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The Bearing of the Sociology of Knowledge on Sociological Theory

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THE BEARING OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

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FOR MY PARENTS

in admiration of their resistance to irrationalities

in Southern culture

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My sincerest love and wishes for future happiness are extended to Dorothy, with whom I shared many struggles as a student and spouse. These experiences were the genesis of many ideas in the thesis. "If I love you," said Goethe, "what concern is that of yours?"

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Theoretical advancement in sociology is contingent upon an understanding of the cognitive framework of those who hope to convey an explanation of social phenomena. Throughout much of the history of sociology, disagreement as to how one should approach social theory has existed; the most marked difference being that between adherents of positivism and those who, following Max Weber, attempt to view social reality through the subjective orientations of the individual or group. Speaking of the complicated and detailed classifications of modern sociological theories, one inveterate critic of sociology says that "this multifariousness of classifications denotes a rather chaotic situation, but this is quite natural and not reprehensible at all."[1] However in this thesis, the question of how and why these diverse approaches exist will be considered as a theoretical problem in itself.

The sociology of knowledge emerged as the self-consciousness of this multitude of perspectives in the political turmoil modern man has experienced with the onset of the Industrial Revolution

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[1] Pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociological Theories of Today (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 9.

and the rapid development of science and technology. Furthermore Gunter Remmling has gone so far to say that the sociology of knowledge is the theoretical formulation of "mental entropy," or the loss of intellectual certainty accompanying the accumulation of reservoirs of knowledge.[2] Moreover, the sociology of knowledge perspective has been used to "debunk" social theory and thought as ideological expressions of class-based interests. As Louis Wirth suggested thirty-six years ago, the progress of social knowledge is impeded if not paralyzed by this politicization of the intellectual arena.[3]

However, it is questionable whether the sociology of knowledge should confine itself to the study of ideology, as has much of the work done under its auspices. One difficulty is that the discipline suffers from a lack of clarification of what indeed it is supposed to cover. In the United States the sociology of knowledge is often viewed suspiciously as a variant of speculative European philosophy which lacks empirical quality and at times even appears to be self-refuting. In a review of the field Franz Adler states "there is unfortunately no generally accepted delimitation of the 'sociology of knowledge'."[4] The sociology

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[2] Road to Suspicion, A Study of Modern Mentality and The Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), p. 5.

[3] "Preface," in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. xi.

[4] "The Range of the Sociology of Knowledge," in Modern Sociological Theory, ed. by Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1957), p. 396.

of knowledge has been defined so broadly as to hinder its development. The purpose of this thesis then is to (1) offer a more concise definition of the sociology of knowledge; and (2) apply this definition in its relationship to sociological theory.

The second chapter of the thesis is intended, after tentatively defining the scope of the sociology of knowledge, to be a review of the literature pertaining to studies in the field. Chapter II considers the sociology of knowledge in five approaches which are the author's own designations: the structural, cultural, phenomenological, sociology of science, and contemporary empirical studies. Special emphasis will be given to the phenomenological approach, which is currently gaining a stronger foothold in the United States and is probably the least understood approach. The work of Max Scheler, Werner Stark, Alfred Schutz, and Peter Berger is included in this section. Under the structural classification are placed Emile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim. Karl Marx is also included in the structuralist approach, although interpretation of his thought will actually place him in a more independent category. The cultural approach is most concerned with the work of Pitirim A. Sorokin and Talcott Parsons. The sociology of science is taken to include the sociology of sociology, with special attention given to Robert Friedrichs and Alvin Gouldner. Chapter II then traces the theoretical, rather than the historical, development of the sociology of knowledge.

Utilizing the insights gained from the preceding chapter, Chapter III delimits and narrows the theoretical relevance and perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Previous conceptualizations of the field are critiqued, focusing on the relationships between central concepts. The importance of language as a mediating phenomenon in defining the sociology of knowledge is discussed. After this the points of convergence as well as the distinct foci of the sociology of knowledge, epistemology and philosophy in general, the study of ideology and political sociology, the philosophy of social science, and social stratification are presented. In contrast to the "activist" classical theory of knowledge, the "passivist" conception of traditional sociology of knowledge is shown to be a primary source of problems involving objectivity and relativism which have so plagued the field. This leads into the distinction between the sociology of knowledge and sociological theory itself. With all these delimitations of the tangential and peripheral aspects of the relationships among these various areas of inquiry, the author is prepared to venture his own definition of the sociology of knowledge. Chapter III then ends with a partial answer to the question, "What does the sociology of knowledge have to offer us in terms of sociological theory?"

Chapter IV describes four modal types of consciousness, the justification for this having been accomplished in the definition of the sociology of knowledge arrived at in Chapter III. These four modes of consciousness are the

dialectical, analytical, synthetic, and phenomenological. Together they form the core concepts of an exploratory model examining the relationship of the sociology of knowledge to sociological theory. This model is primarily the author's original contribution. The next part of the model describes structured systems of knowledge which correspond with the modal types of consciousness. Given these, we can describe broadly-defined methodological orientations in the social sciences which are most amenable to the four modes of consciousness and corresponding structured knowledge systems. Finally, the kind of theoretical frameworks which are likely to emerge from each of these clusters are defined, along with an evaluation as to their scientific quality.

A brief summary of the study and its conclusions are presented in Chapter V, as well as the limitations of the thesis and suggestions as to how it may contribute to further research. The study in no way claims to be inclusive in its interpretation of the subject matter.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Since a major part of this thesis is definitional, the task of arriving at a more precise delimitation of the sociology of knowledge has been reserved for Chapter III. No detailed analysis of previously existing definitions of the field is included in Chapter II. However, it would be somewhat facetious to conduct a review of the literature without defining the boundaries of the field, and for that reason a tentative definition is proposed simply for the heuristic purpose of allowing the reader to have something in mind as he considers the various approaches to the sociology of knowledge. The author does not view the field as the "social determination of ideas," or the study of ideologies, or the study of some mental complex determining historical activity. As traditionally understood, however, all of the following are components of the sociology of knowledge, each of them problematic in itself: conditioning social factors and ideas making up human knowledge ("mental productions"), as well as the relationship between the two. At the end of this chapter the concluding remarks will, hopefully, clarify the conceptual components of the sociology of knowledge,

preparing the way for a more precise definition. In the meantime the sociology of knowledge is provisionally defined as the study of the relationship between mental events and social existence. This definition is perhaps no better or worse for the purpose at hand; it is vague enough to include under its rubric all of the various approaches presented in this thesis. At the end of Chapter II both the diverse and common elements in these approaches will be summarized.

Part A: The Structural Approach

By the "structural" approach to the sociology of knowledge is simply meant the perspective which seeks to establish a certain isomorphism of knowledge with the social structure in which the group or individual operates. In this section we include the most seminal thinkers: Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Mannheim. However, Karl Marx is only with some hesitation placed in this category; orthodox interpretations would undoubtedly classify him as a "structuralist," but renewed examination of his work shows that this is only partially correct. In fact, the position usually identified as that of Marx is seen here to be more that of Durkheim, who was explicitly anti-Marxian in his polemic. Karl Mannheim represents perhaps the prototype "paranoid thinker" of which Gunter Remmling speaks, though even he attempted to find a way out of the intellectual morass in which he found himself. In one sense, it can be shown that all these men were positivists and perhaps both Mannheim and Durkheim

were functionalists, although there have been several attempts to equate Marx with functionalism as well.[5] Despite their differences, however, these three men show affinities in the direction of a similar plane or dimension of thought. With this in mind, we turn first to Karl Marx.

Karl Marx

The literature on Karl Marx is at once overwhelming and still undecided on its interpretation of the thought of this man. In the last decade in particular there has been renewed interest in his work; some authors speak of an early humanistic Marx; others of his later scientific-theoretical work; and some still espouse an orthodox quasi-religious Marxism.[6] The relevance of Marx for the author's purposes can be summed in the following statements:

a. In keeping with the general thesis of this study, a large part of the writings of Marx are not properly within the realm of the sociology of knowledge as they are more a study of ideologies, although this work represents one of the earliest inceptive formulations of problems analogous to those in the field.
b. Although there is considerable evidence of a rather narrow economic determinism in Marx's work, there is at the same time just as much evidence to indicate that he was consciously very empirical

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[5]Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968 enlarged edition), pp. 92-100; Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 13-46; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), pp. 93-101.

[6]For an exposition of these trends, see Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 259-287.

and scientific in his analyses. Marx avoided monistic cause and effect analysis in favor of an empirical-dialectical methodology which assumes that an objective, almost positivistic description of social reality is possible.[7]

c. The study restricts itself more to the statements of Marx on consciousness itself and not with substantive ideologies. The conception of false consciousness, and concomitantly, those of alienation and reification, are the roots of Marx's positivism. This is all germane to the construction of sociological theory, and is therefore central to the object of this thesis.

d. As there is difficulty enough in interpreting Marx's own thought, this thesis avoids the task of interpreting the work of the disciples of Marx.[8]

The first three of these points are scrutinized in greater depth below.

Much of Marx's though rested on his distinction between the material substructure of society (Unterbau) and its ideological superstructure (Ueberbau):

> In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material

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[7] A more detailed analysis of this point can be found in Fuad Baali and J. Brian Price, "The Empirical-Dialectical Methodology of Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx," presented at the 1972 meetings of the Midwest Sociological Society in Kansas City, Missouri (publication pending).

[8] For a concise summary of neo-Marxist contributions, see Adler, "The Range of the Sociology of Knowledge," pp. 399-405. Of particular importance is Klassen und Klassenbewusstein by George Lukacs, which has been recently available in English as History and Class Consciousness, trans. by Rodney Livingston (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971 reprint of the 1923 edition).

> life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.[9]

It is here that we find the root of the more orthodox translations of Marx's work; all religious, political, and other such ideas are seen to be a reflection or refraction of the economic base, i.e., "the ruling ideas of every epoch are the ideas of the ruling class."[10] Elsewhere the author has challenged such an interpretation, pointing to the dialectical and sociological elements in Marx's suppositions; inferring that the relationship between these variables is multi-causal; that Marx is not an economic determinist; and that his efforts were directed to confirming the foundation of science in concrete, empirical reality rather than in some abstruse Platonic realm of ideas.[11] At any rate, Marx at best developed only an inchoate sociology of knowledge: the corpus of his writings in this area instead fall under the study of ideology.

With these assumptions briefly clarified, the thesis is restricted to two limited aspects of Marxian thought: the nature of consciousness, and the relationship of this to the

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[9]Karl Marx, "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in Marx and Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), pp. 362-363.

[10]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 39.

[11]Co-authored with Fuad Baali, "Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx on Social Change and Social Theory," presented at the 1972 meetings of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society in London, Ontario (publication pending).

construction of social theory. This in turn entails some discussion of false consciousness, which is essentially a form of alienation; and his empiricism, which is a logical outgrowth of the conception of false consciousness. In the citation to the Preface above, it can be seen that according to Marx consciousness does not exist a priori but is a social product, evolving from men in their actual life-process. That consciousness is a social, and not an individualistic phenomenon, provides a connection with Marx to the social behaviorism of George Herbert Mead:

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior.[12]

In the above passage Marx mentions that consciousness is "at first" and "at this stage" interwoven with the material activity of men, which could really be any variable one desires to choose. This suggests that ideas and conceptions can develop an autonomy of their own. In The German Ideology we are told that:

> Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the idea," "die Idee," etc., as the dominant force in history, and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as

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[12]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 13.

> "forms of self-determination" on the part of the concept developing in history.[13]

If these ideas gain such an autonomy, then they can in turn have an influential effect on the course of history. However, Marx does not systematically carry out the ramifications of such a premise.

Marx did make a distinction between illusion, unclear ideas, and knowledge, which is the result of scientific investigation. When man is living under illusions he has a false consciousness of his true condition. This implies that objective knowledge is possible and is the basis of his empirical thought:

> Empirical observations must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. . . . Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions.[14]

This empiricism is not incompatible with the negative, critical thinking which he took from Hegel. It would seem as if the two are in fact integrally related.[15]

On another level false consciousness presents itself in the form of reification (Verdinglichung), which is explored further

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[13] Ibid., p. 42.

[14] Ibid., pp. 13-15.

[15] See Irving M. Zeitlin, Marxism: A Re-Examination (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), p. 8.

by Joachim Israel, Peter Berger, and Anton C. Zijderveld.[16] This is usually connected with Marx's analysis of the fetischism of commodities, but is found on a more general level:

> My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and confronts it with hostility.[17]

Thus man is alienated from the community by a social consciousness which is an abstraction and not a living community. Marx is well aware of consciousness itself as a phenomenon which at times acts almost as an independent variable in historical periods. He can be placed in the structural approach to the sociology of knowledge only with some reservation: his methodological principles which were developed in part from his ideas about consciousness mitigate against any form of strict determinism. Marx is thoroughly dialectical in his thought and in his analysis of the relationship between men's conceptions and their socio-economic matrix of behavior.

Emile Durkheim

Although he denied that his theory of knowledge and religion was a restatement of historical materialism, Durkheim was clearly indebted to Marx's distinction of Unterbau/Ueberbau,

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[16]Joachim Israel, Alienation From Marx to Modern Sociology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), pp. 255-342; Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); and Anton C. Zijderveld, The Abstract Society (New York: Anchor Books, 1970).

[17]Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 137.

as well as by Marx's idea that social existence determines social consciousness.[18] However, as Zeitlin points out, Durkheim was wrong in thinking that Marx treated consciousness as "mere epiphenomena" and goes on to say that "the real divergence occurs when Durkheim generalizes Marx's proposition beyond socioeconomic relationships to include other social relationships."[19] Durkheim saw social structures and arrangements as the principal determinants of behavior--this is the basis of his concept of collective conscience. He believed that the problems of a theory of knowledge were inexorably tied in with the problems of the sociology of religion. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, he attempts to show how the categories of understanding--in the classic Aristotelian sense of ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, etc.--were born in primitive religious belief and thus a product of religious thought. But more than this: if religion is preeminently social, as he concluded, then "religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities."[20] As the categories are of a religious origin, then they too are social affairs and the product of collective thought. In our states of consciousness, for instance, the categories of space and time are socially conditioned: "A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time

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[18]Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 276.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 22.

its function is to assure their regularity."[21] Similarily, in some Australian tribes space is conceived in the form of a spatial circle because the camp is organized in a circular form. The circle is divided up exactly like the tribal circle and is in its image.[22] Thus classificatory thought has social origins, although these classifications have achieved a certain autonomy from their original origins. These problems which Durkheim dealt with are the ones which have been carried over in the modern sociology of knowledge. However, he did address himself to questions of a traditional philosophical nature.

The epistemological question which preoccupied Durkheim was the debate between classical empiricism and Kantian a priorism. Durkheim believed that the empirical position could result in irrationalism as universality and necessity are reduced to pure appearance, or illusion, thus denying all objective reality to logical life, which is based on the categories. On the other hand, the a priorists (rationalists) believed the world to have a logical aspect which could be expressed through reason. Durkheim believed that his idea of collective representations was the key to a solution to these two opposing theories of knowledge. As Zeitlin says:

> Durkheim therefore concluded that the "empiricists" were wrong in assuming that knowledge was the result of an individual's immediate sensory perceptions; they were wrong in believing that knowledge was unmediated by thought categories. Knowledge is indeed mediated

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[21] Ibid., p. 23.

[22] Ibid., p. 24.

> as the "rationalists" claimed; however the categories are not immanent but social in nature. All collective representations depend on their common underlying social structures. . . .[23]

Durkheim's work clearly belongs, then, in the structural approach to the sociology of knowledge.[24] In his claims about the influence of social structure on thought he went far beyond Karl Marx. As with this thesis, it can be said that Durkheim was concerned with how states of consciousness are structured in the human mind; although he goes further in relating this directly to the social milieu in which the individual exists.

Karl Mannheim

Max Scheler was the first to introduce the term sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie), but in the United States Karl Mannheim is the name usually associated with this discipline. Of all thinkers in the sociology of knowledge, he has been given the most attention and subjected to the most thorough-going analysis. A detailed introduction to the man and his work has been written recently by Kurt Wolff,[25] and several excellent, in-depth

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[23]Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory, p. 277.

[24]See Remmling, The Road to Suspicion, pp. 15-22, for a concise summary of the work of Marcel Granet and Levy-Bruhl, which is very similar to that of Durkheim.

[25]Kurt H. Wolff, From Karl Mannheim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. xi-cxxxiii. In addition see Paul Kecskemeti, "Introduction," in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. by Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 1-32; Louis Wirth, "Preface," in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. x-xxx; Helmut R. Wagner, "The Scope of Mannheim's Thinking," Social Research, 20 (April,

expositions of his sociology of knowledge are available.[26] Mannheim finds few defenders of his work, with most criticisms focusing on the self-defeating relativism of his position; i.e., if all thought is existentially determined, then even this proposition is, ipso facto, socially conditioned and is open to question as to its validity.[27] These arguments have been stated and restated to the point where it is a mere act of boring repetition to go over them again. Rather, the basic outlines of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge are presented here, and the

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1953), pp. 100-109; Gunter Remmling, "Karl Mannheim: Revision of an Intellectual Portrait," Social Forces, 40 (October, 1961), pp. 23-40.

[26] See especially Robert K. Merton, "Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge," in Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 543-562; Jacques J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge: A Critical Analysis of the Systems of Karl Mannheim and Pitirim A. Sorokin (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), pp. 19-104; Irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory, pp. 281-310.

[27] These are, in addition to the references cited in the preceding footnote: Alexander von Schelting, "Review of Ideologie und Utopie," American Sociological Review, 1 (1936), pp. 664-672; Arthur Child, "The Theoretical Possibility of the Sociology of Knowledge," Ethics, LI (July, 1941), pp. 392-418; "The Existential Determination of Thought," Ethics, LII (January, 1942), pp. 153-185; "The Problem of Imputation in the Sociology of Knowledge," Ethics, LI (January, 1941), pp. 200-219; "The Problem of Truth in the Sociology of Knowledge," Ethics, LVIII (October, 1947), pp. 18-34; Virgil G. Hinshaw, "The Epistemological Relevance of Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy, XL (February, 1943), pp. 57-72; Frank E. Hartung, "Problems of the Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, 19 (January, 1952), pp. 17-32; T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," British Journal of Sociology, 7 (March, 1956), pp. 52-58; Robert H. Coombs, "Karl Mannheim, Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge," Sociological Quarterly, 7 (Spring, 1966), pp. 229-233; Toyomasa Fuse, "Sociology of Knowledge Revisited: Some Remaining Problems and Prospects," Sociological Inquiry, 37 (Spring, 1967), pp. 241-253.

epistemological arguments will be picked up briefly again in Chapter III.

Mannheim--sometimes called the "bourgeois Marx"--begins his study with a distinction between the particular and total conceptions of ideology:

> The particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests . . . [the total conception of ideology] refers to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, i.e. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group.[28]

Thus, Mannheim portrays a situation in which all thought is believed to be ideologically inspired and distrust prevails. However, when the analyst begins to subject all points of view--his own and his adversary's--to ideological analysis, the sociology of knowledge is approached:

> With the emergence of the general formulation of the total conception of ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge. What was once the intellectual armanent of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally.[29]

Karl Mannheim was aware of the dangers of a relativism in which all thought becomes invalid once its social origins are pointed out. To counteract such an interpretation, he developed the concepts of relationalism and perspectivism, which together

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[28] Ideology and Utopia, pp. 55-56.

[29] Ibid., p. 78.

formed a pragmatic criterion of truth similar to Pierce and Dewey in the United States. "Perspective" (Aspekstruktur) refers to the total conception of ideology, but is a substitution of the word "ideology," which has moral connotations, with a word that takes its stand on a noological plane, or the plane of logical thought.[30] Aspektstruktur refers to how a perceiving individual sees an object, which of its elements he grasps, and how he constructs a context in the process of thinking. Mannheim attempted to establish an empirical branch of the sociology of knowledge in this manner and applied his concepts in the essay Das konservative Denken.[31] His treatment of relativism, however, is the epistemological consequence of empirical research. This he thought to be the most important aspect of the sociology of knowledge, and it is this same point which evokes the strongest objections to his work. To escape relativism he invented the term "relationalism"; that is, objective thought is guaranteed by the freischwebende Intelligenz, a relatively classless stratum of the "socially unattached intelligentsia." This group seeks reality by escaping ideological and utopian thought. By utopian thought Mannheim simply means a system of ideas which is oriented toward change of the existing society; whereas ideology is concerned with the preservation of the existing order. Essentially, as Robert Merton points out, with the concepts of relationalism and perspectivism Mannheim has arrived at almost

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[30] Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 22.

[31] In Kurt H. Wolff, From Karl Mannheim, pp. 132-222.

the same interpretation of the Rickert-Weber formulation of Wertbeziehung, which holds that values are relevant to the formulation of the scientific problem but are not relevant to the validity of the results.[32]

Gradually, then, Karl Mannheim attempted to move away from his historicism and establish the sociology of knowledge on an empirical basis. Toyomasa Fuse sums up Mannheim's efforts as follows:

> (1) empirical studies of the relation between thought and reality; (2) the search for criteria by which to distinguish values; and (3) the elaboration of a new theory of knowledge which shall take, finally, account of the discoveries of the sociology of knowledge.[33]

After a tortuous intellectual struggle, Mannheim arrived at essentially a shaky synthesis between historicism and positivism. In addition, he provides us with a functional theory of knowledge in that particular thought styles function to maintain or threaten social structures. In this thesis, the epistemological quandry which enmeshed Mannheim is avoided by adopting a dialectical interpretation of the relationship between thought and social structure.

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[32]Merton, "Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge," p. 559. Marlis Kruger attempts to refute this point in his "Sociology of Knowledge and Social Theory," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, XIV (1969), pp. 156-157.

[33]Fuse, "Sociology of Knowledge Revisited: Some Remaining Problems and Prospects," p. 247.

Part B: The Cultural Approach

In contrast to the structural approach, the two men considered in this section--Pitirim A. Sorokin and Talcott Parsons--are avowedly anti-Marxian and seek instead to locate the source of knowledge in cultural values, as with Parsons; and cultural mental complexes, as the case with Sorokin. These cultural factors are taken as independent variables. However, the work of Sorokin and Parsons can be seen as an over-reaction to Marxian sociology; they have failed to see that an interpretation of Marx as a strict materialist or economic determinist is simply not true. In a sense they have placed themselves in the same position as that which they criticize by reversing the causal direction implied between ideas and social structure. The word "causal" must be used here with some reservation, as the functional methodology of both Parsons and Sorokin, especially the latter's "logico-meaningful" method, attempts to skirt this kind of imagery. However, to establish links of a logical order between phenomena at the same time may confirm the existence of meaningful relationships. Thus it is not improper to speak of causal relationships, i.e., of independent and dependent variables.[34] Sorokin has contributed more than Parsons to the sociology of knowledge, and this analysis begins with his work.

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[34]Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 163-167.

Pitirim A. Sorokin

Unlike the structuralists such as Marx and Mannheim, Sorokin looks at "cultural mentalities" from which knowledge systems are derived; his is essentially an idealistic and emanationist theory of the sociology of knowledge:

> One of the main tasks of the so-called sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie) is a study of the factors which condition the essential contents, configurations, and transformations of the mental life of an individual or of a group: their language, scientific ideas, religious and other beliefs . . . and their set of values in general. The sociology of knowledge, or, more exactly, the sociology of mental life, tries to answer the basic questions of how and why the mental life of any given individual or group happens to be such as it is . . . and why the mental life of various persons or collectivities is often quite different. The sociology of mental life endeavors to elucidate these problems through a study of the mentalities of vast cultures and societies (macrosociology of mental life) and through that of the mental life of a given individual (microsociology of mental life).[35]

Sorokin's monumental work, Social and Cultural Dynamics, is an effort to investigate these problems on a macrosociological scale.[36] Every culture can be characterized by its system of truth and reality; the main categories being the Ideational, Idealistic, and Sensate mentalities or systems of knowledge. Sorokin accumulates massive evidence to show the fluctuation of these mentalities throughout history. He notes that these classifications have probably never existed in pure form, but

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[35]Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Sociology of My Mental Life," in Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review, ed. by Philip J. Allen (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), p. 3.

[36]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, (4 Vols.; New York: American Book Company, 1937).

that the Sensate and Ideational cultural forms have been part of the composition of all integrated cultures. In Ideational culture reality is perceived as nonsensate and nonmaterial; supersensory critieria are relied upon as its system of truth, and it is spiritual and stresses everlasting Being (Sein). In Sensate culture reality is viewed with the sense organs; here the stress is on Becoming (Werden). Sensate culture is characterized by change, flux, evolution, and progress. In brief, its major premises are the opposite of Ideational culture. The Idealistic cultural mentality is a mixed form which appears to be logically integrated into a more or less balanced unification of Ideational and Sensate cultural premises. In addition, empiricism is dominant in Sensate culture; mysticism and fideism in Ideational (the truth of faith). Other indices Sorokin has constructed indicate that realism correlates positively with the truth of the senses (sensate), and conceptualism with the truth of reason (idealistic culture).[37] Each of these cultural mentalities conveys a system of truth, but to Sorokin true reality is only obtainable through his "integralist" notion of truth: this includes empirical and logical criteria as well as a "supersensory, super-rational metalogical act of 'intuition' or 'mystical

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[37]This bears a similarity to F. S. C. Northrop, who attributes to eastern cultures the primacy of "the aesthetic component" and to the west "the theoretic component"; the former relies on the senses, the latter rationalizes and theorizes; see, The Meeting of East and West (New York: Collier Books, 1946).

experience'."[38] Sorokin believes that with the integralist notion of truth he has achieved a synthesis of idealism and materialism.

For the purposes of this thesis, we can see how these cultural mentalities affect scientific theory, indeed define it: "Scientific theory thus is but an opinion made 'creditable' and 'fashionable' by the type of prevalent culture."[39] Sorokin delves into this in his book Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time, in which certain fundamental categories are seen as prerequisites of all coherent thought and all knowledge of facts.[40] He quotes Durkheim's analysis of the spatial organization of the Australian Aborigines with approval, but sees the concepts of space and time as an expression of the dominant cultural mentality rather than a function of group structure. Also, as with Schutz, Sorokin does not believe that the positive, mathematical sciences are independent of cultural influence, as opposed to Marx and Mannheim.

Despite some criticism, then, the author agrees with Maquet, who concludes that in Sorokin's sociology of knowledge

> the independent variable is itself a mental production. The three premises of culture are nothing else but philosophic positions . . . thus, because the independent

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[38]Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, I, p. 36.

[39]Quoted by Robert Merton and Bernard Barber, "Sorokin's Formulations in the Sociology of Science," in Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review, p. 334.

[40]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964).

> variable is sociocultural and especially because it is exterior to each particular field of knowledge, we can speak with good reason, it seems, of Sorokin's Wissenssoziologie.[41]

Talcott Parsons

Talcott Parsons' orientation to the sociology of knowledge fits into his attempt to construct a general theory of social action. Drawing mostly on Max Weber he states his question as "not whether nonempirical existential ideas are always to be found in social systems, but whether important features of these social systems can be shown to be functions of variations in the content of these ideas."[42] Parsons conceives of two problems in the sociology of knowledge: (1) the relationship between institutionalized values and empirical conceptions of social systems; and (2) the relation of values to cultural systems. In the article which he devoted specifically to the sociology of knowledge, he gave more attention to the first, although the latter was ultimately more important to him. He is concerned with how value systems affect bodies of knowledge.[43] Parsons believes that empirical-rational knowledge is an independent aspect of all cultural systems:

> The sociology of knowledge should not be identified with the sociology of culture, which is a wider

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[41]Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 187-188.

[42]Talcott Parsons, "The Role of Ideas in Social Action," American Sociological Review, 3 (1939), pp. 657-658.

[43]Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge," in his Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 146.

> category. Only through an analysis of both social and cultural systems and of their interpenetration and interdependence, however, can an adequate sociology of knowledge be worked out.[44]

Criticisms of Parsons' sociology of knowledge are necessarily bound with criticisms of his entire theoretical framework; here ample work has been done.[45] Suffice to say that in his sociology of knowledge, as with Sorokin, cultural values and ideas are taken as independent variables, which is the direct opposite of the position taken by the structuralists. Both views are one-sided.

Part C: The Phenomenological Approach

The phenomenological approach to the sociology of knowledge is the least understood in American sociology, deriving from philosophical traditions that are almost strictly European which is expressed in a terminology often difficult to grasp. Phenomenology is actually an attempt, however, to establish philosophy as a pure science and is not incompatible with many of the basic postulates commonly accepted by social scientists. Helmut R. Wagner has defined phenomenology as being concerned with "that cognitive reality which is embodied in the processes of subjective human

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[44] Ibid., p. 165. In addition see chapter viii, "Belief Systems and the Role of Ideas," in Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 326-332. Here Parsons discusses the prevalence of cultural patterning of knowledge in the form of belief systems, systems of expressive symbols, and systems of value orientations.

[45] See Max Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961).

experiences."[46] However, there is a great deal more involved in phenomenological analysis. Therefore as a prelude to a discussion of the phenomenological approach to the sociology of knowledge a brief summary of the thought of the most systematic phenomenological philosopher, that of Edmund Husserl, precedes the discussion of Schutz. Of the other four thinkers in this section, particular attention is given to Alfred Schutz and Peter Berger. Max Scheler studied under Husserl, but diverged from this philosopher far more than did Schutz; Scheler's contributions are presented first as they represent somewhat of a synthesis of between the two previous approaches, the structural and cultural. Following Scheler, the sociology of knowledge of Werner Stark is examined. Stark was phenomenological in his methodology but original in the core of his work. After Stark, the insights of Schutz and Berger are analyzed.

Max Scheler

As previously noted, Scheler was the first to use the term "sociology of knowledge," or Wissenssoziologie. Unfortunately, his Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft (1926) has yet to be published in English. The ensuing summary of his conception of the sociology of knowledge is based primarily, then, on secondary

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[46] In "Preface" to Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations: Selected Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 12.

sources.[47] Scheler contended that social factors do not determine the content or validity of ideas, saying that:

> . . . the sociological character of all knowledge, of all forms of thought, is unquestionable. However, this (sociological determination of thought) refers only to the selection of objects of knowledge, which is determined by the controlling perspective of social interests (herrschenden sozialen Interessenperspektive). Neither the content nor the validity of knowledge is sociologically determined, but the forms of the mental processes by means of which knowledge is acquired are always and necessarily codetermined sociolcgically, i.e. by the social structure.[48]

Scheler was influenced by Husserl's phenomenology in that he regarded the cognitive act as insight into eternal essences, as a contemplative participation in these eternal truths.[49] Thus he created a metaphysical dualism; claiming that there is a realm of idea value-essences and a realm of concrete existential facts. Drawing from Marx's distinction of substructure/superstructure, he distinguished between Kultursoziologie and Realsoziologie. The relationship between these is expressed in his "law of the order of effectiveness of the ideal and real factors" (Gesetz der Ordnung der Wirksamkeit der Idealfaktoren und Realfaktoren).[50] The mind is expressed in ideal factors and determines what thoughts

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[47] Especially Remmling, Road to Suspicion, pp. 32-39; J. R. Staude, Max Scheler, 1874-1928 (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 163-202; Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 510-542. For early criticisms see Paul Arthur Schlipp, "The 'Formal Problems' of Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge," The Philosophical Review, 36 (March, 1927), pp. 101-120.

[48] Wissenformen, p. 58; quoted in Staude, Max Scheler, p. 165.

[49] Remmling, Road to Suspicion, p. 33.

[50] Ibid., p. 37.

can be created by the culture. The substructural factors--power relations, etc.--are "negative factors of realization." However, and for this Scheler has been termed the Catholic Nietzsche, the "positive factor of realization" is the free will and actions of leaders, the elite who help open the "sluice gates" for the mental stream by preparing the masses for new ideas.[51] Thus, "real history" only hinders, facilitates, retards or accelerates the realization (Auswirkung) of ideas; that they may pass from possibility to actuality. The real history of any supranational culture (Hochkultur) is summed up in a law of three phases (Gesetz der drei Phasen je vorwiegender Primarkausalitat der Realfaktoren). The independent variables in real history are, in Scheler's words:

> 1. A phase in which blood relationships of every kind and the institutions that rationally govern them . . . form the independent organizational form of groups; that is, they determine the scope of what can happen from other causes of a real sort, for example, political and economic.
> 2. A phase in which this causal primacy--understood in the same limited sense of the determination of scope--passes over to the factors of political power, in the first place to the efficacy of the state.
> 3. A phase in which the economy receives the causal primacy and the "economic factors" determine real events, though for intellectual history they merely open and close the sluice gates of the spirit.[52]

Scheler was influenced somewhat by Marxism, and in fact drew up a table of class-determined propensities to think in a certain way. In it, for example, Scheler listed tendencies of the lower class

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[51] Ibid.

[52] Wissenformen, pp. 44-45; Staude, Max Scheler, p. 175.

to have a prospective time consciousness and a mechanistic conception of the world; with an emphasis on materialism, realism, becoming, pragmatism, and a search for contradictions. In contrast, the upper class has tendencies toward a retrospective time consciousness and a teleological conception of the world; with an emphasis on spiritualism, idealism, being, intellectualism, and a search for harmonies.[53] To Scheler ideologies were rationalizations of the interests and prejudices of a particular social group, whereas knowledge was the objective perception of reality. Thus he believed that these preconditions exist for class prejudices, although they could be overcome, in principle, by every individual member of a class.

We can see that Scheler synthesized materialism and idealism in his sociology of knowledge. but this dualistic metaphysics has been severely criticized:

> Clearly, if these notions were to be taken seriously--and we must not forget that according to Scheler the gap to be bridged between substructure and superstructure is whole gulf between physical and metaphysical--a meeting of the two could not be imagined at all. For how could a mindless movement select for itself ideas that would suit it; and how or why should ideas descend from their heavenly abode, incarnate themselves in this world, or mingle with the dross and dirt of these lower spheres?[54]

Scheler's sociology of knowledge, then, escapes the narrower conception of the social determination of ideas, but his

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[53] Wissenformen, p. 171; Staude, Max Scheler, p. 186.

[54] Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge: An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 264.

postulation of a supratemporal, metaphysical sphere of truth is not something we can prove or disapprove. In the context of empirical research it is completely meaningless. But on the other hand it can be said that there are historical variants of repeated themes or ideas, which is in part due to the autonomy of thought structures developed over time. Realfaktoren may at least create the situation in which men can choose among many of these predefined ideas. Even Staude says that "in spite of all his Platonic exaltation of ideas, there is a tendency in Scheler's sociology of knowledge to reduce ideas to the level of epiphenomena."[55] If so, then Scheler has failed to achieve a synthesis between the structural and cultural approaches in his phenomenology; in fact, he bypasses the cultural realm into one of transcendental eidectic essences.

Werner Stark

In contrast to those who have placed the subject matter of the sociology of knowledge as the study of the ideological nature of all thought, Werner Stark is unique (although perhaps he comes close to Sorokin's integralist philosophy) in that he views the ultimate task of the sociology of knowledge to be a search for truth, to supercede ideological distortion of thought. Although he falls somewhat outside of the phenomenological tradition, he shares with these people, especially with Scheler, a belief in a transcendental realm of truth:

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[55]Staude, Max Scheler, p. 180.

> We conceive the philosophical anthropology which will reconcile and so to speak roof over the mutually alien worlds of ideas which the history of our race has engendered to be attainable empirically and inductively from observation and experience, not speculatively and by means of a priori fiat. The absolute is recognizable, so we believe, in, through and under the relative. . . . In fact and in truth, observation gives us knowledge that is essentially relative and absolute at the same time, and the main task of scholarship--a scholarship which is not pure fact-finding, but also aware of ultimate philosophical problems--consists precisely in the separation of the absolute from the realtive, of the more than phenomenal from the no more than phenomenal. The absolute is for us, in other words, the common factor in the relative. Our procedure must be that of the mathematician in face of a series of expressions in which a common factor occurs: he extracts the common factor and sets it in front of a pair of brackets, within which the elements of irreducible diversity stand collected. This operation (akin what in philosophy is known as the phenomenological method) seems to us the only one capable of leading beyond the historical manifold without doing violence to it.[56]

As did Sorokin, Stark distinguishes between a macrosociology of knowledge, which fixes its attention on the inclusive society and its influence; and the microsociology of knowledge, which is concerned with the narrower world of scholarship and art,[57] but he excludes the former from consideration in his extremely scholarly and erudite book. A full chapter in The Sociology of Knowledge is devoted to a critique of ideology, which he considers to be an historical forerunner of the sociology of knowledge, but whose study really belongs to psychology. The author will return to this in Chapter III of the thesis.

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[56]Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 197.

[57]Ibid., p. 20.

In a discussion of social determination and individual freedom, Stark affirms that "individual thought and social being from an indissoluble unity."[58] Although found only in the individual, human consciousness is essentially social and is always related to a system of social conceptions and values. This axiological factor, which is operative in the inception and constitution of a world view, is the essence of Stark's own sociology of knowledge and is expressed in the following scheme:[59]

The subject and his approach	The Categorial Layer of the Mind The Physical Apparatus of Perception The Axiological Layer of the Mind	The concern of the soc. of knowledge
The objective world	The Objects of Knowledge The Materials of Knowledge	

Thus in Stark's sociology of knowledge the mind makes certain prejudgments, or value judgments, with regard to the relative importance or unimportance of the "numberless separable and eligible strands of objective reality."[60] However, although the axiological system determines <u>what</u> is to be selected from the materials of knowledge, it does not and cannot determine <u>how</u> this selection is to be carried out. Stark believes that his sociology of knowledge, if properly handled, "can lead to an objectivity in the treatment of social and historical reality incomparably deeper than any achieved or attainable by those who deny the existence

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[58] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 142.

[59] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 108.

[60] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 126.

and the influence of a basic axiological layer in the human mind."[61]

In terms of the Marxian distinction between substructure and superstructure, Stark gains theoretical insight by combining a "theory of functional interrelation" with a "theory of elective affinity." The former simply refers to the functionalization of knowledge, the latter to the tendency of certain ideas to have an affinity with a given stage of historical development (similar to Max Weber on the protestant ethic). Stark sees a gradual convergence between substructure and superstructure and a reciprocal influence between the two, but adds that "because it is easier to understand the superstructure through the substructure than the other way about,"[62] more emphasis is given to social determination:

> . . . The true basis of social determination, so far as human thought is concerned, is the process of social interaction, that all-important process which . . . is also, and essentially, a meeting and making of mind and mind. Social life, for us, is in the last analysis something that happens, not something that is, a flow, not a substance, a stream of relationships, not a hard and fast thing. But in this living stream or process, there is a twofold tendency of crystallization at work:
>
> Ideas ← Social life as process → Institutions
>
> On the one hand, institutions form themselves and achieve comparative fixity, on the other hand modal ideas; and both poles thus produced--ideas and institutions--are determined by, and characteristic of the parent reality

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[61] Ibid., p. 127.

[62] Ibid., p. 255.

> which has brought them forth. Social life as a process is given direction by certain guiding values which emerge as dominant in the living interplay of individual and group volitions and strivings.[63]

He then quotes Ziegenfuss as saying "the social as such is neither subjective or objective. It realizes itself at the same time correlatively in two directions--mental inwardness and the external world."[64]

Werner Stark opened a new dimension of the sociology of knowledge with his emphasis on the axiological nature of the mind. Mind, or consciousness, is structured into a choosing phenomenon.

Alfred Schutz and Edmund Husserl

In Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt (Vienna, 1932)[65] Alfred Schutz began the task of constructing a phenomenological sociology by synthesizing the work of Edmund Husserl and Max Weber. Only recently have sociologists in the United States begun to give his contributions serious consideration; today phenomenological sociology has evolved as one of the major alternative paradigms for sociological theory.

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[63] Ibid., p. 244.

[64] Ibid.

[65] A translation by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert is now available as The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). For the purpose of this thesis, however, this work is not central. The most relevant essay is "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XIV (September, 1953), pp. 1-37.

Phenomenological philosophy began with Hegel, was given a strong impetus by Kant and Ernst Cassirer, but developed in its most radical form by Edmund Husserl. This philosopher wanted to arrive at "philosophy as a rigorous science"; that is, through critical and systematic investigation philosophy could attain absolutely valid knowledge of things.[66] This was to be accomplished by reducing everything to primary "presuppositions" which have no need of clarification because they are immediately evident. The method for accomplishing this was twofold: eidectic and phenomenological reduction, of which only the latter is important to this thesis. Eidectic reduction leads us from the realm of facts to that of general essences; phenomenological reduction makes us pass from the world of realities to that of their ultimate presuppositions. Of the different forms of phenomenological reductions, the most important for us is that of the reduction of the cultural world to the world of our immediate experiences (Lebenswelt). This is the natural world which correlates with our primordial, original lived experiences (Erlebnisse); when we go back to this immediate, given nature of experience Husserl is speaking of "intentional analysis." Intentionality is a property of our consciousness which is always directing this consciousness to that which it itself is not; in other words, every act of consciousness, in order to be an act,

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[66]This discussion of Husserl is based on Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Some Fundamental Themes of Husserl's Phenomenology," in Kockelmans, Phenomenology (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 24-36.

demands a certain object because every conscious act intends something. In simpler terms, Friedrichs defines phenomenological reduction as "the apperception of the impact of phenomena on one's consciousness devoid of reference to the actual presence or absence of external objects."[67] These are the bare outlines of Husserl's phenomenology which Schutz adapted to sociology.

We consider here three aspects of Schutz's work: (1) a general summary of his phenomenological sociology, (2) more specifically, his ideas on knowledge; and (3) his synthesis of empiricism and subjectivism in his scientific method. These will be intermingled, however, in the following exposition. A cogent summation of some of his core ideas is to be found in the passage below:

> All our knowledge of the world, in common sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, namely a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of the mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, namely, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting. In either case they carry along their interpretational inner and outer horizon. This does not mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us either for carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedure of thinking called the method of science.[68]

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[67] Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology, p. 303.

[68] Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," pp. 2-3.

Thus we perceive and interpret the world through a series of common-sense constructs taken from the reality of everyday life. Scientific constructs are designed to supercede the constructs of common-sense thought; they are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, or constructs of the constructs made by the actors in the social setting which the scientist is attempting to explain by using the procedural rules of science. Thus man lives among his fellow men in the inter-subjective world of daily life, and all our interpretation of the world is based on a "stock of knowledge at hand" which has been more or less handed down to us. In the natural attitude of our daily life our mind is constantly selecting objects against a field of pre-experienced other objects. Therefore at any moment of our life we are in a biographically determined situation:

> . . . there is a selection of things and aspects of things relevant to me at any given moment whereas other things and other aspects are for the time being of no concern to me or even out of view. All this is biographically determined, that is, the actor's actual situation has its history; it is the sedimentation of all his previous subjective experiences.[69]

This biographically determined situation includes possibilities of future practical activities which often determine our "purpose at hand." Our knowledge is socially derived and transmitted in the vocabulary and syntax of everyday language. As Schutz puts it, "language is not a substratum of philosophical grammatical

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[69]Alfred Schutz, "Choosing Among Projects of Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XII (December, 1951), p. 169.

considerations for me, but a means to express my intentions or to understand the intentions of others, etc."[70]

The social world of the actor is arranged, with the me as center, into associates (Umwelt: the immediate world within which direct and relatively intimate experience of others is possible); contemporaries (Mitwelt: a world of mediate, but contemporary, experience within which indirect and relatively anonymous experience of others can be obtained); predecessors (Vorwelt: experiences of the historical past); and successors (Folgewelt: the future, of which no experience is possible, but towards which an orientation may exist).[71] All this is done in various degrees of familiarity and strangeness.[72] These fields (Zentren) of differing relevances are in turn divided into systems of imposed and intrinsic relevances; with intrinsic relevances we choose what we are interested in, but this interest, once established, determines the system of relevances intrinsic to the chosen interest.[73]

Common-sense thinking, however, overcomes the differences in individual perspectives by way of two basic idealizations:

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[70]Alfred Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," in Kockelmans, Phenomenology, p. 466.

[71]Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences," p. 467. This portion of Schutz's work has been reprinted as "The Dimensions of the Social World," in Collected Papers II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 20-62.

[72]See Alfred Schutz, "The Homecomer" and "The Stranger," in Collected Papers II for applied examples of these concepts.

[73]Alfred Schutz, "The Well-Informed Citizen," Social Research, 13 (December, 1946), pp. 463-478.

the idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints, and the idealization of the congruency of systems of relevance. Together these postulates constitute the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives--typifying constructs of thought which supercede the thought objects of my and my fellowman's private experiences.[74] Most knowledge does not originate from personal experience but is socially derived, i.e., it is intersubjective. Furthermore, knowledge has degrees of clarity, distinctness, and familiarity and precision. Here is the difference between the expert, the well-informed citizen, and the man on the street. The expert, for example, proceeds from the assumption that the system of problems established within his field is relevant, and that this is the only relevant system; whereas the well-informed citizen is in a position where there is an infinite number of possible frames of reference. Therefore, the frame of reference chosen is the one defined by choosing his interest, and the well-informed citizen is more subject to change in what makes his primary relevances than the expert.[75] For this reason, to Schutz the sociology of knowledge should be more concerned with the social distribution of knowledge:

> Knowledge is socially distributed and the mechanism of this distribution can be made the subject matter of a sociological discipline. True, we have a so-called sociology of knowledge. Yet, with very few exceptions, the discipline thus misnamed has approached the problem of the social distribution of knowledge merely from the

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[74]Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," p. 8.

[75]Schutz, "The Well-Informed Citizen," pp. 474-475.

> angle of the ideological foundation of truth in its dependence upon social, and especially economic, conditions, or from that of the social implications of education, or that of the social role of the man of knowledge. Not sociologists, but economists and philosophers have studied some of the many theoretical aspects of the problem.[76]

The purpose of the study of the social distribution of knowledge is to investigate what motives prompt men to accept unquestioningly some parts of the relatively natural concept of the world and to subject others to question. These motives can either be "in-order-to motives" or "because-motives." The former refers to the actor "prephantisizing" a future state of affairs as motive for carrying out the action. Thus we can say the motive of the murderer was to obtain the money of his victim. On the other hand, we may say that the murderer has been motivated to commit his deed because he grew up in this and that environment. This class of motives are the "(genuine) because-motives."[77]

This part of Schutz's social philosophy is largely derived from Husserl. However, he now brings in the "subjective interpretation of meaning" postulate of Max Weber as a principle of constructing course-of-action types in common-sense experiences, which is made possible by revealing the motives which determine a given course of action. The problem with the scientific observer is that often his stock of knowledge differs from those being observed in their systems of relevances; and thus the general

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[76] Ibid., p. 235.

[77] Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," pp. 16-17.

thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives is not sufficient to eliminate this difficulty. The rational definition of the scientific observer must take into account both his frame of reference and that of the group under observation. The scientist must define himself as a disinterested observer, whose frame of reference "constitutes his 'being in a scientific situation' which supercedes his biographical situation as a human being within the world."[78] In other words the scientist is operating under a different system of relevances, defined by the corpus of his science and the rules of procedure central to it; but he must at the same time interpret human interaction patterns in terms of their subjective meaning structure. The question is, then, how is it possible to grasp subjective meaning scientifically? Or, stated another way, how is it possible to grasp by a system of objective knowledge subjective meaning structures? This is where Schutz criticizes logical positivism:

> All forms of naturalism and logical empiricism simply take for granted this social reality, which is the proper object of the social sciences. Inter-subjectivity, interaction, intercommunication, and language are simply presupposed as the unclarified foundation of these theories. They assume, as it were, that the social scientist has already solved his fundamental problem, before scientific inquiry starts.[79]

But he is not rejecting the methodology of logical positivism:

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[78] Ibid., p. 29.

[79] Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," in Maurice Natanson, ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 236.

> I agree . . . that all empirical knowledge involves discovery through processes of controlled inference, and that it must be statable in propositional form and capable of being verified by anyone who is prepared to make the effort to do so through observation . . . that 'theory' means in all empirical sciences the explicit formulation of determinate relations between a set of variables in term of which a fairly extensive class of empirically ascertainable regularities can be explained.[80]

Schutz is in effect synthesizing what have long been thought to be two contradicting orientations in social science. However, the scientist cannot be arbitrary in his creation of constructs. They must comply with several postulates; the most important being the postulate of logical consistency and the postulate of adequacy. Compliance with the postulate of logical consistency warrants the objective validity of the thought objects created by the social scientist; and compliance with the postulate of adequacy warrants their compatability with the constructs of everyday life.[81]

An important part of Schutz's sociology of knowledge is the emphasis which he places on language. When phenomenological philosophers such as Husserl speak of a transcendental structure which orders experience, Schutz instead substitutes language, which is a more empirical referent, as the focal point of the method of phenomenological reduction. In addition, his theoretical work is both philosophic and sociological. In the next section we

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[80] Ibid., p. 235.

[81] Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," pp. 246-248.

shall see how an American sociologist has adapted and modified the approach of Schutz in his own sociology of knowledge.

Peter Berger

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality clearly falls within phenomenological sociology, yet at the same time they have made substantive contributions which go beyond Schutz; namely by synthesizing his ideas with those of Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and George Herbert Mead.[82] Their definition of the sociology of knowledge is as follows:

> . . . [it] must concern itself with whatever passes for 'knowledge' in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such 'knowledge'. And insofar as all human 'knowledge' is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this done in such a way that a 'taken-for-granted reality' congeals for a man in the street. In other words, we contend that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality.[83]

They are not, therefore, concerned with epistemological questions on a theoretical level, nor with the theoretical perspectives of intellectuals, but with the social construction of reality on an everyday level in an empirical fashion. Their indebtedness to Schutz is obvious; in fact, the first chapter of their book, "The

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[82] Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. This book has overshadowed a similar approach by Charles Madge, Society in the Mind: Elements of the Social Eidos (New York: Free Press, 1961).

[83] Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 3.

Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life," is entirely a restatement of Schutz's work.

Very briefly, their view of the nature of social reality is based on Durkheim's sociology of religion; their dialectical perspective from Marx; the emphasis on the construction of social reality through subjective meanings from Weber; and the work on the internalization of social reality from Mead.

In an earlier article co-authored by Stanley Pullberg, Berger presents us with two conceptions of sociological theory. One sees society as a "network of human meanings." The second, on the other hand, presents us with a view of "society conceived of as a thing-like facticity, standing over against its individual members and moulding them in its socializing process."[84] These are, respectively, the sociologies of Weber and Durkheim. The problem thus stated is how do these subjectively intended meanings become objective facticities? The solution is that men are producing society and are in turn produced by it--here they borrow from Marx the understanding of society as a dialectical process. The point of convergence, in turn, between the phenomenological and Marxian traditions is to be found in the Marxian concept of reification; the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things. This, by definition, is a dehumanized world since man has lost sight of the fact that he is author of his world. The meaning of this term becomes clear if we understand the process

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[84]Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," History and Theory, IV (1965), pp. 196-211.

by which it occurs. The first important term is that of objectivation, the process whereby human subjectivity embodies in products elements of a common world; man is a world-producing being. Objectification is the moment in the process of objectivation in which man establishes a distance from his producing and its product in order that he may take cognizance of it and make of it an object of his consciousness. By alienation is meant the process by which the unity of the producing being and the product is broken down. Finally, by reification is meant the moment in the process of alienation in which the characteristic of thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality: reification is objectification in an alienated mode.[85]

Language is the most fundamental objectivation of all, in that it is experienced by the individual as an external facticity--things are what they are named.[86] These are common assumptions of the social psychological approach of George Herbert Mead. But reification operates in society most often by bestowing ontological status on social roles and institutions. According to Berger religious, social, and "scientific" theories are used to legitimate and mystify the dehumanization that has occurred. All this entails a critique of consciousness, of which, according to Berger and Pullberg, there are three levels: pre-reflective presence to the world; reflective awareness of the world and one's

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[85] Ibid., pp. 199-200.

[86] Ibid., p. 203.

presence to it; and, finally, out of the second level may arise various theoretical formulations of the situation.[87] Bodies of knowledge legitimate the institutional sector of society in the sense of their being symbolic universes, or "bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality."[88] In addition there are various "conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance": mythology, theology, philosophy and science. Ivan H. Light has pointed out that this is nothing more than a restatement of the Comtean sequence.[89]

Given the necessity for socialization of the individual in society, Berger believes that identity is also a problem for the sociology of knowledge.[90] However, his most important conclusion

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[87] Ibid., p. 204.

[88] Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 95. This is very similar to Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills in their Character and Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 274-305.

[89] Ivan H. Light, "The Social Construction of Uncertainty," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, (1969), p. 193.

[90] Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 173-183; also Peter Berger, "Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge," European Journal of Sociology, 7 (1968), pp. 581-587. For more detailed analyses of contributions of social psychologists to the sociology of knowledge, the reader is referred to the following articles: John C. McKinney, "The Contribution of George Herbert Mead to the Sociology of Knowledge," Social Forces, 34 (1955), pp. 144-149; Charles Horton Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (July, 1926), pp. 59-79 (Cooley speaks of a "mental-social complex"); Harvey A. Farberman, "Mannheim, Cooley, and Mead: Toward a Social Theory of Mentality," Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Winter, 1970), pp. 3-13.

is that "the sociology of knowledge presupposes a sociology of language, and . . . a sociology of knowledge without a sociology of religion is impossible (and vice versa)."[91] Light thinks that the imagery used by Berger and Luckmann is religiously inspired, deriving from an "existential terror," and proposes instead a sociology of uncertainty based more on Marx, in which it is recognized that there is creative potential in disorder, unrest, and mass uncertainty.[92] In addition Friedrichs has noted that where Husserl and Schutz's paradigmatic stature is essentially a priestly one, Berger's stands clearly in the prophetic mode in that his sociology is based on and motivated by the paramount claim of transcendence of the reified world in which modern man finds himself.[93] Despite these criticisms, Berger's sociology of knowledge is the newest approach to the sociology of knowledge in the last decade.

Part D: Sociology of Science Approach

It is not unusual for the sociology of science to be conceptualized as a special case of the sociology of knowledge.

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[91]Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 186. See also Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, "The Sociology of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge," Sociology and Social Research, 47 (July, 1963), pp. 417-427. The problem of language in a sociology of knowledge will be found in Chapter III of this thesis.

[92]Ivan H. Light, "The Social Construction of Uncertainty," p. 198.

[93]Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology, pp. 309-313.

However, it has been emerging as a distinct area of inquiry. According to A. R. Hall and N. W. Storer, the sociology of science separated from the sociology of knowledge after the 1938 publication of Robert Merton's Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England.[94] In this book Merton attempted to show the connection between the development of seventeenth-century English science with a series of social and cultural factors; in particular Puritan religious ideas and practices. However, notes Bernard Barber:

> . . . no primary causative significance was attributed to these ideas and practices. They were shown to be influential for the development of science in interaction with economic needs, cultural values, the changing social organization of science, population growth, and changing military and naval techniques.[95]

After this book Merton turned his attention to the internal social organization of science rather than with its relationship to the rest of society. This dualism still exists in the sociology of science, however, and we can distinguish two approaches to the subdiscipline. For example, both Gerald DeGre and Bernard Barber, two major contributors to the field, view the sociology of science both as a special case of the sociology of knowledge and as the

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[94] A. R. Hall, "Merton Revisited," History of Science, 2 (1963), pp. 1-16; N. W. Storer, The Social System of Science (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 6.

[95] Bernard Barber, "Sociology of Knowledge and Science, 1945-55," in Sociology in the United States of America, ed. by Hans Zetterburg (UNESCO: 1956), p. 68.

study of science as a social organization or institution.[96]

DeGre defines the sociology of science as follows:

> A sociology of science studies the functional interdependence of the sciences with the other aspects of man's larger culture, and at the same time the internal structure and dynamics of science as a tertiary institution, including its norms, organization, personnel, and status within society.[97]

Similarily, in Science and the Social Order, Bernard Barber studies the social organization of science but adds in a later article that "the ambiguity about the nature of the relations between science and society remains one of the central problems in the sociology of science."[98] Drawing on Talcott Parsons' discussion of the generalized function of idea-systems in social systems,[99] Barber now views science as an idea-system about empirical phenomena which is a relatively independent variable in interaction with a series of other relatively independent social and personality variables; including ideologies, value-systems, economic systems, etc.[100]

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[96]Gerald DeGre, Science as a Social Institution (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955); Bernard Barber, Science and the Social Order (New York: Collier Books, 1952).

[97]DeGre, Science as a Social Institution, p. 3.

[98]Bernard Barber, "Sociology of Science, A Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology, 5 (1956), p. 93.

[99]Talcott Parsons, "The Institutionalization of Scientific Investigation," in The Social System, pp. 326-348. Although Parsons is a major figure in the conceptual development of the sociology of science, he is passed over lightly here as his work was examined in Chapter III of this thesis.

[100]Barber, "Sociology of Science, A Trend Report and Bibliography," p. 93.

More recently N. W. Storer in his The Social System of Science reflects the influence of Talcott Parsons; however, the book is mostly oriented to a discussion of the norms of science which were originally formulated by Merton: universalism, organized skepticism, communalism, and disinteredness.[101] It is interesting to interject here, that although not referring to the sociology of science, Thelma Z. Lavine arrived at a similar definition of the sociology of knowledge:

> The sociology of knowledge is concerned to subject to socio-historic analysis the several types of norms which are operative in the construction of objectively valid knowledge; the regulative, or directional norm, which establishes basic categorial distinctions; the validity-norm, which legislates the criteria of concrete types of phenomena and the requirements involved in their verification; the procedural norm, which establishes for certain modes of inquiry general methods of identification, measurement, corroboration, etc.; the presentational norm, which provides for the apprehension as a meaningful structure of that which is experienced; the objectivity-norm, which legislates for all the special sciences the general principles of the precise discrimination of the object of interest.[102]

One additional book stands as a landmark in the development of the sociology of science. This is Florian Znaniecki's The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge, which studies the composition and social structure of the various types of scientists' social roles. These roles are the technological advisers, sages, scholars, and creators of knowledge (explorers). Znaniecki

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[101] Storer, The Social System of Science, chapters five and six; Robert K. Merton, "Science and the Social Order" and "Science and Democratic Social Structure," in Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 591-615.

[102] Thelma Z. Lavine, "Sociological Analysis of Cognitive Norms," The Journal of Philosophy, 34 (1942), p. 349.

sees four interacting components of the social system in which the man of knowledge operates: the social circle, the actor's self, the actor's social status, and the actor's social functions.[103]

It appears then that the sociology of science is successfully breaking away from the sociology of knowledge, and strictly speaking, is not now a true part of the latter. The separation, however, is not complete. In fact, a resurgence of a sociology of science in the old sociology of knowledge vein is evident, beginning in 1962 with the publication of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.[104] Though speaking largely of the natural and physical sciences, Kuhn's insights have been taken to apply to the social sciences as well. Essentially he sees the development of science as a political process and not as an independent institution in the sense that, in sociology, Talcott Parsons would view it. Kuhn distinguishes between "normal science," in which a paradigmatic base consolidates the members of the discipline into a structure so that cumulative research can take place. However, these professionals become so integrated into the paradigm that with social and political changes inconsistencies arise which they cannot explain. New initiates to the discipline are more likely to be aware of these changes and begin to break away from the cumulative routine of "normal science"--this is a period of

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[103]Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).

[104]Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

"extraordinary science." A new alternative paradigm is created, and after much conflict a "revolution" takes place when this new paradigm takes the place of the old one.

Taking Kuhn's thesis, Robert W. Friedrichs has most thoroughly delved into a new subdiscipline, the sociology of sociology--which he considers an outgrowth of the sociology of knowledge and sociology of science.[105] Friedrichs explores the functionalist and systems paradigm as "normal sociology" and examines in detail the gradual shift to a search for new paradigms--Marxian conflict theory and phenomenological sociology being the two primary examples of "revolutionary sociology." These, in order, are the "priestly" and "prophetic" modes of sociology. Friedrichs links these developments to social and political changes within American society.

A more in-depth, substantive study which fits very well into the framework Kuhn and Friedrichs propose is Alvin Gouldner's The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology.[106] Gouldner describes two approaches to explanation in sociology--Academic Sociology, or, more specifically, Parsonian sociology; and Marxism. He

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[105]Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology. Recently two readers have appeared which may be of aid to the reader. These are (1) Larry T. Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds, The Sociology of Sociology (New York: David McKay, 1970); and (2) Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., The Phenomenon of Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971). The subdivisions of the latter book are instructive: "Sociology and its Social Settings," "Sociology: Values and Ideology," and "Internal Structures of Sociology"; respectively, the history of social thought, the study of ideology, and the sociology of science applied to sociology.

[106]Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

specifically states that the book is a study in the sociology of sociology,[107] although it lacks the conceptual development of Friedrichs' book. Rather, it seems as if it is a history of contemporary social thought. Some of Gouldner's more original contributions might be his concepts of background and domain assumptions. The former are in effect general orientations which may make a theory appear intuitively convincing to the viewer;[108] domain assumptions are more specific. For example they may be "dispositions to believe that men are rational or irrational, that society is precarious or fundamentally stable."[109] In other words social scientists hold a subtheoretical set of beliefs which is fused into his work. To Gouldner this is the "infrastructure" of theory and is its ultimate determinant.[110] As he states:

> If every theory is thus a tacit theory of politics, every theory is also a personal theory, inevitably expressing, coping, and infused with the personal experiences of the individuals who author it.[111]

To Gouldner every theory in effect ideologizes social reality. Essentially he is returning to the orthodox Marxian and Mannheimian tradition of the sociology of knowledge perspective by pointing

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[107] Ibid., p. 25.

[108] Ibid., p. 30. This is little different from Merton's description of general sociological orientations, "The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research," in Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 141-143.

[109] Ibid., p. 31.

[110] Ibid., p. 46.

[111] Ibid., p. 40.

out how every theory is an ideological masking over or an expression of the class structure of society. This is "orthodox" because, as we have seen, both Marx and Mannheim did attempt to avoid this "debunking" tendency in favor of scientific analysis. Nowhere does Gouldner offer us a definition of what a "theory" might be, for this we must evidently wait.

In Chapter IV an alternative approach to this argumentum ad hominen view of sociological theory and knowledge will be outlined which avoids Gouldner's anachronistic ideologizing. In the next section, the few existing empirical studies in the sociology of knowledge are reviewed which may help in such a task.

Part E: Contemporary Empirical Studies

In this section three empirical-theoretical studies are reviewed, those of Wolff, Merton, and Horowitz. Judith Willer's study is excluded here as it is used in detail in Chapter IV. Two empirical-descriptive articles, in the sense of their having precise hypotheses which are tested, are also looked at; these are authored by Adler and Wanderer. Many articles have been written on mass communications, political ideologies, community power, etc., under the auspices of the sociology of knowledge, but these are excluded by definition from being part of the sociology of knowledge in this thesis. This leaves only a paucity of studies which can even be remotely called empirical. It must be kept in mind that the sociology of knowledge has not been defined

in this thesis as merely the social determination of ideas. Many empirical studies, considered by their authors to be within the sociology of knowledge, have attempted to show a correspondence between ideologies with social structure. In this respect, we look at one such effort which is representative of this older approach which provides at least some minute justification for rejecting the traditional definition of the sociology of knowledge. The article in mind is Gwynne Nettler's "A Test for the Sociology of Knowledge."[112]

Nettler analyzed public opinion data to find if political attitudes were determined by membership in certain occupations. The persons questioned were all professionals with established reputations in their fields. Nettler concluded that "there is no simple position that conditions all knowledge."[113] It was found instead that the relationship between social position and knowledge was a function of the criterion of social position used, the type of knowledge measured, and the time at which the relationship is measured. This study was at best misnamed, for it tells us only that certain professionals may or may not hold a particular political opinion at any given time. This article foreshadowed the reduction of the sociology of knowledge to mass communications research and political sociology.

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[112]Gwynne Nettler, "A Test for the Sociology of Knowledge," American Sociological Review, 10 (1945), pp. 393-399.

[113]Ibid., p. 399.

Insofar as the author can determine, only two articles may properly be called empirical-descriptive research in the sociology of knowledge. In the earliest of the two, Franz Adler relates types of epistemological thinking to social and cultural change, individual freedom of action, and general security.[114] Four types of epistemological thinking were used--universalism, nominalism, organismic (or intuitional), and dialectical. An attempt was made to measure the degree to which the thought of any given thinker--in this case a panel of philosophers and sociologists--corresponded to each of the four types of epistemological thinking. An initial finding indicated no discernible relationship between the chosen characteristics of historical periods and organismic-intuitional and dialectical thinking. Secondly, scatter diagrams showed that the use of types of thought as <u>independent</u> variables led to better fitted curves than the use of characteristics of historical periods. This suggests that the definition of the sociology of knowledge as the social determination of thought is not entirely accurate. The main findings are summed below:

> (1) Speed of change is inversely related to universalist thought content. A slight positive relationship exists between nominalism and speed of change.
> (2) Increased speed of change is negatively related to universalism, but positively related to nominalism.
> (3) Universalism and increased security are positively related; universalism and decreased security negatively related.

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[114] Franz Adler, "A Quantitative Study in the Sociology of Knowledge," <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 19 (February, 1954), pp. 42-48.

Relationships between nominalism and the other variables were primarily curvilinear.

Adler's article is important for its empirical precision and for the fact that the correlations found did not predict any clear causal direction of the influence of change on epistemological thinking, or vice versa.

Jules J. Wanderer makes a departure from traditional sociology of knowledge in the second empirical-descriptive study.[115] Instead of focusing on substantive properties of a mode of thought and then relating it to a social base, he analyzes intellectual systems for underlying structural dimensions. Using Guttman scale analysis Wanderer uncovers a common structural property in the thought of Spinoza and Euclid, two thinkers separated by centuries and distinguished by their work in diverse subject matters. In Wanderer's words:

> If a common underlying dimension can be empirically ascertained among intellectual systems with content as different as Spinoza's and Euclid's, and if these intellectual systems can be said to be representative of a tradition of thought, i.e., Western thought, then one might include the constituent structural properties of the traditions that issued them.[116]

Wanderer found that both Spinoza and Euclid "present unidimensional and cumulative arguments in the demonstration of their propositional systems."[117] It was discovered that the structural

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[115] Jules J. Wanderer, "An Empirical Study in the Sociology of Knowledge," Sociological Inquiry, 39 (Winter, 1969), pp. 19-26.

[116] Ibid., p. 20.

[117] Ibid., p. 25.

element of Western rationality underlaid the intellectual work of both thinkers: both employed lineal demonstrations of proof. Wanderer suggests that these structural components of thought could be examined in light of their social origins as traditional comparative sociology of knowledge has done. For this thesis, the important thing is that Wanderer has demonstrated how thought itself may be structured; this is utilized in the author's definition of the sociology of knowledge.

The first of the empirical-theoretical articles is by Kurt Wolff.[118] Wolff believes that the sociology of knowledge has anachronistically limited its subject matter to ideologies, theories, and ideas. To him the sociology of knowledge is concerned with two main elements: communicated mental events, and the relations existing between these events and social units. A "mental event" is a general term referring to all emotional-intellectual processes, ranging from intuitive feelings to the creation of philosophical systems. Wolff says:

> If . . . the sociology of knowledge limits its investigations to manifestations of knowledge--as the mental presence of contents of the consciousness, or as contents of the consciousness to which the qualification of "I know" can be attached--it excludes, from the beginning, thinking and feeling.[119]

As Wanderer did, Wolff is attempting to make the sociology of knowledge something more than just the content and substance of knowledge; they are going further into consciousness itself.

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[118] Kurt H. Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge: Emphasis on an Empirical Attitude," Philosophy of Science, 10 (1943), pp. 104-123.

[119] Ibid., p. 108.

According to Wolff, the method of the sociology of knowledge is that of understanding; the most important concept pertaining to this methodology is the "central attitude," or that attitude "which through our continuous efforts in the process of understanding a given communicated mental event reveals itself as one which renders understandable all single attitudes."[120] Wolff refines this concept by referring to "typical central attitudes," formed by reducing an empirically traceable attitude to a defined type. These typical attitudes are autonomous in so far as they are understood according to their own structure.[121] Furthermore, there are theoretical attitudes which are oriented toward the solution of a mental task; the most distinguishable of these are the magical, religious, artistic, philosophical, and scientific. This is similar to theoretical model in Chapter IV of this thesis.

The second major empirical-theoretical study is Merton's paradigm for the sociology of knowledge.[122] This is substantially a structural-functional approach concerned with the existential basis of mental productions. The most original part of his paradigm is on the ambiguity of terms used to designate the relations between the social base and mental productions:

> a. causal or functional relations: determination, cause, correspondence, necessary condition, conditioning,

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[120] Ibid., p. 112.

[121] Ibid., p. 115.

[122] Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 510-542.

> functional interdependence, interaction, dependence, etc.
> b. symbolic or organismic or meaningful relations: consistency, harmony, coherence, unity, congruence, compatibility, (and antonyms); expression, realization, symbolic expression, Strukturzussamenhang, structural identities, inner connection, stylistic analogies, logico-meaningful integration, identity of meanings, etc.[123]

This is perhaps the core problem in the sociology of knowledge, and the basis of distinctions between various approaches to its study. It is largely a question of methodology, which will be looked at in Chapter III of this thesis. Interestingly enough, Merton does not mention dialectical relationships in his paradigm.

The final empirical-theoretical study by Irving Louis Horowitz is in fact concerned with the basic elements of ideological systems, related to mass communications and public opinion. However, there are important innovations made in that (1) Horowitz suggests that a logical indexing of basic variables in the study of ideas as a cluster type be carried out; and (2) he links the Parsonian pattern-variables to the study of constellations of thought; albeit in this case political ideological systems. The author agrees with Horowitz's conclusion that we must:

> . . . explain what the sociology of knowledge can perform operationally; namely, the production of empirical studies in the sociology of knowledge based on some firm logical distinctions and minus the awkward baggage of obscure phraseology and inherited metaphysical credos that identify logical truths with historical events. The history of the sociology of knowledge has

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[123] Ibid., p. 515.

been a progressive emancipation from its metaphysical inheritance.[124]

Summary and Conclusions

In this rather lengthy review of the literature, the ideas in a number of divergent approaches to the sociology of knowledge have been described. The differences in these approaches is quite apparent, but rather than focusing on this aspect an attempt will be made instead to isolate some common themes which will help in arriving at some basic conceptual components of the sociology of knowledge and its fundamental problems. With this accomplished, it will be easier to criticize existing definitions conceptualizing the field and to offer a definition which might be more precise.

(A) A central premise of this thesis is that the study of ideology is not properly the study of knowledge; more often than not this leads to a "debunking" of social theory of the type we have seen of Alvin Gouldner, and perhaps in the polemical writings of Marx. Horowitz placed the study of ideology within the realm of the sociology of knowledge but did so on an empirical basis. Of the three structuralists, Durkheim avoided mention of ideologies altogether. Mannheim tried to escape a simple theory of ideology with his conception of Aspekstrukur, but became so overwhelmed in his epistemological questions as to lose logical coherence. He did try to escape the bounds of ideological thinking by speaking of the role of a free-floating intelligentsia, but

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[124]Irving Louis Horowitz, "A Formalization of the Sociology of Knowledge," Behaviorial Science, 9 (January, 1964), pp. 45-56.

this actually violated his basic premises and he never transcended the dilemmas he created. Parsons was concerned with ideologies, but only to the extent that they conflict with empirical conceptions of social systems. Sorokin did not use the concept of ideology, although his cultural mentality types present us with an analogous problem on a broader basis; to this he sought a solution in his integralist conception of truth. Of the phenomenologists, the sociology of knowledge of Schutz had no mention of ideology, and Berger came closest when he spoke of symbolic universes; although these were not depicted as completely controlling perspectives. Stark was quite explicit in rejecting the study of ideologies as being within the bounds of the sociology of knowledge; and Scheler wrote only of propensities to class prejudices; knowledge, on the other hand, was the objective perception of reality. Due to our definition, no empirical-descriptive studies were concerned with ideologies.

(B) The sociology of knowledge, like many other subdisciplines, can be examined on the micro- and macro-sociological planes; the former more involved with thought systems as such; the latter with their place in the larger context of society. This thesis falls more under the micro-sociology of knowledge. These distinctions were made only by Werner Stark and Pitirim A. Sorokin.

(C) In this review of the sociology of knowledge, the dialectical nature of many relationships is apparent. This occurs on several levels: (1) the dialectical relationship

between social determinism and free will of men (which influences their thought structures); and (2) the dialectical relationship between ideas as superstructural phenomena and the empirical, or material substratum of society. The first was central to the thought of Marx, although to him as well as to Durkheim, social relationships and social consciousness mediated this dialectic on both levels. However, both Durkheim and Mannheim were more deterministic in their explanation of the structural influences on thought. Parsons and Sorokin tended to be deterministic on the opposite end of the spectrum, that which is commonly termed the ideational or superstructural level. Scheler tried to transcend this problem by postulating a dualistic metaphysics and with his discussion of the "positive factor of realization." His work did not reach the sophistication of Marx however. Stark saw a reciprocal relationship working between the substructure and superstructure, and defined social determination in terms of a dialectical process of social interaction. A rudimentary dialectic is working in Schutz's distinction between "in-order-to" and "because motives"; phenomenology in general though is an active theory of knowledge and the problem does not loom so large. Peter Berger was definite in his adoption of Marxian dialectics. Finally, it is to be recalled that Franz Adler simply views dialectic thinking as one of four types of epistemological thinking.

(D) The problem of the relations between ideas and social context has been the central dividing dimension among the theorists

in the sociology of knowledge. Only Merton treated this problem systematically; on the basis of this thesis, however, the author believes the relationship to be dialectical. This is an option which Merton did not even mention.

(E) Logically following this emphasis on dialectical thinking, we can see the attempt of many of these thinkers to synthesize rationalism and empiricism in their work; or, with Schutz, logical positivism with subjectivism. With Marx, the synthesis of rationalism and empiricism is evident in his empirical-dialectical methodology. Durkheim believed his conception of collective representations to be a solution to the two opposing systems of knowledge of Kantian a priorism and classical empiricism. Karl Mannheim began to establish himself as an empiricist and in his struggle to find a criterion by which to distinguish values approached a solution to the problem. Mannheim arrived at a somewhat shaky synthesis of historicism and positivism. In his integralist conception of truth, Sorokin believed he had brought together empiricism and rationalism. Parsons clings to his belief that empirical-rational knowledge is an independent aspect of all cultural systems. In his dualistic metaphysics Scheler thought he had synthesized idealism and materialism. Stark and Schutz avoided this problem altogether by conceptualizing it on a different level; i.e., the level of subjective versus objective conceptions of reality. Peter Berger purposefully kept away from such epistemological questions.

(F) Of the phenomenologists, Schutz and Stark, and to some extent Scheler, used a methodology of phenomenological reductionism which has immense possibilities in social science, especially if wedded to the dialectic method. Scheler's phenomenology is essentially religiously motivated ("the cognitive act as insight into eternal essences"), as is Stark's to the point where he is searching for an ultimate philosophical-religious truth or absolute. However, there is an objective element in Stark's methodology--the search for the common factor in the relative; which strictly speaking is analogous to an empirical-dialectical methodology. Schutz develops the method most explicitly in his various postulates which the social scientist must observe in the creation of constructs and in the social scientist's treatment of a subject under study as a "homunculus."

(G) Within the writings of almost all of the thinkers reviewed, there is a move away from a radical relativism that has been traditionally ascribed to the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim and Sorokin are perhaps the most bound to this hermenuetic circle; although both try to avoid this, their solutions have been severely criticized.

(H) The importance of language to a sociology of knowledge is evident in the work of Marx, Schutz, and Berger. This will be taken up again in Chapter III.

(I) The sociology of science and the sociology of sociology are treated as independent disciplines; where they

overlap into traditional sociology of knowledge this is usually in the structural or cultural approach.

(J) The question of consciousness itself as object of study in the sociology of knowledge is rooted in the work of Marx; and to a limited degree with Durkheim; and very much so in the work of Schutz, Berger, and Wolff. Other thinkers took ideas in some form as datum; Sorokin could not free his mentality types from culture and Scheler placed ideas in a supratemporal Platonic realm; Stark conceived of an axiological layer of the mind (which is consciousness). This is examined in greater detail for each of the contributors as it is a necessary prelude to a definition of the sociology of knowledge:

> MARX: Consciousness is essentially a social product created, however, in a dialectic between individual and society which is often associated with a certain mode of production in society. Because of his empiricism, Marx could explicate a conception of false consciousness which in more general terms characterized the process of reification; here general consciousness exists as an abstraction over the individual, obfuscating the true, living, communal consciousness.
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> DURKHEIM: States of consciousness are categorically structured in the human mind from participation in the collective conscience. Our basic conceptions of space and time are conditioned by our social and religious affairs. Once established, these categorical thought patterns establish an autonomy of their own; as for example, with scientific classificatory thought.
>
> MANNHEIM: Our thinking is inherently ideological, but after reconsideration, a noological plane of thought does exist.
>
> SOROKIN: Mental life is inexorably tied in with cultural systems of truth and reality, as are our basic conceptions of causality, space, and time.
>
> PARSONS: Ideas are considered in terms of their substantive content, which is culturally defined.

SCHELER: Forms of consciousness have a certain propensity to be determined by social class; but the individual can theoretically escape this. Through elimination of prejudices the individual can, in his cognitive life, participate in the realm of eternal truth.

STARK: Human consciousness is essentially social, and is always related to values. There is an axiological layer of the mind which can determine what is to be selected from the materials of knowledge for inclusion in the objects of knowledge.

SCHUTZ: Through phenomenological reduction, pure states of consciousness can be assumed. However, consciousness is always intending something and thus the individual exists in a system of relevances which is the sedimentation of his previous subjective experiences.

BERGER: There are three levels of consciousness: pre-reflective, reflective, and theoretical.

ADLER: There are basic types of epistemological thinking to be found in men: universalism, nominalism, intuitionism, dialectic.

WANDERER: Underlying structural dimensions of thought can be distinguished from substantive properties of a mode of thought.

WOLFF: Mental events are emotional-intellectual processes; contents of consciousness are only external manifestations.

HOROWITZ: Cluster types of ideas can be found; constellations of thought.

(K) Finally, with reference to the bearing of the sociology of knowledge on sociological theory, only Schutz and Gouldner make specific connections in any detail.

This completes the summary of the review of literature. Many of the themes and concepts are to be integrated in the following two chapters of the thesis. The information provided in Chapter II is summarized in Table 1 on the next four pages.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF CONCEPTS AND THEMES IN CHAPTER II

Themes or Concepts	"Theorists"														
	Marx	Durkheim	Mannheim	Sorokin	Parsons	Scheler	Stark	Schutz	Berger	Gouldner	Adler	Wanderer	Wolff	Merton	Horowitz
Ideology as datum for sociology of knowledge	X		X		X					X				X	X
"Debunking" position with regard to social theory	X		X	X						X					
Epistemological relativism[a]			X	X						X					
Class basis of ideology	X		X			X				X					
Knowledge[b]		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Micro- / macro- sociology of knowledge distinction				X			X								
Paradigmatic models														X	X
Culture mentality types				X											

TABLE 1--Continued

Themes or Concepts	"Theorists"														
	Marx	Durkheim	Mannheim	Sorokin	Parsons	Scheler	Stark	Schutz	Berger	Gouldner	Adler	Wanderer	Wolff	Merton	Horowitz
Emphasis on social determinism[c]	X	X	X							X				X	
Dialectical synthesis of social determinism and free will	X														
Dialectical relation between ideas and social context	X					X	X	X	X					X	
Dualistic metaphysics						X	X		X						
Phenomenological reduction						X	X	X							
Synthesis of rationalism and empiricism	X	X	X	X	X	X									
Synthesis of logical positivism and subjectivism								X							
Idealistic-emanationist theory				X	X										

TABLE 1--Continued

Themes or Concepts	"Theorists"														
	Marx	Durkheim	Mannheim	Sorokin	Parsons	Scheler	Stark	Schutz	Berger	Gouldner	Adler	Wanderer	Wolff	Merton	Horowitz
Provision for absolute conception of truth (other than empiricism)				X		X	X								
Subjectivist orientation	X					X	X	X							
Axiological layer of the mind							X								
Language and social reality	X							X	X						
Symbolic universe									X						
Reification	X								X						
Religious basis of the sociology of knowledge		X				X	X		X						
Consciousness--social	X	X		X		X	X	X	X						
"Pure" consciousness or thought structures allowed						X	X	X	X		X	X	X		
System of relevance-structures								X	X						

TABLE 1--Continued

Themes or Concepts	"Theorists"														
	Marx	Durkheim	Mannheim	Sorokin	Parsons	Scheler	Stark	Schutz	Berger	Gouldner	Adler	Wanderer	Wolff	Merton	Horowitz
Categorical structure of the mind		X		X		X					X	X			X
Common-sense knowledge								X	X						
Intellectual-theoretical systems				X	X				X	X		X	X	X	X
Substructure / superstructure distinction	X	X	X						X	X				X	
Mathematics given autonomy from social context	X		X												
Methodology offered for sociology of knowledge			X	X				X				X	X	X	X

[a]By epistemological relativism we are narrowly referring to the inability to establish a criterion for truth when this doctrine is carried to its radical conclusions.

[b]By knowledge is meant here only nonideological perception of social reality.

[c]This is a matter of ultimate emphasis; Marx, for instance, is also classified in the next category, "Dialectical synthesis of social determinism and free will."

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

In this chapter, building on the conclusions reached in the preceding chapter, the author in the first part of this chapter criticizes past conceptualizations of the sociology of knowledge by focusing on the problem of the relationship between concepts offered in definitions. The notion of isomorphism of knowledge with either social structure or cultural values is rejected. In conjuncture with this, the importance of language as a mediating phenomenon in a definition of the sociology of knowledge is stressed. Following this, the relationship between the sociology of knowledge, epistemology and philosophy in general, the philosophy of science, and the study of ideology is discussed.

The second part of the chapter distinguishes between the sociological theory of knowledge and the classical theory of knowledge. After classifying past definitions of the sociology of knowledge as being passive, the consequence of such a definition, which is a paralyzing relativism manifested in the dual problem of objectivity and imputation, is examined. Intrinsic and extrinsic approaches to the sociology of knowledge are distinguished. Finally the author offers a definition of the sociology of knowledge

and explains the terms which comprise it. The chapter concludes with a suggestion of what the importance of the sociology of knowledge for sociological theory might be.

For the purpose of criticism, three of the most frequently cited definitions of the sociology of knowledge by reviewers of the field are stated:

> (A) The sociology of knowledge deals with the socio-cultural determinants of thinking. There are two approaches. The first regards thought as relative, i.e., the validity of ideas is restricted to particular groups, cultures, and historical epochs. It also implies an epiphenomenolism, for thought is merely the expression of, or an accompaniment to, an underlying reality. Not only the manner of cognition and understanding but also the categories of thought are a function of an independent variable, some social or cultural factor. This approach is an extreme extrinsic interpretation. The second or "substantive" approach does not raise the question of validity nor consider thought as merely epiphenomenal. It does try to show a functional relationship between a socio-cultural context and the theoretical problems formulated and developed.[125]

> (B) . . . whatever the conception of knowledge, the orientation of this discipline remains largely the same: it is primarily concerned with the relations between knowledge and other existential factors in the society or culture.[126]

> (C) The point of view characteristic of the sociology of knowledge is the consideration of the mental productions insofar as they are influenced by social factors . . . again the term "influence" must be taken in a very broad sense. It connotes all the degrees of conditioning which can exist between two variables from simple correspondence up to the most mechanical determinism. . . . The sociology of knowledge, a positive science, has as its ambition a precise description of the ways in which certain

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[125] Otto H. Dahlke, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in H. E. Barnes and Howard Becker, eds., Contemporary Social Theory (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940), p. 65.

[126] Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," p. 510.

> social factors influence certain mental productions, and to do so follows a strict method of observation.[127]

In all three of these definitions, it is apparent that the crux of the problem of the sociology of knowledge is the relationship between mental factors and social factors. All three of these definitions have faults, however.

The first approach of which Dahlke writes (definition A) is synonymous with the term "structural" used in this thesis; that is, the sociology of knowledge characteristic of Durkheim and Mannheim and to a limited extent Marx. The second is similar to the approach termed "cultural." All these definitions tend to emphasize the social or cultural determination of ideas without perceiving the feedback of mental phenomena to social and cultural patterns. That is, few definitions take knowledge or ideas as independent variables, rather than the dependent (as a realm of thought autonomous from particular cultures), and investigate its social consequences rather than its social origins. To speak of an isomorphism of knowledge with either society or culture is a very static conception of the sociology of knowledge. On a micro-sociological level it is probable that the dialectic which Marx describes is that which best fits the relationship between individual systems of thought and society. The dialectic is not defined necessarily as a principle of contradiction, but, for lack of a better word, it refers to this process of complementarity and reciprocity; and in so doing supercedes the notion of causality

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[127]Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 4-5, 10.

which has been the root of the problems in defining the relationship between mental phenomena and social or cultural influences. On the macrosociological level, it is even more difficult to give a term to these relationships as the degree of complexity is increased. But here too the term dialectic is perhaps most appropriate. As Schneider suggests, until sociologists can better array and understand the clusters of meanings to which dialectic refers, it is useful to retain the term.[128] The dialectical relationship between mental phenomena and social and cultural phenomena on the macrosociological scale is the first premise of our definition of the sociology of knowledge.

A second important element of our definition of the sociology of knowledge centers around language. To the point: language provides a concrete referential phenomenon by which we may connect the primary elements of the sociology of knowledge. This, too, would be very static unless wedded to the notion of a dialectical process as described above. Thought which is meaningful is communicated or expressed by language or some other form of symbolism--this is the basic insight of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic interactionists in sociology. To Mead the mind is simply the presence in behavior of significant symbols; language is the medium through which individuals develop "minded" behavior. Significant symbols always imply a context within which they have significance, or a universe of discourse, a system of

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[128]Louis Schneider, "Dialectic in Sociology," American Sociological Review, 36 (August, 1971), p. 667.

common meanings.[129] These ideas can be tied in with the phenomenologists. For instance, Ernst Cassirer, a philosopher whose work has long been deemed relevant to social science, believed that:

> . . . consciousness takes some given content as signifying a universe of meaning beyond itself and of which the content is a symbolic representation. The various forms are the different structures of such meaning. Consciousness functions in accordance with these forms which are characteristic of itself. It is "form-giving" to whatever is "given" to it.[130]

In the review of the literature we have seen the importance of language to Marx, Schutz, and Berger. But as far back as 1848 Wilhelm von Humboldt ventured to say that "man lives with the world about him principally, indeed . . . exclusively, as language presents it."[131] And the famous Whorfian hypothesis claims that "the world is presented in a kaleidoscipic flux of impressions which has to be organized . . . largely by the linguistics systems in our minds."[132] Man's consciousness is filled with his experiences and his knowledge is experience which has particular meaning for him. In order to convey these meanings he uses language. As Hertzler says, "Thus the language-system and the

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[129] From John C. McKinney, "The Sociology of Knowledge of George Herbert Mead," pp. 146-149.

[130] Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, III (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 56-57.

[131] Quoted in Joshua Fishman, "A Systematication of the Whorfian Hypothesis," in Edward E. Sampson, ed., Social Psychology (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 28.

[132] B. L. Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," Technology Review, 44 (1940), pp. 229-231.

socio-culture texture and context of society or even a group of people cannot be separated. Each reflects the other; each is both cause and effect of the other. [emphasis added]"[133] The stress here is not on mass communications of the variant espoused by Merton and Wolff, but is rather structural linguistic analysis. This is not incongruent with the movement in philosophy of placing that discipline on a basis of linguistic analysis, such as in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.[134] Thus both a methodology and a conceptualization for the field of the sociology of knowledge is emerging here: dialectical structural linguistic analysis. This is inexorably tied in with a critique of consciousness. Before suggesting a more concrete definition of the sociology of knowledge, it is first necessary to distinguish it from some other areas of inquiry with which it has been confused.

Although the sociology of knowledge involves epistemological questions, it is not epistemology proper. The latter is a very general branch of philosophy concerned with the character of knowledge--in essence, epistemology is synonymous with the classical theory of knowledge described further in this chapter. For the moment, consider the rather adamant view of Virgil G. Hinshaw:

> . . . there is no epistemological branch of the sociology of knowledge. If there are consequences for the theory of knowledge, they should be investigated by the epistemologist, not by the sociologist, who is properly a behavior scientist.

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[133] Joyce O. Hertzler, "Toward a Sociology of Language," Social Forces, 32 (December, 1953), p. 112.

[134] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958).

> In other words, the sphere of competence of sociology of knowledge is that of a science, not of an epistemology.[135]

The author agrees with Hinshaw that there are separate spheres of competence of the sociologist and philosopher. But on the other hand there is no reason why the two cannot develop in conjuncture with one another; the contention being that the very nature of the sociology of knowledge demands such a union. Furthermore, modern philosophy since Kant, including Husserl and Wittgenstein, has sought to make philosophy a science; in this sociology and philosophy have an affinity to each other.

In traditional or classical theories of knowledge one usually looks at the relationship between the perceiving subject and the objective external world, showing how subjective consciousness structures a unified image of this mass of impressions. The sociology of knowledge simply makes the social world of man the empirical referent of his experiences. Thus the two views are inherently connected with one another. Contemporary sociologists tend to forget, with some exceptions,[136] that all sciences, including sociology, have philosophical foundations: scientific explanation is in a sense philosophic. Therefore, philosophical analysis can have a definite influence on the quality of scientific

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[135]Virgil G. Hinshaw, "Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, 15 (January, 1948), pp. 4-10.

[136]See H. J. Kienzle, "Epistemology and Sociology," British Journal of Sociology, 21 (December, 1970), pp. 413-424; and Dorothy Emmet and Alasdair Macintyre, eds., Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis (New York: MacMillan Company, 1970).

sociology. In addition the methods of both disciplines are beginning to overlap. Irving Horowitz, who sought to establish the sociology of knowledge on a scientific-empirical base, himself admits that "the ultimate aim of the sociology of knowledge corresponds to the historic quest of philosophy."[137] Of all the sociologists of knowledge, Berger and Pullberg were most explicit when they noted that while the critique of consciousness has been traditionally the province of philosophy and the empirical analysis of the social location of knowledge the province of sociology and other social sciences, a more comprehensive perspective unites the two views:

> . . . the sociology of knowledge is not an optional entertainment for either philosophy or sociology. Rather, the sociology of knowledge presents an essential meeting place for the sociologist and the philosopher as each is engaged in his own proper task, which is the illumination of the human world.[138]

This is the kind of integration of the disciplines of sociology and philosophy which the author has been seeking in this thesis.

Classically, the sociology of knowledge has restricted itself to, or at least been identified with, the study of ideology: defining it in such broad terms as to make all knowledge and thinking ideological. But looking at the following three definitions of ideology we can see that it does refer to a narrower phenomenon than knowledge:

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[137]Irving Louis Horowitz, "Science, Criticism, and the Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Review, 21 (1960), p. 185.

[138]Berger and Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," pp. 210-211.

> "Ideology" is a generic term applied to general ideas potent in specific situations of conduct: for example, not any ideas, only political ones; not any values, only those specifying a given set of preferences; not any beliefs, only those governing particular modes of thought.[139]

> Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers.[140]

> . . . ideology names the structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is one of commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberatively suggestive: by objectifying moral sentiment through the same devices that science shuns, it seeks to motivate action.[141]

Ideology is expressed in terms of evaluative, often pejorative language; it is not knowledge, but the distortion of knowledge which it seeks. Geertz conceives of two approaches to the study of ideology. Once the interest theory, based on social class, sees ideology as the rationalization of self-interest. The other, the strain theory, stresses the cathartic, morale, solidarity, and advocatory functions of ideology.[142] He attempts to synthesize these in a way which is directly analogous to what this thesis is doing at the level of the sociology of knowledge. Geertz sees a weakness in both approaches in that the link between cause of ideology and its effects is lost as the connecting element--the

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[139]David E. Apter, Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 17.

[140]Daniel Bell, in James P. Young, ed., The Politics of Affluence (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company), p. 201.

[141]Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Apter, Ideology and Discontent, p. 71.

[142]Ibid., pp. 32-34.

autonomous process of symbol formulation--is often passed over in silence.[143]

The "end of ideology" debate sparked by Bell in 1960 meant primarily the end of commitments to political ideologies.[144] To some degree this has been replaced with an emphasis on occupational ideologies.[145] Regardless of whether ideology is defined in terms of political commitments or occupational outlooks, it is not a problem of the sociology of knowledge. It is better to reserve the study of ideologies to political scientists and political sociologists; or to students of collective behavior, social movements, or occupations. Knowledge in this thesis is taken to be the subjective apperception of objective reality, which assumes that nonideological statements are possible.[146]

In addition, the conception of the sociology of knowledge as the social distribution of knowledge, such as that of Schutz and also of the structuralists, is better classified under social stratification. This subdiscipline usually takes social status,

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[143] Ibid., p. 71.

[144] Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1960).

[145] John H. Marx, "A Multidimensional Conception of Ideologies in Professional Arenas: The Case of the Mental Health Field," Pacific Sociological Review, 12 (1969), pp. 75-85; and Vernon K. Dibble, "Occupations and Ideology," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (1963), pp. 229-241.

[146] See Theodor Geiger, "Ideology and Truth," in Renate Mayntz, ed., Theodor Geiger on Social Order and Mass Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 125-168.

class, or economic systems as independent variables; this is avoided in our dialectical definition of the sociology of knowledge.[147]

When writing about the sociology of knowledge and sociological theory, it is important to distinguish between the former and the sociological theory of knowledge.[148] Texts in sociological theory often include the sociology of knowledge as if it were actually a theory, but this is not necessarily the case. It is perhaps an elliptical distinction to make, for they seem in some respect to presuppose one another. Yet like in so many fields, we study a subject matter but have no true theoretical explanation for it--i.e., we have studies in the area of political sociology, but as of yet there is no sociological theory of politics. Much of the work in sociological theory is rather metatheoretical, general statements about the nature of theory construction. The sociology of knowledge can provide insight into the social construction of theory; and, in a rather unique way, these same insights may be helpful in constructing theories within the sociology of knowledge itself.

We have mentioned the classical theory of knowledge on a preceding page. This theory of knowledge probably culminates in

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[147]An exception is the social stratification approach of Pareto, who believed that social strata are not primarily determined by economic or other external factors, but are constellations of and the consciousness. See Bridgett Berger, "Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology of Knowledge," Social Research, 34 (Summer, 1967), p. 280.

[148]Gerald DeGre, "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Truth," Journal of the History of Ideas, 11 (January, 1941), p. 110.

the work of Immanuel Kant, whose conception detaches the knowing subject from his social context. Karl Popper has pointed out that this is an "active" theory of knowledge in contrast to the "passive" perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Popper calls the sociology of knowledge the "receptacle theory of the mind," or, more bluntly, the "bucket theory of the mind."[149] He is criticizing the approaches which this author has termed the structural and cultural. The dialectical conception of the sociology of knowledge synthesizes the activist and passivist distinction of Popper. Man is creating knowledge and at the same time created by existing bodies of thought. It is the passivist approach which has been the source of the entire problem of objectivity and relativism that formed the basis of almost all the critiques of Karl Mannheim in particular. This is the baffling logical contradiction illustrated by the riddle which goes, "Epimenides, who is a Cretan, says 'All Cretans lie'."[150] Thus if Epimenides speaks the truth, then at least one Cretan tells the truth and the proposition is self-contradicting, or false. In more archaic terminology, this is the problem of "imputation" which we find so effectively criticized by Wolff,

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[149]Karl Popper, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 213-214.

[150]Benjamin Walters, "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Objectivity," in L. Gross, ed., Sociological Theory: Inquiries and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

Child, and Gruenwald.[151] On a different level, the activist-passivist dichotomy is synonymous to the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction made by many reviewers of the sociology of knowledge.[152] In the "intrinsic" approach one is primarily concerned with thought in terms of its inherent meaning and logical interrelations; where the latter is more concerned with the social context of thought. This too is superceded by our dialectical approach.

The most direct connection of the sociology of knowledge with sociological theory is made by Kurt H. Wolff, who claims that in his article he has dealt primarily with the relationship between the two disciplines.[153] Yet very little of the paper is actually oriented in this direction, and all Wolff concludes is that the sociology of knowledge makes it incumbent on sociological theory to define itself. However, the author contends that sociological theory is relatively well-defined, and that the sociology of knowledge perspective is most relevant in that it may help us understand the cognitive framework of those who construct

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[151]Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge: Emphasis on an Empirical Attitude"; Arthur Child, "The Problem of Imputation in the Sociology of Knowledge"; and for Gruenwald, see Kurt H. Wolff, "Ernst Gruenwald and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Collective Venture in Interpretation," History of the Behaviorial Sciences, I (April, 1965), pp. 152-164.

[152]See Wolff, "Ernst Gruenwald and the Sociology of Knowledge"; Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 213; Fuse, "Sociology of Knowledge Revisited: Some Remaining Problems and Prospects," p. 242.

[153]Kurt H. Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston and New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959), pp. 567-602.

sociological theories, avoiding the reduction of theory to ideology; the one-sided attempts to make knowledge isomorphic with social structure or cultural values; and the self-defeating arguments over imputation or objectivity.

Another study connecting the two disciplines only says that the "sociology of knowledge is of great value to historical sociology or the history of sociological theory."[154] This is only true if one clings to the traditional, structural definition of the sociology of knowledge. In the next chapter, a limited example of a different connection between the two disciplines is outlined. All this is contingent upon a definition of the sociology of knowledge, to which we finally turn.

The following definition of the sociology of knowledge has already been suggested throughout this thesis. It is not intended as being final or complete, but hopefully overcomes some of the limitations of past definitions:

> The sociology of knowledge is a unique intersection of sociology and philosophy having as its subject matter the study of the modal structure and content of consciousness in its dialectical interconnection with social and cultural systems of relevance, manifested as systems of knowledge. Language is the mediating phenomenon by which this relationship of elements is concretized; thus the methodology of sociology of knowledge is one of dialectical, structural linguistic analysis.

The earlier part of this chapter examined the treatment of the sociology of knowledge as the intersection of sociology and philosophy; as well as the dialectical and linguistic aspects

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[154]Fuse, "Sociology of Knowledge Revisited," p. 250.

involved in a definition of the field. "Systems of relevance" is ued in the sense of Alfred Schutz, which avoids a narrow sociologistic (orthodox Marxian) or culturalogistic (Sorokin) conceptualization of social and cultural systems. "Knowledge" has been defined by contrasting it with ideological thinking. Some explication of the phrase "modal structure and content of consciousness" is still due though.

"Consciousness" was a primary object of study to Peter Berger and Alfred Schutz in particular; all the references to consciousness are summed in Chapter II. In general, consciousness is distinguishable only by the act of consciousness and the content of consciousness; otherwise a definition is almost impossible. This perhaps violates one of the rules of definition by defining a phenomenon in terms of itself, but the very nature of consciousness precludes any other method of definition. Consciousness is at once personal and social; thus it is a dialectical stream of an inter-subjective process which has the characteristic of intentionality; that is, it is selective in its experiences. This selectivity is analogous to what Werner Stark called the axiological layer of the mind. Speaking about Pareto, Bridgett Berger says that "it is appropriate to speak of constellations of consciousness, understood as being in an on going dialectic relation with social conduct."[155] William James noted that consciousness is the result of self-assertion and

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[155]Bridgett Berger, "Vilfredo Pareto and the Sociology of Knowledge," p. 273.

self-negation; that this is a dialectical process.[156] His distinction is similar to that of Mead's on the "I" and the "Me." Self-assertion is the "I"; self-negation to James is the world, or "not-I." This enmeshes perfectly with the conception of the sociology of knowledge which we have attempted to describe. The activity of this consciousness is concretized in language.

Finally, the definition is concerned with "modal types of consciousness." Obviously we cannot say that one or another form of consciousness is exclusive of all others; we can only speak of a manifestional form of an underlying property. The following chapter presents four modal forms of consciousness from which specific types of sociological theory may emerge. As most of the work of this nature has been concerned with the cultural and social determinants of knowledge, this aspect is deleted for the limited purpose of emphasizing the part of the sociology of knowledge which has been largely ignored. A structural linguistic analysis of current theory would be prohibitively long; besides, the technique has not been developed to any point of precision. The dialectical nature of the flux of thought, theory, and society and culture is only assumed here as we are dealing with only one part of the sociology of knowledge. With these limitations, the thesis proceeds.

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[156] William James, Principles of Psychology, I (New York: Dover Publications, 1908), pp. 291-301.

CHAPTER IV

A MODEL OF MODAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND EMERGENT THEORY

In this conceptual model no reference is made to empirical content. The pattern of the relationships among the concepts are simply described and defined. It is hoped that the model will provide a meaningful context within which specific findings can later be located. The model is generally construed to be an exploratory, heuristic symbolic construction containing some testable statements. The statements are not expressed in any axiomatic or propositional form; it is only a model in the most general sense of the term. There is no attempt made to measure the statements in quantitative terms. The model simply seeks to reduce the complexity of the phenomena under study into a more parsimonious framework.

The basic premise of this model, then, is that there are certain modal forms of consciousness from which one can expect different kinds of social theories to emerge. "Social theory" is used rather than sociological theory; the latter refers more to strict propositional systems, few of which exist in sociology. Much of the work done in sociological theory has been in actuality metatheoretical. Social theory is a less rigorous term, although

it is suggested that a precise sociological theory could be predicated from each corresponding social theory. This first premise is not without precedent. Kienzle says:

> Ontological and epistemological ideas are embedded in the sociologists' thinking about man and his relation to other men, and these ideas help the sociologist shape his definitions of social phenomena and the areas he will study.[157]

Working on similar assumptions, Martindale abstractly charted the major types of theories in terms of their combination of ontological and epistemological components. The primary ontology, or theory of reality, was divided into sociological holism and elementarism. Its major epistemology, or theory of method, divided as positivism and anti-positivism.[158] Neither of these two studies took consciousness itself as a variable.

The next premise is that these modal forms of consciousness can be structured into corresponding systems of knowledge, or systems of relevance as described by Alfred Schutz. However, we go further than this by relying on an excellent theoretical work by Judith Willer. She defined systems of knowledge as being:

> . . . nothing more than a set of ideas about the nature of the world and the relationships in it. Systems of knowledge are collections of explanations of the relatedness of A and B (or C and D, etc.) which have been needed to explain or predict B or to determine what to do to get from circumstance A to B. Individual

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[157]Kienzle, "Epistemology and Sociology," p. 413.

[158]Don Martindale, "Limits and Alternatives to Functionalism in Sociology," in Martindale, Functionalism in the Social Sciences (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1965), pp. 144-163.

> explanation of events will differ according to the different systems of knowledge.[159]

It must be emphasized that the systems of knowledge described are ideal constructs; in actuality any set of ideas will only approximate this construct as a matter of degree.

Finally, "methodological orientation" is broadly defined as a predisposition to describe, explain, and justify the subject matter under study on the basis of general philosophical principles. This is distinct from the actual methods or techniques used, and is very similar to the word epistemology as Martindale uses it.

The model, sketched on the following page, makes no attempt to connect the constellations of thought patterns in their dialectical relationship to social structures or culture patterns; presupposing as this does the development of an adequate methodology.

"Modal consciousness" has been defined in Chapter III. The four forms described are not meant to be exhaustive of all possibilities; the most conspicuous exclusion here has been of irrational thought patterns, although nonrational patterns have been included.[160] It is recognized that there are alternative terms to describe these properties. However, the author believes that the terms used adequately symbolize the appropriate properties.

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[159] Judith Willer, The Social Determination of Knowledge (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 18.

[160] See Herbert M. Garelick, Modes of Irrationality, Preface to a Theory of Knowledge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

A MODEL OF MODAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND EMERGENT THEORY:

(Schematic Representation)

Modal Consciousness:	Dialectical	Analytical	Synthetic	Phenomenological
Structured Knowledge System:	Science	Magic	Religion	Mysticism
Methodological Orientation:	Abstractive	Empirical	Holistic Rationalism	Experential
Social Theory:	Levels of Explanation	Mathematical	Kultur-soziologie	Verstehen Sociology

Constellations of Thought ↓

The next step is definition of these four forms of modal consciousness:

DIALECTICAL: The mind interprets phenomena and events in their continuously changing aspects which are fully understood when the fundamental concepts correspond to the trichotomous character of the process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The mind is able to understand the universe, and events are seen to be determined by the operation of antagonistic forces and contradictions. Reality is conceived in its totality, in its various dimensions, expressions, and manifestations.[161] As Gurvitch says, "The dialectic focuses on the complexities, sinuosities, flexibilities and constantly renewing tensions, along with the unexpected turn of events of social reality--all of these must be taken into account to comprehend . . . social entities."[162]

ANALYTICAL: The analytic form of consciousness breaks elements of reality down into its parts and seeks to find interrelations among them. It focuses on a selected aspect abstracted from complex, multidimensional phenomena.

SYNTHETIC: Synthetic consciousness is the opposite of analytic, focusing on the whole as something greater than its parts; complex phenomena are grasped in their totality. It is organismic, nomothetic, and proceeds from the general to the particular; i.e., it is deductive rather than inductive.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL: The phenomenological form of consciousness interprets the world in terms of reflective subjective processes, attempting to arrive at the pure essence or eidos of experience: wir wollen auf die 'Sachen selbst' zuruckgehen (we will go back to seeing things in themselves).

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[161] See Adler, "A Quantitative Study in the Sociology of Knowledge," p. 43.

[162] Quoted in Philip Bosserman, Dialectical Sociology, An Analysis of the Sociology of George Gurvitch (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1968), p. 228.

Dialectical consciousness is considered last as we have defined science as emerging out of this particular mode of consciousness, which is probably objectionable to most social "scientists" today. To avoid confusion by analytically breaking down the model into each constituitive part, the knowledge systems, methodological orientations, and social theories of each mode of consciousness are considered each in turn as a cluster.

The analytic mind, breaking reality into its parts and isolated elements, is structured into a magical system of knowledge concomitant with an empirical methodology; in microsociological work a large part of research is nothing more than a mathematical conglomerate of statistical analysis. When writing of a magical system of knowledge, the author relies on the work of Judith Willer:

> Knowledge in a magical system consists of knowing how connections between condition A and condition B, the cause of the change from one condition to another. For any individual, knowledge of causal connection is needed to determine action in pursuit of specific ends. The test of this type of knowledge is strongly dependent on trial and error. . . . Magical systems utilize trial and error methods because there is no choice; all tests of knowledge must rely on empirical evidence, the only type of evidence possible.[163]

By empirical is meant the classic definition of gaining knowledge through observation relying on the senses. Empirical connections are usually made by associating A and B over time; in sociology these are usually expressed by using statistical correlations. This epistemological or methodological orientation is characteristic

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[163]Willer, The Social Determination of Knowledge, p. 26.

of magical knowledge systems; although it has to be emphasized that while magical knowledge is empirical, not all empiricism is magical. Empirical thinking is part of the thinking in any system of knowledge made up of sensing individuals. Empiricism is only magical if it alone forms the basis for gaining knowledge about the world.

Pitirim A. Sorokin has made perhaps the most scathing, critical analysis of the use of statistical and mathematical data in the social sciences, commenting on what he calls the "cult of numerology" and "quantrephrenia."[164] Increasingly it seems that social "scientists" use computers and statistical analysis to "prove" relationships between empirical phenomena on a trial and error basis. The century-old insight of David Hume that correlation is not causation is passed over by our modern magicians in their quest to find strict causal relationships between isolated empirical occurrences. Hubert Blalock himself recognizes the limitations of this mode of thinking:

> Causal laws, then, are assumed by the scientist. When they appear to be violated, he reformulates them so as to account for existing facts . . . Bertrand Russell notes that causal laws are really only applicable to a completely isolated system. . . . Since it will always be possible that some unknown forces may be operating to disturb a given causal relationship, or to lead us to believe a causal relationship exists when in fact it does not, the only way we can make causal inferences at all is to make simplifying assumptions about such disturbing influences.[165]

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[164]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), pp. 102-173.

[165]Hubert Blalock, Causal Inferences in NonExperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 12-13.

Yet despite this skepticism modern statistician-magicians have become ever more esoteric, constantly inventing new techniques without questioning their basic assumptions. For example, path analysis, for all its complexity, boils down to a criss-crossing of lines and arrows with statistical correlations printed beside them. The cultish nature of these practices are evident in the controversy over the "sacredness of .05" in significance tests.[166] Sorokin says of this analytical-empirical constellation that:

> As a result of the unwarranted extension of the knowledge of "specks" supplied by analytic and fact-finding theories, and of the meagerness and uncertainty of such knowledge, the recent predominantly analytical and fact-finding theories have increased our knowledge of the total socio-cultural reality only slightly, especially in the field of multidimensional macrosociological systems of "civilizations," cultural supersystems, and great historical social systems. In some cases they have even yielded more pseudoscientific sham-truth, half-truth, and plain error than valid truth.[167]

Malinowski noted that magic is surrounded by certain strict conditions: exact remembrance of a spell, unimpeachable performance of the rites, and unswerving adhesion to the taboos which shackle the magician. As he says, "if any one of these is neglected, failure of magic occurs."[168] In graduate schools new initiates are socialized into accepting statistical formulas as part of their

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[166] James K. Skipper, et al., "The Sacredness of .05: A Note Concerning the Use of Statistical Levels of Significance," American Sociologist, 2 (February, 1967), pp. 16-18.

[167] Pitirim Sorokin, "Sociology of Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," American Sociological Review, 30 (December, 1965), p. 831.

[168] Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 1954), p. 85.

professional life, serving to insure the cultish nature of modern academia. A statement is not true if it has logical coherence, but only when supported by some numerical data. Modern sociology could do well to look back to the fragments of Philolaus for a verbal rite of passage:

> In truth, everything that can be known has a Number; for it is impossible to grasp anything with the mind or to recognize it without it.
>
> Number has two distinct forms, odd and even, and a third compounded of both, the even-odd; each of these two forms has many aspects, which each separate object demonstrates in itself.
>
> The first composite entity, the One, which is the center of the Sphere, is called Hearth.[169]

Facetious as this may sound, medical students still quote the Hippocratic Oath and the fragments of Philolaus reflect the dominant orientation in sociology in its ancient way.

It is not the purpose here at all to reject outright the use of analytical-empirical mathematical analysis, which are integral parts of research and of science, but only of the latter if handled in conjunction with the other parts of the scientific orientation which we shall describe. As for now, the author agrees with Judith Willer who says, "the prevailing system of knowledge in the modern world, the system of knowledge which typically dictates the development and use of science, is a modern form of magic."[170]

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[169]Quoted by Giorgio de Santillana, The Origins of Scientific Thought (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 67-68.

[170]Willer, The Social Determination of Knowledge, p. 134.

Synthetic consciousness, on the contrary, is structured into a religious knowledge system. The methodological orientation is that of a holistic-rationalism; from this constellation of thought may emerge social theory in the form of Kultursoziologie. In its own way it is just as one-sided as the analytical-magical-empirical-mathematical cluster. Alfred North Whitehead describes religion as follows:

> Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity. . . . Religion is centered upon the harmony of rational thought sensitive reaction to the percepta from which the experience originates . . . [thus] religion deals with the formation of the experiencing subject.[171]

In Judith Willer's model or framework knowledge in a religious system consists of rational connections between concepts and concepts.[172] In addition to rationalism, the epistemological or methodological orientation emanating from a religious knowledge system is holistic; the view that basic social reality consists of interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his acts. In logical thought processes this would make the religious-rationalistic constellation most amenable to deductive and nomothetic methods of reasoning. Thus, if the first group were the magicians of sociology, this group would by analogy be the priests. The problem classically with this group is that their

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[171]Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1929), pp. 19-20.

[172]Willer, The Social Determination of Knowledge, p. 29.

construction of grand rational theories has rarely if ever been combined with empirical verification, although Sorokin came close in his Social and Cultural Dynamics. Thus the defects in the analytical-magical-empirical-mathematical constellation are the virtues of the synthetic-religious-rationalistic-Kultursoziologie complex, and vice versa. As the latter are working on such a grand scale, they are more likely to look at cultural and historical supersystems or civilizations. As sociology is fairly well-dominated by the former, the need to criticize Kultursoziologie is not as imperative.

Phenomenological consciousness is manifest in a mystical system of knowledge, an experential methodological orientation, and Verstehen type social theories. In mystical systems an attempt is made to escape the empirical world, ironically by emphasizing immediate experience or awareness and direct, intimate consciousness of a divine presence. Since the method of orientation is experential, it is criticized for not being verifiable and often connotes spurious knowledge. Actually, if empiricism is defined as knowledge obtained through the senses, experential methods of gathering knowledge would be empiricism par execellence.[173] However, the distinction is one of validity; how can subjective experience be actually verified? "Experential" by definition is the condition or state of subjectivity or awareness, and in the mystical system of knowledge would be the basis of what the Germans

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[173]See Peter A. Munch, "Empirical Science and Max Weber's Verstehende Soziologie," American Sociological Review, 22 (February, 1957), pp. 25-32.

call Mysticismus; while the word Mystik would be reserved for the higher form of experience which involves a divine presence. The phenomenological mode of consciousness does not contradict any of the other three; as do the analytic and synthetic modes; rather it comprehends and filters through them in a unique, penetrating way:

> Our knowledge in life is not without hypotheses, inductions, and predictions, but they all have the character of the approximate and the typical. The ideal of everyday knowledge is not certainty nor even probability in a mathematical sense, but just likelihood. Anticipations of future states of affairs are conjectures about what is to be hoped or feared, or at best, about what can be reasonably expected. When afterwards the anticipated state of affairs takes some form in actuality, we do not say that our prediction has come true or is proved false, or that our hopes or fears were or were not well founded. The consistency of this system of knowledge is not that of natural laws, but that of typical sequences and relations.[174]

The last cluster which must be defined is the dialectical-scientific-abstractive-levels of explanation constellation. Contemporary sociology has tended to define science only in terms of its methods and not in its more general philosophical sense. The dialectic, by definition, brings the analytic and synthetic forms of consciousness together, and in so doing is able to view social reality in its complexities and at its different levels. The abstractive methodological orientation is taken as defined by Judith Willer as connecting the theoretic (rationalistic) and observational (empirical) levels. She continues:

> It may begin at the observational level and conclude at the theoretical level or vice versa. Observables

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[174]Schutz, Collected Papers II, p. 73.

> are always connected to nonobservables in abstraction, empirical terms to rational concepts . . . Empirical thought uses only observables, rational thought uses only mental concepts, and abstraction uses only mental concepts and observables together.[175]

Now it is clear why, at the end of Chapter II, the efforts of various thinkers in the sociology of knowledge to synthesize empiricism and rationalism were given such a prominent place in the review of literature. Several of the men who were doing so were striving to conceptualize a true science which avoids the dilemmas presented above. Karl Marx was perhaps the most successful in his depiction of such a method for social science; his empirical-dialectical methodology is what Willer terms "abstractive." Baali and Price suggest that:

> . . . the dialectic of Marx can be shown to be an historical generalization which evolves from empirical observations. This generalization, embedded as it is in empirical reality, can be abstracted from its context and be posited as a methodology in itself; thus we may speak of an empirical-dialectical methodology. Because of the dialectic's rationalistic character, with an empirical-dialectical methodology we have a synthesis of percept and concept, the key to a unity of theory and method in sociology.[176]

Thus only thinking which combines synthetic, analytic and phenomenological forms of consciousness and the systems of knowledge and methodological orientations is considered here to be scientific. If thinking were only in the synthetic cluster, it would be essentially religious. If, on the other hand, it remains only at the analytic level, it is magical. Similarily, phenomenological

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[175]Willer, The Social Determination of Knowledge, p. 24.

[176]Baali and Price, "The Empirical-Dialectical Methodology of Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx," pp. 1-2.

thought alone results in mysticism. The three thought modes (analytic, synthetic, phenomenological) combine, respectively, empirical description, theoretical generalization, and understanding; and ties them in with a holism which seeks to explain the total social-cultural reality. This is science defined on a far broader level than its traditional, methods-oriented description.

The sociologist who comes closest to this is perhaps George Gurvitch. A synopsis of his work is available by Philip Bosserman and by Pitirim A. Sorokin, along with their perceptive critiques of his theoretical system.[177] In his sociology of total social phenomena Gurvitch describes the vertical and horizontal view of social reality combined with explanations about various depth levels. His methodology is dialectical, and at the same time exudes a quest for understanding in the phenomenological strand of thought. Gurvitch has developed a microsociology, a macrosociology, and an analysis of global structures. In his Dialectique et Sociologie he acknowledges that social scientists have little alternative often to causal analysis in ordering social data, but he does not resort to magic in doing so. Unfortunately, this is also the weakest point in his work, for there is little if any empirical verification, violating one of the basic premises of scientific thought. The author believes that the scientific thought style described will help solve the need for a

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[177] Bosserman, Dialectical Sociology; Pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociological Theories of Today (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 462-526.

metatheoretical framework in sociology; Llewllyn Gross himself adopts a "neodialectical framework."[178]

As language and linguistics have been a central part of the definition of the sociology of knowledge in this thesis, it would help expedite matters if, in looking at sociology of knowledge and sociological theory, there were a body of metalinguistic principles or methodology for defining reality and justifying claims of scientific adequacy. As Gross says, "sociological theory, whatever else it may be, is made known through one or more language schemes. . . . One kind of language is taken as standard-bearer, and all others are evaluated by it."[179]

In this chapter we have briefly outlined how the sociology of knowledge can be useful to sociological theory; in this instance by helping to describe to what extent sociology is scientific. If, as we have suggested, there is very little in sociology that can be called scientific, what are the reasons? Here is where the more traditional aspect of the sociology of knowledge comes into prominence by analyzing social and cultural conditions which are created by and creating the specific modal forms of consciousness from which these scientific, magical, and mystical

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[178] L. Gross, "Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, 67 (September, 1961), pp. 125-136.

[179] L. Gross, "An Epistemological View of Sociological Theory," American Journal of Sociology, 65 (1960), pp. 441-448.

knowledge systems emerge. Why, in particular, is the dialectical mode of consciousness not prevalent in American culture?

By not defining the sociology of knowledge in terms of ideology, it has been possible to avoid the muckraking polemical approach of a Gouldner to the problems inherent in the construction of sociological theory. Similarily, the epistemological relativism which leads to an intellectual disarray has been avoided.

In the final chapter, the thesis will be briefly summed and any additional conclusions or suggestions appended.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis began with two purposes in mind: (1) to offer a more adequate definition of the sociology of knowledge; and (2) apply this definition in its relationship to sociological theory.

In response to the first goal, previously existing theoretical approaches to the sociology of knowledge were examined, noting their similarities and differences. The structural and cultural approaches were presented as the two opposing traditional conceptualizations of the subject matter of the sociology of knowledge; whereas greater length was given to the most neglected branch; that of the phenomenologists, which was shown not to be incompatible with logical empiricism. The struggle to separate the sociology of science from the sociology of knowledge was analyzed; and the sociology of sociology was placed in a context as to its classification. Finally, existing contemporary empirical studies in the sociology of knowledge were reviewed. Chapter II ended with a detail summary of some basic conceptual components and common themes in the sociology of knowledge.

Chapter III, building on the conclusions of the review of literature, isolated some theoretical issues and problems involved

in defining the sociology of knowledge: these centered on the role of the dialectic and on language. At that point, the sociology of knowledge was distinguished from other disciplines such as epistemology and political sociology. The discipline was also distinguished from sociological theory, recognizing that a sociological theory of knowledge was possible. The "passivist" orientation inherent in traditional sociology of knowledge was contrasted to the "activist" classical theory of knowledge, along with the ensuing problems of objectivity, relativism, and imputation. Suggestions were made of the possible bearing the sociology of knowledge might have on sociological theory. At this point a definition of the sociology of knowledge was offered, which led to an emphasis on the role of consciousness.

Chapter IV constructed an exploratory model to make the connection between the sociology of knowledge and theoretical frameworks in sociology; that is, a model of modal consciousness and emergent theory. The model provided a standard against which the scientific quality of sociology might be evaluated. George Gurvitch was believed to most completely fulfill the model's definition of science in sociology.

The author believes, then, that the twofold task which was set for the thesis was accomplished as to its definition of the sociology of knowledge, and that the exploratory model represents a partial contribution to the better understanding of the cognitive framework from which theory emerges.

Although models are somewhat untestable, the possibility for precise empirical research within this theoretical framework is by no means precluded. The definition of science in this thesis was broad; and because of the lack of empirical data in the thesis, by the author's own terms it would seem to border on the religious system of knowledge. The study was carried in a dialectical frame of reference, though, attempting to synthesize contradicting approaches in a complex field. In actuality, the study is meta-scientific.

In very general terms the author has tried to avoid the situation described so effectively by Gunter Remmling:

> The emergence of separate thought-styles with their corresponding universes of discourse has two consequences: each of these universes develops a parnoidal response to all the others, since its exponents experience the existence of conflicting interpretations and views as a threat to the truth and rightness of their own universe of discourse. Second, the process of meaningful communication between these mutually distrustful universes comes to a virtual standstill. Eventually all objective and factually grounded inquiry into the content of out-group utterances is replaced by the suspicious query: What are the ulterior motives behind the outside point of view?[180]

A dialectical, phenomenological understanding of social reality seeks to reconcile these conflicting systems of relevances into a ground of common meaning, scientific understanding. However, this is but a matter of choice, as the ultimate truth value of each constellation described can only be relative.

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[180]Remmling, The Road to Suspicion, p. 7.

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