The Role of the Concept of Death in Existential Psychology: From Kierkegaard to Binswanger

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THE ROLE OF THE CONCEPT OF DEATH IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY: FROM KIERKEGAARD TO BINSWANGER

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The meaning and importance of death in existential psychology are investigated. Four major theorists are presented, i.e. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Rank, and Binswanger. Their interpretation of death in man's personal development, although with different perspectives, nevertheless is seen as having a basic common theme: It is necessary for the person to free himself from the chains of conformity in order to become an individual. By realizing one's potentialities one also must realize and understand one's finitude. Thus by facing death one may actively and courageously move through the anxiety of this life in the shadow of death.

These theories are focused on the classic schizophrenic case of Ellen West. The case is presented in light of Binswanger's existential analysis. It involves the meaning of the struggle of life and death. Particular emphasis is placed upon Ellen's decision to take her own life. Existentialists view her suicide as an enrichment of her own personal being, in that it constitutes an active
concern for her self-authenticity. Ellen's decision is also seen as a longing for immortality and a desire to go "beyond" her individuality.
**Introduction**

This thesis is primarily concerned with the existential tradition within philosophy and psychology. That concept of essential importance, however, is the concept of death and the meaning and role death has come to play in the various existential theories of man. An attempt will therefore be made to present and to integrate the most important existential thoughts related to this particular concept.

Individual consideration will first be given to such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Rank, and Binswanger. An existential analysis of the classic schizophrenic case of Ellen West will follow, which will try to integrate the perspectives of these individuals. The author of the present thesis believes that the case in question may become particularly interesting, when various existential views on death are considered. It is hoped then that the conclusion will constitute a synthesis of all the mentioned existentialists regarding their thoughts on the concept of death.

Initially, however, it may be appropriate to explain briefly various ideas that are inextricably tied to the understanding of death as existentialism views it. We commonly think of death as the biological termination of a living organism, whose vital organs have ceased to
function. However, if we go beyond this obviously concrete and impersonal definition, death becomes private and more psychological in its implication. Consequently, the existential idea of the concept is a lot more than mere physical or biological non-existence. It is central and, therefore, important to man's continuous and never ending effort to make sense and meaning out of his own life. As will be seen, however, the existentialists tell us that by taking an active interest in one's mental well-being, a person may render constructive meaning to his own life. Thus, by emphasizing personal action, as opposed to passivity or conformity, existentialism stands out and reveals its unique identity.

According to some existential psychologists (May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958), there is a distinct tendency in our Western world, and in particular modern science, to make man look more and more like a robot or virtually over into the image of the machine. This is viewed as a dangerous dehumanizing process, as May (1969) points out that, "there is real possibility that we may be helping the individual adjust and be happy at the price of loss of his being" (p. 7). May contends that the emphasis in today's society is to make the individual dependent as a social person, by stressing the need for belongingness, rather than pointing out to him his responsibilities toward himself as an
individual. William James once said that "science was made for man rather than man for science" (May, 1969, p. 8).

Existentialists further assert that the disregard for individualism seems to have increased during the course of the Industrial Revolution (May et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944). Kierkegaard, in particular, witnessed in despair the growth of modern science and technology in the early 19th century. Although he was one of the early critics of this new and emerging industrialized society, Heidegger was really the first to articulate a formal existential philosophy which embodied this despair (Blackham, 1952). According to Kierkegaard and Heidegger, man becomes overly dependent on society by allowing himself to be defined by others through role-playing or conforming. Man prefers the simple certainty of the world of things because he wants to avoid the uncertainty and finitude of his existence. In so doing, he lets society take charge over his living which in turn frees him from having to experience the pain of facing one's responsibilities (Blackham, 1952).

The existentialists are saying that technology and science in fact have actually helped the individual repress his sense of being, of what it means to be human in the world. The result for the person is that this "has led his image of himself and his experience and concept of himself as a responsible individual to become disintegrated" (May, 1969, p. 11). Hence what is required is a kind of personal
commitment on part of the person, which will make him less dependent upon his immediate environment. It is necessary that he actively attempts to move away from this kind of symbiotic condition which, if allowed to grow, very well can become neurotic in kind (Kierkegaard, 1954; May et al., 1958; May, 1969).

Some scholars, existential and others, even hold that modern man is actually in the process of losing awareness of his own self (Fair, 1969; May et al., 1958). With the loss of self awareness, man is becoming less and less capable of developing his unique potentialities. The general feeling of insecurity, therefore, is intensified. A decreasing interest in literature, philosophy and the arts is symptomatic of the deep-seated alienation in modern man. Man develops a subtle feeling about existence which Heidegger calls dread or Angst (Heidegger, 1962). This dread or anxiety is essential to the human being in that it reveals to the person that he is "cast into the world in order to die here" (Blackham, 1952, p. 96).

There is an increasing emphasis on extrinsic rewards, which are elements "devoid of intrinsic or significant value" (Marcel, 1949, p. 1). Thus, contemporary man can be characterized as being lethargic, apathetic, and unreflectively sinking back into the immediate world of pleasures (Fair, 1969; Marcel, 1949). He will get further
and further away from his own self, or even potentially out of contact with this inner authenticity that should define and denote his existence.

It is no wonder then, as May et al. (1958) point out, that "the existential thinkers as a whole take this loss of consciousness as the centrally tragic problem of our day, not at all to be limited to psychological context of neurosis" (p. 29). Fair (1969) terms this deteriorating condition as "the dying self." A similar observation is made by Tillich, the existential theologian, who in his celebrated work The Courage To Be (1952) defines sin as the separation from the self.

The dramatic technological and scientific changes of the Industrial Revolution in effect meant a kind of psychological hegemony over the masses. Kierkegaard realized the disastrous implications it would have on the individual. He saw these same impersonal tendencies also within philosophy and the established church. Thus, he spent most of his life attacking Hegel's pan-rationalism and the ruling Lutheran dogma of his country. Basically his criticism focused on the disregard for the individual's need to ask himself the most fundamental and important questions of life. These are ontological questions like, What is Being?, What does it mean to be? etc., which all point to man's existence and the human situation as such.
Such inquiry, Heidegger said (1962), comprises a very healthy contemplation indeed, as it implies concern for man's being-in-the-world, or Dasein as Heidegger has it. The best concern or "Care" one can show for one's Dasein, amidst all risks and uncertainties, is when the person decides to meet death face-to-face by attempting to accept the fact that he is a mortal being (Blackham, 1952; Heidegger, 1962). Therefore, and above all, death is to Heidegger a possibility, since it reveals existence as an island in nothing or between two nothings (Blackham, 1952; Heidegger, 1962). It is important that death is seen as a possibility because the authentic human being is never realized here and now; the individual Dasein is always "becoming" or moving forward (Blackham, 1952; Breisach, 1962; Heidegger, 1962). Henceforth, a person "anticipates death not by suicide but by living in the presence of death as always immediately possible and as undermining everything" (Blackham, 1952, p. 96).

The dread or anxiety that this realization entails virtually throws man into a situation in which he is forced to make a decision as to what route to take. The individual has to make a choice, a very important choice indeed, as on one hand it means "acceptance of death as the supreme and normative possibility ... and to refuse to be identified with the preoccupations in which I engage," but rather "take them for what they are worth: -- nothing"
(Blackham, 1952, pp. 96-97). On the other hand, by lack of courage, man may choose to continue to live under the dictate of everyday monotony, preoccupied with small projects and trivia, which actually is a retreat into illusion (Blackham, 1952). The former choice goes beneath nothingness and, in its total acceptance of death, constitutes a healthy prerequisite for authentic being (Heidegger, 1962).

We are our choices, Sartre (1956) said, meaning we have the power constantly to transform ourselves and therefore become aware of our own truth as we translate it in action (Kierkegaard, 1954; 1957). With this emphasis on the commitment of the individual, it is perhaps not difficult to understand Sartre's famous axiom that "existence precedes essence," that is, each man creates his essence as he lives (Sartre, 1956).

With the above outline and explanation of some of the most important concepts of existential philosophy, the reader should be well equipped to follow the development of the idea of death as it moves from philosophy to contemporary existential psychology. In so doing, the present author hopes to tie a few strings together, something which he feels has been long overdue in modern, scientific psychology.
Although one may consider the dialogues of Socrates and the thoughts of Pascal as proofs of existential themes, contemporary scholars generally regard Kierkegaard and his vigorous attacks on the rationalistic tendencies of his day as the actual onset of what has come to be known as the existential movement (Binswanger, 1963; Kaufmann, 1950; May et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944, 1952). This is due in part to the sudden technological advancements, as well as Hegel's attempt to interpret all reality in terms of a system of essences as opposed to concrete entities. Kierkegaard was naturally strongly critical of this Hegelian tendency to identify abstract truth with reality, as he declared that pure speculative thought cannot define man's existence (Kierkegaard, 1941).

According to Kierkegaard, with the industrial revolution the human values and ideals slowly disintegrated; and the psychological life of the individual was, therefore, characterized by denial and repression of the emotions. And it is this psychological disunity which became the predisposition for the emergence of anxiety. Hence, it is not surprising, as May (1950) points out, "that in the middle of that period, we should find Kierkegaard producing the most direct and, in some ways the most profound study of anxiety to appear up to that point in history" (May, 1950, p. 29). Kierkegaard, as well as Nietzsche,
that the panacea to this compartmentalization would have to consider man as "the whole individual, as a feeling and acting as well as thinking organism" (May, 1950, p. 30). In no other way, the existential thinkers insisted, could the human being avoid the complete deterioration of the self.

Kierkegaard held that the so called irrational aspects of experience cannot and should not be dispensed with; thus thinking and passion are in this regard inseparable. For this reason, it may be understandable why Kierkegaard rejected strict definitions of such terms as "self" and "truth." He advocated instead a dynamic and dialectic way of defining, which as Tillich states is more than a mere subjective approach since it entails "that living experience in which both subjectivity and objectivity are rooted" (Tillich, 1944, p. 67).

What Kierkegaard cared for more than anything else was the spiritual health of the individual. There are two works by the Danish existentialist that exclusively deal with the various dispositions of individual self, and these are The Concept of Dread (1957) and The Sickness Unto Death (1954). These works will be analyzed in the context of Kierkegaard's view of death in man's personal development and also to make clear what he means by such concepts as self, spirit, and dread. So far, they have merely been stressed tangentially since the objective was more to delineate the rationale behind Kierkegaard's endeavor.
While Nietzsche is characterized by a psychological breadth, Kierkegaard is recognized for his psychological depth (Kaufmann, 1956). In the works mentioned above, Kierkegaard makes a thorough analysis of his own self and almost exclusively concentrates on different kinds of despair or anxiety and how to deal with these states of mind. "Dread," he states, "is freedom's reality as possibility for possibility" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 38), which to him is the same thing as saying that whenever there is a possibility for an individual to move on or potentially grow, there inevitably is anxiety present as well. The anxiety in this case is not of a neurotic kind, which is constrictive and uncreative, but rather of a normal quality which serves as a catalyst to further growth (May, 1950; May et al., 1958).

One key to understand Kierkegaard's thoughts lies in his interpretation of the myth of Adam and Eve, i.e. the original sin. Although his purpose for employing this myth primarily is a theological one, his approach is nevertheless of enormous psychological significance. (The two works mentioned, incidentally, are the only books expressly described as psychological by Kierkegaard himself.)

Thus, in The Concept of Dread (1957), the author develops the idea of what the human self may be as a living spirit. As Genesis relates it, Adam and Eve were, prior to the Fall, both "naked," as they had not yet eaten the
fruits from the tree of good and evil. But at this point, of course, they had no knowledge of the tree of good and evil; therefore, as Kierkegaard says, "Innocence is ignorance" (1957, p. 37). As soon as God's prohibition is sounded however, Adam is overwhelmed by a vague, vacuous and profound feeling of anxiety which Kierkegaard prefers to call Dread. It describes the condition perfectly because of the dialectic ambiguity involved. Thus, in the author's words, "Dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 38). It is important to note here that Kierkegaard is not referring to fear, which is being afraid of something in particular—like a snake, but rather to something unexplainable, that is—Nothing, to speak with Heidegger's tongue (Heidegger, 1962; Kierkegaard, 1957). Therefore, Adam is beginning to become aware of something, but in his ignorance he does not know of what, and so he experiences Dread. Kierkegaard states hence that "This is the profound secret of innocence that at the same time it is dread" (1957, p. 38).

Kierkegaard finds, ironically, use for Hegel's dialectic method at this stage, but of course for quite different purposes, since he aims at logically explaining the development of the self, or man's potential freedom in becoming an individual. Before the Fall then, man is yet without individuality, as his body and mind, in "peace and repose,"
lie dormantly entangled with one another (Kierkegaard, 1957). However, the first move toward self-consciousness has already taken place, at the occurrence of dread, which "is a qualification of the dreaming spirit, and, as such, it has its place in psychology" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 38). The spirit then consists of a body-mind synthesis, a combination which Kierkegaard says is still only potentially in existence. This state of spirit also comprises the highest level of potential individuality—something that Kierkegaard labels "pure awareness" (Kierkegaard, 1957).

Next follows the Fall, which the author states "psychology is unable to explain, for it is the qualitative leap" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 43). Most likely, the author is referring to the individuality of the act because it cannot be experienced in any other way since it stands out as a subtle and introvert transition and, therefore, out of reach for objective science. At any rate, the Fall connotes the birth of consciousness, as man receives knowledge of good and evil, which in turn causes the separation of the spiritual synthesis, i.e. body and mind. The consequence is that no longer is this relationship in repose and harmony but rather a denotion of a differential dialectic. Man becomes aware of himself, not because he is tempted, says Kierkegaard, but because he dreads (1957). However, if dread drove him to obtain knowledge, then dread very
much turns out to be the consequence as man becomes conscious of his own mortality and difference in sex.

The role of the spirit, Kierkegaard says, is to achieve in actuality what was earlier in potentiality, namely pure awareness. It is important here to see what Kierkegaard really means by spirit. In the first paragraph of his *Sickness Unto Death*, he thus states that "Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 146). The relation of course refers to the union of body and mind, where the body knows of the mind and vice versa. However, he states that the relation actually is the self relating itself to its own self. In order to make this possible, one would need completely to detach one's self from body and mind. This individual detachment can lead toward a fulfillment of the self or pure awareness (Blackham, 1952; Kierkegaard, 1957). In turn, it is the most important task of the spirit and can only come about by moving through dread, which therefore first needs to be overcome. In other words, dread is the result of the spirit's knowledge of body and mind. Dread can be overcome by closing out the busy, everyday world and by absorbing the true sense of one's reality. Kierkegaard's *Sickness Unto Death*, consequently, presents us with the following motto: "Lord give us weakened eyes for things
that are no good and eyes full of clarity for all they truth" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 141).

If the above motto is not followed, that is, if man does not act upon his dread, he will most certainly find himself in a state of transposition of life and death. Kierkegaard calls this condition the sickness unto death, the very terror of which is that one cannot die, although one would want to. One is brought to the threshold of death but not over it because one has to go on living the life of choice (Kierkegaard, 1954; May, 1950; Wahl, 1969). Therefore, the heart of the problem exists in man's relation to himself, since only he can choose to rid himself of the nonsense of petty preoccupations. Hence, Kierkegaard would probably concur with Nietzsche that in order to become an individual one should "read only your life and understand from it the hieroglyphics of universal life" (Kaufmann, 1950, p. 135).

The crucial point of Kierkegaard is how man can will to be himself. He may choose to be himself, but only in a defiant fashion, or he may be willing to be someone else, by actually submitting himself to an idol and worshipping that idol. Willing, according to Kierkegaard, is a creative decisiveness, based centrally on self-consciousness. The more conscious, he says, the more self the individual will realize (Kierkegaard, 1954). By producing will-power, then, one can move through the anxiety of the situation and thus
develop one's potentialities in light of the possibilities present at a particular time. If the person refuses, this will clearly lead to severe guilt and self-defeating conflicts, whereupon neurotic or, worse even, psychotic anxiety may develop, which can promise nothing but impotence for the individual (Kierkegaard, 1954; May, 1950).

Despite Kierkegaard's vehement assaults upon the Established Church and the Hegelian System, he remained completely unknown throughout the 19th century. Nevertheless, in his antagonism toward Hegel, he was later joined by a number of scholars, of whom Nietzsche, by far, was the most dynamic. Nietzsche feared that the inevitable result of the growing emphasis on the technical aspects of reason would probably be nihilism (Kaufmann, 1950). The traditional rationalism, he predicted, would transform everything, "including man himself, into an object of calculation and control" (Tillich, 1944, p. 66). In an assessment of this historical period, Tillich refers to this dehumanizing process as a result of what he calls "technical reason," the implications of which "have become increasingly clear: a logical or naturalistic mechanism which seemed to destroy individual freedom, personal decision, and organic community" (Tillich, 1944, p. 66).

May (1950) points out that all segments of society, therefore, seemed to have been marked by a cultural "compartmentalization" (p. 28), a fragmentary and alienating
process. Hence, for instance, it may not be surprising to find Ibsen attacking just that in his classic play *The Doll's House* (1909), where family life appears stagnant and unreal. Even the early Marx, with whom Kierkegaard possibly had a few encounters, showed great sympathy with the anti-rational tendencies, as he strongly criticized the Industrial Revolution for its depersonalization of the masses (May et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944). Thus, these various existential voices relied to a large degree on the emergence of industrialism which, as has been seen, permeated and affected all sections of society. However, the influence of these thinkers was not felt or fully recognized until the occurrence of World War I, over half a century past the death of Kierkegaard (May et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944).

There are similarities between the insights of Kierkegaard and those of more contemporary psychologists. Thus, Otto Rank and C. G. Jung speak of the realization of one's potentialities or unique existence as "individuation" (Progoff, 1969). This, they say, may be gained "at the price of confronting the anxiety inherent in taking a stand against as well as with one's environment" (May, 1950, p. 34). In a similar vein, Kierkegaard speaks of his emerging awareness as "the alarming possibility of being able" (1957, p. 40). Thus, it is clear that self-hood cannot be achieved unless the individual moves ahead despite the confronted anxiety.
The task is now to relate what previously has been said about Kierkegaard to the German existential philosopher Heidegger, who eventually came to play an important role in the formation of existential psychoanalysis, i.e. the psychology of Ludwig Binswanger (1963). Although Heidegger prefers not to be called an existentialist, it is nonetheless clear that the essence of his writings, i.e. Being and Time (1962), is very existential indeed (Kaufmann, 1956). This will become clearer as we penetrate into his thought and as the Kierkegaardian influence is brought to the surface.

Blackham (1952) denotes that Heidegger's primary ambition seems to have been the continuous search for the "original roots of all possible knowledge" (p. 87), a project which in effect meant a realization of a fundamental ontology or theory of Being. As a result, he departed sharply from traditional Western philosophy which to a large degree had been outlined and formulated by Hegel (Blackham, 1952; Kaufmann, 1956). In so doing, Heidegger preferred to think of himself as a scholar of a more technical and systematic type. However, his ontological study aims at showing us the necessary steps to take in order to become an existing human being. In other words, although Heidegger does not take the passionate and subjective route
of Kierkegaard, his debt and similarity to Kierkegaard is, in many ways, quite obvious.

Due to the intricacy and abstruseness of Heidegger's thought, no attempt will be made in this presentation to relate and analyze the man in his philosophical totality. The intention, rather, is to give a concise but thorough exposure of those concepts and ideas that the present author believes to be the most relevant ones in light of the theme of the thesis.

Initially, however, a brief recollection of what has been said up to this point is deemed to be appropriate. It is recalled, then, that the emerging problem of interest settled around the concept of death, or rather the dread or anxiety thereof, and the relation of this to a person's individual development. An attempt was undertaken to point out how and why man comes to experience lethargy and meaninglessness in his life. Later, with reference to Kierkegaard and others, it was found that there exists basically two courses of action for the individual to take, provided he first realizes and experiences the dread of this kind of situation. He may either simply acquiesce or give in to a continuously dependent but vacuous sort of living or he may choose to see himself as a potentially unique and free human being. Hence, one can speak of a passive versus an active path, of which the latter signifies the only route toward constructive self-development. In order to realize
one's true individual self, however, one necessarily must face and move through the profound dread experienced. Dread, therefore, always seems to be oriented toward something that has not yet occurred and, hence, it also could be spoken of as a possibility. Moreover, this essential role of dread in the thought of Kierkegaard is one important factor that brings existentialism away from the rationalistic philosophy of Hegel. Nothing in the existential approach could perhaps be deemed more existential than this ambivalent leap into consciousness. By moving on to Heidegger, it should be possible to discover his proximity to the above theme and, hence, the continuation of the so-called "Kierkegaardian rhythm," i.e. going from "the extremity of dread to the thought of beatitude" (Wahl, 1969, p. 115).

In the philosophy of Heidegger, the concept of dread or anxiety is of outstanding significance. He is said to have called it the most important of human emotions (Blackham, 1952; Wahl, 1969), which in turn points at death, the source and center of the Heideggerian ontology (Blackham, 1952; Langan, 1961; Wahl, 1969). The phenomenon of death, therefore, is especially well suited to serve as a guide through the labyrinth of his thought. Anybody attempting to understand or at least familiarizing himself with the major work of the German philosopher, i.e. *Being and Time* (1962), cannot fail to notice the centrality of death.
Already at this stage one should be able to notice the influence of Kierkegaard, to whom, of course, death was of utmost significance in his inquiry into human existence. Heidegger, thus, saw death, not unlike Kierkegaard, as a possibility or prospect through which a person, on account of his own power to realize his own finitude, may render particular meaning to his present moment of existence. The mode of existence of the human being is roughly what Heidegger calls Dasein, and it is this that I as an individual have to try to get the most out of in order to be able to realize my individuality. The implication of this is that human existence is not something given, but rather a possibility that only can be experienced when the person actually decides to take charge over his own existence (Heidegger, 1962).

From the above analysis, it should be possible to derive two dimensions or relations of Dasein that are separate yet necessarily interrelated. The first phase comprises the connection between the person or being and other beings. Hence, it is an environmental bond which Heidegger says cannot be disregarded or taken lightly as it connotes an indispensable social interdependence of everyday experience. This nature of Dasein, or "being-in-common," is primordial to the concept and also reveals the solicitude for other persons (Blackham, 1952; Heidegger, 1962). However, too much dependence inevitably leads to an escape
from personal responsibility. Complete submission or adjustment to the established everydayness of life can only impair the person's potential self-growth. The individual may not realize that his "I remains buried in the one" (Blackham, 1952, p. 91), because with his own acquiescence he virtually reinforces this general form of existence (Heidegger, 1962). A person may never come to realize the many fruitful actions that the Dasein has in store for him, unless he becomes aware of the meaninglessness and dehumanization of the established routine. This impersonal "ubiquitous dictator of everyday human affairs" (Blackham, 1952, p. 91), Heidegger calls "they" (das Man) (1962).

Closely linked to the "they" concept is the idea of death, which Heidegger considers of utmost importance, as it plays a key role in the individual Dasein. In the "they" dimension, or the pragmatic world of objects and obstacles, "death is 'known' as a mishap, which is constantly occurring - as a 'case of death'" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 296). Furthermore, Heidegger points out how we escape even talking about death or dying, as we pass it off as something "not yet present-at-hand," and therefore surmising it does not constitute a threat (Heidegger, 1962, p. 297). Thus, there is a certain pull toward the "they" world, or as Heidegger says "a temptation to cover up from oneself one's ownmost Being-towards-death," which in turn reveals the amazing power of "the tranquilized everydayness" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 297) of
the "they' world. By shrugging off the thought of death as an objective and distant event, "they has already decided what state-of-mind is to determine our attitude towards death" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 298). In this sense, we seem to display a cowardly fear or "a sign of insecurity on the part of the Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 298). Heidegger states that it is exactly this kind of indifference that "alienates Dasein from its ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 298). Thus, the second and more profound dimension of the Dasein concerns itself with the Being, to which Heidegger says we must turn our attention if we are to approach the highest state of authenticity (Heidegger, 1962; Wahl, 1969). But what actually does Heidegger mean by the term Being? Also, what is its connection to authenticity? A clarification of this would surely enhance the understanding of his philosophy as a whole.

The basis for Heidegger's philosophy is the differentiation between Being and particular beings. Traditional metaphysics, he thought, had confused the term being or any particular object, such as man or tree, with Being or the common ground of beings (Demske, 1970). In Heidegger's own image, "the truth of Being may thus be called the ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the tree of philosophy, is kept and from which it is nourished" (Heidegger, 1962,
Consequently, authenticity or the truth of Being can only be found in that which all the aspects (beings) are grounded and have in common, i.e., the Being itself (Heidegger, 1962; Wahl, 1969). Therefore, it is impossible to describe and define Being, since it is concealed and goes beyond or transcends all particular objects in time and space (1969). What separates man from other beings is that he has the opportunity to relate himself as a human being, "to what it intrinsically means to be" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 298). Thus, when man contemplates and realizes his connection to Being, then, according to Heidegger, he is on the way to open up the authentic phase of his Dasein (Demske, 1970; Heidegger, 1962; Wahl, 1969).

In order to understand the polarity of the Dasein, Heidegger makes reference to anxiety, which, like the Kierkegaardian concept of dread, plays an essential role in man. It serves the same purpose of allowing us to distinguish between the authentic and unauthentic (Wahl, 1969). Hence, there is a situation of choice that enters into the individual's life as he realizes that he is more than just a being in the everyday routine world. For the first time he sees himself in a world of possibility and freedom, which, because it offers the opportunity to create his own values to live by, also brings a feeling of tremendous anxiety of death (Heidegger, 1962). Overwhelmed by his own finitude or
the certainty that death could strike at any moment, "evasiveness in the face of death" is no longer possible (Heidegger, 1962, p. 299).

Upon the unfolding of this existential truth, the person for the first time in his life realizes his potential individuality in the sense that he feels "cast-into-the-world" (Blackham, 1952; Heidegger, 1962). The same phenomenon Heidegger calls throwness or an experience that denotes to the individual the uniqueness of his own situation and thus defines his Dasein (Heidegger, 1962). Perhaps in the words of Pascal this existential problem is most appropriately put: "When I consider the brief span of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and behind it, the small space that I fill, or even see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces which I know not, and which know not me, I am afraid, and wonder to see myself here rather than there, now rather than then...." (Pascal, 1946, p. 36). This anxious feeling of the world as a whole, at this particular point in time (Befindlichkeit), simultaneously reveals a future full of possibilities. Hence, to the individual it is a condition of becoming, which tells him that whatever he will become it is his own doing, as he from now on is in personal charge over his destiny (May et al., 1958). A person's life may not change in shape unless he takes an interest and does something about it. The determination to take a constructive approach to one's life is thus of key
importance to Heidegger and other existentialists. This same process Heidegger came to label Care (Sorge), since without proper personal concern we could never hope to bring about constructive and healthy change in ourselves (Heidegger, 1962; Langan, 1961).

Pascal's experience of being cast-into-the-world also seems to link the feeling of anxiety or dread to what Heidegger called nothingness (1962), a vague and trembling intuition on part of the individual that his "personal existence is launched between nothingness and nothingness and it is nothingness that is real" (Blackham, 1952, p. 96). He seems to have come to the conclusion that he has been arbitrarily thrown into existence, out of "the infinite immensity of spaces" (Pascal, 1946), and upon his death again become "one" with this "no-thing-ness" (Spiceland, 1971). Perhaps Heidegger is trying to tell us that upon the realization of our own finitude we simultaneously see ourselves as infinitesimal or like a flash of lightning projected on the eternal black screen.

In Heidegger, as in Kierkegaard, it is clear then that anxiety (dread) is our reaction to death or the reality thereof. But as Wahl (1969) stated, "it cannot be said that Heidegger and Kierkegaard wish to leave us in dread," for it is "by way of dread of death that we can approach the highest state of authenticity ... a kind of serenity" (Wahl, 1969, p. 117). Hence, in the face of death we must move on
in spite of the dread of the situation and enthusiastically make the most out of our existence. However, in order to break with the status quo of a society, one must have courage or, as Jung once phrased it: "Everything good is costly, and the development of the personality is one of the most costly of all things" (Kopp, 1972, p. 6).

Heidegger's philosophy, no matter how metaphysical in aim, nonetheless turns out to be quite personal after all. In the final analysis, this is probably what he wished it to be, although his primary objective always was to revise the existing Western philosophical tradition. Like Kierkegaard, he seemed to want to remind us that while completely wrapped up in rational everyday behavior, we forget what it means to be, to exist as human beings, complete with senses and all. In truth, of course, our Danish friend has much more emotional insight to offer, while Heidegger basically is a systematic philosopher—not overtly interested in the everyday mental health of the human being. It appears, therefore, that Kierkegaard has much more to tell us about the depths of anxiety (vide Concept of Dread) and thus reveals more proximity to psychology than Heidegger. However, the influence of these two pioneering existential thinkers becomes clear with the emergence of Otto Rank and Ludwig Binswanger. These two psychoanalysts, who initially were associated with Freud, have established a reputation of great significance within existential psychotherapy and psychology.
Otto Rank

Up to this point, the thesis has settled around thinkers that clearly have been identified with the existential movement. At the outset it was emphasized that their thoughts, particularly in relation to the idea of death, together would facilitate the later analysis of the case of Ellen West. Hence, it is within this understanding that the psychology of Otto Rank now is being brought forth. The present author believes, therefore, that not only will the case just referred to become illuminated but the inclusion of Rank will also enable the reader to discover his proximity to, in particular, Kierkegaard. In this sense, the definite existential theme in Rank's thought can more clearly be seen. Several scholars have suggested that had Rank not met such an untimely and early death he would probably have turned out to be an important voice in existential psychology (Becker, 1973; Langman, 1961; May et al., 1958).

Rank was together with Jung and Adler one of Freud's few major "disciples." While, in contrast to the others, he had no medical background, he instead obtained an extensive training in the humanities. He is known to have been greatly interested in such notable thinkers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer (Langman, 1961; Nagler, 1974). Hence, it was in this context that Rank first developed his special interest for the artist, something that he was to
maintain throughout his short lifespan. Due to his long affiliation with Freud, he did not seem able to devote himself freely to the role of the artist until he had been ostracized from Freud's inner circle. However, the separation was an uncomfortable one for Rank; and the remainder of his life, during which he became very creative on his own, is therefore seen as that of isolation, anxiety, and introspection (Karpf, 1970; Progoff, 1969).

The Concept of The Birth Trauma

With the publication of The Birth Trauma (1929) Rank made his first documentation of his deviant views. Although this birth trauma formulation was not completely unfamiliar to Freudian thought (Karpf, 1970), members of the psychoanalytic school called it "a scientific regression which closely resembled that of Jung and Adler" (Wilson, 1972, pp. 100-101). Ironically, it had not been Rank's intention to defy the established psychoanalytic doctrine but, on the contrary, to present his ideas in the best spirit of his master. The controversy that followed nevertheless forced an unwilling break between Freud and Rank (Karpf, 1970). However, Rank's newly gained independence meant that he was now at liberty to express his own unique ideas.

Initially, his opinions basically centered around birth, or the separation from the womb, which he at the time of the break with Freud viewed to be the most important fact of human existence (Progoff, 1969; Rank, 1929). The great
shock that birth in effect constitutes, Rank says, "proves anxiety to be the nucleus of every neurotic disturbance" (1929, p. 46). The main point of his argument, however, does not rest with the affect of anxiety per se, but rather that "the whole neurosis formation point quite definitely to reproduced reminiscences of birth or the pleasurable stage preceding it" (Rank, 1929, p. 46). It is evident in the above quote that Rank still very much adhered to traditional Freudian interpretations, while his own unique ideas are only implicitly visible at this stage of his thinking. Thus, as Langman (1961) points out, Rank most certainly intended to view the birth trauma as something more than mere psycho-physical reality. It is of great interest, therefore, to see how he later on, still in the same work (1929), incorporates the idea of the original sin into the context of the birth trauma. By so doing, he becomes somewhat elusive in terms of his own position in this regard. His elusiveness is perhaps understandable in light of the conflict that had emerged between his humanistic background and his Freudian upbringing.

It is interesting to notice Rank's nearness to Kierkegaard as he states that "the death punishment decreed for the breaking of this command (not to eat of the fruit) clearly shows that the woman's offence consists in the breaking off of the fruit, namely giving birth, and here again in the meaning of the tendency to return to death
proves to be a wishreaction to the birth trauma" (Rank, 1929, pp. 113-114). Hence birth seems to be the symbolical picture of man's estrangement from a paradisaical state of tranquillity or existential Being. Thus, in order to overcome the trauma or anxiety involved in man's existence, one must move ahead and, during the course of one's lifetime, attempt to restore the lost Paradise. Rank depicts precisely this when he states that "the Ego in its retreat from the confines of anxiety is constantly urged forward to seek for Paradise in the world formed in the image of the mother, instead of seeking it in the past, and, in so far as this fails, to look for it in the sublime wish compensations of religion, art, and philosophy" (Rank, 1929, p. 190).

Quite clearly, one discovers in the above quote a familiar theme from Kierkegaard and Heidegger. They repeatedly stressed that the only way man may be able to overcome his existential crisis is for him to move forward, despite the confronted anxiety. Moreover, this theme seems to coincide with the basic notion of existentialism as a whole. According to Wilson (1972) the existential manifesto states that "man is not naturally static; his mental energy, like his blood, was intended to be kept moving. His mental being must be understood as something essentially dynamic, forward-flowing, like a river. All mental illness is the outcome of damming the river" (p. 206). No doubt, this
basic idea in existentialism to move ahead, in spite of the troubles, becomes even more conspicuous at a later stage in Rank's career. This is particularly true in his psychology of neurosis.

**The Artist and Creativity**

There is one type of human being, according to Rank (1932), who perhaps more than anybody has the ability to successfully develop his potentials. He is the one, Rank says, who "the history of mind has handed down to us as the hero, and which we would like to designate as 'artist' in the broadest sense of the word, in so far as it is a question of a creation of ideal values" (Rank, 1929, p. 190). The interest and sympathy with which Rank approached the hardships of the artist's life reveals, as Progoff (1969) puts it, "that Rank saw himself reflected in the kind of individual he called the 'artist type'," and that he had "a strong urge to creative activity in his own personality" (p. 189). It is no small wonder then that Rank so firmly refuted Freud's quite negative view of creativity as some sort of neurotic compensatory mechanism.

The artist, as Rank sees him, is the type of person "who no longer accepts the collective solution to the problem of existence" (Becker, 1973, p. 171). On the contrary, he is the creative type who realizes that he himself must fashion his own picture of existence. And because the artist, better
than anybody else, understands his plight of estrangement, "he takes refuge, from the life of actuality, which for him spells mortality and decay" (Rank, 1932, p. 38). The artist, therefore, tends to be the opposite to what Rank called "the average well-adjusted man" (1932, p. 251), who, as Becker (1973) puts it, "bites off what he can chew and digest of life and no more" (p. 178). Consequently, the artist is "the creative searcher after truth" (Rank, 1945, p. 251), who seeks individualization in a non-constrictive world-design. In so doing, he "lifts his nose from the ground and starts sniffing at eternal problems like life and death" (Becker, 1973, p. 178).

That which sets Rank's psychology of neurosis most clearly apart from orthodox psychoanalysis is his assessment of the neurotic individual. Like the creative type, the neurotic is "at the point of seeing through the deception of the world of sense, the falsity of reality," but "as distinguished from the creative man of will ... is not the voluntary happy seeker of truth, but the forced unhappy finder of it" (Rank, 1945, p. 251). Judging from the above, it would appear as if Rank expresses a subtle scorn or contempt toward the "average" or "well-adjusted," something like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche often did (Becker, 1973; Langman, 1961). Not surprisingly, therefore, one finds Rank (1945) acknowledging that "If man is the more normal, healthy and happy, the more he can accept the appearance
of reality as truth, that is, the more successfully he can repress, displace, deny, rationalize, dramatize himself, and deceive others" (pp. 250-251).

If Rank (1932) maintains a sympathetic outlook toward the neurotic, it is because he sees him as an individual with artistic potentials but unable to create, as he "stops at the point where he includes the world within himself" (p. 377). Thus, in contrast to the artist, the neurotic allows his introverted world to become an oppression instead of an expression. The artist is also an introvert, with a "major feeling of the world," but he can "use this introverted world not only as a protection but as a material" (Rank, 1932, p. 377). According to Rank (1945) then, the neurotic, despite his profound and self-defeating anxiety, "nevertheless corresponds much more to a miscarried artist (artiste manqu'e), than to an average man who has not achieved normal development" (p. 160).

Hence, the artist seems to be able to work out his potentially schizophrenic fantasies by way of objective production. In turn, his creativity saves him from getting caught in the vicious circle of the world of the neurotic.

The question still remains, however, what is the motivation or energy underlying the creative artist's aspirations for individuality? In Rank's later works, i.e. Art and Artist (1932), Psychology and the Soul (1961), and Beyond Psychology (1941), the concern is predominantly
focused on what lies "beyond psychology," which to Rank meant "going beyond individuality that provides the background of the individual personality" (Progoff, 1969, p. 229). Moreover, these later writings constitute a growth and maturity in Rank's thought which in turn is a clarification and development of his idea of the birth trauma.

The Will to Immortality

If there is one aspect of Rank's psychology that has come to stand out and, thereby, given Rank his present status, it probably is his concept of the will. Hence, Progoff (1969) states that, "Rank's insight into the nature of the will is the key to all his work, therapeutical and theoretical" (p. 201). At the time of his negation of Freud's work, Rank (1945), out of sheer defiance, simply viewed the will as a manifestation of consciousness. But as his independence and intellectual maturity grew, Rank (1941) saw consciousness, rather, as a "barrier to the free expression of the life-will of the individual" (p. 277-278). Although in this broader context, Rank (1941) did not speak of the unconscious as such, he defined the will in terms of "the irrational forces" of the psyche, or as "an autonomous organizing force in the individual which ... constitutes the creative expression of the total personality and distinguishes one individual from another" (p. 50). Accordingly, the will is the force with which a human being asserts his
potentials. Therefore, in order for the individual to realize his unique existence it is necessary that he does not shun away from active participation in life. Rank points out that the will, or the inner principle of the psyche, remains dormant and passive unless it is excited in situations of conflict or tension.

Thus, the power or the expression of the will is able to enhance or encourage individual existence. But since existence sooner or later must come to an end, the underlying question still remains as to what the real purpose may be, if in death it is destroyed. At this time, therefore, Rank more explicitly expounds on his view of death. While so doing, it seems as if he also adds new meaning to his concept of the birth trauma.

Throughout history, Rank (1961) says, man has interpreted and reinterpreted death in light of his conception of the universe. What brought on this ceaseless inquiry, Rank (1961) reiterates, was man's "dawning sense of death" (p. 34). As the individual realizes that at some futural moment his life must be terminated, it becomes absolutely necessary for him to develop a clear notion of the will's continuous existence. In this context, therefore, man's most basic striving is revealed, namely, his urge or longing for immortality (Rank, 1932; 1961).
Based on what so far has been said about the creative, artistic type, and his particular aspirations, it would, thus, follow logically that he is the one who is most anxious to immortalize himself. Consequently, Rank (1932) states, "Only through the will-to-self-immortalization, which rises from the fear of life, can we understand the interdependence of production and suffering and the definite influence of this on positive experience" (p. 43). What is important in this last statement is not only that "In creation the artist tries to immortalize his mortal life" (Rank, 1932, p. 39), but equally that "there is in the individual a primal fear, which manifests itself now as a fear of life, another time as fear of death" (Rank, 1945, p. 123). Hence, to the artist this is clearly detected, as his "creative impulse ... attempts to turn ephemeral life into personal immortality" (Rank, 1932, p. 39). Everyday monotony, thus, is transient and spells death and decay to the possessor of creative impulse, which Rank (1932), moreover, sees as "the life impulse made to serve the individual will" (p. 39).

But since "the individual is thrown back and forth all his life" (Rank, 1945, p. 124) between these poles of fear, the artist creates out of fear of death as well. Rank (1932) points out that, in itself, the act of creation constitutes immortalization of mortal life, but afterwards "the created work does not go on living; it is, in a sense, dead,
both ... spiritually and psychologically, in that it no longer has any significance for its creator, once he has produced it" (p. 39). Thus, the individual's will demands that "he again takes refuge in life and again forms experiences" (Rank, 1932, p. 39).

However, it appears as if the double fears, in fact, are one and the same, since, as has been seen, the artist can be either repelled from or attracted to the same stimulus source. And it is precisely in this dimension that Rank (1941) introduces his idea of Third Principle, which in effect is an integration of instinct psychology and that of consciousness. He, therefore, viewed "human behavior as extending beyond individual psychology to a broader conception ... a third principle, which combines the rational and irrational elements in a world view based on the conception of the supernatural" (Rank, 1941, p. 62).

Hence, it is by going beyond his own individuality that the artist, inspired by his will, seeks to gain immortality. The artist transcends his personal as well as his social or collective experiences, whereby he creates an immortalized self-will (Rank, 1932; 1961). Specifically, then, the artist seeks to make himself eternal in a battle against "complete absorption of the ego in the collective or of the individual in the genus" (Rank, 1932, p. 366).

In conclusion then, it needs to be emphasized that what Rank in essence had accomplished with his theory of
will-to-immortality was, first of all, an extension of his original birth-trauma theory. Man's foremost goal in life is to overcome his anxiety of isolation, after having been separated from the tranquil and dependable womb. But since Rank did not have in mind to view the birth-trauma on a psycho-physical level, it would appear as if his later notion of immortality, quite profitably, parallels the existential concept of Being. In fact, both Kierkegaard and Heidegger discussed anxiety as a consequence of the original sin or in terms of "thrownness", that is, man's sense of being cast-into-the-world (Heidegger, 1962).

Moreover, Kierkegaard's "sickness-onto-death" (1954) is exactly what Rank's neurotic artist is possessed with. He is completely torn between the life and death fears or, as Rank also put it, man's refusal to accept "the loan (life) in order thus to escape the payment of the debt (death)" (Rank, 1945, p. 126).
Ludwig Binswanger

At this point the attention turns to Ludwig Binswanger and his original existential approach to psychoanalysis. In so doing, the present author hopes to identify the various currents of thought that were instrumental in the formation of "the existential analysis school of thought" (Binswanger in May et al., 1958, p. 191). Although the philosophical foundation of Binswanger's existential analysis was derived from Heidegger's analysis of Being, the influence of Freud's psychoanalysis and Husserl's phenomenology are equally of great importance (Ellenberger in May et al., 1958). In the words of one contemporary existential analyst, "Binswanger represents a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and existential concepts modified by original new insights" (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 120).

In this presentation of existential analysis we shall start with the psychoanalytic role in Binswanger's approach, since it was his participation in Freud's analytic circles that prompted Binswanger to become more philosophically concerned. The next step will be to examine the influences of Heidegger and Husserl so that we may more fully understand the framework of existential analysis. However, it is believed that a complete picture of the Binswanger point of view may not be obtained unless it can be exemplified and elucidated by a case study. The latter part of this thesis is, therefore, devoted to fulfill this particular objective,
as Binswanger's analysis of the case of Ellen West is being presented. This classic case is particularly interesting for the present thesis, since it deals with a woman torn between life and death anxiety (Binswanger, 1958).

The inclusion of this particular case also provides ideal ground for bringing together various existential voices. These tend to reveal a striking proximity to the approach taken by Binswanger. Of particular interest in this context are the often profound insights offered to us by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Rank, and Tillich, to name a few. In a sense, then, the case of Ellen West hopefully comprises a conjuncture of everything that has been said heretofore.

Binswanger and Freud

In contrast to the other innovators in the area of psychoanalysis, Binswanger maintained a warm and respectful relationship with Freud throughout the latter's life. Although this bond by no means was free from disagreement, it is important to bear in mind that Binswanger saw himself and his existential analytic approach as a complement rather than denial of psychoanalysis (Binswanger, 1963). He saw orthodox psychoanalysis as "an oversimplification and constriction of human reality" (Wilson, 1972, p. 19). He argued that there was more to be found in the nature of man than what Freud had led us to believe (Wilson, 1972). One time, in particular, at a significant meeting between
the two, Binswanger (1963) expounded on the essence of human existence, whereby he revealed his conviction that there are in man certain potential qualities which together may be termed "spirit" (Binswanger, 1957, p. 81). In response, Freud surprisingly acknowledged this idea with the statement that "Yes the spirit is everything" (Binswanger, 1957, p. 81). Binswanger (1963), however, found Freud qualifying his remark in the following manner: "Mankind has always known that he possesses spirit; I had to show it there are also instincts" (p. 81).

The central concern of Binswanger's entire work and life may perhaps best be contained by a Kierkegaardian motto that Binswanger himself chose for his breakthrough essay *Dream and Existence* (Binswanger, 1963). "Above all," Kierkegaard says, "let us hold on fast onto what it means to be a man" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 222). Up to the arrival of Binswanger, all concerns and research on what it means to be a man had centered around and been explored by Freudian psychoanalysis. But Binswanger found it necessary to include the study of man in its entirety, not only the abnormal side, which Freud had pursued. Binswanger emphasized that the encounter between the analyst and the patient ought to be more than just another "doctoral appointment;" it should be a loving one between two human beings. In fact, Binswanger's close friend Martin Buber came close to Binswanger's intention as he spoke of a dialogue in the "I and Thou" sense.
(Buber, 1958). Buber, who is regarded as an existential theologian, explained that "I and Thou" is a mutual and open relation between two individuals. This particular dimension is characterized by him as "The Thou that meets me. But I step into direct relation with him. Hence relation means being chosen and choosing ... My Thou affects me, as I affect him" (Buber, 1958, pp. 11, 15).

Binswanger's existential analysis (Daseinanalyse) must not be regarded as a separate school of psychoanalysis, since its purpose is to "update" or make psychoanalysis a more effective therapeutic approach (Foy, 1974; May et al., 1958). Daseinanalyse, as it is called in German, primarily sought to "reinstate spirit in the science of psychiatry" (Needleman, 1963, p. 4). Needleman (1963) claims this could only have happened after the emergence of Freud's system. What the existential approach in fact does is that it "epitomizes an orientation toward man within psychiatry, which more than any single difference of viewpoint has set Daseinanalyse apart from psychoanalysis" (Holt, 1967, p. 95). Binswanger proposed that scientific psychology and psychiatry include the ontological problem of man's total being, which he saw as an indispensable as well as a strengthening ingredient of the explanatory power of science. He is, thus, not arguing against the explanatory power of psychoanalysis, rather he asks the fundamental and very important
question: "What is it in man that enables his existence to be explained by psychoanalysis?" (Needleman, 1963, p. 4).

The enterprise that Binswanger undertakes requires one in other words, to go "beyond Freud," by discovering and capitalizing on "the deep awareness of man's spirit," which he says is "implicit in many of Freud's statements" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 184). Apart from the meeting between the two referred to above, there is also the example of Freud's tribute to a close friend, about whom he writes in the following manner: "Unforgettable man, to have soared to such heights of humanity through so much hardship and suffering!" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 184). This is very much reminiscent of what both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche repeatedly denoted, that in order for man to attain self-realization, he has to move through feelings of deep anxiety and pain. Freud, hence, reveals his awareness of human spirituality, although he never allowed it to interfere with his basic scientific ideas.

The possibility to understand man's worth and true being, according to Binswanger (1963), can only be achieved when viewing man "in the totality of his existence" (p. 185). By taking this kind of perspective, "we can articulately recall to ourselves the 'what' and 'how' of being human" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 185). Freud's hypothetical constructs may then be replaced by a "real self-understanding of humanity", by way of an "insight into man's most basic
ontological potentialities" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 185). This
is what Binswanger called "genuine anthropology," a word
which he did not use in the usual cultural meaning, "but
rather in its more strictly etymological sense," or "anthro-
pology as the study of essential meaning and characteristics
of being human" (May et al., 1958, p. 191).

In actuality then, what Binswanger attempted to do was
to restore dimensions of human experience that were often
concealed by psychoanalytic dogma. He refused to build a
theory "on some rigid assumptions about the nature of
causation" (Holt, 1967, p. 94). Therefore, as was indicated
earlier, he cannot be said to be the founder of a separate
school of psychoanalysis. Instead his existential analysis,
as has often been remarked, "has been a widespread, sponta-
neous, and uncoordinated reaction of many creative indi-
viduals to a movement that offered an unduly mechanistic
understanding of the processes of internal human experi-
ences" (Holt, 1967, p. 94).

Freud's systematic explanation of man, in the name of
natural process, Binswanger viewed as an inadequate approach
to genuine anthropology, since he felt this view did not
include emotional aspects of experiential human existence
(Holt, 1967; Needleman, 1963). Binswanger concluded that,
"human existence could only be understood, by the empiricism
of a phenomenological method" (Holt, 1967, p. 94), the
language of which he found in the phenomenology of Husserl
and the philosophy of Heidegger. Above all, his approach to human existence constituted "a therapy for individuals" (Holt, 1967, p. 94), something which he thought Freud had left out in his assumptions of the nature of therapy. By using Heidegger's philosophical insight that "man's existence is defined not by generalities about his nature, but by the particularity of his individual limits of time and space, by his existence as a Dasein" (Holt, 1967, p. 95), Binswanger emphasizes the mutually empathetic relationship that should exist between the analyst and the patient (Holt, 1967; Needleman, 1963). Thus, the aim of every therapist should be to enter as fully as possible into the world of the patient and to share it and, eventually, to show the individual that it is possible to break from a constrictive private world (Holt, 1967).

It can be said then, that what comprised the genius of Freud, inadvertently, also constituted the major platform for existential analytical advancement. Binswanger (1963) did recognize Freud's achievement in translating depth-psychological insight into a natural scientific framework, but he also regarded this as a preoccupation with "homo natura" (p. 166), that is to say, an overemphasis on the exploration of the world of man in his biological environment (May et al., 1958; Needleman, 1963). The term Umwelt was adopted to represent this man-world relationship, whereas "man in personal relations with fellow men" was called
Mitwelt (May et al., 1958, p. 61). Binswanger felt that Freud, because of his exclusive dealing with the past or the domain of the Umwelt, was prevented from comprehending fully the Mitwelt and hardly at all the sphere of man in relation to himself, or the Eigenwelt (Binswanger, 1963; May et al., 1958).

It is interesting, therefore, to consider Freud's relationship to Nietzsche, whom Freud claimed had had very little, if any, influence on psychoanalysis (Jones, 1957). But in his own words, Freud believed, nonetheless, that Nietzsche "had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live" (Jones, 1957, p. 344). In light of this statement, it would certainly be extraordinary if Nietzsche did not disturb or influence Freud in the least. However, Freud was in the process of laying down the principles of a systematic theory, and so he was not about to allow any extensive escapades into the world of Eigenwelt. Consequently, this is where Binswanger and others quite clearly differentiate from the Freudian aim.

In short, then, what is the significance of the existential analytic movement? This movement, as represented by Binswanger and others, protested against the preoccupation of Umwelt on part of classical psychoanalysis. By so doing, they did not underestimate the reality of the natural world. Kierkegaard had earlier pointed out that "natural law is as
valid as ever" (May et al., 1958, p. 61). But what was then true to him was as true to Binswanger later on, that by overemphasizing biological determinism, "ethical nihilism" inevitably would result (May et al., 1958, p. 36). This would no doubt strip man or deemphasize his individual make-up.

**Binswanger and Husserl**

Inadvertently reinforced by Freud's systematic view of man, Binswanger set out to "design" a phenomenological anthropology, based on the philosophies of Heidegger and Husserl. Binswanger preferred to call it a phenomenological anthropology, although he let it be understood there was no separate school as such (Binswanger, 1963). It was via these sources, then, that existential analysis or Dasein-analyse came to take on its distinct and unique character. Husserl, "the father of phenomenology," provided the necessary methodology for Binswanger as well as for Heidegger and Sartre. In fact, according to some scholars, had it not been for Husserl existentialism would never have gained the reputation it enjoys today (Breisach, 1962; Spiegelberg, 1972). It is therefore necessary to consider the main points of Husserlian influence upon existential analysis and how Binswanger absorbed them in the context of Heidegger's being-in-the-world concept.

Husserl had in a lecture, arranged by Binswanger, pointed out that "unless we become like children" and "look
for the A B C of consciousness, ... we shall not enter the
kingdom of a true psychology" (Spiegelberg, 1972, p. 365).
Phenomenology is thus defined as "a science of the subjec-
tive," that is to say, "the analysis of things as they
appear to human consciousness" (Foy, 1974, p. 927). Thus
Husserl's main concern, according to Ellenberger (1958),
centered on "the descriptions of states of consciousness
in the purest form, as experienced by the subject" (p. 97).
It should not be surprising, therefore, that this subjective
emphasis attracted Binswanger's attention, as he thought to
get at the innermost feelings of the patient. Hence the
intentional directness of a phenomenon, combined with its
typical absence of prior assumptions, gave Binswanger the
methodology he needed for his alternative analysis. By
letting a phenomenon provide its own data through self-
description, the essential structure of the phenomenon is
revealed as it speaks for itself. Thus, phenomenology
could offer an understanding of the world of the patient, as
it is expressed by the patient himself, on his own terms

However, it is important to emphasize that "Existential
analysis does not restrict itself to the investigation of
states of consciousness, but takes into account the entire
structure of existence of the individual" (Ellenberger, 1958,
p. 121). Thus, as Ellenberger also points out, existential
analysis should be viewed as an extension of phenomenology
as it applies and integrates phenomenology within a larger frame of reference (Ellenberger, 1958).

Spiegelberg (1972) denotes, furthermore, that although Binswanger had become attracted to Husserl's idea of intentionality, that is, "a subject pointing to, intending an object" (Foy, 1974, p. 927), it was not until he discovered Husserl's transcendental phenomenology that he became overtly interested. Binswanger (1958) found the importance of utilizing the concept of transcendence in Heidegger's idea of being-in-the-world. Transcendence implies something toward which the transcendence (to pass or exceed beyond) is directed, i.e. "world" or one's world-design and, secondly, that which is being transcended, i.e. "the being itself" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 193). Hence, by identifying being-in-the-world with transcendence, Binswanger stresses the profound meaning of Heideggerian ontology. The important implication, Binswanger (1958) says, is that "the fatal defect of all psychology has been overcome and the road cleared for anthropology, the fatal defect being the theory of a dichotomy of world into subject and object" (p. 193).

Thus, Binswanger is avoiding studying human existence in a reductive sense as he attempts to replace the man-environment split by uniting them or, rather, going beyond the separate worlds of subject and object. In so doing, he seeks to establish a general context of meaning in each patient's existence by the aid of the transcendental category.
Binswanger and Heidegger

Already the most essential influence of Heidegger upon Binswanger has been discussed. This is the concept of being-in-the-world, which of course is the major ingredient in Binswanger's psychology, i.e. Daseinanalyse. The present author believes, therefore, it would be redundant to further expound on Heidegger's Dasein. Suffice to say, however, that Binswanger's intention in adopting Heidegger's ontology was purely to complement Freud's analytical techniques, as well as Husserl's phenomenology. Hence, as Needleman (1963) puts it, "Binswanger ... and his anthropology is rooted in Heidegger's ontology" (p. 150).

Moreover, as the next chapter of thesis will relate a particular case study of Binswanger's, Heidegger's meaning in the context of existential analysis should be obvious. Like any existentialist, Binswanger is particularly interested in the concept of time. Thus, the three worlds of his analysis constitute an important contribution to depth psychology. The forthcoming case is, therefore, in effect a study in time and space, distortion in an attempt to overcome death and life fears. Concurrently, this should bring further meaning to the insights of Kierkegaard, to whom Binswanger felt indebted (May et al., 1958).
The Case of Ellen West

This is the case of Ellen West, a schizophrenic personality, which Binswanger himself chose to exemplify and elucidate his Daseinanalyse. It has emerged as one of the most famous and controversial cases in existential psychotherapy (May et al., 1958). In personal communication with the present author, Dr. May further affirms this opinion as he points out that "the case of Ellen West is the most thoroughly misunderstood case to come from Europe" (May, 1975). Moreover, despite the seemingly impossible task of translating Binswanger's complex language into English, this particular case, nevertheless, became an important contribution to an anthology on existential psychology titled Existence (May et al., eds., 1958).

In the life of Ellen West we find a psychosis emerging underneath an obesity-phobia. This eventually takes a catastrophic turn when her life is becoming increasingly impoverished, up to the point where she decides to take her own life. Although the life of Ellen West only spanned some thirty years, her biography is nonetheless rich with poems, diaries, and other personal records. Before being admitted to the Kreuzlingen sanatorium, which Binswanger himself headed, Ellen had twice been diagnosed and treated by orthodox psychoanalysts. At Kreuzlingen she came under the care of Bleuler and Kraepelin, two early psychoanalytic authorities in Switzerland, the location of this sanatorium.
The existential analytical attempt of this case was done by Binswanger at a later date and is thus based on the above mentioned sources of information which he himself collected (May et al., 1958). Hence, there is no indication that Binswanger ever actively participated in the consultations with the individual, to whom he later gave the pseudonym Ellen West (Binswanger, 1958).

**Sickness-Unto-Death**

In a separate outline on existential analysis (Dasein-analyse), Binswanger (1960) denotes that the aim of this analytical approach is "to reinstate the human being in his full humanity, his existence, and his being-in-the-world" (p. 159). Thus what Binswanger is talking about is that any analysis of schizophrenia needs, first of all, to recognize "those critical moments which are moments of failure in the process of existence" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 160). In other words, what prevents the individual in question to live a life of being or a world of fruitful experience? Experience implies consequence, which in turn tells us of a flowing sequence of events. Thus it is within this world of sequential experiences that interruptions or disturbing gaps emerge. The schizophrenic usually responds to this vacuous world in a contradictory and irreconcilable fashion (Binswanger, 1960; 1963; Burton, 1960). What follows is that the person is unable to conduct his own life in a "normal" manner as he shuts himself off from others as well as himself. The
result is a deteriorization of the self, which rapidly approaches almost complete stagnation or a condition of immobility (Burton, 1960; Foy, 1974). As the schizophrenic attempts to move on within his confined world, he "shuts himself off from any possibility of a loving relatedness with men and the world about him" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 160). Hence, the person is slowly withdrawing into his Eigenwelt, as his view of Mitwelt and Umwelt becomes distorted.

The picture that emerges here is, of course, quite reminiscent of Kierkegaard's idea of sickness- unto-death, which was expounded on earlier in this paper (Kierkegaard, 1954). This is a transpositional concept in which death has taken the place of life in terms of becoming one's only hope or a way out of the suffering of life. But the terror or despair of this kind of situation is that one cannot die but has to go on being oneself. Thus, as Kierkegaard says "the hopelessness in this case is that even the last hope, death, is not available" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 151). The experience of this is therefore the real torment of despair, which is "the sickness- unto-death, this agonizing contradiction, this sickness in the self, everlastingly to die ... for dying means that it is all over, but dying the death means to live to experience death" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 151). This ambivalence or threshold of life and death is clearly what Ellen West suffered from. By recognizing this,
Binswanger simultaneously reveals his proximity to Kierkegaard (May et al., 1958).

**Misguided Ideal**

Binswanger emphasized the appearance of vacuums in a person's experiential continuance, which made it extremely difficult for the person to go on living. Nevertheless, the person invents a set of rigid either/or alternative solutions which, because they are unable to help him regain his uninterrupted sequence of experience, instead constitute what Binswanger calls "misguided ideals" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 160). As far as Ellen West is concerned, we find her obsession with maintaining slenderness to be her kind of misguided ideal. This, in turn, is rigidly contradicted by the mutually exclusive alternative of gaining weight. In order to maintain her misguided ideal, Ellen West invented all sorts of peculiar devices. Binswanger described this as "an attempted masking of the constantly threatening experience of contradiction" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 162).

As a whole then, these various forms of existence, with all their mannerisms and peculiarities, need to be understood as "the consequences of the breakdown in the sequential order of the experience and the resulting experience of existence with no exits" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 162). Now, Ellen West tried to escape her existential anxiety by desperately turning to her misguided ideal. The attempted masking had thus so far provided the necessary cover-up or
protection from the anxiety of not being able to cope with life. However, as soon as this masking process fails, no more cover or refuge exist and, consequently, the existential anxiety erupts completely and mercilessly.

**Time and Space**

As was mentioned at the outset, Ellen West did escape her agony by way of suicide. This decision is a crucial one, for understanding existential thought in psychotherapy and philosophy, but we must first understand the concepts of time and space in Ellen's life. They are important so far as they relate to Ellen's distortion of the three modes of existence, i.e. Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt. In turn, this will aid the understanding of the difficulties the person had in bringing harmony to her own life in the face of death.

To begin with, all the world-regions contained expressions of emptiness, constriction, loneliness, the self, and the longing for freedom. In Ellen's diaries and poems one finds numerous symbols and patterns that signify and express her various emotions. In the Umwelt, or the biological world around us, symbols such as darkness, night, and cold suggest limitation and emptiness. Frequently, however, Ellen pictures herself as being restricted and oppressed in a hole or tomb in which her self, a worm, no longer is capable of freedom. Thus, it is a hole of empty darkness as opposed to a sky singing of freedom or, as Binswanger
has it, the tomb-world versus the ethereal world (Binswanger, 1958; 1963). Within the Mitwelt, or the I-Thou relation, i.e. the world of one's fellow men, the hole not only means loneliness and seclusion but also the suffocating routine of everyday life, which Binswanger calls Alltag (1958), or Heidegger das Man (1962). Finally, in the Eigenwelt or the relationship to oneself, the longing for freedom is an urge for independence, defiance, indulgence, and the abandonment of ideals for the cowardly acceptance of compromises. The longing for freedom is seen in her desire to be thin but simultaneously being oppressed by layers of fat, which causes her to regard herself as "a mere tube for material filling-up and reemptying" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 367).

The Concept of Love

It is important to remember here that, because of Ellen's preoccupation with her body, her psychosis is less oriented toward the Mitwelt than toward the other two world-regions. This is seen in the fact that her ability to have love or friendship for others steadily decreased. Her body-preoccupation and the attempted masking thereof also prevented anybody from having what Binswanger calls "Mitwelt-intercourse" (Binswanger, 1960; 1963). By turning inward she had grown quite irritable and extremely sensitive, complaining that people did not want to help her, but rather preferred to see her suffer. These barriers that she increasingly built up accentuate the thoughts of Frieda
Fromm-Reichmann, a notable analyst, who after much experience with schizophrenics arrived at the conclusion that "schizophrenics were predisposed to require more love than other people" (Burton, 1960, p. 390).

In the case of Ellen West we find her Dasein or existence almost exclusively ruled by the life-death dichotomy, which, because of its particular individual nature, allows for almost no I-Thou love. This basically Christian concept of mutual love, of being human, Binswanger (1958) calls being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world, which to him signifies an extension of Heidegger's care (Sorge). Binswanger saw this, in contrast to his own love-term, as finite and limiting in its search for authenticity of the Dasein, one's own existence. Thus, by contributing this "being-We," Binswanger thought he had discovered something by-passed by Freud and others because, as he points out, "it is the authentic mode of being-human, the dual mode is the one most hidden, indeed the one most severely suppressed" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 312). By necessity, then, because this concept extends beyond-the-world, this mode restricts itself to time and space but instead implies eternity or a "meeting of I and Thou in the eternal moment of love" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 312).

Binswanger states that in Ellen's life there are moments when love is "at least shimmering through," which he says are Ellen West's "readiness for Thou" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 313).
Moreover, it is true that, as Binswanger (1958) says, "even the reader of her case history must have seen Ellen West not only as an object of interest but also as Thou" (p. 313). Certainly this further stresses his point of the subtle, ever-presence of mutual love. By delineating the difficulties Ellen West experienced in her Mitwelt world, we may well understand the extreme predominance of her Eigenwelt. She is completely entangled in her self-made or chosen net of bodily spheres, which on a deeper level comprise her existential alternatives. These are "deficient existential modes" and, in the final analysis also self-destructive, since instead of providing a way out to a rendez-vous with her lost being, they severe her existential crisis to the point where catastrophe is the only remaining solution (Binswanger, 1958; 1963).

The Death of Ellen West

We now arrive at perhaps the most crucial point in the life of Ellen West, namely when she decides to take her own life. So far she has been constantly torn between the fear of life and death or, as Binswanger would say, thrown between the realization of the tomb-world and the ethereal world (Binswanger, 1958; 1963). The following poem by Ellen gives us an opportunity to see exactly this. Furthermore, it reveals to us Ellen the artist as she, full of energy, paints her existential crisis in which we can detect, in particular, the suffering she finds herself in:
I'd like to die just as the birdling does
That splits his throat in highest jubilation;
And not to live as the worm on earth lives on,
Becoming old and ugly, dull and dumb!
No, feel for once how forces in me kindle,
And wildly be consumed in my own fire.

Although the above poem, as was indicated earlier, shows Ellen creating, there is also the indifference or the very dull and impersonal Alltag. She consoles in the fact that eventually, at some point in the future, death would release her from these chains. In her diary she writes longingly about this final event: "Such a delicious stretching out and dozing off. Then it's over. No more getting up and dreary working and planning ... Death is the greatest happiness in life, if not the only one. Without hope of the end of the life would be unendurable. Only the certainty that sooner or later the end must come consoles me a little" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 242-243).

Now the question arises, to what extent can suicide provide a meaningful exit? Binswanger responds that the only time when the sensing and knowing of love breaks through is in the face of death. It reveals a great deal about Ellen West, that in spite of the pressure of not being able to achieve this breakthrough in life, it still shows itself in the imminence of death. This is very much reminiscent of the being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world, which
literally tells this experience takes place in another dimension. Typically, this is an experience of extreme insight, and where time feels as if still, and every moment filled with pregnant meaning (May et al., 1958). That is what Tillich had in mind when he said that the "courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt" (Tillich, 1952, p. 190). The achievement of this stage reveals Being by way of courage. Tillich (1952) called it "God above God" (p. 186), when man has taken upon himself "the anxiety of meaninglessness" (p. 190) and thus transcended it.

"The God above God" or the experience of love beyond-being-in-the-world, that Tillich (1952) and Binswanger (1958) termed the authentic state of existence, seems to coincide amazingly with the final hours in the life of Ellen West. At this point, in midst of despair, she is very courageous as she decides to bring about an end to her torment. As soon as she had made up her mind to commit suicide, she is "as if transformed ... for the first time in thirteen years! - she is satisfied by her food and gets really full ... she reads poems by Rilke, Storm, Goethe, and Tennyson" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 267). On the following day she is dead, after taking poison the night before, and "she looked as she had never looked in life - calm and happy and peaceful" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 267). Did this sudden transformation in fact signify, through her courage, Ellen's
achievement of authenticity or individuation? Binswanger's approach and analysis is that she did. In spite of the anxiety, Ellen went beyond her dichotomous life-death anxiety and created, chose something strictly her own, namely the way she was going to die. And to choose one's course of life is very existential indeed.
Concluding Remarks

In light of the case of Ellen West, the similarities between all the thinkers mentioned appear to be quite substantial. To begin with, the four existentialists presented in the current thesis all seem to agree about the plight of man or his fundamental condition. Man's sense of life, they say, is tragic. And unless we cease evading death, by conforming to the everydayness of average man, we will never realize our potentialities. Hence, what is required of the individual is the courage or will to stand up and face the fact of mortality. As we realize our finitude, life suddenly becomes dear and potentially meaningful. It is the "throwness" or the feeling of being-cast-into-world, as Heidegger calls it, that overwhelms the individual with both life and death fears. And it is out of proper or creative choosing that he has the possibility to go beyond himself or his own individuality.

Although the four authors of different existential-humanistic schools speak with a different tongue or perspective, their languages appear to coincide. An important exception is Binswanger who, of course, primarily views himself as a methodologist. Thus, one finds Binswanger talks very little about the life/death fear as such as he seeks to establish a phenomenological anthropology and, hence, seems more inclined to wanting to go beyond the three modes of worlds (Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt). On the
other hand, both to Kierkegaard and Rank, the problem of duality emerges. Hence, Rank's neurotic artist basically suffers from sickness unto death, as he is seen as being thrown between either fear of life or fear of death. As has been pointed out earlier, sickness unto death is what Ellen West suffered from, until the amazing thing happens when she realizes that she possesses the potentials to create something unique beyond life and death.

Consequently, if Ellen is viewed as the artist, it would appear correct to analyze her in terms of creativity. Her problem as an artist is that she does not possess the creative courage to express herself fruitfully. It is as if nothingness held a firm grip on her, the more amazing then, when she discovers her own immortality beyond the earth-bound. On this dimension we have seen all the theorists express themselves. Thus both Kierkegaard and Heidegger talk about the enrichment and fulfillment of Self or Being, either by way of faith or care. Binswanger seems to go a step beyond Heidegger, as he emphasizes his love concept as the potential source of eternal authenticity. Finally, Rank explains that the rational and irrational forces combine to move individuality beyond itself.

The significance of Ellen West's life, hence, appears to boil down to those few moments before her physical death. Perhaps Martin Buber in his I and Thou (1958) tells it all:
"The word of revelation is I am that I am. That which reveals is that which reveals. That which is is, and nothing more. The eternal source of strength streams, the eternal contact persists, the eternal voice sounds forth, and nothing more" (p. 112).
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