The Campaign Strategies of Candidate Richard Fulton in Nashville's 1975 Mayoral Race

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THE CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES OF CANDIDATE RICHARD FULTON
IN NASHVILLE'S 1975 MAYORAL RACE

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THE CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES OF CANDIDATE RICHARD FULTON
IN NASHVILLE'S 1975 MAYORAL RACE

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Communication and Theatre
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Debra A. Braselton
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................. v

Chapter One: LOCAL BOY COMES HOME: CONGRESSMAN FULTON
RUNS FOR MAYOR--NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, 1975 ........ 1
Rationale ............................................................ 1
Review of Literature .................................................. 3
Political Climate ...................................................... 13

Chapter Two: LOCAL BOY SPEAKS: CANDIDATE FULTON'S
RHETORICAL STRATEGIES .......................................... 18

Chapter Three: LOCAL BOY WINS! RICHARD FULTON, MAYOR,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, 1975 ................................. 38

Appendix A: Transcript of Excerpts from Video Tapes
Acquired from WTVF, Channel 5, Nashville ......... 55

Appendix B: Transcript of Interview with Candidate Fulton .... 61

Appendix C: Copy of the Candidate's Inaugural Address,
September 2, 1975 .................................................. 71

Appendix D: Total Votes in 1975 Mayoral Election .......... 72

Appendix E: Copy of Poll Used in Fulton Campaign .......... 73

Appendix F: Letter Sent with Poll in Fulton Campaign .... 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................. 75
Because of the increasing importance of local government in America's cities, it is worthwhile to note what factors influence the election of our local leaders. This study sought to isolate the communication factors and rhetorical strategies which influenced the election of Mayor Richard Fulton in Nashville's 1975 Mayoral Race.

Data was gathered from the written and video media, a private interview with the candidate, and campaign materials. Research also provided the candidate's previous political background.

Various factors in Nashville's 1975 Mayoral Race combined to produce an insightful episode in rhetorical and nonrhetorical communication campaign strategies. During the initial stages of the study, emphasis was placed on the rhetorical strategies of candidate Richard Fulton, and to a lesser degree, those of his opponent, Earl Hawkins. As the study progressed, it became increasingly evident that although rhetorical strategies were influential in Fulton's campaign victory, the major reason for his political success could not be totally attributed to his campaign speaking. After acknowledging that fact, a search throughout the available data began to determine what factors were responsible for his ultimate campaign success. It was found that the raising of the candidate's ethos was the most influential campaign factor.
Evidence throughout the available data documented over and over again the conclusion that Richard Fulton built an attractive image appealing to Nashville's voters. Fulton's rhetorical content and past experiences served to communicate this "winning image." It was revealed that:

1. The national and local political situation was favorable to the image which Fulton projected,
2. Fulton's ethos was very high,
3. Fulton's image was the chief factor in this successful campaign, and
4. Fulton's rhetorical strategies were in accord with the majority of Nashville's voters' attitudes.

Because specific categories have not been formed by the communication community pertaining to the political candidate's image, this study has been one of discovery and new insight in the area of local politics. A proper rhetorical analysis could not simply proffer an evaluation of traditional aspects of speaking, such as ethos, logos, and pathos. Truly these categories enter the campaign on an important level, but with the increasing role of the media, even in local campaigns, new categories need to be developed and explored.

It is the hope of the writer that this particular study will encourage greater interest and future investigations into the local political workings in our cities, particularly those in the South. Why are the Americans of each city choosing their particular leaders? What role is public rhetoric playing in the local choice? How is the media affecting those choices on the local level? Is the American public being "sold" a false image by local politicians due to local advertising, and if so, how might greater public speaking help to dispell
these misleading images? These are just a few questions which may stir future interest in pursuing the rhetorical study of our nation's many, local political campaigns and their place in the future development of the contemporary South.
LOCAL BOY COMES HOME: CONGRESSMAN FULTON RUNS FOR MAYOR—NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, 1975

A major problem in this country is loss of faith in government, and loss of morale of the people. Dick Fulton is the one candidate who can start his administration with the backing of a wide spectrum of people from the rich to the poor, from stiff-collared, black-suited executives in tall buildings to bearded guitar pickers on Music Row. He has the ear of all and can pull all of us together in unity.1

The Nashville Banner, July 11, 1975 formally endorsed Richard Fulton for mayor of Nashville. More importantly, the people of America's "Music City" cast their vote in favor of Congressman Fulton.

What were the reasons behind Richard Fulton's overwhelming success over his major opponent, Earl Hawkins, in the 1975 mayoral race? It is the purpose of this project to evaluate selected persuasive dimensions in the campaign speaking of Richard Fulton that promoted his success in the 1975 mayoral election of Nashville, Tennessee.

RATIONALE

The proposed study is unique in several ways. Since Georgia's famous peanut farmer, President Carter, entered the White House, the South has gained widespread National popularity. Nashville, Tennessee is considered one of the South's major cities in regards to transportation, religious printing industry, education, and country music.

1Editorial, Nashville Banner, July 11, 1975, p. 12.
Nashville is the capital of Tennessee and its second largest city. The city has long been known as the "Athens of the South." Therefore, the man chosen to lead this important southern city, and the reasons for his selection, should interest southerners in particular and men of political persuasion in general.

Mr. Fulton's past career as a Tennessee Senator, as a thirteen-year Congressman, and as a declared candidate in the 1979 Tennessee Gubernatorial Race makes him a significant target for study by the political sciences as well as by the entire speech community. Because this study is the first rhetorical evaluation of its kind of a southern, local politician, it is doubly unique in nature. However, perhaps the strongest rationale for evaluating the persuasive dimensions of Fulton's mayoral campaign is its relationship to the plight of America's cities. An editorial printed in the Nashville Tennessean expresses the concern Nashvillians share for the future success of their city:

... America's cities stand at a crossroads. With some of them already facing bankruptcy, hundreds of others are on their way to major financial trouble. Nashville may not be facing an immediate fiscal crunch, but the day is not far off when the city's leaders will be forced to choose between increased taxes or drastically reduced services."

No rhetorical studies have focused on a southern, local mayoral campaign. Rather, the bulk of research has concentrated on evaluating the major political figures, such as presidents, senators, and governors. In light of the continuing growth and problems of our nation's cities, it seems that the success or failure of these cities depends largely upon their elected leadership.

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Chapter one consists of a review of literature stressing the uniqueness of this project, methods of research, and a discussion of the political climate in Nashville at the time of the campaign. Because of the absence of mayoral and similar local studies, this review focuses on what exists as parallel research, i.e., senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns from the 1950's to the present.

By example, Stephen Boyd concentrates on the various campaign speaking strategies of Frank Clement in the 1954 Gubernatorial Campaign of Tennessee. Boyd's article discusses the integral role Clement's delivery played in the three successful campaigns of which Clement participated. Methods used to formulate conclusions included personal background research of the candidate, and interviews with close associates of Clement.3

Boyd concludes that the following factors showed a strong relation to the success of Clement's campaign speaking:

1. his training in the Shipp School of Expression,
2. his extroverted personality,
3. his appearance,
4. his treatment of public speaking as a performance, and
5. his evangelistic approach to campaigning.

In another article, Boyd analyzes "identification" in the 1954 Tennessee primary. First, the author gives a brief explanation of the term "identification" as used by Kenneth Burke. The remainder of the

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4Ibid. 290.
paper deals with the relation of Burke's identification to the campaign rhetoric of Frank Clement.\(^5\)

James S. Taylor evaluates John M. Patterson's campaign speaking in the 1958 Alabama Democratic Primary in his doctoral dissertation. Taylor analyzes Patterson's speaking in terms of artistic perfection, immediate surface response, and delayed response. Analysis of the candidate's speaking showed his style to be direct and simple, yet often disorganized, lacking in conciseness, awkwardly phrased, and with various grammatical errors.

In spite of these speaking difficulties, the immediate response to the candidate was favorable, as seen through public opinion polls. Whereas the opponent, George Wallace, appealed to the industrial money-makers of Alabama, Patterson received the "grass roots" support. Major daily papers backed Wallace while the rural weeklies supported Patterson. Election returns showed the delayed response toward Patterson to be favorable, also.\(^6\)

In his dissertation of the gubernatorial campaign speaking of Mills Godwin, Virginia, 1965, Max Graeber includes historical and biographical research, and seven selected speeches representing various audiences. The speeches were analyzed according to the Aristotelian methods of logos, pathos, and ethos. In addition, Graeber held personal interviews with Godwin and his staff. Graeber concludes that the candidate "makes an excellent appearance, has above average


content, and with his superior voice he must be rated very high among political speakers."

In his dissertation, A. Alley discusses the relationship between speeches delivered and the seven geographic districts in Kentucky. Louie Broady Nunn delivered the speeches in the 1967 Kentucky Gubernatorial Race. The seven geographic districts were analyzed for sociological composition of the population and voting reactions. Then, Alley studied the candidate's speeches to see if they changed in relation to the setting. Conclusions of data revealed that Nunn did not relate his speaking to demographic profiles. Nunn felt that the media aired most of his stances on the issues. Nunn also did most of his speaking before special interest groups rather than in specific demographic parts of the state.

In his dissertation, Thomas Holland studied Tennessee's "Grey Fox," Senator Albert Gore. In the 1970 Senatorial campaign for reelection, Holland focused on the persuasive efforts of Senator Gore in the following speech situations: (1) the traditional speaker-audience setting, (2) political debate speaking, (3) political stump speaking, and (4) speaking over radio and television.

The basic issue, as concluded by the author, was of a philosophical nature pertaining to the question of what an elected senatorial representative should do and be. Senator Gore proposed a dual role: the representative should not only reflect the wishes of his


constituents, but should also provide enlightened leadership for them.

In a study of the 1971 Mississippi Gubernatorial Campaign, Emma King attempted to determine whether there was evidence of the race issue in either candidates' campaign discourse. In addition, an experiment was conducted to decide whether there were racial differences in the campaign discourse as perceived by black and white Mississippians. King tested a biracial group of college students for connotations and denotations within sample prose works to form control data from which contrasts to the two candidates' (Evers and Wallers) writings were drawn. King found the racial issue to be evident in the campaign, and that while Wallers' rhetoric ignored the racial issue, Evers' did not. 9

Joseph Stearns conducted a study of the Texas Gubernatorial Campaign of 1968. The purpose of the dissertation was to, first, examine the newspaper coverage of selected speeches of Paul Eggers to determine how much of what the candidate said was reported. Then, Stearns sought to determine the accuracy of the reporting and, finally, to find out whether or not the candidate relied on one basic speech throughout the campaign. 10

John M. Cornett described the speaking in the 1968 Senatorial Primary in Florida. Both LeRoy Collins and Earl Faircloth were high

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10 Joseph C. Stearns, "An Analysis of Selected Speeches and Relevant Newspaper Coverage of the Political Campaign Communication of Paul Eggers, Texas Republican Gubernatorial Candidate." Dissertation Abstracts (81/07-A) 3687.
credibility politicians. Collins, however, was favored to win because of his involvement in Florida politics.

Methods of investigation in Cornett's study include traveling with both candidates, obtaining audio tapes of campaign speaking, television schedules, and official campaign reports, the collection of articles and materials by the candidates, and interviews with the candidates, their staff, newsman, campaign workers, and political experts. Collins emphasized his own leadership ability as his primary theme. Faircloth stressed the primary concern of Florida voters in 1968--law and order.11

Michael Adams' dissertation concerned the 1972 Senatorial Campaign of Tennessee. Adams sought to isolate the major ideas expressed by Senator Howard Baker in adapting to the voters of Tennessee. Effects of the campaign speaking were determined through observation of the campaign, campaign materials, local newspaper analyses, examples of media exposure, and personal interviews with the Senator and his staff. Adams reached five main conclusions:

1. Baker's role as an incumbent aided his effort.
2. The Senator's rhetorical strategies were closely in tune with the attitudes of Tennessee voters.
3. Baker's ethos was very high.
4. The political situation was favorable to the strategies which Baker formulated.
5. Baker's campaign was well-planned and heavily financed.12

Stacy Myers also conducted a study of Howard Baker's rhetorical strategies with a focus on Baker's Senatorial campaigns of 1966 and 1972. The purpose of the dissertation was to show the sociopolitical situation of the day, to show the main issues involved in both campaigns, and to highlight the success of the senator's public speaking. Myers reached some of the same conclusions as Adams did in his study and added that Baker offered positive solutions to the issues of the day in each campaign.\(^{13}\)

In an article by Gerald Sanders, the public speaking of Governor George Wallace and Governor Jimmy Carter was compared and contrasted in light of the rhetoric of the South. The study was conducted in the early seventies and was divided into four sections. First, Sanders gave a description and the background of the two speeches under study. Then the author critically compared treatment of the issues by the two speakers, gave a general discussion of the rhetorical techniques used, and provided implications of the analysis in the conclusion.

Wallace is viewed as the aggressive rhetorician of the South, whereas Carter is seen as the typical, moderate Southern politician. Wallace uses the techniques of ad hominen attacks against the Supreme Court, the press, other government officials, Communists, left-wing groups, and Congress. Carter, on the other hand, completely lacks the attack technique in his speaking. Carter appeals to the pride of Georgians and to their sense of fairness. Both speeches include patriotic introductions, yet differ in the total content.\(^{14}\)


Stephen A. Smith and Jimmie N. Rogers presented a paper to the Southern Speech Communication Association concerning the rhetoric of William Fulbright during the 1974 Senatorial Primary in Arkansas. The purpose of the paper was to analyze the campaign rhetoric and explain the victory of Dale Bumpers even though Fulbright outspent him three to one. Because there seemed to be no real issues involved in the campaign, pre-existing images of the candidates became the central issue. The authors studied first the pre-campaign images of the two candidates, observed how these images reacted with the few issues of the campaign, and finally described how these images came to be the central issue of the campaign.

Whereas Fulbright stressed his experience and good reputation, Bumpers cited the past failures of the present government and asked that new faces and ideas be put into office. Fulbright's image was one of being the senior Senator, which paradoxically marked him as old. He was seen as an important man in Washington, which also marked him as too distant from his constituents at home. Bumpers was seen as a young, friendly man who was concerned about the problems of the Arkansas citizen. The image of Bumpers was obviously the deciding factor for a majority of voters.\(^\text{15}\)

Larry James Winn and Carl L. Kell also studied the rhetoric of a senatorial incumbent in the 1974 Kentucky race. The purpose of the

study was to "analyze the rhetorical strategies of an underdog incumbent."16 The paper gives an overview of the campaign of Senator Marlow Cook, shows what went wrong with the campaign, and discusses implications for further study of political campaigns.

In the final analysis, Cook seemed doomed for failure from the beginning. The authors report that because of family problems, the Senator started the campaign at a later date than desirable. Cook was rather disgusted with the political scene and was not very enthusiastic about another long campaign. These attitudes cut his chances for success tremendously. Other factors listed by the authors for Cook's loss were:

1. the internal campaign lacked professional leadership,
2. the opposition stressed the Senator's absence from Kentucky, while the issues concerned local factors,
3. the fast pace of the campaign resulted in Cook giving too many unprepared speeches,
4. due to finances, Cook made only half the use of the television as his opponent, and
5. the Democrats, who held a two-to-one edge among Kentucky voters, were united.17

Of all the literature researched, only one study concerned a mayoral election, and this one was not in a southern city. Estelle Zannes conducted an analysis of the 1967 Mayoral Campaign of Cleveland, Ohio, in her dissertation. The author analyzed one of the formal speeches of the two candidates (Carl Stokes and Seth Taft) and the events and conditions which led to the development of certain rhetorical


17 Ibid. 6.
strategies. In addition, an evaluation was made of the effects of the strategies on the campaign, the candidates, and the election.

The methodology of the Stokes-Taft study included interviewing the candidates and their managers, news reporters and editors, and audience members, as well as being a participant-observer. Formal speech texts, campaign literature, and a statistical analysis of voter outcomes are also included in the study. An especially interesting aspect of the study is the reflection that statements made by the voters on election day showed an awareness of the differences in the candidates' speaking and the ways in which their speaking helped or hindered themselves.18

In "Political Myth: The Image and the Issue," Dan Hahn and Ruth Gonchar stress the fallacy of academicians in looking towards issues rather than images in rhetorical studies of political campaigns.19 The authors present statistics which show that the "character," or image of a candidate is the most influential factor contributing to a voter's decision. Emphasis is placed on four major points:

1. Elections are held by the calendar. Often, because of a lack of "real" issues, issues are manufactured by the candidates.
2. Even if there are recognizable issues, the politicians' positions are often unclear, thereby confusing the voters.
3. Complaints are often registered that the candidates or their stances are "too much alike."

4. Issues are often avoided and undeveloped, allowing candidates to remain as neutral as possible.\(^{20}\)

The authors argue that since candidates select issues according to their own personality and world view, then we should look to that personality for our voting decision. The writers also contend that the image contains a nonverbal element that eludes complete identification, but is the real basis for the majority of our impressions of others. It is this image that we should view in the candidate running for office, and vote for the image we believe in.

Anderson agrees with Hahn and Gonchar that the primary clues to electoral competition are the images of the candidates. Anderson provides "The Characterization Model for Rhetorical Criticism of Political Image Campaigns." This model stresses that images are "perceptual phenomena allocated by members of an electorate as a means of assigning order and meaning to a complex and ambiguous political environment."\(^{21}\) The author clarifies that issues and images are not mutually exclusive, but that those scholars who only talk about issues may "miss the real political drama exhibited in election campaign."\(^{22}\)

The review of literature suggests various avenues for the present study. This study aims at presenting an analysis of the campaign image, rhetoric and strategies of a local, southern mayoral candidate, Mr. Richard Fulton.

\(^{20}\) Ibid. 58.


\(^{22}\) Ibid. 86.
The political climate of late 1974 and early 1975 in Nashville was affected by several situations. At the national level, the mistrust created by the Watergate Scandal left the people in numbed shock. At the local level, however, Democrat Mayor Beverly Briley enjoyed a reputation of sincere interest and concern for Nashville Metro citizens.

Nashville's major newspapers credited Mayor Briley with much of Metro's recent success. Even though the Nashville Banner had often criticized Mayor Briley's actions, he received words of praise upon leaving the office of mayor:

Under Beverly Briley's leadership, Metro Nashville has grown and progressed and become better ... Briley can leave office secure in the knowledge that his leadership was what made the difference.²³

The Tennessean offered similar comments and added that Briley's leadership had been very open and straightforward.²⁴

Briley declared that 1975 was a time when the people "embittered and disillusioned by past headlines" no longer really expected much from their leaders. With this undertone of national political dissatisfaction, candidate Richard Fulton entered the local political landscape. How would Richard Fulton fit into the metro Nashville picture?

As a Congressman from the fifth district of Tennessee, Fulton had already gained a reputation of unfailing sincerity. Auer refers to this as "ascribed ethos."²⁵ Throughout his career Fulton introduced bills aiding specific groups in his district, thereby helping nearly

²⁴ Wayne Whitt. "Mayor Briley Swings into His Last Year," Tennessean, August 18, 1976, p. 2B.
all his constituents at one time or another. For example, in the Fall of 1971, Congressman Fulton introduced legislation that authorized the sale of thirty-eight acres of government land to a lodge of the Nashville Fraternal Order of Police to be used as a camp for underprivileged youth.26 These activities, as well as other charitable acts, made Richard Fulton a friend of businessmen, veterans, farm workers, educators, and many other groups.

When Fulton announced his intentions of running in the Nashville mayoral election, many people questioned his motives. They wondered why a Congressman making $42,500.00 yearly would want a $25,000.00 job as mayor unless there was something "crooked" about him. Richard Fulton answered these questions by comparing a legislator's power with a local administrator's power. He commented that as a legislator, it might be years before something appears in which you have a deep interest, whereas, as a local administrator, "I would be able to say 'we are going to do . . .' and actually do them."27

Candidate Richard Fulton looked to the city's and the citizens' needs as a basis for his campaign rhetoric. In a letter mailed to every registered voter in Davidson County, the candidate listed thirteen issues on which he polled citizens. The people were asked to check the issues which concerned them most. (Appendix A is a copy of that poll.)


As well as seeking the voters' viewpoints, Fulton sought to air his personal areas of concern through a series of releases to the press. Fulton's campaign concerns included: crime, street repair, education, sewers, a youth "runaway" unit, war on narcotics, and the flooding problem. The candidate then offered positive action plans to be implemented if he were elected as mayor.

According to the Nashville Banner, Fulton ran his campaign from a low-key, but sincere base. The Banner declared that Fulton's campaign was one of "dignity," seriousness," "sincere desire to serve this community," "honesty," and "the will to work."\textsuperscript{28} Likewise, the Tennessean, usually in opposition to the Banner in political matters, characterized Fulton's campaign as "quiet, efficient, and economical."\textsuperscript{29} These characterizations were extremely important, especially when contrasted with the "desperate" tactics attributed to Fulton's opponent, Earl Hawkins, later in the campaign.

All of these perceptions of candidate Fulton's political character provide a feeling for the political climate which Richard Fulton faced in 1975. However, the candidate also encountered a politically frustrated and disillusioned public in regards to the national government. Locally, the public was rather apathetic toward metro government, with no real strong feelings toward issues. Nashvillians were looking for someone who could take the place of a successful Mayor Beverly Briley, leading their city in the direction of sustained growth and progress—but without uncertain, radical changes in the process.

\textsuperscript{28} Editorial, "In Richard Fulton, There Is Leadership." Nashville Banner, August 5, 1975, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{29} Wayne Whitt. "Low Key, Low Financed Race for Metro Mayor." Tennessean, August 3, 1975, p. 18.
METHODOLOGY

Data sources to be used to arrive at conclusions are as follows:

1. Newspaper articles from both major newspapers,
2. Campaign-related material,
3. Written and video documentation of actual campaign speaking as provided by Channel 5, WTVP of Nashville, Tennessee and by the office of Mayor Fulton.
4. A public opinion poll conducted by Sam McPherson, assistant to candidate Fulton,
5. A personal interview with the candidate and staff members, and,
6. Views of oppositional critics of the candidate through video, films, and newspaper accounts.

Although most of the sources were available and utilized, some sources could not be employed due to lack of finances and/or time. A personal interview was obtained from the candidate, Richard Fulton, but staff members were not available due to work schedules. (The transcript of the interview with Mr. Fulton appears in full, as Appendix B.) The only views of open critics of candidate Fulton came from his major opponent, Earl Hawkins. Hawkins' remarks were taken from video tapes as well as newspaper articles.

In summary, from the methodologies reported, a review of literature, and the discussion of the political climate prior to the campaign, we get a feel for what is about to take place. How has Richard Fulton handled campaigns in the past? What has been his key
to success and reasons for failure in previous campaigns? Will he differ in his strategies in the mayoral campaign of 1975 from previous campaigns? These are among the questions we will attempt to answer in Chapter 2 as we examine the rhetorical strategies of candidate Richard Fulton.
EnTRing the poLiTical aRena

Richard Fulton's record in the political arena was not one of consistent success. Fulton was unseated in 1953 because he had not yet reached his thirty-fifth birthday which was the minimum legal age for a state senator. Fulton tried to regain nomination for the Tennessee Senate in 1956 and lost.

In 1958 Fulton ran for the senate again and won. He served for two years and then ran for Congress in 1960. He was defeated, reportedly hurt by charges that he was supported and influenced by teamster leader, Jimmy Hoffa, and other gangsters.

Entering his third congressional primary in 1962, Fulton lost by only seventy-two votes. A scandal developed when a ward politician allegedly stole the vote by mishandling absentee ballots, in favor of Fulton's opponent. State and federal investigations began and both candidates ran as independents with Richard Fulton subsequently winning the fifth congressional seat by 30,000 votes. 2


2 Ibid. 2.
There were several reasons for Fulton's failures in campaigns prior to 1975. Fulton was criticized in past campaigns for a lack of leadership on controversial issues. For example, the conflict over busing in 1971 brought strong criticism towards Fulton because he failed to provide "leadership on the school integration issue." However, records confirm that in September of 1971 Fulton gave a "special report" on busing and studied the subject for two weeks on his weekly television show.

Another costly mistake in previous campaigns (1956 and 1960) was Fulton's association with private corporations and other large, private contributors. As previously mentioned, Fulton was accused of being strongly influenced by hoodlums. Fulton demonstrated in the 1975 mayoral race, however, that he had learned from his previous mistakes.

One of the keys to the success of Fulton in former campaigns has been attributed to a "sympathy vote." Personal tragedies aroused sympathy from a variety of voters. In 1969 Fulton's wife, Jewel, was found dead—an apparent suicide. Only thirteen months later, 18-year-old Barry Fulton drowned during a fishing trip. Additionally, the boy was a victim of cerebral palsy.

The "sympathy vote" does not appear to be a strategy of the candidate; rather, the vote is viewed as a derived effect of tragedy. Fulton's reactions to tragedy, however, added to his political appeal. Fulton not only survived his misfortune without becoming embittered

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3Ibid. 4.


5Tennessean, January 17, 1970.
and withdrawn, but was seen as an "overcomer" and a man of great inner strength.

Another positive aspect of the candidate's previous campaigns was the attention given to publicity. Fulton's older sister, Wyadine Fulton Thornton, ran the fifth district and credited Fulton's "high visibility" as a prime factor for his success. In a personal interview, she related that, as a congressman, Fulton stayed in the district 165 days a year. In addition, four radio stations and two television stations carried his weekly "Fulton Report," a five-minute summary of his legislative activities. Seasonal mailings of his newsletters were sent to the then 185,000 families in the district. Specific groups, such as police, teachers and veterans, received special reports of Fulton's latest accomplishments. 6

During previous campaigns Fulton also received favorable coverage from the areas most influential paper, The Nashville Tennessean. Former opponents, Republicans Bill Spann and George Kelly, reported that the paper's support was a tremendous asset to Fulton's success. 7 Richard Fulton gained the support from both The Nashville Tennessean and The Nashville Banner in the 1970 campaign.

In essence, Fulton's early cognizance of the media's political influence gave him a decided edge over those who were less aware. The candidate's 1972 campaign statement, "After ten years your congressman is still as near to you as your telephone," 8 evidenced a keen perception

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6Citizens Look at Congress. 2.

7Ibid. 2.

8Representative Richard Fulton, 1972 Campaign Flier, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
as to the wants of the voters and the importance that the media convey his message to the voters. This consciousness became especially effective during the 1975 mayoral race.

1975 RHETORICAL STRATEGIES OF MAYORAL CANDIDATE RICHARD FULTON

The mayoral contest of 1975 evidenced several rhetorical strategies by candidate Fulton. As early as January 17, 1975, reporters speculated as to who would enter the contest. An article in The Nashville Banner suggested the "possible candidacy of Fulton." However, Fulton's response about a decision to run was not very revealing—"I've got too much to do."9

"Suspense" rates high as one of the seven "attention-getting devices" among communications experts and scholars. Fulton relied heavily upon suspense concerning his declaration of candidacy. While other candidates, including Fulton's major opponent, proclaimed their intentions to run loud and early, Fulton kept rather silent. When asked about the declaration, Fulton replied, "It is not always to one's best political interest to tell all too soon."10

Fulton's suspenseful strategy continued throughout the months before the campaign. On January 29 the Banner published another article espousing Fulton's candidacy:

A lot of politician-watchers say Fulton has no real intention of running. A group, much smaller, but with considerable political influence, says he's still a possibility.11


10Personal interview with Richard Fulton, November 1977, p. 65.

In February, the candidate was reported as "keeping an open mind about the race."12 By April, there was still no public word from Representative Fulton concerning his possible candidacy. Allen Green, Banner reporter, offered several conclusions regarding the race and Fulton's participation in it. The most interesting conclusion Green reported was that Fulton was a "stalking horse"13 who blurred the true candidacy picture. In the latter part of April, Fulton was reported as "giving serious consideration"14 to the mayoral office. Finally, Richard Fulton filed his official qualifying petitions on June 20, 1975. The qualification deadline was June 28, 1975. Representative Fulton and County Court Clerk Earl Hawkins were viewed as the two major contenders. Minor candidates include: Cohen, a small businessman; Rev. James Price; Jessie McDonald, the black representative; and "Red" McEwen, a Nashville musician.15

As mentioned, Richard Fulton relied on suspense to gain public interest and exposure. An objective search within the written media revealed that Richard Fulton was mentioned five times as often as was Fulton's primary opponent, Earl Hawkins, in the early prequalification months. It was known that Earl Hawkins would be running for mayor for he had made an early declaration. In fact, Hawkins even began to

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13Allen Green, "Field Open in Mayoral Derby," Nashville Banner, April 14, 1975, p. 17.
14Frank Van Der Linden, "Fulton Plans Candidacy Answer Well Before Deadline," Nashville Banner, April 23, 1975, p. 72.
comment on various issues quite early in the campaign. On the other hand, examples from the media have shown that the candidacy of Richard Fulton was an unknown factor in the early months before the campaign, and that his declaration would be a newsworthy announcement, in the event that it materialized.

Fulton successfully built, step-by-step, speculative suspense approaching the qualification date. Early denials of candidacy intentions gave way to "serious considerations" and finally to the candidacy declaration. This advanced publicity given freely by the media placed Richard Fulton before the voters more frequently than did the one-time announcement offered by Earl Hawkins months before the vote was to take place.

Another strategy implemented by Fulton was his responsive action toward the media or public constituents. An issue was raised early in the campaign which might have been harmful for Fulton if he had not acted quickly. The Nashville Federated Republican's Women's Club announced, through the media, their feeling that Fulton should resign from Congress in order to run for mayor. The members claimed that Fulton could save the taxpayers $65,000.00 by resigning early. Fulton responded to the announcement immediately. He indicated that, if elected, he would resign his congressional post "the following day." He refused, however, to resign before the outcome of the election, as he claimed it would be impossible to hold an election at the present time.


17"Fulton Vows Quick Resignation," Tennessean, July 17, 1975, p. 28.
One could surmise from this first issue that Fulton was a man of immediacy and straightforward action. He did not ignore the issue, hoping that it would fade into the background. He simply began his campaign letting the public know his stand on the issue at hand.

A politician's image is always an important aspect of the campaign, one that many political evaluators consider the most important. Through his own political rhetoric, campaign literature, and the testimony of others, the candidate established a multi-faceted image. He was seen by voters as sincerely concerned for Metro citizens, experienced in government leadership, hardworking, and religious.

Richard Fulton evidenced concern for Metro citizens in various ways. The candidate first sent out a poll listing thirteen issues on which voters were asked to indicate the issues which concerned them most. Fulton declared that a good response would be helpful in order to know on which problems to concentrate first.18

In addition to sending a poll, Fulton decided to inform citizens concerning his stance on several issues through the print media. In regards to drug pushers, Fulton proclaimed, "We want the dope pushers off our streets, out of our schools, and in jail where they belong."19 Fulton also declared that he would give priority attention to crime in the streets:

We want our streets free of muggers and purse-snatchers so that our women and our elderly people can go to the stores and shop without fear of becoming a statistic on

our reports on crime. . . We're going to get every federal dollar we can for this all-out fight against crime, and we're going to make progress.20

Fulton also spoke progressively on transportation,21 education,22 and other areas. Fulton believed the voters should know his beliefs, at the same time seeking to make his beliefs consistent with theirs.

Fulton's decision to release his stances in print impressed at least the media, and probably many voters. An editorial from The Nashville Banner assessed:

His (Fulton's) assessments of Nashville's needs and his ability to meet those needs has been realistic and honest. He has presented approaches to problems that must bear careful consideration. And in meeting those problems, he has not said that taxes will not go up. . . He has a deep interest in his city—in our city, in seeing that it provides the best for its citizens.23

Fulton possessed the ability to communicate his desires for Nashville and its people as one addressing an old and trusted friend. He used rhetoric in a positive way, never expounding upon the problems of the city without proposing a solution.

In regards to the problem of a traffic tie-up on Interstate 65, Fulton indicated that immediate action needed to be taken. Fulton added that high gasoline prices and the frustration of citizens and tourists caused by the bottleneck necessitated a solution. But he did not stop there. Fulton went on to provide both a short-term and a permanent,

20"Fulton Says He'd Lead Crime Fight," Tennessean, July 8, 1975, p. 16.


long-range solution. It was this sort of handling of Metro's problems which helped to inspire the Nashvillians' votes.

During a personal interview, Richard Fulton told of a popularity poll conducted by Sam McPherson, an assistant to Mr. Fulton. Fulton revealed that each councilmatic district was polled and that the poll accurately predicted, within one percentage point, the number, or percentage, of votes which were later received in the election. The poll also accurately predicted in which districts Fulton was or was not popular. Although a copy of the poll was not available, questions asked in the poll were provided by a telephone interview. The questions were: (1) Do you plan to vote on August 5?, (2) What do you consider the greatest issues?, (3) For whom do you plan to vote?

Others who knew Richard Fulton personally also helped to advance his image of concern. In The Nashville Banner, Frank VanDerLinden reported a list of reasons for Fulton's running as viewed by his congressional associates: "(1) A desire to serve his constituents, (2) Ambition for future statewide office, and (3) Fatigue from the Congressional rat race." Democrat Ed Jones of Yorkville said of the candidate: "Fulton certainly has done much to enhance the image of Tennessee with his dedication to public service here in Washington. . . I know he truly loves Nashville and its people." Mrs. Fulton added


26 Ibid. 33.
to the testimonies, "I know it sounds corny, but Dick is really a devoted public servant."  

Fulton not only expressed his concern for Nashvillians, but was vitally interested in their ideas. In many speeches throughout the campaign, Fulton communicated a need to know the voters' wishes and desires. At one assembly of Fulton supporters, a crowd estimated between 5,000 and 10,000, the candidate pleaded,

> I want and need your thoughts to add to mine. I want your dreams to combine with mine. I want your help to make them a reality. I want 500,000 advisers, as we all come together to meet the challenges which lie ahead of us in the next four years.  

Fulton also sought to make his audience feel a total, necessary part of his campaign and the upcoming election. He continually drew his listeners into a "we" partnership, an important goal of any campaign. Three speeches, selected randomly, substantiate Fulton's use of the "we" term over the more individual "I" form. Two speeches given during the campaign compared eleven "we's" to nine "I's" and six "we's" to zero "I's." In addition, twenty-three "we's" and ten "I's" were found in Fulton's Inaugural Address.

Three speeches, also selected at random, given by candidate Hawkins revealed a difference from Fulton. In all three speeches combined, Hawkins was found to use the "I" term ten times, whereas not once

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was the term "we" found. Hawkins might have fared better in the election had he realized the importance of showing consubstantiality, or oneness with his audience.

Another way to interest and motivate listeners, as suggested by J. Jeffrey Auer, is to include rational arguments, or logos in a speech. According to Brigance, primitive man first relied upon authority, then upon experience as determinants of behavior. Only later, in an alert and intellectually aggressive society was behavior shaped by reason. Candidate Fulton's rhetoric often concentrated on his past successful experiences as a legislator to reason with the voters that he was capable of holding the mayoral office. He frequently related that his expertise in gaining federal and state aid would be of great benefit to Nashville. It seemed logical to claim that any money received from the state or federal government "is one dollar less we have to raise locally."

Supporting testimony from major Nashville papers also lent credence to Fulton's "experience" claims. Even though these testimonies may not have been "strategies" of the candidate persay, the writer believes Fulton exerted much energy toward good relations with the papers' staffs. An editorial in the Nashville Banner acclaimed Fulton as one with the "experience, know-how, and capability needed to

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lead this community in the years ahead.” The Tennessean cited the responsible record of Fulton in Congress as another strong reason to support the prominent Nashvillian.

Through campaign literature, as well as media coverage, Fulton's staff enunciated his hardworking energies. A campaign brochure proclaimed Richard Fulton as: "A decisive leader who believes in getting the job done quickly and economically. A man of almost inexhaustible energies, whose average day exceeds twelve hours of steady work." Fulton indicated from the campaign's start that the "challenge" of the job was a deciding factor in running. Even more challenging than representing the fifth district in Congress? Yes, according to Fulton. He advocated that, "The mayor is on the firing line every day. We do have some insulation in Washington."

Fulton was also viewed by many voters as a patriotic, religious man—loving both God and country. A campaign leaflet described Fulton as "A Navy veteran of W.W. II, who loves his country..." His wife, Sandra, emphasized in an interview that Fulton did not believe in campaigning on Sunday. It also is well-known in Nashville that Fulton

34 "Mr. Fulton Has Capacity to Bring Metro New Day," Tennessean August 3, 1975, p. 4B.
37 Campaign Brochure.
still attends the old Methodist church where his mother brought him as a young child.

Because most American voters are still looking for their "knight in shining armour" or "honesty in government," Fulton's staff fulfilled a need in his followers. This need was fulfilled by providing the information, impression, and image of Fulton as an industrious, God-fearing and knowledgeable public servant. Fulton himself lived up to his self-elevated image with vigor. In a private interview, he indicated that one problem with recent campaigns is that we often see a distorted picture of a candidate because of advertising. When asked to describe his own image, Fulton replied, "Well, hard work. Compassion. Concern. Conviction is another must." He added, "I don't want an image projected of me that is not a true image." 39

An important characteristic for a politician to possess is dependability—especially during the campaign. Fulton showed a strong reliability during his campaign which can be contrasted to the lack of responsibility evidenced by his opponent, Earl Hawkins. One evening, both Hawkins and Fulton were invited to address the Middle Tennessee Chapter of a professional journalism society. The program chairman, Kenneth Jost, said that he was told earlier in the day by a member of Hawkins' staff that "Hawkins would try to make the meeting." Hawkins failed to appear, without so much as a note of apology from himself or his staff. Fulton appeared and answered questions from the floor. 40

Again, on July 24, 1975 Earl Hawkins failed to appear at a forum

40 Fulton Vows Quick Resignation, Tennessean, July 17, 1975, p. 28.
scheduled for all mayoral candidates held at the University of Tennessee at Nashville. Hawkins was reported as having claimed an "unavoidable last-minute engagement." On another occasion, the Executive Vice-President of the Independent Policeman's Union requested by letter that all mayoral candidates meet with the union and be interviewed. He reported that only one candidate appeared for the interview, candidate Richard Fulton.

In the final analysis, it would seem safe to project that Richard Fulton was successful in living up to an image of availability and dependability. In the day in which we generally cannot get through to our local leader's secretaries, Fulton's concern in communicating his desire to be helpful and of service was rewarded later at the polls.

Fulton's strategy included a simple process of putting forth the "good guy" image. His optimistic attitudes and goals for Nashville's future, his constant consideration of others, and his way of treating all in his easy, charming southern care created a likeable, trusted personality. Fulton knew the meaning of "southern hospitality."

Perhaps the most elusive strategy Fulton employed was his use of silence. Fulton did not mention his major opponent Earl Hawkins, by name, during the entire campaign. This "silent" policy originated from Fulton's feelings that even negative publicity toward an opponent was just that--publicity.

In late July, a scandal developed which tested Fulton's policy against campaign name-calling. The scandal resulted from leaflets

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which were brought to Fulton by an aide which proclaimed message to
"Keep Dick Fulton in Congress." The scandalous aspect of the handbills was that they were signed by Mr. Jack Butler, a Nashville attorney known to serve on the campaign coordinating committee for Earl Hawkins. The leaflets proclaimed:

An Open Letter to Dick Fulton. A Vote Against Fulton is a Vote to Keep you as Our Congressman. Bring Dick home and Who Will Work for you in Washington? Signed, Friends of Dick Fulton. Paid for by the Keep Fulton in Congress Committee, Jack Butler, Chairman. 43

When the handbills were presented to Fulton he remarked that he knew Jack Butler, but had never known him to endorse Fulton in any of his congressional races. He added, "It seems more than a little strange that a man who has never helped me to get elected to Congress would now be so interested in my staying in Congress." 44 Fulton, however, refrained from derogating Hawkins by name, preferring instead the term "my opposition" when speaking of the incident. Investigations revealed further that an aide to Senator James Roberson, also coordinator for Hawkins' mayoral campaign, was linked to the circulars which urged Fulton to stay in Congress. It was learned that the aide, Raleigh Squires, signed for the leaflets.

When confronted with the evidence, Jack Butler affirmed his support for Hawkins and acknowledged chairmanship of the "Keep Fulton in Congress Committee." Butler denied, however, having anything to do with the discovered handbills. 45 When Hawkins was questioned, he


44 Ibid. 1-A.

replied that although "Keep Fulton in Congress" had been his theme, he had not "seen a single one of the circulars."46

It appeared that all the men who helped coordinate Hawkins' campaign, including Hawkins himself, seemed to know of the committee formed to "Keep Dick Fulton in Congress!" It also appeared, however, that none of these men acknowledged any participation in the creation or distribution of the controversial leaflets, although evidence to the contrary existed. Not only had Jack Butler signed the leaflets, but Roberson's own aide was identified as the man who had come to sign for them. Hawkins' denials concerning the handbill's existence made him appear either dishonest or stupid. One might tend to question a man's ability to govern a city of Nashville's size when he, seemingly, could not attend to the actions of his own campaign committee. Throughout the entire episode, Fulton faithfully refrained from specific name-calling. He did, however, strategically maneuver his "opposition's" mistake into an advantageous comparison to the national political scene: "After Watergate and the events of the past two years, I hoped and thought this sort of political tactics would have disappeared. It looks like the public had better get ready for a lot of trickery."47 The leaflets were reportedly being distributed throughout Davidson County.

If the voters of Nashville had harbored doubts of indecision between the two candidates, this episode in itself may have won over the undecided. Hawkins' reputation and integrity were severely questioned at this point in the campaign. The media scooped up the scandal


immediately, for there had been relatively few "real issues" to date, with the campaign being dubbed "low-key." The Tennessean declared that the "hired gun" politics of one of his (Fulton's) opponents:

... smacks of old-style pre-Watergate campaigning. There is no excuse for the devious circulation of misleading political literature under contrived circumstances that smell of dirty tricks.48

A stinging editorial also appeared in the July 30 issue of The Banner. The title of the editorial, "The 'Keep Fulton' Leaflet Caper Reeks of Political Trickery" reflects the stance of the article. A particularly damaging image of Hawkins is given by The Banner:

... it is inconceivable that grown men, accomplished lawyers (Jack Butler and Seth Norman) could engage in the leaflet deception in an effort to get votes for Mr. Hawkins. We cannot help but wonder what other tricks they might consider if their candidate should somehow get into the mayor's office.49

Fulton fired the strategic ammunition theme of "political trickery" throughout the remainder of the campaign. He knew when he had a good thing going. Fulton was later questioned by a television newsman concerning rumored reports that Fulton would fire the police commissioner, Joe Casey, if elected. Fulton declared that the report was not only ridiculous, but that it was just another desperation charge.50 In other words, "My opponent is a desperate man— you should not vote for him." Richard Fulton went on to fulfill the important finish to the implication ("You should vote for me.") by adding, "I'm

48 Editorial, "Mr. Fulton Has Capacity to Bring Metro New Day," Tennessean, August 3, 1975, p. 4B.


"I'm very proud to say I've never engaged in such activities and do not intend to in this campaign or any future campaign I may be involved in."51

During a private interview with the candidate, the writer asked why the candidate came out in defense of himself, as he had often ignored previous charges made by Hawkins during the campaign. Fulton responded that he was "Fed up." He added that he seldom responded to particular charges in a campaign, except by the media or the public. Fulton continued, "... quite often the candidate who is running behind will resort to making outrageous statements that imply things are happening that are wrong."52

Fulton's rhetorical reactions toward the misleading leaflets were realistic, sincere and believable. His temperance in choosing not to "sling mud" back at Earl Hawkins by name resulted in praise from the media. The Banner declared that Fulton's campaign was "a campaign of dignity, aimed not at personalities or trickery."53 If Fulton had "cried wolf" too dramatically, he might have seemed naive and exaggerated. Voters might have believed Hawkins' counter-implications that since only Mr. Fulton, his aides, and newsmen had seen these "leaflets," these might be the only ones in existence; that Dick Fulton could be the trickster.54 (Investigations later proved that many more handbills existed, yet were not being distributed.) It was believable that Fulton would be not

51 Ibid. 58.
52 Personal Interview with Richard Fulton, November 1977, p. 69.
shocked, but concerned, realistic that he condemned the action and sincere that he supported his own policy against name-calling.

It seems that Hawkins' committee had been "caught in the act." Fulton did not respond to these innuendos or implications. He knew there was no need. Hawkins' election committee had been given just enough rope to hang themselves—and hang they did! The rhetorical strategy of Fulton at this point in the campaign was simply to announce his incredulity at the actions of his opponent, and let the media take it from there.

Fulton must be judged successful in his decision to refrain from more "condemnation rhetoric" than was necessary. Although he was not viewed as a highly intellectual type, he exuded an admirable sensitivity to human psychology and the theories of persuasion. He did not call the theory by its correct academic title, but he sensed what the people, his audience, wanted to hear, where they wanted to hear it, when they wanted to listen, and how much they could stand to hear. Richard Fulton is an effective "people pleaser."

In the final analysis, the vital question remains, "What factor(s) most profoundly influenced Nashville voters to choose Richard Fulton over Earl Hawkins?" Was the candidate's victory one totally of rhetorical persuasion, or were other factors responsible? In chapter three, the answers to these questions are provided by, first, categorizing factors found in the campaign and then evaluating these categories as important or unimportant to the ultimate success of Fulton's campaign.

In addition, chapter three will include a summary of the study and conclusions drawn by the writer. Questions raised by the present study and implications for future local studies will also be discussed.
LOCAL BOY WINS! RICHARD FULTON MAYOR,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE. 1975

Although Richard Fulton evidenced various communication strategies throughout his campaign, he could not be called history's most outstanding speaker. Mr. Fulton's delivery does not appear to be the ultimate factor in his successful campaign, although his delivery was correct and precise. During a personal interview, Fulton admitted feeling a lack of delivery skills. He revealed that he had had no speech training at any time in his life and added that it had been difficult for him to speak publicly because of the lack of training.¹

What Fulton lacked in training, he tried to make up in experience. He joined many civic clubs and participated in various community activities. Richard Fulton was a local PTA member before he had any children and was active in the Lions Club, the local YMCA and other community programs. The candidate stated that club activity gave him an opportunity to speak before people, thereby helping him to gain speaking experience.² This experience allowed Fulton to become a confident and effective speaker, if not an overwhelming one. Fulton indicated that he hoped voters would be "impressed with the sincerity or the particular

¹Personal interview with Richard Fulton, November 1977, p. 64.
²Ibid. 64.
knowledge imparted" when he spoke rather than "the way I delivered my remarks."³

When judged according to delivery, one must also consider the opponent's delivery. How did Earl Hawkins' delivery compare with Fulton's? Both men, being southerners, spoke with a drawl. Fulton spoke grammatically correct and precise sentences, while Hawkins continually used incorrect grammar. Phrases such as, "I'm gonna," "it's the people that does the votin'," "we're gonna hafta" and "We got good . . ." are found throughout Hawkins' public speaking record.⁴

Because Nashville is considered an educational center of the South with some fourteen colleges and universities, it would seem logical that the education of the man being considered for public office would play an important role in a successful campaign. Based on language usage alone, Richard Fulton would be judged as the more highly educated of the two candidates. Fulton's drawl connected him with the city, yet his correct usage of the language evidenced his education and helped the image of Nashville. So, although Richard Fulton was not an outstanding speaker, he was better than his opponent.

Richard Fulton's election win does not appear to be the result of his stance on the issues any more than the success of his public speaking. Both men appeared to have similar ideas on the major campaign issues. Both men advocated progress for Nashville in several areas. In fact, external evidence, such as news editorials and commentaries

³Ibid. 66.

⁴Found in excerpts from videotapes acquired from Channel 5, WTVF, Nashville, 1975--See Appendix A.
indicated the media's dissatisfaction toward the lack of "real issues" in the campaign. After mayoral candidates came before the public at the University of Tennessee at Nashville, Pat Nolen of Nashville's WTVF Channel 5 Eyewitness News reported:

And there still appear to be no real issues in this campaign. All the candidates want to see the city progress, get better roads, have teachers get more pay, and have the elderly get a better shake.  

Although the issues themselves were not a major factor in the campaign, later discussion will promote the idea that media exposure of Fulton's ideas on the issues was a factor in his successful campaign.

Another area that experts would acknowledge as an important part of any campaign concerns the financial support required to mount a campaign. During the early months of the campaign, reporter Allen Green interviewed several possible candidates concerning finances. Metro Finances Director, Joe Torrence, predicted a successful campaign, including the run-off, would cost $200,000.00. Other predictions ranged to $500,000.00.  

Post-campaign audits revealed that Hawkins spent $54,944.00 in comparison to Fulton's $194,000.00. The Tennessean declared metro's 1975 race as its "least expensive one with none of the candidates spending extravagantly." These reports indicate that even though

5 Pat Nolen, Eyewitness News, Channel 5, WTVF, Nashville, July 24, 1975--See Appendix A, p. 56.


7 "Fulton Race Expenses Set at $194,000.00," Nashville Banner, September 4, 1975, p. 21.; "Hawkins Race Raises $54,944.00," Tennessean, August 1, 1975, p. 40.

8 Wayne Whitt, "Low-Key, Low Financed Race for Metro Mayor," Tennessean, August 3, 1975, p. 1B.
Fulton did spend twice the amount that Hawkins did, finances were not the chief influence in the 1975 mayoral election.

In review, several areas have been noted that might have strongly affected campaigns elsewhere, but held rather inconsequential effects upon the 1975 mayoral race. These areas include the candidate's vocal training and delivery, the candidate's stance on the issues, and the candidate's financial expenditures. Now we must identify and evaluate the primary factors influencing Fulton's election victory.

Analysis of the primary factors influencing the campaign produced three major categories, two of which Fulton controlled to some degree. First, Fulton's political success stemmed from raising his ethos, evidenced throughout the campaign. Research by communication experts has produced six major dimensions of source credibility, or ethos. These dimensions are: (1) Trustworthiness, (2) Expertise, (3) Consensusubstantiality or Homophily, (4) Dynamism, (5) Charisma, and (6) Physical Appearance.9

Trustworthiness is described as one who is "honest, reputable, good, and dependable."\textsuperscript{10} Richard Fulton was perceived as a trustworthy man through his public rhetoric and lived up to his rhetoric in his public life. It was discussed earlier in this study that some Nashvillians questioned the candidate's motives for running since he would take a $17,500.00 salary decrease upon winning the mayoral race. Some citizens saw the change as not being financially beneficial, so what reason could Fulton possibly have for running? The candidate dispelled those questions when he declared that he did not view the mayoral position as a step up or a step down, simply as a challenge and as a job "more needed than my presence in Congress."\textsuperscript{11} The \textit{Banner} also helped dispell the fears of some by giving their approval of the candidate's intentions:

\begin{quote}
We don't believe Dick Fulton has a crooked bone in his body. We've checked all the political rumors and have found nothing to blemish his personal integrity. We believe his motivations to represent all the people are good.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Fulton relied more heavily on the dimension of trust than any other in his campaign. In a speech to over 5,000 supporters, Fulton declared his wishes for Nashville. He emphasized "good, clean, honest candidates; a good, clean, honest election, and good, clean, honest government."\textsuperscript{13} In the aftermath of the leaflet scandal, the plea for

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\textsuperscript{13}Steven Reed, "Fulton Has Big Worry: Low Voter Turnout," \textit{Nashville Banner}, August 5, 1975, p. 1.
\end{flushright}
an honest government seemed to appeal to many voters, as can be supported by the large voter percentage in favor of Richard Fulton.

The leaflet scandal especially served to accentuate the leading candidate's honesty when contrasted with "political trickery" tactics attributed to Fulton's opponent, Earl Hawkins. The media concentrated upon the scandal to build Fulton's trustworthy image:

His (Fulton's) has been a campaign of dignity, aimed not at personalities or trickery... His has been a campaign of seriousness, of sincere desire to serve this community as its leader for the next four years, of honesty, and of the will to work.14

The Tennessean also adds its sentiments:

His campaign--like his past races--has been intelligent, dignified and sincere... Congressman Fulton has the capability, the honesty, and determination to forge such a government, to direct it, and set the example for it.15

On evaluating Fulton's decision to extend an image built on trustworthiness and honesty, the writer would have to declare the candidate as successful. The national political situation of the day prompted a great desire in Americans across the country to have their faith restored in government. It seems logical to assume that in order to have honest leaders in our federal government, we must begin by electing honest local administrators.

Second only to trustworthiness, Fulton sought to transmit an expert and qualified political image. Expertise includes characteristics such as reliability, authority, and experience.16 From the first days

14 Editorial, Nashville Banner, August 5, 1975, p. 10.

15 Editorial, "Mr. Fulton Has Capacity to Bring Metro New Day," Tennessean, August 3, 1975, p. 4B.

16 Tuppen, 256.
of the campaign, Fulton stressed his past congressional experience and record. He often indicated that his Washington contacts would continue to help him locate federal and state financial assistance for metro.17

Both major newspapers endorsed Fulton's capabilities to run metro Nashville. The Tennessean declared:

Mr. Fulton is by far and away the best qualified candidate seeking the office, . . . His service in Washington was responsive and responsible. . . In this election, there is no intelligent choice except Richard Fulton.18

The Banner added, "... we believe Mr. Fulton posses the stability, integrity, experience, and capability to lead this city."19

Knowledge concerning the issues is a significant area related to expertise. How can one be a good leader without awareness pertaining to the problems at hand? Even though it has been said that Fulton's stance on the issues was not a primary factor in his victorious campaign, his knowledge concerning those issues did have an effect on his ethos.

In almost every speech with a particular issue as its theme, Richard Fulton presented logical appeals, underscoring his research and study of each problem. For instance, when pledging attention to improving Nashville's streets, Fulton presented several indicators that he had done his homework. He told his audience that Nashville must spend at least four million dollars a year for the next several years in order to bring its streets and roads up to standard; that metro has approximately 2,200 miles of roads and streets; and that in order to maintain safe, smooth streets, Nashville should repair or resurface 220

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18 Editorial, Tennessean, p. 4B.

19 Editorial, Nashville Banner, August 5, 1975, p. 10.
miles every year. By citing these facts and figures, Richard Fulton said to the voters, "I think this problem is serious enough to deserve my time and concern." He acknowledged the fact that he could not propose a solution without first studying the problem.

Another prime example showing Fulton's utilization of statistics to evidence his knowledgeability is in his speech, "Fulton Pledges Full-Scale War on Narcotics," July 29, 1975. Fulton revealed that in 1972 there were 288 petitions on file in Juvenile Court for drug-related offenses; in 1973, 510 such petitions were filed; and in 1974 there were 753 petitions filed. He also announced that arrests on narcotics charges by the Youth Guidance Division were up 19.7 percent in 1974 over 1973.

Fulton continually backed his speeches with supporting evidence, whereas Hawkins often admitted to being unsure or uninformed concerning the issues. In his speech, "Hawkins Promises Cut in Crime Rate," July 26, 1975, Hawkins commented on Nashville's crime rate:

I don't know if officers are assigned quotas and have to write a given number of tickets each day or not, but if there is a quota system in use, it will be eliminated my very first day in office.

Hawkins went on to alienate police workers or those related to them by blaming leadership in the department for police concentration on writing traffic tickets rather than fighting serious crimes. His statement that all the police were going to be taken out of the offices and be put on

20 "Fulton: Hike Funds on Roads," Tennessean, July 9, 1975, p. 25.


22 "Hawkins Promises Cut in Crime Rate," Tennessean, June 26, 1975, p. 27.
the streets\textsuperscript{23} seems farfetched and a little drastic. Hawkins continued
to make rather exaggerated claims throughout the campaign. Regarding a
tax increase, Hawkins declared that he stood "against a tax increase of
any kind." He went on to state, "I am convinced that we can operate the
government and provide essential services during the next four years
without increasing taxes."\textsuperscript{24}

Fulton responded to these promises by saying that it was
stretching one's imagination to "Believe we can both extend sewers and
reduce water rates or taxes."\textsuperscript{25} Fulton not only raised his own ethos
when he appeared knowledgeable on the issues discussed, but also success-
fully lowered his opponent's ethos when he questioned the logic of
Hawkins' campaign promises.

Richard Fulton not only evidenced trustworthiness and expertise,
but also worked to create a "common ground" with his audience, known as
consubstantiality or homophily. In working for this "common ground," the
speaker seeks to identify with his audience by standing for like values
or gaining favorable reactions from his audience.\textsuperscript{26} Evidence offered
in chapter two supports the claim that Fulton progressively identified
with almost every faction of Nashville's voters. Although Richard
Fulton was not a minority member, a laborer, or even a common housewife,
he spoke to these groups on their level. He concerned himself with the

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid. 27.

\textsuperscript{24} "Hawkins Would Cut Sewer Rates," \textit{Tennessean}, June 16, 1975,
p. 20.

\textsuperscript{25} Joe White, "Fulton 'Excited' About Campaign," \textit{Nashville

\textsuperscript{26} Tuppen, 256.
problems and issues with which they were concerned. Fulton spoke before a crowd estimated between 5,000 and 10,000 at the Nashville Municipal Auditorium. The candidate urged each voter to become involved in the government: "I ask you tonight to join with me if you believe as I believe there is much we can do that we've not done before." 27

Fulton stressed over and over again the necessity for a strong working relationship between the administration and the voters. Concerning the drug issue, Fulton said he would do everything in his power to get drugs out of Nashville's school systems. He added that he would have to rely upon educational leaders, law officers, and parents to supply "the muscle" to get the job accomplished. 28 Fulton emphasized the situation, or problem to create a "common enemy" with whom he and the voters would have to band together to do battle.

During the final days of the campaign, the biggest worry expressed by Fulton and his staff was that there might be an apathetic, low-voter turn out. It seems that partial credit for the moderately heavy voter turn out of over fifty-seven percent, 29 or 96,671 30 voters can be ascribed to Fulton's soliciting. He remarked often throughout the campaign that even if voters did not cast their ballot for him, he wanted everyone to vote:


28 "Make City Too 'Hot' For Pushers," Nashville Banner, July 26, 1975, p. 12.


30 Nashville Banner, August 8, 1975, p. 1.
I hope everyone will vote for me. But perhaps more important, in the decision to vote is the decision to actively participate in the outcome of the election.  

Fulton not only successfully persuaded voters to vote, but also convinced the voters that he was the right man for the job, gaining 69.8 percent of the vote.  

Another dimension of source credibility is dynamism, which usually refers to the physical and vocal aspects of delivery and evidences characteristics of boldness, activity, aggressiveness, and energy. Fulton was rather weak in this area. A major reason for the campaign's label of "low-key" can be attributed to Fulton's typical campaign style. Richard Fulton is not a "gangbuster" type. He is rather soft-spoken, very calm, and reflective. These personal mannerisms tend to carry over into his political life. In a personal interview, Fulton related that he did not like a "hard-sell" approach and that "hand-shaking and back-slapping" are not easy campaign rituals for him. He added that many times he feels he is imposing on the voters, especially if they are eating in a public restaurant or shopping in a public mall.  

When the editorial comments were reviewed, it was again evident that Fulton was not praised for his dynamism. However, it is important to note that most felt his delivery was adequate and was described as

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31 Wayne Whitt, "Low-Key, Low Financed Race for Metro Mayor," Tennessean, August 3, 1975, p. 1B.

32 Tennessean, August 8, 1975, p. 1.

33 Tuppen, p. 256.

34 Personal interview with Richard Fulton, November 1977, p. 67.
"sincere." So, even though Fulton would not be rated highly in the dynamism category, most would agree that he was able and genuine.

The fifth dimension of ethos is charisma. Charisma generally refers to an interpersonal attraction between a speaker and his audience. Adjectives which help describe charisma include "merit, grace, genius, or power" in a leader which bring a "direct personal allegiance in his followers."35 Richard Fulton possessed a quiet, subtle charisma with even his largest audiences. At a watermelon cutting held two days before the election, over 5,000 voters slopped juice on themselves and cheered on the country music stars brought in for entertainment. A description of the event by local reporter helps to visualize Fulton's effect on the crowd:

... when Fulton appears in a crowd, excitement sets in. People swirl around him, leaning against his head to be heard, ... He shakes hands perfunctorily, but stops to listen to the elderly ladies who throng to tell him how much they like him. His modest grin comes easily.

The women in the crowd flock to Fulton, particularly the very old and the very young. Little girls with watermelon sticky fingers tug at his coat and whisper and giggle in his ear.36

The crowd was attracted to Nashville's own, and they let him know it. Most of us are attracted to those we consider open, sincere, and concerned about our future. Fulton radiated a desire to meet the needs around him. He communicated an aura of servitude lacking, some feel, in many public officials today.

35 Tuppen, 257.
36 Steven Reed, "Fulton Has Big Worry: Low Voter Turnout," Nashville Banner, August 5, 1975, p. 1.
Physical appearance is the final factor of source credibility and has been shown to have a significant effect on the audience's evaluation of a speaker.\textsuperscript{37} The description regarding physical appearance, while important to the successful campaign, does not require an in-depth description. Richard Fulton had Hawkins beat here, hands down! While both men were from the South, there were many differences between them.

Fulton's athletic build contrasted attractively against Hawkins' paunchy physique. Fulton sported a glowing tan versus Hawkins' sickly, pale complexion, thin, balding hairline, giving an elderly appearance while Fulton's thick, silver-gray hair gave him a youthful, yet distinguished look. Reporters and columnists often commented on the candidate's handsome appearance:

A striking man with a big handshake and a straight, steady glance, he is Nashville to the core.\textsuperscript{38}

With his silvery-gray hair, clear blue eyes, and an aqua-colored body shirt showing off his athletic build, Richard Fulton greets his visitor with a handshake and a "Howdy!"\textsuperscript{39}

If election results had been based on looks alone, it might be predicted that Fulton's majority would have been much larger than 69.8 percent.

All the factors of source credibility combined to give Fulton the edge that he needed to win the election. He did not score highly in every area, but then, that was not necessary. What was necessary

\textsuperscript{37}Homophily, closely aligned with ethos, has four dimensions, one being physical appearance. James McCroskey and Lawrence Wheeless. \textit{Introduction to Human Communication}, p. 109-113.


\textsuperscript{39}Citizens Look at Congress, p. 1.
was to score higher in more areas than his opponent, and according to the election outcome, Fulton did just that.

The second category of factors aiding Fulton's victory was related to the media, both the print and video. Although the candidate indicated in a personal interview that he felt neither media played a tremendously important role in the campaign win, the writer disagrees. A careful examination within the written media revealed over seventy-five articles dealing with Fulton's campaign, while only approximately twenty-three articles dealt with Hawkins' campaign. Richard Fulton's name simply appeared before the voters three times as often as his opponent's, Earl Hawkins. Not only did Fulton receive more news coverage, but also most of the articles displayed the leading candidate in a most favorable light.

No polls, or otherwise external data, were available to support the evaluation that the media was important to Fulton's campaign. However, it seems logical to propose that the media furnished an outlet whereby Fulton could communicate his past governmental expertise and other factors relevant to his ethos, both attributed and derived. These multiple media outlets provided the circumstance whereby the candidate could show his far-reaching concerns for Nashville, and his desire to serve the metro community during the next four years. Yes, Fulton also went one-on-one to the community which was involved, but a great many more voters read about or watched Fulton from a television screen than ever saw or spoke with him in person. Even though the candidate would say it was more his image than the media that won him

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40 Personal interview with Richard Fulton, November 1977, p. 66.
the election, this writer will posit that Fulton made wise use of the media throughout his campaign and that the two forces worked hand-in-hand to produce the wide vote margin ultimately in Fulton's favor.

The final category which had a strong influence on Fulton's campaign success would not be considered an internal strategy, that being one for which Fulton and/or his staff were responsible. This category of campaign rhetoric might be labeled "political tactics of the opponent." Hawkins' "leaflet scandal" gave Fulton the necessary ammunition to soundly defeat his already weak opponent. As suggested in chapter two, those undecided voters who might have been leaning in Hawkins' direction were given one more valid reason, according to Fulton, not to cast their ballot in a "desperate man's" favor.

One can only speculate as to the closeness of the final election had Hawkins chosen a more suitable campaign tactic during the last few days of the campaign. Chapter two presented reactions by the media to Hawkins' strategy and they were not favorable. These reactions, in addition to Fulton's warnings that Nashville better get used to "political trickery," resulted in a damaged image for Hawkins. Not only was Hawkins seen as "desperate," but was also categorized as "dishonest" when he totally denied any knowledge of the "Keep Fulton in Congress" leaflets. Perhaps the voters would have felt sorry for the aging politician if he had openly admitted to producing the leaflets and claimed he had been driven to the act by the overwhelming desire to serve Nashville. Perhaps not. The only judgment that can be offered is that Hawkins proved to be unwise in his decision to use deceitful tactics in order to gain the mayoral office.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Various factors in Nashville's 1975 Mayoral Race combined to produce an insightful episode in rhetorical and nonrhetorical communication campaign strategies. During the initial stages of the study, emphasis was placed on the rhetorical strategies of candidate Richard Fulton, and to a lesser degree, those of his opponent, Earl Hawkins. As the study progressed, it became increasingly evident that although rhetorical strategies were influential in Fulton's campaign victory, the major reason for his political success could not be totally attributed to his campaign speaking. After acknowledging that fact, a search throughout the available data began to determine what factors were responsible for his ultimate campaign success. It was found that the raising of the candidate's ethos was the most influential campaign factor.

Evidence throughout the available data documented over and over again the conclusion that Richard Fulton built an attractive image appealing to Nashville's voters. Fulton's rhetorical content and past experiences served to communicate this "winning image." It was revealed that:

1. The national and local political situation was favorable to the image which Fulton projected,
2. Fulton's ethos was very high,
3. Fulton's image was the chief factor in his successful campaign, and
4. Fulton's rhetorical strategies were in accord with the majority of Nashville's voters' attitudes.

Because specific categories have not been formed by the communication community pertaining to the political candidate's image, this
study has been one of discovery and new insight in the area of local politics. A proper rhetorical analysis could not simply proffer an evaluation of traditional aspects of speaking, such as ethos, logos, and pathos. Truly these categories enter the campaign on an important level, but with the increasing role of the media, even in local campaigns, new categories need to be developed and explored.

It is the hope of the writer that this particular study will encourage greater interest and future investigations into the local political workings in our cities, particularly those in the South. Why are the Americans of each city choosing their particular leaders? What role is public rhetoric playing in the local choice? How is the media affecting those choices on the local level? Is the American public being "sold" a false image by local politicians due to local advertising, and if so, how might greater public speaking help to dispel these misleading images? These are just a few questions which may stir future interest in pursuing the rhetorical study of our nation's many, local political campaigns and their place in the future development of the contemporary South.
I've been an optimist always; not quite the optimist of a gentleman I saw crossing Broad Street 7:00 a.m. one morning last week, uh . . . in front of the Post Office with his umbrella on his arm. It hadn't rained in Nashville at least, other than a few spotted rains, in three weeks, but he was optimistic enough to have his umbrella. I'm optimistic enough to think that under proper management we can make it through, not only this year, but next year without an increase in taxes.

Hawkins. It just makes me work that much harder. I've got a little rest now and I'm back in the saddle and I'm gonna be right here until August 7. I'm gonna try to put into 18-20 hours every day.

In an all day meeting gave blacks opportunity to question candidates on issues such as equal housing and busing. Hiring of more blacks in metro government. Fulton. "This should and must be more official policy police department or fire department."
July 22, 1975  Third Community Forum. All but Mayor Fulton were there--Sandra Fulton sat in for him.

July 24, 1975  Mayoral Candidates before UTN
Hawkins did not show up claiming an unavoidable last minute engagement.
"And there still appear to be no real issues in this campaign. . . . All the candidates want to see the city progress, get better roads, have teachers get more pay, have the elderly get a better shake. But no one offered any remedies for Metro's real problem: a lack of tax revenue and resources next year to fund all those hoped-for programs." Pat Nolen--Eye Witness News Channel 5.

July 28, 1975  IPU--Independent Policemen's Union. Vote
Executive Vice President--"We sent letters out to all the . . . mayoral candidates requesting that they meet with us and be interviewed. Out of the number . . . we interviewed only one mayoral candidate." (Fulton)

July 28, 1975  Mayor's Race
Candidate Earl Hawkins today denied that he or any of his campaign workers had put out literature urging voters to keep Fulton in Congress by not voting for him as mayor of Nashville. But Hawkins did say that he agreed with that message.

Hawkins. "You know that's exactly, just exactly been my feeling. That Mr. Fulton has been a good congressman and that he should remain in Congress. That's
been my theme all along. I have so stated that in many of my interviews and many of my speeches."

After denying Fulton's charge of foul play Hawkins went on to charge the Congressman of putting pressure on the police department to vote for him. Hawkins claimed that two policemen were told to support Fulton or take the chance of losing their job. Congressman Fulton denied that accusation and says that he isn't putting pressure on anyone.

Fulton. "Why anyone would think that any of the policemen would need to be pushed or shoved into my campaign I think is just almost unbelievable. I am not going to be part of any such campaign, I haven't been and don't intend to be."

July 29, 1975

Fulton speaks at luncheon.

"It's indeed nice to be popular, particularly at election time. But I think that the decisions that need to be made, here in Nashville, decisions that often will not be popular, that when the roll is called four years from now that the people will not judge you whether or not you did something that they agreed or disagreed with, but whether they will judge you on the overall record you have established."

July 30, 1975

Fulton-Hawkins Campaign disclosure.

July 31, 1975

Chief Casey on Hawkins

"... Reports that he would make such accusations to try, I guess, to get some votes. I don't know what
other reasons, but there's no truth in what he says. I don't understand his reason for saying that."

August 1, 1975 Fulton-Fire Police Commissioner "That's ridiculous. I've never given any thought to firing police commissioner, much less discussed it with anyone. Still this is just those last minute charges, desperation charges. I'm very familiar with them. Unfortunately, they seem to appear the last few days of every campaign I'm involved in. I'm very proud to say I've never engaged in such activities and do not intend to this campaign or any future campaign I may be involved in."

August 4, 1975 Fulton Rally "I realize fully that this will not help my campaign—it could even hurt my campaign. But for the sake of the future candidates, we're going to go through with asking for the investigation—it has been requested and the investigators will arrive here in the next few hours."

"What will happen if the investigators find that there has been some unfair play?"--Reporter Fulton. "Of course that's left up to the pursuit of the law. I can't say what would happen, but I would think that if there has been a violation, those people that are guilty of the violation will be prosecuted."

Meanwhile Hawkins . . .
Hawkins. "Well, you know, endorsements, I have several endorsements from labor groups myself and also he (Fulton) has several endorsements, but actually, it's the people that does the voting. I figure I'll receive somewhere around between 53-55 percent of the vote. I have that much confidence in the people of Davidson County."

August 5, 1975 Hawkins accuses Fulton--Hatch Act

"Remember this. That all of this money that they are getting and using around, that's taxpayers' money. That's federal money, that's taxpayers' money. And I think it should be stopped. We need to do something else besides pool it around in elections."

Official. "The Hatch Act has a specific exemption for local, non-partisan municipal elections. Those elections are not covered by the Hatch Act. Therefore, any conduct that this particular candidate could turn about could not be a violation of the Hatch Act."

August 6, 1975 Hawkins--Changes that need to be made.

"We'll first start by putting the mayor's office back in the court house. Then we'll open all the doors to the mayor's office and to the various departments in the metropolitan government."

"Well, one thing is we're gonna hafta reorganize the police department and put it in a position to where they serve the people instead of being served. We
got a good police force. They just got to have some direction. They need some leadership."

"In fact, I just got the confidence in the people of this county that they want a change and they don't want no machine, no political machine in here to dictate and tell them what to do. . . . I just know these people. I know what they want and I know I can do what they want to be done in this county."

Fulton--final day campaign

Reporter. "Fulton campaigned hard today. Up at dawn talking to factory workers, later at traditional breakfast meeting. Some campaigning at the courthouse, later this afternoon, visits to firehalls. As a candidate, Richard Fulton doesn't have too many problems. He's been proclaimed the frontrunner by most, endorsed by both newspapers. Some say the only thing that can hurt him is a low voter turnout."

Fulton. "I have confidence that there will be a large turnout, particularly since the weatherman has predicted weather tomorrow in the low 80's and no rain. We have a good carpool going, we have the telephone number for the voters to call if they need a ride to the polls. We've done everything that we can do to try to assure a big turnout. I've emphasized that I want people to vote for Dick Fulton, but more than that I want them to vote."

August 7, 1975  Fulton victory
APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIPTION OF MAYOR FULTON INTERVIEW

Question: What made you decide, after being in Congress 12 years, to come back to Nashville and run for mayor?
Answer: I got tired of traveling. Keeping two homes was a bit troublesome, as well as the fact that in the Congress, it is difficult to see results. I wanted a new challenge and the power to change some of the things I felt would better those around me.

Question: Once you decided to run, how did you ascertain what issues were significant--Did you try to convince the people that certain issues were important, or did you choose your issues from what the people considered to be important?
Answer: Both. We sent out a poll to determine the people's real concerns, and aimed much of our stand there. However, there are some pet concerns of my own, and I do emphasize these as well.

Question: Did you aspire to be a political leader as a very young man, and if so, did you prepare for this type of occupation in any particular way?
Answer: I ran for president of the student body, and I was defeated. That was my first defeat in politics . . . my first effort as a candidate. My opponent was George Kate, Jr. who is a very
good friend of mine. ... I actually had no aspirations to enter into politics as a candidate. It came about by accident. My late brother, Lyle, did aspire to hold office and ran for the Senate in 1954. I was (sort of) his campaign manager. ... He went to the hospital the day after the August primary for what we thought was some gall stone problem, only to find out that he had cancer. Lyle died then about 6 or 8 weeks later, about 8 weeks later he died. The then late governor, Frank Clement, and the late mayor Ben West and others prevailed upon me to allow the county Democratic executive committee to place my name on the ballot in November, even though I was 27 years of age and the Constitution says a senator must be 30 years of age. But the Constitution also says that the Senate shall be the sole judge of the qualifications of its members and there were many legal opinions that said that that's why that article was in the Constitution, so that they would be able, under unusual circumstances, to make exceptions. I was elected. Prior to the election, Professor Sanborn of Vanderbilt University, decided he would run as a Republican candidate. He also filed a suit against my name being on the ballot. The State Supreme Court ruled the courts had no jurisdiction since that was a party matter that they had no authority. So, after the election (I was victorious in the election by a vote of about 22,000 to 3,000), after the election, some of those who had encouraged me to run decided that it would probably be best if I did not serve ... that I made an announcement that I was going to withdraw or resign, and that I would recommend
someone else to be elected in a special election. And I took the position with Governor Clement, in his office, that I respected his advice, but that the people had elected me knowin' my age. Should I run out under the pressure of the local newspapers and others, that should I then in the future decide that I would like for them to place their confidence in me again many of them would feel, "Well, why do that? He will not stand up under pressure." So I was sworn in in January and served 3 days before they were able to get a senator to introduce the resolution unseating me, and I was unseated and I immediately gave the $45.00 that I had received for the three days that I had served in the Senate to the American Cancer Society and that sort of triggered a mechanism in me that made me desirous of holding public office. From 1954 until 1975 my name was on the ballot as a candidate. In 1975 being elected mayor, that meant I was not a candidate in '76, I must say I missed it.

Question: As far as any actual speech training in high school, was there any to speak of?

Answer: No. Unfortunately, when I was in high school I spent most of my time in athletics rather than in some of the extra-curricular activities such as speech. I did sing some in the chorus. . . . I would suggest to everyone that attend a school where there is speech training that they take advantage of it. It has not been easy for me. I have not had any formal training, not even the Toastmaster's or the Dale Carnegie
course. . . . Most of the experience I've had has been a result of being involved in clubs and community activities where if one was to be active, one found oneself speaking out. Since I was a member of the PTA at the elementary school where I attended, prior to even having a child born, and then active in a new charter, the Lions Club in East Nashville, the YMCA and other programs--it gave me an opportunity to speak before people and so it was experience.

Question: How do your speeches evolve? Do you write your own speeches?

Answer: It depends upon the subject matter. If it is a speech that I feel that I alone can really write, ya know, (stuttering) my own true feelings, then I do it, particularly if it happened to be of a religious nature (a layman's club, or layman's Sunday in a church) then I certainly would not want someone else attempting to write my feelings. If it has to do with statistics with some background that is needed in a subject that I am not totally familiar with, then I, of course, depend upon some staff personnel to assist in that. I seldom use a totally prepared text. Possibly I should. I normally just ask for specifics and then take that, if I have time, and write out some notes. Hopefully, I familiarize myself enough with those notes, to where I do not need them.

Question: In the campaign of '75, did you have a particular speech writer?

Answer: No.
Question: To your knowledge, were there any popularity polls during the campaign?

Answer: Sam McPherson, who was active in my campaign (conducted) a poll, that I think was rather professional. He conducted a poll in each of the councilmatic districts. His poll was so accurate that it came within one percentage point of the number or the percent of the votes that we received, and also was accurate in pointing out to us where the districts that we were weakest in.

Question: You took a poll of the people themselves.

Answer: We sent out a direct mailing to every registered voter. Enclosed was a questionnaire on issues. Also enclosed was a convenient card for them to return if they would like to work in the campaign and donations. The mailing was quite expensive. It cost $23,000 and we received back something in the neighborhood of $30,000 in contributions which meant we were able to reach that many households. I think somewhere around 140,000 voters that we reached by the mailing and still paid for the mailing as well as approximately 7,000 more. There were very few contributions over $50.00 and a few were $50.00. Most of them were $5.00 and $10.00 contributions which is the desirable way to finance a campaign but it's obvious from that extensive mailing and the cost of other forms of campaign efforts such as television, radio and newspaper ads, unfortunately that type of fundraising will not finance the total cost of the campaign. I think until the
public realizes that and is willing to contribute more than they do we will still have campaigns financed by larger contributors, which always then, not always, but sometimes, raises the question as to the motives of whether there's going to be special treatment given to the contributor that gives $500.00 or $1,000.00.

Question: What area do you feel made the biggest impact: your own public speaking, personal engagements, T.V. commercials, radio, news coverage or newspapers?

Answer: . . . I have spoken literally well over a 1000 speeches serving the Nashville community. . . . I would hope that those appearances, whether or not people were impressed with the way I delivered my remarks but rather were impressed, hopefully, with the sincerity or the particular knowledge I've been privileged to gain as a result of having served in public office for so many years. And the television coverage I've received, as well as newspaper, I really don't think that any of those things played a major role during the period of time that I announced for office . . . and the election day. I think it was more what had happened prior to that time.

Sandra and I talked about the reduction in income, we also talked about that if we had to borrow money during the four year term that I was mayor we would do so and that if it was necessary at the end of that four year term in order to pay off what we had borrowed that we would sell our home. We have a rather large home, and most of the children now
are gone and we made that decision that if it was worth what we wanted to do to sacrifice whatever loss of dollars or income.

Question: The Banner reported that a majority of your campaign expenditures went to a public relations firm, Bill Hudson and Associates. What factors were suggested to you by them as definite do's or definite don'ts of a public relations nature.

Answer: Since I have known Bill Hudson and members of his firm for many years . . . I sought them out a number of years ago in a Congressional campaign. They had no previous experience in a political campaign and that was what I wanted, because I knew what I wanted in the way of a campaign, and I knew what sort of theme that I wanted to develop, and I found them to be very cooperative in listening to my ideas and developing these ideas into what their profession has trained them to do. We have had a very excellent working relationship and now that they know me so well I think they almost know what I like and do not like without me having to tell them. For instance, I do not like a hard sell; I like a soft sell approach much better. I don't want an image projected of that is not a true image. I've been criticized by some as not being a backslapper, or as much of a handshaker. I shake hands very readily and enjoy it. But I do not think people want someone entering a restaurant where they're eating maybe fried chicken with their fingers to come over and stick out their hand that's been all across the county square. If I go into a restaurant, particularly during a
campaign, I will walk over to the table and maybe put my hand on the back of the chair or on the back or the shoulder of the man and say, "Now, look, I don't want to bother while you're eating, but I just want you to know I'm Dick Fulton and I would appreciate your consideration," and move on. As far as the image that advertising agencies are able to create this is something that I think is dangerous to our system. I would like to see more candidates go back to more person-to-person campaigning. I realize that it's very difficult and very strenuous but that doesn't mean that we won't use commercials . . . there just hasn't been, I don't think, enough person-to-person campaigning in recent years . . . . Often we have seen an image that was not the true image of the candidate.

Question: You talked about a theme and your ideas to project. If you had to put yourself into a theme or an image, what would you say that might be?

Answer: Well, hard work. Compassion. Concern. I don't see how anyone can be a good public official that doesn't have compassion and concern. Conviction is another must . . . .

Question: Your major opponent in the campaign was Earl Hawkins. It didn't seem that the issues were the dividing line between the two of you. However, you won by such a landslide. Do you remember having to defend yourself against any claims?

Answer: Unfortunately, in campaigns quite often the candidate who is running behind will resort to making outrageous statements
that imply that things are happening that are wrong. I seldom have ever responded to particular charges in a campaign even though I do respond, of course, to the media or to the public if they ask. I don't recall anyone than the media asking. . . .

Question: Late in the campaign, the leaflets were found in the office of Hawkins' manager. Why did you choose to come out in defense?

Answer: I was fed up. (Previous cases had occurred). "The Open Housing '68 vote has created more of a political problem for me than any vote that I have cast." Being asked to speak before the plumbers union, I was booed and I was heckled as a result of that vote.

Question: How do you handle that heckling?

Answer: Oh, I just related a story about two black Vietnam veterans who had lost both legs and one was blind. They would forever be supported by the government and would be able to pay the rent on an apartment or a downpayment on the small house, but unless the Fair Housing Act was passed, would never be able to choose where they wanted to live. "If you feel that strongly about your hatred of Black people, I'm sure you don't want any Black men over in Vietnam fighting for your protection. So if any of you have a son or grandson or brother that you'd like to send over there so that that Black man can come back home because you don't want him fighting for you, if you'll raise your hand, I'll be more than happy to ask the draft board to contact him. Two years from now I just want you to know that I will be back over here asking
for your vote and your support. In the meantime, as your Congressman, I'm going to have my pro-labor views because I think I'm a much better union person than some of you here tonight."
APPENDIX D¹

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<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
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¹Wayne Whitt, "Fulton Wins in Landslide," Tennessean, August 8, 1975, p. 27B.
Inaugural Speech
OF MAYOR RICHARD FULTON
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1975, AT MUNICIPAL AUDITORIUM

Thank you for being here tonight . . . for filling this auditorium so well and for filling my heart with this demonstration of your interest and support.

We stand tonight on the edge of a great, unexplored frontier of opportunity in public service. The past 12 years have served well to bring us to this point of challenge.

During these 12 years our metropolitan Government has grown to maturity. It has enjoyed excellent leadership under Mayor Beverly Briley, it has proven to be stable and enduring. It is a dream which has met its reality.

And during those same 12 years, I have matured by service in the United States Congress. In that legislative role, I have been privileged to work closely with all levels of government. It has brought me to a fuller understanding of where the real frontier exists and where the opportunity for public service is greatest.

There are many cities in our country not so fortunate tonight. Some of our largest municipalities across this nation are fighting for their lives, their futures on the brink of financial disaster with no chart to guide them.

With our metropolitan government, we have the chart to guide our way. What we must provide in this second administration of metropolitan government is the courage of conviction and the strength of determination to follow that course.

The hallmark of this second administration of metropolitan government will be "service." Its watchword will be "dedication." Its keynote will be "work."

We cannot do less and regain for government service the respect it once held and rightly deserves.

It is my intention for this administration to be open and above reproach.

I expect every employee of this government . . . including the mayor and his staff . . . to give maximum effort to the cause.

I pledge myself to set the example. I expect each employee to follow.

Each employee should remember who pays the bills and who pays his salary. Every citizen should be treated with courtesy and respect. This government will be responsive to the needs of the half-million people it serves.

That philosophy will help regain the respect the citizen once held for public service. It is the philosophy of this administration, and each employee will practice that philosophy.

My relationship with the Metropolitan Council will be one of cooperation, and I hope, mutual respect, I am fully aware of the requirements of public service placed on the legislative branch and the needs of legislators to service their constituency. I know of the contributions which can be made to government from the legislative chambers. I want the council to accept a full partnership role in leading this community forward.

We must display a positive attitude which will give this community we love an atmosphere of progress and an environment for planned, quality growth.

My goals are simply stated:

We must reverse the dangerous trend of runaway crime rates. We will do that job by creating a more effective police effort.

We must expand essential services into every possible area as rapidly as possible. We will do that job with careful planning.

We must upgrade our school system to give each student the basic skills needed to prepare himself for a full life. We will do that job by returning to some basic concepts like the three R's.

We must provide social services to the less fortunate and the handicapped. We will do that job by preparing them for fuller roles in our society.

We must regain the faith of the people in the government processes. We will do that job by being open and honest and keeping the people involved directly in the processes.

We must, to achieve these things, be creative and innovative. We must provide efficiency in service if we are to have the funds with which to do these jobs. We will be fiscally responsible. We will economize in every area we can. But we must also work. That is my commitment to this job.

My heart is full tonight:

Full of gratitude for the opportunity you present me to be your servant.

Full of thankfulness for the grace of God which permits me to accept that duty.

Full of excitement for the potential which lies before us.

Full of respect for the challenges which confront us.

Full of commitment to answer those challenges with positive solutions.

But most of all, my heart is full of love, for this city and the people who so singularly honor me tonight with their faith.

That faith demands that we feel a commitment to explore this new frontier with courage and purpose . . . and it commands us to fulfill that commitment with the best we can offer.

I pledge you that commitment:
APPENDIX E

METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE ISSUES POLL

Your opinion is needed to carry your message to the Mayor's office. Listed below are a few of the major issues facing our city today. What do you consider the most important? (Please check only the ones that concern you the most.)

- CRIME
- FIRE PROTECTION
- METRO TRANSIT
- STREETS
- STREET LIGHTING
- EDUCATION
- ECONOMY IN METRO GOVERNMENT
- SANITATION
- TAXES
- METRO AIRPORT SERVICES
- ZONING
- POLLUTION
- ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFIC

NOTE: Please return as soon as possible. Your name and address will not be used when results of this poll are released.

Dear Congressman Fulton:

( ) I want to help and have enclosed a contribution of $1, $5, $10, $________.*

( ) I want to help and will work or contribute my time on your behalf. Please contact me and let me know how I may help.

( ) I am unable to contribute time or money, but will support you for Mayor.

*NOTE: Personal checks only, made out to Fulton Campaign Committee.

NAME: __________________________________________

ADDRESS: ________________________________________

TELEPHONE NUMBER: ________________________________

OCCUPATION: ________________________________________

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: ________________________________
APPENDIX F

TO THE FULTON-FOR-MAYOR COMMITTEE:

I want to be a Fulton helper. Count on me --

- to serve on the Door-to-Door Canvas Committee.
- to serve as an Election Day worker.
- to place a Fulton sign at
- to serve on the Telephone Campaign Committee.
- to have a meeting at my home.
- to work in some other capacity.

________________________________________
Name

________________________________________
Address

________________________________________
Phone

________________________________________
Ward & Precinct
SOURCES CONSULTED

BOOKS AND JOURNAL ARTICLES


NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES are arranged chronologically


"Fulton Qualifies for Mayor's Post," Tennessean, June 21, 1975


"Hawkins Race Raises 54,944.00," Tennessean, August 1, 1975.
Nashville Banner, Editorial, August 5, 1975.
Nashville Banner, Editorial, September 2, 1975.
"Fulton Race Expenses Set at $194,000.00." Nashville Banner, September 4, 1975.


SPECIAL REPORTS, BROCHURES, AND TRANSCRIPTS


Transcript of Personal Interview with Richard Fulton, November, 1977.