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UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID: A CROSS-NATIONAL
ANALYSIS

A Capstone Experience/Thesis Project Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts
with Mahurin Honors College Graduate Distinction
at Western Kentucky University

By

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May 2022

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how public support for bilateral foreign aid in democratic donor countries, namely the United States and South Korea, is influenced by various methods of policy framing. Despite the benefits of bilateral aid to both donor and recipient countries, public support for distributing it has been on the decline due to fears that aid is ineffective. However, this trend may also be the product of the publics' perceptions of where aid is going and for what purpose. To determine the effects of type of aid and perceptions of recipient countries on support for foreign aid, I conducted a public opinion survey distributed by Amazon mTurk with 1035 respondents in the United States in June 2020. To further examine if the U.S. public prefers different types of aid to be distributed to certain types of countries or regimes, I conducted another public opinion survey in July 2021 distributed by Qualtrics with 625 respondents being obtained through quota sampling. Finally, to examine the effect of policy information, in this case on support for aid to North Korea, I conducted a public opinion survey in South Korea in September 2020 distributed by Macromill Embrain with 1200 respondents. A comparison of these findings suggests that public support for aid among democratic donor countries is sensitive to policy framing, although the efficacy of certain framing methods may be highly dependent upon the social and political context in which aid is being considered.

I dedicate this work to Iuliana and Jukka Puhakka, who suggested I get into research even though they do not remember doing so. I also dedicate this work to my husband, Luke Manning, who helped me stay sane throughout the process of writing this thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

Bilateral foreign aid¹ plays a significant role in the development of both donor and recipient countries. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is positively associated with growth in human development indicators (Kar 2016; Mohamed & Mzee 2017) and negatively associated with poverty and infant mortality rates (Masud & Yontcheva 2005; Boone 1996). Foreign aid has the potential to promote significant economic growth and reform in recipient countries (Bearce & Tirone 2010; Headey 2008); While recipient countries utilize aid for humanitarian and institutional purposes, donor countries can also use aid to conduct strategic foreign policy (Paxton & Knack 2011).

Not only can donor countries explicitly place conditions on aid contributions, but also a norm of reciprocity, typically by means of regulated state behavior, is expected out of a recipient country. Reciprocity is encouraged through democratic mechanisms within donor countries. For instance, aid donors, though inadvertently through the votes of self-serving electorates, selectively punish human rights violators through aid cuts (Heinrich et. al 2018). Despite these benefits, public support for aid has been declining in donor countries out of concerns that aid is ineffective (Norris 2017). However, lowered support for aid may also indicate a discrepancy between public opinion and the goals of policymakers. Thus, the observed pattern in public opinion may not result from the concept of aid itself, but rather from where the aid is going.

¹ In the context of this paper “foreign aid” will refer to a combination of bilateral humanitarian, economic or developmental, and military aid that is provided by one donor country to one recipient country unless stated otherwise. It is also used interchangeably with “foreign assistance” and “ODA.”

Nonetheless, states are influenced by the public in determining the quantity and quality of foreign aid contributions (Mosley 1985). It is thus important to examine the role of public support for foreign aid policy, including where the public prefers aid to be delivered, as many donor countries are democratic and reflect public opinion through policymaking. This thesis examines the effects of policy framing in various contexts, at first through individual-level analysis of public opinion surveys in the United States and South Korea, and then more broadly through a cross-national lens. This type of analysis is beneficial for a couple of reasons. The first is that it accounts for inherent differences in demographics and prominent political issues and attitudes between different countries. Second, it allows for comparison of how policy framing impacts support or preferences for aid in different political contexts, as well as comparison of individual-level factors that may predict support or behavior.

This analysis is conducted throughout five main chapters. The first chapter is a literature review that broadly examines determinants of support for bilateral aid in democratic donor countries and contains subsections of literature specific to public opinion of aid in the U.S. and South Korea. Next, I include a quantitative chapter analyzing the effects of policy framing, varying by type of aid and recipient regime being considered, on support for aid in the United States. This chapter uses data obtained from an original public opinion survey that was conducted through Amazon mTurk in June 2020. The following quantitative chapter analyzes the effects of policy framing, varying by type of aid, on public preferences for the types of regimes that should receive aid. This analysis uses an original public opinion survey, also in the United States, conducted by Qualtrics in July 2021. The third quantitative chapter analyzes the effects of policy

framing, varying by information provided on allocative costs, on South Koreans' support for providing humanitarian aid to North Korea. The data for this chapter was obtained from an original public opinion survey conducted in South Korea by Macromill Embrain in September 2020. The final analytical chapter of this thesis is the conclusion, which summarizes the main findings of each quantitative chapter and then segues into broader conclusions drawn from a cross-national comparison of the findings, suggestions for future research, and policy implications. At the end of the thesis, there is a section for references, and then an appendix containing tables not included in the second quantitative chapter.

LITERATURE REVIEW: BROAD OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN AID DETERMINANTS

Who Donates the Most Foreign Aid?

Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) form the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which sets objectives for ODA provided by developed states. Bilateral foreign aid constitutes over 60% of the committee's foreign aid donations overall. Not only does the DAC provide most of the world's bilateral foreign aid, but the developed democracies within it provide the most out of the 30 member states (OECD 2021; Ilasco 2020). The most recent statistics on bilateral aid flows, reporting FY2020, indicate that the largest volume donors of foreign aid were developed democracies: The United States was the largest contributor of ODA followed by European Union (EU) institutions, Japan, and the United Kingdom (OECD 2021). Nonetheless, because a majority of the world's foreign aid consists of ODA that is mostly provided by developed democracies, this analysis of public opinion will be restricted to such countries, in which public opinion is readily available, in the context of bilateral aid.

Framing of Foreign Aid Policy

One of the main topics of examination in this area surrounds how the framing of foreign aid policy by political elites and the media shifts public support. There are a variety of ways in which policy can be framed including specifying the purpose of aid, perceptions of aid costs, relating aid donations to domestic affairs, and emphasizing

moral obligations. Before discussing the literature that expands on the effects of such policy framing, it is important to determine whether this topic is worth examining at all.

For his analysis of European public opinion on aid to Africa, Rye Olsen (2001) argues that it is essential to understand public opinion of foreign aid as being top-down rather than bottom-up. In other words, decision-making on where foreign assistance is delivered is centralized and mainly dictated by general public attitudes, not explicit expressions from the public of how much aid should be disbursed and where.

Moreover, Rye Olsen (2001) states that general humanitarian attitudes and a widespread public belief that generally supports “helping the poor” allows European political elites to give aid to poor African states in a manner that is still consistent with public opinion. In demonstrating a different top-down decision-making model, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that it is necessary to foster broad public consensus to achieve its international aid goals and actively educates constituents on foreign aid policy (2003). On the other hand, Mosley agrees that public opinion of foreign aid can be determined by policy framing in DAC countries, but also concludes that public opinion works bottom-up and invokes changes in the quantity and quality of aid distributions (1985). Overall, one cannot conclude that public opinion of aid is either top-down or bottom-up, but rather that elements of both theories shape it. Nonetheless, it is essential to examine top-down decision making particularly as it pertains to policy framing. Public opinion on foreign aid that works in a bottom-up manner will be discussed later in this analysis.

Type of Aid

One manner in which government officials frame aid policy to the public is by specifying the purpose of aid allocations. Although there seems to be an overarching theme of favoring humanitarian aid out of altruistic public attitudes, in many countries this contrasts with preferences to cut the foreign aid budget (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Aorere 2019; Wood 2018). Furthermore, it is difficult to establish causation for variations in aid's purpose on public support; existing literature reports mixed-effects/correlations, which are not only dependent on a study's unit of analysis and context but also its methodology (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Aorere 2019; Wood 2018).

In the United States, for instance, a Chicago Council poll found that few Americans support the idea of increasing economic (10%) and military aid (10%) to other nations, but when assistance is described in a mission-specific manner, for example as aid to “promote democracy” or “aid for disaster relief,” support for distributing aid increases to 56% and 82%, respectively (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017). It is easy for the authors to establish a relationship between the variations in aid because there is only one question that gauges the respondents’ support for six different aid objectives, and the survey also asks a general question of whether the respondents support increasing either military or economic aid. Thus, from the results of this survey, one could perhaps also conclude that Americans are more supportive of aid that goes towards disaster relief than aid that goes towards promoting democracy abroad. Nonetheless, the broader takeaway is that the public seems sensitive to the purpose of aid, separate from the amount.

Moreover, a public opinion study conducted in Australia found that Australians were supportive of humanitarian aid and foreign aid more generally. Even further,

Australians seemed to be more supportive of humanitarian aid (74%) than aid that politically and commercially benefitted Australia (13%) (Wood 2018). While variables that were correlated with general support for Australian aid (including party, gender, and ideology, all of which will be discussed later in this analysis) failed to explain the difference in support between these two types of aid, it can be inferred that humanitarian aid seems less selective and self-serving. Consequently, a causal relationship could not be established. Sadly, there is not much literature that examines foreign aid policy framing, in the context of identifying the purpose of aid, outside of the United States.

Perceptions of Costs

Public support for the objectives of aid contrasts with public preferences for cutting the foreign aid budget. In both the American and Australian studies mentioned directly above, a large majority of respondents supported cutting the foreign aid budget rather than cutting spending for domestic programs or increased taxation (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Wood 2018). This dichotomy is also observed throughout European countries and the United Kingdom. This phenomenon begs two questions: 1) what causes this view in public opinion to arise, and 2) how should political elites counter it?

To answer the first question, a majority of the literature seems to suggest that publics of donor countries are ill-informed on foreign aid policy and drastically overestimate their costs (Scotto et. al 2017; Klein 2013; Gillens 2001; Ingram 2019; Wood 2018; Aorere 2019; Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017). The average percentage of annual GNP allocated to foreign aid, both bilateral and multilateral, by wealthy donor countries is merely .4% (Ingram 2019), or just around 1% of most federal budgets (Paxton & Knack 2012). In a study that compared potential European rationales for

public opinion of foreign aid with potential American rationales, Divens & Constantelos (2009) found that of the 14 European countries observed, as well as the UK and the U.S., an average of only 34.6% of citizens could identify the percentage of the national budget allocated to aid. Although this trend is widely observed throughout wealthy democracies, it appears to be more pronounced in the U.S. Of the 14 European countries and the UK, the average accuracy was 40%, a stark contrast from only 16% of Americans. Not surprisingly, the percentage of the public that could accurately identify the costs of foreign aid had a significant, positive effect on public support for bilateral aid distribution as determined by multiple regression analysis (Divens & Constantelos 2009). This finding has been confirmed by more recent studies including Klein 2013 and Hurst et. al 2017, which both analyzed public opinion in the United States, and Scotto et. al 2017, which examined public opinion in both the U.S. and the UK. Understandably, when the public is not informed on aid policy there is room for misinformation to shape public opinion.

To begin to answer the second question, many studies have found a relationship between framing relative costs of aid and public support, but there are mixed results. Klein (2013) found that 61% of Americans thought that the government spent “too much” on foreign aid which then decreased to 30% when they were informed that foreign aid constituted only 1% of the national budget. Following a similar line of questioning, Hurst et. al (2017) found that when participants in their survey were informed of the same fact, the percentage of respondents who thought levels of aid were “too big” decreased from 67% to 28%. Similarly, Scotto et. al (2017) found that presenting the percentage of costs allocated to foreign aid positively shifted public support in both the U.S. and the

UK. However, when costs of foreign aid were presented in both monetary and percentage terms U.S. public support decreased from the baseline form of questioning with no funding context, but for the UK public support was still higher than the baseline. This finding suggests that the effect of cost framing is more ambiguous than originally thought in most theory, and that providing context matters. Perhaps presenting the dollar amount cancels out the positive effect from presenting aid in terms of a percentage of the federal budget, or there could be underlying cultural and institutional explanations that drive this contradiction.

A similar ambiguity is also observed in a South Korean public opinion survey on bilateral aid to North Korea. While 36% of South Korean respondents supported expanding humanitarian aid to North Korea without any contextualization, unsurprisingly that number was only 25% for respondents that were provided with the amount of won allocated towards that aid. Support was not significantly higher (28%) for respondents provided with both the amount of won and the percentage of aid in terms of the national budget despite the comically low percentage that was allocated: less than .1% (Rich & Puhakka 2020). While there are most likely other factors that can account for the ambiguity, such as opinions towards North Korea itself, it is still difficult to conjure a plausible, much less causal, explanation for this finding. The effect of presenting the amount of won may overshadow the effect of the percentage in this specific context, but it is difficult to apply this finding anywhere else. Nevertheless, the findings from Rich and Puhakka and Scotto et. al suggest that this occurrence exists partly because of different contexts, as in explanations provided in previous sections of this paper, and that

policy framing in a manner that is completely transparent with costs may simply have an ambiguous effect.

Preferences for Domestic Issues

The tendency for publics in donor countries to pay attention to domestic affairs rather than international affairs also explains this paradoxical dichotomy: a public that supports the idea of foreign assistance but also the idea of cutting the federal budget allocated to it. More specifically, this occurs in the context of trade-offs.

The dilemma of a tradeoff is exemplified by Wood (2018). Australian survey participants were informed that the government allocated 1.2% of its budget to foreign aid and were then asked to choose one of four policies that they preferred the government implement to recover an amount of national debt equivalent to 20% of the aid budget: maintaining the foreign aid budget and allowing debt to increase, cutting spending in other domestic programs, increasing taxes, or cutting the budget allocated to foreign aid. A majority of the respondents (57%) chose the option of decreasing the foreign aid budget. This finding starkly contrasts with the finding that 74% of respondents in the same study approved or strongly approved of the Australian government giving foreign aid. A related finding from Hurst et. al (2017) is that Americans were significantly more likely to think aid levels were “too high” if presented with the fact that the amount of money allocated to foreign aid was higher than the amounts allocated to popular, but less expensive, domestic programs. These results suggest that publics in donor countries are not supportive of aid when they perceive that money is being sent abroad rather than being used to alleviate pressing domestic issues. They also suggest that when foreign aid

is considered in the context of comparison to domestic issues there is a negative effect on support.

Evidence also suggests that even when a tradeoff is not presented the public still demonstrates more support for domestic spending than foreign aid spending. Wojtowicz & Hanania (2017) presented survey participants with 4 domestic programs, military aid, and economic aid and asked respondents to select whether spending should be decreased, stay the same, or be increased for each program. For the military and economic aid programs, 49% and 50% of respondents, respectively, thought that spending should be decreased. On the other hand, for each domestic program, less than 25% of respondents thought that spending should be decreased.

Many public opinion studies conducted throughout developed democracies have found that it is possible to shift support for foreign aid in a positive direction by relating foreign aid initiatives abroad to domestic issues. However, some studies have found that such framing has no significant effect on public support. The results of each paper are difficult to compare because how foreign aid policies were framed depended on the domestic affairs of the country being analyzed at the time the analysis was taking place. Nonetheless, there are mixed results in contention for this topic as well.

In New Zealand, for instance, only 51% of respondents in a 2018 national public opinion survey supported the overseas aid development assistance program for the Pacific Islands region. However, the participants were more supportive when presented with arguments that related the aid program to the shared history between New Zealand and the Pacific Islands region, geographic proximity, and a common understanding of regional challenges (Aorere 2019). This finding support claims that the public is more

supportive when foreign aid is framed around domestic issues. It also demonstrates that the public is more inclined to provide aid to countries that they perceive to be like their own. Similarly, Tingley (2009) found that Americans, amid the global economic crisis, were more supportive of foreign aid when informed of potential benefits for the U.S. economy. Overall, these studies suggest that relating aid to domestic issues and interests, as opposed to comparing domestic and aid priorities, has a positive effect on support for foreign aid.

Results begin to diverge due to the nature of certain shared domestic issues and the different characteristics of the countries experiencing them. Kiratli (2021) reported that the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe prompted an aggregate increase in public support for aid to countries from which migrants originated. However, support varied widely from country to country. Support was higher in countries that had larger flows of migrants or were more economically prosperous including Finland, Denmark, France, and Belgium. Support was constant or decreased in countries that did not experience an influx of migrants and in relatively poorer countries including Romania, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria. Even within the study, countries within the categories described above experienced mixed results in foreign aid opinion. For example, Sweden's support for foreign aid remained constant—granted, support for aid was very high before 2015—and Slovakia and Slovenia saw an increase in public support for aid despite having relatively low numbers of immigrants (Kiratli 2021).

Furthermore, Komiya et. al (2018) found that policy framing around the potential economic and soft-power benefits of Japanese foreign aid increased support among respondents within their survey, but the effect was not statistically significant. The

authors recognize, however, that the effect may have been statistically significant if they had a larger sample size. Similarly, Hurst et. al (2017) found that arguments stating that foreign aid was distributed in the U.S.' best interest shifted support positively and was statistically significant. However, it did not have nearly as strong of an effect as other arguments presented such as those that were cost and morality-oriented. Overall, the efficacy of framing foreign aid around domestic interests seems to have mixed results not only around the world but within countries as well. At best, it may be possible to conclude that this type of policy framing is dependent on the specificity and urgency of the domestic interest and is further influenced by other demographic and institutional factors. This may also be a function of contextual events, as public support may be influenced by the most recent related event or news items observed.

The Morality of Providing Foreign Aid

Publics in donor countries tend to shift their opinion of foreign aid when it is framed in a moral light. The direction of the shift can be positive or negative depending on the argument's perspective. In other words, the statement that "developed countries have a moral obligation to assist developing countries" may shift opinion in the positive direction while "foreign aid does not go to populations it is intended to because it is abused by corrupt leaders" may do the opposite (Hurst et. al 2017). There may be a social desirability function as well: few want to admit they overlook moral obligations out of a fear of not conforming to social norms. This section of the analysis focuses on the former, or "aid-positive," moral argument.

In their study, Hurst et. al (2017) found that arguments about morality were among the strongest and most statistically significant out of other arguments including

self-interest, efficiency, dependency, and costs. Admittedly, the cost argument was about as effective as the morality argument. As expected, the moral argument treatment that stated: "vulnerable populations desperately needed foreign aid" pushed opinion in the positive direction while the treatment that stated "corruption in recipient countries prevents needy populations from receiving foreign aid" pushed opinion in the negative direction. Interestingly, when both arguments were presented together the aid-positive argument had a stronger effect than the aid-negative argument. Kull (2017) reports multiple statistics that support Hurst et. al's (2017) findings; for instance, 7 in 10 Americans agree that "the United States should be willing to share at least a small portion of its wealth with those in the world who are in great need." Kull (2017) also cites a 2017 University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation (PPC) survey which found that even in the context of considering tradeoffs, as was discussed above in the Preferences for Domestic Issues section of this analysis, a large majority of Americans (68%) did not favor reducing "food aid to malnourished people, assistance in the event of disasters, aid to refugees from political conflict." This is slightly different from Hurst et. al's (2017) finding that framing surrounding the costs of aid and morality of providing aid have relatively equal effects and suggests that the morality argument may be even stronger, at least in the U.S. Nonetheless, both studies may indicate that a heightened sense of morality pushes the public towards supporting humanitarian aid, but not necessarily aid in general. This would also imply that the effects of moral and type-of-aid policy framing are interactive. The interaction between morality and type of aid is observed similarly in Australia. As was stated in the Type of Aid section of this analysis, a large majority of

respondents polled in a survey (74%) favored humanitarian aid over commercial and political aid (13%) (Wood 2018).

An analysis of Europe may be indicative of why morality-oriented policy framing is effective. In Europe, attitudes that supported “helping the poor” and general favorability towards humanitarian intentions allowed elite decision-makers to provide foreign assistance to Africa (Rye Olsen 2001). However, at least according to this case study, public knowledge of foreign aid and foreign policy regarding Africa was limited due to insufficient media coverage; despite the lack of public concern for foreign aid, these attitudes enabled political elites to provide aid to Africa with little to no resistance from the public (Rye Olsen 2001). In other words, humanitarian, arguably moralistic, attitudes did not necessarily drive public support for foreign aid, but simply the lack of opposition did. This effect may also be an explanation for public "support" of humanitarian aid in other developed democracies, but I have not found any literature to substantiate that claim. In the UK on the other hand, the 2021 Annual Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Policy and Global Britain, which is conducted by the British Foreign Policy Group, found that citizens' rationales for supporting foreign aid are heterogeneous. Motivations for distributing aid are quite evenly split between arguments of morality, history, and strategy and security (Gaston 2021). This may suggest that, at least in the UK, the morality of aid is not as significant of a consideration as it is in other democracies, but this finding may be a result of individual or other contextual characteristics not reported in this article. Nonetheless, most evidence suggests policy framing that surrounds the morality of humanitarian aid is effective because publics in

democratic donor countries tend to share benevolent attitudes and favor assisting vulnerable populations.

Does Public Opinion Actually Matter?

Much of this analysis of public opinion has suggested that decision-making regarding foreign aid policy is top-down rather than bottom-up, which may imply that public opinion may actually not be that significant in determining bilateral aid flows. Indeed, whether public opinion is significant in determining foreign aid is a major debate within the literature in and of itself.

Primarily, Mosley (1985) recognizes that public opinion of foreign aid can work both top-down and bottom-up in creating a supply-demand model for the foreign aid market through the analysis of 9 OECD countries and their foreign aid flows. Actors of supply consisted of the government, electoral patterns, and economic factors while demand actors consisted of public opinion based on knowledge of foreign aid and bilateral relations. Overall, he found that two market adjustment patterns shifted on the demand side when the public applied pressure to either change the quantity or quality of current aid levels. In response, the government would alter the aid in accordance with public preferences. These observations are consistent with bottom-up models of decision-making. In the third market adjustment pattern that Mosley identified, which was also on the demand side, the government responds to public pressure by persuading the public to accept the aid policies they had already adopted. In other words, supply actors altered demand, which is more in line with the top-down decision-making model.

As discussed above, Rye Olsen (2001) argues that foreign aid policy is determined through a top-down public opinion model, with political elites making

decisions for an ignorant public. However, as Kiratli (2021) observes, publics in Europe generally became more favorable of aid due to the migrant crisis, a pressing issue that was heavily covered by the media and addressed by public officials through migrant-friendly policies. Arguably, there was more leeway for political elites to centralize decision-making when concerns about issues in developing countries received less attention because they were considered to be distant. Thus, after the migration crisis, public opinion toward aid in European countries became more substantiated and informed. Conversely, this also suggests that policymakers are unlikely to promote aid if expecting a backlash and supportive when the public seems open to it.

Similarly, Heinrich et. al (2018) find that American public opinion on providing aid to human rights violators significantly depends upon media coverage of the security² and economic³ hierarchies maintained by the U.S. within a recipient country. If the public was informed of the domestic affairs of and bilateral relations towards countries that violated human rights, foreign aid flows were consistent with public opinion. Overall, evidence suggests that public opinion is substantial in determining foreign aid policy, especially when certain recipients are high-profile and of particular concern to donor publics. Even when the public is ignorant of foreign aid, a lack of opposition towards existing policies is inadvertently a reflection of public attitudes.

² Lake (2009) defines the security hierarchy index as the average number of U.S. troops deployed per capita to a “subordinate” country and the inverse of the number of independent alliances that the “subordinate” has.

³ Lake (2009) defines the economic hierarchy index as a “subordinate” country’s relative trade dependence on the U.S. and the inverse of the “subordinate’s” degree of monetary autonomy. Monetary autonomy is low, for instance, if a country pegs its exchange rate to that of the U.S. dollar.

Perceptions of Recipient Countries

Public perceptions of recipient countries also shift public support for bilateral foreign aid, but how do these perceptions form? One manner in which perceptions of aid recipients are molded is through media coverage. Smillie (1999) aptly summarizes the effects of negative media coverage on “the public in industrialized countries,” stating “As negative images and beliefs harden and become more firmly established, it is even more difficult to convince the public that aid can and does work.”

Additionally, Europeans became more supportive of providing foreign aid following the onset of the European migrant crisis, especially to countries of origin (Kiratli 2021). Not only did the crisis receive a high amount of news coverage but it also affected the daily lives of Europeans who began to work and live beside an influx of immigrants. Thus, perceptions of aid recipients are also shaped by their domestic issues that have spillover effects on donor countries. In other words, the domestic affairs of recipient countries become less distant from publics in donor countries. This was also the case with New Zealand, which experienced higher levels of support for aid to the Pacific Islands region when the policy was framed in a context of geographic proximity and shared regional challenges (Aorere 2019). Below, I discuss the different ways in which these perceptions manifest themselves in public opinion of foreign aid distribution.

Effectiveness of Aid and Corruption Fatigue

Public perceptions of foreign aid surround whether foreign aid is effective or not. The literature that falls under this topic is highly divisive, the main reason being that it is difficult to determine whether foreign aid is effective or not. The literature on aid efficacy constitutes a debate in and of itself but delving into the topic is outside of the scope of

this analysis. Rather, this section of the paper will analyze public opinion studies that aim to determine the effects of identifying aid as either effective or ineffective on public opinion. Thus, this section is also somewhat related to the topic of how political elites frame foreign aid policy.

How does public opinion change when aid is portrayed as being ineffective? As Smilie (1999) has already suggested, most of the time support for aid tends to decrease due to negative media coverage coupled with expectations that aid should significantly decrease the adversity being observed. Many arguments that aim to defile the integrity of foreign aid will point to evidence of systemic poverty that prevents populations within developing countries from overcoming conflict, natural disasters, and economic hardship. Why poverty persists, they also believe, is due to weak institutions and corrupt rent-seeking (Aidt et. al 2008; Aidt 2003; Svensson 2000) that results in the abuse of foreign aid resources and the further cementation of corruption (World Bank 1998; Alesina & Weder 2002; Jablonski 2014). When the public perceives corruption in a general sense, associating corruption with developing countries overall can cause aid fatigue⁴, or in other words a lack of support for providing foreign aid (Bauhr et. al 2013). Findings from Hurst et. al (2017) reported that framing corruption from a moral standpoint, for which they utilized the statement “aid is lost to corruption,” significantly and negatively altered attitudes towards aid.

However, the relationship between corruption and aid is nuanced. According to a public opinion study by Bauhr et. al (2013), which analyzed the 2009 Eurobarometer survey, the effect of corruption fatigue is highly contextual and can be mitigated by moral

⁴ “Aid fatigue” is interchangeably used with “corruption fatigue.”

or strategic motivations. For instance, if the public thinks that humanitarian aid is desperately needed by a vulnerable population residing within a corrupt regime, a majority may still opt for such aid to be disbursed. Moreover, if a public perceives a poor, corrupt regime to be a future trading partner, they may still opt to provide aid to that regime with hopes of creating a new export market in the future. This concept is what Bauhr et. al (2013) term the “aid-corruption paradox.” Heinrich et. al (2018) and Heinrich and Kobayashi (2020) reach similar conclusions from their studies on the American public. They find that citizens do not fully support their government withholding aid from human rights abusers if 1) the U.S. has high levels of bilateral engagement with such countries and 2) such recipient states offer important policy benefits. An economic analysis of foreign aid flows to recipient countries supports the findings from above, finding no evidence suggesting that corrupt countries receive less foreign aid than non-corrupt countries (Alesina & Weder 2002).

Much of the quantitative analysis for this thesis concerns how perceptions of different regimes impact support for aid and is based on corruption fatigue theory. Thus, I will establish the connection between corruption and regime in this section of the literature review. Low political accountability, founded on weak institutions, is closely correlated with high levels of regime corruption (Aidt 2003; Aidt et. al 2008). More specifically, procedural democracies, not non-democracies, that have not obtained substantive democracy are associated with higher levels of corruption (Hariss-White & White 1996). Moreover, perceptions of corruption are linked to the level of democracy within a regime, but how this is perceived by the public, or if the above literature is even perceived accurately, is unclear. One may assume that the public in most democracies

equates democracies as less corrupt, regardless of actual evidence, since it's a readily available heuristic. Throughout this thesis, I address how public perceptions of different types of regimes, in connection with how they may perceive corruption based on public opinion data, affect support for bilateral aid.

Conversely, how is public opinion altered when they perceive aid to be effective? Hurst et. al (2017) found that when they framed effectiveness using facts, such as attaining desirable policy outcomes in recipient countries, this line of framing had a small effect on public opinion compared to arguments surrounding morals and costs surrounding foreign aid. Likewise, Komiya et. al (2018) found that both of their arguments stating that aid either had an "uncertain effect" or "definitive effect" on recipient countries did not significantly alter the attitudes of survey respondents. However, when they stated more specific benefits that aid had on recipient countries, "micro-level" and "macro-level" educational effects, attitudes towards aid were altered significantly and positively. The results from these studies imply that framing aid policy in a manner that simply states "aid is effective" is not persuasive enough for the masses to shift their attitudes. Rather, a more constructive method of convincing the public to alter their stances on the effectiveness of aid is by informing them of specific, tangible benefits that have been secured through bilateral ODA in the past. As these studies also proved it may be sufficient to not include which countries these benefits were observed in, further suggesting that bilateral perceptions of corruption are not tremendously significant to donor publics. Overall, this implies that narrowly defined aid with clear goals, as opposed to broad packages, would likely receive greater support.

Domestic Institutional Structures

Similar to how perceptions of recipient countries shape public opinion of aid, perceptions of how effective donor publics think *their own* government is affects their views of how effective foreign aid is. Other attitudes towards their government, namely what they consider to be government's role in society and outlooks on public spending, shape their views of foreign aid more generally. This section explores debates in the literature about the effects of different institutional structures on public opinion of foreign aid.

The Domestic Welfare State

Conventional wisdom would dictate that public attitudes towards international redistributive policies like foreign aid reflect their attitudes towards domestic redistributive policies. For instance, Noel and Therien (2002) conclude from 1995 Eurobarometer responses that in donor countries with social-democratic qualities and institutions, publics value equality and are thereby more likely to support international redistribution policies such as foreign aid. Similarly, Divens & Constantelos (2009) find that public support for foreign aid is higher in Europe than in the U.S. because foreign aid corresponds with the overall European belief that the government has a significant role in addressing social issues. Thus, foreign aid aligns with European core values, but the same cannot be said for the U.S., where the state is less involved in the economy than in other developed countries (Divens & Constantelos 2009).

However, other studies demonstrate that this may not necessarily be the case. Zimmerman (2007), who bases his theoretical premise on the work of Noel and Therien (2002), was surprised to find that the results of his cross-sectional time-series analysis

were not significant and thus inconclusive. At best, when methodological requirements for the analysis were eased, coefficients for decommodification⁵ and the cumulative power of the left⁶, contrary to what might be expected, had statistically significant effects in the negative direction. Perhaps this relationship is observed because, as Inglehart (1990) suggests, there is a diminishing marginal utility⁷ for equality. Thus, in donor states that have a more conservative welfare system, for which there is a higher degree of commodification for essential services, domestic income inequality and poverty are typically relatively higher and of greater concern to the public. Consequently, the public is more likely to value redistributive policies and foreign aid. Conversely, in donor states with a more liberal welfare system, where income inequality and poverty are not of great concern, publics are less likely to value redistributive policies at the domestic and international level. Therefore, they are less likely to support foreign aid (Inglehart 1990). This explanation is refuted by findings from Chong and Gradstein (2008) concluding that domestic income inequality has a "detrimental" effect on public support for aid. Overall, it is difficult to deduce the effect of domestic welfare structures on support for foreign aid. Evidence for different theories is generally scattered and inconclusive.

⁵ According to the English Encyclopedia (2021) "decommodification" is "the degree to which welfare services are free of the market. In a predominantly decommodified system, welfare services such as education and healthcare are provided to all and are not linked to market processes." In the context of Zimmerman (2007), the independent variable for the degree of decommodification observed in a state is measured utilizing an index.

⁶ In the context of Zimmerman (2007), the cumulative power of the left pertains to the proportion of left-wing politicians in Cabinet positions. This variable operates under the assumption that when there is a higher percentage of left-wing individuals in a Cabinet, they have more power to affect welfare and foreign aid policies.

⁷ Diminishing marginal utility is an economic concept stating that the amount of utility, or satisfaction, acquired from one additional unit of a product begins to decline as the total quantity of that product increases.

Efficacy of Government Spending

A concept that is related to the structure of welfare spending is public perceptions of how efficient their government is. The extant literature surrounding this topic, though, is more convergent than the effects of welfare structures. Views on government efficiency are also related to notions of political trust and attitudes towards public spending, both of which are somewhat moderated by political ideology (Rudolph & Evans 2005; Chong & Gradstein 2008). In this section of the analysis, however, the effects of political ideology will only be discussed in the context of its relationship to views on government efficiency.

Links between views on government efficiency, specifically as it relates to spending, and foreign aid is best exemplified by Aorere's (2019) analysis of public opinion in New Zealand. Among the 31% of the sample who considered overseas aid and development efficient based their opinions on "faith that overseas aid spending is effective, in the absence of evidence: namely that spending is helping people in need, aid is sent for disaster relief and [we] help neighboring countries" (Aorere 2019). This demonstrates that confidence in government, which is similar to political trust, plays a role in opinion because it shapes the publics' perception regarding whether the government will send aid to where/whom it is promised and to what it is intended for.

Divens and Constantelos (2009) present "straightforward" evidence that public opinion of foreign aid is related to confidence in government, among other explanatory factors, and that lower support for foreign aid in the U.S. than in Europe can be partially explained by lower levels of trust in government. On the contrary, Paxton & Knack (2012), through an analysis of a 17-country sample of the 2002 Gallup International

Survey, found that trust in government (“political trust”) had no significant effect on public support for foreign aid. These two findings stand in stark contrast to each other. While the findings may be different due to the use of two different public opinion surveys that originated from two different years, they may also be the result of two completely different country samples, further suggesting that country-level variance plays a large factor in aid opinion.

Using a sample of 81 developed and developing countries, a much broader sample than those used in Paxton and Knack (2012) and Divens and Constantelos (2009), Chong and Gradstein (2008) found that confidence in government had a strong and highly significant effect on public support in the positive direction. They elaborate that government efficiency plays a significant role in determining public opinion because it relates to whether the government efficiently spends public coffers for both domestic and international initiatives. Rudolph and Evans (2005) argue that political trust is positively correlated with public support for government spending but can be moderated by ideology, especially conservative ideology, at the individual level. Chong and Gradstein (2008) go further, though, and argue that there is no relationship between the political position of domestic governments and support for aid. They found that when accounting for whether the Chief Executive of a donor country was a member of a left-wing party, under the assumption that leftist governments tend to provide higher levels of foreign aid, confidence in government shadowed these effects. Together, these findings may suggest that confidence in government as motivated by an individual's ideology has a stronger effect on public support for aid than the dominant ideology of democratically elected or appointed governments. Nonetheless, the literature seems to point toward the significance

of own government efficiency, specifically as it concerns public spending, in shaping public opinion of foreign aid on the aggregate level.

Individual-Level Determinants of Foreign Aid

Up until now, most of this analysis has reviewed determinants of public opinion on aid as it pertains to the aggregate, but determinants can be further broken down to the individual level. Moreover, there are demographic and personal characteristics that influence an individual's favorability towards foreign aid that, when aggregated, influence a donor country's public opinion of aid in general. This section will be broken up into demographic factors, political attitudes and beliefs, and psychological behaviors that influence an individual's opinion of foreign assistance.

Demographic Factors

Most of the demographic factors that have been analyzed in the extant literature, at best, have a mild effect on an individual's opinion of foreign aid. Two of the most significant demographics for analysis at the individual level are income and education. Due to the highly correlative nature of the two variables, it is difficult to separate the effects of the two.

Milner and Tingley (2012) and Paxton and Knack (2012) find that individuals who are employed in professional sectors, which tend to require higher levels of education, and those who have higher incomes are more favorable of foreign aid. This is consistent with theory that capital/economic endowments drive preferences. Milner and Tingley (2012) point to a much larger debate surrounding what constitutes a sufficient proxy to measure such endowments, but that debate is outside of the scope of this paper. A moderate degree of significance is demonstrated in Wood's (2018) analysis of

Australia, which points to a modestly positive, modestly significant, beta coefficient for education in estimations for an ordered logistic regression model. The significance of the education model, however, was small relative to other variables such as opinions motivated by ideological stance, which will be discussed further down. This is also exemplified by research by the British Foreign Policy Group in the UK, which finds that individuals who have lower socioeconomic status and live in less prosperous areas are more likely to question foreign aid spending (Gaston 2021). The rationale provided for this observation is that “undoubtedly... they consider their own standing within British society, and perceive that structural economic inequalities persist here,” or in other words implicitly distinguishing the significance of foreign aid from the significance of domestic issues. This is consistent with some of the findings in the Domestic Welfare State section that argue perceptions of prevailing domestic inequality result in lower public support for foreign aid (Chong & Gradstein 2008).

One demographic that has mixed findings of significance is gender. Theory dictates that women are generally more supportive of aid than men because they rate themselves higher in altruism and have differing, usually more progressive, policy preferences from men (cited in Paxton & Knack 2012). Wood (2018) finds that men are more supportive of aid, and Paxton and Knack (2012) find women are more supportive, but in both studies the effects of gender are mild. Burcu (2017) also finds that men are more supportive of aid than women but differs from Wood (2018) in that the effect of gender is relatively large and significant. On the contrary, Chong & Gradstein (2008) find that gender has no significant effect on aid support at all. The split in findings is most likely due to country-level differences, differences in methodology or variations in the

type or scope of aid, but the effect of gender is inconclusive overall. Lastly, most literature seems to find that age has little to no effect on opinion of aid (Wood 2018; Paxton & Knack 2012; Chong & Gradstein 2008) with the exception of Burcu (2017), who found that a one-year increase in age has a very significant and relatively large, negative effect on public support.

Political Attitudes and Beliefs

General ideological leanings and political attitudes towards poverty, income inequality, and political participation serve as sufficiently accurate proxies for an individual's support for foreign aid. Most left-right divides consistently predict how favorable an individual is towards foreign aid, but sometimes, as in Australia, there is no clear left-right divide when foreign aid spending is widely favored (Wood 2018). This may suggest that for individuals in certain donor countries, other determinants, such as confidence in government or moral outlooks, have a stronger effect on opinion.

Paxton and Knack (2012) find that the more conservative an individual is, they are significantly less likely to support the foreign aid. This is not surprising considering that conservatives have less-than-favorable attitudes toward the role of government in addressing social issues and towards redistributive policies both domestically and internationally (Rudolph & Evans 2005; Chong & Gradstein 2008). Liberals tend to be more supportive of foreign aid because they are more comfortable with government intervention and favor social equality more than conservatives (Pew Research Center 2020; Milner & Tingley 2013).

Milner and Tingley (2013) go further to suggest that there is a liberal-conservative divide over economic, or developmental, aid. Conversely, the moralistic inclinations that

drive support for providing humanitarian aid where needed, regardless of the strategic policy goals of a donor country, imply that liberal-conservative divides are less relevant in determining opinion on aid (Hurst et. al 2017; Kull 2017; Wood 2018; Rye Olsen 2001). These two patterns imply that the degree to which ideology plays a role in shaping an individual's opinion on foreign aid is limited.

Some literature also explores how specific attitudes towards poverty and inequality predict an individual's opinion on foreign aid. Paxton and Knack (2012) found that the more respondents agreed with the statement "the poor are lazy," the less likely they were to support foreign aid. However, this view had a much weaker and less significant effect on opinion than the statement "the poor can escape poverty," which moderately and positively shifted support for aid. On a slightly different note, and contrary to Chong and Gradstein's (2008) findings, Wood (2018) found that Australians' worries about domestic poverty significantly shifted support for aid in a positive direction.

Overall, the literature seems to agree that interest in politics on both the domestic and international levels are substantial predictors of an individual's opinion on foreign aid. Burcu (2017) and Paxton and Knack (2012) report that interest in politics has a highly significant and positive effect on support for foreign aid. This may be the case because individuals who are more interested in politics are more aware of domestic and international issues, the needs of vulnerable foreign populations, and the benefits of foreign aid both domestically and abroad. Similarly, individuals who consume more media are significantly more likely to support aid (Paxton & Knack 2012; Burcu 2017; Wood 2018). It is slightly more difficult to discern the effects of involvement in

international politics on support for aid due to variations in methodology between studies and the scant amount of literature that includes such analysis. Nonetheless, Paxton and Knack (2012) find that if an individual views themselves as being a “member of the world” and if they have higher levels of trust towards the United Nations and World Bank, they are more likely to support aid. Similarly, Wood (2018) reports that an increase in “favorable views of multilaterals” is associated with a higher affinity toward aid.

Psychological Behaviors

Personal beliefs and attitudes held by individuals are also indicative of altruistic behaviors, and thus motives behind public opinion of foreign aid. There seems to be agreeance in the literature surrounding the strength and significance of effects for factors such as trust and financial satisfaction. For other factors, namely religiosity, there is more ambiguity regarding the size and significance of their impact. Admittedly, though, there is scant literature on this particular topic of foreign aid determinants.

Perhaps counterintuitively, those who are more confident in their ability to manage their financial debts tend to be more supportive of foreign aid. The greater the sense of financial security of an individual, the more likely they are to support foreign aid distribution (Paxton & Knack 2011; Chong & Gradstein 2008) because they are less risk-averse and are thus more likely to demonstrate altruistic tendencies. Those with less financial security are less likely to support foreign aid, especially when they believe they themselves need aid from the government (Burcu 2017).

There is also convergence around the effects of generalized trust, or an individual’s propensity to trust others. Also called agency, generalized trust is a crucial component in the moral calculus of an individual’s support for foreign aid (Paxton &

Knack 2012; Burcu 2017). Those with higher levels of trust are more likely to want to aid “beggars” even if they are strangers (Burcu 2017).

Literature that examines the effects of religiosity, or how often one attends religious services regardless of religion and denomination, report mixed effects. For instance, Paxton and Knack (2012) find that religiosity has a minimal, almost negligible, impact on an individual’s support for foreign aid whereas Burcu (2017) finds that religiosity has a highly significant and positive impact. Wood (2018) finds that Australians who hardly ever attend religious services and Australians who do not attend religious services at all are moderately more inclined to favor foreign aid. Although coefficients for more religious Australians are more positive, they are not significant. The results of these studies may suggest that religiosity has an interaction effect on foreign aid opinion with other determinants such as generalized trust, political leanings, and type of aid.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AID IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AID IN THE UNITED STATES

Most literature on U.S. public opinion of aid centers around whether foreign assistance itself is favored or not. However, it is important to note this thesis also analyzes public opinion of foreign aid in the context of recipients the public thinks are most deserving of aid, or regime prioritization. Nonetheless, I will still review existing literature.

It is commonly known that the U.S. plays a significant, dominant role in handling foreign affairs, including in distributing foreign aid (Paxton & Knack 2011). However, compared to the publics of other donor European countries, Americans are the least supportive of foreign aid. At the state level, countries in Europe have foreign aid approval rates that vary anywhere between 68.7% to 95.4% while only a slim majority of the U.S. public (54%) is supportive (Diven & Constantelos 2009). One reason support for aid is relatively low may be that many Americans have become disillusioned with the overextension of U.S. power in the international arena; this disillusionment was harped upon by Donald Trump during his presidency and reflected by the former president's multiple attempts to slash the USAID budget (Kull 2017; Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017). Trump's increasingly isolationist policies led to the polarization of foreign aid support, despite historical bipartisan support of foreign aid funding. Another reason for low support may also be that Americans tend to prioritize domestic over international spending, preferring budget cuts in foreign assistance over cuts in domestic welfare spending (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Chong & Gradstein 2008). A final reason is that

Americans prioritize other foreign policy initiatives, such as protecting American jobs and nuclear non-proliferation, over foreign aid initiatives. The lack of support for foreign aid, however, contrasts with the fact that 69% and 66% of Americans see military and economic aid, respectively, as an effective means for achieving foreign policy goals (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).

The idea that Americans support the potential benefits of distributing military and economic aid, yet do not support aid more generally contrasts with reality; the U.S. has thoroughly demonstrated its commitment to military and economic aid abroad to promote foreign policy. Before the COVID-19 pandemic in FY2019, the top aid-spending category for the U.S. was peace and security, which constituted approximately 34% of foreign aid obligations, or \$16.1 billion. Economic development was the fourth-largest spending category at \$3.9 billion (U.S. Agency for International Development 2021). Before the pandemic, which shifted aid priorities towards funding health programs in developing countries, the U.S. provided aid for many initiatives that the public has historically been supportive of including humanitarian assistance, democracy and governance, and human rights. This may suggest that the public has a poor sense of where foreign aid goes. The public's current understanding may stem from high-profile incidents showcased by mass media, which tend to have a greater focus on failures of U.S. military assistance in developing countries (U.S. Agency for International Development 2021; Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).

Even though Americans are less supportive of foreign aid than Europeans, Americans are actually more supportive of it than surface-level public opinion polls would indicate. Despite the economic benefits of foreign aid, more Americans believe

that it should be prioritized for countries with the poorest economies rather than for countries needed as U.S. trade partners. Conversely, in a humanitarian aid context, more Americans support the idea that the U.S. should send food aid where needed than only sending aid to areas where the U.S. has security interests (Kull 2017). Only 10% of Americans support the idea of increasing economic and military aid to other nations, but when assistance is described in a mission-specific manner, for example as aid to “promote democracy” or “aid for disaster relief,” support for distribution increases to 56% and 82%, respectively (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).

This dichotomy of supporting the intentions of aid but not wanting to pay for it is a result of Americans’ tendency to overestimate the foreign aid budget, which is simultaneously balanced out by the altruistic appeal of donating aid (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Kull 2017). This phenomenon may also be indicative of a public that is not deeply committed to policy issues surrounding foreign aid. Some conservative estimates show that Americans believe aid comprises 8.5% of the federal budget, but many others show that Americans believe aid takes up 28% of the federal budget (Chicago Council 2014 cited in Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Klein 2013).

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AID TO NORTH KOREA IN SOUTH KOREA

North Korean and South Korean Development

The challenges South Korea faces in distributing aid to North Korea are best understood in the context of North Korea’s social, political, and economic development in comparison to South Korea’s. North Korea and South Korea were created following WWII when the U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR) split Korea along the 38th parallel with the U.S. occupying the south and the USSR occupying the north. In line with the

dominance of these world powers, South Korean and North Korean economic development followed largely capitalist and communist developments, respectively (Cha 2012; Oh & Hassig 2000).

South Korea is often viewed by the international community as a developmental success story and economic miracle. It is the only country to have ascended from the development assistance community (DAC) to a donor country of ODA in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Kim & Oh 2012). Though South Korea is currently a high-tech industrialized economy, its GDP per capita was comparable with those of developing nations in the 1960s (NationMaster 2014). South Korea's economy witnessed rapid growth during the 1970s under Park Chung-Hee, who encouraged investment in heavy industry and chemical facilities. This line of policy and the adoption of export-oriented economic development plans formed a basis on which South Korea would become one of the world's largest exporters of heavy industrial products. Now, it is one of the world's top 10% of exporters and one of the world's largest economies (Korea.net 2020; NationMaster 2014).

On the other hand, North Korea followed a different path under the USSR's influence. North Korea's economy is centrally planned and closed off. After the USSR instilled Kim Il-Sung as President of the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim built his nation with Confucian and Stalinist elements and founded the nation's predominant, and only, political ideology: Juche socialism (Oh & Hassig 2000). Juche is an ideology of self-reliant autarky and serving the State with filial piety (Cha 2012). Juche socialism not only enabled the Kims, particularly Kim Il-Sung, to consolidate totalitarian power but also allowed for poor economic planning and foreign policy to

occur. North Korea GDP growth is stagnant and, as of 2019, approximately 54 times smaller than South Korea's (Statista 2021). Industrial and power output have also remained stagnant, and food shortages are chronic (NationMaster 2014).

Overall, South Korea's economy fares much better than North Korea's; North Korea's state has made it reliant on foreign assistance from the international community to resolve humanitarian crises (Cha & Lloyd 2021; Manyin & Nikitin 2014). In more recent history, North Korea has continuously been provided humanitarian aid by the international community for fifteen years, with South Korea being one of North Korea's largest donors (Kim 2014). Even though the amount of aid it has distributed has declined since 2008 when Lee Myung-Bak ascended to the presidency, North Korea relies on aid from both the South Korean government and South Korean NGOs (Kim 2014; Manyin & Nikitin 2014).

History of Aid Failure in North Korea

To effectively analyze South Korean attitudes toward providing aid to the north, it is essential to understand the past success, or lack thereof, of foreign assistance in North Korea. The historic inefficiency of aid in North Korea helps to explain why South Koreans are skeptical of providing assistance now and in the future (Aaltola 1999; Haggard & Ryu 2012).

One of the most notable examples of humanitarian aid failure began in the 1990s when North Korea asked the international society for foreign assistance to end its worst famine to date (Kim 2014; Aaltola 1999). Although North Korea was able to put an end to its Arduous March, as of 2019 40% of North Koreans were in urgent need of food assistance, and North Korea remains highly vulnerable to food shortages (United Nations

Food Program 2019; Haggard & Noland 2007). This is among other related food insecurity issues, severe declines in agricultural production, and inefficiencies in the state's Public Distribution System (PDS) (United Nations Food Program 2019).

North Korea, despite receiving developmental assistance, has failed to effectively feed its citizens in the long run due to institutional corruption. This follows a consistent trend of development assistance failures due to the North Korean government diverting resources from welfare allocations (Kim 2014; Silberstein 2018 (a)). Under the administration of Kim Il-Sung, foreign aid was mostly used to consolidate state power as North Korea consistently declined on several development indicators (Kim 2014; Oh & Hassig 2000). Additionally, the Congressional Research Service reports “multiple sources have asserted that some of the food assistance is routinely diverted for resale in private markets or other uses” and that “the North Korean government restricts the ability of donors to operate in the country” (Manyin & Nikitin 2014). Admittedly, though, it is difficult to quantify the effect of development assistance in North Korea as data for key indicators such as the Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product, poverty level, Purchase Power Parity, and Gini Coefficient are scant (World Bank Group 2019; United Nations Development Program 2019). Regardless, more analyses of the North Korean economy are indicative of consistent economic stagnation and decline (Oh & Hassig 2000; Cha & Lloyd 2021).

Moreover, acts of aggression toward South Korea and North Korea's conduction of nuclear and ballistic missile tests are also viewed as failures of development assistance, especially in the context of diplomacy and security (Haggard & Ryu 2012; Kim & Friedhoff 2011; Jeong 2015; Aaltola 1999). Generally, a norm of reciprocity,

typically by means of regulated state behavior, is expected out of a recipient country by donor countries as long as the latter sponsors their aid, though North Korea tends to fall through on these obligations as North Korea is more aggressive and non-compliant than most aid-dependent states (Aaltola 1999; Hogarth 2012; Lee 2010; Manyin & Nikitin 2014). The 2002 nuclear crisis, the 2006 nuclear test, and the sinking of the *Cheonan* in 2010, after all of which support for aid had significantly decreased, are examples of security threats that have been associated with aid failure and corruption fatigue (Haggard & Ryu 2012; Jeong 2015). North Korea's resistance to denuclearization on multiple occasions is also viewed as a failure of aid by westerners, though the United States shares a small portion of the blame according to South Koreans (Manyin & Nikitin 2014; Jeong 2015).

Many studies have attributed the long-run failure of development aid to the structure of North Korea's economy (Kim 2014). North Korea's economic system is a tightly state-controlled, mixed-Socialist economy with no coherent economic policy (Stiftung 2020; Kim 2014). North Korea's economy is subject to the established chronic failures of planned economies: economic mismanagement and resulting stagnation in growth. As a result of no cogent tax-collection system and the lack of necessary infrastructure, the North Korean population suffers from poor state resource management and virtually nonexistent or inefficient distributive welfare programs (Stiftung 2020; United Nations Food Program 2019).

More so than the country's economy, North Korea's sociopolitical environment is a driving factor in the failure of foreign aid efforts. Generally, themes of power, authoritarianism, and corruption dominate North Korean political and foreign aid

literature (Kim 2014; Oh & Hassig 2000). Failures in its social safety net mainly stem from the state's emphasis on authoritarianism and the priority allocation of resources to elite citizens under the strict organization of the social Songbun system (Stiftung 2020). Furthermore, most citizens do not receive the aid they need and/or are promised due to widespread corruption (Aaltola 1999). The distribution of foreign aid and other welfare resources only tends to favor the powerful few with the right political connections (Stiftung 2020). In the past, the prevalence of corruption has led to the diversion of foreign aid resources from ordinary North Korean citizens to soldiers, many symbolic--not practical-- state-building projects, weaponry development, and even imported luxury goods (Silberstein 2018(b); Aaltola 1999; Hogarth 2012).

Another related, prevalent historical aspect of aid policy towards North Korea was the implementation of the Sunshine Policy by President Kim Dae Jung in 1998. The goal of this policy was to promote cooperation between the two states, primarily through the disbursement of economic aid and re-establishing lines of communication and financial flow, in long-term hopes of Korean reunification (Hogarth 2012; Lee 2010). However, in maintaining consistency with historical trends, the North failed to uphold its reciprocal obligations about the policy, ultimately resulting in the policy's end and perceived failure (Hogarth 2012).

Though aid has not succeeded in generally improving North Korea's humanitarian crisis, hope is retained that aid can pave a path for progress in inter-Korean relations. Over the four years of being provided humanitarian aid throughout the Arduous March, North Korea became relatively more open to the international community (Smith 1999). Many thought that the foundational relationships established between North Korea and

various humanitarian aid agencies would lead to increased, productive policy engagement with the country (Smith 1999). Though levels of aid contributions had declined since 2008, in 2014 President Park stated that preparations for an open era of unification were to be made including strengthening humanitarian aid (Park 2014). However, North Korea remains a global security threat and continues to endure an immense humanitarian crisis. Although many challenges remain to be resolved between North Korea and South Korea, both diplomatically and in foreign aid developments, there is potential for humanitarian aid to force North Korea into negotiations at the very least (Manyin & Nikitin 2014).

South Koreans' Perceptions of North Korea

Historically, support for providing aid to the north has largely been contingent on South Koreans' perceptions of North Korea (Jeong 2015; Haggard & Ryu 2012). Generally, there is a negative correlation between South Koreans' perceived insecurity and their support for distributing aid to North Korea, though threats to security are relatively stable unless provoked by a specific event (Jeong 2015). Interestingly, under the Lee and Park administrations, which emphasized joint economic cooperation rather than unconditional aid following the end of the Sunshine Policy era in 2008, the public struck a balance in opinion between reducing/suspending aid and expanding/maintaining aid (Jeong 2015). By extension, this implies that the public struck a balance in supporting inter-Korean cooperation. At its highest disapproval rate in 2006, 70% of South Koreans supported the notion of aid decreasing or being stopped altogether following a series of DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile tests (Haggard & Ryu 2012); a similar decline in popularity of aid occurred in 2010 following the sinking of the *Cheonan* (Kim & Friedhoff 2011). Despite North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction,

South Koreans view this as less of a security threat than South Korea's vulnerability to an artillery attack by the north (Lee 2012). Overall, these events and subsequent changes in public opinion on aid towards North Korea suggest that support is influenced by contemporary events.

South Koreans frequently debate the question of how to deal with North Korea (Kim et. al 1996). Broader foreign aid literature suggests that perceived corruption in a recipient country by donor countries reduces overall support for aid in donor countries (Bauhr et. al 2013; Diven 2009). In South Korea, conflicting views of North Korea's intentions underly this debate: as an enemy and militarist aggressor versus as brethren of part of a bigger nation (Kim et. al 1996). The former of these views, or the realists, suggest that North Korea's political and economic differences, in addition to historical bilateral conflict, should result in a hard-liner approach to regulating North Korean behavior through deterrence and by seeking unification on their own (South Korea's) terms. The latter of the views, or the nationalists, support engagement with the North through a soft-liner approach through rapprochement and ultimate unification (Kim et. al 1996). This analysis can be extended to foreign aid applications. Interestingly, South Korea's ODA in general is highly dependent on its own economic interests rather than the recipient's needs. However, when considering South Korea's aid to its poorest recipients, only population factors are significant in influencing how much aid the country receives as opposed to economic factors such as the recipient country's income, economic growth, and bilateral trade flows with South Korea (Kim & Oh 2012). In the context of providing aid to North Korea, although South Koreans generally view aid as

ineffective, the moral obligation to assist its general population in the short run outweighs the desire to decrease or stop aid altogether (Silberstein 2018(a)).

More generally, many South Koreans do not have a favorable view of North Korea, though engagement with North Korea is not generally thought to be important among the public. From 2004 to 2014, South Korea's favorability toward North Korea declined by approximately 39%, and over that same period ,70% of South Koreans believed that north-south relations had worsened (Jeong 2015). North-south relations, however, has low issue saliency among the public, which suggests that South Koreans are not preparing for unification, the overarching goal of South Korea's aid policy towards North Korea (Kim & Friedhoff 2011). In fact, support for reunification has declined primarily due to its perceived economic burden (Jiyoon et. al 2015). The indifferent, negative view of North Korea is consistent with the finding that public support for aid to North Korea, in comparison to other political issues, has been and always will be low (Haggard and Ryu 2012; Jeong 2015; Kim & Friedhoff 2011).

UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION 2020: EFFECTS OF FRAMING TYPE OF AID AND RECIPIENT REGIMES

Data and Methodology

To determine the factors that shape public opinion of foreign aid in the United States, summary and ordered logistic regression analyses were applied to an original public opinion survey conducted through Amazon mTurk in July 2020. The survey had 1035 individual respondents who were conveniently sampled in the U.S. A summary table for the variables used within the data can be viewed below in Table 1:

Table 1: Data Summary for Amazon mTurk July 2020 Survey

Variable	(N)	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>Aid Support</i>	1027	.4284	.4951	0	1
<i>Economic, Control</i>	1035	.1277	.3337	0	1
<i>Economic, Democratic</i>	1035	.1333	.3401	0	1
<i>Economic, Democratizing</i>	1035	.1227	.3283	0	1
<i>Economic, Nondemocratic</i>	1035	.1267	.3327	0	1
<i>Humanitarian, Control</i>	1035	.1256	.3316	0	1
<i>Humanitarian, Democratic</i>	1035	.1092	.3120	0	1
<i>Humanitarian, Democratizing</i>	1035	.1246	.3305	0	1
<i>Humanitarian, Nondemocratic</i>	1035	.1227	.3283	0	1
<i>Male</i>	1030	.5466	.4981	0	1
<i>Urban</i>	1035	.3005	.4587	0	1
<i>Rural</i>	1035	.1681	.3742	0	1
<i>Household income</i>	1027	3.3632	1.6689	1	9
<i>Education</i>	1032	4.5291	1.2701	1	7
<i>Democrat</i>	1035	.5169	.5000	0	1
<i>Republican</i>	1035	.2734	.4459	0	1
<i>Liberal</i>	1032	.5543	.4973	0	1
<i>Conservative</i>	1032	.3188	.4662	0	1
<i>Trust in others</i>	1024	3.2080	1.0250	1	5
<i>Risk aversity</i>	1024	3.5518	.9734	1	5
<i>Interest in politics</i>	1024	3.7207	1.0713	1	5
<i>Trust in federal govt</i>	1027	1.8724	.6969	1	4
<i>Confidence debts</i>	1027	3.2795	1.1303	1	5
<i>Religiosity</i>	1024	2.5156	1.6737	1	6

Within the survey, an eight-version experimental design question was implemented to gauge public opinion on foreign aid based on the types of aid being distributed, in this case, economic or humanitarian, and regimes of recipient countries. The eight versions were equally distributed among respondents, and they could choose to answer either “no” or “yes.” It is important to note that version 1 of the question serves as the control variable for economic aid and version 5 serves as the control for humanitarian aid. The design for the question is presented in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Experimental Question Design from Amazon mTurk July 2020 Public⁸

Version 1: Do you think the US should give more **economic aid** to poorer nations than they are giving now?

Version 2: Do you think the US should give more **economic aid** to poorer nations that are **democratic** than they are giving now?

Version 3: Do you think the US should give more **economic aid** to poorer nations that are **democratizing** than they are giving now?

Version 4: Do you think the US should give more **economic aid** to poorer nations that are **nondemocracies** than they are giving now?

Version 5: Do you think the US should give more **humanitarian aid** to poorer nations than they are giving now?

Version 6: Do you think the US should give more **humanitarian aid** to poorer nations that are **democratic** than they are giving now?

Version 7: Do you think the US should give more **humanitarian aid** to poorer nations that are **democratizing** than they are giving now?

Version 8: Do you think the US should give more **humanitarian aid** to poorer nations that are **nondemocracies** than they are giving now?

To gauge differences in opinion between support for distributing economic and humanitarian aid to certain types of regimes, four identical regression models are run for both types of aid. In other words, I examine economic and humanitarian aid separately for a total of eight regression models. The first hypothesis being is that the variations in each version of the question, for each type of aid, will have a significantly different effect from the control version of each type of aid on the dependent variable. The second

⁸ Highlighting and bolding are for emphasis in Figure 1 and are not in the original survey.

hypothesis being tested is that there will be differences in the types of regimes and demographic and attitudinal factors that have a significant effect on the dependent variable between economic and humanitarian aid. Thus, hypothesis testing is based on a two-tailed test.

Support for aid, or ***Aid Support_i***, is based on whether respondents said “no” or “yes” to one of the eight versions of the experimental question and serves as the dependent variable for this experiment. It is a dichotomous variable with a (0) indicating a response of “no” and a (1) indicating a response of “yes.” Additionally, eight separate dummy variables were created to indicate which version of the question was received by the respondent. A (1) in either eight of these variables signals the version of the question received by the individual and a (0) signals which versions of the question were not received by the respondent.

The first regression model only considers the versions of the question asked and serves as a benchmark model where ***Aid support_i*** indicates whether the i-th individual in the sample supports distributing foreign aid or not:

$$\mathbf{Aid\ Support}_i = \beta_1 \mathbf{Democraticversion}_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{Democratizingversion}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{Nondemocratizingversion}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Demographic variables from the survey are also included in the regression models. ***Male_i*** is coded into a dummy variable, with (0) indicating a female and (1) indicating a male. Following similar coding, separate dummy variables were created for ***Democrat_i*** and ***Republican_i*** to capture the effect of each party identification on aid support. Identifying as members of either the libertarian or green parties or not identifying with a party at all serve as the baseline for the party identification variables. ***Urban_i*** and ***Rural_i*** are also separate dummy variables to indicate whether a respondent

resides in either an urban or rural location with a (1) and a (0) to indicate otherwise. In this case, residing in a suburban area serves as the baseline. **Education_i** is a categorical variable with the coding: (1) Some high school/No diploma, (2) high school diploma or GED, (3) Some college/no degree, (4) associate's degree, (5) bachelor's degree, (6) master's degree, and (7) professional degree (MD, JD, MBA) or PhD. Annual **Householdincome_i** level is coded into \$25,000 quintiles. The lowest income bracket, \$0-\$24,999, is coded as a (1) and the highest income bracket, \$200,000 and up, is coded as a "9." The variables for **Liberal_i** and **Conservative_i** ideological identifications are each coded as a dummy variable with a (0) indicating that the respondent does not align with either the liberal or conservative ideology, and a (1) indicating that the respondent is either slightly, moderately, or extremely aligned with either the conservative or liberal ideology. The baseline for the ideology dummy variables is not identifying with either. The second regression model considers the versions of the question asked and the above demographic variables:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Aid Support}_i = & \beta_1 \text{Democraticversion}_i + \beta_2 \text{Democratizingversion}_i + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Nondemocratizingversion}_i + \beta_4 \text{Male}_i + \beta_5 \text{Urban}_i + \beta_6 \text{Rural}_i + \\ & \beta_7 \text{Householdincome}_i + \beta_8 \text{Education}_i + \beta_9 \text{Democrat}_i + \\ & \beta_{10} \text{Republican}_i + \beta_{11} \text{Liberal}_i + \beta_{12} \text{Conservative}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Attitudinal factors are also considered by the regression models.

Trustinothers_i, **Riskaversity_i**, and **Interestinpolitics_i** are all coded on the same Likert scale of 1-5 with (1) indicating strongly disagree and (5) indicating strongly agree. **Confidencedebts_i**, which measures how confident an individual is that they can manage their financial debts, is also coded on a Likert scale with (1) indicating not at all confident and (5) indicating extremely confident. **Trustinfedgovt_i**, which asks respondents if they trust the government to "do what is right," has the following coding:

(1) almost never, (2) some of the time, (3) most of the time, and (4) just about always.

Religiosity_i, or how often one attends religious services regardless of religion and denomination, has the following coding: (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) a few times a year, (4) once or twice a month, (5) once a week, and (6) more than once a week. The third regression model accounts for versions of the experimental question received and the above attitudinal variables, which are all expected to be positively associated with the dependent variable:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Aid Support}_i = & \beta_1 \text{Democraticversion}_i + \beta_2 \text{Democratizingversion}_i + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Nondemocratizingversion}_i + \beta_4 \text{Trustinothers}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Riskaversity}_i + \beta_6 \text{Interestinpolitics}_i + \beta_7 \text{Trustinfedgovt}_i + \\ & \beta_8 \text{Religiosity}_i + \beta_9 \text{Confidencedebts}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The final regression model used to control for individual-level factors that affect support for economic/humanitarian aid is as follows:


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Aid Support}_i = & \beta_1 \text{Democraticversion}_i + \beta_2 \text{Democratizingversion}_i + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Nondemocratizingversion}_i + \beta_4 \text{Male}_i + \beta_5 \text{Urban}_i + \beta_6 \text{Rural}_i + \\ & \beta_7 \text{Householdincome}_i + \beta_8 \text{Education}_i + \beta_9 \text{Democrat}_i + \beta_{10} \text{Republican}_i + \\ & \beta_{11} \text{Liberal}_i + \beta_{12} \text{Conservative}_i + \beta_{13} \text{Trustinothers}_i + \\ & \beta_{14} \text{Riskaversity}_i + \beta_{15} \text{Interestinpolitics}_i + \beta_{16} \text{Trustinfedgovt}_i + \\ & \beta_{17} \text{Religiosity}_i + \beta_{18} \text{Confidencedebts}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Results

A distribution was run to determine the percentage of support for aid within the sample for each version of the experimental question. The axis titles in Figure 2 correspond with the versions of the question displayed above in Figure 1. For each category of aid, there is a similar fluctuation of support between the control and regime-variations. In fact, support is observed to be roughly equal between the control, democratic versions, and democratizing versions, though it is slightly higher for humanitarian aid as a whole. Interestingly, the democratizing versions, Version 3 and

Version 7, have the highest percentage of support for both types of aid. There was a 10.24% increase in support from the control version for economic aid, between versions 1 and 3, and a 10.39% increase for humanitarian aid, between versions 5 and 7. On the other hand, the non-democratic versions of the question are associated with decreased support, and the democratic versions only moderately increase support by roughly 5% from each control version. Though the non-democratic version of the question receives the least support for both economic and humanitarian aid, support for the economic non-democratic version, or Version 4, is 9.6% lower than support for the humanitarian non-democratic version, or Version 8. Results from the distribution suggest that framing matters. Americans believe consideration for humanitarian aid should not always be considered in the context of regime. This could be due to a sense of a moral and human obligation to help people in urgent need. To summarize, there is generally less support for providing aid to a non-democratic country, this is more evident for economic aid than humanitarian aid. Similarly, framing in the context of democratizing recipients illicit marginally increased support.

Figure 2: Percentage of Respondents in Support of Aid vs Version Received



The estimation results for the ordered logistic regression models are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The first column in each table shows the estimate of the benchmark/regime-only model in which neither demographic nor attitudinal variables are controlled for. The remaining columns show the regressions in which the control variables are added to the regression in accordance with the equation models specified in the Data & Methodology section.

Table 2: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Economic Aid

VARIABLES	Economic Aid			
	Regime	Demographics	Attitudes	Comprehensive
Democracy version	0.0903 (0.189)	0.333 (0.209)	0.0430 (0.193)	0.302 (0.214)
Democratizing version	0.280 (0.195)	0.431** (0.218)	0.290 (0.201)	0.382* (0.225)
Non-democracy version	-0.594*** (0.207)	-0.460** (0.226)	-0.678*** (0.214)	-0.534** (0.235)
Male		0.284** (0.141)		0.242 (0.148)
Urban		0.603*** (0.159)		0.495*** (0.164)
Rural		0.0742 (0.203)		-0.0361 (0.210)
Household income level		-0.0138 (0.0443)		-0.0325 (0.0476)
Education level		0.164*** (0.0596)		0.0831 (0.0626)
Democrat		0.677*** (0.211)		0.450** (0.219)
Republican		-0.0722 (0.277)		-0.518* (0.297)
Liberal		0.390 (0.246)		0.452* (0.258)
Conservative		-0.690** (0.294)		-0.839*** (0.304)
Trust in others			0.202*** (0.0682)	0.203*** (0.0765)
Risk aversity			0.0448 (0.0667)	0.0954 (0.0752)
Interest in politics			0.227*** (0.0635)	0.200*** (0.0704)
Trust in federal govt.			0.0188 (0.101)	0.168 (0.115)
Religiosity			0.0493 (0.0403)	0.185*** (0.0481)
Confidence in debts			-0.00270 (0.0593)	0.0540 (0.0674)
/cut1	0.265*** (0.0803)	1.781*** (0.350)	2.070*** (0.433)	3.731*** (0.549)
Observations	1,027	1,023	1,017	1,013

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Humanitarian Aid

VARIABLES	Humanitarian Aid			
	Regime	Demographics	Attitudes	Comprehensive
Democracy version	0.190 (0.205)	0.157 (0.221)	0.246 (0.210)	0.208 (0.229)
Democratizing version	0.397** (0.193)	0.276 (0.208)	0.404** (0.197)	0.247 (0.215)
Non-democracy version	-0.0817 (0.198)	-0.0792 (0.221)	-0.0958 (0.201)	-0.0493 (0.226)
Male		0.302** (0.140)		0.263* (0.147)
Urban		0.591*** (0.157)		0.497*** (0.164)
Rural		0.0763 (0.202)		-0.0339 (0.209)
Household income level		-0.0200 (0.0441)		-0.0369 (0.0474)
Education level		0.158*** (0.0590)		0.0779 (0.0618)
Democrat		0.698*** (0.209)		0.480** (0.218)
Republican		-0.00789 (0.275)		-0.450 (0.294)
Liberal		0.341 (0.244)		0.396 (0.256)
Conservative		-0.736** (0.292)		-0.893*** (0.302)
Trust in others			0.206*** (0.0680)	0.206*** (0.0759)
Risk aversity			0.0538 (0.0663)	0.109 (0.0747)
Interest in politics			0.228*** (0.0632)	0.207*** (0.0701)
Trust in federal govt.			0.0297 (0.100)	0.195* (0.114)
Religiosity			0.0443 (0.0401)	0.178*** (0.0478)
Confidence in debts			-0.0165 (0.0589)	0.0375 (0.0668)
/cut1	0.350*** (0.0792)	1.724*** (0.345)	2.189*** (0.435)	3.771*** (0.549)
Observations	1,027	1,023	1,017	1,013

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Overall, regression results tell a slightly different story from the distribution results in Figure 2. Indicating that a non-democratic country is being considered for an increase in economic aid makes respondents less likely to support the notion. However, in terms of the comprehensive model, regime is not a significant determinant for increasing humanitarian aid. The results still suggest that support for humanitarian aid is

not as sensitive to the context of regime. This may be the product of altruistic tendencies, the belief that such aid is less likely to be abused by corrupt governments, and that providing it to any type of regime is an acceptable risk. But now the results also suggest that support for economic aid, or the lack thereof, is particularly sensitive to the signalling of a non-democratic regime. This may be due to impressions of economic aid as being discretionary and general perceptions of non-democratic regimes as being corrupt. As corruption fatigue theory suggests, support for aid in the framing of this context may be lower due to fears that economic aid has higher potential for misuse and abuse by corrupt political elites. Although the results may be interpreted as to associate perceptions of regime with corruption, it is important to note that non-democratic regimes are not necessarily corrupt.

Furthermore, the regression results can be broken down even further to compare which demographic and attitudinal factors are more significant in predicting support for increasing economic versus humanitarian aid. However, the significant demographic and attitudinal determinants for support are identical for both types of aid. Unsurprisingly, residing in an urban area and identifying as a Democrat are associated with increased support. On a similar note, conservative ideology is associated with less support for increasing either economic or humanitarian aid. The latter finding can be intuitively explained by the tendency for conservative individuals to be less favorable of aid in general. Moreover, individuals who reside in urban areas tend to be more accepting of diverse contacts and are Democratic; Democrats tend to be more liberal and thus more favorable of foreign aid.

Attitudinal determinants of support for economic and humanitarian aid are also quite intuitive. The regression results suggest that the more interested in politics an individual is, the more likely they are to support the notion of increasing either type of aid. This may be due to a greater awareness of what each type of aid entails, where it is delivered, and causes to which aid is allocated to. In line with theory that suggests altruistic tendencies are positively correlated with support for foreign aid, trust in others and religiosity are associated with higher levels of support for economic and humanitarian aid. The regression results confirm Burcu's (2017) findings on generalized trust: the more an individual is inclined to trust others, which acts as a proxy for altruistic tendencies, the more likely they are to support the distribution of foreign aid. Furthermore, the results also confirm previous findings that the more religious an individual is, which also serves as a proxy for altruism, the more likely they are to support aid.

Nonetheless, the most significant conclusion from the similarity of the demographic and attitudinal predictors between support for economic and humanitarian aid is that it further confirms that support for aid is sensitive to the context of both type of aid and regime of the recipient country *ceteris paribus*. This finding has substantial implications for framing of foreign aid policy to policymakers, which will be further discussed in the Conclusion section of this thesis.

Post-Estimation Results

To gain further insight into how the framing of the experimental question affected responses I ran 16 marginal effects models. The marginal effects models more accurately pinpoint the magnitude of the effects of the comprehensive regression model given by

Equation 4 for both types of aid. The rows in the tables are the answer choices “no” and “yes” and the columns indicate which version of the experimental question are being used to predict the probability of each answer choice. All the values below can be interpreted as the probability that each answer choice is predicted by Equation 4, based on responses within the sample, for each version of the question. The marginal effects models hold the other independent variables specified in Equation 4 at their mean. The marginal effects model for economic aid is displayed in Table 4 and the model for humanitarian aid is displayed in Table 5:

Table 4: Marginal Effects Model for Economic Aid

	Control (V1)	Democracy (V2)	Democratizing (V3)	Non-democracy (V4)
No	.605	.531	.511	.723
Yes	.395	.469	.489	.277

Table 5: Marginal Effects Model for Humanitarian Aid

	Control (V5)	Democracy (V6)	Democratizing (V7)	Non-democracy (V8)
No	.611	.560	.551	.622
Yes	.389	.440	.449	.378

The marginal effects results tell a similar story as the ordered logistic regression results. The most noticeable difference in probabilities occurs in the non-democratic version of the model for economic aid, which is 11.8% more likely to predict “no” than the control (V1). This reaffirms the conclusion drawn from the regressions that support for aid is sensitive to the context in which it is considered. More specifically, respondents were more likely to answer “no” when the question was framed in terms of economic aid and non-democratic regimes. The same reasoning can be deduced from the regression

results that an impression of economic aid being discretionary in nature and perceptions, albeit misconstrued, that non-democratic regimes are corrupt induce corruption fatigue. Consequently, support for distributing further economic aid in this context decreases. Also like the regression results, there is no significant difference between the probabilities of the regression model predicting either answer choice for each regime-context of humanitarian aid. Again, the reasoning behind this observation can be deduced from the regression results that perceptions of humanitarian aid's non-discretionary nature and altruistic tendencies to help those in urgent need, rather than perceptions of regime and corruption, drive public support in this context.

However, slightly different from the regression results is that the marginal effects model for economic aid indicates that the democratizing version (V3) is also significantly more likely to predict "yes" than the control version (V1) at 9.4%. It is also twice as likely to predict "yes" than framing economic aid in the context of a non-democratic regime (V4). This suggests that when all other demographic and attitudinal variables are held constant, positive perceptions of democratizing regimes illicit greater support for foreign aid. Nonetheless, post-estimation results also suggest that framing matters.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION 2021: REGIME PRIORITIZATION BASED ON TYPE OF AID

Data and Methodology

This section aims to determine how type of aid shapes which regimes the public thinks are most deserving of aid. In the United States in June 2021, 625 individual respondents were obtained using quota sampling for age, gender, and geographic region. Descriptive statistics for the data and variables used are displayed in Table 6:

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics from Qualtrics June 2021 Public Opinion Survey

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>RegimePrioritization_i</i>	625	2.331	0.785	1	3
<i>EconomicAid(V2)_i</i>	625	0.251	0.434	0	1
<i>HumanitarianAid(V3)_i</i>	625	0.245	0.43	0	1
<i>MilitaryAid(V4)_i</i>	625	0.261	0.439	0	1
<i>Minority_i</i>	625	0.192	0.394	0	1
<i>Female_i</i>	625	0.486	0.5	0	1
<i>EducationLevel_i</i>	625	3.677	1.585	1	7
<i>HouseholdIncomeLevel_i</i>	625	5.76	3.54	1	12
<i>Democrat_i</i>	625	0.426	0.495	0	1
<i>Republican_i</i>	625	0.354	0.478	0	1
<i>CitizenoftheWorld_i</i>	625	0.499	0.5	0	1
<i>USInvolvement_i</i>	625	0.278	0.449	0	1
<i>ImmigrationSupport_i</i>	625	0.496	0.5	0	1
<i>DecreaseAid_i</i>	625	0.344	0.475	0	1

Within the survey, a four-version experimental design question was implemented to gauge public opinion on this topic. Each respondent was randomly assigned one version of the question, which varied by the type of aid being distributed—economic, humanitarian, or military. For each version of the question, respondents could choose

between “Democratic countries”, “Democratizing countries”, and “Non-democratic countries.” The design of the experimental question is as follows in Figure 3:

Figure 3: Experimental Question Design from Qualtrics June 2021 Survey⁹

Version 1: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving aid to what type of countries?

Version 2: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving **economic** aid to what type of countries?

Version 3: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving **humanitarian** aid to what type of countries?

Version 4: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving **military** aid to what type of countries?

Version 1 of the question serves as the control while the variations in types of aid seen in versions 2, 3, and 4 serve as the experimental versions. To paint a full picture of how the public thinks each type of aid should be distributed, four different ordered logistic regression models are run.

The first model presented in Equation 5 only includes dummy variables for the type of aid received in the question. The variables *EconomicAid(V2)_i*, *HumanitarianAid(V3)_i*, and *MilitaryAid(V4)_i* are coded (0) for the types of aid the respondent did not receive in their version of the question and (1) for the type of aid received in their version of the question. The dependent variable, *RegimePrioritization_i*, indicates the respondents’ answer to the question as (1) non-democratic, (2) democratizing, and (3) democratic.

$$\mathbf{RegimePrioritization}_i = \beta_1 \mathbf{EconomicAid(V2)}_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{HumanitarianAid(V3)}_i + \beta_3 \mathbf{MilitaryAid(V4)}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (5)$$

⁹ Highlighting and bolding are for emphasis in Figure 3 and are not in the original survey.

I choose Regime Prioritization as the dependent variable for a couple of reasons. The first is that previous studies have highlighted the significance of donor publics' perceptions of corruption in recipient countries, or corruption fatigue, in decreasing the public's overall support for aid (Bauhr, Charron & Nasiritousi 2013; Diven & Constantelos 2009). As a parallel to the phenomenon of corruption fatigue, I offer the hypothesis that the type of aid discussed affects the type of regime publics in donor countries would prefer to give aid to. Although previous literature suggests that procedural democracies are most associated with high levels of corruption, this may not be perceived accurately by the public. For instance, the public may think that non-democracies are more corrupt than democratizing or democratic regimes. Consequently, they may prefer to give aid to democratizing or democratic regimes. Responses to the experimental question may provide insight as to how the public associates corruption with the regime of recipient countries, and how that in turn affects aid.

The second model presented in Equation 6 adds demographic control variables to the first ordered logistic regression model. *Minority_i* is a dummy variable coded as (0) to indicate the respondent is white and (1) to indicate that the respondent is an ethnic minority. *Female_i* is also a dummy variable coded as (0) to indicate the respondent is male and (1) to indicate that the respondent is female. *EducationLevel_i* is an ordinal variable with the following coding to distinguish between different levels of education among the respondents: (1) Less than high school, (2) High school graduate, (3) Some college, (4) 2-year degree, (5) 4-year degree, (6) Professional degree, and (7) Doctorate. *HouseholdIncomeLevel_i* is also an ordinal variable that is coded into \$10,000 quintiles up through the last two income brackets. (1) indicates that the respondents' household

income is less than \$10,000, (2) indicates \$10,000-\$19,999, (3) is \$20,000-\$29,999, (4) is \$30,000-\$39,999, (5) is \$40,000-\$49,999, (6) is \$50,000-\$59,999, (7) is \$60,000-\$69,999, (8) is \$70,000-\$79,999, (9) is \$80,000-\$89,999, (10) is \$90,000-\$99,999, (11) is \$100,000-\$149,999, and (12) is more than \$150,000. Finally, ***Democrat_i*** and ***Republican_i*** are two dummy variables to indicate that the respondent does not identify with either party using a (0) and uses a (1) to indicate the respondent's party identification as either a Democrat or Republican.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RegimePrioritization}_i = & \beta_1 \text{EconomicAid}(V2)_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{HumanitarianAid}(V3)_i + \beta_3 \text{MilitaryAid}(V4)_i + \beta_4 \text{Minority}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Female}_i + \beta_6 \text{EducationLevel}_i + \beta_7 \text{HouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \\ & \beta_8 \text{Democrat}_i + \beta_9 \text{Republican}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The third model (below in Equation 7) contains dummy variables to control for attitudes towards international affairs. ***CitizenoftheWorld_i*** is coded as a (0) to indicate that the respondent does not see themselves as a “citizen of the world,” while a (1) indicates that they do. Likewise, ***USInvolvement_i*** is coded so that a (0) signifies that the respondent does not think that “the U.S. should be more involved in international affairs” while a (1) signifies that they do think so. Finally, ***ImmigrationSupport_i*** indicates that the respondent does not “support legal immigration” with a (0) and indicates that they do with a (1).

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RegimePrioritization}_i = & \beta_1 \text{CitizenoftheWorld}_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{USInvolvement}_i + \beta_3 \text{ImmigrationSupport}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Finally, the model presented in Equation 8 essentially combines all independent variables regressed in Equations 5, 6, and 7. It serves as the primary theoretical model for this thesis chapter.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RegimePrioritization}_i = & \beta_1 \text{EconomicAid}(V2)_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{HumanitarianAid}(V3)_i + \beta_3 \text{MilitaryAid}(V4)_i + \beta_4 \text{Minority}_i + \end{aligned}$$


$$\beta_5 \text{Female}_i + \beta_6 \text{EducationLevel}_i + \beta_7 \text{HouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \beta_8 \text{Democrat}_i + \beta_9 \text{Republican}_i + \beta_{10} \text{CitizenoftheWorld}_i + \beta_{11} \text{USInvolvement}_i + \beta_{12} \text{ImmigrationSupport}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (8)$$

Results

A distribution was run for the sample to determine the percentage of support for each type of regime based on the type of aid received by respondents. The axis titles in Figure 4 correspond with the versions of the question laid out above in Table 2. Just from these results, it is clear that the respondents would prefer to give aid to democratic countries rather than democratizing and nondemocratic countries. There is not a significant difference between preferences for democracies between the control, economic aid, and humanitarian aid versions, which only vary by 48%, 53% (+5%)¹⁰, and 52% (+4%), respectively. However, there appears to be a stronger aversion towards non-democratic countries for economic aid at 16% (-10%), which in the control question was 26%. There is an even stronger preference for democratic countries when military aid is mentioned, at 58% (+10%), and almost as strong of an aversion towards non-democratic countries for military aid, at 17% (-9%), compared to economic aid. The results of the distribution suggest that the American public is more inclined to prioritize aid for countries like their own. For that reason, they may be even more hesitant to provide economic and military aid to countries that are not democratic if they believe such aid can be abused by governments they perceive to be “corrupt.”

¹⁰ Values in parentheses indicate differences, in terms of percentage, from the results of the control version of this question.

Figure 4: Overall Distribution of Responses



The estimated results for the regression models are presented in Table 7. The columns in the table correspond to the regression models detailed in Equations 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the Data and Methodology section of this chapter.

Table 7: Regime Prioritization Regression Results

VARIABLES	Type of Aid Regime Prioritization	Demographics Regime Prioritization	Attitudes Regime Prioritization	Comprehensive Model Regime Prioritization
Economic aid (V2)	0.321 (0.216)	0.311 (0.219)	0.329 (0.217)	0.336 (0.220)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.212 (0.217)	0.262 (0.221)	0.273 (0.220)	0.309 (0.222)
Military aid (V4)	0.476** (0.218)	0.576** (0.224)	0.528** (0.220)	0.610*** (0.226)
Minority		0.237 (0.205)		0.180 (0.208)
Female		0.226 (0.164)		0.219 (0.167)
Education level		-0.156*** (0.0599)		-0.136** (0.0614)
Household income level		-0.00211 (0.0271)		-0.00300 (0.0273)
Democrat		-0.300 (0.211)		-0.247 (0.218)
Republican		-0.544** (0.216)		-0.529** (0.219)
Citizen of the world			-0.211 (0.157)	-0.308* (0.165)
US involvement			0.103 (0.182)	0.232 (0.193)
Immigration support			-0.658*** (0.160)	-0.496*** (0.166)
/cut1	-1.156*** (0.165)	-1.906*** (0.314)	-1.561*** (0.200)	-2.160*** (0.326)
/cut2	0.146 (0.157)	-0.563* (0.305)	-0.227 (0.189)	-0.796** (0.315)
Observations	625	625	625	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

It is apparent from the regression results that the public does not seem to differentiate aid in general from economic or humanitarian aid. However, the estimated coefficient for military aid remains positive and grows in significance throughout each model. Thus, the data suggests that military assistance elicits greater support for aid to democratic countries as opposed to less democratic countries. The democratic preference for military aid may imply that the public prioritizes giving military aid to countries that they perceive to be like their own: substantive democracies.

Two demographic variables impact an individual's perception of where aid should be distributed. The more educated an individual is, the higher their tendency is to support democratizing or non-democratic countries as opposed to democratic countries. One

factor that may contribute to this result is that people who are more educated are more likely to be informed on foreign policy topics, including foreign aid. Thus, they may be more informed on the intent of foreign aid to help developing countries—which tend to be non-substantive democracies, democratizing, or non-democratic (Hariss-White & White 1996)—rather than developed, democratic countries.

More surprisingly, though, the coefficient for those who identify as Republicans is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that Republicans are more likely to prioritize distributing aid to democratizing or non-democratic countries. The reason this pattern occurs may not be intuitive, but it may suggest that Republicans prioritize giving foreign aid to countries for reasons other than a regime's institutions or corruption-related factors. Examples of other motives include creating new export markets, securing strongholds in developing regions, or believing aid will lead to gradual regime change. On the other hand, this estimate may just be an anomaly¹¹.

The only attitudinal variable that is statistically significant at the level of $p < .05$ is support for legal immigration. Those who support legal immigration are more likely to support providing aid to democratizing and non-democratic countries. Although one would expect the estimate of the coefficient for support of legal immigration to be

¹¹ To confirm that the results were not drastically distorted by omitted variable bias I estimated the third model of the ordered regressions, but excluded the variable for Democratic party identification, or *Democrat_i*. Interestingly, the estimate for the *Republican_i* coefficient moved from $\beta = -0.544$ with a p-value of .016 to $\beta = -0.377$ with a p-value of .028. Within the latter estimate, the coefficients for the other independent variables did not significantly change. This may suggest that the model is not accounting for a certain attribute of Republicans, but between these particular ordered logistic regression models, neither did the direction nor the level of significance for the Republican variable change. Consequently, the implications of the Republican variable estimate in the original model are muddled.

correlated with partisan divisions, a cross-tabulation of the variable according to party identification suggests otherwise: 54.3% of Republicans, but only 51.1% of Democrats, said they supported legal immigration. Regardless, the impact of legal immigration may be an indication that those who support it are more sympathetic towards residents of countries that generate immigrants, which tend to be democratizing and non-democratic countries. If this is the explanation for the observed results, it would also confirm that altruism plays a significant role in determining the public's opinion of where foreign aid should be distributed.

Proxy for Aid Favorability

The main models have operated under the assumption that foreign aid must be distributed to a recipient country with no regard to whether foreign aid, in the general sense, is actually favored by the public or not. Due to the international norm that developed countries should donate at least .7% of their GNP, in combination with the fact that the average aid donation of developed countries is only .3% of their GNPs while the U.S. only donates .2% of their GNP (Ingram 2019), it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. foreign aid budget is not going to be eliminated or significantly decreased in the near future.

However, to account for the shortfall in the original model, I run a fourth ordered logistic regression. The model adds *DecreaseAid_i* to the theoretical regression equation (Equation 8). It is a dummy variable used to indicate that the respondent does

not support foreign aid with a (1) and that the respondent is either indifferent towards or supportive of foreign aid with a (0)¹².

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RegimePrioritization}_i = & \beta_1 \text{EconomicAid}(V2)_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{HumanitarianAid}(V3)_i + \beta_3 \text{MilitaryAid}(V4)_i + \beta_4 \text{Minority}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Female}_i + \beta_6 \text{EducationLevel}_i + \beta_7 \text{HouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \\ & \beta_8 \text{Democrat}_i + \beta_9 \text{Republican}_i + \beta_{10} \text{CitizenoftheWorld}_i + \\ & \beta_{11} \text{USInvolvement}_i + \beta_{12} \text{ImmigrationSupport}_i + \beta_{13} \text{DecreaseAid}_i + \\ & \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

The results for the Aid Support Proxy specification that includes the variable *DecreaseAid_i* are presented in Table 8:

¹² The data for the *DecreaseAid_i* variable comes from another experimental foreign aid question within the same Qualtrics survey. The four variations of this other experimental question were randomly assigned to the respondents, with each question receiving approximately the same number of responses. The control version of the question reads: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates \$40 billion to foreign aid. Should foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?” The variations of this control question are as follows:

- Version 2: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates \$40 billion to foreign aid, most of which goes to peace and security, health, and humanitarian assistance. Should foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?”
- Version 3: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates \$40 billion to foreign aid. This constitutes approximately 1 percent of the federal budget. Should foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?”
- Version 4: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates \$40 billion to foreign aid, most of which goes to peace and security, health, and humanitarian assistance. This constitutes approximately 1 percent of the federal budget. Should foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?”

The answer choices available to the respondents were consistent throughout each version: aid should be “decreased,” “stay about the same,” or “increased.” For the *DecreaseAid_i* variable used in the fourth ordered logistic regression model, the respondents who responded “decreased,” regardless of the version of this question received, were coded as a (1). Responses of “stay about the same” and “increased” were coded as (0).

Table 8: Aid Support Proxy Regression Results

VARIABLES	Aid Favorability Proxy Regime Prioritization
Economic aid (V2)	0.325 (0.221)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.307 (0.223)
Military aid (V4)	0.598*** (0.226)
Minority	0.196 (0.209)
Female	0.216 (0.167)
Education level	-0.138** (0.0614)
Household income level	-0.00557 (0.0273)
Democrat	-0.234 (0.219)
Republican	-0.500** (0.220)
Citizen of the world	-0.286* (0.166)
U.S. involvement	0.244 (0.193)
Immigration support	-0.488*** (0.166)
Decrease aid	0.321* (0.168)
/cut1	-2.050*** (0.331)
/cut2	-0.680** (0.322)
Observations	625
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

The results from this model indicate that the variable intended to capture the effects of aversion to foreign aid has a very small impact and is not significant at the $p<0.05$ level. The coefficients for the independent variables from the third regression model have not considerably changed, and the variables that demonstrated to have a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable hold the same level of significance in the fourth model. Overall, the results suggest that the public's general support for foreign aid does not significantly impact their opinion on which types of countries should receive foreign aid.

Interaction Variable Models

The main models have also operated under the assumption that the independent variables do not interact with each other to influence individuals' support for foreign aid. To test for interactions between independent variables, 9 additional ordered logistic regression models were created. Each control variable— *Minority_i*, *Female_i*, *EducationLevel_i*, *HouseholdIncomeLevel_i*, *Democrat_i* and *Republican_i*, *CitizenoftheWorld_i*, *USInvolvement_i*, *ImmigrationSupport_i*, and *DecreaseAid_i*—were multiplied by each version of aid and added to the original and aid proxy models. The general regression model for the first eight interaction terms is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RegimePrioritization}_i = & \beta_1 \text{EconomicAid}(V2)_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{HumanitarianAid}(V3)_i + \beta_3 \text{MilitaryAid}(V4)_i + \beta_4 \text{Minority}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Female}_i + \beta_6 \text{EducationLevel}_i + \beta_7 \text{HouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \\ & \beta_8 \text{Democrat}_i + \beta_9 \text{Republican}_i + \beta_{10} \text{CitizenoftheWorld}_i + \\ & \beta_{11} \text{USInvolvement}_i + \beta_{12} \text{ImmigrationSupport}_i + \\ & \beta_{13} \text{Interactedvariable} * \text{EconomicAid}_i + \beta_{14} \text{Interactedvariable} * \\ & \text{HumanitarianAid}_i + \beta_{15} \text{Interactedvariable} * \text{MilitaryAid}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (10) \end{aligned}$$

The regression model for *DecreaseAid_i* is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RegimePrioritization}_i = & \beta_1 \text{EconomicAid}(V2)_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{HumanitarianAid}(V3)_i + \beta_3 \text{MilitaryAid}(V4)_i + \beta_4 \text{Minority}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{Female}_i + \beta_6 \text{EducationLevel}_i + \beta_7 \text{HouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \\ & \beta_8 \text{Democrat}_i + \beta_9 \text{Republican}_i + \beta_{10} \text{CitizenoftheWorld}_i + \\ & \beta_{11} \text{USInvolvement}_i + \beta_{12} \text{ImmigrationSupport}_i + \beta_{13} \text{DecreaseAid}_i + \\ & \beta_{14} \text{DecreaseAid} * \text{EconomicAid}_i + \beta_{15} \text{DecreaseAid} * \\ & \text{HumanitarianAid}_i + \beta_{16} \text{DecreaseAid} * \text{MilitaryAid}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (11) \end{aligned}$$

The only interaction model to report statistically significant results was *CitizenoftheWorld_i*. This model will be discussed in length in this section while the rest of the models can be viewed in the Appendix of this thesis. The results table modeling the interaction variables for *CitizenoftheWorld_i* is as follows in Table 9:

Table 9: Citizen of the World Interaction Regression Results

VARIABLES	Citizen of the World Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.326 (0.318)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	-0.186 (0.310)
Military aid (V4)	0.536* (0.320)
Minority	0.161 (0.210)
Female	0.226 (0.168)
Education level	-0.131** (0.0616)
Household income level	-0.00345 (0.0274)
Democrat	-0.260 (0.218)
Republican	-0.534** (0.219)
Citizen of the world	-0.617* (0.322)
US involvement	0.247 (0.193)
Immigration support	-0.508*** (0.166)
Citizen x economic aid	0.0701 (0.444)
Citizen x humanitarian aid	0.990** (0.444)
Citizen x military aid	0.179 (0.447)
/cut1	-2.305*** (0.353)
/cut2	-0.929*** (0.342)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results indicate that the interaction term between those who identify as a “citizen of the world” and the variable for humanitarian aid have a statistically significant effect on regime prioritization, tending towards democracies, at the $p<.05$ level. This differs from the original citizen of the world variable, as seen in both Table 9 and Table 7, which was negative and not significant at the $p<.05$ level. In other words, identifying as a citizen of the world is associated with a higher propensity to prioritize giving humanitarian aid to more democratic countries. This is a surprising development considering that the citizen of the world variable generated a negative coefficient estimate in the original theoretical model. This may suggest that identifying as a world citizen is

associated with altruistic tendencies surrounding the idea of providing humanitarian aid, as well as democratic sentiments that shape the idea of being a citizen of the world. Perhaps there are democratic elements of world citizenship, or the “world” is confined, consciously or not, to democratic countries. Nonetheless, the altruistic tendencies that compel individuals to assist their community may also advance their disposition to provide humanitarian aid to democratic countries.

Interestingly, the variable for the military aid version of the question is no longer significant at the $p < .05$ level. This suggests that accounting for the interaction between the signaling of humanitarian aid and being a citizen of the world has a more significant effect on regime prioritization than the signaling of military aid alone as in the previous models. Further investigation into the relationship between identifying as a citizen of the world and humanitarian aid may provide more insight as to why this is the case, but that discussion is outside of the scope of this paper.

Post-Estimation Results

Marginal effects models were run to more accurately pinpoint the magnitude of the specifications identified in the third regression model (Equation 3). The columns in Table 4 indicate which version of the experimental question is being analyzed for the marginal effects specification. The rows in the table are the answer choices for the experimental question that were specified in the Data & Methods section of this paper. The cells contain the probability that each answer choice is predicted by Equation 3 for each version of the question while simultaneously holding the other independent variables in the model at their means. Thus, a total of 12 marginal effects models were estimated:

Table 10: Marginal Effects Model for Regression Equation 8

	Control (V1)	Economic Aid (V2)	Humanitarian Aid (V3)	Military Aid (V4)
Non-democratic	0.240	0.184	0.188	0.146
Democratizing	0.313	0.285	0.287	0.255
Democratic	0.448	0.532	0.525	0.599

The results from Table 10 illustrate a similar story as the results from Table 7 but also provides further insight on the framing of the experimental question and each of its variations, thus containing significant policy framing implications that will be discussed in the Conclusion section of this thesis. The probability that the control (V1) version of the question would predict prioritizing aid for democracies, based on the respondents' answers, is not drastically different from the probabilities of predicting democracies in the economic (V2) and humanitarian (V3) aid questions. In fact, the probabilities that the regression model would predict prioritizing aid to democratizing or non-democratic countries did not vary considerably between the control (V1) version and the economic (V2) and humanitarian (V3) aid versions.

However, the probability that the model would predict prioritizing aid to democracies jumps from .448 in the control (V1) version of the question to .599 in the military aid (V4) version. Conversely, the probability that the model would predict aid should be prioritized to non-democratic countries decreases by almost .1 from the control (V1) version to the military aid (V4) version of the question. This suggests that the framing of the question increases a respondent's propensity to prioritize military aid to democratic countries as opposed to democratizing or non-democratic countries.

There are two plausible explanations for this finding. One is that respondents, who may be inclined to prioritize aid to countries like their own, may have a flawed

perception of what characterizes “democratic” regimes. They may think that military aid should go to fully consolidated, or substantive, democracies that have institutional characteristics similar to the United States (i.e. the United Kingdom or France), perhaps relating to the concept of corruption fatigue; the public does not want military aid to be distributed to a “corrupt” country where 1) there is low government efficiency, or 2) the aid has potential to be abused. However, countries that have democracies that are not fully consolidated, or are procedural, are still democracies in the technical sense. Public perceptions of corruption in procedural democracies may be higher due to differences in how the public views corruption in such democracies as opposed to how they view it in substantive democracies. Consequently, they equate the former as being either “democratizing” or “non-democratic” in the context of this survey.

The second explanation is that the public has a flawed perception of what military aid constitutes. According to USAID, military aid is not just limited to “assistance to foreign governments’ armed forces for purposes such as internal security [and] legitimate self-defense,” but also includes assistance with peace and diplomatic efforts (U.S. Agency for International Development 2021). There may be a tendency to associate military aid as just consisting of the former, arguably broader and more sensitive, component, which ultimately reinforces the propensity to provide military aid to democracies similar to the U.S. Despite the premises that the public may base their opinion of military aid on, the results are still politically significant. Public opinion is considered for policymaking in democratic donor countries, including in foreign aid policy (Mosley 1985). However, there is a larger irony here: many consolidated, stable democracies already possess a greater ability to provide for their own defense.

SOUTH KOREA PUBLIC OPINION 2020: EFFECTS OF POLICY INFORMATION ON SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN AID TO NORTH KOREA

Data and Methodology

This analysis relies on data from a survey distributed in South Korea by Macromill Embrain in September 2020, which obtained 1201 respondents. Summary statistics for this data can be viewed in Table 11 below:

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics from Macromill Embrain September 2020 Public Opinion Survey

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>AidSupport_i</i>	1201	.2456	.4306	0	1
<i>Control(V1)_i</i>	1201	.3322	.4712	0	1
<i>DollarAmount(V2)_i</i>	1201	.3339	.4718	0	1
<i>DollarAmount%(V3)_i</i>	1201	.3331	.4715	0	1
<i>Female_i</i>	1201	.4938	.5002	0	1
<i>EducationLevel_i</i>	1200	3.7367	1.1015	1	6
<i>MonthlyHouseholdIncomeLevel_i</i>	1200	4.8642	2.0589	1	9
<i>Progressive_i</i>	1200	.3817	.4860	0	1
<i>Conservative_i</i>	1200	.1950	.3964	0	1
<i>DemocraticParty_i</i>	1201	.4505	.4977	0	1
<i>UnitedFutureParty_i</i>	1201	.1232	.3288	0	1
<i>JusticeParty_i</i>	1201	.0674	.2509	0	1
<i>TrustinOthers_i</i>	1200	1.5092	.7508	1	3
<i>CurrentRelations_i</i>	1200	2.2842	.8986	1	5
<i>UnificationSupport_i</i>	1200	3.1742	1.1860	1	5
<i>NuclearConcern_i</i>	1200	3.7367	.9236	1	5
<i>MilitaryConcern_i</i>	1200	6.0308	2.2743	1	10

Within the survey, an experimental question asking respondents' opinion of increasing aid to North Korea, with varying information about costs of aid, was asked:

**Figure 5: Experimental Question Design from Macromill Embrain September 2020
Public Opinion**

Version 1: Do you think South Korea should give more humanitarian aid to North Korea than they are giving now?

Version 2: South Korea has allocated approximately \$5.7 million (680 billion won) for humanitarian aid to North Korea for 2020. Do you think South Korea should give more humanitarian aid to North Korea than they are giving now?

Version 3: South Korea has approximately \$5.7 million (680 billion won) for humanitarian aid to North Korea for 2020. This comprises less than one-tenth of one percent of the national budget. Do you think South Korea should give more humanitarian aid to North Korea than they are giving now?

Respondents could either respond “no” or “yes” to one of the three versions of the question that were equally distributed among them. Respondents’ answer to this question serves to gauge support for distributing humanitarian aid to North Korea, which is the dependent variable for this study. The survey also asks respondents a variety of demographic and attitudinal questions that are useful for examining predictors of public opinion on providing aid to North Korea. To analyze the effect of framing foreign aid policy in this manner, I ran 4 ordered logistic regression models. The hypothesis for this analysis is that, compared to the control version of the question, support for providing humanitarian aid will decrease when respondents are only provided with the dollar amount of aid allocated to North Korea, but will increase when respondents are also provided with the percentage of the national budget equivalent to the dollar amount.

The first model in Equation 12 serves as a benchmark model and only considers the version of the experimental question asked, or in other words, how policy information was framed to respondents. ***AidSupport_i*** is coded as a dummy variable with a (0) indicating “no” and a (1) indicating “yes.” ***DollarAmount(V2)_i*** and

DollarAmount_{%(V3)_{*i*}} are dummy variables coded with a (0) to indicate that the respondent did not receive that version of the experimental question and with a (1) to indicate that the respondent received either version. Thus, the control version of the question, or version 1, serves as the baseline for regression analysis of the experimental survey question.

$$\mathbf{AidSupport}_i = \beta_1 \mathbf{DollarAmount}(V2)_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{DollarAmount}\%(V3)_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (12)$$

The second model presented in Equation 13 incorporates demographic and identity factors. ***Female***_{*i*} is coded into a dummy variable, with a (0) indicating a male and (1) indicating a female. Similarly, the variables ***DemocraticParty***_{*i*}, ***UnitedFutureParty***_{*i*}, and ***JusticeParty***_{*i*} are dummy variables for South Korean political parties, indicating the respondents' party identification with a (1) and lack thereof with a (0). ***EducationLevel***_{*i*} is a categorical variable with the coding: (1) under high school, (2) high school graduated, (3) attending college, (4) college graduated, (5) graduate school without completion, and (6) completed graduate school.

MonthlyHouseholdIncomeLevel_{*i*} is coded into quintiles. The variables for ***Progressive***_{*i*} and ***Conservative***_{*i*} ideologies are dummy variables coded with a (0) to indicate that the respondent does not align with either the liberal or the conservative ideology, and a (1) to indicate that the respondent is either slightly, moderately, or extremely aligned with either the conservative or liberal ideology. The baseline for both ideology dummy variables is identifying as ideologically moderate.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{AidSupport}_i = & \beta_1 \mathbf{DollarAmount}(V2)_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{DollarAmount}\%(V3)_i + \\ & \beta_3 \mathbf{Female}_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{EducationLevel}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \mathbf{MonthlyHouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \beta_6 \mathbf{Progressive}_i + \\ & \beta_7 \mathbf{Conservative}_i + \beta_8 \mathbf{DemocraticParty}_i + \beta_9 \mathbf{UnitedFutureParty}_i + \\ & \beta_{10} \mathbf{JusticeParty}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

The third regression model presented in Equation 14 controls for attitudes associated with perceptions of the north and of foreign aid more generally. The ***NuclearConcern_i*** and ***UnificationSupport_i*** variables, which ask respondents to rate their concern for North Korea's nuclear weapons program and whether they support unification, are coded on a likert scale of (1) "strongly disagree" and (5) "strongly agree." To measure generalized trust (Burcu 2017), respondents were asked "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Responses are provided by the ***TrustinOthers_i*** variable, an ordinal variable coded to signal progressively higher levels of trust, thus following the coding of (1) "Can't be too careful," (2) "It depends," and (3) "Most people can be trusted." ***MilitaryConcern_i*** asked respondents to rate how concerned they were that North Korea would use military force against South Korea on a scale of (1), indicating "not concerned at all," to (10), indicating "very concerned." The variable ***CurrentRelations_i*** gauges respondents' perceptions of relations between North Korea and South Korea with the following coding: (1) Very negative, (2) Negative, (3) Neither negative nor positive, (4) Positive, and (5) Very positive.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{AidSupport}_i = & \beta_1 \text{DollarAmount}(V2)_i + \beta_2 \text{DollarAmount}\%(V3)_i + \\ & \beta_3 \text{TrustinOthers}_i + \beta_4 \text{CurrentRelations}_i + \beta_5 \text{UnificationSupport}_i + \\ & \beta_6 \text{NuclearConcern}_i + \beta_7 \text{MilitaryConcern}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

The final model, below in Equation 15, combines all independent variables included in the regression models presented in Equations 12, 13, and 14. Thus, Equation 15 serves as the primary theoretical models for this chapter of the thesis.


$$\begin{aligned} \text{AidSupport}_i = & \beta_1 \text{DollarAmount}(V2)_i + \beta_2 \text{DollarAmount}\%(V3)_i + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Female}_i + \beta_4 \text{EducationLevel}_i + \\ & \beta_5 \text{MonthlyHouseholdIncomeLevel}_i + \beta_6 \text{Progressive}_i + \\ & \beta_7 \text{Conservative}_i + \beta_8 \text{DemocraticParty}_i + \beta_9 \text{UnitedFutureParty}_i + \end{aligned}$$

$$\beta_{10}JusticeParty_i + \beta_{11}TrustinOthers_i + \beta_{12}CurrentRelations_i + \beta_{13}UnificationSupport_i + \beta_{14}NuclearConcern_i + \beta_{15}MilitaryConcern_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (15)$$

Results

First, I ran a distribution of “yes” responses to determine what percentage of respondents supported increasing humanitarian aid based on the version of the question they received. It is important to note that South Korea only provides humanitarian aid due to multilateral sanctions placed on North Korea. Thus, analysis of the experimental question only focuses on public support for providing humanitarian aid to North Korea and how framing the context with varying amounts of information affect that support. The results are displayed below in Figure 6:

Figure 6: Distribution of Responses Support for Humanitarian Aid to North Korea



Without receiving any information about aid allocation, only 26.8% of respondents supported giving more aid to North Korea. When only receiving the information that South Korea allocated \$5.7 million (670 billion won) to humanitarian for

North Korea, support decreases to 22.69%. When additionally receiving the information that the dollar amount comprises less than one-tenth of one percent of the national budget, support slightly increased to 24.25%. From the sample statistics, it is evident that the information received in the second and third versions of the experimental question were associated with only slightly differing levels of support for aid. This may be the case because other factors play a larger role in determining support, especially considering \$5.7 million won is not a lot of money in a government spending context

The results for the ordered logistic regression models can be viewed below in Table 12:

Table 12: Ordered Logistic Regression Results

VARIABLES	Information Aid Support	Demographics Aid Support	Attitudes Aid Support	Comprehensive Aid Support
Dollar amount (V2)	-0.218 (0.164)	-0.336* (0.177)	-0.271 (0.188)	-0.355* (0.194)
Dollar amount & % (V3)	-0.132 (0.162)	-0.163 (0.175)	-0.173 (0.187)	-0.191 (0.195)
Female		-0.854*** (0.149)		-0.741*** (0.166)
Education level		-0.00981 (0.0681)		-0.0374 (0.0747)
Monthly household income level		0.0410 (0.0365)		0.0527 (0.0401)
Progressive		0.753*** (0.163)		0.435** (0.180)
Conservative		-0.0332 (0.251)		0.109 (0.278)
Democratic party		1.107*** (0.177)		0.830*** (0.196)
United Future party		-0.646* (0.363)		-0.310 (0.391)
Justice party		1.076*** (0.288)		0.920*** (0.316)
Trust in others			0.129 (0.137)	0.104 (0.141)
Current relations			0.485*** (0.0955)	0.439*** (0.101)
Unification support			0.660*** (0.0830)	0.519*** (0.0870)
Nuclear concern			-0.0515 (0.0943)	-0.0392 (0.0982)
Military concern			-0.245*** (0.0394)	-0.234*** (0.0406)
/cut1	1.007*** (0.113)	1.681*** (0.332)	3.127*** (0.529)	3.029*** (0.613)
Observations	1,201	1,200	1,200	1,200

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The ordered logistic regressions indicate that support for aid to North Korea is not sensitive to policy framing surrounding allocative costs¹³. This outcome reflects the results from the distribution of responses in Figure 6, which also found that there are not significant differences between providing the dollar amount or providing the dollar amount and budget-percentage. These findings suggest that public support for aid is

¹³ Because the ordered logistic regression did not yield significant results for the question version variables I did not run marginal effects models, for the insignificance of these variables have made such post-estimation models moot.

driven by other factors more than policy framing or lack of information regarding the allocation of aid to North Korea.

A few demographic factors influence an individual's support for providing further humanitarian aid to North Korea. Despite previous findings that women are more likely to support foreign aid than men, the regression estimates indicate that women are significantly less likely to support aid to North Korea. While the rationale for this occurrence is unclear, it may be attributed to unobserved cultural and political dynamics that are particular to South Korea. Unsurprisingly, possessing a progressive ideology makes an individual more likely to support providing further aid to the north, which echoes previous findings that individuals with left-leaning views are more likely to support foreign aid in general. Following the same logic, identifying as a member of either the Democratic or Justice parties also predispose individuals to be more supportive of distributing aid to North Korea. This result was expected considering that the Justice Party is the most left-leaning party in South Korea and that the Democratic Party is center-left.

The most interesting findings are offered by the attitudinal variables that predict support. The variables with highly significant coefficient estimates pertain to perceptions of North Korea and inter-Korean relations. Increasingly positive views toward current relations with North Korea and increasing levels of support for unification are associated with growing support for providing North Korea with more humanitarian aid. This also suggests negative views toward inter-Korean relations, perhaps due to North Korean belligerence or perceptions of its corruption, are associated with decreased support for providing aid. The positive correlation between evaluations of relations and support for

aid is consistent with previous findings that suggest support is contingent upon perceptions of North Korea as either a threat, resulting in decreased support, or perceptions of it as a bretheren nation. Likewise, support for unification may be closely tied to attitudes toward North Korea, as well as with the potential that such aid has to overcome developmental challenges posed by the north should unification occur. More simply, those who are more supportive of unification may view humanitarian aid as an investment towards unification. On the other hand, concerns that North Korea poses a military threat to South Korea is negatively correlated with support for aid. Again, this finding is consistent with previous literature that has established the relationship between perceptions of security threats posed by North Korea and a decline in support for giving it aid. Overall, the regression results suggest that policy framing surrounding information about allocative costs does not significantly influence support for providing humanitarian aid to North Korea. However, policy framing surrounding relations with North Korea might. The implications of this finding will be addressed in the Conclusion section of this thesis.¹⁴

¹⁴ Although not included in this paper, I also generated interaction variables between each of the demographic and attitudinal variables with each version of the question and ran additional ordered logistic regression models to test for significant interaction terms. For each regression, I included all of the variables modeled in Equation 15 with the addition of the chosen independent variable interacted with the dummy variable for the second version of the experimental question and the same chosen independent variable interacted with the dummy variable for the third version of the question. However, none of the models produced significant results. This suggests that the comprehensive model presented in Equation 15 is sufficient as-is.

CONCLUSION

Summary

To recap the quantitative findings of this thesis, three public opinion surveys were conducted to examine the effects of policy framing and perceptions of recipient countries on public support for aid in democratic donor countries, particularly the United States and South Korea. Although several broad conclusions can be drawn from the findings of the public opinion surveys, I will first summarize the main findings of each survey's analysis.

First, the Amazon mTurk survey conducted in the U.S. in June 2020 examined the effects of framing regarding type of aid and type of recipient regime. Through ordered logistic regression and marginal effects analysis, I found that in the context of economic aid signalling that the recipient country is non-democratic has a negative, significant effect on public support for distributing aid. This finding may be the product of perceptions, however misconstrued, that economic aid is discretionary in nature and that non-democratic regimes, associated with higher levels of corruption, may abuse or misuse the aid. On the other hand, type of recipient regime has no significant effect on support for humanitarian aid, perhaps due to altruistic tendencies and a moral obligation to provide aid to those in need. The marginal effects results also indicate that perceptions of democratizing regimes, compared to non-democratic regimes, illicit positive perceptions that make Americans twice as likely to support giving economic aid. Interestingly, there was no difference in the demographic and attitudinal predictors of aid

support between the two types of aid. This consistency further confirms that public support for foreign aid is sensitive to policy framing.

Second, the Qualtrics survey conducted in the U.S. in June 2021 examined the effects of policy framing regarding type of aid on where the public thinks aid should go, or regime prioritization. Through ordered logistic regression and marginal effects analysis, I found that in the context of military aid the public prefers to give aid to democratic countries over less-democratic ones. Like the conclusion drawn about economic aid in the June 2020 survey, this may be due to perceptions, albeit not accurate, of military aid as potentially arming non-democratic, or corrupt, regimes that may abuse or misuse the aid. An additional robustness check, which examined the effects of general support for aid on regime prioritization, found that the latter is not affected by the former. This may suggest that policy framing intended to influence the types of regimes the public supports aid going to can have a significant effect on support regardless of the public's attitude towards aid in general.

Finally, the survey conducted by Macromill Embrain in September 2020 examined the effects of policy framing regarding information about allocative costs on South Korean support for providing aid to North Korea. Interestingly, according to ordered logistic regression analysis, providing any information about costs does not have a significant effect on support. Beyond expected factors that may predict an individual's support for providing aid to North Korea, namely possessing a progressive ideology, certain attitudes towards the north have highly significant impacts. Increasingly positive attitudes towards North Korea, particularly perceptions of relations between the north and the south and support for unification, are associated with increased support for aid.

Contrastingly, increasingly negative attitudes toward North Korea, or concerns that North Korea poses a military threat, are associated with decreased support for providing it with humanitarian aid. These findings are consistent with previous literature that suggest support for providing aid to North Korea is contingent upon perceptions of the country. More specifically, support for aid declines following the country's belligerent actions.

Conclusions from Cross-National Comparison and Directions for Future Research

A few overarching conclusions can be made about public opinion in democratic countries through comparison of the main findings. Perhaps most obviously, public support for aid and preferences to whom it should go are influenced by policy framing surrounding type of aid and perceptions of recipient countries or regimes. Future surveys could consider how interactions between different types of policy framing, including informative context, interact to influence support for aid or regime prioritization. Another comparison that can be made between the surveys is that progressive individuals are consistently inclined to be more supportive of foreign aid. Due to a lack of resources and the different types of relationships I examined, I did not control for the same attitudes across each survey. Thus, I cannot draw a general conclusion about the attitudes held by individuals in democratic donor countries that would predispose them to favor aid. More importantly, and for the same reasons, I cannot draw a broadly applicable conclusion concerning *which* methods of policy framing are most effective on publics in democratic donor countries. However, it may be safe to infer that the most effective methods of policy framing are dependent upon the context in which aid is being considered. Examples of different contexts include political attitudes dependent on social and cultural factors of donor countries, specific recipient countries, and international events.

Although my rationales on perceptions of recipient regimes are based on literature regarding corruption fatigue (Bauhr et. al 2013) and literature establishing a correlation between regime and corruption, how the public perceives corruption and its association with regime is not clear from the data because the relationship is never explicitly drawn. Future surveys could enhance the robustness of my conclusions by implementing questions that gauge respondents' associations between type of regime and perceptions of corruption. Even further, surveys could combine elements of dichotomous and open-ended questions that would link this association directly to attitudes toward foreign aid.

Policy Implications

The findings from my thesis have significant implications for the realm of foreign aid policy. Overall, it is evident that policy framing has a significant effect on public support for aid and regime prioritization. However, framing methods that have significant effects on public attitudes toward foreign aid may differ between countries and social and political contexts. Thus, I will address policy implications in-depth for the United States and for South Korean aid to North Korea.

For the United States, President Biden intends to bring foreign aid back to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy, which heavily contrasts from President Trump's "America First" approach to foreign policy (Whitehouse.gov 2021; Kull 2017). From what the administration has outlined in its Discretionary Request for fiscal year 2022, military aid will primarily be distributed to democratizing and non-democratic regimes to counter authoritarian threats, particularly those posed by Russian and Chinese influence in the developing world. Additionally, aid will be directed towards Central America to curb endemic corruption, and to the Middle East for peace and security purposes

regarding the Israel and Palestine conflict (Office of Management & Budget 2021). Thus, foreign assistance efforts proposed by the Biden administration are likely to be met with public opposition. However, there are a few ways in which the oval office can frame foreign aid policy to increase public support for these initiatives.

The first, and most important, manner in which the administration should frame their policy is by explicitly connecting the issues they are attempting to alleviate abroad with domestic issues such as domestic security. By appealing to the majority of Americans' preference for addressing domestic over international issues, the public may be more forgiving about the types of countries the military aid is going to. This outcome can also be achieved by downplaying the costs of these aid efforts considering the public prefers domestic over international spending. By discussing the costs of military aid in the context of the foreign aid budget, and then in the context of the federal budget more generally, the public may realize that the administration's plans for aid are relatively low-cost. Another way that the administration can acquire more public support is by framing policy in a manner that emphasizes the heavy, on-ground involvement of military aid. This strategy appeals to how Americans are more supportive of foreign aid when it is stated in a mission-specific manner while simultaneously countering decreased support caused by perceptions of corruption in any of the recipient countries. Generally, the administration should be more informative of their intentions with foreign aid, and define different types of aid, to dispel the widespread notion that foreign aid is ineffective.

For South Korea, these findings have significant implications for engagement with North Korea. The factors identified in this paper can help policymakers in the Ministry of Unification frame aid policy in terms that would increase public support for

giving humanitarian aid to the north. More specifically, instead of emphasizing the budget allocated for aid, they should go this initiative by framing current relations with the north in a positive light. They should also emphasize themes of reunification, overcoming developmental challenges posed by North Korea if reunification was to occur, and outcomes of Korean prosperity. This strategy entails that security threats posed by North Korea need to be downplayed to 1) address possible corruption fatigue, and 2) make themes of unification and prosperity seem more attainable. However, this is easier said than done, especially considering the recent hike in North Korean weapons testing, the low-issue salience of engagement with North Korea, and even lower salience of providing it with bilateral aid.

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APPENDIX: INTERACTION VARIABLE MODELS

Table 13: Minority Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Minority Interactions
Economic aid (V2)	0.386 (0.247)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.346 (0.243)
Military aid (V4)	0.686*** (0.248)
Minority	0.419 (0.431)
Female	0.213 (0.167)
Education Level	-0.137** (0.0616)
Household income level	-0.00299 (0.0273)
Democrat	-0.256 (0.219)
Republican	-0.530** (0.219)
Citizen of the world	-0.312* (0.166)
US involvement	0.231 (0.193)
Immigration support	-0.496*** (0.167)
Minority x economic aid	-0.282 (0.564)
Minority x humanitarian aid	-0.209 (0.610)
Minority x military aid	-0.431 (0.585)
/cut1	-2.132*** (0.329)
/cut2	-0.767** (0.319)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: Education Level Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Education Level Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.661 (0.540)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.0702 (0.557)
Military aid (V4)	0.673 (0.577)
Minority	0.186 (0.208)
Female	0.224 (0.167)
Education level	-0.124 (0.105)
Household income level	-0.00311 (0.0273)
Democrat	-0.250 (0.218)
Republican	-0.530** (0.219)
Citizen of the world	-0.300* (0.166)
US involvement	0.232 (0.193)
Immigration support	-0.486*** (0.166)
Economic aid x education level	-0.0908 (0.139)
Humanitarian aid x education level	0.0619 (0.141)
Military aid x education level	-0.0176 (0.141)
/cut1	-2.107*** (0.434)
/cut2	-0.741* (0.426)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15: Female Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Female Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.537* (0.315)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.473 (0.311)
Military aid (V4)	0.705** (0.315)
Minority	0.174 (0.208)
Female	0.446 (0.319)
Education level	-0.136** (0.0614)
Household income level	-0.00426 (0.0275)
Democrat	-0.238 (0.218)
Republican	-0.530** (0.219)
Citizen of the world	-0.310* (0.166)
US Involvement	0.224 (0.193)
Immigration support	-0.481*** (0.166)
Female x economic aid	-0.396 (0.441)
Female x humanitarian aid	-0.329 (0.447)
Female x military aid	-0.177 (0.446)
/cut1	-2.042*** (0.352)
/cut2	-0.676** (0.344)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16: Household Income Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Household Income Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.832* (0.427)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.332 (0.439)
Military aid (V4)	0.862** (0.424)
Minority	0.194 (0.209)
Female	0.223 (0.168)
Education level	-0.137** (0.0613)
Household income level	0.0292 (0.0451)
Democrat	-0.234 (0.220)
Republican	-0.528** (0.219)
Citizen of the world	-0.307* (0.166)
US involvement	0.233 (0.193)
Immigration support	-0.497*** (0.166)
Household income x economic aid	-0.0848 (0.0618)
Household income x humanitarian aid	-0.00421 (0.0624)
Household income x military aid	-0.0422 (0.0617)
/cut1	-1.961*** (0.381)
/cut2	-0.593 (0.373)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17: Party ID Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Party ID Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.881* (0.482)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.763 (0.484)
Military aid (V4)	0.690 (0.494)
Minority	0.178 (0.210)
Female	0.226 (0.168)
Education level	-0.135** (0.0616)
Household Income level	-0.00358 (0.0275)
Democrat	0.0214 (0.423)
Republican	-0.0961 (0.419)
Citizen of the world	-0.301* (0.167)
US involvement	0.210 (0.195)
Immigration support	-0.484*** (0.167)
Democrat x economic aid	-0.775 (0.588)
Republican x economic aid	-0.559 (0.602)
Democrat x humanitarian aid	-0.310 (0.595)
Republican x humanitarian aid	-0.891 (0.604)
Democrat x military aid	0.0610 (0.603)
Republican x military aid	-0.284 (0.604)
/cut1	-1.881*** (0.408)
/cut2	-0.507 (0.401)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18: U.S. Involvement Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	US Involvement Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.371 (0.255)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.151 (0.259)
Military aid (V4)	0.614** (0.266)
Minority	0.175 (0.208)
Female	0.215 (0.167)
Education level	-0.134** (0.0614)
Household income level	-0.00498 (0.0273)
Democrat	-0.251 (0.218)
Republican	-0.506** (0.220)
Citizen of the world	-0.294* (0.166)
US involvement	0.125 (0.367)
Immigration support	-0.493*** (0.166)
US involvement x economic aid	-0.160 (0.509)
US involvement x humanitarian aid	0.594 (0.505)
US involvement x military aid	-0.00423 (0.490)
/cut1	-2.181*** (0.337)
/cut2	-0.813** (0.326)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Immigration Support Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Immigration Support Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	-0.0666 (0.307)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	-0.0301 (0.327)
Military aid (V4)	0.351 (0.328)
Minority	0.150 (0.209)
Female	0.192 (0.168)
Education level	-0.146** (0.0616)
Household income level	-0.00141 (0.0274)
Democrat	-0.241 (0.218)
Republican	-0.548** (0.219)
Citizen of the world	-0.301* (0.166)
US involvement	0.250 (0.193)
Immigration support	-1.014*** (0.325)
Immigration x economic aid	0.838* (0.447)
Immigration x humanitarian aid	0.665 (0.450)
Immigration x military aid	0.531 (0.447)
/cut1	-2.462*** (0.365)
/cut2	-1.089*** (0.354)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 20: Decrease Aid Variable Interaction Term

VARIABLES	Decrease Aid Interaction
Economic aid (V2)	0.0905 (0.267)
Humanitarian aid (V3)	0.251 (0.269)
Military aid (V4)	0.451* (0.273)
Minority	0.196 (0.210)
Female	0.197 (0.168)
Education level	-0.136** (0.0616)
Household income level	-0.00697 (0.0274)
Democrat	-0.252 (0.220)
Republican	-0.515** (0.221)
Citizen of the world	-0.289* (0.167)
US involvement	0.267 (0.194)
Immigration support	-0.491*** (0.166)
Decrease aid	-0.0250 (0.338)
Decrease aid x economic aid	0.739 (0.477)
Decrease aid x humanitarian aid	0.175 (0.475)
Decrease aid x military aid	0.456 (0.478)
/cut1	-2.182*** (0.351)
/cut2	-0.807** (0.341)
Observations	625

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1