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Husserl's Collapse of Cartesian Dualism as a Result of the Epoche & the Intentionality Theory of Consciousness

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1982

HUSSERL'S COLLAPSE OF CARTESIAN DUALISM
AS A RESULT OF THE EPOCHÉ¹
AND THE INTENTIONALITY THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of
Philosophy and Religion
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by

David L. Nickell

July 1982

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AS A RESULT OF THE EPOCHÉ
AND THE INTENTIONALITY THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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July 1982

113 pages

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Since the time of Descartes, it has been an implicit assumption of western thought that human reality is composed of two totally distinct substances: the physical (extended) and the non-physical (non-extended). Explaining the nature of these two substances, and the relation between them, has been a central dilemma in western philosophy ever since. Edmund Husserl believed these categories are the result of latent abstraction in our way of conceiving the world and have no place in reality itself. By explicating the implications of Brentano's observation that 'all consciousness is consciousness of something' (the theory of intentionality) and by effecting a radical attitude shift beyond all naive acceptances to the apodictic ground of pure experience, Husserl believed he could gain immediate access to the categories of reality itself. From the standpoint of this apodictic realm of pure experience--which Husserl believed to be prior to all mental abstractions--a non-dualistic (in the substantial sense) view of human reality could be obtained. Emphasis is placed on the collapse and replacement of Cartesian categories by the radical categories of transcendental phenomenology.

INTRODUCTION

All of philosophy is based on an assumption, whether tacit or explicit, of the relationship between consciousness and its objects. This relationship is by no means resolved. Traditionally western philosophy has dealt with this issue by viewing reality as bifurcated into a dualism of opposing substances: the physical and the non-physical.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Edmund Husserl's attempt to collapse (not unite) these categories. We shall see that in working out the implications of the theory of intentionality,¹ Husserl abandoned the Cartesian categories and strove to explicate a non-dualistic yet not monistic model of reality. This was made possible by taking experienced phenomena, purely as experienced, to be the ground of absolute certitude sought by Descartes.

We shall begin by briefly reviewing Descartes' dualistic theory of man. Then we will look at Husserl's view of Descartes' philosophy in order to gain a preliminary grasp of why Husserl felt compelled to reach for a more radical understanding of the relationship between consciousness and its objects. The rest of the paper will examine

¹Brentano's observation that for consciousness to exist, it must be consciousness of something.

Husserl's progressive replacement of Cartesian dualism with the more radical phenomenological categories.

SECTION A

CARTESIAN DUALISM

Mind-body dualism has been an implicit element of western thought since Plato, but it was Descartes who made it an institution. Much of the philosophy since Descartes has been in response to his theory of man being composed of two totally distinct and independent substances. The multitude of theories have traditionally been confined to three main categories:

1. Interactionism--Both the physical and the non-physical are real and somehow intermingle, actively influencing one another.

2. Idealism--The non-physical mind is real; material objects are non-substantive and are ultimately modes or aspects of the mental.

3. Materialism--Physical substance is real; all non-physical aspects can be reduced to material origins.

Recently, however, attempts have been made to totally abandon these categories in an attempt to describe personhood in a manner which does not give rise to these questions. This fresh attempt was begun (if, indeed, one philosopher can be said to begin this sort of thing) by Edmund Husserl. This new "radical philosophy" must be examined in its contextual relation to what Ryle termed the "Official Doctrine"¹ of Cartesian Dualism.

¹Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1949), p. 11.

While in Paris in November of 1628, Descartes became engaged in a debate with Chandoux on the nature of science. Chandoux's contention was that science could only be grounded on probabilities. Descartes, however, argued that human knowledge could have nothing but absolute certainty as ground; and not only that, he had a method of establishing this absolute certainty once and for all.² Thus Descartes set out to develop a system which would yield a piece of indubitable knowledge upon which all of human knowledge could be based. From this ground of certitude, Descartes believed his method could be used as an actual process of discovery in any rational inquiry.³

Descartes' method for discovering the indubitable was to suspend the active judging process by systematically withholding "belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable,"⁴ until he at least might "know with certainty that nothing is certain."⁵ According to his methodology, all knowledge gained through the senses is immediately subject to doubt (it cannot be known for certain that I am not dreaming) and must therefore be set aside. But doubt must not stop with physical objects; even belief in the arithmetic and geometry which express such extension

²The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rep. ed. (1972), s.v. "Descartes, Rene," by Bernard Williams.

³Ibid.

⁴Rene Descartes, "Meditations," trans. John Veitch, in The Rationalists (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 112.

⁵Ibid., p. 118.

must also be set aside, for it is possible that a "malignant demon" is deceiving me even on these matters.⁶ And since this means that I cannot be absolutely certain about the objects of memory, that I possess senses, nor that body, figure, extension, motion, or place are real, I must assume that indubitable knowledge is "something different altogether."⁷

But though I must doubt the nature of my existence and all related knowledge, I cannot doubt that I exist:

Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses or body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed since I was persuaded.⁸

And so, I cannot in any way be deceived about the fact of my existence, for to be deceived I must exist.

In order for this piece of indubitable knowledge (expressed by the formula "cogito ergo sum"--I think, therefore I am) to provide a base from which to build, it must first be examined for revelations about my essential existence, or ego. Descartes' reasoning to the nature of self-existence from the fact of this existence is based on the scholastic belief that no property or quality ever exists independently but is always dependent on some substance.

⁶Ibid., p. 116

⁷Ibid., p. 119.

⁸Ibid.

According to Descartes, substance is

. . .nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. And in fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely God.

But there are also "created substances" which are almost as good; these need "only the concurrence of God in order to exist."¹⁰ These cannot be directly experienced by us, however.

. . .substance cannot first be discovered merely from the fact that it is a thing that exists, for that fact alone is not observed by us. We may, however, easily discover it by means of any one of its attributes because it is a common notion that nothing is possessed of no attributes, properties, or qualities. For this reason, when we perceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present.¹¹

Descartes held that "each substance has a principle attribute"¹² which, when present, indicates the presence of the particular substance.

. . .extension in length, breadth and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance.¹³

By its attributes Descartes deemed the ego to be a thinking, non-extended substance. Because it is of

⁹Descartes, Rene, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) 1:239.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 240.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

this class of substance, its existence gives us no verification of physical substance. Even when I think I perceive an object, all I can know for certain is that I think I perceive an object and therefore I, as a thinking substance, exist. All I can know for certain about physical objects (at this point) is that they are a possibility since extension (the principle attribute of physical substance) is expressed by pure mathematics and geometry, which are still under doubt. Contact of one class of substance with the other creates special problems. For me, as a thinking substance, to make the move from the possibility to the certainty of physical substance, I must make recourse to God (the ultimate substance).

The concept of God plays a major role in Descartes' epistemology. Beginning with only the indubitability of his own existence and thoughts (which may refer to nothing), he must prove the existence of God and then employ God to justify his belief in the world of objects beyond the boundaries of his self. The result is Descartes' ontological argument which establishes the objective existence of God from (or as the source of) the intrinsic existence of the idea of a perfect God in Descartes' consciousness. This is made possible by the acceptance of a causal principle which says that the cause of anything must contain at least as much reality, or perfection, as the effect.

. . .it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect; for whence can the

effect draw its reality if not from its cause? And how could the cause communicate to it this reality unless it possessed it in itself?¹⁴

Descartes takes this to mean that the thought of a perfect God must be based on a God at least as perfect.

Once the concept of God is established, it can be used to justify the belief in external objects. Descartes notes that ideas of physical objects

. . . are frequently produced in my mind without my contributing to it in any way, and even frequently contrary to my will. This faculty must therefore exist in some substance different from me, in which all the objective reality of the ideas that are produced by this faculty is contained formally or eminently. . .¹⁵

He continues to say that the source of these ideas must be one of three possibilities: corporeal nature, consisting of physical bodies; God himself; or ". . . some creature, of rank superior to body."¹⁶ And since God is perfect and cannot be a deceiver (nor would he allow me to be systematically deceived¹⁷), I am justified in believing the external world is the cause. If my strong natural tendency to believe in physical substance were invalid, then God would be a deceiver.

Though Descartes' method has brought us at last to a certainty of both the ego and material objects, it is imperative to notice that the two are totally distinct. As stated earlier, the ego, according to Descartes, belongs

¹⁴Descartes, The Rationalists, p. 133.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 166.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 167.

to the category of non-extended, thinking substance; material objects belong to the category of non-thinking, extended substance. The two are vastly different in respect to their very nature, yet somehow are intertwined.

. . . I rightly conclude that my essence consists only in my being a thinking thing [or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And . . . although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I [that is, my mind, by which I am what I am] is [sic] entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it.¹⁸

The mind and the body have a peculiar association. When my body is injured, I feel pain. I even learn to associate the two, recognizing that my body is in need of food when I feel the sensation of hunger. Thus the mind and body, though remaining totally distinct, form a certain unity. The forming of a unity, however, does not mean the two are of equal status.

. . . nature . . . teaches me to shun what causes in me the sensation of pain, and to pursue what affords me the sensation of pleasure, and other things of this sort; but I do not discover that it teaches me, in addition to this, from these diverse perceptions of the senses, to draw any conclusions respecting external objects without a previous careful and mature consideration of them by the mind: for it is, as appears to me, the office of the mind alone, and not of the composite whole of mind and body, to discern the truth in those matters.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 169.

Descartes' position, then, is that by proceeding to doubt every thing that can possibly be doubted, we arrive at the indubitable ground of the ego--I think, therefore I am. This ego is seen by its attributes to be a thinking, non-extended substance and, as such, provides no immediate evidence for the reality of non-thinking, extended substance. But because Descartes salvaged the concept of God by means of his ontological argument, we can reason that material objects do exist; if the natural tendency to believe in the objects of the sensations I am experiencing is not valid, then God would be a deceiver and therefore not perfect. Hence physical objects exist. Mind and body necessarily remain totally distinct, yet interact to the point of apparent unity.

Descartes' philosophy raises many questions, but for the present discussion, two main issues will become prominent. First and most obvious is the problem of interaction: How do two totally distinct substances interact with the intimacy required in Descartes' model of a person? This problem is not limited to mind-body dualism, but arises whenever a dualistic theory appears. Materialism and Idealism are largely the results of attempting to solve this problem. The second problem is metaphysical solipsism. All I have access to is my own experience. If ultimately my experiences are subjective, how do I know for certain that there is any thing other than me

and my experiences? We shall see that Husserl offers a way around these problems and does not rely on divine intercession.

SECTION B

PRELUDE TO HUSSERL

For our examination of Husserl's collapse of mind-body dualism, we shall use his Logical Investigations, Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences as primary sources, despite the popular theory that the Crisis marks a distinct departure from his earlier works. Though the departure view may apply when dealing with certain specific elements of Husserl's phenomenology, it will be seen that his investigation of the intentional relation between subjective conscious acts and the objective world is a sustained effort. An analysis of the results of this investigation must, of course, be tempered by the knowledge that Husserl's works were never a complete, refined philosophical argument for a particular view, but were examples of philosophical-investigation-in-progress. Thus we shall treat each work as a further development of his preceding investigations.

But before we can grasp Husserl's own philosophy, we must first examine his conception of Descartes' philosophy. This will give us an understanding of the ramifications of Cartesian dualism which provided the impetus for Husserl's phenomenology.

SECTION C

HUSSERL'S VIEW OF CARTESIAN DUALISM

Any theory (including foundational beliefs such as world views, religious views, morality, etc., whether philosophical or not) presupposes assumptions concerning the relationship between consciousness and the world. Usually these are smuggled into the belief system by rote. The average man in the street is unaware that he holds any such presuppositions (or more likely, he is unaware that there is the possibility of an alternative set) yet they shape his very conception of--and hence his actions in--the world. It is not difficult to see that such presuppositions held collectively by a culture have staggering effects.

As was stated earlier, most of western thought since Descartes has been under the shadow of Cartesian dualism. Indeed post-Cartesian philosophy can be roughly categorized according to the various options of handling the dilemmas of physical/non-physical dualism. These have been listed as Interactionism, Idealism, and Materialism.¹ Post-Cartesian philosophy is caught in an interesting bind: to

¹It should be noted that these are broad categories and that many subheadings may exist within each.

even attempt a solution is to validate the problem. It is the attempt to deny the validity of the problem itself--and hence the need of a solution--that makes Husserl's philosophy radical. Husserl believed the problem to be a bogus one, but one that has worked its way into the fiber of the age.

Husserl maintains that mind-body bifurcation has been artificially superimposed on reality due to an abstraction. This abstraction began as an innate tendency to view the world as composed of two separate realms: the physical realm of nature and the non-physical realm of the psyche. This tendency, which had its beginnings with the ancient Greeks, found its way into religious thought and therefore into the culture's storehouse of inherent assumptions. The tendency to perceive the world as bifurcated along this line of abstraction was enhanced by the adopting of the "ready-made geometry of the ancients."²

The tendency to divide reality according to abstract distinctions remained latent until Galileo discovered that much could be accomplished by limiting scientific endeavor to the purely objective world of physical objects--the world as expressed in pure mathematics and geometry. Husserl felt that this limited science to a realm of abstrac-

²Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 221.

tion, thus unavoidably creating a "natural-scientific rationality"³ which is disjunct from experienced reality.

. . . Galileo abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life; he abstracts from all that is in any way spiritual, from all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis. The result of this abstraction is the things purely as bodies; but these are taken as concrete real objects, the totality of which makes up a world which becomes the subject matter of research. One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. A consequence of this, along with mathematization, which was too quickly taken for granted, is [the idea of] a self-enclosed natural causality in which every occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly the way is thus prepared for dualism⁴, which appears immediately afterward in Descartes.

When the valid field of scientific inquiry was restricted to 'concrete real objects', which were signified through the language of mathematics and geometry (i.e., the idiom for expressing extension), a residue of experienced reality remained unaccounted for. Descartes merely uncovered and developed the implications of Galileo's abstract view of nature. Through his inquiry, Descartes revealed the psyche as the residue of experienced reality which could not be accounted for by Galilean physics. Pure bodies--which exist as objects of measurement--were reified as a closed realm of reality. Hence it followed that the psyche (which is composed of that aspect of experience

³Ibid., p. 61.

⁴Ibid., p. 60. When Husserl uses the term 'spiritual' in this context, he is referring to such aspects of experienced reality as art and culturally shared meaning values. The connotations of the term which are derived from the assumption of the Cartesian split must be abandoned as no longer applicable.

perceived as 'my own'--i.e., the internal dialogue, remembrances, etc.) should also be a closed and distinct realm of reality. Thus it was not long before psychology appeared as a new field of science.

Descartes interpreted the split to be between a realm of extended substance and a realm of non-extended substance. These substances were said to be separate and distinct because each possessed a totally distinct set of attributes. Despite this, psychology (due largely to Hobbes and Locke) soon came to be "naturalized" as a field of science parallel to physics.⁵

It should be kept in mind that neither Galileo nor Descartes were deliberately making the abstraction from the world as actually experienced to the mathematized world of the realm of physical nature. Their tendency to think of the world as bifurcated had been latent. Galileo and Descartes were attempting to render the world accessible to rational inquiry, and although they opened the way for much beneficial progress, they failed to notice the abstraction inherent in their method.

. . .because of the way in which the ready-made geometry of the ancients was taken over, the idealization which thoroughly determines its sense was almost forgotten; and on the psychic side [such an] idealization, as an actually executed and original accomplishment in a manner appropriate to the nature of the psychic, was not required, or rather not missed.⁶

⁵Ibid., p. 63.

⁶Ibid., p. 221.

Once the dualism (which had remained implicit ". . . throughout the millennia. . ." ⁷) was made explicit by Descartes, the two branches of study became fields of scientific discipline in a manner never before possible.

The ancients had individual investigations and theories about bodies, but not a closed world of bodies as subject matter of a universal science of nature. They also had investigations of the human and animal soul, but they could not have a psychology in the modern sense, a psychology which, because it had universal nature and a science of nature before it [as a model], could strive for a corresponding universality, i.e.⁸ within a similarly self-enclosed field of its own.

After the world had been formally severed into a corporeal aspect and a psychic aspect, the problem immediately arose concerning the obvious interaction of the two spheres. Our everyday lives are based on--and are examples of--the interaction between these aspects of the world. But now the rational explanation of this phenomena posed an embarrassing problem. Descartes had invoked the concept of God to bridge the chasm, but this attempt failed to provide intellectual satisfaction and philosophy was presented with a new theme.

In general, the separating-off of the psychic caused greater and greater difficulties whenever problems of reason made themselves felt. Of course it was only later that these difficulties became so pressing that they became the central theme of philosophy, in the great investigations on human understanding, in "critiques of reason."⁹

⁷Ibid., p. 75.

⁸Ibid., p. 60.

⁹Ibid., p. 62.

The constituting of a universe of purely corporeal bodies is a mental act of idealization which was useful in the development of a science based on mathematics. But this realm of abstraction from everyday experience leaves a portion of experienced reality unaccounted for. Because the abstraction necessary to isolate a sphere of extended objects of experience was not taken into account, both the sphere of extension and its resulting 'metaphysical' residue were assigned their own substantiality. Herein lies the problem, according to Husserl. If we take the bifurcating abstraction into account, the Cartesian dualism of two distinct substances is seen to be invalid. Rather than raw reality, Descartes had examined reified abstractions and ". . . abstracta are not 'substances.'"¹⁰

This assigning of substantiality to what Husserl believed to be 'abstracta' plagues philosophers even today. Many still feel an urgent need to devise some new trick argument that will explain how man can be composed of both physical and non-physical substances. Many believe that if this view cannot somehow be salvaged, there will be no way to preserve our personhood. Ironically, it is often this school of philosophy which most vehemently denounces phenomenology when Husserl was in fact attempting to eliminate the problem they consider so threatening. Once the Cartesian categories are admitted, their collapse

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 229.

would result in the conceptual reduction of our very being (i.e., in an Idealistic or Materialistic sense). Thus many philosophers--while confounded by the ensuing dilemmas--doggedly maintain and defend the categories. This is apparently due to the inbred belief in the substantiality of a self-enclosed realm of physical bodies. When the substantiality of a physical realm is assumed, the denial of substantiality to its residue of experience would have unfavorable implications, especially in questions of morality.

But Husserl does not deny the substantiality of one in favor of the other. Instead he denies the autonomous substantiality of both, reducing them to the one heading of 'lived experience.' The enigmas of Cartesian dualism present themselves only on a conceptual level (as does the dualism itself, according to Husserl) and do not appear in actual experience. Husserl's belief that the evidence of lived experience is more primary than traditional theoretical dilemmas--and the resulting dismissal of abstract theory in favor of what is actually experienced--is central to phenomenology.

It is human beings that are concretely experienced. Only after their corporeity has been abstracted--within the universal abstraction which reduces the world to a world of abstract bodies--does the question arise, presenting itself now as so obvious, as to the "other side," that is, the complimentary abstraction.¹¹

Husserl's insight--that we experience humans and not corporeal bodies and/or disembodied souls--is the

¹¹Ibid., p. 228.

clue we shall use for an understanding of his phenomenology. Though the role of the Cartesian dogma in our everyday life is not readily apparent (especially while standing in the dogma), it results in an ever broadening split between the world of experience and the world of the mathematically exact sciences. This split produces anomalies of reason which are usually overlooked by both the man in the street and the working scientist, but for the philosopher, these anomalies are indications that our understanding of reality is awry.

As previously stated, any attempt to unify the psychic substance with the corporeal substance validates the split. If, as Husserl believed, the bifurcation was the product of an abstraction performed by rote, then no philosophy which presupposes the mind-body dualism can accurately portray concretely experienced reality. For Husserl, the option left open was to find a point prior to the bifurcation and build a unified science--and philosophy--from that base.

Descartes had attempted to find a foundation for rational inquiry and, through his famous method of doubt, had determined that the starting point should be one's own point of existence: the ego. Husserl believed this to have been a monumental discovery but one which Descartes neglected to develop because he failed to stick with ". . .

what we find actually given. . . ."12 Descartes had made the discovery that all knowledge is ultimately referred to the ego but then, according to Husserl, had promptly misinterpreted his discovery due to hidden presuppositions which shaped his thought. His discovery was annulled by "things taken for granted throughout the millenia."¹³ Descartes had inquired as to the nature of the ego which he discovered as apodictically posited. He eliminated corporeal substance (for it can be doubted) and was left with the psyche, which he interpreted as the pure soul. Hence the notion of a person as a combination of extended body and non-extended soul (each with a distinct substance) arises. But in doing this, Descartes was assuming the validity of the Galilean world of bodies.¹⁴ In allowing this dogma to shape his thought, Descartes had fallen from the radicalness he initially proclaimed. Thus, he identified the ego with the psyche--which gave birth to the problem of interaction and left rational inquiry ungrounded--and missed the turn to the transcendental ego.

Husserl took up Descartes' project of grounding knowledge and tried to do it without admitting entry to the dualistic dogma, not by attempting a solution to its

¹²Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 24.

¹³Idem, The Crisis, p. 75.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 79.

resulting dilemmas. As we shall see, Husserl takes as ground the world-as-experienced (the 'Life-world'), which is the presupposition of all forms of inquiry.¹⁵ We shall also see that this is made possible through an expanded definition of 'experience.'

¹⁵Aron Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 418.

SECTION D

THE BEGINNINGS OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Husserl took Descartes' attempt to ground rational knowledge as the beginning for his transcendental phenomenology yet denied most of the claims of Cartesian philosophy.¹ More precisely, Husserl wanted to take up Descartes' motives in a "quasi-Cartesian fashion" which would overcome ". . . the hidden but already felt naivete of earlier philosophizing."²

Transcendental phenomenology's beginning is, therefore, parallel to Descartes' beginning: the search for ". . . absolute insights, insights behind which one cannot go back any further."³ Thus Husserl took up Descartes' initiative to find a piece of apodictic evidence; that is, a piece of evidence that would reveal itself in a manner such that its non-being would be absolutely inconceivable. Because Husserl, like Descartes, believed the being of the world to be obvious but not apodictic,⁴ he saw the turn away from the world toward the subject himself

¹Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.1.

²Ibid., p. 6

³Ibid., p. 2.

⁴Ibid., pp. 15-18.

as the move which made Descartes ". . .the primally founding genius of all modern philosophy."⁵

Descartes had expressed what he believed to be apodictic subjectivity as ego cogito--"I think." Husserl expanded this expression to ego cogito cogitatum,⁶ believing that this accounted for what Descartes had missed: "The essence of consciousness, in which I live as my own self. . . ."⁷ The addition of the one word to Descartes' famous formula marks the beginning of the split from Cartesian categories which gave transcendental phenomenology a life of its own.

Descartes took the ego cogito, the "I think," to be an indubitable expression of a complete, coherent self-experience. But Husserl points out that although it was implied, Descartes failed to fully explicate the 'intentionality'⁸ of consciousness. By intentionality Husserl means the

. . .universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.

For this reason consciousness can not accurately be expressed as "I think," but must be stated as "I think x." To examine

⁵Idem, Crisis, p. 73.

⁶Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.

⁷Idem, "Paris Lectures," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980), p. 53.

⁸Idem, Crisis, p. 82.

⁹Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.

consciousness otherwise is to examine an abstraction; and we have seen the dangers involved in conferring the status of substantial being upon an abstraction. Once the intentional nature of consciousness is accounted for, its essential structure is revealed.

According to Husserl, consciousness must always consist of an act (cogito) and an object, or more technically, the "meaning" of the act (cogitatum). These two aspects can never concretely exist separately; only as abstracta may we deal with them individually. For this reason we can never accurately speak of consciousness and experience in separate terms, but must refer to conscious experience (or phenomena).¹⁰ We shall see momentarily that it is within the stream of conscious experience that phenomenology will take its base.

Husserl believed that Descartes' method of doubt, although a definite and crucial step in the right direction, is inadequate for the more radical needs of transcendental phenomenology. Because it is impossible to simultaneously doubt and accept a single thing, Descartes' ". . . universal attempt at doubt is just an attempt at universal denial."¹¹ But even as radically investigating philosophers, we cannot

¹⁰Robert C. Solomon, ed., Phenomenology and Existentialism, p. 19.

¹¹Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 98.

fully deny the being of a phenomenon (i.e., a conscious experience). What we can do is suspend all judgment concerning the validity claim of the meant object of the phenomena by 'bracketing' the entire phenomena--act and meaning--thus reducing it to the status of pure experience. This bracketing, or suspension, of the natural or everyday acceptance of world validity is termed 'epoché.' The epoché, Husserl maintains, can even be applied to things held with unshakable conviction whereas Descartes' doubt--a full denial of being--could not. Hence, Husserl refers to the epoché as a "disconnecting of a living conviction that goes on living."¹²

To understand the bracketing function of the epoché, we must first consider Husserl's initial goal: a piece of knowledge that is absolutely certain--"an Archimedian point"¹³ which will serve as the unshakable foundation on which all of human knowledge can be built. Husserl distinguishes two types of evidence by means of which we attain knowledge.

The first type of evidence is that of 'harmonious experience.' This is the evidence by which the world around us is presented in everyday life. If a table continues to harmoniously present itself in all the proper modes,

¹²Ibid.

¹³The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rep. ed. (1972), s.v. "Husserl, Edmund," by Richard Schmitt.

I accept it as existent: I will unquestioningly walk around it next time. But acceptance of an object through harmonious evidence is dependent upon continued harmonious presentations. Adequate evidence for absolute certainty would "lie at infinity."¹⁴ Thus harmonious presentation, though adequate for everyday life, falls short of the demands of a radically meditating philosopher.

The second type of evidence Husserl refers to is 'apodicticity.' Apodictic evidence, though given simultaneously with the evidence of harmonious presentations, is evidence of a "higher dignity"¹⁵--it is immediate evidence of itself. When I experience a table, it is absolutely indubitable that I am having the experience of the table. That the table actually exists remains open to doubt. Recognizing the distinction between harmonious evidences and apodicticity forms the beginning of the epoche and the ensuing move to the transcendental standpoint.¹⁶

The disconnecting of oneself from the validity claims of all phenomena is the key to understanding transcendental phenomenology, according to Husserl. Not only must one understand this alteration of attitude, one must undergo and maintain the "radical and universal epoche,"¹⁷ To

¹⁴Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 15.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 14-17.

¹⁷Idem, Crisis, p. 80.

attempt the study of Husserl's philosophy without fully regarding the significance of the epoche¹ is to "destroy the whole meaning of . . . phenomenology."¹⁸

Prior to the epoche¹ we live in the attitude of everyday life, which is termed the 'natural stance.' From the natural stance I fully accept the validity of the harmoniously presented world. Any discordant presentation is debilitated to the status of hallucination or illusion. In the attitude of the natural stance, my conscious life is caught up in and presupposes the world¹⁹--which I perceive by implication of the manifold harmoniously presented objects distributed about me.²⁰

Husserl also distinguishes

"straightforwardly" executed grasping, perceiving, remembering, predicating, valuing, purposing, etc., from the reflections by means of which alone, as grasping acts belonging to a new level,²¹ the straightforward acts become accessible to us.

Through a direct act of consciousness, the object itself is under scrutiny. Through reflection the act of perceiving the object--which includes within it the object as perceived according to the intentionality theory--comes under scrutiny.

Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection

¹⁸ Idem, Ideas, p. 16.

¹⁹ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 32.

²⁰ Idem, Crisis, p. 143.

²¹ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.

do we "direct" ourselves to the perceiving itself, and to its perceptual directedness to the house.²²

By means of everyday and descriptive psychological reflection, my conscious acts, through which I relate to the world around me, are revealed. That is, I gain access to the flowing stream of cogitations which are presupposed as the valid psychic components of my existence as a man in the world. This aspect of my everyday existence is referred to as the psyche.²³ We have seen that Descartes isolated the psyche through such reflection--which "makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process but not objective"²⁴--and assigned to it the substantiality of an autonomous realm of being. He then identified this with the ego.

Descartes was led to this position because he abandoned his radical demand for apodictic evidence and remained in the natural stance, assuming the validity of the world presented through harmonious evidence. Through the non-radical reflection of the natural stance, the cogito of straightforward perception is revealed as ". . . data belonging to the world, which is presupposed as existing--that is to say, taken as the psychic components of a man."²⁵ Any

²²Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.

²³Ibid., p. 32.

²⁴Ibid., p. 34.

²⁵Ibid., p. 32.

subjectivity which is revealed through a reflection from the natural stance remains ". . . on the footing of the world already given as existing. . . ." ²⁶

But we have seen that although harmonious presentation is sufficient to get us through life in our everyday--or naive--stance, it does not possess the certitude demanded by the philosopher radically searching for the ground of reality itself. It is the move beyond the natural stance which places phenomenology firmly in the transcendental realm of apodictic certitude. This is accomplished by the epoche'.

For example, when I perceive this paper, its actual existence, though obvious, is not apodictic. It is, however, apodictic that I am experiencing the perception of this paper located in a particular relationship to its surrounding objects--the ones actually seen and those inferred. To attain a ground of apodictic validity, then, I must bracket--or set aside--all claims of being and non-being made by the object of perception.

Instead of simply existing for us--that is, being accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing in its existence--the world is for us only something that claims being. . . . In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a ²⁷phenomenon of being, instead of something that is.

²⁶Ibid., p. 34.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 18-19.

This is made possible by a radical 'objectifying' reflection. Natural reflection (both of everyday life and that of a psychology examining the life of the psyche) alters the naive subjective process by making an object of the original straightforward grasping act. In reflection the original process remains as the object of the reflection whose task is "to consider it and explicate what can be found in it."²⁸ But while natural reflection reveals the data given as being the psychic components of a man in the world of everyday life, the reflection of the epoche' performs a more radical objectification by making the shift from a naive acceptance of the validity of what is harmoniously presented to the apodictic ground of the pure experience of the presentation. Thus, radical reflection differs from natural reflection because

. . .the parallel data, with their like components, are not taken in this manner, because the whole world, when one is in the phenomenological attitude, is not accepted²⁹ as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon.

The epoche' removes the radically meditating philosopher from the natural stance by reducing the tacit belief in the validity of the natural world from a lived acceptance to an acceptance phenomenon. In other words, the naive

²⁸Ibid., p. 34.

²⁹Ibid., p. 32.

attitude of acceptance is itself placed before the radically objectifying reflection of the epoche', thus disconnecting the meditating philosopher from the natural footing of the world. For example, in the natural stance I perceive my ink pen. And simple reflection reveals that I, this man, am perceiving my ink pen. Scrutiny has been shifted from the object given/accepted as existent to the cogito--my conscious act--of perceiving the pen which obviously exists in my hand. But after performing the epoche', the ink pen (and also myself, as a man holding the ink pen³⁰) is not viewed as either existing or not existing. Instead, scrutiny is placed on an ink pen perception (cogito-cogitatum). I, the meditating philosopher, am no longer concerned with the cogito itself or with the cogitatum itself. Rather, the inquiry is directed to the totality of the perception as it is concretely experienced and naively lived through in its full intentionality: cogito-cogitatum.

Husserl believed this removal of perspective (or shifting of attitude) from living the cogito of perceiving the world to passively observing the fullness of the cogito-cogitatum relationship by means of the epoche' would simultaneously reveal apodictic evidence and propel the meditating philosopher into the realm of pure conscious experience. It is this change of attitude which is the key to transcendental phenomenology.

³⁰For a more detailed account of this subject, see Section E below.

Not a few shut themselves out altogether from the start because they cannot bring themselves to grasp intentional experience, the experience of perception, for instance, in company with its own proper essence as such. They do not succeed because they cannot replace the practice of living in perception, their attention turned towards the perceived object both in observation and in theoretical inquiry, by that of directing their glance upon the perceiving itself, or upon the way in which the perceived object with its distinguishing features is presented, and of taking that which presented itself in the immanent analysis of the essence just as it actually does present itself.³¹

³¹Husserl, Ideas, p. 236.

SECTION E

THE UNCOVERING OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

We must not take the abstention of the epoche¹ to be a Cartesian denial. The entire world continues to appear exactly as before but I, the meditating philosopher, have reduced all experience of the world to world-phenomena.

It must not be overlooked that epoche¹ with respect to all worldly being does not at all change the fact that the manifold cogitationes relating to what is worldly bear this relation within themselves, that, e.g., the perception of this table still is, as it was before, precisely a perception of this table. In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such, regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be, and regardless of the circumstances that I, as standing in the transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this object as well as from all my other natural acceptances.

Indeed, the world appears after the epoche¹ exactly as it did before. Included in the appearance after the epoche¹, however, are the naive beliefs and acceptances (through which I live in the world while in the natural stance) that also fall before the reduction. My naive involvement in the world, through beliefs and tacit assumptions, is presented as part of the world-phenomenon which I, the radical meditator, passively observe as mere-phenomenon.

¹Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 32-33.

. . .I, as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in experiencing the world--though that believing too is still there and grasped by my noticing regard. . .everything meant in such accepting or positing processes of consciousness (the meant judgment, theory, value, end, or whatever it is) is still retained completely--²but with acceptance-modification, "mere-phenomenon."²

It is true that while in the natural stance I experience objects as existing across varying strata (such as corporeal bodies or pure numerical and geometrical figures) and--through naive reflection--the flowing stream of cogitationes I call my psychic life. But I am not justified in assigning substantiality to these varying strata, for their mode of appearance is through harmonious presentation, thus lacking apodicticity.

By reflectively placing scrutiny on the intentional fullness of the cogito-cogitatum relationship, however, the apodictic realm of experience itself is opened for examination by the meditating philosopher. When examining only that which is given as apodictic and ". . .keeping at a distance all interpretations that transcend the given,"³ the cogitationes and their cogitatum (in all possible strata of presentation) of the natural stance are collapsed to the one heading "mere phenomenon." Such categories as physical and non-physical, then, reduce to abstract subheadings of the one apodictically grounded heading.

²Ibid., pp. 19-20.

³Idem, Ideas, p. 242.

By performing the reflection of the epoche¹, the flow of world-accepting cogitationes and their object (the factual world) is reduced to cogitatum of a higher stream of abstaining cogito. This creates a unique attitude for the meditating philosopher. While the radical reflection passively and non-positionally looks on, the naive living in the world continues just as before. In the perception of a house, for instance, the cogitationes within the natural attitude assume the validity of, and take a position in relation to, the factual house. Because the factual house--indeed, the factual world--is given as lying "outside" of consciousness, this entire realm is referred to as 'transcendent.' Hence the ego, which natural and psychological reflection reveal living through the stream of cogitationes⁴ that have their footing on--that is, which presuppose the validity of--the natural world, is termed the 'transcendent,' or 'natural' Ego. The Ego that lives through the abstaining cogitationes (which have as their cogitatum the entire naive cogito-cogitatum interaction) is called 'transcendental.'

As we have said, the radical reflection of the epoche¹--which reveals the transcendental ego--does not disturb the flow of the naive cogito-cogitatum by objectifying it. The transcendental level cogitationes have as their

⁴Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 31.

cogitatum the pure experience of, for example, an actually existing man believing that he is perceiving an actually existing house through his acts of consciousness (which are revealed through naive reflection as his psyche). The transcendental Ego abstains from any position taking as to the being or non-being of this experience; all experiences--no matter what their claim to substantial existence--are reduced to mere phenomenon of being.

The reflecting Ego's non-participation in the "positing" (believing, taking a position as to being) that is part of the straightforward house-perception in no wise alters the fact that his reflecting experiencing is precisely an experiencing of the house-perception with all its moments, which belonged to it before and are continuing to take shape. And among these, in our example, are the moments of the perceived "house", purely as perceived. There is lacking neither, on the one side, the existence-positing (perceptual belief) in the mode of certainty, which is part of--normal --perceiving, nor, on the other side (that of the appearing house), the character of simple "factual existence."⁵

While the Ego (which radical reflection reveals as living through the transcendental intentional acts) abstains from all participation that presupposes the factual existence-status of any phenomenon, the naive ego (which natural and psychological reflection reveals living through the naive cogitationes) remains immersed in the presupposition of an existing world. Thus the subjectivity of an inquiring philosopher is split into the transcen-

⁵Ibid., pp. 34-35.

dental Ego and the transcendent ego; that is, into the subjective pole of flowing intentional acts that are intuitively apodictic in themselves and into the subjective pole of flowing intentional acts which naively presuppose the validity of a world presented through harmonious presentations.

If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencing and otherwise, is called "interested" in the world, then the phenomenologically altered--and, as so altered, continually maintained--attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes himself as "disinterested on-looker", above the naively interested Ego.

This splitting of the Ego is a crucial element of Husserl's philosophy, yet it is left open to a variety of interpretations. Much of the disagreement among Husserl's successors has its roots in this central point. Of course, a large portion of the perplexity arises from the vagueness of what the term 'Ego' refers to. Before we can know what it means to 'split' an Ego, we must know what an Ego is. A discussion of the Ego in Husserl's phenomenology will follow shortly, but for the present we may say that there is no clear, concise definition of 'Ego' in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl believed that the defining of the Ego was not a prerequisite for phenomenology, but its task. The lack of clarity concerning the precise nature of one's own being is the motivating force behind

⁶Ibid., p. 35.

phenomenology; thus the ". . .phenomenology of this self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole."⁷

If this is not complication enough, Husserl also failed to specify the nature of this split: Is it ontological, epistemological, or otherwise? The initial encounter with this portion of phenomenology is likely to be exasperating, for its crucial claim appears to be, "We know not what splits, we know not how." Yet closer examination reveals that the epoche¹ dictates the nature of the split, and determining what is split becomes a valid field of inquiry.

There are two obvious ways of interpreting the split: either it is an ontological split (meaning that I, the meditating philosopher now consist of two distinct Egos⁸) or the split is epistemological (meaning that the split does not result in a second really existing Ego, but merely in an alternative manner of obtaining knowledge of one's own being). The epoche¹, however, seems to rule out both of these options.

One might easily be led to read the 'splitting of the Ego' as an ontological distinction, for Husserl maintains

⁷Ibid., p. 68.

⁸Because the term 'Ego' involves inherent complications, we shall, for the present, take it to be the equivalent of the unitary subjectivity (later to be called "monadic") implied as existing through the flow of cogitationes-cogitatum.

that the natural world (which includes the naive ego) presupposes the transcendental Ego.⁹ That which is apodictic is the necessary presumption of that which is deduced from harmonious presentations. It was the task of the epoche', after all, to bring forth the previously unacknowledged ". . .being that is intrinsically prior to the world. . ." which is the ". . .already presupposed basis for the existence of the world."¹⁰

The split is between two distinct streams of cogitationes (taken with their intended objects of course). The natural stream livingly accepts the full implications of the validity of the factual world. The transcendental stream has as its meant object the entire natural stream (cogito-cogitatum) yet takes no position (which would necessarily presuppose an inference based on what has been, and what so far continues to be, harmoniously presented) concerning the validity of the presentation. Instead, the transcendental level of cogito-cogitatum, as pure experience of all presentations as mere phenomenon, is the apodictic ground from which the natural world can be inferred.

The ontological interpretation of the Ego-split, then, entails that the transcendental Ego, as ground for the natural world, enjoys ontological priority over the

⁹Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 26.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 18.

natural ego and its world of interaction. The transcendental Ego at least must have the status of ontically valid being. When this interpretation is taken, problems concerning the status of the natural ego (which is I, this man in the world¹¹) and his relation to the transcendental Ego (for whom even the "intermundane existence of my own Ego as human"¹² is reduced to mere-phenomenon) arise, for the natural ego continues a life of his own.

The difficulties, however, do not have a legitimate place in Husserl's phenomenology if the epoche is faithfully observed. The epoche serves the function of reducing all claims of substantiality and valid existence (including their natural acceptance) to mere phenomena. The transcendental stance is presented as having priority over the natural stance. To accept this appearance as valid, thus attaching substantiality (or ontic validity) to the Ego which exists through those intentional acts presented as having priority, is to fall from the transcendental stance. The assigning of validity to any appearance can only be done from the natural stance--or rather, the acceptance of validity places one in the natural stance. Husserl called for a "universal criticism of consciousness" which would be "grounded to the utmost and apodictically."¹³

¹¹Ibid., p. 19

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 35

This idea demands an absolute universal criticism, which, for its part, by abstention from all positions that already give anything existent, must first create for itself a universe of absolute freedom from prejudice.¹⁴

To take the presentation of the transcendental Ego as a structure with ontological validity is to disregard the call for "an abstention from all positions that already give any thing existent." The notion of a "universe of absolute freedom from prejudice" (prejudice here meaning presupposition of any sort) taken in the most radical manner possible brings us nearer to Husserl's understanding of 'transcendental Ego.' When the epoche' is performed, no validity judgments apply to any mode of being presented (including own-being). From the transcendental stance, non-being is seen to be a mode of being¹⁵ and all ontological categories are reduced to mere-phenomenon. Hence it appears that the splitting of the Ego must be an epistemological division.

An epistemological interpretation of the split between the transcendental and the natural streams of cogitationes would hold that the epoche' is a technique by which we reflectively gain knowledge of the conscious acts through which we normally attain our knowledge--in short, a reflective objectification of our very subjectivity. The transcendental Ego, then, has no ontological validity, but is

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 58.

merely a product of the reflective method by which we bring our conscious acts (through which we live) before scrutiny.

This interpretation, however, does not and it seems cannot take the epoche¹ fully into account. Like the reflection of descriptive psychology, the epistemological interpretation assumes the validity of "I, the man who is thus investigating"; it is my pure subjectivity which this novel reflective method reveals in such a unique manner. The attempt to understand the transcendental Ego is carried out from the perspective of 'I, this man in the world'. But as we have seen, the epoche¹ demands a radical universal criticism which cannot accept even this presupposition--which appears as so evidently a given fact--without the acceptance modification 'mere-phenomenon.'

It could possibly be argued that a form of epistemological interpretation could survive the reduction of the epoche¹. Perhaps it could be claimed that since the pure experience of mere-phenomenon (which is apodictically evidence of itself and nothing more) is the knowledge from which we naively infer the factual world; it is the epistemic ground of all knowledge. But even this modified epistemological interpretation is a product of attempting to grasp the transcendental stance without fully abandoning the natural stance: the validity of our everyday world

is assumed and the transcendental stance is inferred as the ground of our knowledge thereof. This violates Husserl's insistence that while the epoche¹ is fully maintained we remain in a stance from which any information already possessed--including the existence of my self or of a world--is suspended, leaving only the direct and immediate given as given.

That signifies restriction to the pure data of transcendental reflection, which therefore must be taken precisely as they are given in simple evidence, purely "intuitively", and always kept free from all interpretations that read into them more than is genuinely seen.¹⁶

In the discussions which follow we shall see that the relationship between the knower and the known--subject and object--is altered by the epoche¹ in a way that further restricts the ability of conventional epistemic categories to accurately describe the splitting of the Ego. Due to the collapse of natural stance categories and the emergence of transcendental categories, the Ego split--which appears solely by virtue of the epoche¹--can accurately be described only as a 'phenomenological split.' Let us now examine this category shift more closely.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 36

SECTION F

THE DUAL STANCES OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Taking all that has been discussed above as ground-work, we may now critically examine the relationship of the natural stance to the transcendental stance. From the natural stance I, this man among others, live in the world of spatio-temporally located objects. We have seen that this world of our everyday life, though obvious, suffers a nagging lack of certitude. This lack of absolute certitude (of the sort only a philosopher would demand) was the motivation of Descartes and Husserl alike. The search for that which cannot possibly be doubted led both inward: into one's own subjectivity. By performing the epoche', however, Husserl made a "transcendental turn"¹ which Descartes failed to make. Having missed the entrance to transcendental subjectivity, Descartes remained in the natural stance, believing the apodictic Ego--one's innermost subjectivity--would be "a little tag-end of the world"² which remains as the only unquestionable portion of the world. He intended to use this piece of apodictic evidence as an axiom from which to infer the rest of the

¹Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 23.

²Ibid., p. 24

world. We have seen that Descartes found it necessary to solicit the aid of supernatural personages to sustain this view. But more importantly for the present topic, the differences in stance radically alter the categories through which the world is conceived.

As is well known, Descartes expressed his own indubitability as cogito ergo sum--"I think, therefore I am." The word 'cogito' is the key term here. It is through the cogito that the world is revealed--to "know" in the familiar sense of the term requires a cogito by definition. This cogito (or more precisely, a stream of flowingly unified cogitationes) is our point of existence in the world. This stream of cogitationes is revealed by natural reflection (or psychological reflection which has the same assumptive base but is more deliberate) as the psyche.

As we have often said, this natural stance is based upon the inferred validity of harmonious presentations, thus lacking the apodicticity demanded by a radical philosopher. Let us, for the moment, examine the ramifications of assuming the substantial validity of the harmoniously presented world. While identifying with the stream of thought (cogito) through which the actually existing world (cogitatum) is revealed, we are fully immersed in the midst of natural world-experience (cogito-cogitatum).

. . .when consciously awake, I find myself at all times, and without my ever being able to change this,

set in relation to a world which, through its constant changes, remains one and ever the same. It is continually "present" for me, and I myself am a member of it.³

We must bear in mind that this entire natural world is a world of experienced presentations which include as horizon to the actual "field of perception"⁴ an ". . . empty mist of dim indeterminacy [which] gets studded over with intuitive possibilities or presumptions."⁵ These presentations exist in the form of cognizable qualities: there can be no qualityless presentations. The distinction between the transcendental and the natural stance is in the interpreted meaning values of these presentations.

By presupposing the validity of the flowing cogitationes as his human psyche, Descartes placed himself squarely in the natural standpoint of naive acceptance. His presupposition of the scholastic doctrine relating qualities to substance⁶ had inclined him to assume the substantiality of world-presentations. The further acceptance of Galileo's isolation of those presentations which appear through the mode exhibiting the quality of extension made the abstraction of distinct realms involuntary. If it is accepted that qualities are indicative of an underlying substance then the harmonious presentation of qualities

³Husserl, Ideas, pp. 92-93

⁴Ibid., p. 91

⁵Ibid., p. 92.

⁶Descartes, Philosophical Works 1:240.

must be assumed as substantial. If it is further accepted that those presentations with the mode of extension constitute a closed realm of nature, then it only follows that presentations with the mode of non-extension are indicative of a substance totally distinct from that of corporeal nature.

The assigning of distinct substantiality to particular strata of presentation (which are segregated according to the modes of cognizable qualities or attributes) is the move Husserl felt to be an abstraction. A rough analogy would be considering steam and ice to be indicative of totally distinct substances due to the obvious variance in their attributes. Though the isolation of one mode of appearance may be beneficial in certain cases, an overall inquiry into reality must not lose sight of the fact that both of these modes of appearance are but modes of the one category 'water.' Even so, we may interpret Husserl as holding that the modes of extension and non-extension are but varying modes of the one category 'mere-phenomenon.'

This change of interpretation (or shifting of stance) is a product of the transcendental reduction or epoche'. The implications of this reduction (which we have seen to be the move from strongly held beliefs based upon the rote interpretation of harmonious presentations to pure apodicticity) are subtle yet profound: subtle because

the presentations themselves do not change, profound because the change in meaning-value alters the categories of perceived reality. From the phenomenological stance both stances can be accounted for but while in the natural stance, the transcendental viewpoint is unimaginable.

From the natural standpoint nothing can be seen except the natural world. So long as the possibility of the phenomenological standpoint was not grasped, and the method of relating the objectivities which emerge therewith to a primordial form of apprehension had not been devised, the phenomenological world must needs have remained unknown, and indeed barely divined at all.

From the viewpoint of this "primordial form of apprehension," it is seen that the Cartesian categories refer to abstracta rather than reality. As such they find no role in Husserl's phenomenology. And because the Cartesian categories fall before the reduction of the epoche, the concepts implied by their acceptance do not arise in the transcendental realm.

The soul. . . is the residuum of a previous abstraction of the pure physical body, and according to this abstraction, at least apparently, is a complement of this body. But this abstraction (and we must not overlook this) occurs not in the epoche but in the natural scientist's or psychologist's way of looking at things, on the natural ground of the world as pre-given and taken for granted. . . . a pure soul has no meaning at all in the epoche, unless it is as a "soul" in "brackets", i.e.⁸ as mere "phenomenon" no less than the living body.

⁷Husserl, Ideas, p. 103.

⁸Idem, Crisis, pp. 79-80.

Thus from the transcendental stance, the naive segments into which Descartes severed reality are reduced to the one category 'mere-phenomenon.' When examining consciousness the categories 'physical' and 'non-physical' no longer apply. Instead, far more radical categories emerge. One's own consciousness--his indubitable subjectivity--is no longer interpreted as a particular realm given through presentations. Instead, it is the medium of access to all that is presented, no matter what the mode. The phenomenological categories come into form as the intentional nature of consciousness is taken into account; the perceived as one category and the medium through which the perceived exists as perceived as the other category. These categories come forth as we ". . . wait, in pure surrender, on what is essentially given."⁹

⁹Idem, Ideas, p. 240.

SECTION G

THE CATEGORIES OF NOESIS AND NOEMA

When the epoche¹ is performed, the everyday world (in all of its modalities) continues to be presented as before. But now the scrutiny of the meditating philosopher is reflectively focused upon the "concrete fullness and entirety"¹ of experience itself. The radically investigating philosopher is thus placed on the ground of an apodictic realm of inquiry-- a realm "that would exist even though this world were non-existent."² This realm--the interior of conscious experience in its full plenitude--is precisely the primordial given which makes any decision concerning being possible.³

By non-positionally and non-involvedly observing the intentional flow of the stream of conscious experience, the meditating philosopher creates a reflective space (a "universe of absolute freedom from prejudice") from which a "universal criticism of consciousness" can be undertaken. It is from this unique vantage point that Husserl intended to carry out the central task of his phenomenology;

¹Husserl, Ideas, pp. 104-105.

²Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 19

it is this that provides the underlying unity of the various directions of his works. This task was expressed in the Ideas as the attempt to find "the true meaning of an objective being that is subjectively knowable."⁴ In the Cartesian Meditations this was referred to as the search for "apodictically certain ways by which, within his own pure inwardness, an Objective [objekt] outwardness can be deduced."⁵ In the Crisis the goal is a "theory of how the ego, in the intentionality of its reason (through acts of reason) brings about objective knowledge."⁶

The motivating question resulting from the epoche¹ thus concerns the relationship between an act of perception on the subjective side, and the object perceived (or intended) on the objective side. The intentionality of consciousness, after all, requires both. As we pursue the intentional connection between the act of consciousness and the actually existing object perceived, the new radical categories of conscious experience are necessitated.

. . . In experience the intention is given with its intentional object, which as such belongs inseparably to it, thus really (reell) within it. What the experience intends, presents, etc., is and remains with it, whether the corresponding "real object" (wirkliche Objekt) exists in reality or not, or has been annihilated in the interval, and so forth.

⁴Idem, Ideas, p. 13.

⁵Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 3.

⁶Idem, Crisis, p. 83.

But if we try in this way to separate the real object (in the case of outer perception the perceived thing of nature) from the intentional object, placing the latter as "immanent" to perception within experience as a real factor (reell), we are beset by the difficulty that now two realities must confront each other, whereas only one of these is present and possible. I perceive the thing, the object of nature, the tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the real object of the perceiving "intention." A second immanent tree, or even an "inner image" of the real tree that stands out there before me, is nowise given, and to suppose such a thing by way of assumption leads only to absurdity.

It is obvious that radical categories are necessitated by the intentional connectedness of my experience of the tree and the objectively existing tree because to "ascrib[e] a representative function to perception, and consequently to every intentional experience" produces an infinite regress.⁸ The method of gaining access to these categories is found in the phenomenological method itself. As we know, the phenomenological epoche¹ reduced the entire world (in all of its modalities) to mere phenomenon. Through this reduction,

. . .we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the one who is meditating) acquire. . . is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of "phenomena" in the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense.⁹

This realm of my pure subjective processes (which include within them their meaning), we have seen, possesses the apodictic certitude demanded by a radical philosopher.

⁷Idem, Ideas, pp. 242-243.

⁸Ibid., p. 243. (Brackets mine).

⁹Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 20-21.

Descartes had assumed that once this apodicticity was found, it could be used as a basis from which to logically deduce the rest of the world. Husserl, however, rejected even this presupposition, thus marking another split from mathematized ways of knowing. Instead, he opted to stick to what is apodictically given.

Thus no attempt is made to carry out systematically the transcendental knowledge that can be obtained through logical deduction. Here we have one difference (though not the only one) between the whole manner of this new a priori science and that of the mathematical disciplines. These are "deductive" sciences, and that means that in their scientifically theoretical mode of development mediate deductive knowledge plays an incomparably greater part than the immediate axiomatic knowledge upon which all deductions are based. An infinitude of deductions rests upon a very few axioms.

But in the transcendental sphere we have an infinitude of knowledge previous to all deduction, knowledge whose mediated connexions (those of intentional implication) have nothing to do with deduction, and being entirely intuitive prove refractory to every methodically devised scheme of constructive symbolism.¹⁰

Husserl's phenomenological method consists of observing and describing--but not participating in--acts of conscious experience in their concrete fullness. What is given is to be taken purely as given, and all deductive interpretation and symbolism are to be avoided. What is apodictically given, purely as it is given, is the entire sphere of investigation for transcendental phenomenology. Taken in this manner, what is given in pure immediate experience, in its concrete fullness, may for the first time (by virtue of the epoche) be examined apart from the "conceptual

¹⁰Idem, Ideas, p. 6.

superstructures"¹¹ created and methodogenically imposed by the exacting mathematical sciences. It is within this newly opened field of immanence that phenomenology begins its investigation.

Being restricted to what is apodictically given, the meditating philosopher is not interested in the objectively existing tree outside the window, but with

what remains over as phenomenological residuum. . . and what. . . should count as a real (reelles) integral part of the pure experience, and what should not be so regarded.¹²

Husserl believed that in extracting what was purely given, we would no longer be concerned with the psychological act of an ego and its connection with an objectively existing thing¹³, which was Descartes' concern. Instead we would find the experienced world purely as experienced. And my pure immediate experience of a tree is quite different from the objectively existing tree. The epoche has shown us that it is from the continued harmonious stream of apodictic tree-experience that we come to know of an obviously existing factual tree. The phenomenological approach entails that we examine this immediate apodictic experience to find what it reveals to us about its essential structure. Its immediate connections and structures must then be traced to discover how it relates to the objective world.

¹¹Idem, Crisis, p. 216. (see also Cartesian Meditations, pp. 7-8)

¹²Idem, Ideas, p. 260.

¹³Idem, Ideas, p. 108.

When the tree-experience is passively observed in its concrete givenness, we find that it conforms to the basic intentional structure of all conscious phenomena: there is an act and what the act refers to (or its "meaning"). The act, however, is not itself the broad act of an ego, nor is its meaning an objectively existing thing. Rather, the pure act and its meaning (as given in the immediate experience) form the bi-polar structure of a pure phenomenon. The act, purely as given in its immediacy, is termed the 'Noesis.' The pure immediate meaning of the noesis (its referent) is called the 'Noema.'

. . .when phenomenological reduction is consistently executed, there is left us, on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness and, as its correlate on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as meant.¹⁴

The true meaning of the noesis and noema can only be reached through the epoche'. It is the noetic and noematic poles of an immediate conscious experience--as experienced--with which we are concerned. The distinction between the thing as experienced through the epoche' and the thing as an objective member of the natural world is critical.

The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning--the meaning of this perception, something that belongs

¹⁴Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 37.

necessarily to its essence--cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.

Whatever in purely immanent and reduced form is peculiar to the experience, and cannot be thought away from it, as it is in itself, and in its eidetic setting passes eo ipso into the Eidos, is separated from all Nature and physics, and not less from all psychology by veritable abysses; and even this image, being naturalistic, is not strong enough to indicate the difference.¹⁵

¹⁵ Idem, Ideas, p. 240.

SECTION H

THE NOEMATIC POLE OF PHENOMENA

To simplify our discussion of the concepts of noesis and noema, we shall begin by isolating the noematic pole of phenomena. The noema, as we have said, is the 'meaning' referred to by--or contained within--the act of consciousness (we shall take perceptual acts for our examination, but the same will hold true for all acts of consciousness, such as recollection, fancy, etc.¹). When I perceive a solid geometrical figure from the natural stance, the reduction of the epoche¹ will bring before radical scrutiny the pure, immediate, apodictically given experience of the figure as experienced in its immediacy. That is, through radical reflection and abstention, ". . .the meditating ego can, penetrate into the intentional constituents of experiential phenomena themselves. . . ." ² In the case of the geometrical figure, the epoche¹ will effect a shift of attention from the full many-sided factual object lying in its particular location to what is actually and immediately experienced: two vertical faces which join to form a corner and, extending above them, a portion of a horizontal

¹Husserl, Ideas, pp. 106-107.

²Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 79.

face which fades into indeterminacy. This is the noema, which is the apodictically experienced referent of the immediate conscious act.

Should I move over a few feet, such that I now observe the geometrical figure from a different angle, the figure will remain--from the natural stance--the identically same unitary figure which I can observe from this vantage point or from any number of other possible perspectives. But from the transcendental stance of the *epoché*, each variation in perspective, however slight, is associated with a new and unique noema.

To understand the relationship of a particular noema to the factually existing geometrical figure, we must first examine the role of the noema in an active consciousness. Only in its activity can the essential features of intentional consciousness (the only kind of consciousness) be derived. We shall see that Husserl uses these features to attempt to collapse the subject-object dualism which remained when the Cartesian dualism of physical and non-physical was collapsed.

The "primal form" of consciousness, according to Husserl, is 'synthesis'³. Only through an understanding of synthesis can we attempt to explicate the intentional connectedness of the act of perception and the actually existing perceived object.

³Ibid., p. 39.

Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of--that is to say, Franz Brentano's significant discovery that "intentionality" is the fundamental characteristic of "psychic phenomena"--and actually lays open the method for a descriptive transcendental-philosophical theory of consciousness (and naturally also for a corresponding psychological theory).

Consciousness, as we know, consists of a series of intentional acts. But due to synthesis, ". . .transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional experiences, but . . .a unity. . . ." ⁵ The objective sense is constituted from out of subjectivity through synthesis, and we shall see momentarily that synthesis is likewise tied intimately with time consciousness. But let us now examine the role of synthesis in constituting factual objects from the noematic stream.

It is through the dynamic function of synthesis that identity (on the noetic as well as the noematic side) is perceived within the multiplicity of experience. Even the 'self-ness' of factual objects, according to Husserl, must be extracted from the stream of phenomena by synthesis.

The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself--and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.

⁴Ibid., p. 41.

⁵Idem, "Paris Lectures," pp. 55-56.

⁶Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 42.

This leads us to a seeming paradox: the noematic stream belongs to my pure experience, yet this same stream of ". . . manifold appearances bear within themselves 'that which is' as their 'object-pole.'"⁷ Closer examination of this synthetic constitution will bring us to Husserl's path out of the paradox.

As a series of distinct noema passes, the noema are not random but are tied together by an essential relatedness. To the extent that the flowing noemata are harmonious, they bear within themselves the commonality of being appearances of one identical real object. Within each of the various noema there lies a

. . . central nucleus which at first obtrudes itself prominently, the "meant (vermeinte) objectivity as such," the objective in inverted commas as the phenomenological reduction demands.⁸

Each noema, as pure immediate 'meaning' of a subjective act--i.e., as what is actually and apodictically experienced by the immediate act of consciousness--refers itself to something more: to an objectivity. We may take this relationship to be between what is apodictically experienced and the factual object which claims existence status through the harmonious flow of noemata.

For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective

⁷Idem, Crisis, p. 170.

⁸Idem, Ideas, p. 250.

unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of subjective processes. Rather, they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them "one and the same" is intended as appearing. The one identical die appears, now in "near appearances," now in "far appearances": in the changing modes of the Here and There, over against an always co-intended, though perhaps unheeded, absolute Here (in my co-appearing organism).

While synthesis performs the task of extracting patterns of meaning (or poles of 'self-sameness') from the manifold stream of noemata, it also performs the function of intending 'non-identity.'

. . . every consciousness in which the non-identical is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality, a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex, or whatever it is) synthetically. . . Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of "syntheses" (to be sure, syntheses of another kind).¹⁰

There is little difficulty in understanding these flowing noema (with the synthetically appearing patterns of identity and relational complexes as what is 'meant' in them) to be the apodictic stream of presentations of the one identical die, for example. But complications emerge when we consider Husserl's claim that we cannot "ascribe a representative function to perception."¹¹ This entails that the noemata--in the flowing multiformity (of actual and possible noema)--do not represent a factual die that exists 'out there,' but are inseparably tied to, or better, comprise the factual

⁹ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 39-40.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 42.

¹¹ Idem, Ideas, p. 243.

die. We do not internally experience images of what exists externally; our experience is immediately of the die there on the table. To make the move from the noematic presentation of the die (this side, from here) to the fullness of the actually existing real die, we must first examine what Husserl termed the 'horizon.'

The "intentional horizon of reference"¹² is a product of synthesis by which the actually given noema presents possible noemata to which it stands related. These horizons are "'predelineated' potentialities" by which "we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly"¹³ in the act of perception. The horizons are given with the immediate actual noema as a sense of "foreshadowing."¹⁴ Yet through this awareness of the non-actually given,

[e]very intentional analysis reaches beyond the immediately and actually [reell] given events of the immanent sphere, and in such a way that the analysis discloses potentialities-- which are now given actually [reell].
 . . .¹⁵

In this way consciousness synthetically reaches beyond the apodictically given noema to the fullness of the harmoniously presented factual entity.

For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is "construed" in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving

¹²Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 44

¹³Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Idem, "Paris Lectures," p. 55.

open, prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the "horizon."¹⁶

And again:

When I see a hexahedron I say, in reality and in truth I see it only from one side. It is nonetheless evident that what I now experience is in reality more. The perception includes a non-sensory belief through which the visible side can be understood to be a mere side in the first place. But. . . how does it become obvious that I mean more? It occurs through the transition to a synthetic sequence of possible perceptions, perceptions I would have--as indeed I can--were I to walk around the object.¹⁷

Husserl holds that it is through these "sense-fulfilling syntheses" that consciousness makes the transition from mere apodictic phenomenon to a world of meaning.¹⁸

The horizons created through synthesis not only account for the fullness of particular meant entities; the rest of the factual world is also given horizontally. The harmonious particularity which I single out through scrutiny is the focal point of my attention. This "focal is girt about with a 'zone' of the marginal; the stream of experience can never consist wholly of actualities."¹⁹ The marginal extends out from what is actually perceived, through what is "more or less clearly co-present and determinate" to a "dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality."²⁰ In this way the

¹⁶Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 45.

¹⁷Idem, "Paris Lectures," p. 55.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Idem, Ideas, p. 107.

²⁰Ibid., p. 92.

. . . "form" of the world as "world" is foretokened. Moreover, the zone of indeterminacy is infinite. The misty horizon that can never be completely outlined remains necessarily there.²¹

When we shift from pure apodictic evidence (immediate noema) to what is synthetically constituted through that evidence, we find the 'world' thus horizontally intended as background of each perception of a particular entity. Also included in the stock of what is given horizontally with each immediate perception is the potential of memory.

. . . to every perception there always belongs a horizon of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs, as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality of possible recollections (to be actualized on my initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception.²²

According to this view then, we are given a pure, immediate, apodictically certain presentation: the noema. From the noematic stream (which is neither distinct from consciousness nor from the factual world) patterns of harmonious presentations are constituted as self-identities. Included horizontally in each presentation of a particular constituted entity is the synthetically given 'non-sensual' awareness of what is non-actually given but intended. This synthetic horizon, we have seen, is composed of the non-actually perceived but potentially perceivable aspects of a factual object; the margin of surrounding world (actual and implied), the store of meanings from past experiences

²¹Ibid.

²²Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 44-45.

of the perceived object, and other aspects of our everyday lived experience which are not included in the raw experience of the noema. This synthetic constitution of a horizontally experienced world applies also to

. . . all and any of the cogitationes in the sense illustrated by Descartes' use of the term, to all experiences of thought, feeling and will, except that, . . . the "directedness towards," the "being turned towards," which is the distinctive mark of focal actuality, does not coincide, as in the favourite because simplest examples of sensory presentations, with singling out and noting the objects we are aware of.²³

This transition from what is purely and immediately experienced, as experienced, to the synthetically constituted world of harmoniously presented factual objects, though an intrinsic craft of consciousness, must be developed.

With good reason it is said that in infancy we had to learn to see physical things, and that such modes of consciousness of them had to precede all others genetically. In "early infancy", then, the field of perception that gives beforehand does not as yet contain anything that, in a mere look, might be explicated as a physical thing.²⁴

To understand how a conscious act constitutes its object, we must shift our inquiry to the noetic pole of phenomena.

²³ Idem, Ideas, p. 107.

²⁴ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 79.

SECTION I

THE NOETIC/NOEMATIC RELATIONSHIP

In the preceding section we concentrated our examination upon the noematic pole of experience. We saw that, through its autochthonous feature of synthesis, consciousness constitutes factual objects as meanings intended by harmoniously recurring patterns of presentation which stand forth as 'poles of identity.' As we now pursue the intentional connection from what is intended back to the intending act, we must make full use of the epoche'. By means of the epoche' the meditating philosopher is able to reflectively objectify (and thus examine in its fullness) the noetic pole of experience.

To begin to grasp the intentional relation of the noesis to the noema (and to the factual world), we must take our start with the temporalities inherent in the process of synthesis. By examining the distinction between 'objective' temporality and 'internal' temporality, we will gain access to Husserl's view of the essentially non-dualistic (in the substantial sense of the term) relation of the subject and object. Rather than there being a subjective act of consciousness and an objective article of experience (each having its own autonomous existence

and being only provisionally related to the other), a phenomenon exists as a unity with a bi-polar structure: as in the case of perception, the perceiving (noesis) and the perceived (noema).

'Phenomenological temporality' is a "general peculiarity of all experiences"¹; that is, all experiences are "temporally ordered, temporally beginning and ending, simultaneous or successive, within the constant infinite horizon: immanent time."² But phenomenological time belongs exclusively to the stream of experience of "one pure Ego" (or said differently, a single stream of experience).³ And this must be distinguished from "objective," or "cosmological" time which can be measured by the movement of the sun, a clock, or other objective means.⁴ As we continue to discuss these distinct temporalities, we must bear in mind that the factual world--the world of cosmic time--is the synthetically constituted meaning of the noematic pole of phenomena.

The phenomenological or internal temporality is the order of the noetic pole. The epoche¹ has detached the meditating Ego from the acceptance of the temporal

¹Husserl, Ideas, p. 215.

²Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 43.

³Idem, Ideas, p. 215.

⁴Ibid.

stream in which the factual object is located (though it continues to appear), leaving the temporal stream of experience open to scrutiny.⁵

If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis, namely identification, we encounter it first of all as an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in the form of the continuous consciousness of internal time. Every subjective process has its internal temporality. If it is a conscious process in which (as in the perception of the die) a worldly Object appears as cogitatum, then we have to distinguish the Objective temporality that appears (for example: the temporality of this die) from the "internal" temporality of the appearing (for example: that of die-perceiving). This appearing "flows away" with its temporal extents and phases, which, for their part, are continually changing appearances of the one identical die. Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness, in which the unity of an internal objectivity, as "the same" objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes "constituted." The existence of a world and, accordingly, the existence of this die are "parenthesized" in consequence of my epoche; but the one identical, appearing die (as appearing) is continuously "immanent" in the flowing consciousness, descriptively "in" it; as is likewise the attribute "one identical."⁶

To discern the relatedness of these two temporalities, we must be fully apprised of the role of synthesis in constituting a temporal unity. The sequential constitution of perceived identities from the harmonious stream of noemata synthetically forms a horizontally given unitary temporality: i.e., objective or cosmic time. Likewise, the individual act of perception is sequentially located

⁵Ibid.

⁶Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 41-42.

amidst a stream of noeses. The many individual noeses are synthetically merged into one encompassing noesis, thus forming a unitary consciousness composed of many conscious acts which are distributed along and comprise a temporal stream.

Adopting a suitable reflective standpoint, we are able to note the mode of conscious presentation of the stretches of experience which belong to the different sections of experienced duration, and subsequently to state that the whole consciousness which constitutes this unity of duration is continuously compounded out of sections in which the sections of duration as we experience them are constituted; and that the noeses, therefore, do not only unite together, but constitute one noesis with one noema (that of the filled duration of experience), which is grounded in the noemata of the united noeses. And what holds good for a single experience, holds good also for the whole stream of experience. Foreign to each other as experiences may essentially be, they constitute themselves collectively into one time-stream, as members of the one phenomenological time.

Due to synthesis, then, the series of noeses and the correlate series of noemata are constituted as a unitary stream of conscious acts and its correlate, a unitary world of experience. These two synthetic streams (the two poles of phenomena, each with its distinct temporality) are, of course, intentionally related and essentially co-dependent.⁸

. . .we have, in the Cartesian manner of speaking, the three headings ego-cogitatio-cogitata: the ego-pole (and what is peculiar to its identity), the subjective, as appearance tied together synthetically, and the object-poles. These are different directions

⁷Idem, Ideas, p. 308

⁸We shall take up the Ego as pole of identity in the following section.

our analyses can take, and to them correspond different aspects of the general notion of intentionality: direction toward something, appearance of something, and something, an objective something, as the unity in its appearances toward which the intention of the ego-pole, through these appearances, is directed. . .⁹ . these headings are inseparable from one another. . .

A factual object is synthetically constituted from the stream of noemata as a self-identical thing to which each of the individual noemata refers. As referent of the noematic stream, this object is said to be the 'meaning' of that stream. It is due to the noetic pole (the pole of internal temporality) that the factual world (the world of objective temporality) exists as the meant referent of the noematic pole.

Like perception, every intentional experience--and this is indeed the fundamental mark of all intentionality--has its "intentional object," i.e., its objective meaning. Or to repeat the same in other words: To have a meaning, or to have something "in mind," is the cardinal feature of all consciousness, that on account of which it is not only experience generally but meaningful, "noetic."¹⁰

It is the intrinsic bond between the 'meaning' and the 'meant' that we are attempting to uncover as we explore Husserl's view of the noetic/noematic relationship. As we trace the development from what is given purely as given to what the pure presentations intend, we find that we are uncovering the noetic/noematic relationship. The 'intendings' of the noeses are creatively associated with

⁹Husserl, Crisis, p. 171

¹⁰Idem, Ideas, p. 241.

the synthetically given horizon of the noemata in such a way that the constitution of real objects (which are given as being outside of, or transcendent to, consciousness) is in fact inseparable from the subjectivity of consciousness.

. . . external experience alone can verify objects of external experience, though, to be sure, it does so only as long as the (passively or actively) continuing experience has the form of a harmonious synthesis. That the being of the world "transcends" consciousness in this fashion (even with respect to the evidence in which the world presents itself), and that it necessarily remains transcendent, in no wise alters the fact that it is conscious life alone, wherein everything transcendent becomes constituted, as inseparable from consciousness, and which specifically, as world-consciousness, bears within itself inseparably the sense: world--and indeed: "this actually existing" world.¹¹

Through the intendings of the noeses, the patterns immanent in the synthetically linked noemata take on the meaning of presentations of an object which lies 'out there'-- an object which transcends consciousness through its horizontally given attributes. Synthesis does not and cannot occur, however, unless the noematic presentations occur in syntactically ordered patterns.

. . . the exhibitings must occur in a certain systematic order; it is in this way that they are indicated in advance, in expectation, in the course of a harmonious perception.¹²

The structure that synthetic constitution must follow is determined by what Husserl termed 'eidetic laws.' This conformity of synthesis to prescribed lines of development provides the unity of an objective sense to both

¹¹ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 62.

¹² Idem, Crisis, pp. 161-162.

the noetic and noematic poles of the "flux of intentional synthesis."¹³ These "essentially necessary"¹⁴ rules dictate the form of all aspects of synthetic constitution.

Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional processes. Moreover, it is not a chaos of types of constitution, each organized in itself by its relation to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other words: The allness of objects and types of objects conceivable for me--transcendentally speaking: for me as transcendental ego--is no chaos; and correlatively the allness of the types of the infinite multiplicities, the types corresponding to types of objects, is not a chaos either: noetically and noematically those multiplicities always belong together, in respect of their possible synthesis.

That indicates in advance a universal constitutive synthesis, in which all syntheses function together in a definitely ordered manner and in which therefore all actual and possible objectivities (as actual and possible for the transcendental ego), and correlatively all actual and possible modes of consciousness of them, are embraced.¹⁵

The flow of phenomena prior to any synthetic constitution is "truly the realm of a Heraclitean flux."¹⁶ To this aspect of subjectivity, Husserl applied a statement made by Heraclitus about the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\alpha}$: "You will never find the boundaries of the soul, even if you follow every road; so deep is the ground."¹⁷ It is transcendental constitution which is the "original formation of meaning"¹⁸ from out of this boundless flux. Only due to the regularity created

¹³Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 49

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 49

¹⁷Idem, Crisis, p. 170.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 167

by a "universal conformity to laws of structure on the part of conscious life" do truth and actuality exist as modes of sense for us.¹⁹ But it is not just that synthetic constitution occurs along lines dictated by a priori laws, but also that the lines of constitution (which provide the first pieces of meaning--or order--from the flux of pre-synthetic phenomena) form the a priori laws which the continuously flowing constitution (noetic and noematic) must follow.

Reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title for possible accidental matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity.²⁰

Taking what we have seen thus far concerning the rule conformity of synthetic constitution, and the bipolar intentionality of phenomena, we may now begin to inquire into Husserl's conception of the ego as monad of identity.

¹⁹Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 59.

²⁰Ibid., p. 57.

SECTION J

THE NATURAL EGO

Acts of consciousness do not occur one at a time in simple linear procession, but in intricate act complexes. To over-simplify: When I perceive a hammer, the straightforward act of hammer perceiving is accompanied by (in varying degrees of vagueness or evidentness) the remembrances of past hammer perceptions and usages, and the potentials thus made inherent in this hammer perception. This is possible, in Husserl's theory, due to the formation of 'noetic layers.' These are layers of noetic acts which are "superimposed one on the other. . . [as] in the case of acts of thought, feeling, and will."¹

More precisely, the current act of hammer perception forms what may be described "metaphorically"² as a "beam of attention"³ which, enroute to its intended object, passes through a retinue of noetic layers. Thus the present attentional ray

. . . passes now through this, now through that noetic layer, or (as in the case, for instance, of memories)

¹Husserl, Ideas, p. 260. (Brackets mine).

²Ibid., p. 246.

³Ibid., p. 247.

right through this or that intercalated stratum, sometimes directly, sometimes as reflected. Within the total given field of potential noeses or of noetic objects, we glance now at some whole, say the tree which is perceptually present, now at this or that part and phase of the same; then again at a thing standing close by, or at some complex organization and process. Suddenly we direct our glance towards some object of recollection which chances to occur to us. Our glance, instead of passing through the noeses of perception, which in a continuous and unitary way, though variously articulated, constitute for us the steadily appearing world of things, goes through a noesis of remembrance into a world of memory, moves about in the latter, wandering here and there, passes on to memories of other levels, or into worlds of fancy, and so forth.⁴

For the present topic, our concern must be to delimit within these varying "intentional stratum"⁵ the one identical ego; in short, to discover the relation of these multiple intentional layers to 'I who am perceiving this tree and having these memories.' According to Husserl, the metaphorical beam of attention "gives itself out as radiating from the Pure Ego and terminating in the objective, . . . [yet is] not separate from the Ego, but itself is and remains personal."⁶ The difficulty stems from the vast number of overlapping, superimposed, and interpenetrating noetic acts, each with a distinct 'shaft of attention.'

The very intentionality of a conscious act (a cogito) demands the existence of both an object and an ego (as subject). The ego implied by the act is also partially defined by the act.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 249. (Brackets mine)

To the cogito itself belongs an immanent "glancing-towards" the object, a directedness which from another side springs forth from the "Ego," which can therefore never be absent. This glancing of the Ego towards something is in harmony with the act involved, perceptive in perception, fanciful in fancy,⁷ approving in approval, volitional in will, and so forth.

We have seen that the ego (who has direct evidence of himself) is present in each and every cogito. As such, he experiences himself in the flow of the acts in which his existence is given. But he also experiences himself as the same identical ego through all of these acts--in other words, as a monad of identity.

The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that cogito, as the same I.

Maintaining the stance of the epoche¹ (the viewpoint of the transcendental Ego), we begin the task of explicating the development of this unitary identity that runs through all of the noetic acts. In each act, we have seen, a metaphorical 'beam of attention' exists between the noesis and its noema. This 'beam' is personal; that is, it conveys subjective identity within itself. Throughout a continuous stream of noeses these 'beams' give themselves as issuing from one sustained identity. Our attempt to explain this leads us once again to examine synthesis and constitution, but now as they form a pole of self-identity in the noetic side of phenomena.

⁷Ibid., p. 109.

⁸Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 66.

Since we were busied up to now with the intentional relation of consciousness to object, cogito to cogitatum, only that synthesis stood out for us which "polarizes" the multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects, accordingly in relation to objects as poles, synthetic unities. Now we encounter a second polarization, a second kind of synthesis, which embraces all particular multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own manner, namely as belonging to the identical Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness,⁹ and is related, through them, to all object-poles.

Through synthesis the harmoniousness of a series of presentations is constituted as a meant unity or order. This process is governed by eidetic laws. But we have seen (from the transcendental stance) that the law which governs synthetic constitution is itself brought forth from the pre-synthetic flux by constitution. Thus synthetic constitution is not so much governed by a priori laws of causality as it is autonomous.

The eidetic laws of compossibility (rules that govern simultaneous or successive existence and possible existence together, in the fact) are laws of causality in a maximally broad sense--laws for an If and Then. Yet it is better to avoid here the expression causality, which is laden with prejudices (deriving from naturalism), and to speak of motivation in the transcendental sphere. . . .¹⁰

The on-going process by which order is built up (along 'motivational' lines) into a synthetically constituted unity (one with 'itself-ness') is termed 'genesis.' Husserl distinguishes two types of genesis: active and passive. Active genesis is performed by the ego in the pre-given world.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 75.

In active genesis the Ego functions as productively constitutive, by means of subjective processes that are specifically acts of the Ego. Here belong all the works of practical reason, in a maximally broad sense. In this sense even logical reason is practical. The characteristic feature (in the case of the realm of logos) is that Ego-acts, pooled in a sociality--whose transcendental sense, to be sure, we have not yet brought to light--, become combined in a manifold, specifically active synthesis and, on the basis of objects already given (in modes of consciousness that give beforehand), constitute new objects originally. These then present themselves for consciousness as products.¹¹

But for our present inquiry, it is the presupposition of active genesis that is of interest. For active genesis (which is performed by the ego) to occur, a passive genesis is needed.

. . . anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation. The "ready-made" object that confronts us in life as an existent mere physical thing (when we disregard all the "spiritual" or "cultural" characteristics that make it knowable as, for example, a hammer, a table, an aesthetic creation) is given, with the originality of the "it itself", in the synthesis of a passive experience.¹²

It is passive genesis which, following the eidetic law of constitution, brings forth from the pre-synthetic flux, the raw material of order and unity (the qualities of 'it itselfness', 'similarity', 'difference', 'simultaneity', and 'sequence') on which the active geneses of the natural life are based. Husserl also refers to the process of

¹¹Ibid., p. 77

¹²Ibid., p. 78

passive genesis as "association", which is "a matter of intentionality."¹³ Because association has the bi-polar form of intentionality, passive genesis of the world infers, as its correlate, the passive genesis of the ego. According to Husserl, the elucidation of passive genesis is the only access to a comprehension of the ego.¹⁴ Not only is it ". . . owing to an essentially necessary genesis that I, the ego, can experience a physical thing and do so at first glance",¹⁵ but it is also the "universal genetic form that makes the concrete ego (the monad) possible as a unity."¹⁶

The essential form of genesis is temporality.¹⁷

We have seen that constitution of the noetic and noematic poles of phenomena sets up distinct 'internal' and 'objective' temporal streams. It is through temporal flow that persisting unity is ". . . built up in a continual, passive and completely universal genesis, which, as a matter of essential necessity, embraces everything new."¹⁸ Thus, self-explication reveals the ego's "structural form" to be "temporal within an all-embracing time"¹⁹--a temporal structure related to

¹³Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 103.

a history of past constructions. As such the ego, through passive generation across the stream of internal temporality (which is itself generated from the flow of noetic acts), 'builds up' an identity. The concrete ego, however, is not "an empty pole of identity"²⁰ serving as "center" for the stream of noetic acts.

Rather, according to a law of "transcendental generation", with every act emanating from him and having a new objective sense, he acquires a new abiding property.²¹

In other words, through self-experience, the ego is directly accessible to himself, but only in the strict living present (expressed as ego-cogito). What is immediately available is the present act, which we have seen to contain the quality of subjective identity. But due to passive genesis, the stream of noetic acts blend in such a manner that a monad of subjective identity is synthetically referred to. The present noetic act is given to reflection with a constituted horizon which is

. . . strictly non-experienced but necessarily also-meant. To it belongs not only the ego's past, most of which is completely obscure, but also his transcendental abilities and his habitual peculiarities at the time.²²

This ego, given immediately as the identity pole of each new act, constitutes himself (by active generation) as the one concrete ego whose own past is given thus.

²⁰Ibid., p. 66

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 23.

. . .by his own active generating, the Ego constitutes himself as identical substrate of Ego-properties, he constitutes himself also as a "fixed and abiding" personal Ego--in a maximally broad sense. . .²³

Because of this self-constitution as a concrete, temporally enduring ego, he positions his self-identification in the synthetically constituted temporal stream of 'his' subjective acts.

Let us here point out only what is most important, the most general aspect of the ego's form, namely, the peculiar temporalization by which it becomes an enduring ego, constituting itself in its time-modalities: the same ego, now actually present, is in a sense, in every part that belongs to it, another--i.e., as that which was and thus is not now--and yet, in the continuity of its time it is one and the same, which is and was and has its future before it. The ego which is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with its past ego, even though the latter is precisely no longer present: it can have a dialogue with it and criticize it, as can others.²⁴

But even though this temporal horizon is constituted as my concrete lived identity (which has its existence on the same level as the factual world of my everyday life)²⁵, there always remains the non-synthetic, non-generically built up identity which can be experienced when I perceive my ego purely as subjective identity of the immediate conscious act.

²³Ibid., p. 67.

²⁴Idem, Crisis, p. 172.

²⁵Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 68.

. . .when explicating the horizon of being that is included in my own essence, one of the first things I run into is my immanent temporality and, with it, my existence in the form of an open infiniteness, that of a stream of subjective processes, and in the form of all those "ownnesses" of mine that are somehow included in the stream--one of which is my explicating.²⁶

According to Husserl, the ego's existence purely as subjective identity pole of phenomena must be distinguished from the "ego taken in full concreteness" (which is termed "monad").²⁷ The ego can exist as a concrete monad of identity only when he constitutes himself as including, in his own being, the full range of noetic horizons.

The Ego can be concrete only in the flowing multiformity of his intentional life, along with the object meant--and in some cases constituted as existent for him--in that life.²⁸

We may interpret this distinction to be a matter of what the ego constitutes as his 'own-ness.' The subjectivity immanent in what Husserl metaphorically described as an attentional ray lacks the full concreteness experienced in my lived ego; it has the quality of "open infiniteness." But the ego which constitutes not only the immediate attentional ray, but the entire field of actual and possible noetic layers (which genetically blend to build up a temporality given as 'my inwardness') as its own identity perceives itself as a monad of enduring identity.

²⁶Ibid., p. 102.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 67-68.

²⁸Ibid., p. 68.

For the non-concrete ego given purely as subjective identity in an act of consciousness, the world (as object of the act) exists only as accepted. It is due to "positing and explicating of being"²⁹ (synthetic constitution) that the world exists for the ego-pole. This process, through the temporal sequence of acts, sets up a 'habituality' of position-taking. It is this habituality (of which the ego-pole serves as substrate) that has as its correlate the "abiding existence and being thus" of the object.³⁰ The world is thus tied to the habitualities and position-takings of the conscious acts (noeses) for which the non-concrete ego is given as identity pole.

For the concrete ego, however, the world (whose "ideality as a synthetic unity belonging to an infinite system of my potentialities, . . . is still a determining part of my own concrete being. . .") is "alien" and "external to my own concrete Ego" (but not at all in the natural spatial sense).³¹ This sets up a paradoxical existence for the concrete ego. As a concrete ego, I am inseparable from this external world.

I, the real human being, am a real object like others in the natural world. I carry out cogitationes, "acts of consciousness" in both a narrower and a wider sense,

²⁹Ibid., p. 68.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 106.

and these acts, as belonging to this human subject, are events of the same natural world.³²

But while I exist, in truth, as an object in this world, I also exist as a subject for the world. As an ego who is an object in this world, anything which reflection reveals as purely my own, I refer to as my psyche.³³

We have seen that this is where Descartes made his spurious division between material man and the psyche, which he believed to be the soul. But according to Husserl, the psyche is "part of the phenomenon of man"³⁴; the distinction of objective world and internal psyche, we can now say, is a matter of constituted poles of phenomena and their inherent temporalities. Because both are synthetic constitutions genetically built up from what is not immediately and actually but only horizonally given, both transcend pure consciousness and thus exist in the 'natural world' (but not in the mathematical sense of Galileo and Descartes). As a monad of enduring 'self-identity' living in a pre-given world, the paradox arises that my very acts of inwardness are events in the world which is external to me.

The concrete ego has his existence in the world through 'bodily holding-sway.' In this manner he continues to paradoxically experience the objective world subjectively

³² Idem, Ideas, pp. 101-102

³³ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 100

³⁴ Ibid.

(or the external world internally). Holding-sway (or kinesthesia) is the concrete ego's experience of his physical body in the world. It is through kinesthesia that the concrete ego (the constituted unity enduring as monad through the temporality of the noetic flow) acts in the world (the constituted unity enduring through the temporality of the noematic flow). This experience of existence in the world has the form of an internal experience of the external.

Through bodily "holding-sway" in the form of striking, lifting, resisting, and the like, I act as ego across distances, primarily on the corporeal aspects of objects in the world. . . . all such holding-sway occurs in modes of "movement," but the "I move" in holding-sway (I move my hands, touching or pushing something) is not in itself [merely] the spatial movement of a physical body, which as such could be perceived by everyone. My body--in particular, say, the bodily part "hand"--moves in space; [but] the activity of holding-sway, "kinesthesia," which is embodied together with the body's movement, is not itself in space as a spatial movement but is only indirectly colocalized in that movement.³⁵

Or again:

The kinestheses are different from the movements of the living body which exhibit themselves merely as those of a physical body, yet they are somehow one with them, belonging to one's own living body with its two-sided character (internal kinestheses, external physical-real movements).³⁶

For the concrete ego, the body serves as the "organ"³⁷ through which it lives, as monad, in what is for it a

³⁵Idem, Crisis, p. 217

³⁶Ibid., p. 161.

³⁷Ibid., p. 217

pre-given world of objects. We may understand this kinesthetic sensation of movement about the world of objects if we recall that an object is synthetically constituted from the given noema--this side from here (the "from here" indicating the intentionally required noesis)--and its full horizon of implied possible noemata, each referring to the same meant identical object. The concrete ego, as we know, is synthetically generated from the given noesis and its full range of horizontal noeses: those in its past and those merely possible.

. . . By free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here--that is to say, I could occupy any spatial locus with my organism. This implies that, perceiving from there, I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance, such as pertain to my being there. It implies, then, that not only the systems of appearance that pertain to my current perceiving "from here", but other quite determinate systems, corresponding to the change of position that puts me "there", belong constitutively to each physical thing. And the same in the case of every "There."³⁸

But all of this pertains to the concretely experienced ego of everyday life. We shall return to this discussion when we take up the alter ego, but for now let us examine what Husserl believed to be the role of the transcendental Ego.

³⁸ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 116-117.

SECTION K

THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

The notion of an Ego which remains after the reduction of the epoche¹ is a major theme of Husserl's philosophy. The development of this key concept reflects the development of his phenomenology as a whole. The nature of this Ego, however, is not at all certain. In his preface to the Ideas, Husserl states that transcendental subjectivity, because of its priority over the world of constituted objects, has an ontological status.

. . . only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being, . . . it only is non-relative, that is relative to itself; whereas the real world indeed exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing (seiende) reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity.¹

But this "ontic meaning" can be meaning only from the life-world² (the world of meaning as experienced by the concrete ego which, as a synthetic constitution, falls before the epoche¹). Hence the status of that subjectivity which remains after the epoche¹ must, as we said earlier, be described as 'phenomenological' and its radical explication must follow phenomenological lines. Beginning now with

¹Husserl, Ideas, p. 14.

²Idem, Crisis, p. 218.

the Logical Investigations and chronologically proceeding to the Crisis, we shall examine Husserl's conception of the transcendental Ego as it was developed.

In the Logical Investigations Husserl maintained that there is no ego other than that empirically experienced as the unity of act complexes ("the name 'phenomenological ego' was given to the stream of consciousness as such"³ in the first edition of the above work).

. . .the relation in which experiences are thought to stand to an experiencing consciousness (or to an experiencing 'phenomenological ego') points to no peculiar phenomenological situation. The ego in the sense of common discourse is an empirical object, one's own ego as much as someone else's, and each ego as much as any physical thing, a house or a tree etc. . . . the ego remains an individual, thing-like object, which, like all such objects, has phenomenally no other unity than that given it through its unified phenomenal properties, and which in them has its own internal make-up.⁴

This 'phenomenal ego' bears remarkable similarity to the ego synthetically constituted through passive genesis from the noetic stream and resulting horizons. If, for instance, the phenomenal ego of the Logical Investigations is limited to its phenomenological content, we find that it

. . .reduces to a unity of consciousness, to a real experiential complex, which we (i.e. each man for his own ego) find in part evidently⁵ present, and for the rest postulate on good grounds.

³Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Lindlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 2:541.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

This synthetic constitution of a unity from non-really given presentations also occurs according to laws which bear a striking affinity to the eidetic laws of later works.

In the nature of its contents, and the laws they obey, certain forms of connection are grounded. They run in diverse fashions from content to content, from complex of contents to complex of contents, till in the end a unified sum total of content is constituted, which does not differ from the phenomenologically reduced ego itself. These contents have, as contents generally have, their own law-bound ways of coming together, of losing themselves in more comprehensive unities, and, in so far as they thus become and are one, the phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness is already constituted, without need of an additional, peculiar ego-principle which supports all contents and unites them all once again.⁶

Husserl's statement in the Investigations that this ego is empirical in the same manner as a 'physical object' places the ego in the transcendent realm--transcendent in the sense that it is constituted as an object whose entire being pre-supposes and is referred to by what is immediately and purely presented to consciousness. Thus it, in its identical fullness, lies outside of the immediacy of pure consciousness due to its constituted horizontal inclusiveness.

In the Ideas, the effects of the phenomenological epoche began to take force. The phenomenal ego of the Investigations was, of course, 'bracketed', or reduced to mere phenomena, along with all other objects of the constituted world. But in the Ideas, Husserl admitted

⁶Ibid., pp. 541-542.

another aspect of consciousness: a residue of subjectivity, of awareness, which remains after the epoche. This he believed to be the pure being of consciousness.

. . . Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnexion. It therefore remains over as a "phenomenological residuum," as a region of Being which is in principle unique, and can become in fact the field of a new science--the science of Phenomenology.⁷

This aspect of the meditating philosopher's subjectivity--which remains after the constituted world (including the constituted concrete ego, as experiencer of and object in the world as pre-given) is reduced to the mere phenomena from which genesis ensues--is taken to be that which performs the original constitution. This pre-synthetic synthesizer is called the transcendental Ego.

. . . I am the Ego who invests the being of the world which I so constantly speak about with existential validity, as an existence (Sein) which wins for me from my own life's pure essence meaning and substantiated validity. I myself as this individual essence, posited absolutely, as the open infinite field of pure phenomenological data and their inseparable unity, am the "transcendental Ego"; the absolute positing means that the world is no longer "given" to me in advance, its validity that of a simple existent, but that henceforth it is exclusively my Ego that is given (given from my new standpoint), given purely as that which has being in itself, in itself experiences a world, confirms the same, and so forth.⁸

By the Meditations the self-experience as a human ego had been reduced to mere-phenomena.⁹ What remains is the transcendental Ego as a being which is phenomeno-

⁷ Idem, Ideas, p. 102

⁸ Ibid., p. 11

⁹ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 19.

logically antecedent to all natural world distinctions--the being of the natural world "continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being."¹⁰ Hence the pure pre-synthetically mundanized subjectivity of the meditating philosopher remains independent of all natural modes of being.

If I keep purely what comes into view--for me, the one who is meditating--by virtue of my free epoche with respect to the being of the experienced world, the momentous fact is that I, with my life, remain untouched in my existential status, regardless of whether or not the world exists and regardless of what my eventual decision concerning its being or non-being might be. This Ego, with his Ego-life, who, necessarily remains for me, by virtue of such epoche, is not a piece of the world; and if he says, "I exist, ego cogito," that no longer signifies, "I, this man, exist."¹¹

This results, of course, in the 'splitting of the Ego.' We may now see that this division is between the synthetically constituted concrete ego (mundanized as the ego "I, this man") and the pure pre-synthetic subjectivity of the transcendental Ego. The transcendental Ego exists as passive observer--"disinterested onlooker"--of the "naively interested Ego."¹² As the non-involved observer, the transcendental Ego is now said to have always been present and presupposed; but not as entirely dislocated from the naive ego. The concrete ego--the ego in the "natural attitude" of everyday acceptance--is and has

¹⁰Ibid., p. 21.

¹¹Ibid., p. 25.

¹²Ibid., p. 35.

always been a transcendental Ego but only through the reduction of the epoche' is this revealed.¹³

The transcendental Ego, we may say, is responsible for the synthetic genesis of self-identical objects (which exist as the constituted meanings or referents of the genetically organized phenomena) from the flux of presentations. These phenomena are congealed into meant identities on both the noetic and the noematic poles. From the noematic pole is constituted the factual world, and from the noetic pole is constituted the concrete ego who livingly and naively experiences the world.

. . .for the ego of the transcendental reduction, all that exists is and must be a constituted product. . . . Conscious life is. . .constituted necessarily as human in the constituted world, and as a human conscious life in which the world is intended, psychically constituted, and so forth. . . .

The first procedure in Meditations I-IV is to awaken the guiding thought: The world is a meaning, an accepted sense. When we go back to the ego, we can explicate the founding and founded strata with which that sense is built up [sic] [den Fundierungsaufbau], we can reach the absolute being and process in which the being of the world shows its ultimate truth and in which the ultimate problems of being reveal themselves--bringing into the thematic field all the disguises that unphilosophical naivete cannot penetrate,¹⁴ [alle Verhüllungen der unphilosophischen Naivität].

The world, as naively accepted, exists as meaning. But meaning can only exist within transcendental subjectivity, which, according to Husserl, is the "universe of possible sense." In this way the transcendent, factually existing

¹³Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 52.

world is not separate from the transcendental realm of meaning constitution.

The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely--nonsense. But even nonsense is always a mode of sense and has its nonsensicalness within the sphere of possible insight.¹⁵

This leaving room for "nonsensicalness" as a "mode of sense" is necessary; for from the "other side", as it were, we see the obvious distinction between the constituted factual world of transcendancy and transcendental subjectivity.

. . . Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts. This "transcendence" is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the fact that anything worldly necessarily acquires all the sense determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing. . .¹⁶

The transcendental Ego is perceived by Husserl at this point as the subjective being, a Hericlitean flux¹⁷, from which all meaning (including my own concrete ego) is constituted. The concrete ego results from the naive acceptance of the meant constitutions.

The transcendental ego emerged by virtue of my "parenthe-sizing" of the entire Objective world and all other (including all ideal) Objectivities. In consequence

¹⁵Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 49.

of this parenthesizing, I have become aware of myself as the transcendental ego, who constitutes in his constitutive life everything that is ever Objective for me--the ego of all constitutions, who exists in his actual and potential life-processes and Ego-habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything Objective but also himself as identical ego. We can say now: In that I, as this ego, have constituted and am continually further constituting as a phenomenon (as a correlate) the world that exists for me, I have carried out a mundanizing self-apperception--under the title "Ego in the usual sense"--in corresponding constitutive syntheses and am maintaining,¹⁸ continuing acceptance and further development of it.

This development is possibly due to association; such as conformity of synthetic constitution to eidetic laws.¹⁹

In the Crisis, the epoche becomes more radical, purging all personal aspects from transcendental subjectivity. Husserl here claims that it was Descartes' mistake to opt for a personal ego grounded in apodictic subjectivity.

It remained hidden from Descartes that all such distinctions as "I" and "you," "inside" and "outside," first "constitute" themselves in the absolute ego.²⁰

The concrete ego continues to exist in its horizontal fullness, but no aspects of this naive ego, or his life, endures the reduction of the epoche. That is, all aspects of my life as this human (form of) being have their place in the transcendent realm of meant objects; the realm of pure subjective being is devoid of such distinctions.

Concretely, each "I" is not merely an ego-pole but an "I" with all its accomplishments and accomplished acquisitions, including the world as existing and being-such. But in the epoche and in the pure focus

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 99-100

¹⁹Ibid., p. 81

²⁰Idem, Crisis, p. 82.

upon the functioning ego-pole, and thence upon the concrete whole of life and of its intentional intermediary and final structures, it follows eo ipso that nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor real psychophysical human beings; all this belongs to the "phenomenon," to the world as constituted pole.²¹

This creates a unique "philosophical solitude"²² for the radically meditating philosopher. From this vantage point, "[a]ll of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns"²³ is reduced to mere phenomenon by the epoche'. In fact, the transcendental Ego can be called "I" only by an equivocation necessitated by reflection. Husserl holds that this reflective equivocation is necessary, however, for "when I name it in reflection, I can say nothing other than: it is I who practice the epoche'. . . ."²⁴ The transcendental subjective realm, which was explicitly denied in the Investigations has thus developed into a realm of radically pure transcendental being which precedes and constitutes all transcendent distinctions of being, both noetic and noematic.

The radically transcendental subjectivity exists in its "own self-enclosed pure context as intentionality."²⁵ As a realm of pure intentionality, it constitutionally intends all transcendent meaning, including ontic meaning²⁶

²¹Ibid., p. 183.

²²Ibid., p. 184

²³Ibid. (Bracket mine).

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 169

²⁶Ibid.

of physical bodies.²⁷ As such, we must also assume that the transcendental and the transcendent are intentionally co-dependent; the transcendental maintains priority, however. In the Crisis the transcendental Ego is opened from a phenomenological residuum to a realm of transcendental purity--a realm of absolute subjectivity comparable to Heraclitus' eternal flux, the depths of which are apparently unfathomable.²⁸ Within this subjectivity,

. . . every "ground" [Grund] that is reached points to further grounds, every horizon opened up awakens new horizons, and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of flowing movement, is oriented toward the unity of one meaning; not, of course, in such a way that we could ever simply grasp and understand the whole; rather, as soon as one has fairly well mastered the universal form of meaning-formation, the breadths and depths of this total meaning, in its infinite totality, take on valuative [axiotische] dimensions: there arise problems of the totality as that of universal reason.²⁹

What here emerges as important, in light of our present topic, is that the traditional dualism of physical and nonphysical (or extended and non-extended, to use Cartesian terms) are collapsed into mere phenomena of transcendent being. This transcendent being, to be sure, stands in a seeming juxtaposition with transcendental

²⁷ Ontic meaning, for Husserl, is tied to identifiable and distinguishable physical bodies (of all sorts) which exist as substrates of causal properties. ". . .if one takes away causality, the body loses its ontic meaning as body, its identifiability and distinguishability as a physical individual." (Husserl, Crisis, p. 218.)

²⁸ Ibid., p. 170

²⁹ Ibid.

being which is revealed only by the epoche'. But this is no dualism in the substantial sense: there are not two distinct and incompatible substances somehow merged together. Rather, we have a fathomless flux of phenomena from which transcendental subjectivity (as its own self-enclosed context of intentionality) constitutes a horizontally given realm of transcendent identities (on both the noetic and noematic ends of the intentionality) as the 'meaning' of the flux of presentations. This synthetic constitution genetically builds up along lines determined by eidetic laws of constitution. The horizontally constituted pole of identity in the noetic stream of the bi-polar phenomena is genetically built up into a temporally enduring (noetic temporality) concrete ego. This concrete ego, as monad of identity, finds himself in the paradoxical position of being both a subject and an object in a pre-given factual world (the horizontally constituted pole of the noematic stream with its objective temporality).

By failing to perform the reduction of the epoche', the transcendental realm of pure subjectivity is not attained (although it always remains as an implicit assumption). Thus it is impossible to reduce the psyche and the physical world (the constituted noetic and noematic poles) to the mere phenomena from which they are synthetically constituted as self-identical enduring transcendent objects: the investigating philosopher, as a naively interested ego, remains on the footing of the world. As a result of this,

we are left with a world evidently split into dual realms-- the realm of scientific nature and the realm of psychic being.

When the epoche¹ is not performed there can be no access to transcendental subjectivity and the eidetic laws of constitution. For this reason, Husserl held that the belief in God was an unavoidable conclusion of the pre-reduction naivete.

Was God not unavoidable as the principle of rationality? Does not rational being, even [merely] as nature, in order to be thinkable at all, presuppose rational theory and a subjectivity which accomplishes it? Does not nature, then, indeed the world-in-itself, presuppose God as reason existing absolutely? Does this not mean that, within being-in-itself, psychic being takes precedence as subjectivity existing purely for itself? It is, after all, subjectivity, whether divine or human.³⁰

This, of course, was the assumption to which Descartes had been led due to his failure to make the 'transcendental turn.' By performing the epoche¹, Husserl believed he was able to reach the subjectivity from which rationality (in the form of eidetic laws of constitution) arises. It is the pre-synthetic (and thus personal only by equivocation) transcendental Ego--the presupposed constitutive principle behind all naive living--which implied the being of a God.

In a sense analogous to that in which mathematics speaks of infinitely distant points, straight lines, etc., one can say metaphorically that God is the "infinitely distant man."³¹

³⁰Ibid., p. 62.

³¹Ibid., p. 66.

But Husserl's theory faces two major problems at this point. First, there are any number of possible rational worlds; how do I manage to find myself in the same world as other men? Secondly, if all that is given in the world of everyday life is synthetically constituted by the transcendental Ego, how does the phenomenologically meditating philosopher escape solipsism; how does Husserl account for other egos? We shall find that Husserl answers both problems with one solution.

SECTION L

THE ALTER EGO AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Husserl's notion of the 'alter ego' and 'intersubjectivity' are worthy of full inquiry in themselves. But in keeping with the topic of the present paper, we shall only summarize this intricate theory. It is of essential importance in comprehending the nuances of this view that we bear in mind the relationship of the transcendental Ego to the synthetically constituted factual world, and the concrete ego (which is genetically built up as a result of the naive acceptance of this world).

The transcendental Ego is responsible for the constitution of the factual world from the flux of presentations. But because of the distinction between the transcendental and the naive attitudes, only the concrete ego, as monad of identity in the noetic pole of world-phenomena, can livingly experience the world as a really existing world. Husserl's problem was to explain how this concrete ego (who through the epoche¹ has gained access to the transcendental realm within his own subjectivity) could have knowledge of another ego, and even of that ego's ultimate transcendental subjectivity.

When the concrete ego encounters a body similar to his own, only the body as pure immediate presentation is given with originality. But, according to Husserl, this original and immediate experience constitutionally includes aspects which I, as concrete ego, do not and cannot have immediate access to. This is due to the process of 'appresentation.'

Just as, in my living present, in the domain of "internal perception", my past becomes constituted by virtue of the harmonious memories occurring in this present, so in my primordial sphere, by means of appresentations occurring in it and motivated by its contents, an ego other than mine can become constituted--accordingly, in non-originary presentations [in Vergegenwärtigungen] of a new type, which have a modificatum of a new kind as their correlate.¹

Horizontal constitution of identity incorporates apperception in every form in which we have examined it; that is, something more than what is actually and immediately given is included as 'also meant.' But thus far, every case we have dealt with has involved evidences of my own: either as constituting my concrete ego, or as comprising my original experience of an object. But now, with the prospect of an 'alter-ego', we are faced with a realm with which I can never be originally presented, only appresented.²

Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, originally--is something I am; or else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which

¹Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 115.

²Ibid., pp. 118-119.

characterizes a primodially unfulfilled experience--an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated--is "other". It is therefore conceivable only as³ an analogue of something included in my peculiar ownness.

This realm, which is inaccessible to the direct experiencing of my concrete ego, is absolutely necessary for another such ego to even be a possibility. Although we rightly say that we encounter the other person, for this to be the case there must be a region of being which remains accessible only by apperception.

Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there before us "in person". On the other hand, this being there in person does not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and⁴ ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same.

Synthesis, we have said, is an intrinsic function of consciousness. This function has been revealed in its role of constituting self-identicalness within a flow of presentations. But another aspect of synthesis, termed 'pairing', constitutes similarity among constituted self-identical objects.

Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as "association", in contrast to passive synthesis of "identification". In a pairing association the characteristic feature is that, in

³Ibid., pp. 114-115.

⁴Ibid., pp. 108-109

the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis--essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed)--, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they found phenomenologically a unity of similarity and thus are always constituted, precisely as a pair.

We have said that when I, the concrete ego living in the world, encounter an animate body, the ego associated with that body cannot be directly presented but only appresented. Yet that ego and my ego are given in the same moment of consciousness due to an "original pairing."⁶ In this way his body, which is presented directly in my original experience, and his ego, which is appresented with my own in a pairing association, merge to present the other as fully transcendent.

The appresentation which gives that component of the Other which is not accessible originaliter is combined with an original presentation (of "his" body as part of the Nature given as included in my ownness). In this combination, moreover, the Other's animate body and his governing Ego are given in the manner that characterizes a unitary transcending experience.

This places the 'Other' (as a perceived body and apperceived ego) in the category of transcendent objects: i.e., not a real part of my own subjectivity. But we still have no reason to assume that the 'Other' embodies subjectivity in the way 'I' do--especially transcendental subjectivity. It is Husserl's answer to this dilemma

⁵Ibid., p. 112.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 114.

which ties us, nolens volens, to this world rather than some other constitutionally possible world. Husserl held that the sense of objectivity, which belongs to what is constituted within my subjectivity as transcendent, is dependent upon other subjectivities and their intentional constitutions. It is the sense of 'thereness-for-everyone' (which arises from the non-directly accessible realm of apperception) that provides the understood objective fullness to what--purely speaking--is only immediate, subjective experience. Through the apperception of another subjectivity, the world is horizontally co-constituted as factually and objectively there.

The existence-sense [Seinssinn] of the world and of Nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes after all. . .thereness-for-everyone. This is always cointended wherever we speak of Objective actuality. In addition, Objects with "spiritual" predicates belong to the experienced world. These Objects, in respect of their origin and sense, refer us to subjects, usually other subjects, and their actively constituting intentionality. Thus it is in the case of all cultural Objects (books, tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which moreover carry with them at the same time the experiential sense of thereness-for-everyone (that is, everyone belonging to the corresponding cultural community. . .).

I experience others then, as "psychophysical Objects" in the world and also as "subjects for the world." The Other, likewise, experiences me as Object in the world.⁹

⁸Ibid., p. 92

⁹Ibid., p. 91.

As I perceive what is constituted as transcendent and actually there, I am, in pure immediacy, perceiving 'this side from here.' The I which perceives this view as 'this side' of a factually transcendent object is the concrete ego who is constituted as encompassing a unique noetic temporal horizon, thus himself transcending the immediately given phenomenon. When an alter ego perceives the same object, it is from another vantage point, yet it [the object] gives itself as the one identical object which transcends both perceptive acts. The alter ego also exists as a concrete ego encompassing his unique noetic temporal horizon and as transcending the immediate phenomenon. The one identical transcending object is thus 'intersubjectively known' by distinct monads of noetic identity.

For each, . . .the fields of perception and memory actually present are different, quite apart from the fact that even that which is here intersubjectively known in common is known in different ways, is differently apprehended, shows different grades of clearness, and so forth. Despite all this, we come to understandings with our neighbors, and set up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as the world about us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves none the less belong.¹⁰

The apperception of the Other causes an expanded sense of transcendency. Not only does the factual object transcend my immediate awareness (due to horizontally given other sides, etc.), it also transcends the sphere of my

¹⁰Idem, Ideas, p. 95.

possible awareness by existing as 'there-for-the-Other.' The one identical object exists as a synthetically co-constituted object for both monads, thus achieving the expanded objective sense of being transcendent to the consciousness of each monad. This sets up, according to Husserl, a modification in the sense of the world as I primordially experience it; that is, as it appears in my sphere of ownness. This modification, called a "super-addition to my primordial world" sets up the Objective world as the "identical world for everyone, myself included"¹¹ which serves as an "intentional index".¹² This is possible because the other Ego ". . . makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is 'other'. . . ." ¹³

This constitution, arising on the basis of the "pure" others (the other Egos who as yet have no worldly sense), is essentially such that the "others"-for-me do not remain isolated; on the contrary, an Ego-community, which includes me, becomes constituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally) as a community of Egos existing with each other and for each other--ultimately a community of monads, which, moreover, (in its communalized intentionality) constitutes the one identical world. In this world all Egos again present themselves, but in an Objectivating apperception with the sense "men" or "psychophysical men as worldly Objects".¹⁴

The "communalization of constitutive intentionality" creates among the community of monads an "intersubjective

¹¹Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 107.

¹²Idem, Crisis, p. 172.

¹³Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 107.

¹⁴Ibid.

sphere of ownness".¹⁵ It is within this sphere that the subjectivity takes form as a "transcendental We" which constitutes the world as "Objectively actual".¹⁶ The Objective world, then, is actual as the meant object of this intersubjectively communal intentionality, which results in a harmonious constitution.

. . .the constitution of the world essentially involves a "harmony" of the monads: precisely this harmony among particular constitutions in the particular monads; and accordingly it involves also a harmonious generation that goes on in each particular monad.¹⁷

Each monad is intentionally connected with every other monad by the transcendental intersubjectivity in which they share and co-constitute a common world. Although this aspect of a particular monad is, of course, only appresentationally available to another particular monad and thus 'irreal', it is nonetheless factual.

Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely separate unity, the "irreal" intentional reaching of the other into my primordially is not irreal in the sense of being dreamt into it or being present to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy. Something that exists is in intentional communion with something else that exists.¹⁸

According to Husserl, transcendental intersubjectivity is, in fact, the ". . .intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity. . ." ¹⁹

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 129

¹⁹Ibid., p. 156.

Each individual monad is, then, related intrinsically to transcendental intersubjectivity. But this relation is unique. Each monad exists as a constituted concrete ego, existing in an objectively actual world. The transcendental subjectivity from which this constitution is performed cannot, however, belong to this particular monad exclusively, for no personal pronoun distinctions exist in the transcendental realm.

. . . each human being "bears within himself a transcendental 'I'"--not as a real part or a stratum of his soul (which would be absurd) but rather insofar as he is the self-objectification, as exhibited through phenomenological self-reflection, of the corresponding transcendental "I."²⁰

Through the epoche¹ this transcendental inter-subjectivity reaches ". . . empirical givenness on a transcendental level. . . ." ²¹ Other monads are thus revealed as the "transcendental society of 'Ourselves'" from which the "real world is constituted as 'objective,' as being there for everyone."²²

As such the difference "between other persons and me as a person among persons is itself a constituted difference. . . ." ²³ According to Husserl, all monads partake in this communion of transcendental intersubjectivity. And all monads must exist in the same Objective world.

²⁰ Idem, Crisis, p. 186.

²¹ Idem, Ideas, p. 15.

²² Ibid., pp. 14-15

²³ Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 64.

. . . there can exist only a single community of monads,
the community of all co-existing monads. Hence there
can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective
time, only one Objective space, only one Objective
Nature. Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there
are any structures in me that involve the co-existence
of other monads.²⁴

²⁴Ibid., p. 140.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that by explicating the intentional connectedness of the act of consciousness to its object, Husserl laid open the fullness of conscious experience (termed 'phenomenon') for investigation. By means of the epoche', he was able to suspend all the validity claims of phenomena and attain the purity of the apodictic experience itself: I cannot be radically certain that this paper exists, but I can be radically certain that the paper-experience exists. This radical certitude (exposed only by the reduction of the evidence of harmonious presentations to the apodicticity of pure experience as experience) he took to be the ground sought by Descartes.

From the reflective standpoint of the epoche', all claims of substantiality are reduced to 'mere-phenomena.' As such the mathematized abstraction of dual substantial realms is collapsed; that is, we attain a point of experience which is antecedent to such 'mental acts of idealization.' Husserl was thus able to dismiss Descartes dualistic substances as 'abstracta', reducing Cartesian categories to 'mere-phenomena.' The categories of physical and non-physical do, however, retain the benign distinction of 'varying modes of presentation'; but they, like all other presentations, are no longer assigned the status of substantiality.

Husserl is left with the bi-polar unity of the pure conscious act and its object, or meaning (the noesis and noema). These are taken in their strict phenomenological purity, and hence form neither a dualism nor a monism in the substantial sense. Through the functions of synthesis and horizontal constitution, Husserl reconstructs objective, lived reality from the subjectivity of pure experience. We have seen that this is accomplished through the related notions of inter-subjectivity, co-constitution, and transcendental communion.

Husserl's development of the phenomenological categories, however, is of secondary importance for our present topic. Our purpose has not been to defend the categories which emerge from Husserl's phenomenology, but to examine his conception of the way out of the Cartesian quandary. Husserl's solution, of course, is that there never was a genuine problem: only a stubborn abstraction which has become ingrained in our thought, and thus in our very cognition of reality. It is Husserl's method of exposing the experienced reality which lies prior to this abstraction that is the crucial point of our investigation. It seems clear that if Husserl's beginning premises (i.e., the move from harmoniously presented evidence to the apodicticity of pure experience and the intentional bi-polar structure of that experience) are admitted then the Cartesian categories and their problematic implications must be seen as non-substantial.

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