Comparative Analysis of Definitions of Social Group

William Schock
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS
OF SOCIAL GROUP

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Master of Arts

by
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL GROUP

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Dr. H. Kirk Dansereau and Dr. Kathleen A. Kalab spent a great deal of time and contributed many thoughts which enabled the author to refine many of the passages throughout the thesis. The author especially wishes to thank them for filling in during the final stages of this work.

Finally, the author wishes to thank his wife, Elizabeth, for bearing with him during the writing of this thesis.
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A set of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group and a set of categories developed by the author were compared to determine which set had the greater parsimony and utility. The sets of categories were compared in order to specify the areas of agreement and disagreement. The sets of categories were applied to a sample of early European and American sociologists' conceptions of social group and a sample of 22 introductory sociology text definitions. Smith's inclusion of non-human individuals, one-way communication, and non-contemporaneous group members in his set of categories was unsupported by the samples of definitions. The combination of Smith's categories, "shared goal dispositions" and "norms regarding means," into the author's category, "shared goal dispositions," and Smith's categories, "role differentiation" and "integroup relations and group representative roles," into the author's category, "role differentiation," received some support from the samples of definitions. Smith's categories, "mutual need satisfaction," "face-to-face interaction," and "socioemotional relations among group members" were not cited in any of the samples. The author's category, "social structure," received some support from the samples of definitions.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The importance of definitions in sociology has long been viewed as essential to the development of the discipline. The problem of defining terms has been doubly compounded by the fact that many of the terms used in sociology are also found in everyday language. Emile Durkheim recognized this problem in searching for a sociological definition of the term suicide. He states that definition is difficult because suicide is a common term and "susceptible of more than one meaning."¹ In order to avoid misunderstanding, the sociologist must clearly state the things which fall within the meaning of the term. Without a clear and precise definition, scientific investigation has little chance of success.²

Two additional problems are implied by the need for precision. The definition should include only the elements necessary to identify the thing defined, and these elements must be determined through agreement. Paul H. Furfey states that an adequate definition should contain only the minimum

²Ibid.
number of elements necessary to clearly identify the term. Timasheff cites the problem of agreement as central to the formulation of adequate definitions in sociology. Unlike definitions in the physical sciences, definitions in sociology are more often the subject of dispute than of agreement. Controversy over the elements to be included within a definition stifles the development of sociological theory and directs research to fruitless investigations. Timasheff argues that the extent of conceptual agreement is a good indicator of the maturity of a science. Robert Bierstedt mentions that the advantage of a committee within the American Sociological Association which formulated standard definitions was that ultimately it "could ... contribute to the linguistic facility and accuracy of sociological communication."

Acknowledging that the comparative analysis of definitions can aid in the determination of the extent of agreement and utility of definitions, the decision remains as to which concepts are of prime importance in sociological


investigations. "Social group" is one of the most basic concepts in sociology and one of the oldest. It is a specific arena of sociological inquiry. Other disciplines such as physiology and anatomy deal with man as an individual. Psychology, insofar as it specifically deals with the physical and biological responses of the body, treats human beings as individuals. It is only when our concern extends beyond the individual that we enter the realm of the social. Groups and group-like phenomena make up the social world and, as such, are the subject matter of sociology. It has even been asserted that "every bona-fide sociological concept deserves that adjective only because of its group connection." Yet, the term was in common use long before the advent of the science of sociology. A comprehensive set of elements derived from common experience was already associated with the term. Sociologists incorporated many of these elements within their own definitions of social group. This has contributed to the misunderstanding of which Durkheim warned. According to Charles K. Warriner, "despite its [the term, group] antiquity, there is little agreement on the nature of the reality to which it refers."

With the definition of social group or, more generally, group, there is a special problem. This term is


commonly used to refer to many different realities. People of a certain age, sex, or religion are sometimes called a group. A collection of animals is sometimes called a group. Even a number of inanimate objects are sometimes called a group. Although sociologists agree that the definition should be confined to people and that interaction is an important element, they "are not at all agreed on which collectivities they wish to include or exclude in using the term 'group.'" Social group has been defined so that it includes primarily the type of group referred to as a "small group." According to Smith,

Defining groups in this restricted manner ignores some very important similarities between small informal groups and such other grouplike entities as formal organizations, 'collective behavior,' or national states. Others maintain that there are sufficient similarities between larger associations and small groups so that both fall within the denotation of the term social group. For example, E. T. Hiller asserts that the community is a social group. In his view,

A group is a social system comprising identifiable elements which are also found in the composition of an analytical community, so that the latter may be regarded as a type of social group amenable to analysis by methods suitable to the study of social groups in general.
However, the disagreement on the meaning of social group does not stop here. Social group has been defined with such a wide scope as to include almost any type of social relation. Sometimes it has not been distinguished from human beings who are merely in spatial proximity to one another or who share a similar physical or social characteristic.¹²

Despite the lack of agreement on this pivotal definition, few investigations have dealt with the analysis of the various definitions of social group employed in sociology. Marie L. Borgatta made a brief examination of the concept as it was used by early European and American sociologists.¹³ Nicholas S. Timasheff included the term along with several others in an analysis of definitions found in treatises and texts between 1931 and 1951.¹⁴ Most recently, David H. Smith compared definitions from sociological and non-sociological sources with his own definition.¹⁵ There are, in short, two reasons for this study. It is made in order to supplement the paucity of investigations in this area. It is also made to accomplish that requirement of science which demands that concepts be continually reexamined.

¹²Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group'": 143.
¹⁴Timasheff, "The Basic Concepts of Sociology": 176-186.
¹⁵Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group'": 141-167.
The Purpose of the Study

The primary focus of this thesis is to compare a set of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group developed by David H. Smith with a set of categories developed by the author. The author reviewed Smith’s set of categories and found several which he felt could be modified or omitted. Throughout the thesis the two sets of categories will be compared and contrasted to the conceptions of social group of selected early European and American sociologists as well as to a sample of definitions of social group from introductory texts in sociology. The agreement between both Smith’s and the author’s sets of categories and various conceptions of social group will be determined. In addition, this thesis will review and compare the conceptions of social group since the time of Auguste Comte. The definitions will be compared to determine the areas of agreement and disagreement among sociologists on the nature of social group.

The Procedure

Chapter two cites the work of David H. Smith on the definitions of social group. The categories used in his analysis will be described and compared to a set of categories derived by the author. Chapter three is divided into two sections. Part A deals with the various conceptions of social group among the early European sociologists. The thoughts of the following men are examined: Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Toennies, Max Weber,
and Georg Simmel. Part B deals with the early American sociologists. This section is concerned with the conceptions of Lester Ward, Franklin Giddings, Charles H. Cooley, George H. Mead, E. A. Ross, William G. Sumner and Pitirim A. Sorokin. At the conclusion of each section dealing with the conception of a particular sociologist, a comparison is made of the agreement between Smith's and the author's sets of categories and the conception of that sociologist. Finally, a determination will be made of the extent of agreement among the early European and American sociologists on the nature of social groups.

Chapter four analyzes and compares the definitions of social group found in introductory sociology texts published between 1964 and 1973. These texts would most likely reflect the present understanding of the definitions. In addition, they have--as one of their purposes--the definitions of key concepts within the discipline. The sample which was selected consists of only those texts which have more than one edition. It is the author's contention that texts with more than one edition would be the ones with the widest use. The index of texts is obtained primarily from the Subject Guide to Books in Print 1973. This chapter is divided into three parts. Part A is devoted to the definitions of social group alone. Each definition is examined to determine which elements the texts consider essential to social groups.

Part B applies the categories on which Smith and the author are in disagreement to the sample of definitions. This is done in order to avoid redundancy in Part C. If a deficiency is found in any of Smith's categories, the definition is then compared to the author's set of categories to determine if they contain the same deficiency. Part C applies the author's set of categories to the sample of definitions of social group. In this part a determination is made of the extent of agreement in the texts on the elements to be included in the definition of social group. The conclusion of this chapter again examines the sets of categories derived by Smith and the author in order to determine which set of categories provides a better "fit" with the definitions in the texts.

The discussion in chapter five centers around a brief examination of the utility of Smith's and the author's sets of categories. Conclusions derived in the course of the study are presented. Finally, there is a discussion of the nature and extent of the development of the conceptions of social group since the time of Comte.
CHAPTER II

A COMPARISON OF THE PRESENT STUDY WITH SMITH'S SET
OF CATEGORIES FOR THE ANALYSIS
OF DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL GROUP

The purpose of the article by David H. Smith was to
determine "the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of 'grouplike phenomena,'" and to incorporate
these "into a precise but general definition of the term
'group.'"¹ In order to accomplish this objective, he
examined the elements which have been included in the
definition of group. His data were collected in a hap-
hazard fashion and the presentation of the results was
brief. He lists the elements which were included in the
different definitions and compares them to his own defini-
tion of social group. Partly on this basis, he maintains
that his definition meets the criteria of "parsimony, con-
ceptual clarity, and scientific utility."²

But does the haphazard nature of his collection of
definitions disqualify his sample as representative? Would

¹David H. Smith, "A Parsimonious Definition of

²Ibid., p. 141.
his categories be found in a representative sample of definitions? Does his definition actually satisfy the three criteria mentioned above? These are the questions which will be examined in this chapter and the chapters that follow.

Smith utilized dictionaries, texts, and articles. He did not confine himself solely to sociological definitions but drew his data from psychological and social psychological sources. Also, as he states, "The intention is not to derive theory through summary or synthesis of common definitional parlance, but rather to elicit the major elements that have been used in defining group." This author does not agree with Smith's utilization of sources other than textbooks. Dictionaries of sociology do contain definitions of social group but there are too few such dictionaries to give a representative picture of the elements of a social group. Also, research articles may define social group operationally, that is, in terms of the purposes of the particular article, rather than in general.

If Smith is a sociologist, writing in a sociological journal for other sociologists, should he not have used sources from within the field alone? This is not to discount the importance of contributions from other fields but rather to emphasize that a definition of social group for use by sociologists should be drawn primarily from the

\[3\text{Tbid., p. 144.}\]
context of sociological theory and convey the general understanding of sociologists on the meaning of the term. This is not to discount the possibility that Smith might have intended to make his "sample" comprehensive. Finally, it is the author's contention that some agreement on the definitions of social group can be found in introductory sociology texts and that these texts can be selected to insure representativeness.

Smith cites thirteen categories which he used in his analysis of the definitions of social group. These categories are: (1) the largest set of two or more individuals; (2) a network of relevant communications; (3) a shared sense of collective identity; (4) one or more shared goal dispositions with associated normative strength; (5) face-to-face interaction; (6) norms regarding means; (7) action; (8) duration; (9) external perception of group identity or membership; (10) socioemotional patterns among group members; (11) mutual need satisfaction; (12) intergroup relations and group representative roles; (13) role differentiation. In reviewing these categories the author encountered several which he felt should be modified or eliminated. The categories which were derived and their relation to Smith's categories are described below.

**Two or More Individuals**

Smith's category of "the largest set of two or more individuals" included the notion that only the largest set

\[4\] Ibid., pp. 141, 156.
could rightly be called the group. In Smith's view the group includes not only individuals who are members but also those who were members or will become members. This leaves the sociologist with the prospect of "studying in most cases partial groups rather than complete groups." In the author's category, two individuals may be a group despite the fact that the sole basis of their interaction is membership in a larger group. Therefore, included under the aspect of "two or more" are such terms as "plurality," "a number of," or "many." This is because these terms imply a minimum of two individuals.

Smith used the term "individual" to mean that a group may consist of non-human individuals. The author agrees that this is "an interesting empirical question." Nevertheless, it is the author's position that this category should include only those elements which are accepted as fact and not those open to question. In the author's category, the term individual refers solely to human beings.

Interaction

Instead of "interaction" Smith used the category "a network of relevant communications." In Smith's category communication may be one-way. This is linked with his notion that a group may be composed of two members whose one-way communication takes place over a wide span of time. If one

5 Ibid., p. 145.
6 Ibid.
agrees with Smith, then it is possible for a group to be formed when one individual reads the work of some long-deceased philosopher. A group would be formed when the individual reacts to the work by identifying with the goals of that philosopher. In this instance, the time span is great and communication is definitely one-way. The author's category "interaction" includes the notion of two-way communication. Only present, living members will be included. Past members were part of the group, but they are not now. Future members will be part of the group but they are not now. Thus, Smith's category "a network of relevant communications" is not used by the author because the author feels that it is too broad.

Shared Sense of Collective Identity

Smith included the following elements under this category. Each group member

\[\ldots\ (a) \text{ believes himself to be a member of (or participant in) some collective entity, and (b) believes that there is at least one other individual in space-time who also views himself as a member of that same collective entity and who in turn believes in the existence of other members.}\]

While the author accepts the first part of Smith's definition of this category, in the author's category of the same name a group member must know another member and not simply believe that there is another member who exists somewhere in space-time. Thus, the author modified Smith's category

\[\begin{align*}
\text{\cite{7}} \quad & \text{Ibid., pp. 145-146.} \\
\text{\cite{8}} \quad & \text{Ibid., p. 147.}
\end{align*}\]
because he felt that it was too broad to have utility. The group members in the author's view must exist simultaneously. The author's category also includes Franklin H. Giddings' concept of "consciousness of kind" which "is a state of consciousness in which any being recognizes another conscious being as of like kind." This concept is not used by Smith.

Shared Goal Dispositions with Associated Normative Strength

This category is included as stated by Smith. It refers both to "the tendency to prefer or want some end-state or configuration of events," and to "some significant moral feeling, a sense of social duty, 'oughtness,' conscience or internal obligation." This category is teleological in character and implies the presence of norms. Norms direct the individual toward group goals. Smith also acknowledges that "the necessity of at least one norm has been accepted when it came to the shared goal dispositions of the group." Nevertheless, he includes norms under the separate category of "norms regarding means." The author has combined Smith's categories of "shared goal dispositions" and "norms regarding means" to form his own category, "shared goal dispositions."

Role Differentiation

Both the author and Smith use the category of "role

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10Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group': 148.

11Ibid., p. 158.
differentiation." Smith used this category to refer solely to the division of labor. However, the author feels that the division of labor implies the presence of a hierarchy. Therefore, the author's category refers not only to the division of labor but also to superordination/subordination, that is, the presence of leaders and followers. Smith placed the latter conception under the category of "intergroup relations and group representative roles."

**Social Structure**

This category was added by the author and is not used by Smith. The author felt that if a sociologist accepted the notion of "duration" as used by Smith and the author, he was also likely to include the notion that interaction over time becomes patterned, that is, a structure develops. The author's category allows for the possibility of a formal or informal structure.

**Categories Retained or Deleted**

The categories of "Duration," "Action," and "External Perception of Group Membership" are included in the author's set of categories in the same sense as used by Smith. Only the elements contained in each category will be mentioned. "Duration" refers to the tendency of a group to persist in time. "Action" means the overt behavior of individuals within the group. "External Perception of Group Membership" means that the group must be able to be observed by individuals outside of it. Smith's category of "Face-to-Face Interaction" was not used in the author's set of categories.
since this pertains principally to the primary group. The primary group was defined by Charles H. Cooley as:

A group of from two to possibly fifty or sixty people--i.e., a small number--who are in relatively lasting face-to-face association for no single purpose, but merely as persons rather than as specialized functionaries, agents or employees of any organization.\textsuperscript{12}

Smith's category of "Face-to-Face Interaction" would therefore limit the generality of definition to one type of social group. The category "Socioemotional Patterns among Group Members" was deleted from the author's set of categories since group membership does not necessarily imply affective bonds. For example, a relationship may be based on the fulfillment of a contract. In this case the attitude of group members toward one another may be one of indifference. Finally, Smith's category "Mutual Need Satisfaction" was not used in the author's set of categories. The satisfaction of needs affects the continuance of a member in a group. However, the conviction that needs will be satisfied leads individuals to join a group. Once a member, an individual may find that his needs are not satisfied. For example, an individual may join a religious community because he feels that he will find spiritual satisfaction within it. If he does not find it, he may still remain in it for a period of time in order to make sure that he has given the community a chance to satisfy his needs.

Conclusion

Table I presents the differences between Smith's and the author's sets of categories. Although the two sets of categories are similar, they differ in the areas cited in Table I. In the following chapters the conceptions of social group held by selected early European and American sociologists, as well as the definitions of social group from a sample of introductory sociology texts, will be applied to the sets of categories of Smith and the author. The objective of these chapters will be to determine which of the two sets of categories more closely encompasses the various conceptions of social group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smith's Category</th>
<th>The Author's Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE LARGEST SET OF TWO OR MORE INDIVIDUALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>TWO OR MORE INDIVIDUALS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A complete group is made up of all individuals in space-time who were, are, or will become members. Individuals may be non-human.</td>
<td>A group is formed by two or more human individuals who exist simultaneously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A NETWORK OF RELEVANT COMMUNICATIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>INTERACTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication may be one-way or two-way and can take place between distant generations.</td>
<td>Communication must be reciprocal or two-way. It takes place between individuals who exist simultaneously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHARED SENSE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>SHARED SENSE OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The group member must know another existing member of the same collective entity. 2. An individual must only believe that another group member exists somewhere. He does not have to know him. The other individual does not have to exist in reality.</td>
<td>The first position is accepted. The second position is not accepted. Giddings' concept of consciousness of kind is included within this category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ONE OR MORE SHARED GOAL DISPOSITIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>ONE OR MORE SHARED GOAL DISPOSITIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tendency to prefer some end state of events and an associated feeling of internal obligation.</td>
<td>Includes both the meaning of Smith's category of the same name and his category of &quot;norms regarding means.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FACE-TO-FACE INTERACTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>Not used.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal communication between individuals who can physically observe each other.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued on page 19)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smith's Category</th>
<th>The Author's Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORMS REGARDING MEANS</strong></td>
<td>Not used as a separate category. Included under the author's category of &quot;one or more shared goal dispositions.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal or formal rules which direct the behavior of group members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION</strong></td>
<td>ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt behavior of individuals within the group.</td>
<td>Same as Smith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DURATION</strong></td>
<td>DURATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tendency of a group to persist in time.</td>
<td>Same as Smith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXTERNAL PERCEPTION</strong></td>
<td>EXTERNAL PERCEPTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF GROUP IDENTITY</td>
<td>OF GROUP IDENTITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups can be observed by individuals outside of them.</td>
<td>Same as Smith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIOEMOTIONAL PATTERNS</strong></td>
<td>Not used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMONG GROUP MEMBERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual social relations of friendliness or tension release.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUTUAL NEED SATISFACTION</strong></td>
<td>Not used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fulfillment of physical or psychosocial requirements of group members by others in the group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP REPRESENTATIVE ROLES</strong></td>
<td>Not used by itself. Included within the author's category of &quot;role differentiation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of a hierarchy in which some lead and others follow.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued on page 20)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Differentiation</th>
<th>Smith's Category</th>
<th>The Author's Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division of labor or differential task allocation.</td>
<td>Includes both Smith's category of the same name and his category of &quot;intergroup relations and group representative roles.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not used.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The pattern of internal organization of the group. It may be either formal or informal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER III
EARLY EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEFINITIONS

In this chapter an attempt will be made to show the overall development of the concept of social group. The conceptions of social group held by selected early European and American sociologists will be discussed and compared to each other as well as to Smith's and the author's sets of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group. In order to make the most effective comparison among the conceptions of the early sociologists and Smith's and the author's sets of categories, this chapter is divided into two parts. Part A deals with selected early European sociologists. Part B discusses the conceptions of selected early American sociologists. At the conclusion of each section dealing with the conception of a particular sociologist, a comparison will be made between that conception and the sets of categories of Smith and the author. The purpose of the comparison is to determine which of the two sets of categories more closely embraces the conception of social group of the sociologist studied.

Part A: Early European Conceptions of Social Group

Auguste Comte

Comte views all forms of social collectivities as similar to organisms. The various parts comprising the social
organism, whether it is a family or the whole society, are interdependent. Without the interdependence of parts the organism could not survive. In Comte's words, "There must always be a spontaneous harmony between the whole and the parts of the social system, the elements of which must inevitably be, sooner or later, combined in a mode entirely conformable to their nature." The basic units which make up society are families. It is in these two notions of family and society that Comte's conception of the nature of social groups can be found.

Building on the thought of Aristotle, Comte asserts that all collective organization from the family to society manifests a division of labor and cooperation which cannot be separated. These two elements are found in the fundamental social unit, the family, and develop with the coordination of efforts between families. Comte argues that cooperation in modern society is rooted in the division of labor. The division of labor produces both solidarity through the interdependent needs which it fosters and the complex form of the modern social organism. However, Comte also regards the division of labor as possessing "a natural tendency to extinguish the sense of community, or

at least seriously to impair it. The danger lies in overspecialization which can lead to fragmentation of societal components. This tendency toward dissolution is checked by the natural inclination toward control and authority. Comte contends that "the most important of all the properties of society, beyond cooperation and division of labor, are its basic subordination and tendency toward government."

In sum, Comte views social collectivities as organisms consisting of interdependent parts. The parts have separate functions which are interrelated to form a harmonious whole. Separate functions are determined by the division of labor and unified toward a common goal by cooperation. Finally, the possible detrimental effects of the division of labor are kept under control by authority which naturally manifests itself.

Comte conceives of social groups as being composed of human individuals alone. This is more in accord with the author's set of categories than with Smith's. Comte does not consider a group to be made up of "the largest set of two or more individuals" which would match Smith's category. Rather, his organismic approach emphasizes the existence of interdependent groups within society without regard to their relative sizes. His conception is thus more consistent with the author's category of "two or more individuals"

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because it does not contain the notion of "the largest set." Comte's notion of cooperation implies the presence of two-way communication which is contained in the author's category of "interaction." Comte's conception of social group was not included under Smith's category of "a network of relevant communications" because of Smith's inclusion of the element of one-way communication within his category. Smith uses the notions of the division of labor and superordination/subordination in the categories of "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group representative roles" respectively. Comte's conception combines these two notions. Authority exercised by leaders acts as a check on overspecialization engendered by the division of labor. The author also combines these two notions in his category of "role differentiation." Finally, the division of labor in modern society is, in Comte's view, contractual. Such a relationship can be non-emotive. Thus, Comte's conception cannot be placed under Smith's category of "socioemotional patterns among group members." This category is not used by the author.

Herbert Spencer

Spencer also takes an organismic approach to the study of society. However, Spencer relies on the analogy of the organism to a greater extent than Comte. Throughout his writings there are continual comparisons between the two. For example, in Social Statics he compares the social structure and morality to the hard and soft parts of an
organism. 8 Spencer also differs from Comte in that he considers the primary social unit to be the individual and not the family. But Spencer does not consider the individual in a state of isolation. Rather he views him in his relations with other individuals and with society. Thus he argues that

the essence of the social process is the interaction between individuals and society, between units and the mass, and their adaptation as a result of the adjustment of the natures of men to society and of the social organization to the nature of its constituent units. 9

In The Study of Sociology he maintains that one of the aims of sociological inquiry is "to trace, in societies of some size, the genesis of the social relations, regulative and operative into which members fall." 10 Because of this orientation to the individual, Spencer's approach is closer to a social psychology of social relations.

Spencer agrees with Comte that the two principal elements in any social collectivity are the division of labor and cooperation. For Spencer, however, it is cooperation rather than the division of labor which makes for social entities. This emphasis on cooperation also appears in The Principles of Sociology. In the first volume of this work, Spencer provides a definition of the simpler peoples


10Ibid., pp. 23-24.
which avoids the notion of the division of labor. In his words, this basic group is "one which forms a single working whole unsubjugated to any other, and of which the parts co-operate, with or without a regulating centre, for certain public ends."\(^{11}\) Spencer's interpretation of the division of labor is that it produces groups or society through the exchange of services in the gratification of self-interest. It is a contractual relationship which predominates. Spencer does not regard the spatial proximity of individuals as the starting point of society:

A society in the sociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxtaposition there is cooperation. So long as members of the group do not combine their energies to achieve some common end or ends, there is little to keep them together. They are prevented from separating only when the wants of each are better satisfied by uniting his efforts with those of others than they would be if he acted alone.\(^{12}\)

Comte and Spencer hold similar views on the nature of social groups. They differ in their estimation of the relative importance of the division of labor and cooperation. They differ most radically in that Comte conceives of authority as the "glue" which holds groups together whereas Spencer finds it in the satisfaction of individual self-interest.

Both Spencer and Comte emphasize the presence of cooperation and the division of labor in the group. The comments in the section on Comte on the applicability of Smith's and the

\(^{11}\)Rumney, *Herbert Spencer's Sociology*, p. 72.

author's categories to these elements are also valid for Spencer's conception. Spencer does not supplement the division of labor with the notion of superordination/subordination. This is closer to Smith's category "role differentiation" which includes only the division of labor and not the author's category "role differentiation" (see Table I). Although Spencer asserts that the basic sociological unit is the individual in his relations with society, this is still ultimately a relationship among individuals. Spencer speaks only of human individuals and does not refer to Smith's notion of "the largest set." Therefore, Spencer's conception more closely agrees with the author's category of "two or more individuals" than with Smith's category "the largest set of two or more individuals." Spencer emphasizes cooperation to attain goals. Cooperation, especially in a contractual relationship, implies the presence of rules or norms which direct the individual's behavior to the attainment of the goals of the contract. The two elements of goal dispositions and norms are present in the author's category of "shared goal dispositions." Smith places them in the separate categories of "shared goal dispositions," and "norms regarding means."

Emile Durkheim

Durkheim takes Spencer to task for this conception of the division of labor. He asserts that a society which is held together by this type of exchange process could not endure for any appreciable period of time. Durkheim sums up his position in The Division of Labor in Society when he
argues that if Spencer's view is taken:

Society would be solely the stage where individuals exchanged the products of their labor, without any action properly social coming to regulate this exchange. Is this the character of societies whose unity is produced by the division of labor? If this were so, we could with justice doubt their stability. For if interest relates men, it is never for more than some few moments. 13

It must be kept in mind that Durkheim criticized Spencer's conception in light of his own interpretation of the division of labor.

Durkheim clearly delineates the nature of the processes which come into play in group formation. When individuals possess

... ideas, interests, sentiments, and occupations not shared by the rest of the population, it is inevitable that they will be attracted toward each other under the influence of these likenesses. They will seek each other out, enter into relations, associate, and thus, little by little, a restricted group, having its special characteristics, will be formed in the midst of the general society. 14

Durkheim calls these likenesses the collective conscience. As he defines it, the collective conscience is "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society which forms a determinate system which has its own life." 15 Individuals sharing a collective conscience associate not only because of their shared interests but also because they derive some pleasure from forming a unity. 16

15 Ibid., p. 80.
16 Ibid., p. 15.
Groups possess different types of solidarity dependent upon whether the society is primitive or modern.

In primitive society the collective conscience is so dominating that individuality tends to be lost. Primitive societies are characterized by mechanical solidarity which "is induced by a community of representations which gives birth to laws imposing uniform beliefs and practices upon individuals under the threat of repressive measures."\(^{17}\)

Individuality emerges only with the division of labor in modern society. Durkheim readily acknowledges Comte as the source of his notion of the division of labor.\(^{18}\) However, he disagrees with Comte's reference to authority as the bonding force in modern society. Durkheim thinks of Comte's position as equivocal since he relies on authority to supplement the division of labor.\(^{19}\)

Durkheim's conception of social group includes neither the notion of non-human individuals nor "the largest set." His conception thus falls within the author's category of "two or more individuals" and not Smith's category of "the largest set of two or more individuals." Durkheim stresses the idea that relations occur between individuals. They communicate and respond to the communications of others. Interaction takes place. Durkheim's conception does not


\(^{18}\)Durkheim, The Division of Labor, p. 62.

\(^{19}\)Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, p. 141.
cite the possibility of one-way communication within the group. Thus, it cannot be completely included under Smith's category, "a network of relevant communications," which emphasizes both one-way and two-way communication. His conception of social group is more closely related to the author's category of "interaction" which includes only two-way communication. Durkheim states that likenesses between individuals have an attracting power which can lead to group formation. It appears from his discussion that this power of attraction is confined to simultaneously existing individuals. Therefore, the author does not place Durkheim's conception of social group within Smith's category of "a shared sense of collective identity" because of Smith's contention that a sense of collective identity can be "shared" between living and deceased individuals. Durkheim's conception can also be placed under Smith's categories of "shared goal dispositions" and "norms regarding means." The author combines these two categories under his own category of "shared goal dispositions." Although Durkheim does not view authority as a restraining power on the division of labor, he nevertheless recognizes that the division of labor produces a hierarchy. He can thus be placed in Smith's categories of "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group representative roles" respectively or in the author's category of "role differentiation" which also includes the notion of leaders and followers. Finally, Durkheim's conception indicates the presence of a patterning of rules and relations
within the group which falls within the author's category of "social structure." Smith has no category which corresponds to this notion.

Ferdinand Toennies

Toennies bases his conception of groups on the interrelation of human wills. Relationships between individuals consist "of assistance, relief, services, which are transmitted back and forth from one part to another and are considered as expressions of wills and their forces."\(^{20}\) These associations are thought of as units by their individual members. They are also thought of "either as real and organic life ... \textit{Gemeinschaft} (community); or as imaginary and mechanical structure ... \textit{Gesellschaft} (society)."\(^{21}\) Natural Will arises from the individual's disposition and character. Natural Will may range from inborn and inherited behavior to the sharing of specific values. Rational Will, on the other hand, arises through the evaluation of means and ends. Rational Will may refer to any type of free behavior or to the deliberate choice of a specific goal.

Social entities are

... products of human thinking and exist only for such thinking. ... Individuals ... are bound together ... and think of their collective existence as dominating them and as something which is represented as a person capable of volition and action, to which they give a name.\(^{22}\)


\(^{21}\)Ibid.

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 246.
The existence of social entities may be recognized by individuals outside of them or by other social entities. A social relationship is the most basic and natural type of social entity. Unlike social organization, a social relationship is not thought of as an entity in its own right. In the social relationship common values, which may be physical (common property, inheritance) or intellectual (ideals), arouse in each part expectations of the other in connection with mutual action. When individuals realize that they cannot fulfill their needs alone, they seek others with whom they cooperate, e.g., a source of barter or exchange. Although exchange involves a common volition, it is usually a temporary phenomenon. Permanency is achieved "partly through repetition, resulting in regularity of the exchange act and partly through the lengthening of the individual act by the postponement of fulfillment on the part of one or both sides." Individuals do not recognize social relationships themselves as separate entities but they must nevertheless establish the relationship as an existing reality. The collective is a middle form of social entity where individuals are united into a common way of thinking and feeling. However, volition comes into being only in association with others and not independently. Social organizations or corporate bodies are recognized by their members as a kind of imaginary social person capable of

\[23\] Ibid., p. 250.

\[24\] Ibid., p. 251.
independent volition and action. Social relationships may be either Gemeinschaft-like or Gesellschaft-like. In fact, the dichotomy which Toennies draws between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft should be viewed "as traits, which, in empirical social entities, are found in varying proportions."\(^{25}\)

Durkheim accepts Toennies' classification in general. However, he has some reservations about the notion of Gesellschaft. He argues that

\[\ldots\] Gesellschaft would be characterized by a development of individualism that the state could forestall only for a time and by artificial procedures. It would be essentially a mechanical aggregate; all that would remain of the truly collective life would result not from internal spontaneity, but from the impetus of the state.\(^{26}\)

Commenting on Durkheim's criticism of his classification, Toennies replies that it is

\[\ldots\] most surprising to find in Durkheim's book \textit{The Division of Labor in Society} a differentiation of a primitive and derived 'solidarity,' one of which is based on an analogous way of thinking or on common ideas and tendencies \[\ldots\], while the other is based in individual differences and on the consequent division of labor.\(^{27}\)

He objects to Durkheim's interpretation of Gemeinschaft.


\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 1199.
Toennies insists that his own "conceptions do not exclude in any way the fact that ruling and other active corporations or individuals in a big nation as well as in a village or town community take an attitude toward their entirety as organs do toward an organism."  

Toennies cites only human beings as part of the social group. Although he notes that the number of individuals affects the form of social of social groups, the author could find neither a statement nor an implication that a group is composed of "the largest set of two or more individuals" (Smith's category). Toennies' conception of social groups is thus in greater agreement with the author's category of "two or more individuals." Because of his emphasis on reciprocal communication, Toennies' conception cannot be placed within Smith's category of "a network of relevant communications" which also includes one-way communication. His conception does fit the author's category of "interaction" which includes only two-way communication. Toennies conception falls within Smith's categories of "shared goal dispositions" and "norms regarding means" which the author incorporates into the single category of "shared goal dispositions." This conception can also be placed within Smith's categories of "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group representative roles." These two categories are combined in the author's category of "role differentiation." The elements contained in Toennies' conception of social group imply the

Ibid., p. 1200.
existence of a social structure but Toennies does not specifically use this term. The category of "social structure" is used by the author and is not used in Smith's set of categories.

Max Weber

Weber also calls the most basic form of group a social relationship. He defines it as follows:

The term 'social relationship' will be used to designate the situation where two or more persons are engaged in conduct wherein each takes account of the behavior of the others in a meaningful way and is therefore oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely of the probability that individuals will behave in some meaningfully determined way. It is completely irrelevant why such a probability exists, but when it does there can be found a social relationship. 29

The mutual orientation between individuals need not be positive or affective. Moreover, the definition does not indicate the extent to which solidarity is present in the social relationship. 30 The individuals in a social relationship are oriented to each other according to the meaning which each attributes to the social relationship, but the individual subjective meaning need not be the same. Weber emphasizes that social relationships vary in duration. What makes for a social relationship "is only the existence of the probability that, corresponding to a given subjective meaning complex, a certain type of behavior will take place, which

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30 Ibid.
constitutes the existence of the social relationship." The meaning attributed to the social relationship can change. It is said to be a new relationship only if there is insufficient continuity in the change of meaning. 

Weber states that it is difficult to arrive at the meaning attributed to a social relationship. The greater the rational orientation of members within the social relationship, the greater the probability of a correct analysis of meaning. It is also more likely if the meaning is reached through mutual consent.

Weber's assertions that the social relationship is a probability and that it relies on the behavior of individuals are not to be misconstrued as a nominalist position on the nature of groups. For Weber, social groups are real, at least in the minds of the individuals participating in them:

The concepts of collective entities which are found in common sense and in juridic and other technical forms of thought have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as something actually existing, partly as something with normative authority. Actors, thus, in part orient their actions to them and in this role such ideas have a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the course of action of real individuals.

Because social groups have a reality for more than one individual, they cannot be classified with phantasms contained in the mind of one individual alone. The recognition

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31 Ibid., p. 65.
32 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
33 Ibid.
of their reality is shared. Even Weber's assertion that social relationships exist only as an expression of a probability implies something lasting. According to Theodore Abel,

"We can ask what the basis is for expecting the recurrence of a pattern of social actions at a given time and place over and over again. There are more or less lasting commitments made, obligations undertaken, and needs to be satisfied for which an organization of activities has been instituted. There is, therefore, a framework of organization in the awareness of participants that regulates and directs their conduct." 35

Following the thought of Toennies, Weber divides social relationships into communal and associative or aggregative. A social relationship is communal if it is based on solidarity. It is associative or aggregated if it is based on "a reconciliation and a balancing of interests which are motivated either by rational value-judgments or expediency." 36 Weber insists that his distinction is more general than that of Toennies.

Weber states that a group is composed of "two or more individuals" (the author's category) who are in meaningful intercommunication or "interaction" (the author's category). Weber's conception of social groups implies the presence of "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category) and specifically mentions the presence of "norms" (Smith's category) which are combined in the author's category of "shared goal dispositions." Weber emphasizes that "socioemotional patterns among group members" (Smith's category) are not essential to social groups. His conception can be placed in Smith's categories.

35 Ibid.

of "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group representative roles" or in the author's category of "role differentiation" (see Table I).

George Simmel

Simmel's approach to the study of social groups is quite detailed. The forms of sociation or interaction within groups are in Simmel's estimation, the subject matter of sociology. However, sociology studies only the form and not the content of sociation:

Neither hunger nor love, work nor religiosity, technology nor the functions and results of intelligence, are social. They are factors in sociation only when they transform the mere aggregation of isolated individuals into specific forms of being with and for one another, forms that are subsumed under the general concept of interaction. Sociation is the form (realized in innumerable different ways) in which individuals grow together into a unity and within which interests are realized.37

Pitirim A. Sorokin feels that Simmel's emphasis on the intricate network of reciprocal human relations is a rejection of idealism and organicism. Both the social group and society are not merely labels but real things. Regardless of the size of groups or how alien to the individual they seem to be, they are just "crystallizations of this interaction, even though they may attain autonomy and permanency and confront the individual as if they were alien."38

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can vary from mutual attraction through conflict. In every society individuals may be "with one another, for one another, against one another." 39

The clearest formulation of Simmel's conception of social groups is found in his analysis of the dyad and triad. The dyad is the most basic social group. It consists of the reciprocal relations between two individuals. Yet it possesses "the scheme, germ, and material of innumerably more complex forms." 40 Because the dyad has only two members, it is characterized by impermanency. It is impermanent in the sense that if one member drops out, it is no longer a group. Thus, the dyad is completely dependent upon each of its members for its continued existence. Impermanency in the dyad results in triviality of relations. As Simmel states,

This phenomena indicates the sociological character of the dyad: the dyad is inseparable from the immediacy of interaction; for neither of its two elements is it the super-individual unit which confronts the individual, while at the same time it makes him participate in it. 41

Because of the uniqueness which each member experiences in his relations with the other, a sense of intimacy is also characteristic of the dyad.

With the addition of a third member a change occurs in the relations among individuals. Impermanency of relations disappears because the absence of one member still leaves a group consisting of two individuals. An element of indirection

41 Ibid., p. 126.
in relations is introduced because two members of the triad can communicate with each other by means of the third member. This element leads to a lack of complete harmony. The triad transcends the individuals who compose it. The third element acts as a mediator who can either become an affective object permitting the other two parties to communicate indirectly or the third element can produce

... the concord of two colliding parties, whereby he withdraws after making the effort of creating direct contact between the unconnected or quarreling elements; or he functions as an arbiter who balances, as it were, their contradictory claims against one another and eliminates what is incompatible in them. 42

Through his mediation the third party adds the elements of authority, "objectivity, reason, and the means of analyzing deviant or creative contributions from the other roles." 43

What if the objective of the third party in the triad is not the reconciliation of conflicting parties but the destruction of the group? Simmel does not answer this question. Rather he views conflict as a form of sociation which aids in group maintenance. High cohesion within groups produces intense conflict among members. Conflict serves as

... a means of reestablishing unity and cohesion of a group when it has been threatened by hostile feelings among its members... A contest fought between group members by means of objective values or social services is advantageous to the group and therefore is usually fostered by it. 44

42 Ibid., pp. 146-147.


44 Abel, Foundation of Sociological Theory, p. 83.
However Simmel is aware that conflict has the innate capability to destroy the group. He simply chooses to explore the beneficial aspects of conflict.

Although Simmel stresses the effect of size on the character of group relations, he does not conceive of a group as composed of "the largest set of two or more individuals" (Smith's category). Simmel's conception of social group can be placed under the author's category of "two or more individuals" because of his notion that the dyad or basic group is composed of two human individuals. Throughout his discussion of groups, Simmel emphasizes the importance of interaction and its various forms. His conception therefore cannot be placed under Smith's category of "a network of relevant communications" which includes both one-way and two-way communication but falls in the author's category of "interaction" which includes only two-way communication. Simmel's conception implies the presence of "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category). Even in a conflictual situation, the group members are in disagreement over the ways of attaining the group's goals. Assuming that conflict is resolved, the course of action agreed upon by the group members takes on a normative character. Thus, "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category) and "norms" (Smith's category) are linked and can be placed under the author's category of "shared goal dispositions" (see Table I). Simmel's emphasis on the range of emotions within the group (engendered by conflict, cooperation, etc.) excludes the use of Smith's category
of "socioemotional patterns among group members."

Conclusion: Part A

The disagreement among the early European sociologists who were investigated involves not only the elements to be included within the conception of social group but also the relative importance of these elements. However, all of the early European sociologists who were studied emphasized "individuals" and "interaction" as elements of their social group concept. It should be kept in mind that this was a relatively youthful stage in the development of sociology. At this time many sociologists were attempting to develop their own independent systems of sociology.

The following paragraph is a brief restatement of the relation of Smith's and the author's categories to the conceptions of social group held by the early European sociologists who were studied. Almost all of the early European sociologists refer to groups composed of a minimum of two people. No mention is made of a group's being only the largest set of individuals. The only exception is Spencer, who speaks of the basic unit as the individual. Even here, however, Spencer does not speak of the solitary individual but of the individual in his relations with society. Although Comte and Spencer rely heavily on the organismic conception of group, they do not mention the possibility of non-human individuals forming groups. No early European sociologist studied mentions the possibility of a group's having only one-way communication. Rather the emphasis is on reciprocal relations, interaction,
or cooperation. Within the thought of each early European sociologist there is the implicit assumption that the group is composed of simultaneously existing members. In his discussion of group formation, Durkheim dwells on the notion of solidarity achieved through the recognition of likenesses. However, he views this recognition as taking place solely between existing individuals and as based on knowledge rather than belief in the existence of the individuals and of the likenesses. Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim emphasize the division of labor as an element in social groups. However, they also link the division of labor and the notion of authority or leadership. No mention is made of face-to-face interaction as applicable to a general conception of social group. Simmel confines this type of interaction primarily to the dyad. Although the presence of socioemotional relations is mentioned by all of the early European sociologists investigated, they also stress the non-emotive relations of contract and exchange. The conceptions of the early European sociologists thus provide some support for the author's set of categories.

Part B: Early American Conceptions

The purpose of part B is to describe selected early American sociologists' conceptions of social group and to compare them to Smith's and the author's sets of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group. Throughout this section frequent reference should be made to Table I which states the differences and similarities between
the two sets of categories.

William G. Sumner

Sumner was strongly influenced by the work of Herbert Spencer. However, he was a social Darwinist of a very special kind. In his view, competition for survival engenders cooperation and social life. In order to explain Sumner's position more clearly, the elements which went into his conception of groups and group life will first have to be examined.

A fundamental notion of social group is found in Sumner's definition of society which is "a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species." Society can consist of from two human beings to the mass of men who constitute an advanced society. The major factor is that they cooperate to win existence over the forces of nature. The family is the most elementary type of society. All higher types of society have developed from it. The family possesses an elementary division of labor which enables it to function far better than any other arrangement.

In Sumner's discussion of rudimentary groups he maintains that cooperation within the group calls for the suppression and reconciliation of conflicting interests. He calls

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this type of cooperation "antagonistic cooperation" which "consists in the combination of two persons or groups to satisfy a great common interest while minor antagonisms of interest which exist between them are suppressed." The underlying motive for antagonistic cooperation is survival. However, what is the nature of the forces which lead men to suppress their own interests and to cooperate with others? Sumner asserts that these forces are "hunger, love, vanity, and fear." They are first experienced by the individual in the form of pain. In seeking relief, the individual manifests random behavior. When a means is found for satisfying the need, it is repeated and communicated to others. This continues until the form of behavior is accepted within the group. An individual habit has thus become a group custom. It has attained a social character. Sumner calls the end product of this process, "folkways." Folkways which have endured for a period of time and are viewed as indispensable for group maintenance become mores.

Mores involve the belief on the part of the members of the group that "their own ways are the only right ones, and that departure from them will involve calamity." Since groups arrive at different sets of mores and folkways, it is inevitable that they should clash and that a

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49 Ibid., p. 33.
distinction should be made between group members and outsiders. Sumner calls these two types of groups in-groups and out-groups. The in-group, or we-group, is characterized by peace and cooperation while there is hostility and war in its relations with out-groups. The in-group elevates its own folkways and mores and simultaneously devalues the folkways and mores of the out-group. Sumner calls this group attitude "ethnocentrism." A strong ethnocentric attitude engenders a strong sense of group solidarity. 50

In short, the group is an organism which comes into being as a result of the struggle for survival. Division of labor within the group emerges naturally. Cooperation is achieved through the reconciliation of antagonistic interests. The group develops standardized ways of dealing with its requirements. Finally, ethnocentrism promotes solidarity within the group and hostility toward outsiders.

Because Sumner speaks only of human groups and of simultaneously existing group members, his conception of social group cannot be included in Smith's categories of "the largest set of two or more individuals," "a network of relevant communications," and "a shared sense of collective identity." However, his conception can be placed under the author's categories of "two or more individuals," "interaction," and "a shared sense of collective identity" (see Table I). Sumner discusses the norms of the group in detail. However, norms emerge as a means of dealing with problems

50 Ibid., p. 456.
common to the group. Norms enable the group to achieve the basic goal of survival. Thus, Sumner links "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category) and "norms" (Smith's category) in the same fashion as the author does in his category of "shared goal dispositions." Sumner explicitly cites "role differentiation" (Smith's category). However, the notion of leaders and followers contained in Smith's category of "intergroup relations and group representative roles" and the author's category of "role differentiation" remains implicit in his conception.

Lester F. Ward

Ward refers to social groups as social aggregates which may be either partial or complete. Partial social aggregates are not confined to a fixed geographical area and do not embrace a whole population. Thus, individuals may be members of two or more partial social aggregates. Complete or universal social aggregates, on the other hand, are confined to a fixed area and are made up of all individuals residing in that area.51

Social aggregates have rules which govern the behavior of members. Because of their limited objective, partial social aggregates have relatively mild sanctions associated with their rules. In contrast, complete social aggregates have only the purpose of securing "the general good of its members."52 The rules of the complete social aggregate are

52 Ibid., p. 295.
clearly specified and strictly enforced. Its organization is analogous to consciousness in the individual organism because consciousness functions to secure the well-being of the organism. 53

Social aggregates attempt to satisfy the demands of social forces and thus seek to "attain some end, to carry some point, to further some scheme, to accomplish some purpose, to gratify some ambitions, to realize some aspiration." 54 Ward subdivides social forces into physical forces and spiritual or psychic forces. Physical forces are further subdivided into preservative forces which involve pleasure seeking and reproductive forces which involve "sexual desire" and affection for parents or kin." 55 The psychic forces are classified as emotional, esthetic or intellectual. 56 Ward

53 Ibid., p. 298.


56 Albion W. Small also recognized the existence of social forces but he utilized this conception in order to develop his classification of interests. In his view, social forces do not correspond to man's universal inclinations as in Ward's conception but are specific desires which are manifested in the activities of individuals. The simplest activities are the interests which Small defines as "an unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition" (Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory /Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960/, p. 193). Small finds six classes of interests which first cause conflict within the group and later become resolved into cooperation through the process of socialization. Cooperation based on congruence of interests leads to group formation. Small conceives of a group as "any number of individuals between whom relations are discovered such that they must be thought of together"
states that social forces combine into a new force of extremely great potential, "the social mind," which he also calls "public opinion" or "the social will." The social mind functions in a manner similar to that of the individual will:

Just as the individual will controls the emotions of the individual, so the social will governs the collective emotions of society. . . Only the social will can control the social forces.57

Although Ward divides social groups into partial and complete social aggregates, his conception does not make use of the notion of "the largest set of two or more individuals" (Smith's category). Instead, Ward conceives of a multitude of partial social aggregates existing within a complete social aggregate so that his conception can be placed under the author's category of "two or more individuals." Ward states that cooperation and intercommunication among individuals within social aggregates are necessary to satisfy the demands of social forces. Thus, Smith's notion of "one-way communication" is absent from Ward's conception of social groups. His conception is in greater agreement with the author's category of "interaction" which contains only the notion of "two-way communication." Ward links "norms" (Smith's category) and "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category) which are both combined in the author's category

(57 Chugerman, The American Aristotle, p. 166.)
of "shared goal dispositions" (see Table I). Ward's notion of psychic forces does not fall under Smith's category of "socioemotional patterns among group members" because of his emphasis on non-emotive intellectual forces.

Franklin H. Giddings

Giddings' conception of social group centers around the interplay of three elements: "consciousness of kind," "the social mind," and "volition" which he describes in his analysis of group formation. The stimulus to group formation is, at first, physical and external to the individual and includes such things as climate, food, or conflict with others. The resulting aggregations are normally composed of similar parts:

But presently, within the aggregation, a consciousness of kind appears in like individuals and develops into association. Association, in its turn, begins to react favourably on the pleasures and on the life chances of individuals. . . . Thenceforward, the associated individuals deliberately seek to extend and to perfect their social relations.58

Volition also plays an important role in group formation. Imitation is closely interwoven in the volitional process and together with the physical environment imposes limitations on the social process. According to Giddings,

Volition acts upon the social process through impulse and imitation, and consciously, through rational choice. The laws of the volitional process therefore are laws of imitation and of social choice. The laws of limitation by the physical process are laws of selection and survival.59

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59 Ibid., p. 400.
Although Giddings relies on Tarde's conception of imitation, he adds the elements of impulse and like-reaction. Giddings argues that the social mind acts as a mechanism for the maintenance of group cohesion. The social mind is a real thing but still can be found in individual minds. It is "the simultaneous like-mental-activity of two or more individuals in communication with one another, or as a concert of the emotion, thought, and will of two or more communicating individuals."\(^{60}\)

The most fundamental component of the social mind is consciousness of kind. Giddings acknowledges that this concept is complex but argues that it is the simplest state of the social mind. In fact, "all other states of the human mind which can be called social and which enter into social activities are found upon examination to be composed of the consciousness of kind in combination with various other ideas, desires, and passions."\(^{61}\) The consciousness of kind is made up of four elements: the desire for recognition, the perception of resemblance, reflective sympathy, and organic sympathy. Of these four elements, organic sympathy is the most important and consists of the elements of like sensations, like responsiveness and "the readier imitation of one another by like individuals than by those who greatly differ."\(^{62}\)

Giddings states that cooperation is an essential element

\(^{60}\) Franklin H. Giddings, The Elements of Sociology: A Text-Book for Colleges and Schools (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910), p. 120.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 66.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 62.
within groups, but there can be no cooperation without the presence of consciousness of kind. Traditional cooperative activities are folkways. Giddings also builds on Sumner's classification of folkways, mores, and laws by introducing the notion of "themistes" which are a type of mores. They involve "concerted volition and apply social pressure through boycotting, outlawry, and other social dooms, including death."63 Giddings further asserts that in times of crisis traditional behavior is overcome and is partially replaced by rational deliberation.

Giddings defines groups or associations as a number of individuals who interact because of consciousness of kind. In his words, groups involve "the commingling and the pluralistic activities of individuals who are conscious of themselves and of their behavior, and whose consciousness is conversationalized."64 Giddings distinguished groups from society by the presence of common goals. In his conception the family is an intermediate group between associating and society. Society is composed of families maintaining more or less "permanent association generation after generation."65

Giddings conception of social groups uses Spencer's notion of the social organism as a starting point. However,

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64 Ibid., p. 262.
he differs from Spencer in his emphasis on consciousness of kind. Groups form through the struggle between the individual and the forces of nature and are held together by consciousness of kind.

The central element in Giddings' conception of social group, "consciousness of kind," is specifically included in the author's category of "a shared sense of collective identity" and not in Smith's category of the same name. Because consciousness of kind refers solely to contemporaneous individuals, Giddings' conception does not completely fit either Smith's category of "the largest set of two or more individuals" or his category of "a network of relevant communications" (see Table I). However, it does fit the author's categories of "two or more individuals" and "interaction." Like Ward, Giddings cites "norms" (Smith's category) and "Shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category). These two notions can also be placed under the author's category of "shared goal dispositions."

Edward Alsworth Ross

Ross' conception of social groups excludes the organic analogy. He asserts that in spite of the insistence of earlier sociologists on the existence of the social organism, it is nowhere to be found. Instead, Ross uses Simmel's "forms of sociation" and Small's "social processes" as the starting point for his conception of social groups. He views social

processes as types of repeated patterns of social phenomena and subdivides them into four basic types: association, domination, exploitation, and opposition.

These social processes together with other factors form an end product, the social group. In Principles of Sociology Ross succinctly describes the way in which each of the social processes contributes to the formation of social groups:

- Domination calls into being large aggregates, such as realms and empires. Exploitation binds exploiters and exploited together in certain permanent relations. Opposition between sects, races, parties, sections, classes, and nations causes those on the same side to stand together both from sympathy and in order to win. When two elements of a population engage in struggle, up to a certain point the blows of each pound the other into coherence. Conflict has long been recognized as the arch-consolidator. Adaptation smooths away the obstacles to the formation of groups or makes men more harmonious if they are already in the same group. Stratification extends the we-feeling among those of the same social condition. Socialization makes people ready to cohere when an occasion for union presents itself. Professionalization necessitates a union of those within the same profession to formulate its standards and to expose, punish, or cast out practitioners who ignore these standards. 67

Ross states that "common traits" which distinguish individuals within the social group from outsiders must be present and that there must also be a "momentous common interest" which overrides the specific interests of the members and which can only be realized within the group. 68

The social process works in two ways to further the

68 Ibid.
solidarity of the group. Opposition increases the group's internal solidarity as well as the number of characteristics which make it a distinct entity. Also, a socializing process tends to increase the areas of concurrence between the members of the group and outsiders. This process acts to "level the barriers it the group has raised against rivals." 69

In contrast to the early European sociologists who were studied, Ross contends that while groups are real, society is not. It is merely the name for "people in their collective capacity." 70 Ross does not view the division of labor as essential to group life but links this element with the organic conception of groups. Ross agrees with Simmel's "forms of sociation" but believes that this notion belongs more to social morphology than sociology. Ross rejects Tarde's conception of imitation as a social factor but nevertheless finds it at work in the formation of mobs. Finally, he asserts that Ward's classification of social forces is "by far the most helpful that has been made." 71

Ross' enumeration of the social processes which produce social groups can be placed under the author's categories of "two or more individuals," "interaction," "a shared sense of collective identity," "shared goal dispositions," and "social structure." Like the preceding sociologists, Ross does not

71 Ross, Foundations of Sociology, p. 167.
include the notions of "the largest set," "one-way communi-
cation," or group members who are widely separated in space-
time within his conception of social group. This precludes
the placement of Ross' conception under Smith's categories of
"the largest set of two or more individuals," "a network of
relevant communications," or "a shared sense of collective
identity." respectively. All of these categories are broader
than the elements found in Ross' conception. Ross' conception
of social groups can be placed in Smith's categories of
"shared goal dispositions" and "norms." Finally, Smith has
no category corresponding to the author's category of "social
structure."

Charles H. Cooley

Cooley applies the organic analogy to social groups
but argues that he uses it "in no abstruse sense but merely
to mean a vital unity in human life."\(^72\) The starting point
for understanding Cooley's conception of social groups is
his analysis of the nature of primary groups which he views
as the source of both human nature and of more complex and
fragmented secondary groups.

Cooley states that primary groups are characterized by:

1. Face-to-face association.
2. The unspecialized character of that association.
3. Relative permanence.
4. The small number of persons involved.
5. The relative intimacy among the participants.\(^73\)

\(^72\)Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of

\(^73\)Charles H. Cooley, Robert C. Angell, and Lowell J.
Carr, Introductory Sociology (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1933), p. 55.
Despite its intimacy, the primary group does not manifest complete harmony. In addition, self-assertion and competition are also present within the primary group and are controlled by its unity. The unity of the primary group is expressed in the term "we." This "we-feeling" involves both sympathy and mutual identification. While the we-feeling manifests group unity, it is also inseparable from the individual's self-image or "I." Cooley argues that the "group self or 'we' is simply an 'I' which includes other persons."74 The "I" is a social self, the idea of which has been provided in relations with others. The individual reacts to his imagination of another's judgment of himself and adjusts his behavior accordingly. This process of continual adjustment is found in the notion of "the looking-glass self."75

Through association in the primary group, the individual develops both his self-image and his human nature.

The process of communication underlies the character of the primary group. Communication includes not only spoken and written words but also non-verbal communication and communication through mechanical instruments. Communication is of such importance that without it "the mind does not develop a true human nature but remains in an abnormal and nondescript state neither human nor properly brutal."76

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75 Cooley, Angell, and Carr, Introductory Sociology, p. 121.

76 Cooley, Social Organization, p. 62.
The primary group may take the forms of family, play-group or neighborhood. Cooley maintains that the simplest type of primary group is "the intimate pair-group" which consists of only two individuals. Primary groups are the source of secondary groups which are later and more complex forms. Secondary groups do not require face-to-face interaction and are, according to Cooley, Angell, and Carr,

Association narrowed down by special purpose, by communication at a distance, by rules, by social barriers, or by the casual nature of contact. This means that under such conditions associating personalities present only special facets of themselves to one another. They cannot meet as whole persons.

Cooley accepts Sumner's notion of folkways and mores and places it under the general heading of patterns of adjustment. Cooley's conception of solidarity relies on the work of Durkheim. This is evident in his discussion of solidarity in The Social Process:

Formerly we lived in many small societies the relations among which were comparatively external and mechanical; now we live in one great society the parts of which are vitally and consciously united. The instances of this are familiar—the world-wide traffic, travel, and interchange of thought; the universal fashions, the international markets, the cooperation in science and in humanitarian movements. This is that modern solidarity, so wonderfully increased within the memory of living men, which makes the understanding of our life a new problem.

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78 Ibid., p. 219.

Cooley and Small find the source of the increase of groups in the pursuit of interest.

By comparing Cooley's conception of primary groups with the conception of secondary groups developed by Cooley, Angell, and Carr the elements which are common to all social groups become apparent. Difference in group size affects the nature of relations within groups; both primary and secondary groups contain only human individuals. His conception thus fits only the author's category of "two or more individuals." Primary and secondary groups manifest different patterns and contents of intercommunication between simultaneously existing individuals and also possess different types of solidarity. Therefore, Cooley's concept can be placed in the author's categories of "interaction" and "a shared sense of collective identity" but not in Smith's categories of "a network of relevant communications" or "a shared sense of collective identity" (see Table I). Because Cooley accepts Small's notion of interests as well as Sumner's notion of folkways and mores, his conception can be placed under Smith's categories of "shared goal dispositions" and "norms" or the author's category of "shared goal dispositions." Finally, Cooley views "face-to-face interaction" (Smith's category) as essential only to primary groups.

George H. Mead

In order to understand Mead's conception of social group, attention must first be given to those elements which
comprise his general system of thought. Mead never clearly defines what he means by social group, and so his conception must be approached circuitously. The starting point for this discussion is Mead's conception of the social act. An act considered in itself is the choice of certain stimuli which enable an organism to maintain its life-process. For an act to be social it must "involve the co-operation of more than one individual, and . . . its object as defined by the act, in the sense of Bergson, is a social object." The object in order to be social must be responsive to all individuals in the act, and its objective must be a group and not an individual objective.

The individuals involved in a social act are able to cooperate by means of communication. Mead and Cooley considered communication to be the basis of the social self and of all social activities. Through communication the individual is able to see himself as an object. This is possible because communication includes not just interaction with others but interaction with one's self. In Mead's words, "The elaboration, then, of the intelligence of the vertebrate form in human society is dependent upon the development of this sort of social reaction in which the individual can influence himself as he influences others."  

Mead breaks communication down into gesture and lan-

81 Ibid., p. 243.
guage. He identifies gesture with the start of the social act. It serves as a stimulus to which other forms respond. These responses in turn serve as stimuli to the form which initiated the act. Gestures are exhibited by both non-human and human forms. However, only human forms have a self-consciousness of the inner attitudes which the gesture manifests. Thus, human gesture has a double meaning; the meaning interpreted by the responding organism and the meaning which resides in the gesturing organism. When this meaning is located within the social act and is the same for the gesturing and responding organism, it becomes a significant symbol. According to Mead,

In this way every gesture comes within a given social group or community to stand for a particular act or response, namely, the act or response which it calls forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is addressed, and implicitly in the individual who makes it; and this particular act or response for which it stands is its meaning as a significant symbol.62

Language is composed of a set of significant symbols which serve to elicit the appropriate responses from other members involved in a social process.

Another important element which is closely connected with language and the emergence of the social self is "the generalized other." It amounts to the internalization within the individual of a complex of common group attitudes. In fact, the group or community which provides these attitudes is "the generalized other." Mead states that in order for the individual to develop the "self" to its fullest extent

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62 Ibid., p. 47.
he must

... in the same way that he takes the attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward one another, take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects of common social activity or set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged; and he must then, by generalizing these individual attitudes of that organized society or social group itself, as a whole, act toward different social projects which at any given time it is carrying out, or toward the various larger phases of the general social process which constitutes its life and of which these projects are specific manifestations.\textsuperscript{83}

It is through the internalization of "the generalized other" that the individual can respond not just to other individuals but to the social group as a whole. The individual's self, then, develops in two stages. In the first stage the individual responds solely to other individuals involved in a social act, his significant others. In the second stage he responds to the social group as a whole by means of the generalized other.

Two aspects of self spring from this notion of "the generalized other," the "I" and the "me." Mead's notion of the "me" bears a strong similarity to Cooley's notion of the "I." For Cooley, the "I" is a social self whose definition has been provided by the individual's social environment. For Mead, the "I" is "a sustained identity which is socially undervived."\textsuperscript{84} As Cooley's "I," Mead's "me" is derived from the social environment. Unlike Cooley's "I," the "me" is

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid., pp. 154-155.

not specifically related to a "looking-glass self." Rather it represents the attitudes of the social group which have been internalized by the individual. Mead relates the "I" to the "me" as follows:

The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me,' and then one reacts toward that as an 'I.'

While there is no specific mention of a "looking-glass self" in Mead, his description of the process of attitude internal-ization in the "me" is similar to that described by Cooley in his notion of the "looking-glass self."

The self is most easily integrated into functional groups in which the individual relates solely to other members of the same group. In this instance, the relation tends to realize "the ideal of any social situation respecting organization, unification, co-operation, and the integration of the behavior of the several individuals involved." When individuals are members of different functional groups integration is difficult because they lack common interests and goals on which to base their relationship.

Mead viewed the family as the basic social group. However, the family is not responsible for the more complex forms of human association. Instead the self arises through family relations and serves as the stimulus for further

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85 Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 175.
86 Ibid., p. 322.
Mead's conception of social groups underscores the importance of communication between human beings so that his conception fits the author's categories of "two or more individuals" and "interaction" but not Smith's categories of "the largest set of two or more individuals" or "a network of relevant communications" (see Table I). Mead's definition of the social object as well as his reference to the importance of common interests and goals in functional groups allows his conception to be placed in Smith's category of "shared goal dispositions." Finally, Mead's discussion of functional groups cites the element of organization which falls under the author's category of "social structure."

Pitirim A. Sorokin

Sorokin's conception of social group is concisely presented in Society, Culture, and Personality. His conception relies on the understanding of two elements: "interaction" and the "causal-meaningful unity" of the group. Interaction involves the interplay of three elements: "individuals," "meanings-norms-values," and "vehicles." The subject of interaction is the human individual capable of thought, action, and reaction. Individuals interact because of meanings-norms-values which they possess and exchange. Meanings-norms-values are treated as one concept which

87 Ibid., p. 240.

involves:

(1) cognitive meanings, in the narrow sense of the term, such as the meaning of Plato's philosophy . . . ; (2) meaningful values, such as the economic value of land . . . ; (3) norms referred to as a standard, like the norms of law and ethics. 89

Sorokin states that meaning, values, and norms can all be interchanged since they form a general class of meaningful phenomena. Meaning is of such importance that its absence reduces interaction to the realm of the biophysical sciences. The final element of interaction is the vehicle which is overt action and material objects. The set of meanings become objectified in the vehicles which transmit them from one individual to another. Meanings-norms-values can be objectified in different vehicles. 90

In Sorokin's system, the group is first a causal-functional unity in the sense that there is a triple interdependence of parts with parts, parts with the whole, and the whole with the parts. This triple interdependence forms the group into a cohesive unity in an organic and not a mechanical or spatial sense. The group is a meaningful unity because it involves interaction in terms of meaning. Sorokin argues that meanings tend to become integrated into a logically consistent whole. 91

The group is real since it neither consists solely of spatial or accidental propinquity nor ceases to exist when

89 Ibid., p. 47.
90 Ibid., pp. 41-42, 48.
91 Ibid., p. 147.
it encounters disruptive external forces. Instead, the group always seeks to restore or maintain its unity. The reality of the group is found in the meaningful interaction of its members. It is not, as argued by Durkheim, external to the individual. 92 Inasmuch as each group possesses its own set of meanings-values-norms, it possesses its own individuality. Vehicles play a relatively minor part in determining the individual character of the group since the same vehicles can be used to objectify different meanings. 93 Also, as long as the meanings-norms-values remain the same, the group can change its members and/or vehicles without losing or changing its individuality.

Group change is inner directed. According to Sorokin, the group is "a self-changing and self-directing unity that bears in itself the essentials of its life-career, the direction of its change, its phases, and its destination." 94 However, external forces may facilitate or inhibit change within the group or may even destroy it. Also, groups are both quantitatively selective in terms of the number of members which they incorporate and qualitatively selective in terms of their membership qualifications and their meanings-norms-values. Finally, as a result of their unity and self-direction, groups can undergo only limited variation. If a group were to radically change its set of meanings-

92 Ibid., pp. 149-150.
93 Ibid., p. 151.
94 Ibid., p. 155.
values-norms, it would lose its identity.

Sorokin's emphasis on meaning and on the vehicles which objectify meaning brings his conception of social group close to that of Mead. Sorokin also recognizes the importance of gestures as stimuli which evoke similar mental states in individuals. In contrast to Mead, Sorokin emphasizes the importance of the biological as well as the social self. As he states, "The initial constellation of the child's selfs consists of his biological selfs surrounded by his sociocultural selfs or egos." The change in or development of the social selfs is dependent upon unalterable development of the biological selfs and changes in the individual's position in his social groups.

Sorokin's conception of social group emphasizes the element of "norms" (Smith's category) which he links with "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category). Sorokin terms the process of exchange of meanings-norms-values between human individuals "interaction" (the author's category). He does not view the group as "the largest set of two or more individuals" (Smith's category) but as "two or more individuals" (the author's category).

**Conclusion: Part B**

The early American sociologists and the early European sociologists who were studied emphasize the elements of "two

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95 Ibid., pp. 58-63.
96 Ibid., p. 718.
or more individuals" (the author's category) and "interaction" (the author's category) within the social group. Because of Smith's emphasis on the possibility of non-human individuals and one-way communication within groups, none of the conceptions of the early American sociologists who were studied can be placed under his categories of "the largest set of two or more individuals" or "a network of relevant communications." Giddings, Ross, and Cooley include the notion of "a shared sense of collective identity (the author's category) but mention only contemporaneous individuals. For this reason, the conceptions of social group of Giddings, Ross, and Cooley cannot be placed under Smith's category of "a shared sense of collective identity" (see Table I). With the exception of Mead, all of the early American sociologists who emphasize "shared goal dispositions (Smith's category) also emphasize "norms" (Smith's category). The author combines both of these categories to form his own category of "shared goal dispositions." Ross and Mead emphasize the presence of a "social structure" (the author's category) for which Smith has no corresponding category.

Again, more support has been found for the author's set of categories than for Smith's. Although the early American conceptions of social group manifest greater consistency than the conceptions of the early European sociologists who were studied, they do not move in the direction of the notions contained in Smith's set of categories. In the next chapter both sets of categories will be applied to a
sample of definitions of social group in order to determine which set has the greater utility.
CHAPTER IV
DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL GROUP IN
INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY TEXTS:
1964 TO 1973

The purpose of this chapter is to apply Smith's and the author's sets of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group to a sample of definitions from introductory sociology texts between 1964 and 1973. Introductory texts are used since one of their purposes is the definition of the principal concepts in the discipline. Also, texts with more than one edition are used since these reflect the widest use.

The sample consists of 22 introductory sociology texts published in the United States.¹ Special purpose introductory sociology texts aimed at a particular occupation, such as nursing, and edited books were omitted. The author feels that this manner of sample selection is both representative and systematic.

In order to make a more effective comparison of Smith's set of categories with those of the author, this chapter is divided into three parts. Part A analyzes the definitions

of social group in order to determine the elements which each text includes in the definition. Although the definition of social group in each introductory sociology text is presented, only those elements of the definition which the author feels have a special bearing on Smith's and the author's sets of categories are analyzed. A complete breakdown of the elements in each definition is made in Tables II, III, IV, and V. In addition, an investigation is made of the entities to which social group is contrasted, e.g., categories and aggregates. The introductory texts are presented in order of publication and alphabetically by author within the same year. In part B an application of Smith's set of categories to the definitions of social group is made. Any deficiencies and/or inconsistencies in Smith's set of categories are noted here. Also, a comparison of Smith's set of categories with the author's is made to see if the same deficiencies are present. In part C the author's set of categories is applied to the definitions of social group. In this part the extent of agreement among the various texts on the definition of social group is presented.

Part A: Definitions of Social Group

In Introductory Texts

Ogburn and Nimkoff

Ogburn and Nimkoff contrast social groups to statistical and social categories. These two types of categories differ only in that the similarities between individuals are
assigned in the former and socially derived in the latter. No contrast is made with aggregates. The text states that a social group is "characterized by patterned interaction, shared beliefs and values, and 'consciousness of kind'." Although no minimum number of individuals is stated in the definition, the text does cite the dyad as the smallest type of social group.

Bell and Sirjamaki

The definition employed in this text is derived from its general system of classification which consists of the elements of intensity, duration, and frequency. Within the text it is argued that a definition including just the elements of individuals and interaction is of little utility. Such a definition includes chance encounters which are unrepeated and of short duration. They therefore use the term group "to designate those collections of people whose members have patterned interaction, roles, have a sense of belonging, and cherish some sense of purpose." In the chapter entitled "Groups and Social Systems - The Basis of Orderly Behavior," six elements are cited as essential for social groups and social systems. These are: positions, roles, relationships, status, norms, and purpose.

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4 Ibid., p. 196.
With the exception of "norms," these elements are identical with the elements cited in the definition. In the section following the definition, social groups are distinguished not only from aggregates and social categories but also from audiences, publics, or mobs.

Chinoy

Along much the same lines as the previous definitions, is the definition in this text. As it states,

A social group consists of a number of persons whose relationships are based upon a set of interrelated roles and statuses. They interact with one another in a more or less standardized fashion determined largely by the norms and values they accept. They are united or held together by a sense of common identity or similarity of interests which enables them to differentiate members from nonmembers. The social group is identified by three attributes: patterned interaction, shared or similar beliefs and values, and to use Franklin H. Giddings' phrase, consciousness of kind.5

In the same section as that in which the definition is found, social groups are differentiated from categories and aggregates.

Cuber

A social group is "any number of human beings in reciprocal communication."6 The first part of this definition could not be included under Smith's original category of "the largest set of two or more individuals" since specific reference is made only to human beings. While

Cuber does not specify a minimum number in the definition, he does so in his explanation. As he states, "A group may be of any size from two persons to, theoretically and potentially, the entire population of the world." Cuber does not explain how it is potentially possible for the entire world population to form a social group. In fact, when he distinguishes social groups from aggregates he places the world population under this definition:

An aggregation is a collectivity of persons who are held together in a physical sense by some factor other than intercommunication. The populations of a country or of the world are cases in point.

He also distinguishes social groups from categories. Cuber asserts that communication is the most important aspect of group formation but he does not explain why this is so. He also argues that communication must be two-way.

Lundberg, Schrag, Larsen, and Catton

Social group is defined in two places in this text. The first definition, which is found in the section of the text devoted to basic concepts, states that a group is "two or more persons who take each other into account in their actions and thus are held together and set apart from others." The only difference between the first and the second definition which is found in the section distinguishing social groups from categories and aggregates is the addition of the phrase

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., pp. 274-275.
"by virtue of their interaction" to the second definition. In the discussion following the second definition interaction is asserted to be "the distinctively sociological basis for the identification of social groups." 

Merrill presents two slightly different definitions of social group. In the first version a group is "two or more persons who interact over an appreciable period and share a common purpose." The previous edition of this text used the same definition but cited Ralph M. Stodgill as the source. Merrill's own definition contains some additional elements:

The group is a unit composed of two or more people who are: (a) in interaction over a more or less continuous period; (b) mutually aware of each other as members; (c) able to communicate effectively; and (d) established in a definite structure or pattern. He does not identify the exact amount of time required for interaction to lead to group formation. However, Merrill does discuss what he means by effective communication. Using Mead's conception of gestures, he argues that communication

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10 Ibid., p. 73.
11 Ibid.
is effective when an exchange of meaningful gestures between individuals has taken place.\textsuperscript{15} Aggregates and categories are not defined in the chapter on groups or in any other section of the text.

Bierstedt

This definition and the one by Vander Zanden which will follow are extremely similar. In fact, Vander Zanden acknowledges that his definition is taken from Bierstedt. Bierstedt's definition stands out since the term, group, is applied to what is usually defined as either a statistical or social category. Bierstedt illustrates four types of groups in the following table:\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consciousness of Kind</th>
<th>Social Interaction</th>
<th>Social Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Statistical</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Societal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Social</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Associational</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of the present discussion, the analysis is confined to the definition of social group alone. Using Bierstedt's illustration, one would expect to find only the elements of people, consciousness of kind, and social interaction. While this does occur, there is also the inclusion

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 14.

of crowds. In Bierstedt's words,

We use the word 'social' here in its narrowest sense, that is, to imply social contact and communication, social interaction and social intercourse. . . . In any event social groups are those in which people actually associate with one another. They can be of many kinds - friendship or acquaintance groups, classroom groups, cliques, crowds, audiences, congregations, kinship groups, passengers on the same ship, neighborhood groups, play groups, and numerous others. In these groups there is not only consciousness of kind or of some like interest but also social interaction—extending from polite conversation, or simply mutual awareness, at one pole to the most intimate relationship at the other.¹⁷

Neither category nor aggregate is defined elsewhere in the text.

Rose and Rose

Rose and Rose do not devote any specific section of their text to the definition of social group. Their definition is found in an appendix of sociological terms. For them, a group is "a number of people having some meanings and/or values in common, which other persons do not share, and who therefore have a special set of perceived expectations in relation to one another as a result of previous interactions."¹⁸ Although they do not indicate a minimum number of two individuals in their definition, they do cite it elsewhere in the text.¹⁹ They make no distinction among groups, aggregates, and categories.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 280.


¹⁹Ibid., p. 154.
Vander Zanden

Vander Zanden's discussion of social groups is similar to Bierstedt's except in his illustration. He substitutes the terms statistical and social categories for Bierstedt's statistical and societal groups and also association for associational group. He confines the term, group, only to social group which he defines with the same elements as those found in Bierstedt's definition. According to Vander Zanden,

Social groups are similar to social categories in that their members are aware that they share something in common--a consciousness of kind. They differ from social categories in one important respect--social relations between individuals. The members of a social group are in interaction with one another--that is, there is a mutual and reciprocal influencing by two or more people of each other's feelings, attitudes, and actions.

Vander Zanden as Bierstedt does not contrast social groups with aggregates.

Fichter

According to Fichter, "A group is an identifiable, structured, continuing collectivity of social persons who enact reciprocal roles according to social norms, interests, and values in the pursuit of common goals." The element of "external perception of group membership" is mentioned.


\[21\text{Ibid., p. 177.}\]

This element includes even secret societies which "have a recognizable existence, although their membership may be exclusive and hidden."\(^{23}\) Fichter asserts that superordination and subordination are always present in social groups no matter how small, informal, or equalitarian. He argues that "there is always at least a trace of subordination or superordination even in the most equalitarian groups."\(^{24}\) However he does not explain it. In this definition groups cannot be in any way transitory. In fact, one of the principal characteristics distinguishing social groups from aggregates is the brief duration of aggregates. There must also be activity, but the activity must be directed toward the realization of a goal or goals.\(^{25}\) The above factors also imply a social structure. Social groups, aggregates, and categories are viewed as separate entities.

\textbf{McNall}

The definitions of McNall and Cuber are the shortest of all those considered in the sample. McNall's definition is not even one sentence long and occurs within a discussion of associational behavior. According to McNall, "Associations differ in complexity from the most simple group, two or more people in interaction with one another, to large-scale bureaucracies with written constitutions."\(^{26}\) In McNall's view a

\(^{23}\) Ibid., pp. 106-107.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 107.
\(^{25}\) Ibid.
social group contains only two elements, people and interaction. He does not discuss the definition but instead goes into a discussion of primary and secondary groups. There is no mention of either categories or aggregates.

Toby

In this text there is no discussion of groups; the definition appears in the glossary and is referred to only once in the first chapter. Social category is defined within the definition of group. A social group is

... a plurality of interacting individuals with some sense of solidarity. (Members of a social category, e.g., the physically handicapped, are a group only in a classificatory and not an interactive sense.)

Aggregate is not defined either in the glossary or in the body of the text.

Wilson

Wilson indirectly includes people in his definition of social group. As he states,

The common conception of a group is misleading. It is not a collection of people. But if a group does not consist in people it nonetheless requires them.

It seems contradictory to state that people are not necessary to the definition of a group but are necessary for the group itself if it is to be social or human. Wilson defines a social group in the following manner: "A group consists of

---


one or more relationships whose boundaries are marked by the 
interlocking of differentiated roles and a common mission."²⁹ 
Wilson does not include his definition and discussion of social 
groups in the chapter on groups but in a footnote in the chap-
ter on socialization. Finally, Wilson includes people in 
his definitions of categories and aggregates. These defini-
tions are found immediately after his definition of social 
group.

Green

In Green's view a social group is

... an aggregate of individuals which persists in 
time, which has one or more interests and activities 
in common, and which is organized—that is, some 
members lead, others follow, and informal rules and 
statuses control social relationships within it.³⁰

The most obvious difference between this and the previous 
definition is that Green uses the term, aggregate, in his 
definition. The term, aggregate, usually implies physical 
proximity. However, in this instance, Green goes on to 
state that the individuals involved do not need to be "in 
close physical or social contact."³¹ He also does not dis-
tinguish social groups from categories and aggregates. Green 
thus uses the term to mean a collection of individuals and 
not an aggregate as usually defined by sociologists. While 
Green does not mention interaction specifically in the defi-

²⁹ Ibid., p. 30.
³⁰Arnold W. Green, Sociology: An Analysis of Life in 
1972), p. 49.
³¹Ibid.
nition, he nevertheless does include the notion of reciprocal relationships in his discussion of primary and secondary groups. Finally, he does not explain the manner in which leaders and followers are present in primary or friendship groups.

Horton and Hunt

Horton and Hunt do not claim the definition of social group which they use as their own, but neither do they indicate the source of the definition. In their discussion of definitions of social group they state, "Another quite common usage (which your authors prefer) is any number of persons who share a consciousness of membership and interaction." In the second edition of this text the authors presented a similar definition but with one exception. Instead of using the phrase, "any number of persons," as an indicator of group size, they used the term "aggregate." In the second edition they did not define aggregates. In the third edition they define an aggregate as "any physical collection of people," and categories as "a number of people who share some common characteristic." In the third edition they also distinguish social groups from categories.

32 Ibid., pp. 51-53.
In order to define social groups with greater clarity, Lowry and Rankin first emphasize that social groups are neither categories nor aggregates. They then state that "the concept of social group implies interaction between two or more individuals." In the discussion of the meaning of the definition, they also include the elements of "social structure" and "goals." In their words,

Groups possess a structure and nature of their own. They are not merely the summation of a number of responding individuals. They have a life history and purposes and goals.

Bertrand

Bertrand defines social group in two sections of his text. The first definition is found in the section dealing with the difference between social groups and society. Here, he asserts that

... a social group is a social system that involves some degree of cooperation among its members for the attainment of common goals. Furthermore, the members of a social group are distinguishable from non-members. The members of a social group have rights and obligations (social statuses and roles) that non-members do not have. The social group is thus defined by its normative structure which differentiates it from the non-group and from other groups.

The second definition which occurs in the chapter on group structure and formal organizations omits the element of


37 Ibid., p. 159.

"normative structure but deals with it in detail in the
course of the discussion. Bertrand distinguishes social
groups from statistical and societal aggregates. Societal
aggregates are defined so that they resemble what is usually
termed a social category. According to Bertrand, "Societal
aggregates are made up of individuals who are sociologically
perceived as similar in some way." Biesanz and Biesanz

They conceive of a social group as

... a plurality of persons (two or more) who interact,
take one another into account, are aware that they have
something significant in common, feel a sense of iden-
tity that sets them off from others, and have social
relationships consisting of interrelated and reciprocal
statuses.

This definition is similar to Green's except that interaction
is explicitly cited as an element of the definition. Social
group is not only contrasted with aggregates and categories
but it is also specifically stated that they are not groups.

Broom and Selznick

A group is

... any collection of persons who are bound together
by a distinctive set of social relations. This includes
everything from members of a family; adherents to
Catholicism, or participants in a mob, to citizens of
a national state. Two persons form a group if they are
friends or partners or otherwise held together and set

40 Ibid., p. 157.
41 Mavis H. Biesanz and John Biesanz, Introduction to
Sociology, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973),
p. 166.
apart from others by their relationship.\footnote{42} Broom and Selznick do not consider "consciousness of kind" to be an essential element in the social group. They argue that although similarities exist between members of a group, the members themselves may not be aware of it. Thus, "similar life experiences lead to social interaction and the formation of groups, even though people are not aware of why and how this takes place."\footnote{43} Within the section dealing with the definition of social groups, they also define and distinguish statistical aggregates and social categories.

\textbf{DeFleur, D'Antonio, and DeFleur}

These writers define social group in two places in their text.\footnote{44} Both definitions are essentially the same. However, the second definition is much more concise. The second definition refers to a social group as a "number of individuals who interact recurrently according to some pattern of social organization. This pattern includes norms, roles, social control, and social ranking.\footnote{45} Following the first definition, the authors distinguish between social groups and social categories. They argue that there is little


\footnote{43}Ibid.


\footnote{45}Ibid., p. 615.
difference between a social category and a statistical aggregate. As they state, "Such labels as statistical aggregate, collectivity, conglomerate, and even plural are more or less synonymous with social category." 46

Dressler and Carnes

This definition of social group immediately follows the definitions of aggregate and category to which it is contrasted. According to Dressler and Carnes, "A group exists when a sense of relatedness is shared by a number of individuals as a consequence of their interacting or having interacted with one another." 47 In the discussion following the definition, they argue that interaction is not enough for group formation. A sense of relatedness is also required. To bolster their assertion, they cite a hypothetical example of two individuals who meet on a train. Although the individuals may interact, they do not form a group until their interaction is oriented to some shared object or interest. It is only then that "a rudimentary feeling of relatedness has been established and these two individuals have become a group." 48

Mack and Pease

Kimball Young was the co-author of the fourth edition of this text. The definition which is found in this edition

46 Ibid., p. 38.


48 Ibid., p. 260.
is much simpler than the one found in the definition co-authored by Pease. The definition which is used in Mack and Pease is taken from another source. They define a social group as "a plurality of people 'involved in a pattern of social interaction, conscious of sharing common membership, of sharing some common understanding, and of accepting some rights and obligations that accrue only to members.' They differentiate social groups from social categories but make no reference to aggregations.

49Mack and Young confine the definition of social groups to two elements, "two or more persons in interaction" (Raymond W. Mack and Kimball Young, Sociology and Social Life, 4th ed. [New York: American Book Co., 1968], p. 24). They acknowledge that this definition covers a wide range of human association and go on to identify several different types of groups according to their intensity, frequency, and duration. They include as types of groups, audiences, crowds, and mobs (ibid., pp. 27-28). The authors call nongroups, that is, people not in interaction, aggregates. They define a human aggregate as "people who are classified together because they share some characteristic but who are not in interaction" (ibid., p. 32). Among the human aggregates are race, publics, society, and community. In this author's opinion, it is difficult to see how they can include community and society as types of aggregates in which no interaction takes place. Communities and societies are composed of groups, and groups interact. Mack and Young appear to qualify themselves somewhat in their definition of society. A society is "composed of a number of persons who share a language and a specified territorial boundary but who, for the most part never interact" (ibid., p. 33). Finally, they include social categories under the category of human aggregates but the distinction is relatively minor. As they state, "A social category is made up of persons sharing some innate characteristic which is socially defined and which therefore alters their life chances" (ibid., p. 32).

Conclusion: Part A

It is evident from the definitions of social group, which were covered in this section, that some disagreement exists on which elements are to be included within the definition. In order to determine the nature and extent of disagreement on the definition of social group, the definitions must be broken down into their constituent elements. These elements then have to be located within a set of categories. The set of categories employed must have utility. It must embrace all of the elements which are included within the definitions of social group but it must contain no elements which are not found in the original definition. The categories must also be defined in such a way that the closest possible agreement between the categories and the elements of the definitions is achieved. This is the purpose of the following parts. Part B applies those categories on which Smith and the author differed to the contemporary sample of definitions of social group. A selection from Smith's set of categories is made in order to set off more clearly the areas of disagreement between Smith and the author and to minimize redundancy in Part C. Wherever a deficiency is found in one of Smith's categories, a comparison is made with the author's category to see if it contains the same deficiency. Part C applies the author's set of categories to the sample of definitions. The interpretation of the nature and extent of disagreement among the definitions will be principally confined to this
part. At the conclusion of Part C a final comparison is
made between the set of categories used by Smith and the
set of categories used by the author. Throughout Parts B
and C the reader should refer to Table I which underscores
the differences between Smith's and the author's sets of
categories.

Part B: The Application of Smith's Set of
Categories to the Sample of Definitions

In this part only eleven of Smith's categories are
applied to the sample of definitions of social group. The
results of the application of Smith's set of categories are
presented in Tables II and III. A separate section is devoted
to each of Smith's categories. If no definitions can be
placed under a particular category, an explanation of the
reasons for their omission is given in the section concerned
with that category.

The Largest Set of Two or More Individuals

None of the texts is included under this category
because none of the texts cited the category segment of "the
largest set." All of the texts either implicitly or explicitly
included the element of "two or more individuals." Those
that did not explicitly mention this element (Green,
Vander Zanden, Bierstedt, Mack and Pease, Fichter, Horton

51 These categories are: "the largest set of two or
more individuals," "a network of relevant communications,"
"a shared sense of collective identity," "one or more shared
goal dispositions with associated normative strength," "face-
to-face interaction," "norms regarding means," "duration,"
"socioemotional patterns among group members," "mutual need
satisfaction," "intergroup relations and group representative
roles," and "role differentiation" (see Table I).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introductory Texts by Author</th>
<th>The Largest Set of Two or More Individuals</th>
<th>Network of Relevant Communications</th>
<th>Shared Sense of Collective Identity</th>
<th>Shared Goal Dispositions</th>
<th>Face-to-Face Interaction</th>
<th>Means Regarding Norms Regarding</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Mutual Need Satisfaction</th>
<th>Socioemotional Patterns Among Group Members</th>
<th>Roles Representative</th>
<th>Intergroup Relations and Role Differentiation</th>
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<td>Ogburn &amp; Nimkoff</td>
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<tr>
<th>Introductory Texts by Author</th>
<th>The Largest Set of Two or More Individuals</th>
<th>Network of Relevant Communications</th>
<th>Shared Sense of Collective Identity</th>
<th>Shared Goal Dispositions</th>
<th>Interaction Face-to-Face</th>
<th>Means Regarding Norms</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Socioemotional Patterns Among Group Members</th>
<th>Mutural Need Satisfaction</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Representative Group Relations and Intergroup Differentiation</th>
<th>Role Differentiation</th>
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<td>Biesanz &amp; Biesanz</td>
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<td>Broom &amp; Selznick</td>
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<td>Defleur et al.</td>
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<td>Dressler &amp; Carnes</td>
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TABLE III
FREQUENCY OF APPEARANCE OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL GROUP (SMITH'S SET OF CATEGORIES ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Smith's Set of Categories</th>
<th>Percentage of Texts Citing Each Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Largest Set of Two or More Individuals</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network of Relevant Communications</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Sense of Collective Identity</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Goal Dispositions</td>
<td>64 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-Face Interaction</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms Regarding Means</td>
<td>41 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>23 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioemotional Patterns Among Group Members</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Need Satisfaction</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup Relations and Group Representative Roles</td>
<td>18 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Differentiation</td>
<td>45 (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL NUMBER OF TEXTS - 22
& Hunt, Bell & Sirjamaki, Bertrand, Defleur et al.) use such terms as "a number of," "a plurality of," "collections of," or cite the dyad as the basic group. In addition, all of the texts refer to persons or human beings. There is no mention of non-human groups. Therefore, the 21 texts which cited the element of "two or more individuals" could be placed under the author's category of the same name but not under Smith's category, "the largest set of two or more individuals."

A Network of Relevant Communications

Again, no text implied this category because of Smith's emphasis on both one-way and two-way communication. Fifteen of the twenty-two texts in the sample explicitly cite "interaction" as an element in the definition of social group. Those that do not explicitly cite this element (Cuber, Green, Vander Zanden, Fichter, Broom & Selznick, Wilson, Bertrand) instead use the terms "reciprocal communication," "relationships," and "contact and cooperation." Throughout the texts, there is always at least the implication of two-way communication but no implication of one-way communication. Thus, the author's category of "interaction," which underscores two-way communication, is more closely in alignment with the sample of definitions.

A Shared Sense of Collective Identity

This category is also not cited by the texts in the same sense as that used by Smith. Building on his statement about the possibility of one-way relationships, Smith had added that a member of a group must merely believe "that
there is at least one other individual in space-time who also views himself as a member of the same collective entity and who in turn believes in the existence of other members. In order to explain the difficulties inherent in this category, a hypothetical example of a group made up of a living and a dead member will be used. The above example is consistent with Smith's notion that a group can exist whose members are widely separated in space-time. If communication in this group is one-way, then how can the deceased individual recognize himself as a member of the same collective entity as the living individual? Secondly, Smith's emphasis on belief does not permit the use of any of the definitions of social group in this category. In Smith's view, a member of the group does not have to know another individual who recognizes himself as a member of the same collective entity. It is only required that he believes in the existence of such an individual. All of the texts which cited this element (see Tables IV and V) spoke of simultaneously existing individuals who know another member of the same collective entity. This is the same sense in which the author's category, "a shared sense of collective identity," is used. Smith's category of the same name goes beyond the notion contained in the text definitions by including the elements of belief and individuals widely separated in space-time. In addition, five of the

sixteen texts (Vander Zanden, Ogburn & Nimkoff, Bierstedt, Make & Pease, Horton & Hunt) specifically cite "consciousness of kind" which is included within the author's category.

One or More Shared Goal Dispositions with Associated Normative Strength and Norms Regarding Means

The author's category used the same title as did Smith. However, Smith's category of "norms regarding means" was deleted and used within the author's category of "one or more shared goal dispositions." In the author's opinion, goals or ends logically imply the existence of the means to attain them. Tables II and III reveal that of the fourteen texts which employed the category of "goal dispositions" in their definition of social group, nine also contained the element of "norms regarding means." The remaining texts (Ogburn & Nimkoff, Merrill, Wilson, Lowry & Rankin, Mack & Pease) link norms and social groups either in different chapters of sections. Although Smith separated the two categories, the sample of definitions indicates that they are connected. The incorporation of the category "norms regarding means" within the category "goal dispositions" serves to simplify the analysis and still accurately relates the meaning of the definitions.

Role Differentiation and Intergroup Relations and Group Representative Roles

Like Smith, the author also uses the category "role
differentiation." However, the author's category "role differentiation" embodies the category "intergroup relations." The four texts (Lundberg et al., Fichter, Green, Biesanz & Biesanz) which cite "intergroup relations" as an element also cite "role differentiation." With the exception of Lundberg et al., those texts which list both of these also include a greater number of elements in their definition. Therefore, it is the author's contention that the categories "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations" do not reflect a real difference in definitions but only a difference in the explicitness of the definitions.

**Duration**

Although there is no disagreement between Smith and the author on the nature of this category, it is included in this part because of an assumption which the author made. The author decided to add the category of "social structure" on the assumption that those texts which employed "duration" in their definition would also employ "social structure." This assumption is not substantiated. Rose and Rose cite "duration" but do not also include the author's category "social structure." Nevertheless, this category is retained by the author on the basis of its use, since twelve texts do include it as an element in their definition.

**Face-to-Face Interaction, Socioemotional Patterns Among Group Members, and Mutual Need Satisfaction**

No text cited "face-to-face interaction" as an element in the definition of social group. In every instance, this
element was used in the definition of primary groups. Additionally, there was no mention of "socioemotional patterns among group members" or "mutual need satisfaction." These elements were also cited principally in the discussion of primary groups. All three of these categories are excluded from the author's set of categories.

Conclusion: Part B

Throughout this part, an analysis has been made of the application of Smith's set of categories to the definitions of social group found in the sample of introductory texts. The deficiencies which the author found in attempting to apply Smith's set of categories have been noted. Tables II and III reveal that eight of the 22 texts did not fit Smith's set of categories. Six of the eleven categories on which Smith and the author differed were not cited by any text in the sample. Thus, support has been found for the modifications, additions, and deletions which the author made in deriving his own set of categories from Smith's set of categories. In Part C the author's set of categories alone will be applied to the definitions of social group.

Part C: The Application of the Author's Set of Categories to the Sample of Definitions

Tables IV and V present the results of the application of the author's set of categories to the definitions of social group. It should be kept in mind that each of the categories of "Action," "Duration," and "External Perception of Group Identity" is used in the same sense as employed by
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Ogburn &amp; Winkoff</th>
<th>Bell &amp; Sirimakei</th>
<th>Chinoy</th>
<th>Cuber</th>
<th>Lundberg et al.</th>
<th>Merrill</th>
<th>Bierstedt</th>
<th>Rose &amp; Ross</th>
<th>Vander Zanden</th>
<th>Fichter</th>
<th>McNall</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introductory Texts by Author</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

(continued on page 99)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introductory Texts by Author</th>
<th>Two or More Initiators</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Shared Sense of Collective Identity</th>
<th>Shared Goal Dispositions</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>External Perception of Group Identity</th>
<th>Role Differentiation</th>
<th>Social Structure</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Toby</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horton &amp; Hunt</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowry &amp; Rankin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biesanz &amp; Biesanz</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Broom &amp; Selznick</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defleur et al.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dressler &amp; Carnes</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Mack &amp; Pease</td>
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TABLE V
FREQUENCY OF APPEARANCE OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES 
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL GROUP 
(AUTHOR'S SET OF CATEGORIES ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Author's Set of Categories</th>
<th>Percentage of Texts Citing Each Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Individuals</td>
<td>100 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>100 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Sense of Collective Identity</td>
<td>73 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Goal Dispositions</td>
<td>64 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>23 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Perception of Group Identity</td>
<td>5 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Differentiation</td>
<td>45 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure</td>
<td>55 (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL NUMBER OF TEXTS - 22
Smith (see Table I). The analysis in this part will be confined mainly to the determination of the extent of agreement and disagreement on the nature of social group. However, the conclusion will again compare Smith's and the author's sets of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group.

All of the texts include the category of "two or more individuals" either explicitly or implicitly in the definitions of social group. While Wilson does not explicitly cite this category in his definition, he does state that individuals are necessary for a group to exist. Complete unanimity is also achieved on the inclusion of the element of interaction.

The most frequently cited category is "a shared sense of collective identity." Of the five texts which did not cite this element, two (Cuber and McNall) cite only individuals and interaction as essential to social groups. The three remaining texts (Wilson, Lowry & Rankin, DeFleur et al.) cite "shared goal dispositions" as a third element. "Shared goal dispositions" is cited by fourteen of the texts. Omitting Cuber and McNall, all those texts which did not include this category did include the category "a shared sense of collective identity."

The categories "role differentiation" and "social structure" appear to be linked. Eight of the ten texts which cite "role differentiation" also cite "social structure" as an element in the definition. With the exception
of Rose and Rose, if we combine the texts including either "role differentiation" or "social structure" as categories, we then have the same texts which cite "shared goal dispositions" as a category in the definition of social group.

Of the five texts which cite "duration" as a category, two (Green, Rose & Rose) do not discuss the reason for its inclusion elsewhere in their texts. Fichter cites this category as "one of the most important marks distinguishing a social group from a transient aggregate." Finally, two texts (Merrill, DeFleur et al.) include this category as an element in the development of social structure.

Only one text (Fichter) cited "action" and "external perception of group membership" within the definition of social group. The text emphasizes action on both the individual and group level. It contends that social groups "are knowable, that is, it is possible to find out about them."

Twelve of the 22 texts distinguish social groups from aggregates and categories. One text (Toby) distinguishes them from categories only. One text (Lowry & Rankin) distinguishes social groups from statistical aggregates and statistical categories. One text (Vander Zanden) distinguishes social groups from statistical and social categories and another (Bertrand) from statistical and societal aggregates. Finally, five texts (Merrill, Bierstedt, Rose & Rose, Green, McNall) did not cite aggregates or categories.

53 Fichter, Sociology, p. 108.
54 Ibid., p. 107.
Conclusion: Part C

David Horton Smith's article emphasized the importance of the elements of group size, a communication network, a shared collective identity, and goal orientations as essential to social groups. The analysis which has just been accomplished provides some support for this definition but with certain qualifications. These modifications were discussed in Part B.

If the category "the largest set of two or more individuals" is changed to "two or more individuals" and if only human individuals are included then complete unanimity on this category is found. It cannot be denied that grouplike behavior occurs among non-human individuals. However, it may be argued that this behavior is instinctual rather than learned. Among the sociologists investigated, the definition was confined to human individuals alone.

Smith states in his discussion of the category "a network of relevant communications" that it is not necessary . . . that the communication be two-way for a group to exist, this again permits members who are widely separated in space-time or who are reacting to a commonly perceived event or message without ever having had any opportunity for feedback communication to the source.

This assertion does not receive support from the sample of definitions of social group. Rather the emphasis is on feedback communication or interaction alone. The substi-

55 Idem, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group'": 141.
56 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
tution of the author's category "interaction" for "a network of relevant communications" leads to the finding of complete agreement on its inclusion within the definition of social group.

Using the author's category "a shared sense of collective identity" which incorporates the notion of mutual recognition by simultaneously existing individuals, one finds that sixteen of the texts cite this as an element. Incorporating Smith's category of "norms regarding means" within the author's category "one or more shared goal dispositions with associated normative strength" in no way affects the support which this category receives. Of the remaining categories, only the categories "social structure" and "role differentiation" receive any kind of consistent support from the definitions in the sample.

The use of the author's set of categories suggests a modified version of Smith's definition of social group. A social group is two or more individuals in interaction who possess a shared sense of collective identity and one or more shared goal dispositions. While this modified definition has received support from the sample of texts, the author agrees with Smith that research must be done which "will permit determination of whether grouplike phenomena are indeed markedly more common" with the use of a particular definition.57

57Ibid., p. 149.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is to present a final summation of Smith's and the author's positions on their sets of categories for the analysis of social group definitions. In order to avoid redundancy and to increase clarity, this chapter focuses primarily on the basic positions of Smith and the author and not on the sets of categories themselves. Smith's set of categories contains three positions which the author does not accept: (1) The inclusion of non-human individuals; (2) all individuals in space-time, and (3) one-way communication. These positions are incorporated within his set of categories and his definition of social group.

The author includes only human individuals in his set of categories because the existence of non-human social groups has yet to be sufficiently demonstrated. Based on his assumption that a complete group contains all individuals in space-time, Smith argues that it is difficult to know when a group no longer exists. In his words,

The fact that there are no living members of a given group is supporting evidence for its death, but not

1Konrad Lorenz argues for the existence of non-human social groups in On Aggression (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 159-211. However, he does not adequately prove that the behavior of non-human forms manifests the possession of a culture or is in any way self-conscious.
conclusive evidence, since at any future time (as long as there are living organisms) one or more individuals may join. . . . Thus a current group is a temporal cross-section and should not be confused with the group as a whole.²

If Smith's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, then it appears that sociologists never study complete groups since they can never know who may become a group member in the distant future. Because the subject matter of any science is directly or indirectly observable phenomena, the author confines group membership to contemporaneous individuals. The author also agrees with Warriner that if groups are real so are their components.³

Throughout his article, Smith emphasizes that two-way communication is not essential to group formation and maintenance. According to Smith,

> The most extreme example of a group possessing only one-way communication might be that of a secret religious group or organization that attracted members by one-way communication through a written tract which enjoined anyone who became a group member to do good works in accord with the religion but without ever revealing his group membership to anyone.⁴

The author does not agree that this example is a social group. There are no reciprocal relations or exchange of meaningful gestures or symbols. Individuals respond to the religious tract and act as if no other individuals who possess


⁴Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group'": 156.
the same goal orientations exist. Response takes place within the individual and action is confined to those who are unaware of the individual's "group" affiliation. Thus, there is no interaction. Throughout this paper, the author has emphasized "interaction" as defined by Theodorson and Theodorson:

The basic social process represented in communication and a mutual relationship between two or more individuals (or groups). Interaction between persons is social behavior. Through language, symbols, and gestures people exchange meanings and have a reciprocal effect upon each other's behavior, expectations, and thought.\(^5\)

In the author's opinion it is reciprocal relations and communication which make a group. Because of Smith's three positions mentioned above, none of the conceptions of social group of the early European and American sociologists who were studied nor any of the social group definitions from the sample of introductory sociology texts (1964-1973) could be placed under Smith's categories of "the largest set of two or more individuals," "a network of relevant communications," or "a shared sense of collective identity." All of the early European and American sociologists' conceptions of social group and all of the social group definitions from the sample of texts fit the author's categories "two or more individuals" and "interaction." Five of the thirteen conceptions of social group of the early European and American sociologists who were studied and

sixteen of the sample of 22 text definitions of social group were included under the author's category of "a shared sense of collective identity."

The second area of disagreement between Smith and the author centers around the problem of parsimony. Smith used separate categories for the notions of "goal dispositions," "norms," "the division of labor," and "leaders and followers." It is the author's position that Smith's use of these notions in separate categories is redundant. For this reason, the author placed Smith's notions of "goal dispositions" and "norms" within his category of "shared goal dispositions" and Smith's notions of "the division of labor" and "leaders and followers" within his category "role differentiation" (see pp. 14-15). The author's position has received some support from the conceptions of social group of the early European and American sociologists who were studied and the sample of introductory sociology text definitions which were analyzed in the previous chapters.7

The third area of disagreement between Smith and the author concerns the use of what, in the author's opinion,

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6These notions are found in Smith's categories, "shared goal dispositions," "norms regarding means," "role differentiation," and "intergroup relations and group representative roles" respectively.

7All of the conceptions of social group of the early European and American sociologists who were studied that emphasize "shared goal dispositions" and "role differentiation," also emphasize "norms regarding means" and "intergroup relations and group representative roles" respectively. Nine of the fourteen texts which cite "shared goal dispositions" also cite "norms regarding means," and four of the ten texts which cite "role differentiation" also cite intergroup relations and group representative roles."
are non-essential categories: "face-to-face interaction," "socioemotional patterns among group members," and "mutual need satisfaction." Because none of the conceptions of social group of the early European and American sociologists who were studied and none of the introductory sociology text definitions in the sample cite these categories, the author's position received support. The author does not maintain that the elements contained in Smith's categories do not occur in some social groups, but simply that they do not occur in all social groups.

The final area of disagreement between Smith and the author concerns the absence of a category in Smith's set of categories corresponding to the notion of "social structure." The author argued that those authors who cited "duration" would also cite "social structure." While this argument did not receive support from the conceptions of the early European and American sociologists who were studied or the sample of social group definitions, it was nevertheless cited in two of the early European sociologists' conceptions of social group, two of the early American sociologists' conceptions of social group and the definitions of social group in ten of the 22 introductory sociology texts which were sampled.

The purpose of this paper has not been to invalidate Smith's definition of social group or his set of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group. Rather the attempt has been to compare Smith's and the author's sets of categories to determine which has the greater utility. A
useful set of categories can serve as an accurate indicator of the maturity of the discipline. This paper also makes a contribution to the development of the discipline by presenting the reader with another perspective for the analysis of social group definitions. The author agrees with George Simpson who states:

It must be recognized that, given the kind of data with which the social sciences deal, disagreement is not only healthy but altogether necessary, indeed indispensable. From this welter of complexity and dispute every social scientist worth his salt soon learns the significance of a point of view, that is, of holding to a conceptual scheme and a frame of reference even though they may be different from those of his fellows, for it is from differing points of view that social science has made most progress. Over the long term and sometimes even over the short term, certain points of view show themselves as partial or incapable of explaining the phenomena they purport to encompass. This failure, resulting from a meagerness of conceptual scheme or frame of reference and the dissatisfaction stemming from it, finally result in advancement.

The ultimate value of this work can be determined only by the utility of the author's set of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group in further analyses of the concept.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SAMPLE


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