Geographic and Partisan Patterns of Support for Electoral Reforms

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GEOGRAPHIC AND PARTISAN PATTERNS OF SUPPORT FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS

A Capstone Experience/Thesis Project Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts in with Mahurin Honors College Graduate Distinction at Western Kentucky University

By
Aubrey Kelley
May 2020

*****

CE/T Committee
Dr. Jeffrey Kash, Chair
Dr. Scott Lasley
Dr. Jeffrey Budziak
ABSTRACT

Electoral reform has become a hotly debated issue, and it has recently been in the news at federal and state levels. On the federal level, the House of Representatives recently passed an electoral reform bill to expand early voting and allow for same-day voter registration. On the state level, Kentucky has become one of the most recent states to implement photo identification requirements. Georgia’s strict voter registration system became a subject of deep controversy during the most recent gubernatorial election. Throughout the past couple of decades, electoral reform has been tackled in a variety of different ways; some states have offered increased opportunities for early voting, while others have implemented more restrictive identification requirements.

This study uses survey data from Georgia to explore the basis of public support for a number of electoral reforms that are currently being debated or have been implemented the past couple of decades. Partisan differences are found in levels of support for most reforms, particularly in support for photo identification requirements. Respondents who identify as southern were more likely to oppose vote by mail and Internet voting and are less likely to support Election Day registration.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Kash and Dr. Lasley for their mentorship and guidance throughout the course of this research. Without their help and support, this thesis would not be possible, and I will always be grateful for the impact they had on my time as a WKU student. I would also like to thank the WKU Office of Research and Creativity for awarding me a Faculty-Undergraduate Student Engagement Research Grant, through which I was able to fund this project.
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INTRODUCTION

In March 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a wide-ranging electoral reform bill. H.R. 1 proposed a number of changes to the United States’ electoral system. Components of the proposed legislation include simplifying voter registration, establishing Election Day as a holiday, and expanding early voting. Referred to as the For the People Act, the bill would also address campaign finance, ethics, and redistricting. The passage of the bill was strictly along party-lines with the Democratic majority voting to pass the bill by a 234-193 vote.

While Democrats in the U.S. House were advocating changes to limit restrictions on voting, several state legislatures were looking to implement more stringent requirements on voters. For example, in January 2020, Kentucky legislators introduced legislation to make the Commonwealth the 20th state to require that voters present photo identification when casting their ballot.

The examples highlighted above represent the two normative arguments that are most frequently made for electoral reform. One of the arguments presented by policymakers is to reform elections to increase the ease of voting. These are reforms that make it easier for more people to vote, potentially increasing turnout and participation in elections. Reforms such as early voting, voting by mail, and same-day voter registration are all designed to make it easier for citizens to cast their votes. The other main argument presented by politicians and activists is to pass reforms to enhance the security and
integrity of American elections. Reforms that increase security and integrity of American elections may require stricter guidelines and more steps voters must take in order to be able to cast their votes. Photo identification requirements are one example of laws that are defended as a mechanism to limit voter fraud.

Many electoral reforms receive high levels of support among all Americans, but partisan differences emerge on some. Among reforms supported by the public are photo identification requirements, early and absentee voting, and making Election Day a national holiday. Survey results from a 2018 Pew Research Center poll had 76% of respondents express support for voter photo identification laws (Bialik 2018). Almost all (91%) Republicans supported photo identification laws, while only 63% of Democrats expressed support for a mandatory photo identification requirement. Seven out of 10 survey respondents were in favor of early voting or allowing absentee voting without a documented reason. A partisan gap again emerged with 83% of Democrats supporting early voting compared to just 57% of Republicans. Making Election Day a national holiday was also popular with a majority of respondents, with 59% of Republicans supporting this and 71% of Democrats supported making Election Day a holiday. With the exception of support for photo identification requirements, survey results indicate that Americans generally support expanding access to voting by making it more convenient for voters (Bialik 2018).

While voters typically support making it easier for people to vote, states vary in how convenient they make it for voters to cast their ballot. Historically, southern states have been among those that are most restrictive when it comes to voter registration and voting (Bentele and O’Brien 2013). Prior to the passage of the 24th Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, southern states implemented a number of institutional barriers to prevent African-American voters from voting. Southern states continue to have some of the more restrictive electoral rules when it comes to voting. They typically have some of the earliest closing dates for voter registration. Several southern states have been among the most aggressive states in implementing photo identification requirements as well.

In this paper, I am interested in whether regional identity and partisanship influence the level of support for election regulations that can make voting more convenient or, in the case of the photo identification requirements, make it more difficult. Specifically, I explore whether individuals who self-identify as southerners will tend to support more restrictive election laws while opposing those designed to enhance voter access. Secondarily, I will explore partisan influence on support for various electoral reforms. The research for this paper was conducted in Georgia. Georgia is a particularly useful state for this study for several reasons. Not only is Georgia a strong southern state, but it is also a state where election controversy has recently been a topic of conversation.
**LITERATURE REVIEW**

**Overcoming Institutional Barriers to Lower the Cost of Voting**

Political scientists have spent decades assessing the costs and benefits associated with voting. While clear, tangible benefits of voting are limited, it is fairly easy to identify costs associated with casting one’s ballot (Aldrich 1993; Downs 1957). Since benefits are negligible, it is the cost side of the equation that is impacted by electoral reforms. Institutional barrier theory asserts that procedures and policies have been implemented that make voting more difficult. Barriers of this type drive down voter turnout, as evidenced by barriers created after 1896 that raised the cost of voting (Piven and Cloward 2000). Consequently, reformers looked at mitigating the costs associated with voter registration as a way to boost voter turnout (Highton 2004). Examples of registration reforms include Election Day registration and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, better known as the “Motor Voter Act”.

When calculating costs associated with voting, registration is just one cost that voters must pay. Among the myriad of other factors that influence voting costs are the length of time that it takes to vote and documentation required to vote. The number and location of polling places, whether or not a prospective voter has to take off from work to vote, voter identification requirements, the ability to vote by mail, and the availability of early voting all influence the calculus of voter turnout. In the sections that follow, six election reforms are explored that can affect the costs associated with voting: making
Election Day a holiday, moving Election Day to a Saturday, voting by mail, implementing Internet or e-voting, implementing photo identification requirements, and allowing voters to register to vote on Election Day.

Theoretically, establishing Election Day as a holiday or moving Election Day to the weekend should lower the cost of voting for individuals who find it difficult to vote due to work commitments. Being too busy to vote is frequently cited as one of the top reasons why Americans do not vote (Lopez and Florio 2017). While it is not entirely clear that establishing Election Day as a national holiday or moving voting to the weekend would lead to an increase in voter turnout (Franklin 2004), some evidence is consistent with the expectation that these reforms do have an effect on voter turnout. A case study comparison of the United States and France suggests that an Election Day holiday would lead to a fairly substantive surge in turnout (Bradfield and Johnson 2017).

Providing prospective American voters alternatives to voting on Election Day is another mechanism for lowering costs and removing barriers to voting. Voting by mail is one alternative that several states have already implemented, and COVID-19 has caused several states to allow this method of voting as a public safety measure for upcoming elections. Internet or e-voting would also provide an option for citizens to cast their ballot without having to pay the costs for travel to and from a polling place and waiting in line once there. The impact of voting by mail on turnout is somewhat mixed. Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott (2001) and Kousser and Mullin (2007) find minor or mixed results on the ability of voting by mail to stimulate voter turnout. On the other hand, some studies of voting by mail in Oregon show a boost in voter turnout after adopting voting by mail (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Richey 2008). In terms of
Internet and e-voting, online discussion groups identified the ease with which one could cast their ballot as being a benefit of Internet voting (Stromer-Galley 2003).

Allowing voters to register on Election Day is one reform that consistently boosts voter turnout. Many states have a voter registration deadline weeks in advance of Election Day, while other states allow voters to register up until the day they vote. For example, Kentucky requires citizens to register to vote almost a month in advance of Election Day, while states like Colorado give voters the ability to vote until the day they cast their ballots. Several studies suggest that Election Day voter registration increases voter turnout by several points or more (Brians and Grofman 2001; Knack 2001; Neiheisel and Burden 2012). Early voting has become a recent topic discussion in many states, especially during the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Early voting has been shown to reduce the cost of participation in elections by making it easier for people to fit voting into their schedules and by shortening lines on Election Day (Giammo and Brox 2010). However, although early voting may initially cause a surge in participation, research shows that when the option early voting is consistently given to constituents, the novelty wears off over time and participation will trend toward previous levels of participation with each seceding election (Giammo and Brox 2010). Further, in some cases, providing an early voting option could be more expensive than simply opening more voting precincts, which could have the unintended consequence of suppressing voter turnout (Giammo and Brox 2010). While early voting might have unintended consequences that depress voter turnout, early voting does seem to produce the desired impact of improving turnout (Burden, Canon, Mayer, and Moynihan 2014).
Unlike the policy reforms outlined above, photo identification requirements will typically raise the cost of voting. The question is whether the increased cost in voting is substantive enough to serve as a barrier to casting a ballot. Some studies do not find an effect on turnout (Ansolabehere 2009; Erikson and Minnite 2009; and Vercillotti and Anderson 2009), while others do provide evidence that the ID requirements depress turnout (Alverez, Bailey, and Katz 2008; Hajnal, Lagevardi, and Nielson 2017; Hood and Bullock 2008).

While the normative intents of electoral reforms are important to understand, practical considerations certainly play a role in the passage and implementation of policies that regulate voter participation. Two practical considerations that are of interest to legislators include the electoral impact of electoral rules and the degree to which the public supports particular electoral reforms. The interest of this study is primarily in the latter. I am interested in what factors influence public support for electoral reforms that will either mitigate or reinforce institutional barriers to voter turnout. Specifically, this study is interested in the impact that southern identity and partisan influence play in public opinion on electoral rules. Does the history of erecting institutional barriers to limit political participation in the South continue to shape public opinion on electoral reforms? Are southerners more likely to oppose policies that will make voting more convenient? Before I attempt to answer these questions, I first highlight why we expect southern identity to play a role in shaping public opinion.

**Southern Identity**

The American South has long been regarded as distinctive in nature. Whether it be history, cultural preferences, or politics, it is undeniable that the American South has
qualities and traditions that stand apart from all other geographic regions. From cultural differences, including preferences of religion, music, sports, and literature (Graham 1994), to racial and moral issues (Key 1949; Rice, McLean and Larsen 2002; Valentino and Sears 2005), southerners differ from non-southerners. Preferences and opinions, along with a complex and controversial history, have helped to shape government and political opinions of the American South, which is what this research primarily looks at.

In order to understand the distinctiveness of the American South, it is important to examine southern history. The American South has a complex history which differs tremendously from other regions of the United States. After the Civil War up until the 1960s, the Democratic Party held strong control over the South. Because of this, more of an emphasis was put on the primary election than the general election, which resulted in uncontested elections (Squire 2000) and a lack of interparty competition (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). Because of this, parties were not as important as the individual politicians, who were often outspoken and eccentric (Gibson et al. 1983). The Civil Rights Movement disrupted the stronghold the Democratic Party once held in the South, when political and moral disagreements created more interparty competition. As southern values shifted more conservatively, Republican success began to emerge (Bullock 2009).

It is also important to understand the political culture of the American South. According to Elazar, there are three components that define what a political culture will consist of (1966). These components are what government should do, who participates in politics, and how government operates. Elazar categorizes three different subcultures of politics: individualists, moralists, and traditionalists. The individualist subculture focuses on using government for practical reasons. Moralists believe that the government should
focus on promoting the betterment of society. Traditionalist cultures are focused on protecting the elite and the status quo. It is the elite and those in power who define the issues of importance, and they use their power to protect the political institutions and policies in place.

It is the traditionalist subculture that can be applied broadly to most southern states, and looking at the characteristics of the traditionalist subculture can help to explain what makes the American South different from other regions in the United States. Some characteristics of traditionalists are that they tend to have more restrictive voter registration laws and lower voter turnout (King 1994), they have differently structured political institutions (Johnson 1976; Hero and Fitzpatrick 1988), they have smaller government programs (Johnson 1986), and they have less policy innovation (Morgan and Watson 1891).

Political institutions look different in the South. Generally, party leadership is weaker in southern legislators (Harmel and Hamm 1986; Hamm and Harmel 1993), which disincentivizes southern legislators to increase professionalism (King 2000). Further, the South is less likely to have female legislators, and the legislature is composed of a disproportionate number of lawyers, realtors, and insurance agents (Squire 2000). Legislators in the South are more likely to exhibit higher levels of progressive ambition (Turner, Lasley, and Kash 2018). The distinct characteristics of southern legislators may reflect southern opinion on electoral reforms. For instance, voters who favor southern legislators that emphasize progressive ambition over policymaking may be apprehensive about electoral policies that lead to quick institutional change.
The political behavior of southerners is also something to consider. Southern participation in elections is distinctive from other United States regions. Southerners are less likely to vote, more likely to engage in split-ticket voting, and use a different calculus for political decision making (Burden and Kimball 2002; Wattenberg 2002; Hillygus and Shields 2008). Typically, southerners are more conservative, stronger advocates of smaller government, and are driven by a strong instinct to maintain southern culture (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985; Cowden 2001; Johnston 2001; Hillygus and Shields 2008; Squire 2000; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Gibson, et al. 1983; King 2000; Harmel and Hamm 1986; Hamm and Harmel 1993). They may not be as receptive to electoral reforms that threaten this culture, such as reforms that change who votes, who gets elected, and new public policies (Cooper and Gibbs 2017). Southern distinctiveness can be examined in terms of race, gender, and income (Key 1949; Reed 1974; Rice and Coates 1995; Griffin 2006). Further, recent studies have explored a personality characteristic that may be central to southern distinctiveness (Turner, Lasley, and Kash 2018). The culmination of research shows that southern identity plays a role in southern politics, and the impact of regional identity on opinions of electoral reform shows insight into how the South perceives the roles and legitimacy of elections and voting in American democracy.

**Research Questions and Hypotheses**

Based on the history of institutional barriers being used to dampen voter turnout in the South, it is the expectation that voters that identify as southerners will typically be less likely to oppose election reforms designed to increase access to the polls, but southerners will be more likely to support legislation that is more restrictive. Further,
based on research showing Republican tendencies to support reforms that increase the cost of voting and Democrat tendencies to support reforms that lower costs associated with voting, it is the expectation that Republican voters will be more likely to support reforms that dampen access to the polls, while Democrat voters will be more likely to support reforms that increase access to the polls. Specific hypotheses are outlined below.

R.1: How does southern identity influence support for specific electoral reforms?

H1 – Respondents who identify as southern will be more likely to oppose making Election Day a holiday.

H2 – Respondents who identify as southern will be more likely to oppose moving Election Day to a Saturday.

H3 – Respondents who identify as southern will be more likely to oppose allowing votes to be cast by mail.

H4 – Respondents who identify as southern will be more likely to oppose Internet or e-voting.

H5 – Respondents who identify as southern will be more likely to support the implementation of photo identification requirements.

H6 – Respondents who identify as southern will be more likely to oppose allowing same-day voter registration.

RQ.2: How does party identity influence support for specific electoral reforms?

H7 – Respondents who identify as Republican will be more likely to oppose making Election Day a holiday.
H8 – Respondents who identify as Republican will be more likely to oppose moving Election Day to Saturday.

H9 – Respondents who identify as Republican will be more likely to oppose allowing votes to be cast by mail.

H10 – Respondents who identify as Republican will be more likely to oppose Internet or e-voting.

H11 – Respondents who identify as Republican will be more likely to support the implementation of photo identification requirements.

H12 – Respondents who identify as Republican will be more likely to oppose allowing same-day voter registration.

For the first research question, control variables are included for each of the six models for party identification, race, age, gender, and income, while the second research question controls for southern identity, race, age, gender, and income. I expect to see a contrast in how Democrats and Republicans view these electoral rules and reforms. On average, it is expected that Democrats will be more likely to support policies that make voting more convenient. While the partisan impact of electoral reforms can be complicated, conventional wisdom suggests that increasing voter turnout will generally benefit Democrats (Burden, Canon, Mayer, and Moynihan 2017). More explicitly, Bonica (2018) argues that what is good for democracy, is also good for Democrats.
DATA AND METHODS

The data used in this study is quantitative in nature. The data used in this study was collected from a Qualtrics survey administered in Georgia. This survey consists of a random sample of 600 participants. This data was coded and analyzed using SPSS software. Survey participants were asked questions regarding demographics, geographic identity, and levels of support for various electoral reforms.

The independent variables tested in this regression are party, southern identity, race, age, gender, and income. The descriptive statistics for the respondents in the Georgia survey are as follows. For the “party” variable, 37.3% of respondents were Democrats, 39.3% of respondents were Republicans, and 23.4% of respondents were Independents. For the “sex” variable, 51.3% of respondents were female, and 48.7% of respondents were male. For the “income” variable, 28.2% of respondents reported an income of less than $50,000 per year, 42% of respondents reported an income of between $50,000 and $100,000, and 29.8% of respondents reported an income of higher than $100,000. For the “region” variable, 72% of respondents identified as southern, while 27.3% of respondents identified as non-southern. For the “age” variable, the mean age of respondents was 45.4, and the median age of respondents was 47. This can be seen in Table 1 below.

In order to test the hypotheses, a logistic regression was conducted using SPSS software. Along with the aforementioned independent variables, six dependent variables
were tested. The dependent variables tested were making Election Day a holiday, moving Election Day to Saturday, voting by mail, online or e-voting, requiring voter photo identification, and same-day election registration.
RESULTS

Across Georgia as a whole, support for various political reforms is varied. Generally, respondents were supportive of potential electoral reforms. However, support for specific reforms can be further understood by breaking down support from the variables that this study focuses on. Through a crosstabulation, (see Table 2) relationships between the independent variables of southern and party identity and the dependent variables of support for specific electoral reforms can be further understood. As expected, southerners have the highest levels of support for requiring photo identification. Among those who identify as southern, the highest levels of support are for requiring photo identification (81.4% of southern respondents), making Election Day a national holiday (75.5% of southern respondents), and allowing Election Day registration (65.7% of southern respondents). Southerners were least likely to support voting by mail (53.9% of southern respondents), moving Election Day to Saturday (50.5% of southern respondents), and allowing Internet or E-voting (28.4% of southern respondents). Non-southerners had the highest support for making Election Day a national holiday, although support for requiring photo identification was relatively high. Non-southerners had the highest support for making Election Day a national holiday (80.5% of non-southern respondents), requiring voter identification (75.6% of non-southern respondents), allowing voting by mail (72.5% of non-southern respondents), and allowing Election Day registration (70.7% of non-southern respondents).
Unsurprisingly, Republicans had the highest support for requiring photo identification (89.7% of Republican respondents) and making Election Day a national holiday (69% of Republican respondents), and they had the lowest support for Election Day Registration (56.9% of Republican respondents, voting by mail (52.6% of Republican respondents), moving Election Day to Saturday (48.3% of Republican respondents), and Internet or e-voting (29.3% of Republican respondents). Democrats had the highest support for making Election Day a national holiday (86.8% of Democrat respondents), allowing Election Day registration (77.4% of Democrat respondents), voting by mail (64.2% of Democrat respondents), and requiring photo identification (64.2% of Democrat respondents). Democrats had the least support for moving Election Day to Saturday (55.8% of Democrat respondents) and Internet or e-voting (32.1% of Democrat respondents). Consistently, in every category, Internet or e-voting had the lowest amount of support among all electoral reforms, while requiring photo identification had overwhelming support from Republican and southern respondents.

Overall, the reform that Georgia respondents were most likely to support was requiring photo identification, with 80% of respondents saying they would report this reform (see Table 3). This could be because a higher percentage of Georgians identified as Republicans and southerners than those that identified as Democrats or non-southerners. Other reforms with relatively high levels of support among respondents include making Election Day a national holiday with 77% of respondents saying they would support this, allowing voter registration on Election Day with 67% of respondents saying they would support this, allowing voting by mail with 59% of respondents saying they would support this, and moving Election Day to Saturday with 50% of respondents
saying they would support this. By far, the reform with the lowest support was Internet or e-voting, with only 31% of respondents saying they would support this reform.

Since the variables are dichotomous, logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses, and it paints a mixed picture. Results, presented in Table 4, are mixed for southern identity. For three of the electoral reforms, making Election Day a national holiday, moving Election Day to Saturday, and requiring photo identification, southern identifiers did not significantly differ from non-southern identifiers. Southern identifiers seem to more distrustful of alternative voting methods. Respondents who identify as southern were more likely to oppose voting by mail or Internet or electronic voting. The southern identifier variable was statistically significant at the .001 level for the voting by mail model and .05 level for electronic voting. There was also mild support for the hypothesis that southerners will be less likely to support same-day voter registration. The southern identity variable is significant at the .10 level for the Election Day registration model. On the other hand, regional identification did not play a significant role in determining support for making Election Day a holiday or moving Election Day to Saturday. Regional identification also plays a secondary role to partisanship in shaping support for photo ID requirements.

Partisan splits did emerge for most of the election policies, most notably with support and opposition of photo ID laws. Both partisan dummy variables were statistically significant in the photo ID model. As expected, Republicans support photo ID requirements, while Democrats oppose them. This is consistent with the notion that Republicans and Democrats think differently on the issue and that the support of photo ID requirements has become part of the Republican party orthodoxy (Gronke, Hicks,
Democratic respondents were supportive of an Election Day holiday or moving Election Day to Saturday. Republicans expressed opposition to voting by mail and Election Day voter registration.

There were also interesting results for the other variables accounted for in the logistic regression. Those with higher income levels were much more likely to support Internet or e-voting. This could be due to the fact that those with higher incomes may have more access to the Internet. Older respondents were less likely to support moving Election Day to a Saturday. White respondents were more likely to support Internet or e-voting, but they were less likely to support voting by mail. Interestingly, female respondents were less likely to support Election Day registration, and they were more likely to support photo identification laws.

To supplement the logistic regression results, predicted probabilities were generated for the southern identity variable. The predicted probabilities show the probabilities that southern Georgians will support electoral reforms. Non-southerners have a higher probability of voting by mail, voting online, and allowing voting on Election Day. The likelihood of supporting voting by mail is .25 for southerners and .39 for non-southerners, the likelihood of supporting online or e-voting is .14 for southerners and .19 for non-southerners, and the likelihood of supporting Election Day registration .35 for southerners and .42 for non-southerners. For all of these reforms, non-southerners have a higher probability of supporting than southerners. Because all of these reforms are aimed at lowering the costs associated with voting, this is unsurprising, and it aligns with hypotheses that predict that southerners will be less likely to support reforms that lower the costs associated with voting.
DISCUSSION

This study has analyzed the impact of southern identity and partisan identity on opinions of electoral reform. This research was conducted in order to analyze the effects of geographic identity, particularly southern identity, and partisan identity on support for electoral reforms. The results from Georgia showed that for at least some electoral reforms, southern identity can significantly play a role in affecting support when controlling for other factors.

Partisanship is a strong driving factor for whether Georgians support specific electoral reforms. Addressing the hypotheses for my second research question, one interesting finding from my research is that Democrats were significantly more likely to support reforms that made voting easier, such as making Election Day a holiday and moving Election Day to a Saturday, and they were significantly less likely to support reforms that make voting more difficult. This aligns with previous research which has found that Democrats are generally more likely to favor electoral forms that increase the ease of voting (Bialik 2018). Further, Republicans were much more likely to support the adoption of requiring photo identification. This also lines up with research claiming that Republicans are more likely to support requiring photo identification, and it helps to explain why several red states such as Kentucky have recently passed photo identification laws.
One important thing to note is how this research could be expanded. It has been established that partisanship is a driving force behind support for specific electoral reforms, but it could be interesting to dive further into why that is the case. In the survey, respondents were asked to identify which of the reforms they thought were more likely to benefit Republicans and which were more likely to benefit Democrats. It would be interesting to look into this to see if support or opposition to the reforms is driven by practical political considerations or if there are other reasons why partisanship is such a strong predictor of support for electoral reforms.
CONCLUSION

This study has analyzed the effects of geographic and partisan identity on support for electoral reforms. The results of this study supported previous research that partisanship plays a heavy role in support for electoral reforms. This study also provides further evidence that there is a distinctiveness of the American South, and that this distinctiveness plays an active role in American politics.

Although this study provided interesting information about the American South, there were some limitations. This data was only collected from a survey implemented in Georgia, which may not be entirely representative of the American South. However, this limitation provides opportunities for expansion of this research. Insight into American politics can be gained from conducting similar research in other states, both southern and non-southern. This could help to expand on why southerners are more likely to support certain electoral reforms over others, and it could provide insight into whether southern distinctiveness plays a role in support for electoral reforms in states outside of Georgia.
REFERENCES


### APPENDIX

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>Lower &lt;50</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mid</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher 100K +</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Non-Southern</td>
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<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median</td>
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Table 2. Crosstabulation of support for electoral reforms

<table>
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<th>Crosstabs</th>
<th>Rep</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Non-Southern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Election Day National Holiday</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Saturday</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote by Mail</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet or E-voting</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require Photo ID</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Registration</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Levels of support for electoral reforms in Georgia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level of Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Photo ID</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Holiday</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Registration</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote by Mail</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day on Saturday</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet/E-voting</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Georgia Logistic Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Election Day As Holiday</th>
<th>Election Day on Saturday</th>
<th>Vote by Mail</th>
<th>Vote by Email/Internet</th>
<th>Require Photo ID</th>
<th>Election Day Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-.185</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.628**</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.938***</td>
<td>-.673**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>.637**</td>
<td>.491*</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>-1.467***</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.156</td>
<td>-.664***</td>
<td>-.353*</td>
<td>-.163</td>
<td>-.312#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>-.320</td>
<td>-.613**</td>
<td>.500*</td>
<td>-.311</td>
<td>-.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>-.143#</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>-.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.457*</td>
<td>-.418*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>.664***</td>
<td>-.215</td>
<td>-.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R(^2)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# = .10  
* = .05  
** = .01  
*** = .001
Table 5. Georgia Southern Identity Predicted Probabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote by Mail</th>
<th>Vote By E-mail/Internet</th>
<th>Election Day Registration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Southern</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>