon as a colony, which led to many different identities within Cameroon.

**Economy and Geography.** The discovery of oil has promoted an increase in economic investment, but the government has kept the revenue from the sale of the natural resource a "state secret," and it is not clear what the profits from the oil industry fund (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000). Also, ethnic groups argue that the oil is on their land and is their property (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000). Border disputes with Nigeria also make offshore drilling a problem for the country. The uncertainty of oil
ownership has negated any economic incentives that it might have brought to the country.

Cameroon has three ecological zones covering the area: the Sahel to the north, rainforest to the east, and volcanic mountains and high grasslands to the west (Gros 2003). Mount Cameroon is located in the west and is the highest point in Western Africa, reaching a height of 13,435 feet (New Encyclopedia Britannica 2007). The country lies in the tropics and possesses a hot and humid climate all year long with an average temperature of 82 degrees Fahrenheit, with daytime temperatures reaching as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit (World Book 2000). According to UNICEF (2005a:1), "the north and the far-north are particularly dry." The country is agrarian where 80 percent, "live in rural areas where they engage in subsistence and cash-crop farming" (Robinson 1990:53). Cameroon's economy is largely based on cocoa, coffee, aluminum production, and oil.

The country falls into two categories: Anglophone, and Francophone. Francophone Cameroon contains the majority of the population in the country, and government positions are overwhelmingly given to Cameroonians of French descent. Anglophone Cameroon may be smaller in size, population and area, but Cameroon's oil is located in
the Anglophone regions. Many Cameroonians of English
descent believe that oil revenues are being used to help
Francophone people and not to help their own Anglophone
population (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997). The perceived
belief that oil was not benefiting Anglo Cameroonians has
led to an increase in hostility between the two groups.

**Political History.** Cameroon “seems well on the way to
becoming one of contemporary Africa’s more successful
political systems” (Le Vine 1971:xix). While Cameroon has
been politically stable since independence, the country,
like many in Sub-Saharan Africa, has not achieved the
promise that many researchers predicted in the early post-
colonial years. Ethnic tension continues to plague the
country, and the government resembles a one-party unitary
state, not the multi-party democracy that many leaders in
Cameroon claim.

The U.S. Department of State (1999) explains that the
first people to inhabit Cameroon were the Bakas (Pygmies),
and the Bakas remain in remote parts of Cameroon to the
present day. In the 1770s the Fulani, a pastoral Islamic
people of western Sahel, moved into northern Cameroon and
conquered the area (U.S. Department of ... 1999).
Information is scarce regarding this earlier period, and
much of what is known about present day Cameroon comes from
the first European inhabitants in 1472. The Portuguese were the first to explore the country by sailing up the Rio dos Camaroes (River of Prawns), or present day Wouri River (Gros 2003). The leader of the expedition, Fernando do Po, named Cameroon after the abundance of prawns, which are actually a variety of crayfish, in the river. The port was used as a slave-trade center for the next three centuries.

Sentiment for the slave trade began to turn in the early nineteenth century. Around this time the British explored most of inland areas of Cameroon, and other European countries began to see the area as a potential colony. Great Britain, France, and Germany were scrambling for land in Africa, and all three believed Cameroon would be a valuable possession. Germany won the Cameroon prize by signing treaties with King Akwa and King Bell on July 12, 1884, which officially made Cameroon a protectorate of Germany (Le Vine 1971). In 1911 Germany acquired land in the north and the following year made a deal with France to acquire land in the south from the Congo, thus doubling the size of the territory (Le Vine 1971). Germany’s colonial heritage in Cameroon is believed to be the “good old days” by the people of Cameroon (Gros 2003:4) even though they used forced African labor to build the country. Cameroon was never fully colonized by Germany and was used as a
source of agricultural goods produced using large commercial plantations with a sizeable infrastructure.

France and Britain would obtain control of Cameroon after Germany's loss in World War I. Cameroon was split into two areas, with France receiving the largest share of the land. Great Britain "accepted two noncontiguous portions in the west bordering Nigeria that amounted to about one-fifth of the territory's total area" (Le Vine 1971:7). The split of the country led to an Anglophone Cameroon and a Francophone Cameroon, which division continues to have ramifications today. France quickly made Cameroon a colony, while Great Britain paid little attention to Cameroon with the much bigger and richer Nigeria next door. Great Britain allowed the north and south territories of Cameroon to be administered by Nigeria. France invested $80 million in East Cameroon from 1947 to 1953, a sum that was greater than France spent on their colonies of Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and Oubangui-Chari (Central African Republic) combined (Gros 2003).

Thoughts of self-rule and independence swept through Africa in the 1950s, and Cameroon was no different. Feeling pressure from growing protest movements, France granted East Cameroon independence on January 1, 1960 (Le
Vine 1971). The British controlled North and South were to hold separate plebiscites at the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly to determine their future. On February 11, 1961 South Cameroon voted overwhelmingly to join Cameroon, but North Cameroon voted to join Nigeria (Le Vine 1971). Finally, in October 1961 East and South Cameroon were joined to form the modern Cameroon Federal Republic.

The prime minister at the time of independence, Ahmandou Ahidjo, was named president of Cameroon. Ahidjo seemed an unlikely leader and was seen as a "second-rank politician, someone who could easily be manipulated, blamed if things went badly and then replaced without second thoughts" (Le Vine 2003:38). The facts of Ahidjo’s upbringing are unclear and debates continue as to what his early life was like (Le Vine 2003). Acquaintances of Ahidjo described him as illiterate and ridiculed his lack of education. The initial impression of Ahidjo proved to be quite wrong. Ahidjo held on to power for the next 22 years, often resorting to authoritarian methods to hold power, such as "heavy-handed police operations, physical assault on opponents, imprisonment without trial, extra judicial punishments including torture and death" (Le Vine 2003:44).
From the first day of independence Ahidjo wanted to establish a strong centralized government, which was lacking in the federal system that Cameroon had established at independence. Under the federal system, power was divided among a federal president, vice president, ministers, a national assembly, and judiciary (Ngenge 2003). On September 1, 1966 Ahidjo imposed a one-party system in Cameroon, and in May of 1968 placed Solomon Tandeng Muna in the post of prime minister of West (Anglophone) Cameroon, replacing the opposition party’s candidate A.N. Jua. In 1970 Ahidjo selected Muna as his running mate in the presidential election, which made Muna prime minister of West Cameroon and vice president of the federal republic. Ahidjo claimed that the federal system threatened national harmony, and on June 2, 1972 decreed that Cameroon was a unitary state named the United Republic of Cameroon (Ngenge 2003).

Ahidjo continued to rule as president of a one-party unitary state until November 6, 1982 when he resigned the presidency to Paul Biya. It is not clear why Ahidjo decided to step down in 1982, but Biya was his handpicked successor. It is believed that Ahidjo thought that Biya would be weak, and this weakness would allow Ahidjo to rule from behind the scenes.
Ahidjo to all intents and purposes, had created Biya, and probably could not imagine that Biya the disciple would, or could, cross his master, nor probably, was it any consolation to Ahidjo that Biya had well and truly learned from his example. (Le Vine 2003:37)

Biya quickly proved his skeptics wrong about being weak, much like Ahidjo had done decades earlier. Ahidjo in 1983 apparently admitted that he thought Biya could be easily manipulated only to discover that Biya was not who he thought Biya to be (Le Vine 2003).

In 1983 there was an attempted coup, which Biya blamed on Ahidjo. Ahidjo was exiled to Senegal, where he died of a heart attack on November 30, 1989 (Le Vine 2003). Biya renamed Cameroon the Republic of Cameroon, which angered the Anglophone minority because the Republic of Cameroon is what Ahidjo named Cameroon before the reunification of South Cameroon after independence (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997). In the 1980s Biya’s ethnic group, “appeared to be much bolder in staking out claims on the state’s resources than had Ahidjo’s barons” (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:213).

In addition to the corruption of Biya’s regime an economic crisis hit Cameroon with the falling cocoa and coffee prices. The economic downturn, which Anglophones believed was due to the “corruption and mismanagement of Biya’s regime,” led to political unrest (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:214). Under pressure Biya agreed to allow
opposition parties in December of 1990. Elections were held in 1992 in which Biya was re-elected, but many in Anglophone Cameroon believed that Biya stole the election from Fru Nidi. Violent protest erupted over the outcome and Biya placed the province under a state of emergency for three months and kept Nidi under house arrest. The following election in 1997 was widely boycotted by opposition parties and Biya won easily. Today Biya continues to rule the Republic of Cameroon.

Statistics on Education and Development. Table 2 provides some basic education and development indicators for Cameroon between 1990 and 2004. The data for Table 2 were taken from the World Bank Development indicators for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2004. It is unfortunate that some of the data are incomplete; thus, the data are not consistent for the time period before 1990.

Table 2: World Bank Data on Cameroon - 1990-2004 - Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Indicators</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>1,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</td>
<td>52.40</td>
<td>50.05</td>
<td>46.97</td>
<td>45.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, male (years)</td>
<td>50.75</td>
<td>48.50</td>
<td>45.97</td>
<td>45.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, female (years)</td>
<td>54.14</td>
<td>51.68</td>
<td>48.01</td>
<td>46.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>89.00</td>
<td>88.00</td>
<td>87.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, adult female</td>
<td>361.21</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, adult male</td>
<td>430.39</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>4.2^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The development indicators for Cameroon in Table 2 show a country that is deteriorating. The GDP per capita
has fallen from $2,042 (USD) in 1990 to $1,997 (USD) in 2004. From 1990 to 1995 there was a decline in GDP, and from 1995 to 2004 the GDP has been increasing, but it has not regained the 1990 level. This slow growth is especially troubling when one considers that global GDP increases between 1 and 3 percent each year; Cameroon has missed out on all of this growth over the last decade and a half. Life expectancy has also declined from 1990 to 2004. Cameroon has experienced a decline of 6.42 years in life expectancy over this time period, from 50.40 years in 1990 to 45.98 years in 2004. Coupled with the decline in life expectancy, health expenditure has also declined. Health expenditure has decreased from 4.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2003. With a decreasing life expectancy and a reduction in health expenditure the population growth of Cameroon has decreased from 2.87 percent in 1990 to 1.82 percent in 2004.

External debt has increased from 1990 to 2004; this fact may explain the decline in health expenditure. The debt rose from $666 million in 1990 to $949 million in 2004, thus also increasing Cameroon's debt service. The data do not show the debt service in 2000 or 2004, but the debt service did increase between 1990 and 1995. At the same time foreign direct investment in Cameroon has
decreased. Net inflows are 0 and net outflows are 0.01, or nonexistent. The one positive development indicator for Cameroon is that aid per capita has increased from $38.25 million in 1990 to $47.48 million in 2004. Aid decreased from 1990 to 2000, but in 2004 there was a significant increase in aid to Cameroon.

The education indicators for Cameroon paint a more favorable picture of the country. Public spending on education increased from 3.22 percent GDP in 1991 to 3.82 percent GDP in 2004, but spending decreased from 1991 to 1999. The increased educational expenditure as a percentage of GDP is likely the result of the stagnant economy, which has not witnessed any measurable growth over the last 15 years. In this environment educational expenditures could decline but still register as being higher as a percentage of GDP. Cameroon’s primary expenditure per student is only available for 1999, but when compared to Kenya and Swaziland, Cameroon’s expenditure is the lowest of the three countries. Cameroon spent 8.54 percent of GDP per capita in 1999 on primary education, while Swaziland spent 9.45 percent of GDP per capita in 1999, and Kenya spent 27.64 percent of GDP per capita in 2000.
Primary completion rates have increased from 1990 to 2004 for males and females. The total primary completion rate increased from 56.92 percent in 1990 to 63.26 percent in 2004. Persistence to grade five is higher than Swaziland's at 80.73 percent in 1999 and 73.86 percent in 2000 respectively. The pupil-teacher ration has increased from 51.11 in 1991 to 52.60 in 2004. Cameroon's literacy rate has increased from 57.88 percent in 1990 to 67.90 percent in 2004.

The Multi-party State: Kenya

Kenya is located in Eastern Africa and borders Ethiopia to the north, Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west, and Sudan to the northwest. The country has an area of 582,646 square miles (approximately the size of Texas) (U.S. Department of State 2007). Archaeologists believe that Kenya was the "cradle of mankind" because the country was home to the earliest humanoids (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000:1).

Economy and Geography. There are several topographical regions within Kenya. The low coastal plains have a humid and wet environment with annual rainfall amounts ranging from 47 inches to 26 inches (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). The coastal plateau gives way to a series of low plateaus that cover the entire northern half of the
nation and stretch down to the border with Tanzania. The low plateaus are the driest regions of Kenya with rainfall amounts below 20 inches a year. West of the lowland plateaus is the highlands, which is a series of volcanic mountains. The highest mountain in the country, Mount Kenya, stands at 17,057 feet. The highlands give way to the Rift Valley, which is a massive depression that is 31 - 41 miles wide.

The climate of Kenya is tropical in the south, west, and central regions, and arid in the north and northeast (U.S. Department of State 2007). This climate is a critical influence in Kenya’s position today. The country is prone to drought and “only 11 percent is suitable for agriculture” (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000:3). Almost all of the agricultural land is located in the south. The northern area of Kenya is mostly desert or semidesert. When Kenya experiences drought, the consequences are tragic, with so little of the country able to produce food for the 34 million people in the country (U.S. Department of State 2007).

A severe drought struck Kenya from 1999 - 2000, but corruption in Kenya’s government has hampered any effort to aid Kenya through the drought. The IMF suspended loans to Kenya in 1997 but resumed these loans in 2000 to aid
drought victims. When the government failed to take on corruption, the IMF halted loans to Kenya again in 2001 (CIA World Factbook 2007).

Kenya's economy is largely based on agriculture. There are some small-scale industries, such as textiles, but Kenya's main economic activities are based on tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, dairy products, beef, pork, poultry, and eggs (CIA World Factbook 2007). Tourism also plays a major role in Kenya's economy. Because poaching and the hunting of wildlife are illegal in Kenya, tourists throughout the world flock to Kenya's national wildlife parks to view indigenous African wildlife.

Along with being known as the birthplace of mankind, Kenya has been known as, "one of the most important business, cultural, diplomatic, and political centers in Africa" (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000:1). The African population of Kenya is divided into more than 40 ethnic groups, which speak primarily three languages: Bantu, Cushitic, and Nilotic. Local dialects then split these three languages further. The official languages of Kenya are English and Swahili, thus making Kenyans with some primarily and/or secondary schooling trilingual.

**Political History.** From the 1960s until the 1990s Kenya was primarily a one-party nation state, with the
Kenya African National Union party (KANU) holding power during this time period. On December 2, 1992 President Moi, a member of KANU, unexpectedly announced he would allow multi-party elections in Kenya. Optimism and excitement spread throughout Kenya over the chance of free and fair elections. However, recently the optimism and excitement over a democratic state have vanished. Kenya has fallen from one of the West's favorite African countries to "pariah status" (Meredith 2005:403). According to the BBC News (2007a) the "initial joy has been replaced by anger and resentment" (p. 1), and "Western goodwill has also dissipated as hopes that Kenya would be an example of good governance in the East African region have been dashed" (p. 1).

Kenya has a long history of human existence. According to the U.S. Department of State (2007) fossils suggest that protohumans were in the area more than 20 million years ago. The Koobi Fora near Lake Turkana had hominid habitation 2.5 million years ago (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000).

Arab traders began exploring the coast of Kenya in the first century A.D. and began establishing settlements in the eighth century. The Portuguese where the first Europeans to explore Kenya, trying to obtain control of the area in
the sixteenth century. Swahili and Omani Arabs were able to drive the Portuguese out in the late seventeenth century (BBC News 2007b). It was not until 1895 that the British made Kenya an East African Protectorate, although the north was not brought under British control until after World War I.

Britain became interested in Kenya because it wanted to build a railroad from Mombasa to Lake Victoria. The railroad had a huge impact on Kenya's development as the British government encouraged European farmers to settle the area to help pay for the railway (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). Europeans settled in the highlands and established plantations and ranches, which became known as the White Highlands. Britain raised taxes and used coercive measures, such as state labor control policies and low wages, to force locals to work on settler farms.

Protests sprung up against the Europeans after World War I, but it was following World War II that the protesters began to demand self-governance and independence (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). In 1944 a colony wide political party was formed called the Kenya African Union (KAU), which demanded self-reliance. Little progress was made until October 1952 when Britain arrested Jomo Kenyatta, the head of KAU, and many followers. Britain convicted
Kenyatta and banned KAU in order to stop the increasing militancy and violence, but this increasing militancy and violence had the opposite effect.

The actions taken by Britain sparked the Mau Mau rebellion. According to Meredith (2005), "no other revolt against British rule in Africa gained such notoriety as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya" (p. 79). A guerrilla war was fought by thousands of Kenyans against the British. The rebels were mostly from the Kikuyu who were some of the poorest people in the country, and Europeans believed that Kenyatta was responsible for the rebellion. Whites viewed Kenyatta suspiciously and "no other figure in colonial Africa was so reviled" (Meredith 2005:80). The name Mau Mau in the Kikuyu language is meaningless, but Europeans were convinced that it was something sinister and that Kenyatta was leading the Kikuyu people in the revolt.

Many of the fears of Kenyatta were due to the time he spent in the Russia. In 1932 Kenyatta studied in Moscow at a revolutionary institute called the University of Toilers of the East. After his study in Moscow Kenyatta went to the London School of Economics and published an article on Kikuyu life and customs. During World War II he moved to Sussex and worked as an agricultural laborer. In 1946
Kenyatta returned to Kenya, "anxious to engage in the nationalist struggle" (Meredith 2005:81).

The British eventually suppressed the rebellion, but the British government improved economic, educational, and political opportunities to try to appease Africans and thus prevent them from rebelling in the future (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). In 1960 political parties were allowed to reform, and in 1961 Kenyatta was released from prison and became the leader of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). Realizing that independence was inevitable, Britain granted Kenya independence in December 1964, and Kenyatta was chosen as the president.

Jomo Kenyatta had massive authority over Kenya during his presidency. He dissolved opposition parties in the first year of independence, making Kenya a one-party state. When opposition leader Oginga Odinga formed an opposition party, Kenyatta arrested him and used state power to put down opposition (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). Kenyatta was pro-West and maintained capitalist policies while he was president. During his presidency Kenya experienced considerable economic growth and social progress.

The former White Highlands were transferred to African owners and Kenyatta oversaw the construction and operation of schools and health clinics (Meredith 2005). African
business ownership grew from 19 percent in 1964 to 46 percent in 1973 (Meredith 2005). While this growth may seem remarkable, the figures were skewed. Under Kenyatta income inequality increased, and "the level of rural poverty increased" (Meredith 2005:266).

Moreover, Kenyatta was increasingly seen as corrupt. His wife, Ngina Kenyatta, became one of the wealthiest people in the country by owning plantations, ranches, and hotels. The ivory trade was highly lucrative, and the "high-level corruption cost Kenya half its elephant population" (Meredith 2005:267). On August 23, 1978 Jomo Kenyatta passed away, and Vice President Daniel arap Moi became president of Kenya.

At first Moi was a populist president, but his rule became authoritarian (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). According to Meredith (2005):

His rule became a litany of Big Man tactics. He curtailed the autonomy of judges and the auditor-general, eliminating their security of tenure; he harassed and imprisoned dissidents, condoning the use of torture; he obliterated press freedoms, muzzled trade unions and turned the civil service into a party machine. (p. 384)

Moi also eliminated the secret ballot in elections and made Kenya a one-party state by law. Elections were manipulated to ensure the outcome.
Moi and his sons acquired assets in transport, oil distribution, banking, engineering, and land. Moi’s inner circle known as the Karbanet Syndicate obtained loans they never intended to pay back and received kickbacks from government contracts. Corruption became “embedded in the system during the Moi years” (Meredith 2005:385). Moi continued to rule this way until 1990 when Robert Ouko, who published a dossier on high-level corruption, was found dead.

The world began to notice the corruption of the regime and aid agencies suspended their funding to Kenya on November 25 1992, resulting in a 30 percent decrease in government expenditure (Meredith 2005). Under increasing pressure Moi announced multiparty elections on December 2, 1992. The opposition parties had little time to coordinate and split into many different factions, which led to Moi winning re-election in 1992 and again in 1997. In 2002 Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election under a Rainbow Coalition of parties, thus ending Moi’s 24-year rule. Today, Kibaki is currently the president and has declared an end to corruption in the government.

Statistics on Education and Development. Kenya is a multiparty democracy, holding free elections for the first time in 1992. Yet, corruption is widespread and threatens
the development of Kenya. The past history of Kenya is important in understanding the effects of education on development.

Similar to Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 provides some basic education and development indicators for Kenya between 1990 and 2004.

**Table 3: World Bank Data on Kenya - 1990-2004 - Key Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Indicators</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</td>
<td>57.90</td>
<td>53.14</td>
<td>48.43</td>
<td>48.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, male (years)</td>
<td>55.78</td>
<td>51.85</td>
<td>48.65</td>
<td>49.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, female (years)</td>
<td>60.13</td>
<td>54.50</td>
<td>48.19</td>
<td>47.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, adult female</td>
<td>287.49</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, adult male</td>
<td>357.37</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, total (DOD, current US$, in Millions)</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total debt service</td>
<td>35.41</td>
<td>30.41</td>
<td>20.94</td>
<td>8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid per capita (current US$)</td>
<td>50.61</td>
<td>26.96</td>
<td>16.69</td>
<td>18.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment, net inflows</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment, net outflows</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ages 0-14 (% of total)</td>
<td>48.89</td>
<td>46.28</td>
<td>44.06</td>
<td>42.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth (annual %)</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total)</td>
<td>24.69</td>
<td>29.99</td>
<td>35.89</td>
<td>40.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education Variables**

| Public spending on education (% of GDP)              | 6.73# | ---   | 6.33  | 7.05  |
| Expenditure per student, primary                    | 13.43#| ---   | 27.64 | 25.21 |
| Expenditure per student, secondary                  | ---   | ---   | 18.43 | 25.14 |
| Expenditure per student, tertiary                   | ---   | ---   | 255.48| 409.21|
| School enrollment, primary (% net)                  | ---   | ---   | 66.77 | 76.43 |
| School enrollment, secondary (% net)                | ---   | ---   | ---   | ---   |
These development indicators show Kenya as a country in decline. The GDP per capita of Kenya has fallen from $1,146 (USD) in 1990 to $1,047 (USD) in 2004. Life expectancy has also declined over the time period. From 1990 to 2004 life expectancy has decreased from 57.90 years to 48.35 years. The infant mortality rate has increased from 64 per 1,000 in 1990 to 78.5 per 1,000 in 2004. The number of physicians per 1,000 people has increased slightly from 0.05 in 1990 to 0.14 in 2004, while overall health care expenditures have remained relatively fixed over the last several years.
Foreign aid has drastically decreased from $50.61 million in 1990 to $18.98 million in 2004. The data show an increase in aid from 2000 to 2004, but this is expected because aid agencies resumed aid to Kenya in 2003. Over this same period of time, foreign direct investment inflows decreased from 0.66 to 0.29. External debt in Kenya has decreased from $745 million in 1990 to $683 million in 2004, but external debt increased from 2000 to 2004. Total debt service decreased from 35.41 in 1990 to 8.56 in 2004.

The education indicators reveal impressive changes. Education spending is higher in Kenya than in Swaziland or Cameroon at 7.05 percent of GDP in 2004. Expenditure per student has increased from 13.43 percent of GDP per capita in 1991 to 25.21 percent of GDP per capita in 2004. Primary school enrollment increased from 66.77 percent in 2000 to 76.43 percent in 2004. Primary completion rate is much higher in Kenya (89.33% in 2004) than in Swaziland (61.25% in 2003) and Cameroon (63.26% in 2004). The literacy rate of Kenya increased from 70.76 percent in 1990 to 80.32 percent in 2004. These improvements are the direct result of President Kibaki’s campaign promise during the 2002 election to fund primary school education for all Kenyan children.
In Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland HIV/AIDS is a major factor barring development through education. The following section will demonstrate how the disease is decreasing educational attainment in the three nations. HIV/AIDS is an obstacle to the effects of education on development.

**HIV/AIDS in Swaziland**

According to the United States’ State Department (2006), the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the adult population of Swaziland is 42.6 percent; this figure is the highest prevalence rate in the world. According to UNICEF (2007h), deaths due to HIV/AIDS will remain high through at least 2020. The problem has been compounded by the decision of King Mswati III to embrace traditional Swazi practices such as polygamy and his erratic stance on the HIV/AIDS issue. Table 1 shows that health expenditure has decreased as HIV/AIDS has increased.

In 1999 King Mswati III proclaimed the HIV/AIDS epidemic a national disaster (Daly 2001). Then in 2001 he
forbade men from having intercourse with teenage girls for five years to stop AIDS (BBC News 2007). Many Swazi look to South Africa for guidance, where Jacob Zuma, presidential candidate, said in 2006 that "taking a shower" would prevent the spread of HIV (The Comeback Kid 2006:58). The unclear message that the king sends his people about HIV/AIDS allows myths and rumors, which are not based on scientific evidence about the disease to spread. In 1997 a local newspaper, *Times of Swaziland*, ran articles dispelling myths that AIDS is caused by "muti" (magic) or witchcraft (Daly 2001). According to Daly (2001), many men in Swaziland believe that sex with a virgin can cure AIDS; this belief has led to attacks on young girls.

The reason for the mixed signals about HIV/AIDS is that Mswati wants to remain the dominant political figure in Swaziland. After Sobhuza's death, Mswati has had to face a changing political climate. Mswati claims the reason why Swaziland has escaped genocide, wars, and other problems within Africa is the country's continued reliance on tradition. If the king were to admit that change is needed in dealing with HIV/AIDS he would be saying tradition is not working, thus sacrificing his current rationalization for remaining in power.
Traditionally women in Swaziland have been in a subordinate position to men. Women are not allowed to buy land, have a bank account, or move without a male's approval (Daly 2001). Swaziland practices polygamy, in which the men can marry as many women as they can economically afford (Daly 2001). Premarital relations are common and accepted as part of tradition in Swaziland. It is interesting that Warren, Johnson, Gule, Hlophe, and Kraushaar (1992:6) found that "it was easier for a woman who had had a child to get married than for a childless woman." They go on to state that 85 percent of their respondents had children before marriage. In recent years the king advocated family planning, but only 17 percent of women reported using contraception (Warren et al. 1992).

Women are often afraid to ask men to use contraception because the men will accuse them of being unfaithful. If a woman were to use female contraception, the male would often think the woman is hiding unfaithfulness from him (Daly 2001). Women who test positive are often afraid to tell their husbands for fear of bodily harm. On World AIDS day, December 1, 1998, Gugu Dlamini announced she was HIV-positive; twelve days later she was beaten to death (Daly 2001).
The social impact of HIV/AIDS can be measured in Swaziland’s educational indicators. The Table 1 educational indicators show that completion rates and persistence to Grade 5 are falling. Money is being diverted from social programs, such as education, to combat the epidemic, which will likely have a long-term negative effect on the development of the country. The data in Table 1 indicate that primary completion rates for males and females declined from 60.83 percent in 1990 to 58.30 percent in 2003 and from 64.81 percent in 1990 to 64.22 percent in 2003. Yet, the king continues to send mixed messages to his people as Table 1 shows that health expenditures in Swaziland have decreased.

Swaziland does not provide free primary education so families are forced to choose between health and education. The World Bank (2006b) expects the cost of education to increase due to the rise of HIV/AIDS among teachers. The real impact of HIV/AIDS may not show up in official statistics because families without financial resources have to pull their children out of school to help take care of sick family members. UNICEF (2007a) states that

As a result of the impact of AIDS, more than one third of children cannot access basic services, including health, food, education, water, and sanitation, and psychosocial support. (p. 2)
The confusion among the people of Swaziland on what causes HIV/AIDS also will not show up in official statistics. If the people do not seek proper medical care for the disease, there is no reason to believe that the health expenditure would need to increase. Daly (2001) points out that:

The loss of professionals will be especially notable, as their skills, abilities, and knowledge may not be easily replaced. For example, Swaziland’s Ministry of Education currently estimates that the country is losing four teachers a week to AIDS. (p. 27)

The Life Skills Programme in Swaziland was instituted to educate people about HIV/AIDS. In a report for UNICEF Gachuhi (1999) explained that the program has been negligible in educating people about HIV/AIDS. The failure of the program helps to explain why the people of Swaziland continue to be misinformed about the disease.

In 2005 the United Nations National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA) stated that HIV/AIDS in Swaziland has become, “one of the major development challenges of the current time” (p. 4). The World Bank (2006b) explained that:

HIV/AIDS impacts the education sector by reducing student participation and enrollment, and decreasing teacher supplies and learning outcomes. It also increases cost and reduces efficiency of the sector. (p. 15)
As a result of HIV/AIDS, Swaziland cannot provide the best learning and educational environment. The disease is pulling children out of school to take care of infected parents or relatives. The data in Table 1 indicate that persistence to Grade 5 is decreasing. Many children must disenroll from school because they need to find a job and an income because their parents cannot work due to HIV/AIDS infection.

One major consequence of HIV/AIDS is the number of children who are orphaned by the loss of their parents to the disease. The pandemic has orphaned an estimated 69,000 children and is expected to orphan another 10,000 a year (UNICEF 2005b) in Swaziland alone. UNICEF (2007a) reported that:

over a 10-year period, the proportion of children completing primary and secondary education has been declining due to the increasing inability of families to pay school fees on time. (p. 2)

Children are forced to drop out of school to take care of themselves and younger siblings. The drop in persistence to grade five seen in Table 1 may be due to children becoming orphaned.

Until the king accepts that a modern epidemiological approach must be taken to deal with the HIV/AIDS issue, the disease will continue to divert money and people away from
education. The people need to be educated about the disease, and women need to be empowered to combat the future spread. Development is being hindered in Swaziland due to the government's response to the disease and their traditional stance on women's rights. Education will continue to be hampered by HIV/AIDS until these changes are made.

**HIV/AIDS in Cameroon**

A UNAIDS report (2004) places Cameroon's HIV/AIDS infection rate at 6.9 percent, which is the 14th highest in Africa. HIV/AIDS is a problem for most African nations, but Cameroon in particular has not adapted well to the epidemic. UNICEF (2005a:1) stated that "56 percent of the population is under 20 years," and "50 percent of people live in poverty, with significant regional and sex disparities." The report continues:

Experts attribute the severity of Africa's AIDS epidemic to the region's poverty, women's relative lack of empowerment, high rates of male worker migration, and other factors. Health systems are ill-equipped for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. (Cook 2006:1)

Cameroon's high rates of poverty and "discrimination against girls' schooling is common practice in many schools, within families, and communities" (UNICEF 2003:1). As seen in Table 2, health expenditure has decreased from
4.4 percent of GDP per capita in 2000 to 4.2 percent in 2003.

The rate of HIV/AIDS in Cameroon has been much higher as UNICEF (2005a) demonstrates that, "HIV/AIDS increased from 0.5 percent in 1987 to 11 percent in 2000." The past rates of HIV/AIDS and the current rate of 6.9 percent explains the decrease in life expectancy from 52.4 years in 1990 to 45.98 years in 2004. The epidemic also may be the cause of the decrease in population growth displayed in Table 2 from 2.87 percent in 1990 to 1.82 percent in 2004.

One of the major concerns with such high rates of HIV/AIDS is the effect the disease has on families and children. UNICEF (2005a) stated that "it has been devastating for families already weakened by poverty. There are an estimated 45,300 HIV-positive children." The number of children orphaned by the disease has a negative effect on schooling in the country. The education indicators from Table 2 for Cameroon have declined considerably or are missing, but this could point to the lack of investment in HIV/AIDS prevention in Cameroon. The primary school expenditure per student is lower than Swaziland’s and Kenya’s, and primary school enrollments are lower than in Swaziland.
Lack of resources at the government and the local level has prevented many people in Cameroon from averting the spread of the disease. "A three-day supply of breastmilk substitutes (i.e., infant formula) cost $4, more than those earning minimum wage can afford" (UNICEF 2007b). This lack of resources is not due to the world turning its back on Cameroon. As Table 2 displays, aid per capita has increased from $38.25 million in 1990 to $47.48 million in 2004.

According to the BBC News (2007c), "the country's progress is hampered by a level of corruption that is among the highest in the world." According to Gros (2003:25) in 2000 Transparency International "ranked Cameroon the most corrupt country in the world." In addition, "the Global Fund and the World bank have allocated more than $133 million to stem the tide of HIV/Aids" (BBC News 2006a). The government of Cameroon has claimed to put more than $4.5 million to combat AIDS (BBC News 2006a). Yet, this money is not reaching the people who need the money to buy medicine and receive treatment for the disease.

The money is supposed to go to antiretroviral (ARV) medication for mothers to stop the spread of the disease to their unborn children, infant feeding counseling, and support. UNICEF (2007b) explains that the money is not
being delivered for these preventative measures. It is not clear where the money is going because:

the complete absence of written records makes proving corruption extremely difficult, and until recently the subject has been taboo in government circles. (BBC News 2006a)

Damaris Mounlom ran a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) for women's health and development in Cameroon. She reported "financial irregularities" in money that was allocated to be used for the fight against AIDS (BBC News 2006a). Mounlom quickly found herself, "blacklisted by the health ministry, and has now been removed from the National Aids Strategy Committee" (BBC News 2006a). The corruption in Cameroon's government results in donors questioning whether their money should go elsewhere.

The effects that education has on development will continue to be obstructed by the HIV/AIDS crisis if the government does not take a firmer stance on the disease. Monies that are allocated to fight the disease need to reach the people who need the money to help fight the epidemic. Instead, because of the corruption in Cameroon the money is being used for unknown purposes and is not helping the people of Cameroon. The disease negates any benefits education could bring to Cameroon.
HIV/AIDS in Kenya

Bell, Bruhns, and Gersbach (2006) state that:

the AIDS epidemic threatens Kenya with a long wave of premature adult mortality, and thus with an enduring setback to the formation of human capital and economic growth. (p. 1)

The current HIV/AIDS rate in Kenya is 6.1 per 1,000 (UNAIDS 2006a), and Table 3 illustrates life expectancy has been decreasing in Kenya. Yet, Kenya’s response to HIV/AIDS has been impressive when compared to other African nations. According to UNAIDS (2006a) only Kenya and Zimbabwe in sub-Saharan Africa have decreasing rates of HIV/AIDS.

The government has played a critical role in aiding the people of Kenya in dealing with the disease. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) (2006) reports:

Following widespread initial reluctance to tackle the epidemic in the early 1980s, there is now strong political will to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS in Kenya, and to take constructive steps toward mitigating the effects of the epidemic. The fight has public support and leadership from President Mwai Kibaki and from many senior political leaders. (p. 4)

The government has helped to increase knowledge of the disease and Kenyans rates of HIV/AIDS have fallen from “10 percent in the late 1990s” (UNICEF 2007c).

Kenya’s success is based on the “Three Ones” principle, which is one national strategic action plan, one
national coordinating authority, and one national monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system (United Nations General ... 2006). Kenya is seen as an example for other countries to follow when dealing with the AIDS epidemic. In fact, UNAIDS (2005:1) states, "leaders from DFID, Norway, UNAIDS, and the World Bank today praised Kenya's response to AIDS." One of the real strengths of Kenya's fight against HIV/AIDS is that it is being discussed openly. According to the BBC News (2006b), "the issue is openly discussed in political circles and the media and condoms are promoted" (P. 2).

As the data in Table 3 demonstrate life expectancy has decreased, but the HIV/AIDS rate in Kenya is high when compared to high-income countries. There is hope that the AIDS epidemic will continue to fall. Kenya has been conducting anonymous testing for HIV since 1990. The anonymous testing removes the stigma that surrounds the disease, making people more likely to get tested especially women.

The prevalence of HIV among women is 8.3 percent, while for men is 4.3 percent. The lower life expectancy for women, as shown in Table 3, demonstrates that women are more susceptible to the disease. UNAIDS (2006b:6) states:
the number of women and girls infected with HIV is increasing in every region of the world and in sub-Saharan Africa, they make up almost 60% of people living with the virus. (p. 6)

Kenya has been able to educate and explain how the disease is spread; thus, they have been able to lower their HIV/AIDS rate. Kenya is only the second country in sub-Saharan Africa to have a significant decline in HIV infection levels (United Nations General ... 2006).

Another problem the disease presents is children orphaned by the disease. Kenya began offering free primary education in 2003, and an unintended consequence of offering free schooling was a drop in HIV/AIDS among children. Duflo, Dupas, Kremer, and Sinei (2006) explained that, “reducing the cost of education by paying for school uniforms reduced dropout rates, teen marriages, and childbearing” (p. 1). By reducing school fees children are able to focus on education, and Kenya has seen a reduction in sexual activity among the young. As the data in Table 3 indicate this to be true by showing that primary school enrollments have increased from 2000 to 2004.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has slowed Kenya’s progress as many adults have died due to the disease. The disease has created an imbalance in which “half of the 31.5 million people in Kenya are children under 18 years of age” (UNGASS
2006:11). With so many children and the reduction of school fees the educational system in Kenya has been overwhelmed. According to UNGASS (2006) "primary school classes typically have more orphans than teachers can cope with, further compromising the quality of education" (p. 10). UNICEF (2007d) explains that, "1.3 million new pupils poured into the country’s schools" (p. 1).

The demand for teachers is also high in Kenya. The decrease in life expectancy and the high rates of HIV/AIDS in the past and today have claimed the lives of many teachers. Kenya is struggling to replace the teachers and Kenya’s pupil to teacher ratio has increased from 31.52 in 1991 to 39.54 in 2004, according to Table 3.

Kenya’s HIV/AIDS rate is high when compared to other regions of the world, but Kenya seems to be on the right track to stop the spread of the deadly disease. The key to Kenya’s success is the response by the government. The government has acknowledged the disease, which Swaziland and Cameroon are reluctant to do. President Kibaki has established a program to combat the disease, and it seems to be working. The effects of the disease will continue to be felt in Kenya for many years to come. Orphans will continue to plague the country, and the loss of teachers
will hamper education, but the positives of the government’s response outweigh the negatives.

**Land Distribution**

In each of the three countries another barrier stunting development through education is unequal land distribution. Each country has a different type of land distribution problem, but all three exhibit unequal land distribution. The unequal land distribution causes many people in each country to experience malnutrition due to droughts and food shortages. With the scarcity of food and water children cannot attend school and increase the country’s human capital; therefore, the effects of education on development are negated by the unequal land distribution in each country.

**Title Deed Land in Swaziland**

Title Deed Land (TDL) comprises 40 percent of the nation. The land held by the TDL consists of the best agricultural land in the country. The middleveld has the most suitable land for agriculture and is held by TDL (Booth 2000). In 1904 Sir Alfred Milner appointed a commission to fairly distribute Swazi land among the local Swazis, Europeans, and the king of Swaziland. The Concessions Partitions Proclamation of 1907 divided
Swaziland into three land categories: Swazi areas, European farms, and Crown Lands (Grotpeter 1975).

The British and the king acquired the best land that Swaziland had to offer, while Swazis were given the poorest land in terms of its potential agricultural output. After the British granted independence to Swaziland, the land that was held by Great Britain was given to King Sobhuza II. The king kept a large amount of the land he received for himself and created an investment fund called the Tibiyo takaNgwane. Today Mswati owns many important mines and agricultural lands. The land that Swazis were given is much of the lowveld, which is prone to drought. To make the lowveld productive the king irrigated the land, and today it is the most irrigated area in Swaziland. It is unfortunate that Swaziland endured two successive years of drought in 1999 and 2000, and in 2004 a national disaster emergency was declared by the government (UNICEF 2007a:2). Southern Africa experienced a drought in 2006, and today Swaziland cannot provide enough food for its people. UNICEF estimates that approximately 30 percent of the people are stunted (chronic malnutrition) in 2007.

Drought is not the only problem that this unequal land distribution has caused. The World Bank (2006b:13) states that "Swaziland is considered a middle-income country, but
income distribution is highly unequal.” Land that is highly productive is owned by foreign capital or the king, which division leads to a high rate of income inequality in Swaziland. “Nearly 70 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line. Unemployment continues to be high hovering above 30 percent” (World Bank 2006b:13).


After recording sizable surpluses during much of the 1990s, the central government budget has recorded persistently widening deficits since 1999/2000. (World Bank 2006b:14)

The data in Table 1 indicate that Swaziland’s external debt grew from $288 million in 2000 to $470 million in 2004.

Swaziland has managed to increase educational spending from 1990-2004, but droughts, AIDS (which kill farmers), and the increasing urban population have brought food shortages. The food shortages have increased the number of malnourished children in Swaziland. Primary school enrollments have increased, but persistence to Grade 5 has decreased as is shown in Table 1. As families run short on food, the money that is paying for the child’s education is being diverted to buy food.
Swaziland needs a more equal distribution of land if the country is to develop in the future. Because the crown and foreign companies own much of the land that is productive, when a disaster strikes, such as a drought, the subsistence farmer is hurt the most. The Swazis are forced to choose between buying food or sending their children to primary school.

**The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon**

There are over 250 ethnic identities in Cameroon, but the conflict between the Anglophones and the Francophones has hampered efforts to build consensus and coalitions throughout Cameroon. Krieger (1994:605) explains that "Cameroon’s upheavals since 1990 have not been widely reported among the more visible and violent African state-society conflicts." Since 1989 the Biya government has been under, "periods of political instability, at times almost chaos, and the threat of a civil war" (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000:9).

The roots of the tension between the two groups lay in the colonization of the country. France invested heavily in the Francophone region of Cameroon, while Britain left the Anglophone region to be governed by Nigeria; thus, the Anglophone region of Cameroon was significantly poorer when unified with the Francophone region (Ndongko 1980).
There can be no doubt that the administration of Southern Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria resulted in the blatant neglect of its development. (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:208)

Ahidjo consolidated the two regions quickly because he feared that the multiple ethnic populations in Cameroon would split the loyalty of the people into ethnic groups and not into a unified Cameroon (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000). But, the economic differences upon unification have led to tension and mistrust over the years. Anglophones feel "marginalized, exploited, and assimilated by the francophone-dominated state, and even by the francophone population as a whole" (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:207). The tension has reached such levels that "some anglophones have given up the idea of Cameroon and have begun to demand independence as the Republic of Ambazonia" (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000:9).

The conflict between the two groups has obstructed the effects of education on development. Anglophones do not trust the Francophone government, and Anglophones point out that "Cameroon as a whole is hardly flourishing, but Anglophone Cameroon is totally malnourished" (BBC News 2004). The Anglophone region has little development, and the roads in the region are "shocking" (BBC News 2004). When elections are held many Cameroonians feel that the
elections will not be fair or free and do not take part. France continues to be Cameroon's main trading partner today, further increasing tension in the Anglophone region (U.S. Department of State 1999).

The official languages of Cameroon are French and English, and all schools are taught in French or English (Robinson 1990). This language split further divides the two groups, and other ethnicities in the country have to gain a knowledge of one of the two languages or be left out of the educational system altogether. Many Cameroonians have acquired a mixture of French and English called "Frananglia" that is further complicating schooling in Cameroon (BBC News 2007d). Teachers have to know how to speak many languages to communicate with their students, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for Cameroon to find qualified people to fill this role.

The effects of the Anglophone problem will not be directly visible in Table 2. Yet, the tension and constant threat of civil war hampers development in Cameroon. The discovery of oil on Anglophone land has been negated by the tension the two groups have toward each other. The unique and complicated culture of Cameroon has hindered development and made a uniform educational system impossible to achieve. Without a standardized educational
system in Cameroon any effects that education has on development may be negated.

The two national languages in Cameroon further divide the country. Anglophones have no need to learn French because all of their schools are taught in English. It is also true that the Francophones have no need to learn English for the same reason. Cameroon instituted a local-language literacy program, but there had not been any evidence of development due to the program (Robinson 1990). By having two different languages Cameroon cannot unify around a common culture, which would aid the two groups understanding of each other.

**Drought in Kenya**

Drought in Kenya poses a severe problem to development. As little as 11 percent of Kenya's land is used for agriculture so, when a drought happens, many people are effected. According to UNICEF (2005c) "over half of Kenyans, including 9 million children live below the poverty line" (p. 1). With so many people living below the poverty line a access to water and food is crucial to survival.

Free primary education has increased school enrollments, but drought reverses that effect. UNICEF (2007c) states that "school dropout rates are increasing,
especially in drought-affected areas” (p. 1). UNICEF (2007e) goes on to say, “besides the immediate threat of malnutrition and dehydration, their future is at risk because so many boys and girls are being forced to drop out of school” (p. 1).

Children are being forced from school to look for whatever food or water is available. Many schools are being shut down in drought-stricken areas because their wells have run dry (UNICEF 2007e). Northern areas of Kenya are particularly susceptible to drought. In these areas education is becoming the exception rather than the rule (UNICEF 2007f).

The decrease in life expectancy shown in Table 3 can be explained by the drought as thousands are malnourished. The corruption found in Kenya’s government has compounded the problem. The IMF and World Bank stopped aid to Kenya in 1992 due to the corruption found in the government. Meredith (2005) estimates that aid made up to 30 percent of the government expenditure. The step drop off of aid reduced the government’s ability to deal with a drought. The BBC News (2007e:1) explains that “a long-running regional drought has put millions of Kenyans in need of food aid.”
The data in Table 3 show that foreign aid has decreased from $50.61 million in 1990 to $18.98 million in 2004. The lost $31.63 million could have helped to buy food and water to the drought areas. The corruption in the government will be discussed in the succeeding section, but the government has caused the drought to become a worse disaster, by not providing aid to the people. Drought will continue to cause major development problems in Kenya. Education is being hampered by the lack of food and water in the areas experiencing droughts. The effects of education on development are being barred by the drought.

**Corruption in the Government**

The last barrier found is corruption. Cameroon and Swaziland have secret funds, and no one is aware of how the funds are being used. Kenya's government has been accused of outright robbery of money from the treasury. The loss of funds has robbed the people of money that could have been used to fund HIV/AIDS treatment, drought relief, school fees, and other programs. As long as corruption remains at its current levels, each country will continue to lose any gains in development that could be made through education.
The Tibiyo takaNgwane is an investment fund the king established to help Swaziland develop. Sobhuza II created the Tibiyo when Swaziland gained independence from Britain because he believed that the fund could be used to fund social services and development projects. Since the 1970s the Tibiyo has been able to acquire shares of every major foreign-owned enterprise such as hotels, mines, construction, forestry, and agriculture in Swaziland (Booth 2000).

The money from the Tibiyo is placed in a separate treasury, and the amount of the fund is kept secret. The Tibiyo is not considered in calculations of GDP and other economic indicators and is not taxed. While the data in Table 1 show Swaziland’s GDP increasing from $3,919 in 1990 to $5,182 in 2004 no one knows what growth could have taken place if the Tibiyo was included in the GDP. The fund is used for the benefit of the monarchy and not for the benefit of the Swazi nation, contrary to what the king would say (Booth 2000). Because the Tibiyo is kept secret and not taxed, there is no way of knowing how much the fund is dampening Swaziland’s economic growth.

Mswati III states that the Tibiyo is used to increase investment in the nation, but critics have pointed out that
the Tibiyo is kept secret so that Swazis do not know what
the Tibiyo is being used for. The Tibiyo funds a newspaper
in Swaziland, but Swaziland does not have freedom of
speech. The government also uses the funds for a radio
station, which plays only religious programs (U.S.
Department of State 2006). The fund's main purpose is to
maintain political power in Swaziland. According to the
U.S. State Department, Swaziland has a bad human rights
record including arbitrary killings by security forces,
police torture, beatings and excessive force, infringement
on citizens' privacy rights, and poor enforcement of
women's rights.

The fund stifles growth in Swaziland by diverting
money that could be used for development and social
services. The World Bank (2006a:19) states that
"Swaziland's fiscal crisis has not been for the lack of
resources." No one is sure how much money is in the
Tibiyo, but whatever amount is in the fund could be used to
help the current fiscal crisis. If the money generated
from foreign business were included in the government's
budget, the fiscal crisis might be alleviated. Add the
HIV/AIDS epidemic and the drought, and the money taken away
from the nation by the Tibiyo creates the current situation
in Swaziland. Swaziland is not able to deal with
unexpected financial burdens while the Tibiyo continues to exist. The Tibiyo denies education, which has been shown as a development indicator; the money and resources could be used to aid in Swaziland’s development. The fund also denies money that could be used to alleviate the food and water crisis brought on by the drought and could aid the HIV/AIDS epidemic by paying for medicine and education programs.

**Compte Hors Budget (CHB) in Cameroon**

Oil was discovered in the 1970s and was initially a great boom to the Cameroon economy (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000). The revenue from the oil was used to fund development projects, but oil revenue was also used to fund poorly planned projects (DeLancey and DeLancey 2000). Also, the discovery of oil led to increased tensions between Cameroon and Nigeria. The two countries claim that the Bakassi peninsula, which juts into the Gulf of Guinea, is part of their country. The Bakassi peninsula “may contain up to 10% of the world’s oil and gas reserves” (BBC News 2006c).

The discovery of oil has led to the creation of the compte hors budget (CHB). The CHB is a secret account in which the revenue from oil production is deposited. Funds deposited in the CHB were used to supplement the official
budget of Cameroon, with the president having complete
discretion over how the funds were used (DeLancey and
DeLancey 2000). The fund is no longer in existence, but
Biya is believed to have a secret account today (Van de
Walle 1989).

Oil revenues are not evenly distributed throughout the
country. Konings and Nyamnjoh (1997) state, "oil revenues
were alleged to be used by those in power to feed ‘the
bellies’ of their allies, and to stimulate the economy in
other regions" (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:214). Most of
the oil in the region is found on Anglophone or land other
than Francophone. The discovery of oil has led to an
increase in hostility as discussed in the previous section.
Oil is located in the South and Southwest, which are
“populated by groups that feel estranged from the state and
are not willing to let it exploit ‘their’ resources without
their input” (Gros 2003:21). It is difficult to state the
size of the oil income because the revenue is a secret and
the earnings are not part of the annual budget (DeLancey
and DeLancey 2000).

The Bakassi peninsula was awarded to Cameroon in an
International Court of Justice ruling in 2002. But the
tension between the Anglophones and Francophones has made
the transition violent and chaotic. According to the BBC
News (2006c) many residents, "would rather leave their ancestral land than be ruled by Cameroon, such is their level of distrust." Many residents have vowed to fight any attempt Cameroon makes to administer the area and have called for help from militants in the Niger Delta. Nigeria and Cameroon had bloody clashes over the area in 1994 that claimed 34 lives, and Nigeria began withdrawing troops from the peninsula on August 1, 2006 (BBC News 2006c).

The oil revenue should be a benefit to a developing country such as Cameroon, but this benefit has not been the case. The CHB siphons unknown amounts of money away from projects that could promote increases in social services, including education, and could help Cameroon to develop. Cameroon does not have a free educational system and "the cost of learning materials and other school-related expenses are difficult for low-income families to bear" (UNICEF 2003). "Classes are overcrowded, teachers are in short supply and inadequately trained, and school hygiene and sanitation facilities are inadequate" (UNICEF 2003). The CHB may no longer be an official budget, but Anglophones and researchers still believe that Biya is keeping a secret account with oil revenues (Van de Walle 1989). It is not hard to imagine that Biya would have a
secret account considering the level of corruption in the
country mentioned in the previous section.

The data in Table 2 show a decline in GDP per capita
from $2,042 (USD) in 1990 to $1,997 (USD) in 2004, but we
do not know what the GDP could be if the oil revenue were
included in the GDP. Health expenditure has decreased from
2000 to 2003. Some of the oil revenue could have been used
to increase health expenditure, which would aid HIV/AIDS
prevention discussed earlier. Exposing how much income is
generated from oil production and where the money is being
spent may also help to decrease tension among the
Anglophones and Francophones. If the money were used to
fight HIV/AIDS or build infrastructure in the Anglophones
area, mistrust would be dampened. By using some of the oil
revenue for social services in the Bakassi Peninsula the
people may not look at Cameroon with such anger.

The external debt has been increasing in Cameroon from
1990 to 2004. The income generated by oil production could
have reduced the debt or even have made borrowing
unnecessary during this time period. Again, it is not
clear how much money the oil sector creates, but "U.S.
investment in Cameroon is about $1 million, most of it in
the oil sector" (U.S. Department of State 1999). The
number may seem low, but France is the largest trade
partner with Cameroon, and France would provide much more revenue to Cameroon than would the United States. The increase in external debt decreases the amount of money that can be spent on education.

The secret oil revenue provides a particularly tricky problem in assessing the effects of education on the development of Cameroon. There is no clear evidence as to how much revenue is generated by the oil industry, but the revenue is probably substantial. HIV/AIDS is a major problem that is in need of funds for medicine. Anglophones could be shown that the money from the oil was being used to help them, and the money could also be used to stop the growing external debt. The secret oil fund will continue to skew the data in Cameroon, and the effects of education will continue to be obstructed.

**Corruption in the Government of Kenya**

Corruption in the Kenyan government has been present since independence. Jomo Kenyatta’s wife and daughter were involved in the ivory trade and “high-level corruption cost Kenya half its elephant population” during his rule (Meredith 2005:267). Daniel arap Moi’s rule may have been the most corrupt rule of any of the Kenyan leaders. Moi used any tactic he could to suppress opposition to his party, including arrest, detention, and torture (Meredith
Journalists, academics, trade unionists, and members of parliament were the focus of Moi’s vengeance for speaking out against him.

Five men have recently been charged with fraud in the Goldenberg affair, which Kenya’s Attorney General Amos Wako says cost Kenya over $600 million (BBC News 2006d). Gold and diamonds, which Kenya has no gold or diamonds, from other countries were re-exported and officials claimed the money for themselves. The scam was part of Moi’s compensation scheme, which paid money to Goldenberg International to promote exports and encourage foreign exchange earnings. The scheme was so successful that gold rivaled tea as Kenya’s biggest export.

Moi did not stop at money schemes as he rigged elections to ensure that he stayed in power. After announcing multiparty elections in 1992 Moi won questionable elections in 1992 and 1997 (Meredith 2005). In 2002 Moi was defeated and forced from office. The BBC News (2006e) explains that, “the people were no longer prepared to accept misrule and graft” (p. 1).

President Mwai Kibaki won the election largely on his claim to end corruption. He promised, “corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya” (BBC News 2006f). Yet, Kibaki has not had the ability to stop corruption. Under
Kibaki allegations have been made that "corruption has cost Kenya $1b - nearly a fifth of its state budget" (BBC News 2005). According to the BBC News (2007a):

high-level corruption and nepotism scandals have continued, the tribalism that has dogged Kenya's post-independence history has been rearing its head again and the coalition that brought Mr. Kibaki to power has dissolved into factions. (p. 1)

Kibaki has also been plagued with the Anglo Leasing affair. The Anglo Leasing affair cost Kenya millions of dollars by giving bogus security contracts to Kenyan businessmen with suspicious pasts (BBC News 2006f). Four ministers resigned over the allegations, and President Kibaki reappointed three of them. In response to the scandal the World Bank put a $260 million aid package on hold.

The scandals and corruption have left President Kibaki appearing weak. In response to the pressure Kibaki ordered police raids on media houses in Kenya (BBC News 2006g). The BBC News (2006g:1) states, "there is a genuine shock and amazement in Kenya that hooded armed police were used to raid media houses." The police raided the Standard newspaper offices and the television station KTN, which were critical of Kibaki's recent scandals.

The corruption in Kenya has cost Kenya opportunities to deal with other problems, such as HIV/AIDS and the
drought. Government officials and businessmen are stealing money that could be used to promote HIV/AIDS education, buy medication for AIDS, or provide food aid for the people living in drought-stricken areas. The data in Table 3 show the loss in foreign aid that Kenya has experienced. The aid could be used in the same way as the loss of money from these corruption scandals.

While the data in Table 3 show that public spending on education has increased the HIV/AIDS and drought have pushed some children out of school. As the data in Table 3 illustrate that persistence to grade 5 has fallen from 1991 to 2003. Deaths due to HIV/AIDS have raised the pupil to teacher ratio from 31.52 in 1991 to 39.54 in 2004.

Kenya is a leader in sub-Saharan Africa in the fight against AIDS, but without the corruption schemes more foreign aid would flow into Kenya helping to fight the disease even further. The same holds true for the drought in Kenya's northern regions. More aid would help to alleviate some of the water and food shortages in these regions. The corruption in Kenya will continue to obstruct the effects of education on development.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The focus of this study has been the barriers to the effects of education on development. Hage et al. (1988) explained that, by expanding the educational system, countries increase their economic growth. This finding may be true, but the current study shows that there are barriers that hinder what education can bring to a country. Increasing human capital through the educational system, as Oketch (2005) illustrated can work, but it is important to understand that many countries cannot simply pour vast amounts of money into the educational system and expect results. The three factors brought to light by this study show that there are inhibiting factors that need to be addressed to experience all the benefits that a formal education can bring.

Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland all increased public spending on education from 1990-2004, but only Swaziland's GDP increased over this time period. If educational expansion raised human capital, then all three should have experienced growth, but growth did not happen. The
barriers mitigate any effect that education might have in the country. Sachs (2005:244) explained human capital as any form of "health, nutrition, and skills needed for a person to be economically productive." The barriers to development found in this study operate against the health, nutrition, and skills of the people in the country. Stopping HIV/AIDS, unequal land distribution, and corruption are all keys in acquiring the health, nutrition, and skills that Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland need to develop further.

Furthermore, the barriers discussed in this study provide an illustration of the community-capitals model. HIV/AIDS lowers the human capital, poor land distribution decreases the natural capital, and corruption decreases the political capital of each country in the study. Together all three barriers work together to negate any potential development a country could achieve.

Hoffman and Centeno (2003) explored how stratification stems from the global economic system, internal colonialism, and the underdevelopment of state structures in Latin America. The same holds true for the Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. The barring factors stem from the countries' colonial legacy, but today the underdeveloped health-care system in each country allowed HIV/AIDS to
reach the epidemic levels it has. The three countries’ land distribution has led to internal colonialism. Cameroon’s Anglophone population, Kenya’s ethnic tribes, and Swaziland’s poor all experience internal colonialism through the unequal land distribution in those countries. All three countries depend on agriculture, thus locating them in the periphery in the global economic system.

Summary of Findings

This research has identified several factors in a sample of three African countries (Swaziland, Cameroon, and Kenya) that represent modern-day roadblocks preventing human capital formation from having a positive impact on economic development and social progress. While each country possesses a unique colonial and post-colonial history, patterns emerge showing similar barriers that have served to limit development.

HIV/AIDS is a major problem facing Swaziland, Cameroon, and Kenya. While Kenya appears to be making significant strides to curb the spread of the disease, Swaziland and Cameroon have not shown signs of improvement as measured in HIV/AIDS infection rates over the last several decades. The disease has left an unknown number of children orphaned and reduced the human capital in each country. HIV/AIDS is one of the most important factors
preventing education from having a positive effect on human development.

Land-distribution and land tenure issues are another problem that each country in this study has experienced. Swaziland's unequal share of land stems from its colonial legacy. The distribution of land in Swaziland gives the monarchy the right to utilize the highest quality farmland, while the poor must utilize less-productive areas. The poor also must cope with droughts and other disasters, thus leaving millions of people dependent on government aid to survive. Cameroon’s land distribution also stems from colonization. The majority Francophone population enjoys a higher standard of living than the minority Anglophone population. The Francophone people of Cameroon control the best farmland, while the Anglophones must cope with the more arid regions of the country. Roads, schools, hospitals, and other social services are neglected in the Anglophone area leading to resentment and anger that may manifest itself in acts of civil war. The arid North of Kenya poses a problem for development with millions of people facing malnutrition. In the North Kenya’s educational system is being closed or abandoned by the people because they must focus on finding water and food necessary for their survival.
Corruption is the last key factor barrier of development through education in Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. Swaziland taxes business and places the money in the Tibiyo. The people of Swaziland probably do not benefit from the hidden funds because no one is sure what the funds are used for. The CHB in Cameroon may not officially exist today, but many experts believe that money is being hidden from the people. The secrecy over oil revenues steals money that could be used for education or other social services. The Anglophones remain skeptical of the Francophone government because the money from oil, which is on Anglophone land, does not seem to be improving their area. Kenya's corruption has cost Kenya numerous aid packages that could have gone to improving the infrastructure of the country. Kenyans in the arid North might have benefited greatly from the aid that was cut off from Kenya.

These three issues cannot be resolved independently as they are all significantly related to each other. Kenya may be making progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS, but millions are on the verge of death and starvation in the North. If the government were to clean up the corruption, then additional aid could help the drought victims as well as residents infected by HIV/AIDS. Until the government
addresses corruption, HIV/AIDS, and drought victims will remain in a precarious position in Kenyan society, as aid will continue to be sporadic.

The highest rates of HIV/AIDS are in Swaziland. In order to address this problem, Swaziland has to examine the land distribution and Tibiyo. The poor people live on inadequate land and cannot provide for themselves. Without the ability to provide for themselves and their families, many males work in South Africa. The transient nature of the males' work led many men to brothels and increased HIV/AIDS infections and transmission rates within Swaziland. At the same time the Tibiyo denies money that could go to aiding people infected with the disease. The three factors work together to decrease children's involvement in school, thus neutralizing the positive effect education could have on development.

Cameroon's Anglophone problem cannot be solved until the government uses some of the oil revenues to build infrastructure in Anglophone regions. Anglophones are resentful of the Francophones and have threatened civil war, joining Nigeria, or forming an independent state. At the same time HIV/AIDS has remained high in Cameroon. The epidemic has taken a back seat while Cameroonians fight over oil revenues among themselves and with Nigeria. The
anger and resentment over the oil revenues has allowed HIV/AIDS to remain in the background and wreak havoc on Cameroon’s human capital.

Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland all show the same barriers on development. All three factors work interdependently and only when addressed together will each country have the potential to build human capital and increase their levels of economic development.

**Limitations of the Study**

This study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. Further research is needed examining the causal linkages in the variables identified in this study. Moreover, more cases need to be examined in Africa and in countries in Central and South America and in Asia. By examining more cases the findings will become more generalizable to other countries in Africa and other regions of the world.

The large amount of missing and/or incomplete data from the World Bank and other institutions for African countries represents a significant limitation to this study and any study examining development in Africa. Many years of missing data from the World Bank make any economic growth difficult to assess. The levels of corruption in many African nations leave researchers unaware of what funds are available and how they are being spent or used.
Secret funds prevent researchers from tracking what the money is being used for and how much money is being kept secret.

Another limitation to the study is the reliance on news networks, government organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for some of the historical-comparative data used in this study. These groups may have ulterior motives because their funding may depend on results and other findings. Yet, even with data inadequate and corruption rampant these organizations are the best source available for information on the countries.

The study also is limited in the small amount of resources used. The information used to assess each country came from news organizations and aid organizations. These organizations can have an agenda that is pushed and not truthful to the actual situation in the country. The present study did the best at finding trends in each country, but the narrow focus may limit the findings generalizablity.

**Suggestions for Future Research**

The current study focused on Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. A good starting point for future research would be to examine different countries in Africa. If other countries in Africa experience the same barriers or
different obstructions, the study would be a worthwhile. Examining what barriers on development are present or were present in Latin and Central America and Asia would be helpful in advancing development studies.

While the researcher believes that the three barriers found in Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland are interdependent, a study examining what policies, incentives, or initiatives a government makes to reduce the effect of the obstructing factors would aid development studies to move forward. Understanding what policy makers can do to reduce HIV/AIDS, unequal land distribution, and corruption in each country can aid the country to experience the effects of education on development that other countries have experienced. As stated above any research in what policies, incentives, or initiatives in other countries in Africa and other regions would be helpful in guiding future development studies and policy makers.
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