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Moral Reasoning Structures & Character Structures: A Review & Extension of Relationships between Moral Judgment Stages & Personality Organization

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MORAL REASONING STRUCTURES AND CHARACTER STRUCTURES: A REVIEW AND EXTENSION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT STAGES AND PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION

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Ackowledgements

When I began my exploration into moral reasoning I believed along with Lawrence Kohlberg that justice is the basis of morality. Three years and many friends later, I now see as does Lawrence LeShan that the opposite of 'injustice' is not 'justice' but 'love.' I want to acknowledge those who in their highest sense of morality gave of themselves to me not from a sense of justice but from love. Justice is a minimal schema of moral development; a fully embodied theory of moral development must encompass love as a higher core of moral reasoning. Each of the following friends in their own way have contributed to my being during this journey into character: Art Camplone, John Linden, Steve Finkelstein, Harvey and Sue Landress, Marilyn and Jim Faulconer, Carol Burt, John Crusey, Sandy Motter, Shannon Mountjoy, Becky Selove, and the staff of the Western Kentucky University Computer Center. Such a pilgrimage into character had to begin with my parents, Leslie and Eileen Wilmoth, and was further deepended by Bill Hawkins. Special acknowledgement goes to Sam and Cheryl McFarland whose open hospitality, concern, and encouragement has sustained me through this journey. The most sustaining and giving of all has been Peggy Bulger whose love was always there in the blackest nights of despair and the bleached days of loneliness, pain and hurt. I know no higher morality than the love of these friends who have walked beside me these past years.

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MORAL REASONING STRUCTURES AND CHARACTER STRUCTURES: A REVIEW AND EXTENSION OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT STAGES AND PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION

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The theoretical and empirical relationships of moral behavior and moral judgment to personality were reviewed. Kohlberg's moral development theory and Fromm's character development theory provided the integrating organization for the review of nineteen personality variables examined with six moral judgment instruments.

The Moral Judgment Scale, the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, the Objective Moral Judgment Scale, and the Measure of Moral Values were administered to eighty adult students. Four problems were tested: (1) psychometric comparisons of the four moral reasoning instruments, (2) a test of a trait theory of moral character, (3) a test of increased self-actualization with moral development, and (4) a test of a structural model of moral reasoning and character.

Comparison of the MJS and SMJS essentially replicated the findings reported by Gilligan, et al (1971). Analysis of the OMJS revealed that its reliability was inadequate for research purposes and failed to parallel the MJS scores. The MMV possessed substantial reliability and its scores paralleled MJS scores. The MMV scores failed to statistically distinguish the moral stage classifications.

The test of a trait theory of moral character involved analyzing the POI and 16 PF subscale scores for the moral stage groups on the MJS. This analysis failed to reveal either a substantial number or consistent set of

significant findings. The trait theory was rejected as being inadequate to explain moral development.

Analyses of POI scores by moral stage groups indicated that self-actualization did not significantly increase with moral development. MJS stages 3 and 5 individuals possessed the most consistent set of high POI scores. Moral development as a concomitant construct of an increase in the self-actualization construct under examination was rejected.

A factor analysis of the POI and 16 PF scores was further examined by a discriminant analysis with the MJS moral stages as the a priori groups. This analysis revealed two significant dimensions which distinguish the moral stage groups: ego strength - superego strength, and conventionality. Stage 2 subjects showed the lowest superego strength scores, the highest ego strength scores and the highest conventionality scores. Stage 3 individuals had scores on all three dimensions between those of the stage 4 and 5 subjects. Stage 4 individuals had the highest superego strength scores and the lowest ego strength scores. Stage 5 subjects possessed a balanced proportion of ego strength and superego strength with the least amount of conventionality.

This model of character predicted over 86% of all subjects correctly into Kohlberg's three primary levels of moral reasoning: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. The prediction rate of the model remained significantly higher than chance when five stages of moral judgment were used. This evidence supported the conclusion that there is a significant characterlogical component in the development of adult moral reasoning.

Chapter I

Consistency of Moral Character: An Historical Overview

To be told that one is a moral person is generally considered a strong compliment of one's character. This use of the term 'moral' as a compliment indicates its colloquial usage as a trait of personality. Such a perspective tends to either dichotomize people into moral and immoral or to place them along a continuum between these two extremes. The consistency of a moral trait of personality has received extensive investigation. This chapter will review the historical development of both the theoretical conceptualization of moral character and the research undertaken which attempted to verify the various theories.

Psychologists have generally rejected such a conceptualization as being manifestly too simple. Hartshorne and May (1928 and 1929) concluded from behavioral measures of moral character of children that there was little evidence for the existence of a constant moral factor in personality. This conclusion was based on an analysis of the evidence which indicated that acts in a potentially moral situation were as much a function of the specific situation as of the individual. Critics (Allport, Vernon & Lindzey, 1960; and Burton, 1976) of Hartshorne and May's findings re-analyzed and re-interpreted the data. They have detected a variety of constant trends in the evidence: developmental, socio-economic, and a personality moral trait. One trend clearly emerges from the numerous interpretations of Hartshorne and May's evidence: there is little agreement on the consistency of moral character.

Havighurst and Taba: The Organization of Character

Havighurst and Taba (1949) believed that moral character was a trait of personality and therefore was characterized by organization and persistence. Instead of studying specific behaviors, they used primarily reputational measures. These measures were thought to disclose the persistence of moral character. They further used a number of projective instruments, questionnaires and case studies to discern organizational characteristics of moral character. This combination of reputational measures (based on observations of moral conduct by peers), projective measures, case studies, and questionnaires on moral beliefs and values distinguished a persistent, moral character trait.

This moral character trait consisted of five dimensions: honesty, responsibility, loyalty, friendliness, and moral courage. Significant and substantial correlations were found between these traits across subjects.

The total organization of the individual's values, attitudes, impulses, abilities, habits, and ratings was studied. Five personality types were empirically delineated from the data as shown in Table 1. A Clinical Conference Group determined the personality profile which consisted of factors characterizing each member of that type but no other.

The self-directed, adaptive, and submissive persons all had 'high' character reputations while the remaining two types were characterized by 'low' character reputations. An individual with a 'good' character could possess any one of three personality structures. These subjects with 'good' character, however, varied in their profiles of the five moral traits of honesty, responsibility, loyalty, friendliness, and

Table 1

Havighurst and Taba's Character Types

Area	Personality Type				
	Self-Directive	Adaptive	Submissive	Defiant	Unadjusted
Social personality	Ambitious Conscientious Orderly Persistent Introspective	Outgoing Confident Positive, favorable reactions to environment	Timid Does not initiate action Stubborn Avoids conflict	Openly hostile Self-defensive Blames society for failure	Discontented Complaining Not openly hostile
Character reputation	High Higher on H and R than on F	High Higher on F than on H and R	Average to high Higher on H and R than on F	Very low Higher on MC than on other traits	Low to average

continued

Area	Personality Type				
	Self-Directive	Adaptive	Submissive	Defiant	Unadjusted
Moral beliefs and principles	Variable High uncertainty	High Little uncertainty	High Some uncertainty	Low	Low to average
Family environment	Strict family training Some conflict with family	Permissive family training No conflict with family	Severe family training No conflict with family	Family training inconsistent, provides no basis for constructive character formation Conflict with family Early neglect	Variable family training Conflict with family

continued

Area	Personality Type				
	Self-Directive	Adaptive	Submissive	Defiant	Unadjusted
Social adjustment with age mates	Leader Active in school skills	Very popular Active in school affairs Awkward in social skills	Follower Nonentity Awkward in social skills	Unpopular Hostile to school activities Quarrelsome	Unpopular Hostile or indifferent to school activities
Intellectual ability	Average to high	Average to high	Low to average Seldom high	Low to high	Low to high
School achievement	High, or higher than IQ would imply	Fair to high	Fair Seldom high	Low, or lower than IQ would imply	Low, or lower than IQ would imply

continued

Area	Personality Type				
	Self-Directive	Adaptive	Submissive	Defiant	Unadjusted
Personal adjustment	Self-doubt Self-critical Some anxiety, but well controlled Concern about moral problems Average aggressiveness Moves away from people Lack of warmth in human relations Gains security through achievement	High on all adjustment measures Self-assured No signs of anxiety Unaggressive Moves toward people	Self-doubt Self-critical Submissive to authority Unaggressive	Hostile to authority Aggressive impulses Inadequately socialized Moves against people	Aggressive impulses Feelings of insecurity

From: Havighurst and Taba Adolescent character and personality Table 19. Note: F=Friendliness, H=Honesty, and R=Responsibility

moral courage. Adaptive persons were higher on friendliness than on honesty and responsibility. Self-directive individuals, conversely, were higher on honesty and responsibility than on friendliness.

Two types of criticisms can be made of Havighurst and Taba's study. One area of criticism concerns the selection of moral traits. The traits of loyalty and friendliness are open to challenge. The trait of loyalty has been seriously impugned by the commission of inhumane acts by Hitler's subordinates and dishonest acts by Nixon's subordinates. Friendliness was not defined but appeared to include sociality, altruism, and empathy as defining characteristics. Sociability is neither a necessary nor sufficient component of morality. The unethical used car salesman succeeds on his sociability skills.

The second area of criticism concerns the data itself. Almost a third of the subjects could not be typed by personality. The population sample was divided on a mean split into high moral versus low moral groups. The personality types were clinically rather than statistically derived and maximized traits which were exclusive to a type. This exclusivity principle may have hidden trait similarities within the two character groups which were more important than the exclusive traits. The correlations of moral traits were based on reputational measures. A potential halo effect is an inherent liability of such a reputational rating scale and may be the basis of spurious correlations.

Although Havighurst and Taba divided their subjects into dichotomous 'high' versus 'low' character types, they further noted both distinctive moral trait profiles within each extreme and different levels of variability, relativity, and ambiguity in moral beliefs and principles within the polar types, a finding which further substantiates the complexity of

moral character.

Wright (1971), after reviewing Hartshorne and May's research, Havighurst and Taba's research and additional research on five aspects of moral behavior, concluded that individual differences in one aspect of morality were only weakly and uncertainly associated with individual differences in other aspects. If valid, there is great difficulty in treating morality as a network of moral traits. Wright suggests that each trait is a complex dimension which is influenced by many different kinds of learning and experience. Wright further concluded that "character is defined not so much through an inventory of actions performed, as by a description of the principles that give coherence and meaning to an individual's behavior, and of the relatively enduring dispositions and motivations that underly it " (p. 203). This conception of character (and thus morality) clearly denotes its two components: moral reasoning and moral behavior.

Peck and Havighurst: The Structure of Character

The research reported in The Psychology of Character Development by Peck and Havighurst (1960) was a follow-up study begun in 1948 of the subjects in Havighurst and Taba's 1943 sample. They selected thirty-four of the original subjects who were administered additional and repeated measures on a wide range of psychological components. The types of measures were essentially the same as in the previous research: self-report projective and objective measures, reputational measures, and clinical interviews.

Peck proposed the theoretical typology upon which to design their research and to interpret the findings. He drew this typology from a synthesis of Freud's oral, anal, and genital developmental stages, Fromm's (1947) receptive, exploitative, hoarding, marketing, and productive

character stages, and Reisman's (1960) anomy, tradition-directed conformity, other-directed conformity, and autonomy types. A significant theoretical contribution of Peck was his introduction of a developmental theory to accompany and explain character. This schema is presented in Table 2.

> This set of character types was intended to (1) be defined and labeled in terms of the control system the individual uses to adapt his search for satisfaction to the requirements of the social world, (2) include all the possible modes of adaptation, (3) be defined in terms of motivation (so long as it achieves behavioral expression), (4) represent both operational patterns of behavior, and the stage of psychosocial development to which each pattern presumably is most appropriate. (p. 4)

Peck's motivational theory of character expressed the theories of Freud (unconscious motivational dynamics) and Fromm's conative structures. Peck and Havighurst's research represents the first American study to be based on data other than behavior. Their emphasis was on the individual's reasons for acting either morally or not morally. Only reasoning associated with actual behavior was considered; reasoning about hypothetical moral behavior was not included. This study is, therefore, an intermediate type of analysis between the purely behavioral analysis of Hartshorne and May (1928 and 1929) and Kohlberg's (1958) strictly cognative analysis.

The over seventy measures of personality collected were analyzed as comprising six personality factors (see Tables 3 and 4). These six factors were then applied in two different analyses. In the first analysis, the eight observed character types were rank ordered by the relative proportion of Rational-Altruistic character structure the subject possessed. This ranking from lowest to highest percentage of Rational-Altruistic reasoning was called 'Maturity of Character.' The six personality factors

Table 2

Peck's Developmental Schema of Character

Character Type	Developmental Period
Amoral	Infancy
Expedient	Early Childhood
Conforming	Later Childhood
Irrational-Conscientious	Later Childhood
Rational-Altruistic	Adolescence & Adulthood

Table 3

Factorial Pattern of the Personality Characteristics:

Peck and Havighurst [1]

Trait	Before Rotation				After Second Rotation			Personality* Vector					
	I	II	III	IV	I"	II'	III'	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Functional IQ	.77†	.38	.25	-.18	.51	.17	.72		2				
3. Observation	.81	.26	.14	.10	.58	.05	.63		2				
4. Insight	.83	.33	.34	.03	.48	.11	.81		2				
5. Empathy	.42	.10	.28	.19	.16	-.01	.49				4		
6. Locus of Concern	.86	.13	-.08	.32	.73	-.09	.48		2				
7a. Outward Acceptance of Father's code	.28	-.41	-.10	-.37	.19	-.47	.02						-6
7b. Positive Feeling toward Father	.51	-.09	.33	-.21	.17	-.22	.55				4		
7c. Negative Feeling toward Father	.06	.35	.22	-.18	.00	.32	.28						
8a. Outward Acceptance of Mother's Code	.47	-.27	-.66	-.23	.81	.14	-.20	1					
8b. Positive Feeling toward Mother	.71	-.11	.16	.06	.42	-.29	.53		2				

continued

Trait	Before Rotation				After Second Rotation			Personality* Vector					
	I	II	III	IV	I'	II'	III'	1	2	3	4	5	6
8c. Negative Feeling toward Mother	-.51	.63	.08	.05	-.31	.73	-.15						6
9a1. Outward Feeling toward Same-Sex Peers	.73	.17	.16	-.18	.49	-.02	.59		2				
9a2. Inner Feeling toward Same-Sex Peers	.36	-.19	.33	-.12	.03	-.28	.44				4		
9b1. Outward Feeling toward Opposite-Sex Peers	.57	-.06	-.22	.36	.55	-.20	.16	1					
9b2. Inner Feeling toward Opposite-Sex Peers	.38	-.35	-.21	.54	.34	-.44	.01						-6
11. Range of Moral Horizon	.84	.19	-.31	.04	.87	-.03	.30	1					
12. Emotional Maturity	.90	.14	-.06	.11	.74	-.09	.51		2				

continued

Trait	Before Rotation				After Second Rotation			Personality* Vector					
	I	II	III	IV	I"	II'	III'	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. Identity of Impulse and Behavior	.26	-.17	.68	.34	-.26	-.23	.65				4		
14. Heteronomy-Autonomy	86	.28	.35	.07	.49	.05	.84		2				
15a. Assignment of Responsibility	.90	.14	.13	.21	.63	-.10	.66		2				
15b. Rationality	.92	.25	.11	.08	.69	.01	.67		2				
16a. Inner Consistency	.92	.05	-.06	.04	.73	-.18	.51		2				
16b. Conformity	.65	.15	-.66	-.35	.93	-.02	-.11	1					
17. Guilts about Outer Behavior	-.32	.19	-.33	.30	.00	.26	-.43				-4		
18. Guilts about Inner Behavior	-.52	.62	.04	.16	-.30	.73	-.19						6
19. Self-Perception	.89	.21	.10	.08	.66	-.02	.65			2			
27. Emotional Stability	.80	.19	-.43	-.23	.91	-.02	.18	1					
28a. Absence of Overt Hostility	.57	-.17	-.49	-.17	.70	-.31	-.07	1					

continued

Trait	Before Rotation I	II	III	IV	After Second Rotation I'	II'	III'	Personality* Vector 1 2 3 4 5 6
28b. Absence of Covert Hostility	.64	-.57	-.18	.24	.49	-.71	.16	5
30. Superego Strength	.40	.62	-.46	-.12	.71	.50	-.02	3

*P1: Moral Stability, P2: Ego Strength, P3: Superego Strength, P4: Spontaneity, P5: Friendliness, P6: Hostility-Guilt Complex.

†With an N of 34 children, loadings of .20 or less considered to be not significantly different from zero. Loadings above .40 are the only ones of significance in the table.

1 Based on Table 20, p. 244 from Peck and Havighurst (1960).

Table 4

Peck and Havighurst's Personality Factors in Character

Label	Description
Moral Stability	Tendency to follow the established moral code, willingly and with genuine satisfaction.
Ego Strength	A complex of capacities to react to event with accurate perception, appropriate emotions, and insightful, rational judgment; all proceeding from a well-integrated personality system.
Superego Strength	The degree to which behavior is directed by or in accord with, a set of internalized moral principles--a conscience.
Spontaneity	Tendency to express feelings and wishes directly in action.
Friendliness	A generalized attitude of warm liking for other people.
Hostility-Guilt Complex	A complex of intense feelings of hostility, linked with strong feelings of guilt about inner impulses.

were correlated with Maturity of Character (see Table 5).

This preliminary analysis indicated that consistency in overt morality as measured by the Moral Stability factor was more dependably produced as one moved up the Maturity of Character scale from Expedient, to Conforming, to Rational-Altruistic character structure. This finding was somewhat surprising since it was hypothesized that the Conforming and Irrational-Conscientious types would be as consistent as the Rational-Altruistic type.

Another unexpected finding concerned the Spontaneity factor. One view of human nature assumes that spontaneous expression of human nature unleashes man's innately evil self. The findings not only revealed that spontaneity was not inversely related to morality but also that the actual relationship was curvilinear. Both those at the low end of the Maturity of Character scale and those at the high end showed a high degree of spontaneity. Subjects with an intermediate maturity of character (Conforming and Irrational-Conscientious) had low spontaneity scores.

The Hostility-Guilt correlation was less significant than the other measures. Further analysis revealed that this factor clearly differentiated Amoral (high hostility-guilt) type subjects from Rational-Altruistic (low hostility-guilt) subjects but was inconsistent within the other character types. Peck and Havighurst concluded from this series of analyses that mature character requires rational judgement, emotional maturity, and psychological integration.

In the second analysis in which the personality factors were used, the factor scores were visually charted by character type using pre-selected ranges of scores. I rearranged their Table 6 for clearer interpretation by transforming the scores into a graph (see Figure 1). This analysis was used to generate the personality profiles for each character type.

Table 5

Correlations of Personality, Character, and Moral Reputation

Personality Vector	Maturity of Character	Adult Reputation	Peer Reputation
Moral Stability	.84	.74	.63
Ego Strength	.77	.55	.69
Superego Strength	.68	.63	.53
Spontaneity	.24	.05	.16
Friendliness	.57	.13	.04
Hostility - Guilt	-.33	-.25	-.07

Levels of significance: .44 = .01; .54 = .001; .33 = .05.

From Peck & Havighurst, 1960, p. 87, Table 5.

Figure 1

Peck & Havighurst's Character-Type Profiles on The Personality Factors



Analysis of these character-type rating profiles revealed eight distinct patterns of profiles. The resulting analysis of character and personality, therefore, included the eight observed character types. Each type will be briefly described.

The Amoral type is characterized by low ego strength; poor control over impulses; hostile, immature emotionality; inappropriate emotional lability; active, generalized hostility; weak superego strength, lacking any integrated system of internalized moral principles; blind impulsiveness; poorly socialized; irrational; suffering from punitive but ineffectual guilt feelings; sharp inner conflict; and lacking positive, healthy self-regard.

The Expedient type indicates weak ego strength with below-average accuracy and integration of ego perceptions and controls; high egocentricity; low autonomy; ineffectual superego; and low spontaneity.

The CEA (posesses approximately equal proportions of Conforming, Expedient, and Amoral reasoning) type is very similar to the Amoral character, except with less hostility and guilt, and CEA's are more passive.

The Conforming character type has weak-to-moderate ego integration and moderate-to-strong superego. This type is passive and conforming to outer pressures (outer directed) with strong, chronic guilt and low spontaneity.

The Irrational-Conscientious character shares a weak-to-moderate ego strength with the Conforming character. This type differs in possessing a compulsive superego; intolerance; appreciable generalized hostility; low spontaneity; low self-confidence, and a lack of positive concern for others (low empathy).

The two subjects with the IAE character (possess approximately equal proportions of Irrational-Conscientious, Amoral, and Expedient reasoning)

show high inner conflict resulting from an active, controlling superego but high compulsiveness; covertly hostile with a punitive guilt, weak ego strength, and low self-regard.

The seventh group consisted of individuals who had high proportions of both Rational-Altruistic and Amoral type responses (high secondary R). These subjects are the only ones who received average or better scores on Rational-Altruism. They have, however, as high or higher scores on another of the remaining type dimensions. This group is characterized by high ego strength which included a high degree of rationality, a reality-adapted ego, and firm ego integration. They also show high autonomy, high spontaneity, good regard for people, and high altruism.

The Rational-Altruistic type is very similar to the high secondary R group. Both have a well-integrated ego free from serious conflict, few guilt feelings, emotional maturity, high rationality, high spontaneity, and high self-regard. The difference between the two groups is consistently higher scores on all of these personality factors by the Rational-Altruistic type.

Further analysis of the longitudinal data revealed developmental trends in character and personality relationships. There were increasing ego strength scores from Amoral to Rational-Altruistic types. These scores included increasing rationality, emotional maturity, and integrated behavior.

Superego strength also showed a linear progression in scores from Amoral to Rational-Altruistic. Peck and Havighurst distinguished four stages of conscience in this sequence. The Amoral character possesses a repressive, punitive, and internally inconsistent superego. The second stage of conscience is willing compliance to expected rule conformity as

defined by society. This type of superego is other-directed and passive in making moral decisions. The Conforming character possesses this stage of conscience. This type is very similar to the 'conventional' type of authoritarian personality (Adorno et al, 1950). The Irrational-Conscientious character has instead a deeply internalized, rule-rigid superego. These rules are neither questioned nor adapted to the reality of the moral situation. Moral reasoning and behavior, therefore, is stereotyped and self-righteously dogmatic. This type of conscience was labelled the tyrannical neurotic superego first described by Freud. The most developmentally mature type of superego strength is exemplified by the Rational-Altruistic character. Their superego is integrated into their ego. Their firmly internalized moral principles are, therefore, open to questioning in order to achieve the moral purpose inherent in the moral principle as appropriate to the reality of the moral situation. As a result, the superego strength score above is lower for the Rational-Altruistic type than for the Irrational-Conscientious type.

Although not one of the six personality factors, regard for others and self, labelled 'love' by Peck and Havighurst, was the final developmental trend. Both the Amoral and Expedient character types are incapable of loving and feeling loved. Although the Irrational-Conscientious type can act loving, they do not feel loving or loved. The Conforming type feels more loved and more loving but is limited to considerateness and affection rather than deep love. The Rational-Altruistic person is deeply, spontaneously loving, gives love freely, and feels lovable.

After the completion of the analysis, Peck and Havighurst interpreted their findings within the theoretical models of Freud and Erikson (1950). The data for the Amoral character were interpreted as indicating that this

type is:

> heavily fixated at the early 'oral' stage of psychosocial development. They demonstrate a profound lack of what Erikson has called 'basic trust' (Erikson, 1950), and also lack the perceptual and judgmental ego powers which are necessary to achieve what both Erikson and Piaget have referred to as "psychological autonomy" (Peck and Havighurst, 1960; p. 167).

The Expedient character is psychogenetically described as narcissistic and their orientation not being much past the late oral stage. They show more of Erikson's initiative but are compelled by drives and frustrated by lack of satisfaction of these drives.

Both the Conforming and Irrational-Conscientious characters are seen as having mastered the developmental tasks of the 'anal' stage with the exception of an underdeveloped autonomy. The difference between the two types is a matter of degree.

The Rational-Altruistic type shows "the characters of Freud's 'genital' type and of Erikson's person who has firm identity, good capacity for human intimacy, and a creative, generative orientation. They likewise fit Fromm's productive orientation and Reisman's 'autonomous character'" (p. 170).

Despite Peck and Havighurst's inclusion of Erikson's stages of development, their conclusions about the nature of development are basically Freudian. They concluded that an individual's characteristic personality and character pattern were "largely laid down by age ten and changed little thereafter" (p. 157). Changes in development after age ten consisted of becoming more stable in the basic character pattern and of changing the surface details of behavior. This view of development was to be flatly

rejected by Kohlberg (1958, 1969).

Peck and Havighurst (1960) also reported an 'obverse' factor analysis conducted by Ruth Cooper. This analysis entailed a subject-by-subject correlation matrix which generated ten bipolar personality factors. These ten factors were then compared for the subjects within the character groups previously determined. This procedure indicated both substantial profile agreement between subjects within character types and substantial agreement with the composite, character type descriptions generated by the original six factors. The obverse factor analysis tended to maximize differences within groups. This revealed that several kinds of personality and behavior patterns could be evaluated morally as a particular character type.

This finding supported the hypothesis that character is a persistent pattern of underlying, dynamic motives. Each character type consists of a core Gestalt or organization of motives. Various atomistic personality traits can cluster in varying configurations around the character core. This hypothesis was further supported by correlating the personality variables singly with the character types. The number of significant correlations which resulted were fewer than expected by chance. Only when the core profiles were compared with the six factors did distinctive relationships appear. Fromm (1947) had predicted this type of relationship between personality organization and character. Kohlberg (1969) later expressed similar ideas.

The research of Peck and Havighurst was based on detailed, in-depth data gathering and analysis. Despite the exacting and advanced analytic procedures used, crucial criticisms must be made. The first and most serious criticism focuses on their data analysis. Thirty-plus personality

variables were factor analyzed based on thirty-four subjects. This ratio between number of variables and number of subjects is not substantially reliable for this type of analysis. Partially recognizing this liability, Peck and Havighurst set .40 as the minimum loading for inclusion of a defining variable in a vector. Still, the possibility of spurious factors remains significant.

A second criticism concerns their substitution of 'vectors' for actual factors. The factor analysis produced three factors. From this three-factor system, six vectors were constructed based on "six clusters of variables which were statistically distinct from one another, and which represented psychologically separate and meaningful dimensions that it was desirable to retain" (p. 243). There are two consequences from this procedure. First, some personality traits load above .40 on more than one vector. The vectors, therefore, are not statistically independent. Secondly, two vectors are defined by only one trait. The practice of isolating one trait as a vector which is not a distinguishable factor is questionable. This procedure is even more questionable considering the limited number of cases upon which these vectors are based.

The vector scores were then used to define character types and to differentiate between types. Reference to Figure I reveals that these type definitions and differentiations are based on groups ranging in size from three to eight. At no point are the vector scores statistically checked for significant differences between groups. This brings the type profiles into serious question as statistically reliable classifications. Since actual scores were not provided, it is not possible to make this crucial test. There may be no statistical difference between Amoral and Rational-Altruistic types or any comparison of types. The character profiles have, therefore, not been statistically substantiated.

In spite of the difficulties inherent in Peck and Havighurst's study, it remained one of the most in-depth and significant studies of moral development until the research of Kohlberg. Although Peck and Havighurst only briefly mentioned the work of Piaget, Piaget's influence on subsequent research in morality was to be important. Piaget's influence completed the transition from moral research based on behavior to research based on moral reasoning.

Chapter II

The Structure of Moral Thought and Its Relation to Personality

Piaget: The Structure of Childhood Moral Reasoning

Jean Piaget (1932) not only systematically pioneered the psychological study of moral reasoning but also constructed a developmental theory of moral judgment. As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget studied the way the child's acquisition of knowledge of the world and the child's construction of a representational schema of his knowledge developed. Behavior, and moral behavior as a necessary subset of behavior, was conceived as a function of cognitive structures (schema) possessed and used by the individual. These schema are relatively lasting structures of adaptation to the environment which develop towards an increasingly complete and stable equilibrium with the environment. Each succeeding schema represents a new Gestalt which supersedes and incorporates through transformations the preceeding schema.

Piaget outlined two developmental moral schemas which he labeled 'moral realism' and 'the morality of reciprocity.' Children whose characteristic moral reasoning was classified as moral realism operated with a schema that assumed moral rules were external and rooted in authority. Their application of moral judgments tended to be literal, socially insensitive, and based on material damage rather than on intentions. The basic elements of the morality of reciprocity are an awareness of another's point of view, the realization that rules are created out of human relationships and are therefore alterable, and the development of an incipient moral autonomy.

Although these schemas were presented as distinct stages, Piaget emphasized that there was always a certain mixture of the two. A transitional phase was discerned by Piaget between the moral realism stage and the morality of reciprocity. Peters (1971) considered this transitional phase an intermediate stage which he labeled 'transcendental.' During this stage the individual internalizes and generalizes the rules, and recognizes that he is obeying an imposed rule. An implicit reference to a fourth, more developed stage of moral development in Piaget's theory was examined by Kay (1969). This fourth hypothesized stage goes beyond normative autonomy to the types of autonomy exemplified by Christ and Socrates.

Piaget considered moral reasoning as an intrinsic aspect of general intellectual development. As such, this conceptualization was one of the first to avoid the moral character controversy. By incorporating and integrating what had previously been viewed as a distinct 'moral' trait into an overarching perspective, many of the criticisms levelled against trait theories were inapplicable. A person neither possesses nor fails to possess the trait of moralness, instead, everyone develops through a sequence of moral schemas. One no longer has 'high' or 'low' character, or 'good' or 'bad' character, or is on a continuum between these bipolar terms. Each individual is moral but his moral perspective is different. All individuals, however, can be classified into a certain number of specific moral schemas. Piaget's theory represents a radical shift in psychological thinking about morality and an individual's possession of morality.

With this divergent formulation of morality, it is no longer a search for moral traits or profiles that occupies the psychologist. The question now becomes one of determining which personality traits and/or profiles, if any, are related to the various stages of moral judgment.

Piaget (1932) initially gave very little attention to this relationship. This lack of attention may be due to two reasons. Although certain personality-like traits can be deduced from Piaget's stages, these are dispositions which change with the child's development from one stage to the next stage. The fact that he was studying children between the ages of four and twelve would seriously qualify any personality conclusions.

In later work, Piaget (1967) proposed that emotions develop through a process analogous to that of intellectual development (and thus moral development). He speculated that emotions in the small child were impulsive and follow each other singly. Through the course of development, these various emotions become organized in such a way that emotions compensate each other in a kind of equilibrium. This compensation is a function of simultaneously processing several perspectives of the environment and one's role in it, not only one's immediate feelings but also one's awareness of the other's intentions and an ability to place one self into the other's emotional perspective in evaluating possible courses of action (included in this equilibrium). This coordination of emotional structures, which becomes a relatively persistent aspect of an individual's personality, "emerge as regulations whose final form of equilibrium is none other than the will" (Piaget, 1967 and Wright, 1971).

Kohlberg: The Structure of Life-Long Moral Reasoning

Piaget's developmental theory of moral judgment was modified and elaborated by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1963, 1969, 1973). He constructed his stages and theory of development on a review of past theories and upon empirical evidence. His review of theories current during his research included: 1. the philosophical position of Hume, Smith, Mill, and Stephen; 2. the psychoanalytic theory of Freud (and Nietzsche's similar philosophical thesis); 3. Durkheim's respect for society treatise; 4. Mead's

socially organized role-taking postulation; and 5. the formal cognitive theories of Baldwin and Piaget.

Kohlberg's theory has been a dynamic one. He (1958) originally claimed that there were six stages. These stages are defined by Kohlberg (1971) in Table 6. This schema was expanded by dividing stage 5 into a stage 5A and 5B (Kohlberg, 1973). Stage 5A consisted of a social contract, utilitarian law making perspective, while stage 5B recognized a higher law of inalienable rights and a scrupulous duty to such rights (a conscience orientation).

In this same article, Kohlberg hypothesized a seventh stage. Contemplative experience of a nonegoistic and nondualistic nature characterized this seventh stage. The self is seen from the perspective of the cosmic and there is a sense of being a part of the cosmos. A cosmic identification develops as opposed to a universal humanistic (Stage 6) perspective. An individual's value of life is from the standpoint of identifying himself with the cosmic perspective. Kohlberg makes no claims for having yet recognized this stage in structural analyzes of protocols. It exists as a philosophical and theological concept.

Recently Kohlberg has been reluctant to score stage 6, Kohlberg's 1974 Moral Judgment Scale scoring manual proscribed scoring protocols for stage 6. This recent edition of the scoring manual provided neither principles nor examples for scoring stage 6 responses.

Kohlberg, like Piaget, is not studying moral character. He has replaced this dichotomous trait with a developmental stage construct. Nevertheless, Kohlberg (1958) has speculated about the relationship of moral reasoning to personality.

On one level of analysis, Kohlberg (1958) viewed the moral reasoning

Table 6

Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages

I. Preconventional level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4.)

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right , regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of

conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy--nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consist of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for it's own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal

"values" and "opinions." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

From: L. Kohlberg, The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral judgment, The Journal of Philosophy, 1973, 70, pp. 631-632.

stages as personality types. He hypothosized that "the general elements of the types may hang together to form a distinct and unitary whole, or a concrete 'personality type'" (p. 229). While explaining and describing the six stages, Kohlberg (1958) specifically noted a variety of personality traits that might be related to the particular stages: autonomy, conformity, need for social approval, flexibility, authoritarianism, sympathy, guilt, anxiety, and ego strength.

In considering autonomy, Kohlberg distinguished between life-style autonomy and moral autonomy as necessary for clearly delineating the relationship with moral reasoning. The autonomy of developing and maintaining personal tastes, goals, and opinion in the face of pressure to conform to others' personal preferences was not expected to show a consistent relationship to moral reasoning. The stage 2 individual should be autonomous in the sense of being resistant to social pressure (i.e., life-style autonomy). The stage 6 individual is also resistant to social pressure to change, which violates his moral reasoning (i.e., moral autonomy).

Conformity can be defined as subordinating one's own opinions to those of others (social pressure). Kohlberg (1958) stated that stage 3 individuals were oriented towards conformity, particularly as associated with situational social pressure. The stage 4 person does not conform as much to situational social pressure as to the social pressure exerted by authority.

The need for social approval was another trait discussed by Kohlberg (1958). The need for social approval is felt most strongly by stage 3 persons for whom it is their primary orientation. Stage 4 individuals have a more specific need than stage 3 individuals, a need for approval from those in authority. The stage 5 person has yet another type of approval need: recognition of achievement and reputation by peers.

Kohlberg (1958) further noted certain trait similarities between stage 2 and 5 individuals. Those classified into these stages were expected to share a high level of flexibility in instrumental, utilitarian affairs. Both stages also shared a motivational orientation toward enhancement of the purposes of the self. Flexibility was seen as an asset in instrumental enhancement.

Although Kohlberg (1958) criticized the typology of the Authoritarian personality, he did explain the relationship between it and stage 4 moral judgment. He claimed that stage 4 individuals would possess a few characteristics of the "Authoritarian Personality," although he failed to specify which ones. There is no necessary relationship, however, between the "Authoritarian Personality" characteristics of prejudice and anti-democratic attitudes and stage 4 reasoning.

A strictly emotive view of moral judgment was inadequate from Kohlberg's (1958) view, but he did consider moral judgment's likely relationship to several emotive traits. Kohlberg cited Hume's theory that morality was based on sympathy. The stage 3 individual would indeed be motivated by sympathy, according to Kohlberg (1958). Duty to the value and dignity of human life rather than sympathy would be the motivation of stage 6 individuals. These same individuals, however, may demonstrate through their behavior a high level of sympathy.

Guilt and anxiety, as emotive traits, bear an uncertain relation to morality (Kohlberg, 1958). The unclear relationship results from the multiple definitions of guilt and anxiety. If the guilt or anxiety is felt only as an external avoidance force then Kohlberg (1958) does not

consider this related to being moral. Only self reproach would qualify as moral guilt. Kohlberg (1958) did not specify how moral guilt would vary between stages.

Kohlberg (1958, 1963) has placed strong emphasis on ego strength as an important component of moral reasoning. He has not, however, specified the relationship between ego strength and moral stages. It is clear that ego strength is necessary for all six stages but it is unclear whether a significant difference between stages should be expected. A stage 1 child requires ego strength, for example, to behave in order to avoid punishment and to receive rewards.

In a major theoretical exposition, Kohlberg (1969) reviewed, criticized, and modified major developmental theories of personality, socialization, and moral judgment. The theorists reviewed included Freud, Gesell, Erikson, and Piaget. Kohlberg showed that all of these theorists viewed personaltiy development as changes in the child's world views and coping mechanisms rather than as maturation of fixed character traits.

Personality traits, like character traits, do not change through a process of development. Kohlberg (1969), following the tradition of the other developmental theorists, contended that polar personality traits are rarely either stable or age-developmental. Most longitudinally stable traits are non-cognitive ones such as temperment traits like introversion-extroversion and activity-passitivity. Polar personality traits are those traits which are defined by a quantitative ordering of individuals on a single dimension such as conformity, aggression, affiliation, anxiety, need achievement, condescension, etc. Most developmental theories assume that such traits are differentiated balancings of conflicting forces and that

these balancings differ at different points in the life cycle as new developmental tasks are focused upon. Such traits would not, therefore, have a formal-structural base parallel to the developmental, structural basis of Kohlberg's moral judgment theory.

Only those personality traits which have a structural, developmental basis parallel to that of cognitive and moral development should be significantly related to moral judgment. Kohlberg (1969) proposed two personality domains which possessed a structural basis: affective and interpersonal schemata. These affective schemata appear analogous to Piaget's (1967) emotional structures. Types of feeling, according to Kohlberg, develop a set of general structural properties which represent successive forms of psychological equilibrium. These structural properties are the same as those of cognitive and moral schemata. The development of affects is largely mediated by change in cognitive patterns. Each more mature emotion involves a cognitive differentiation not made at the next less mature affect. Kohlberg (1969) stated that moral judgment stages should be described in both cognitive structural terms and affective structural terms like guilt and empathy. He did not define and discuss guilt and its specific position in the descriptions of each stage.

Motivational personality traits such as dependency, aggression, affiliation, anxiety, need-achievement, and conscience strength are neither stable nor developmental according to Kohlberg. The interpersonal schema was not defined and was only discussed in connection with how it shared the same elementary structural features as moral judgment.

Kohlberg (1973; and Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) has compared his structural moral judgment stages to only one personality theory: Erikson's

functional, ego-development theory. In an attempt to explain apparent retrogression of some college-aged individuals in moral judgment, Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) interpreted this evidence in terms of Erikson's concepts of moratorium, identity crisis, and identity achievement through crisis resolution. Although retrogressed subjects indicated the capacity for and awareness of principled thought, they lacked the committment to this stage of moral reasoning. Committment was thought to often be a part of the resolution of the identity crisis. Kohlberg (1973) stated that the available evidence indicated that no individuals who had not undergone an identity crisis had developed to a stage of principled reasoning. Simultaneously, not all subjects who had undergone and resolved an identity crisis had matured to a principled stage of morality. Identity questioning, apparently, must be combined with explicit cognitive-moral stimulation and reflection.

The preceding analysis led Kohlberg (1973) to revise his analysis of moral judgment and ego-development. He concluded that Eriksonian ego stage progression was insufficient to produce principled morality. It was necessary to integrate Piaget's cognitive-structural accounts of experience with the personal experience of choice central to Erikson's theory for an adequate theory. "All those moving to principled morality would be expected to go through this identity progression. The movement from conventional to principled morality is one which must be considered as a matter of personal choice and as a choice of self in a sense not true of earlier moral stages," (Kohlberg, 1973). Kohlberg (1973) further proceeded to give a detailed comparison of his theory and Erikson's. This is reproduced in Tables 7 and 8.

Table 7

Comparison of Erikson's Ego Stages and Kohlberg's Moral Stages

Ego Stages	Moral Stages
Ascribed identity accepted	Conventional Morality 3 & 4
Identity crisis or Moratorium	Traditional or retrogressed relativism 2 = 5A
Identity Achievement	Principled morality 5B & 6

Table 8

Erikson Functional and Piaget-Kohlberg Structural Stages

Piaget	Erikson
Nature of Stages	
Stages are different structures for a single function, e.g., moral judgment, logical reasoning. Accordingly, later stages replace earlier stages. Experience leading to development is cognitive experience, especially experiences of cognitive conflict and match	Stages are choices or uses of new functions by an ego--earlier functions or choices remain on background to the new stage. Experience leading to development is personal experience, especially experiences and choice of personal conflict.
Focus of Stages	
The developmental change is primarily a changed perception in the physical, social, and moral world. The outcome of movement is perceptual change. The ability of the new stage is not the result of choice.	The development change involved is primarily a self-chosen, self-perception identification with goals. The outcome of a movement is relatively permanent and results in a choice or a commitment.

continued

Later stages are more cognitively adequate than earlier stages: (1) including the earlier stage pattern, (2) resolving the same problems better, and (3) in being more universally applicable or justifiable, i.e., in the universality and inclusiveness of their ordering of experience.	Later stages are more adequate than earlier stages, not in cognitive inclusiveness, but in virtue or ego strength, i.e., in their ability to order personal experience in a form that is stable, positive, and purposive. Attainment of a stage and adequacy of stage use are distinct, however.

From: Kohlberg, 1973, p. 200, Table 2.

Kohlberg and Fromm: The Interface of Character Structures and Moral Thought Structures

One of the purposes of the present review is to demonstrate the interfaces between Kohlberg's moral judgment stages and Fromm's (1947) character types. The application of Fromm's theory in moral theorizing has already been noted in its use by Peck and Havighurst. There are significant differences between the theoretical assumptions and characteristics of Kohlberg's and Peck and Havighurst's theories as well as important differences between their types of data and analyses. It is partially for these reasons that an effort will be made to discover the parallel between Kohlberg and Fromm and to then empirically demonstrate these parallels.

Another theory analyzing and constructing a developmental typology of moral judgment current during Kohlberg's initial work was Fromm's (1947) character theory used in Peck and Havighurst's research. Kohlberg (1959) included Fromm's name once in his dissertation (p. 285) without providing a bibliographic reference. Kohlberg's succeeding publications have considered Fromm's theory no more than did his dissertation. This review will attempt to broaden Kohlberg's initial and subsequent analytic review.

Fromm provides the most complete theory of personality and character. His theory, therefore, is believed to present the best framework in which both to organize the available evidence and interpretations and to explore the relationships between Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages and personality structure.

Since Fromm's work foreshadowed later theoretical developments in American existential and humanistic psychology by May and Shostrom, the present analysis will also point to their parallels with Kohlberg.

The relation between one's morality and his personality was the focal

thesis of Erich Fromm's (1947) Man For Himself: An Inquiry Into The Psychology of Ethics. Fromm viewed personality and moralness as being inherently related. "The subject matter of ethics is character .... problems of ethics cannot be omitted from the study of personality" (pp. 42 and v).

Fromm (1947) conceptualized personality as the totality of inherited psychic qualities (temperament) and acquired qualities (character). Temperament represented the person's constitutional mode of reaction. The stimulus to which the person emitted a reaction through a particular mode (e.g. choleric vs sanguine) was dependent on his locus of relatedness to the environment. The mode of reaction (temperament) determined neither the reaction nor the ethicalness of the reaction. Temperament determined only the medium and amplification (the mode) of the reaction.

Character was, however, "the subject matter of ethical judgment and the object of man's ethical development" (Fromm, 1947). Fromm defined character as the organization of motivations underlying a person's orientations by which one relates oneself to the world. Man relates himself to the world in two ways: 1) by acquiring and assimilating things, and 2) by relating himself to other people and to himself.

The fundamental entity in character was the organization (structure) of motivations. A number of single character traits followed from the specific motivational structure. The character structure was analytically and ontologically prior to the traits themselves.

There are distinct structural parallels between Kohlberg and Fromm. Kohlberg's (1969) moral judgment stage theory was also structurally, as opposed to trait, centered. His focused criticism of the hypothesis that moral judgment was related to personality traits then was consistent with

Fromm's theorizing. Kohlberg (1969) did not, however, eliminate the existence of a relationship between character and moral judgment. Types of valuing and of feeling, like reasoning, were hypothesized as schematic which developed general structural characteristics. These structural characteristics represented successive stages of psychological equilibrium. The structural equilibrium of "affective and interpersonal schemata involves many of the same basic structural features as the equilibrium of cognitive schemata and moral schemata " (Kohlberg, 1969).

Kohlberg's (1969) discussion of these affective and interpersonal schemata indicates that they are similar to Fromm's conative structures. The affective schemata resemble Fromm's motivational structures. Fromm's orientation of relatedness to others and oneself parallels Kohlberg's interpersonal schemata. Fromm further hypothesized that Freud's superego conscience was only one developmental stage. The productive character was proposed as a higher developmental stage represented by a structurally distinct orientation.

In his theorizing, Fromm demarcated five character orientations based on a non-exhaustive matrix of personality traits (Table 9, and 10). Fromm did not indicate that the four nonproductive orientations were developmental.

The similarities previously discussed, however, between Fromm's five character orientation types and Kohlberg's six moral judgment stages generates the proposed structural parallels presented in Table 11. The findings of the present empirical study are not, however, dependent on the adequacy of this model.

The purpose of this study is to explore and, hopefully, add definition

Table 9*

Fromm's Character Types

ASSIMILATION	SOCIALIZATION	
I. Nonproductive orientation		
a) Receiving	Masochistic	symbiosis
(Accepting)	(Loyalty)	
b) Exploiting	Sadistic	
(Talking)	(Authority)	
c) Hoarding	Destructive	withdrawal
(Preserving)	(Assertiveness)	
d) Marketing	Indifferent	
(Exchanging)	(Fairness)	
II. Productive orientation		
Working	Loving, Reasoning	

*From Fromm (1947, pp. 116-117).

Figure 10*

Unproductive Character Types and Traits

Positive Aspect	Negative Aspect
RECEPTIVE ORIENTATION (ACCEPTING)	
accepting	passive, without initiative
responsive	opinionless, characterless
devoted	submissive
modest	without pride
charming	parasitical
adaptable	unprincipled
socially adjusted	servile, without self-confidence
idealistic	unrealistic
sensitive	spineless
optimistic	wishful thinking
trusting	gullible
tender	sentimental
EXPLOITATIVE ORIENTATION (TAKING)	
active	exploitative
able to take initiative	aggressive
able to make claims	egocentric
proud	conceited
impulsive	rash
self-confident	arrogant
captivating	seducing

HOARDING ORIENTATION (PRESERVING)

Positive Aspect	Negative Aspect
practical	unimaginative
economical	stingy
careful	suspicious
reserved	cold
patient	lethargic
cautious	anxious
steadfast, tenacious	stubborn
imperturbable	indolent
composed under stress	inert
orderly	pedantic
methodical	obsessional
loyal	possessive

MARKETING ORIENTATION (EXCHANGING)

Positive Aspect	Negative Aspect
purposeful	opportunistic
able to change	inconsistent
youthful	childish
forward-looking	without a future or a past
open-minded	without principle and values
social	unable to be alone
experimenting	aimless
undogmatic	relativistic
efficient	overactive
curious	tactless

continued

intelligent .....intellectualistic

adaptable .....undiscriminating

tolerant .....indifferent

witty .....silly

generous .....wasteful

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*From Fromm (1947, pp. 120-121).

Table 11

Theoretical Parallels between Fromm's Character and Kohlberg's Moral Structures

Character Structures	Moral Judgment Structures
Receiving	Social Approval (3)
Exploiting	Instrumentality (2)
Hoarding	Authoritarian (4)
Marketing	Social Contract (5)
Productive	Principled (6)

to this hypothesized relation between moral judgment structure and character structure. As an exploratory study, it will perform analyses of three interrelated aspects of the problem. The first of these analyses will compare four of the measures previously used to scale moral judgment. The second stage of the study will investigate the relationships between a sample of potentially relevant personality trait scores and moral judgment scores. The final stage of analysis will attempt to determine the character structures and their personality trait compositions which relate to Kohlberg's moral judgment structures.

Chapter III

The Measures of Moral Judgment

The study of character must be based on the instruments assessing moral judgment and those measuring personality traits. A prerequisite of such a study, therefore, must be a review of such instruments, their psychometric properties, and their interrelationships. Only the moral judgment measures will be reviewed, however, due to the lack of published compendium of this information and the volume of data on personality instruments.

Instruments Based on Kohlberg's Theory

The major instruments have been developed from either Kohlberg's research or Hogan's research (1973 & 1975). Kohlberg's theory has already been presented. Four instruments have been derived from Kohlberg's theory: the Moral Judgment Scale, the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, the Objective Moral Judgment Scale, and the Defining Issues Test.

Moral Judgment Scale

The development of a moral development scale (Moral Judgment Scale, MJS) and a cognitive theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958), revived interest in moral judgment research. At least six other measures related to assessing moral judgment have been developed since then; for ease of reference and as an aid in reading, these are presented in Table 12. Published data on the relationships between these measures is insubstantial. These instruments will be surveyed and critiqued.

The Moral Judgment Scale is a structured, projective test consisting of a series of stories involving moral dilemmas to which the subject makes

Table 12

Moral Judgment Instruments Reviewed

Name	Type	Source
Moral Judgment Scale (MJS)	projective	Kohlberg (1958)
Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (SMJS)	projective	Gilligan, Kohlberg et al 1971
Objective Moral Judgment Scale (OMJS)	objective	Maitland & Goldman 1974
Defining Issues Test (DIT)	objective	Rest et al 1974
Empathy Scale (ES)	objective	Hogan 1969
Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA)	objective	Hogan 1970
Measure of Moral Values (MMV)	projective	Hogan & Dickstein 1972

moral judgments and presents reasoning to support these decisions. The scale can be scored in one or both of two ways: a global system and/or a detailed system.

For global scoring each subject's response per dilemma is assigned a score on one of the Kohlberg stages. The subject's results can be reported for either each dilemma or the dominant stage across dilemmas can be computed.

The detailed scoring method entails categorizing the responses as to respective moral thought-issue units (see Appendix A; Kohlberg, 1971; Kurtines & Grief, 1974). The responses are then assigned stage scores within each thought-content unit. Percentages of responses at each stage are then computed. A moral maturity score (MMS) can be computed by multiplying the percentages of stage usage by the assigned weights for each stage. This procedure yields a total score for each subject between 100 - 600.

Kurtines and Grief (1974) reported two major problems with these scoring procedures. First, the judgmental nature of the coding procedures necessitated by the projective technique introduces potential scorer bias. Second, the use of two scoring systems confounds the generalizability of results. Fodor (1971 & 1972), for example, reported a significant difference between detailed mean scores for delinquents and nondelinquents, although both groups had the same global score. Kohlberg (1958) reported another drawback of the MJS. The effectiveness of the various dilemmas for assessing moral reasoning is not equal. The inter-dilemma reliability coefficient, however, was not reported. The test-retest reliability was also reported as "poor" by Rest et al (1974).

Sexual Moral Judgment Scale

Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner, and Belenky (1971) developed the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (SMJS) as an extension of the MJS. The SMJS has an identical format to the MJS and differs only in the nature of the area of human affairs (sexual relations) for which moral judgments and reasoning are probed (see Appendix C, stories 2 and 3 for examples). Only one published study has used the SMJS. The respondents were high school juniors.

Scores for the adolescent sample showed that the SMJS was only moderately, .405 for females and .482 for males, correlated with the MJS. The results further demonstrated that this deviation was directional. Approximately 80% of those subjects showing any difference in level of moral reasoning exhibited lower moral reasoning for the sexual dilemmas.

Direct comparison of scores on the MJS versus scores on the SMJS for the same sample supported the inequality in the effectiveness of the various dilemmas for assessing moral reasoning. The interscorer agreement level was lower for two out of three of the SMJS stories compared to three MJS stories (see Table 13).

Objective Moral Judgment Scale

Maitland and Goldman (1974) developed an objective form of the MJS. Their scale (OMJS) attempted to eliminate the cumbersome administration and scoring procedures of Kohlberg's MJS. The OMJS stimulus set consisted of fifteen moral dilemmas (see Appendix B for the stimulus set) followed by a question designed to elicit one particular issue of moral judgment. The subject was then required to select one of six stage responses which followed each dilemma. These responses were derived from Kohlberg's (1971) issues scoring guide. The order of these responses was randomized.

Table 13

Gilligan, et al. Interjudge Agreement, Global Rating Method

Percentage of Agreement on Major and Minor Code of Response to Each Story

	Standard* Stories			Modal** Standard	Sex Stories			Modal Sex***
	III	IV	I		A	B	C	
I. Major Stage Agreement	80	83	85	83	82	66	55	80
a. perfect agreement	64	63	67	74	64	44	31	51
b. difference in minor code	16	20	18	9	18	22	24	29
II. One Stage Disagreement	20	15	15	17	15	22	45	20
a. major-minor disagreement	18	13	13	6	10	20	25	15
b. major code one stage-off	2	2	2	11	5	2	20	5
III. Two Stage Disagreement	0	2	0	0	3	11	0	0

*Kohlberg, 1969

**Modal Stage rating for the 3 standard stories (III,IV, I).

***Modal stage rating for the 3 sex stories (A, B, C).

The test was scored by summing the stage responses across the fifteen dilemmas, resulting in scores with a possible range from fifteen to ninety.

The reported OMJS test-retest reliability was r=.83 for 12 to 19-year-olds and r=.60 for 11th and 12th grade pupils. The split-half reliability coefficient was r=.71 and a Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 yielded an α=.67. A direct validity comparison with Kohlberg's MJS was not conducted. OMJS scores were, however, transformed to compare with Kohlberg's moral maturity score (MMS) by multiplying the total score by 100/15. These scores were compared with the MMS norms for a sample of the same age and academic level. This comparison provided highly supportive validity data (MJS=364, OMJS transformation scores=365). These means were not, however, based on the same subjects. Neither the standard deviations nor the correlation between the two sets of scores were reported.

Defining Issues Test

Rest, Cooper, Coder, Nasanz, and Anderson (1974) constructed another objectively based instrument for assessing moral development. Their Defining Issues Test (DIT) consisted of moral dilemmas which were presented with twelve issues bearing upon that dilemma. The subject was to evaluate each dilemma and its concomitant issues, and to then indicate on a Likert scale how important each issue was in resolving the dilemma. The issues exemplified a distinctive characteristic on one of Kohlberg's stages. The DIT has a test-retest Pearson correlation of .81. The DIT correlated .68 with the MJS. Rest et al.,interpreted this result as showing that the DIT and MJS were not equivalent measures.

Instruments Based on Hogan's Theory

Robert Hogan (1973 & 1975) constructed an alternative theory of moral development to that of Kohlberg. Hogan emphasized the ontogenesis of

character structure analogous to Fromm's theory. The dimensions of this character structure according to Hogan's typology are moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, autonomy, and ethical attitude.

Moral knowledge is defined as awareness and comprehension of the relevant social rules. Socialization is the degree to which one has internalized these social rules as personally obligatory and binding. Empathy is the capacity and disposition to regulate one's actions in accordance with the expectations of others. Autonomy is seen as the capacity to make moral judgments without being influenced by peer group pressure or the dictates of authority. Ethical attitude is the degree to which one perceives moral rules as being instrumentally valuable for regulating social conduct versus being valuable for personal integrity.

Hogan has developed instruments to assess three of these dimensions. He constructed the Empathy Scale (ES) to measure empathy, and the Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) to scale ethical attitude. Hogan used I.Q. tests to measure moral knowledge, since earlier research had shown a high correlation between intelligence and moral knowledge. The Socialization scale of the California Personaltiy Inventory was used to assess socialization. Hogan (1973 and 1975) used both Barron's Scale of Independence of Judgment and Kurtines' (1973) CPI Autonomy Scale to scale autonomy.

Measure of Moral Values

To determine the importance of each of these dimensions, Hogan and Dickstein (1972) developed the Measure of Moral Values to measure moral maturity. This scale was comprised of fifteen statements requiring a projective response. These responses were scored two points if any one of four predefined moral concerns was clearly expressed: 1) concern for the sanctity of the individual, 2) judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law, 3) concern for the welfare of society as a

whole, and 4) capacity to see both sides of an issue. An answer was assigned one point if any of the four concerns was easily implied. This method yielded a range of possible scores from 0-30 for the totaled items. Neither item analysis nor reliabilities were reported.

The construct validity of this instrument must be critically examined. Hogan and Dickstein (1974) used this same MMS to assess the construct of 'perception and attribution of injustice' by using a different scoring theme criteria (blame) than that used for assessing moral values (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972). The instructions were identical, however, in both studies. Low scorers were defined as possessing a tendency to attribute injustice to institutions. High scores conversely denoted a tendency to perceive injustice as due to individuals.

The attribution of injustice to institutions rather than individuals is a different type of moral judgment. Moral decisions about people and institutions beyond self are not the same as Kohlberg's moral reasoning about personal behavior. Attribution in Hogan's dilemmas might reflect moral rationalization rather than moral judgment, where rationalization means defensive projection of responsibility rather than acceptance of responsibility. If the same projective responses to the MMV can be scored to determine both maturity of moral judgment and degree of moral rationalization, then these two sets of response scores should be analyzed. This analysis should determine whether maturity of moral judgment correlates with the degree of moral rationalization. The more morally mature should show less moral rationalization. A failure to support such a prediction would challenge the construct validity of the MMV.

Hogan and Dickstein (1972) found that the level of sensitivity to injustice (not attribution of injustice) was significantly correlated

r=.37, p =.01, n=92, with maturity of moral judgment. An increase in moral maturity was accompanied by an increase in assigned level of sensitivity to injustice.

Although the MMV was explicitly presented as a parallel technique for the MJS, no estimate of method variance or between instrument score isomorphism was reported. Hogan (1973; Hogan and Dickstein, 1972) reported two significant correlations between the SEA and his MMV, r=-.34 (n=41, p=.01) and r=-.40 (n=41, p=.01) respectively. These apparently were based on the same sample data but no explanation of the inconsistency has been provided.

Empathy Scale

The Empathy Scale (ES) (Hogan, 1969) was postulated to measure one aspect of moral reasoning because empathy was defined as an inherent element of taking the moral point of view. The moral point of view was conceptualized as adopting impersonal motivations and ends for one's actions through identifying with the goals and expectations of one's social group.

The ES was made-up of sixty-four true-false items. Thirty-one of these were drawn from the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) while twenty-five were taken from the MMPI and eight items were from other sources.

Much of the validity evidence and the reliability coefficients for the ES were based on comparisons with results from the CPI and the MMPI. This lack of independence between the ES and the validity criteria measures represents serious confounding. The personalogical correlates reported by Hogan (1969, 1970, and 1972) which relied on the ES as the moral judgment index and used the CPI and MMPI as the personality measures must be seriously qualified.

Hogan (1968) used the ES as an index of moral judgment in his research and reported (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972) correlations of .48 $n = 41$, $p = .05$, and .58 $n = 30$, $p = .01$, between the ES and MMV for two samples.

A more serious criticism of Hogan's Empathy Scale involves the underlying construct Hogan used for empathy. Hogan confounds the construct himself by using different conceptualizations in different expositions. His (1969) initial definition was: "the act of constructing for oneself another person's mental state...without actually experiencing that person's feelings (p. 308)." In a later article, Hogan, (1973) defined empahty as "role-taking ability." Role taking was not defined but G.H. Mead's (1934) theory was most frequently cited. A third definition was still later presented (Grief and Hogan, 1973); empathy was conceived as "the ability to adopt the moral point of view, to consider the implications of one's actions for the welfare of others... (p. 280)." Grief and Hogan also stated that empathy referred to "a sensitivity to the needs and values of others" in the same paper. Finally, Hogan (1975) defined empathy as "the capacity and disposition to regulate one's actions in accordance with the expectations of others..." (p. 160).

A factor analysis of the ES and Grief and Hogan's (1973) interpretation of the resulting factors further calls into question both the nature of the construct measured and its conceptual validity. The ES items divided into three factors. The first factor suggested that a tolerant, even-tempered disposition was a component of empathy. The second factor was interpreted to reflect that an empathetic person was also self-possessed, outgoing, and socially ascendant. The third factor indicated that a humanistic and tolerant set of sociopolitical attitudes was an aspect of an empathetic disposition.

Hogan (1969 & 1975) has further supported this interpretation. He stated that the validational evidence substantiated that high scorers on the ES were "socially acute and sensitive to nuances in interpersonal behavior." Low scorers were "hostile cold, and insensitive to the feelings of others." This conceptualization is not equivalent to considering the implications of one's actions for the welfare of others. Hogan seems to confuse role-taking empathy with moral empathy which are two distinct concepts. The face validity of the ES items (Table 14) more strongly supports the role-taking empathy concept than the moral empathy concept. Kohlberg (1958) criticized the assumption that role-taking empathy was synonomous with moral empathy.

Survey of Ethical Attitudes

The Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) was conceptualized as measuring the existence of two sets of ethical ideals employed in moral justification and decision making: the ethics of personal conscience and the ethics of social responsibility. The bases for the ethics of social responsibility were the legal system and the general welfare of society. The ethic of personal conscience was based on a higher order of personal integrity. Although Hogan proposed that these two ideals appeared to form a part of Kohlberg's distinction between stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning, Hogan philosophically argued that neither ideal represented a higher form of moral reasoning. For this reason, the SEA will not be used as an instrument in this study. The research generated by the SEA will, however, be reviewed because of its exploration of personalogical variables.

Table 14

Empathy Scale Role-Taking Items

1. I like to talk before groups of people.
2. I think I am usually a leader in my group.
3. I usually don't like to talk much unless I am with people I know well.
4. I am a good mixer.
5. I usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties.
6. I have a natural talent for influencing people.

From: E. Grief and R. Hogan (1973, p. 282).

The SEA consisted of both forced-choice and weighted-continuum items. These items involved both attitude items and forced-choice items related to a moral dilemma story. Neither item analyses nor reliabilities were published. Hogan and Dickstein (1972) reported a correlation of $r=-.34$, $n=41$, $p=.05$ between the SEA and the MMV. This negative relationship indicated that those scoring in the personal conscience range on the SEA scored in the higher range of moral maturity on the MMV. A correlation coefficient between the SEA and MJS was not reported.

The most inconsistent findings to be reviewed in this study derive from the ES and SEA scales. The relationship of these two instruments compared on the CPI and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator showed them to be measures of almost completely independent constructs, even though both were presented as inherent elements of moral reasoning. The justification for including the research based on these instruments resides in their claim to report personality-moral judgment relationships. Neither instrument, based on this critique, will be used, however, as a measure of moral judgment in this study.

The seven measures of moral judgment are all techniques which have been used in morality-personality research. This research will be reviewed in relation to the specific personality variables studied and the moral judgment instrument used.

Chapter IV

The Nature of Responsibility and Research Relationships to Moral Judgment

The character typology constructed by Fromm (1947) and presented in Tables 9 and 10 will serve as the organizational structure through which the research will be presented. The primary division in Fromm's schema was between the 'unproductive' character structures and the 'productive' character orientation.

Three axial dimensions distinguishing between the unproductive and productive character can be gleaned from Fromm's presentation. The first of these dimensions concerns the nature and source of responsibility: whether responsibility exists within, to and for oneself; or within and to socio/religious authority. The second dimension centers on the nature of our relation and interaction with others: whether it is founded in symbiosis (e.g. to loose the self either through submission to or dominance of others), in withdrawal (e.g. to protect the self through either distance or destruction of others), or in love (e.g. the affirmation of the truly human self through caring, knowing, and respecting others). The third dimension turns upon the acceptance and development of Kierkegaard's and May's (1967) construct of certitude : the full development of the human potential (both reason and emotion), and the creation of integrity through thinking, feeling, and acting as a psychological and ethical, fully conscious entity.

Alker and Poppen (1973) presented a similar tripartite loci for representing the nature of an ideological choice. Their schema was also

grounded in Fromm (1942) and more recently in existential theory. The research findings testing the relationship between personality traits and moral judgment will be presented within Fromm's triadic structure.

The problem of responsibility has, according to Fromm, a number of aspects and a wide range of implications. These aspects include socialization, authoritarianism, autonomy, and conformity; while the implications encompass guilt, anxiety, dogmatism and tolerance. Each of these will be treated separately.

Socialization

In Fromm's theorizing, socialization (superego), authoritarianism, autonomy, and conformity to social approval were all dimensions defining the individual's orientation to responsibility. The possession of an authoritarian character orientation placed one into a chain of dependency to authority. The mechanism of authoritarian ethics was the formation of a dependency reaction through the arousal of guilt feelings. Fromm explained the relation as such: "Guilt feelings have proved to be the most effective means of forming and increasing dependency, and herein lies one of the social functions of authoritarian ethics....It is this interaction between guilt feeling and dependency which makes for the solidity and strength of the authoritarian relationships"(p. 159).

Fromm stayed within the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition to define superego socialization as the internalization of an external authority, i.e., the parent and the society. As the basis for responsibility, Fromm claimed that superego-socialization conscience was authoritarian based. The measure of conscience followed as the degree of conformity to authority. The productive character, however, developed beyond authori-

tarian socialization to an autonomous responsibility for his existence. A number of studies present findings which bear on these aspects.

A review of children's moral judgment literature by Kohlberg (1964) concluded that the obtained correlations between superego strength and moral behavior were inconclusive. Kohlberg explained this inconsistency by relying on selected findings which indicated that moral character was based on reason (ego strength) rather than superego strength. Reason entailed the processes Kohlberg theorized as necessary for moral behavior: a) foresight - the ability to consider consequences, and b) generalization - the ability to recognize the effects of one's actions on others. Kohlberg reported that the control of unsocialized fantasies was significantly related to reason.

A number of findings have been based on the Socialization subscale of the California Psychological Inventory. This scale was specifically designed to assess the degree to which a person had internalized the rules, values, and conventions of his society. Table 15 presents the findings of four studies which used the CPI Socialization scale and a measure of moral judgment.

The tabulations show the SEA and MMV to be significantly correlated with the CPI Socialization scale. The ES, however, was not significantly related for either of two samples. The two MMV correlations, although from different reports, Hogan and Dickstein (1972) and Hogan (1973), appear to be based on the same sample and data. If such was indeed the case then Hogan did not provide any explanation for the change in the coefficient.

The socialization dimension has also been explored through the MMPI. An individual with a chronic lack of superego socialization has been

Table 15

Correlations Between Socialization Measures and Moral Reasoning

Measure of Moral Reasoning	CPI SOCIALIZATION CORRELATIONS			MMPI Pd Scale Correlation
ES[9]	.05[1]	-.01[2]	.11[7]	.07[8]
SEA[10]	.38[3]	.34[4]		
MMV[11,12]	.32[5]	.40[6]		

1 $n = 90$, $p > .05$

2 $n = 51$, $p > .05$

3 $n = 94$, $p \leq .01$ Form A

4 $n = 94$, $p \leq .01$ Form B

5 $n = 41$, $p \leq .05$ one-tailed test

6 $n = 41$, $p \leq .05$ one-tailed test

7 $n = 70$, $p > .05$

8 $n = 51$, $p > .05$

9 Hogan (1969)

10 Hogan (1970)

11 Hogan & Dickstein (1972)

12 Hogan (1973)

labeled as a psychopathic deviate. A major feature of this disorder is "repeated and flagrant disregard for social customs and mores" (Hawk and Peterson, 1974). The Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) scale of the MMPI was designed to measure this trait. Hogan (1969) did not find a significant relationship between the MMPI Pd scale and the ES for either of two samples, $\underline{r}$=.11, $\underline{n}$=7 and $\underline{r}$=.07, $\underline{n}$=51.

A study by Hawk and Peterson (1974) to test the hypothesis that the MMPI Pd scale measures deviancy and not psychopathic deviancy yielded data pertinent to this review. As Table 16 demonstrates, delinquents had both lower socialization indices (higher Pd mean score) and lower moral maturity mean scores than either college students or mental health professionals. The finding that the mental health professionals had both significantly higher moral maturity scores and Pd scores than the college student sample was interpreted by Hawk and Peterson (1974) to indicate that the Pd and Pd+.4K (K measures ego functioning; Pd+.4K is the index of psychopathology) indices measured deviancy and not necessarily psychopathic deviancy. These indices measured deviancy but did not and cannot distinguish the underlying motivations and schemata of this unconventionality.

The findings between socialization and moral judgment are conflicting. This conflict may be due to the various measures of socialization and moral judgment used which may not be measuring the same construct. Further research needs to attempt to clarify these conflicting results.

Fromm's (1947) conceptualization of superego socialization entailed a strong authoritarian personality orientation. This authoritarian orientation was more fully developed and explained by Fromm (1942) in Escape From Freedom.

Table 16

Relationships Between Social Deviancy and Moral Judgment*

Instrument	Types of Subjects			Significance
	Delinquents	Students	Mental Health Professionals	level
MMS	360.01, 77.94 s.d.	410.95, 49.27		$p \leq .05$
MMS	360.01, 77.94 s.d.		480.33, 41.85	$p \leq .05$
MMS		410.95, 49.27	480.37, 41.85	$p \leq .05$
Pd	26.0, 5.05 s.d.	19.20, 5.08		$p \leq .01$
Pd	26.0, 5.05 s.d.		20.10, 3.28	$p \leq .01$
Pd		19.20, 5.08	20.10, 3.28	$p \leq .05$
Pd + .4K	30.61, 5.02 s.d.	24.185, 5.33		$p \leq .05$
pd + .4K	30.61, 5.02 s.d.		26.89, 4.31	$p \leq .05$
Pd + .4K		24.185, 5.33	26.89, 4.31	$p \leq .05$

*Hawk & Peterson (1974)

Authoritarianism

The California F scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950) was developed to measure authoritarianism as a personality trait. Kohlberg (1964) reported a significant, r=-.52, negative correlation between MJS scores and the California F Scale scores.

The F Scale was also used by Hogan (1969) with his ES scale. He reported both a significant correlation, r=-.52, p =.01, for a male sample and an insignificant finding, r=-.30, n=29, for a sample of females. No interpretation was offered for this sexual disparity. Hogan's (1970) study of the relationship between the SEA and the F Scale also determined a significant finding, r=.45 for Form A (SEA) and r =.35 for Form B (SEA), n=90, p=.01 . These positive correlations were interpreted as follows: high scores on the SEA were associated with low to moderate scores on the F Scale while low SEA scores were related to very low scores on the F Scale. Low scores on the SEA represented holding ethics of personal conscience which Hogan stated as forming a part of Kohlberg's stage 6 moral judgment level.

Another verbal measure of authoritarianism is found on the Belief Systems Inventory (Kaats, 1969). Using this measure, O'Conner (1971) found that the actual rank order of MJS global scores based on BSI Authoritarianism scale scores was 4,3, 1-2, and 5-6. This result did not match O'Connor's predictions (1 & 2, 5 & 6) nor did it reach the significance level, p = .05, based on an analysis of variance of the mean scores on the BSI Authoritarianism scale for the moral stages overall.

The Law and Order Scale (LOS) has been used by Rest, et al (1974) as another authoritarian scale. Rest et al used this instrument with their Defining Issues Test to investigate the relationship between

moral judgment, attitudes, and values. Significant correlations between authoritarianism (LOS) and moral judgment (DIT) were found for three different samples, r=-.60, -.48, and -.46, $p \leq .01$.

Milgram's (1974) obedience to authority research paradigm can be used as a behavioral measure of authoritarianism. Kohlberg (1969) reported that seventy-five percent of stage 6 subjects versus thirteen percent of stages 1 through 5 subjects discontinued shock administration in a Milgram-type situation. The compliance to administer shock was the obedience to authority measure.

A study conducted by Podd (1972) investigated the relationship between moral judgment, Milgram-type obedience to authority, and Erikson's ego identity statuses. This research showed that those subjects classified as preconventional on Kohlberg's MJS did not administer greater shock intensities than those classified as postconventional. Conventional moral stage subjects were not included in this comparison. The relationship between identity status and compliance in the Milgram-task was also investigated. Twenty-one subjects in a foreclosure ego identity group (individuals who are committed to goals and values of parents and significant others) were preconventional and conventional in moral stage while five were either transitional and/or postconventional. These foreclosure subjects as a group displayed significantly greater, t=4.12 (18), $p \leq .01$, obedience to a low authority experimenter (a student) than to a high authority one (a professor). This finding was contrary to the experimenter's hypothesis.

In his explanation of his research results, Milgram (1974) stated that moral judgment was not adequate to account for the results. The crucial point in this argument was that the morality of harming an innocent victim

was constant regardless of the spatial relation of the victim to the subject. Essentially all subjects espoused the belief that to cause pain to an innocent victim was immoral. Yet, the strongest manipulation of the results (disobeying) was the simple change in spatial proximity of the victim. The closer the victim then the greater the proportion of subjects who disobeyed.

Moral judgment was, however, an important component of Milgram's explanation. Milgram applied both an information theory approach and a phenomenological approach. The focus of a moral judgment was theorized to be controlled by the perceived information and social field. Proper manipulation of the definition of the situation controlled the subject's level of assignment of responsibility. The subjects who did not disobey shifted their moral concern from the results of their actions on the victim to the results of their actions on the experiment. This moral concern shift was consistent with their perceived definition of the situation.

Milgram's conception of the basis of moral judgment was consistent with Fromm's. Morality was conceived as the acceptance of responsibility. In order to feel and accept responsibility for one's actions, the person must believe that his behavior and his responsibility originated from within "his own motive system" (Milgram, 1974). This paralleled Fromm's conative axis of morality. The failure to include the person's perception of the definition of the situation in the assessment of moral judgment may explain the inconsistent results reported by Kohlberg (1969) and Podd (1972). Podd found that perception of the confederate's willingness to participate was important in distinguishing the behavior of identity achievement versus identity diffusion subjects on the Milgram task.

Fromm claimed that the person with the productive character developed

beyond the authoritarian conscience to an autonomous conscience. In certain ways, autonomy can be considered as the opposite end of a continuum with authoritarianism.

Autonomy

A definition of autonomy offered by Kurtines (1974) approximated Fromm's conceptualization. Autonomy consists of making decisions and judgments independent of immediate social pressure and considerations of external influences. Kurtines' research indicated that autonomy was personalogically complex. Autonomy included self-control, moral responsibility, achievement orientation, and dominance in interpersonal style. Dominance in interpersonal style, however, was not an attribute of Fromm's productive character. The studies to be reviewed, however, have used a variety of measures of autonomy which may not all equally measure the same construct.

The Omnibus Personality Inventory (Heist & Yonge, 1968) contained a scale to measure autonomy. Sullivan and Quarter (1972) found that postconventional and preconventional subjects scored higher than conventional subjects. Sullivan and Quarter did not report whether the percentile differences between groups were significant.

O'Connor (1971) rank ordered MJS global scores on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) autonomy scale. The actual rank order was stages 5 & 6, 3, 1 & 2, and 4. An analysis of variance failed to show a significant difference between autonomy scores by moral stage. Research by others (Haan, Stroud, & Holstein, 1973; and Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968) indicated that stage 2 subjects in these studies showed strong indications of autonomy.

Barron's Scale of Independence of Judgment (SIJ) was used by Hogan in his research of the relationship between autonomy and his measures

of moral reasoning. Hogan and Dickstein's (1972) MMV correlated significantly, $r=.36$, $n=41$, $p\leq.01$, with the SIJ. Hogan (1973) apparently presented these findings again for the same sample and data but the coefficient was stated as .56, $n=41$, $p\leq.01$. No explanation was provided for this apparent disparity.

Conformity to Social Approval

Authoritarian prescriptions and proscriptions govern only a relatively small proportion of the total behavioral options available to a person and the situations in which he may find himself. Most of our behavior is voluntary, governed by our own predilection and our desire for social approval. Social approval is conferred by reference groups on their members when these members engage in (conform to) preferred normative behavior. Fromm recognized conformity to social approval as a diagonal dimension of autonomy. The interpersonal behavior of the productive character orientation was based on a deeper level than this mutual stroking, behavioral mode. The productive character functions on a truly autonomous level, not merely on an independent-from-authority level.

Fodor (1971) conceptualized this type of autonomy as resistance to social influence. He operationalized this construct through attempting to dissuade subjects from their judgment after the administration of the MJS. Those subjects who were dissuaded at least once were grouped as 'Yielders', while those who were not dissuaded were labeled "Resisters". The Resisters' mean MMS, MMS=210, s.d. = 31, was significantly, $p=.01$, higher than that of the Yielders, MMS=181, s.d.=27. Fodor (1972) replicated and extended these findings to delinquents versus nondelinquents. The mean MJS moral maturity score for delinquents, MMS=162, was significantly, .001, lower than for the nondelinquents, MMS=196

although both scores fall within the stage 3 range. Fodor dissuaded twenty-six of forty delinquents at least once (yielders). Resisters had significantly, $p=.05$, higher MMS scores than the Yielding group, MMS=177, s.d.=29, and MMS=153, s.d.=27, respectively.

Saltzstein, Diamond, and Belenky (1972) used an Asch-type condition to operationalize conformity. Subjects participated in this condition in either one of two treatments: interdependent and independent. In the interdependent treatment, subjects functioned as a member of a group which had to reach a consensus while competing with other groups. The independent treatment had the subjects competing as individuals against all other individuals. Subjects were rewarded for 'correct' responses, i.e., choosing the choice of the confederate in the Asch task.

Overall conformity was significantly related to moral judgment stage score for both sexes combined, $x^2=8.41$, $p=.02$. Stage 3 subjects were most likely to conform while those at stage 4 and 5 were least likely to conform. The expectation that higher MJS subjects would conform more in the interdependent treatment was not supported by the data.

The McDonald Conformity Scale (MCS) was developed to discriminate between yielders and nonyielders in an Asch-type situation. McDonald (1971) found that conformity scores on the MCS were significantly correlated, $r=.45$, $df=42$, $p=.01$, with stronger endorsement of the ethics of social responsibility on the SEA. By implication, those possessing an orientation of ethics of personal conscience are significantly less conforming on the MCS.

The Rotter Locus of Control Scale (I-E) has been used by Alker and Poppen (1973) and Bloomberg (1974) in the study of moral judgment. Neither study found a significant correlation between I-E scores and

MJS global scores or DIT scores. Both studies, however, report isolated significant findings. Alker and Poppen (1973) reported that although I-E scores were not significantly correlated with the overall MJS scores, I-E scores showed a significant, r =-.40, p=.05, correlation with principled (stage 6) versus premoral (stage 1 & 2) MJS scores. Principled subjects were more internal than premoral subjects on the personal I-E subscale. There was no significant correlation between principled and premoral subjects on the political subscale of the I-E.

Bloomberg (1974) used the DIT to measure moral judgment. The only significant finding, t=2.12 (51), p=.05, was that internals chose a greater average percentage of items which exemplified stage 6 thinking than externals: 8.7% versus 5.8% respectively.

The use of the I-E scale by Bloomberg may be based on a theoretical misinterpretation of the nature of locus of control and thus misapplied. Bloomberg (1974) conceptualized conventional external locus of control as "an orientation that looks to forces outside the self for definitions of morality " (p. 1077). The assumption that the I-E Scale measured locus of control of morality is an untested extrapolation from Rotter's locus of control of reinforcement. The conceptulization of locus of control by Alker and Poppen (1973) was more in tune with Rotter's. They posited locus of control as: "Does the individual believe that his own actions will be casually efficacious in attaining the goals in pursuit of which a given choice was made?" (p. 669).

A nonmetric representation procedure constructed by the computational program TORSCA yielded some intriguing interpretations of Alker and Poppen's data. TORSCA transforms correlation

coefficients into indices of similarity. Similar variables are then placed closer together in the resulting multidimensional space. This was in spite of the lack of significant correlations found by them between the I-E and the MJS scores. This technique presented external locus of control as being proximal to conventional morality. Internal locus of control was grouped with nonconventional morality (principled [6] and instrumental [2]). Bloomberg's (1974) hypothesis predicted such a curvilinear relationship. The difference between the instrumentalist and the principled person was between selfish opportunism and morally creative choices respectively. Fromm's theory supports such a distinction and relationship.

Guilt

Kohlberg (1964) reported that delinquents in his sample scored as premoral on the MJS. Kohlberg reviewed other research which found that delinquents expressed low self-guilt. This relationship between moral judgment and guilt was investigated by Ruma and Mosher (1967) in delinquent males. Four measures of guilt were assessed: a transgression interview was analyzed 1) by content analysis (CA), 2) by speech disturbance (SD), 3) by a global clinical rating (GCR), and 4) the "Hostility" and "Morality-Conscience Guilt" subscales of the Mosher Guilt Scale (MGS) were administered. The Mosher Guilt Scale purported to measure the subject's generalized expectancy for self-mediated punishment for violation or anticipated violation of internalized standards of proper behavior.

Global MJS scores were significantly correlated with three of these guilt measures: content analysis, $\underline{r} = .47$, $\underline{p} = .01$, global clinical rating, $\underline{r} = .43$, $\underline{p} = .01$, and the Mosher Guilt Scale, $\underline{r} = .55$, $\underline{p} = .01$. Increased guilt was associated with a higher global MJS score. The insig-

nificant correlation of the speech disturbance guilt measure with the MJS was interpreted as due to its inappropriateness as an index of guilt.

These findings must be conservatively interpreted due to the distribution of MJS stage scores on which the results are based. The sample consisted of: Stage 1-0, Stage 2-12, Stage 3-11, Stage 4-12, Stage 5-0, and Stage 6-1. Ruma and Mosher's findings therefore reflect the relationship between guilt and moral judgment for stages 2, 3, and 4 only. Post conventional guilt level was not represented in these findings.

Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) used a Q-sort to study the personality differences between Free Speech Movement participants and non-participants. These subjects were divided into groups on the basis of their MJS global stage score. Stage 6 females rated themselves on the adjective "Guilty" as 4.10 on a seven step Likert scale. This ranking was significantly, $p = .01$, higher than that expressed by Stage 4 females (2.45). Males failed to show any significant differences across stages on this adjective. Haan, Smith, and Block interpreted these findings as indicating that the development of autonomous morality (Stage 6) might be more "arduous" for females than males. Another possible interpretation, and clarification of "arduous," posits that moral autonomy is a less secure orientation for this sample of women. The ranking of Stage 6 females (4.30) as opposed to Stage 4 females (3.16) on the adjective "doubting" supports such an interpretation, $p = .05$.

This relationship between doubt and moral stage is encompassed by Fromm in his postulation that possessing an authoritarian conscience produced a feeling of well-being and security. This security ensued from the knowledge of the approval granted by the authority for believing as the authority

does and from conforming to the authority. The guilt which Fromm stated would be characteristic of authoritarians was guilt within the system of authority. The security results from being within the authority system rather than being outside of it.

The relation between guilt and moral judgment as shown through these findings is inconclusive. Two types of relationships need further research. An attempt to isolate the two levels of guilt (inter- versus intra-system guilt) previously mentioned needs to be undertaken. Intra-system guilt is the guilt experienced from failing to live up to one's actualizing, productive potential. Inter-system guilt, on the other hand, is the guilt experienced from violating the rules of social authority. Inter-system guilt is similar to Freud's conception of the superego, while intra-system guilt is a higher order of ego functioning. The other problem resides in determining the source of the difference between males and females on guilt and the nature of this difference.

Anxiety

Guilt has been defined by Fromm as the feeling which results from the transgression of authority's (superego) rules. The authoritarian dependency relationship was said by Fromm to be maintained by the authority's absolution granted for these transgressions. This guilt results in fear that this absolution may not be forthcoming and the resultant rejection causes the feeling of anxiety (Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, 1930). Note that anxiety has been defined differently within other, non-Freudian theories (Polster and Polster, 1973).

Fromm's central thesis, however, was that Freudian superego conscience was only one stage of conscience. The productive character develops beyond this authoritarian conscience. There will be no transgression anxiety for

the productive character because there is no authority against whom one can transgress.

But this does not preclude the productive character from experiencing anxiety. The anxiety is now of a different order and source. Although Fromm (1947) did not explicitly formulate this new anxiety, it is proposed that May's (1967) conceptualization of normal anxiety is congruent with Fromm's theory of the productive character.

May differentiated two types of anxiety: normal anxiety and neurotic anxiety. Anxiety was defined as an apprehension caused by a threat to the values a person identifies with his existence as a self. Normal anxiety was apprehension which was proportionate to the threat and was engaged constructively. The difference between normal and neurotic anxiety was not the type, level, or source of apprehension but the response to that apprehension. The person experiencing neurotic anxiety responds by various techniques of blocking-off areas of freedom of awareness, experience, decision, and responsibility. Neurotic anxiety results in repression and intrapsychic conflict. This denial of threat, anxiety, and responseability causes (and is created by) a loss of the experience of one's own significance. Neurotic anxiety, therefore, can be seen to result when a person does not confront a threat or crisis and resolve it for further expansion of the self.

The research reviewed which has investigated the relationship between anxiety and moral judgment has not delineated the levels and types of anxiety proposed by Fromm and May. Only the Sullivan and Quarter (1972) study researched the anxiety relationship using Kohlberg's MJS. This anxiety-moral judgment relationship needs further extensive and detailed research.

The A scale of the MMPI was used by Hogan (1969) to measure anxiety. The ES moral measure was significantly related to the MMPI A (neurotic anxiety) scale for two samples, $r = -.40$, $p = .01$, and $r = -.41$, $p = .01$. Hogan (1969) also found Taylor Manifest Anxiety (TMA) scores significantly correlated with the ES, $r = -.49$, $p = .01$, for a sample of medical school applicants but not for a sample of female college seniors, $r = -.20$, $p > .05$. These findings were interpreted as demonstrating that those measured as high in empathy (ES) had low feelings of anxiety.

Sullivan and Quarter (1972) using the Anxiety scale of the OPI, found that ten principled absolutists (stage 6) scored at the 56th percentile while nine mixed-stage postconventionals (pure stage 5, 5 [6] and 6 [5] mixed stages), transitionals (mixed stages 5 [3], 3 [5], 5 [4], 4 [5], and 5 [2]), and conventionals (pure stage 3 and 4, and mixtures of 3 and 4), all scored at the 52nd percentile on the OPI Anxiety level scale. Instrumental relativists (pure stage 2 adults) registered a 47th percentile mean score. No significance levels were presented.

Dogmatism and Tolerance

A technique for managing anxiety (the apprehension caused by threat to the values of self) which can occur in today's age of transformation of values is to seek the security of dogma. May (1967) defined dogmatism as the crystallization of one's values. The dogmatic person denies the freedom to become aware and to experience the information which would not support his crystalline structure.

Fromm (1947) stated that the security provided by dogmatism was a symbiotic security. The dogmatist aligns himself with an authority greater

and morepowerful than himself. He subjects his own integrity to a submission to others. In relations with those who do not share the same dogmatic values, the dogmatist responds with a blocking-out technique. This becomes expressed as a lack of tolerance.

Hogan (1969) found the CPI Tolerance scale significantly correlated with one of his components of moral judgment but not with another. The CPI correlated with ES scores for two samples, r = .42 and r = .33, p =.01, but Hogan's (1970) SEA was not significantly correlated with the CPI Tolerance scale for either Form A or B of the SEA, r = -.07, and r = -.11, n = 94 . Consistent with the dogmatism-tolerance dichotomy, Hogan reported in the same study that ES scores were significantly and negatively correlated, r = -.31, p =.05, n =48, with scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism scale for a separate sample.

A high score on the SEA represented professing an ethic of social responsibility as opposed to an ethic of personal conscience. The direction of the results are consistent with Fromm's discussion of responsibility directed outward rather than towards self. An individual either feels responsibility toward the rules of social authority or feels responsibility towards the standards of his own productiveness.

O'Connor (1971) used the MJS as his moral judgment index and the Dogmatism scale of the Belief System Inventory. His rank order prediction (3 & 4, and 5 & 6) was not supported by the data. His prediction that those at the moral stages 3 and 4 would be high in dogmatism is both consistent with either the findings reported for authoritarianism or the theoretical exposition of a conventional moral organization by Kohlberg (1963, 1968, and 1969).

The OPI Complexity scale was used by Sullivan and Quarter (1972) to

measure tolerance for ambiguity and complexity. They measured moral judgment with the Kohlberg Heinz story. Those subjects at the conventional stage (pure 3 and 4, and mixtures of 3 and 4) ranked in the 53rd percentile. Transitional stage subjects (mixed stages 5[3], 3[5], 5[4], 4[5], and 5[2]) were at the 55th percentile. Postconventional subjects (stages 5, 5[6], and 6[5]), indicated a 59th percentile rank. Stage 2 instrumental relativists were characterized with a 60th percentile, while pure stage 6 principled absolutists were at the 62nd percentile. The direction of these percentiles is consistent with the actual rank order findings reported by O'Connor (4 and 3, 5 and 6). Sullivan and Quarter hypothesized that stage 2 adults (instrumental relativists) were more like adults at the postconventional stage than the preconventional stage. These findings support that hypothesis.

Alker and Poppen (1973) also compared conventional moral stage subjects against nonconventional moral stage subjects (5 and 6, with 1 and 2) on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. Again, no significant relationship, $\underline{r} = .08$, $\underline{p} > .05$, was found. Comparing principled subjects (5 and 6) against premoral stage subjects (1 and 2), they did find a significant correlation, $\underline{r} = -.35$, $\underline{p} = .05$.

The TORSCA dimensional analysis used by Alker and Poppen to help interpret these findings was not conclusive. The first solution grouped dogmatism with external locus of control, machiavellianism, and right political beliefs. An orthogonal solution placed dogmatism closest to humanism and conventional morality. Alker and Poppen explained this relationship as indicating that humanism and normativism as well-defined, packaged ideologies represent ready-made solutions to life's dilemmas. Continuing within an existential framework, they further concluded that

humanism as an ideology can be used as well as normativism as a blocking-out technique to escape from the burden of making a free and unique choice.

Chapter V

Certitude

In this section the cognitive aspects of personality (ego strength), the awareness of feelings, and the capacity to act on these conscious feelings (will) will be reviewed. These three cognitive components are integrated in May's (1967) concept of certitude. These three aspects of certitude will be broken down into ego strength, intelligence, cognitive development, attention, ego stages, and awareness of feelings. A review of May's expostion of the concept of certitude will clarify how those components are an integrated whole.

May (1967), adopting Kierkegarde's thought, defined certitude as the full development of the human potential. This development requires the creation of integrity through thinking, feeling, and acting as a fully conscious gestalt. Fromm's productive character is defined similarly. Certitude as here defined is also synonymous with self-actualization (Shostrom, 1967).

May (1969) presented a parallel concept which has a more historically based relation to moral judgment: intentionality. Intentionality is the totality of a person's orientation to the world. This orientation is the cognitive and conative structure which gives meaning to experience, underlies the capacity to have intentions, and is the meaningful action toward something.

The cognitive dimension of intentionality is what the intellect grasps about the thing understood. Cognitively, intentionality is a

process of forming meaning, a process of understanding the outside world. Creating meaning is defined as consciousness. May continued, "The act and experience of consciousness itself is a continuous molding and remolding of our world, self related to objects and objects to self in inseparable ways, self participating in the world as well as observing it..." (p. 225).

Constructing meaning is not, however, a strictly cognitive process. Meanings are also constituted of connotive dimensions. Meanings become associated with physiological-emotional feelings. This association, however, can be directional. When the perception of inner bodily sensations (emotion) immediately preceeds the creation of meaning, the creation of the meaning is influenced by the emotional perception underlying this meaning process. Our experience of consciousness is an experience of both cognitive and emotional dimensions.

Intentionality is further a motivation to action. It is an assertive response towards the structure of one's world. This assertive response is in the manner of taking care of something, to tend our consciousness. "Cognition, or knowing, and conation, or willing, then go together. We could not have one without the other. This is why commitment is so important. If I do not <u>will</u> something, I could never <u>know</u> it; and if I do not <u>know</u> something, I would never have any content for my willing " (May, 1969: 228).

Intentions are specific motivations towards specific parts of the world which are generated and directed from one's orientation to the world, one's intentionality. An intention is a directing of one's attention towards something with some purpose in mind. The conceptualizations of intention used by Piaget and intentionality by Breznitz and Kugelmass (1967), Kugelmass and Breznitz (1968), Kugelmass, Breznitz, and Breznitz (1965), and

Gutkin (1973) reflect this meaning of intention and not May's construct of intentionality.

Ego Strength

Kohlberg (1958), Fromm, and May all used Freud's construct of ego strength to discuss the cognitive aspects of personality and moral judgment. This usage results from the cognitive basis of reality principle functioning.

Kohlberg (1958 & 1963) stated that ego strength represents a set of interrelated ego abilities. These abilities included 1) the intelligent prediction of consequences, 2) the ability to differentiate and relate means and ends, 3) the ability to weigh probabilities, 4) the ability to abstract general rules, 5) the ability to maintain stable, focused attention, 6) the ability to choose greater remote reward over lesser immediate reward (delayed gratification), and 7) impulse control. Research which focuses both on the individual components of ego functioning and on moral development exists only for intelligence and attention.

Intelligence

Numerous researchers (Kohlberg, 1958, 1964; Keasey, 1971; Tracy & Cross, 1973; Hoffman, 1970) have reported significant positive correlations between I.Q. test scores and MJS scores. These correlations have been, however, low to moderate. O'Connor (1971), Selman (1971), Haan, Stroud & Holstein (1973) failed to replicate these relationships.

Hogan (1969) reported that ES scores were significantly, $r = .32$, correlated with the SAT Verbal scores but not with the SAT Quantitative, the MCAT Verbal, or the MCAT Quantitative scores. Hogan's (1970) SEA was not significantly related to three measures of I.Q.

Fromm (1947) drew a distinction between intelligence and reason.

Intelligence is a process of analysis. Reason is a deeper process of synthesis. Fromm claimed that intelligence is applicable to manipulation but that only reason was sufficient for the productive thinking of the productive character.

Keasey (1975) has also challenged the validity of intelligence as either a component or correlative of moral judgment. Keasey presented data to support the argument that I.Q. tests do not measure qualitative, structural cognitive development. Different amounts of intelligence, therefore, could not produce qualitatively different modes of moral reasoning. At most, intelligence may be related to the rate of moral development but not to the development per se.

Although Kohlberg (1958, 1964) has reported I.Q. - MJS correlations, he (1958, 1963, & 1969) has theoretically emphasized the role of cognitive development and not intelligence in the development of moral judgment.

Cognitive Development

Keasey (1975) reported empirical evidence to directly support his previous contention. Keasey cited an unpublished study by Kuhn et al which strongly suggested that formal cognitive operations are prerequisite for principled moral reasoning. Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey (1974) found that all principled (stages 5 & 6) moral judgment subjects possessed "some" capacity for formal operational thought. All subjects evidencing formal operational thought, however, did not exhibit principled moral judgment. They concluded that cognitive development was 1) necessary for moral development, 2) not sufficient for moral development, and 3) chronologically precedent to moral development. A similar relationship was found between concrete operational thought

and stage 2 moral judgment (Keasey, 1973). Hoffman (1975) presented a theory of altruistic motivation (moral empathy) which explicated the necessity of concrete operational thought for moral empathy. If young children have a natural tendency towards altruistic empathy which progresses through a stage based on concrete operational thought, then this altruistic behavior would seem to be incongruous with Stage 2 moral judgment.

Sullivan and Quarter (1972) investigated relationships between MJS scores and Omnibus Personality Inventory (OPI) scores. The "Thinking Introversion" scale of the OPI measures a subject's tendency for reflective thought and abstractions. Conventional (Stage 3 & 4 and mixtures thereof) moral subjects ranked in the fifty-first percentile. Postconventional (Stage 5, 5[6], and 6[5]) subjects scored at the fifty-sixth percentile, while principled absolutists (Stage 6) scored at the fifty-eighth percentile. Stage 2 instrumental relativists ranked in the fifty-sixth percentile. The significance level of these percentile differences, if any, was not reported.

Fromm (1947) stated that productive character thinking was characterized by objectivity, logical analysis, and the development of a deeper structural view. Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) used psychiatric interviews to assess the ego processes of coping, defense, and fragmentation. This assessment included ratings on a number of cognitive operations. They obtained significant, $p = .05$, positive relationships between MJS scores and the ego coping processes of 1) objectivity, 2) intellectuality, and 3) logical analysis. None of these terms were explicitly defined.

Attention

May (1969) emphasized the essential importance of attention for perception and conceptualization. Consciousness and cognitive activity consist of a figure-ground constellation. This constellation is cognitively explorable and understandable only through attention. Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) postulated that the positive definition of ego control was not impulse control but attention. They stated that cognitive performance was dependent on decentered acts of attention.

In a review of child development, Kohlberg (1964) reported that the maintenance of stable, focused attention had been repeatedly found to be significantly correlated with various measures of moral character. The MJS was not one of these measures.

Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) intensively investigated the relationship between attentional processes and moral character. They specifically compared twelve measures of attention and five measures of morality (not moral reasoning) with three age groups. The attention measures consisted of four reaction time (RT) variables and eight galvanic skin response (GSR) variables. The five morality measures were based on two teacher-rated questionnaires (on untrustworthiness and disobedience) and three experimental cheating conditions. These measures were taken on a sample of first-grade pupils, sixth-grade pupils, and college adults (mean age 31). Not all measures were gathered for each group.

For the measure used with the first grade pupils, eight of a possible twenty-seven correlations were significant. Ten of a possible thirty-six attention-morality correlations were significant, $p = .05$, in the predicted direction for the sixth-grade pupils (Table 17). Four of these correlations were significant for both age samples, while

Table 17

Major Correlations Between Attention and Morality Measures at Two Ages

Measure	6th grade	1st grade
Correlations replicated at both ages		
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)* and high RT variability (SD)	.38 (.30)	.59**(.59**)
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)* and increase of RT (4-1)	.50**(.37)	.41**(.43**)
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)* and increase of nonspecifics (4-1)	.25 (.37)	.49**(.52**)
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)* and high movement artifacts	.43**(.40)	.41**(.27)
High cheating, all tests,[b] and high RT variability (SD)	.61**(.61**)	(.16)
High cheating, all tests,[b] and RT increases (4-1)	.36 (.33)	(.44**)
High cheating, all tests,[b] and increase of nonspecifics (4-1)	.43**(.44**)	(.34)
Correlations found only at older age		
High untrustworthiness (disobedience)[a] and long RT ($\bar{X}$)	.74**(.53**)	.15 (.01)
High cheating, all tests,[b] and high nonspecifics ($\bar{X}$)	.42**(.36)	(.12)

continued

Measure	6th grade	1st grade
High cheating, all tests,[b] and high movement artifacts GSR	.47**(.46**)	(-.38)
Correlations found only at younger age		
High cheating, all tests,[b] and high basal GSR	-.13(-.12)	(.48**)

(a) Correlations of disobedience ratings and the given variable are presented in parentheses.

(b) Correlations in parentheses indicate sums based on only the circles and Lie Test used at both ages.

From: Grim, Kohlberg, & White (1968) Table 2.

**$p < .05$.

three were specific to the sixth-grade sample and one to the first-grade sample.

An unrotated factor analysis of the full correlation matrix produced a primary factor which Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) labeled as "general behavior control." The major variables which defined the factor were the two moral behavior ratings (untrustworthiness and disobedience) and three measures of attentional instability (RT variability, RT increase, and increase in nonspecifics (1st - 4th). Lack of general behavioral control significantly, $p = .05$, clustered with attentional instability for both the first-grade and sixth-grade samples. Five other variables were significantly clustered on this primary factor for the sixth-grade sample only: 1) cheating, circles test; 2) cheating, lie test; 3) cheating, block test; 4) RT mean; and 5) GSR movement artifacts. This sample-specific finding was explained as due to the lower reliability of the cheating tests for the first-grade sample.

A subsequent varimax rotated factor analysis defined three factors. The first rotated factor was characterized as "task conformity." It loaded on both psychomotor measures of steadiness (RT increase, RT mean, and movement; the last two for the sixth-grade sample only) and on the teacher's ratings of stable conformity to authoritative social expectations.

The second rotated factor isolated the experimental cheating measures of morality. This factor was designated as one of "inner stability." It was interpreted as follows: "It might be suggested that the morality component of the second factor represents a more internalized disposition than the performance dispositions picked up by the first factor. Where the first factor seems related to the capacity of the child to exert restraint, the second factor seems more voluntaristic. The child who resists an

opportunity to augment a test score by cheating must have both a willingness and capacity"(p. 246). Note the similarity of this interpretation of experimental findings to the theoretical interpretation of intentionality by May (1967, p. 228) described earlier.

A third rotated factor was interpreted as being an artifact of the measures and statistical treatment. It was, however, labeled as "restlessness" and construed as analogous to impulsiveness.

Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) analyzed their findings to determine the extent to which the differences were due to developmental influences as opposed to "personality" factors. Analysis of the correlation matrix revealed four sets of variables: 1) developmental, 2) asymptotic developmental, 3) terminating developmental, and 4) nondevelopmental variables.

Developmental variables were those which increased continuously until adulthood. The two psychomotor variables (RT variability and RT increase) were continuous developmental variables. These variables were stated to represent second-order measures of stability or consistency of performance. They concluded that this indicated a slowly developing factor of stability of attention.

Asymptotic developmental variables were those which increased until approximately sixth-grade and then insignificantly thereafter. These variables were grouped in discussion with the terminating developmental variables which increased to sixth-grade and then terminated. The three psychomotor variables of mean RT, mean nonspecific, and movement, and the one psychophysiological variable (mean nonspecifics), which were associated with moral behavior measures at grade 6 but not at grade 1, were either asymptotic or terminating developmental variables. These variables

were interpreted as being primarily indicators of pure psychomotor inability rather than instability of attention. First graders would not have the neuromuscular coordination necessary to hold their fingers still. Sixth-graders would have developed this psychomotor stability ability. Variations between individuals at the sixth-grade level, therefore, represent instability of attention. Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) concluded that "the asymptotic variables relating to morality at Grade 6 did so because they then began to be determined by the stability components" (p. 248) (the developmental variables).

The general conclusions of Grim, Kohlberg, and White were primarily focused on the interpretation that attention variables showed more clear and regular age-developmental trends than do their moral variables. This was viewed as indicating that honesty (one of their moral variables) was not dependent upon character factors such as guilt or anticipation of punishment. Since they did not investigate this alternative explanation, their findings may represent spurious relationships.

They hypothesized that stable attention promoted honesty by enabling a higher threshold to distracting thoughts of the opportunity to cheat. They viewed the temptation to cheat as an interesting and distracting stimulus rather than as an arousal of an impulse. Resistance to temptation, therefore, was considered an ego process of "ideational-volitional attention" rather than emotional impulse control or inhibition. "Cognitive maturity of verbal moral values or judgment interacts with the attentional-volitional capacities discussed to determine cheating conduct"(p. 251).

Grim, Kohlberg, and White's construct of ideational-volitional attention has the conceptual constituents of May's (1969) concept of intentionality. This interpretation is further substantiated by the fact that both

authors quote the same passages of James (1963) on volition (will) and attention (May, 1969, p. 218; Grim, Kohlberg, and White, 1968, p. 251).

Kohlberg (1969) reported that attention was nonlinearly and significantly correlated with moral judgments. This result was not further elaborated as to samples tested and measures of moral reasoning.

Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) gathered data on "hippies" with thirty different ego process measures. One of these ego measures was the coping process of concentration (an attention-focusing operation). Their sample of "hippies'"moral judgment global stage scores were divided into three comparison levels: stage 2, stage 3, and stages 3(4) and above. Concentration was more significantly, $p = .01$, related to MJS scores than the other ten ego coping processes. The level of concentration increased as moral judgment increased.

Ego Stages

The ego stage development theories of Erikson (1963) and Loevinger (1966 & 1976) have been used in research on moral judgment by Sullivan, McCullough, and Stager (1970); Podd (1972); and Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973).

Loevinger's (1966) model postulates seven stages of ego development: 1) symbiotic, 2) impulse ridden, 3) opportunistic, 4) conformist, 5) conscientious, 6) autonomous, and 7) integrated. Sullivan, McCullough, and Stager (1970) applied Loevinger's theory and Ego Development Test (EDT) in their moral development research. They hypothesized that Kohlberg's and Loevinger's stage formulations encompassed "overlapping content areas of personality." Moral judgment (MJS scores) significantly correlated with ego development (CLQ scores): $r = .66$, $n = 120$, $p = .01$. This relationship decreased to $r = .40$, $n = 120$, $p = .01$, when age was partialed out. The relationship between moral development and ego

development increased between age samples. MJS scores correlated r = .19 with CLQ scores for 12 year olds, r = .48, n = 40, p = .01, for 14 year old subjects, and r = .54, n = 40, p = .01, for the 17 year old sample. These moderate correlations supported their conclusion that those scoring high on either measure did not score at a similarily high stage with an extremely high frequency.

Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) administered the MJS and CLQ to an older sample of "hippies" between the ages of 16 to 35 (modal age = 20). Table 18 presents the distribution of these subjects by ego and moral stages. A chi-square test of this distribution failed to show any significant, p =.05, differences in either ego stages or moral stages cross-classified. They concluded that "the moral and ego stages do not represent identical or parallel sequential phenomena in this sample " (p. 600). Their conclusion is based on the assumption that adults who scored as stage 2 are reasoning at the preconventional level of adult moral judgment.

This conclusion should be reviewed taking into consideration the position of Turiel (1973) on adult stage 2 scorers. Turiel argued that some individuals in late adolescence experience a conflict between society's conventions and the inequalities and hypocrisies within society. Moral confusion and relativity follow this conflict because these individuals fail to distinguish between conventional and moral reasoning. Turiel (1975) defined conventions as norms regulating sexual mores, dress codes, respect modes, sex and age roles, and national and religious rituals and customs. Society also incorporates within its normative system most of the moral domain: honesty, the value of life, responsibility, and individual rights. The moral relativism which results from the rejection of society's normative

Table 18

Distribution of hippies by ego and moral stages: Haan, Stroud, & Holstein

Moral Stages	Ego Stages 2,2-3,3's	3/4s	4s+	Total Ns
2, 3/2s	3	19	8	30
3s	2	7	7	16
3/4s+	2	4	6	12
Total Ns	7	30	21	58

Note: The divisions for the moral sequence are: (a) premoral, (b) stage 3, personally concordant, (c) legalistic and beyond. The ego stages are: (a) impulsive, opportunistic, and conformist, (b) transitional between conformist and conscientious, (c) conscientious and beyond.

system causes confusion and a lack of committment to the moral aspects within that system (Sullivan and Quarter, 1972).

This stage of moral reasoning, rather than being a "regression" as theorized by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969), may be a state of transition: a groping for cohesive moral principles and a reorganization of the moral ideology which excludes social conventions. Sullivan and Quarter (1972) argued that adults or late adolescents classified as stage 2's were structurally a hybrid postconventional stage. These hybrid postconventional subjects' Omnibus Personality Inventory profiles were more like those of postconventional subjects than conventional subjects. Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) conducted an analysis of their ego functioning data to test Turiel's (1973) hypothesis against Kohlberg and Kramer's (1969) theory. Their analysis supported Turiel's position that these instrumental relativists are in transition from stage 4 to stage 5 moral thought. Having performed this analysis, however, Haan, Stroud, and Holstein did not then reanalyze their ego stage (CLQ) data. Such a reanalysis may have modified their ego stage conclusion above.

Such a reanalysis by the present author shows that of the thirty "hippies" classified as instrumental relativists, 3 are typed as either impulsive, opportunistic, or conformist in ego stage, while 19 are in a state of transition from the conformist ego stage to the conscientious stage, and 8 subjects are either conscientious autonomous, or integrated in ego stage. If Haan, Stroud, and Holstein's (1973) data in Table 18 is reorganized to place these instrumental relativists as transitional between stage 4 and stage 5, a relatively clear parallel sequential pattern emerges (Table 19). A chi-square reanalysis, however, failed to find significant, $x^2 = 3.1$ (4), $p \geq .05$, concordance between ego and moral stages.

Table 19

Reanalysis of Ego Stage-Moral Stage Distribution: Stage 2 Reclassified as Transitional Postconventional

MORAL STAGES	EGO STAGES 2,3,4	transitional	4-5	5,6,7	Total N's
Conventional	2	7		7	16
Transitional (instrumental relativists)	3	19		8	30
Postconventional	2	4		6	12
Total N's	7	30		21	58

Podd (1972) investigated the relationship between Erikson's (1963) ego growth stages and Kohlberg's moral judgment stages. He pursued this relationship through focusing on Marcia's (1966) identity statuses. Erikson's eight stages of ego growth were operationalized by Marcia (1966) into four ego identity statuses. These four stages focus on the process of adolescent identity crisis resolution. Identity crisis resolution is accomplished through a process of committment in such areas as occupational choice, religious beliefs, and political ideology. The identity statuses are: 1) identity diffusion - the individual has no commitment regardless of crises; 2) foreclosure - the individual has experienced no crisis but is committed to goals and values of parents and significant others; 3) moratorium - the individual is in crisis with vague commitments; and 4) identity achievement - the individual has gone through a crisis and is committed. Podd postulated that moral ideology was a part of the ego identity construct.

Identity achievement status subjects had significantly higher MJS mean ratings than subjects in all other statuses combined, $\underline{t} = 2.25$ (107), $\underline{p} = .05$. A Newman-Keuls multiple-comparisons test indicated that identity achievement subjects received significantly, $\underline{p} = .01$, higher mean MJS scores that either foreclosure or identity diffusion subjects but not moratorium identity status subjects. The moratorium status sample, however, made significantly, $\underline{p} = .01$, higher mean MJS scores than those in the foreclosure and identity diffusion statuses. For this sample of male college students, those in the identity statuses reflecting a higher degree of ego identity received significantly higher mean moral judgment ratings than those in the statuses designated as reflecting a lower degree of ego identity (identity achievement - moratorium - foreclosure - identity diffusion), $\underline{t} = 4.29$ (107), $\underline{p} = .01$.

An analysis of the distribution of MJS stage scores within the respective identity statuses resulted in a complex pattern of relationships. The identity diffusion status sample had more subjects at the preconventional and less at the postconventional level of moral thought than expected by chance, $\underline{x}^2 = 5.82$ (1), $\underline{p} = .02$ and $\underline{x}^2 = 8.08$ (1), $\underline{p} = .005$. There were also a greater number of identity diffusion subjects who had transitional MJS scores between conventional to postconventional moral reasoning than expected on the basis of chance, $\underline{x}^2 = 8.60$, (1), $\underline{p} = .005$.

Podd hypothesized that foreclosure subjects would show significantly greater tendency to use conventional moral reasoning. This hypothesis was not statistically supported, although foreclosure was the only identity status in which there were more conventional than either preconventional or postconventional subjects. There were, however, significantly fewer foreclosure subjects classified into the postconventional moral judgment stage than expected by chance, $\underline{x}^2 = 4.32$, (1), $\underline{p} = .05$. The moritorium subjects were distributed across the moral stages within chance expectancies.

More identity achievement subjects were classified at the postconventional moral level than predicted by chance, $\underline{x}^2 = 16.27$, (1), $\underline{p} = .0005$. There were fewer preconventional, $\underline{x}^2 = 4.14$, (1), $\underline{p} = .05$, and transitional, $\underline{x}^2 = 9.01$, (1), $\underline{p} = .005$, stage subjects distributed within the identity status group than expected by chance.

Podd futher analyzed the variability of subjects' issue scores on the MJS. These analyses revealed two significant relationships. Significantly fewer subjects in the identity achievement status were variable

x^2 = 7.00 (1), p = .01, and significantly more in the moratorium status were variable, x^2 = 4.63 (1), p = .05, than predicted by chance.

Awareness of Feelings

Ego strength is only one aspect of certitude. Feeling sensitivity and acting on these cognitive and feeling dimensions are the completing dimensions.

Shostrom's (1967) borrowed concept of congruence aptly encompassed these last aspects of certitude. Congruence is the ability to feel our emotions physiologically, to experience them consciously, and to communicate (act upon) them accurately. Kohlberg (1964) reported that stage 2 delinquents showed a lack of such affectional reactions (undefined).

Hoffman's (1970) investigation of conscience in 7th graders tested hypotheses about feeling sensitivity and expression. Hoffman used two Kohlberg dilemmas and two other dilemmas which were scored with modified Kohlberg procedures to assess moral stage. Five measures of guilt were administered: maximum guilt, terminal guilt, ego-alien guilt, impulse tolerance, and repression. The last two were interpreted as measures of feeling sensitivity.

The measure of tolerance of anti-moral impulses did show a significant difference, p = .001, in awareness of feelings between postconventional (Hoffman's humanistic subjects) and conventional moral stage male subjects. Responses to a story in which the "hero" desires to win a race and cheats to accomplish this goal were scored for both an initial expression of pleasure at winning and a subsequent response of guilt for having cheated. Postconventional male subjects expressed both the pleasure and the guilt feelings. Conventional male subjects expressed greater guilt but did not express any positive feeling from having won the race. This was interpreted

as indicating that young adolescent, conventional-moral-stage subjects had such a low tolerance of anti-moral impulses that they could not even experience the pleasure resultant from performing these impulses. Postconventional subjects have appropriate impulse tolerance to both experience positive and negative affects.

Conventional moral stage subjects had higher scores than post-conventional subjects on four repression indexes, but the differences were not significant.

Gutkin (1973) attacked Hoffman's (1970) interpretation of the tolerance of anti-moral impulses on the distinction between impulse and intention. Gutkin defines "impulse" as a thought or desire with no instrumental behavior necessarily attached to it. This definition, however, does not sufficiently discriminate it from his definition of intention. Intention entails anticipated goal-oriented consequences. Halleck (1895) provided a defining component which corresponds more closely to May's (1969) definition of intentionality. An impulse, Hallack (1895) stated, entailed no deliberation of the consequences of the potential action on others, either goal-oriented or not. An anti-moral impulse then would be any thought that violated an internalized norm. Postconventional subjects (Hoffman, 1970) expressed more awareness of depriving another of the deserved prize of winning the race (intention) than did the conventional subjects who focused on their anti-moral impulses. Hoffman's results, therefore, are not inconsistent with the findings between moral stage and intentionality.

The ego functioning processes scaled by Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973) included measures of affective operations. These nine operations consisted of three each of ego coping, defensive, and fragmentation modes.

No significant differences were found for moral stages between either substitution, reaction formation, and unstable alternation or suppression, repression, and depersonalization. Conventional moral stage (stage 3?) subjects, however, had significantly, $p = .05$, higher affective preoccupation scores than either instrumental relativists (stage 2-5) or postconventionals. Affective preoccupation was trichotomized with sublimation and displacement. Haan, Stroud, and Holstein did not interpret this finding, although affective preoccupation was presented as an ego fragmentation operation. Affective preoccupation's context within the above trichotomy suggests that it can be interpreted as impulse domination. This would be consistent with Hoffman's (1970) findings.

Chapter VI

THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS

The third dimension which Fromm (1947) proposed distinguishing between the unproductive character and the productive character orientation was the nature of our relation and interaction with others. One can relate and interact in three ways: in symbiosis (e.g. to lose the self either in submission to or dominance of others); in withdrawal (e.g. to protect the self through either distance or destruction of others); or in love (e.g. the affirmation of the truly human self through caring, knowing, and respecting others' truly human selves).

Fromm's unproductive character lives in either a symbiotic or a withdrawal relationship with others. The productive character nourishes a love relationship with others which is not romantic love (Fromm, 1947 and 1956). Productive love is an active power to give active concern for the life growth and integrity of that which we love under the condition of preserving one's own integrity. The person whose character has not developed beyond the stage of the receptive, exploitative, marketing or hoarding orientation cannot experience love in this way (Fromm, 1956). Since the unproductive character was conceived as possessing an authoritarian conscience, the relationship with authority would be central.

Fromm recognized that the symbiotic relationship with the authority could be expressed through two types of manipulativeness (Machiavellianism). If one blocked his freedom and responsibilities through submission to others,

then he would manipulate others either through servility and parasitical-ness (Receptive Orientation) or through possessiveness (Hoarding Orientation). If on the other side, one blocked his freedom through dominance of others, then his manipulativeness would be expressed through either overt exploitation (Exploitative Orientation) or covert opportunism (Marketing Orientation). May (1967) similarly stated that Western man has historically blocked awareness of his own perception and consciousness, and freedom and responsibility through controlling and manipulating the environment. The environment included nature, others, and self.

Shostrom (1967) conceptualized human existence as residing within the dichotomy of manipulation versus actualization. This closely parallels Fromm's unproductive and productive life orientations. The manipulator is contrasted with the actualizer on four fundamental characteristics (see Table 20). Shostrom presented four manipulative systems which strongly parallel Fromm's four unproductive character types:

Manipulative System	Unproductive Orientation
Passive	Receiving
Active	Exploiting
Indifferent	Hoarding
Competitive	Marketing

The passive manipulator attempts to control others through feigning helplessness and dependency. The active manipulator, however, exercises control through creating obligations, threatening harm, and exercising rank. Indifferent manipulation involves using withdrawal of contact (not hearing, forgetting, not understanding) and being indifferent (claiming not to care). The actual games used by an indifferent manipulator belie his caring and possessiveness. The competitive manipulator continuously calculates

Table 20

Fundamental Characteristics of Manipulators and Actualizors Contrasted*

Manipulators	Actualizors
1. Deception (Phoniness, Knavery). The manipulator uses tricks, techniques, and maneuvers. He puts on an act, plays roles to create an impression. His expressed feelings are deliberately chosen to fit the occasion.	1. Honesty (Transparency, Genuineness, Authenticity). The actualizor is able honestly to be his feelings, whatever they may be. He is characterized by candidness, expression, and genuinely being himself.
2. Unawareness (Deadness, Boredom). The manipulator is unaware of the really important concerns of living. He has "Tunnel Vision." He sees only what he wishes to see and hears only what he wishes to hear.	2. Awareness (Responsiveness, Aliveness, Interest). The actualizor fully looks and listens to himself and others. He is fully aware of nature, art, music, and the other real dimensions of living.
3. Control (Closed, Deliberate). The manipulator plays life like a game of chess. He appears relaxed, yet is very controlled and controlling, concealing his motives from his "opponent."	3. Freedom (Spontaneity, Openness). The actualizor is spontaneous. He has the freedom to be and express his potentials. He is master of his life, a subject and not a puppet or object.

continued

Manipulators	Actualizors
4. Cynicism (Distrust). The manipulator is basically distrusting of himself and others. Down deep he doesn't trust human nature. He sees relationships with humans as having two alternatives: to control or be controlled.	4. Trust (Faith, Belief). The actualizor has a deep trust in himself and others to relate to and cope with life in the here and now.

*Drawn from Table 1, p. 23-24, Shostrom, 1967.

and tries to outwit others either through active strategies or passive ones.

Shostrom (1967 and 1972) seems to have focused on Fromm's third dimension of moral character structure in his theorizing. Although Shostrom does not explicitly cite Fromm (1947) for his theorizing, he does acknowledge that Fromm (1957) was the inspiration for his thought development in Man, the Manipulator (1967).

Our relations with others is a broad construct consisting of four broad dimensions: manipulativeness, aggression, social desirability, and empathy. Each dimension has been divided and measured in numerous ways. In particular, empathy has been widely discussed, divided, and tested. Empathy is reviewed here by separating it into egocentrism and role-taking empathy. These four dimensions closely parallel the underlying dimensions of types of manipulators and unproductive character types.

Manipulativeness

Kohlberg (1968) generalized the egocentric, self-enhancement nature of the stage 2 moral orientation. This relationship was supported by Fontana and Noel (1973), who found a significant correlation, r = .24, p = .05, between MJS and Mach V scores for stage 2 moral subjects. They did not explain how they performed correlations between single stages of moral reasoning and Mach V scores. Significant correlations were not found for stages 3, 4, 5 and 6, r = .04, -.04, -.13, and -.10 respectively, n = 93. The Machiavellian scale measures the orientation in interpersonal relations which uses a manipulative, exploitative approach. These findings must be cautiously evaluated until Fontana and Noel's correlation analyses are explained.

Studying a similar population and relationship, Alker and Poppen (1973)

presented their results in both the total Mach V score, the Machiavellian Tactics subscale score, and the Machiavellian Views subscale score. None of these scores were significantly correlated with MJS scores, r = -.04, -.09, and .04 respectively, n = 192. These scores were not significantly correlated on a comparison of conventional (3 + 4) and nonconventional (1, 2, 5 & 6) moral stage subjects r = .07, .01, and .12 respectively, n = 192. A comparison of premoral (1 & 2) versus principled (5 & 6) moral stage subjects, however, did yield a significant correlation for the Machiavellian Tactics subscale scores, r = -.35, p = .05. The overall Mach V score and the Machiavellian Views subscale were not significantly correlated to this premoral/principled comparison, r = -.23 and .01 respectively.

The initial TORSCA dimensional solution added some interpretation to these findings. The Machiavellian scores clustered with dogmatism, external locus of control, and right political views. This solution was not consistent with previous findingsreported by Alker and Poppen which indicated that the Machiavellian person flourished in situations where others were constrained by rigid compliance to norms since the Machiavellian was not constrained by such norms and profited most in contexts which were ambiguous.

An orthogonal analysis of the same data resulted in a potentially salient relationship. Machiavellianism clustered most closely with principled morality in this analysis. Alker and Poppen interpreted this finding in terms of freedom of choice. Both the Machiavellian and the principled moralist make choices free from the constraints of conventional morality. Both orientations also accepted full resonsibility for their choices. The difference between the two orientations rests on the nature of the choices, either morally creative (principled morality) or selfishly

opportunistic (Machiavellianism).

The productive character was morally creative in Fromm's theory. Morality itself was defined as the productive use of one's powers to reason, to love, to imagine and create. The self-actualizor is morally "constructive" in his relations with others, himself, and his environment. The more productively and thus actualizingly one lives, the more developed becomes one's conscience.

Aggression

Aggression and self-destructiveness were, to Fromm, the counter forces of productiveness. Using the same phraseology as later used by May (1967), Fromm attributed aggression to the "blockage" of man's spontaneous experience of his sensory, perceptual, emotional, physical, and cognitive capacities. Aggression and self-destructiveness in whatever covert, insideous ways were the direct outgrowth of the unproductive character. Shostrom (1967) defined manipulation as a system of dealing with people and oneself which is self-defeating in certain ways. Fromm observed that aggression against oneself and others is conjunctive; Shostrom's thought on manipulation is concordant with this view.

Anchor and Cross (1974) in investigating moral judgment examined a construct with this conjunctive relationship: maladaptive aggression. Maladaptive aggression was defined as behavior towards another which had three characteristics: 1. the aggressive initiator received no instrumental gain, 2. from his penalizing of the victim, and 3. the aggressive initiator was himself penalized for behaving aggressively. Anchor and Cross operationalized maladaptive aggression through a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game. Subjects were given the opportunity on every tenth trial to take away ten dollars from the opponents' account. This ten dollars

went to the "bank" and not to the subject who exercised this option. The "aggressive" subject was in turn deprived of two dollars which was placed in the "bank." The subjects were not directly competing with each other; both subjects were allowed to keep their earnings.

Subjects with lower MJS global scores aggressed their partners significantly more than those higher in moral judgment, $F = 18.36$, $(2/111)$, $p = .001$. Preconventional subjects penalized more than conventionals, $t = 2.58$ (81), $p = .025$, and postconventionals, $t = 5.29$ (47), $p = .005$, and conventional MJS subjects aggressed significantly more than postconventionals, $t = 4.80$ (94), $p = .005$. Anchor and Cross concluded, however, that moral judgment in itself was insufficient to explain maladaptive aggression.

Social Desirability

Fromm (1947) detailed a high need for social approval as a characteristic of the unproductive receptive character. He explained that this need was an outgrowth of the unproductive character's insecurity in his own ability to provide self-support. Shostrom (1967) used very similar phraseology. The manipulator controls others because he needs their support because he does not trust himself for self-support. Yet, he does not trust others and therefore manipulates to insure their support.

Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found significant differences between the Q-sorts of subjects at various moral stages on the MJS. The descriptive adjective phrase "needs approval" was significantly, $p = .05$, different across moral stages for males' ideal-self sorting. The order from lowest to highest need for approval was stage 6, 2, 5, 3, 4. The ideal to be "self-confident" showed a similar pattern for males: stages 5, 2, 6, 3, 4. Females did not show these significant patterns.

Hogan (1969) reported that ES scores correlated significantly with scores on the Edward's scale for Social Desirability for two samples, $r = .50$, $p = .01$, $n = 70$; and $r = .37$, $p = .01$, $n = 51$ respectively. The sample of females showed the lower correlation. The ES was also, however, significantly correlated with the 'Self-acceptance' scale of the CPI for the same two groups. These results are not consistent with Shostrom and Fromm's theories.

These results, however, are inconclusive. The ES scale, as earlier criticized, seems to measure role-taking ability and sociability rather than empathy. High ES subjects would be expected to show high self-confidence. This sociability and confidence may, however, reflect confidence in one's ability to control others' providing of support. It may show successful manipulation, although the need for social approval would still be present.

Results from another of Hogan's (1970) studies supports this latter interpretation. Only the SEA Form B showed a significant, $r = .22$, $p = .05$, $n = 90$, but extremely low correlation with the Edward's Social Desirability scale. This finding was not duplicated for the SEA Form A. The SEA distinguishes between two sets of ethical orientations: personal conscience and social responsibility. Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968) data indicates that stage 6 subjects would have the lowest need for social approval and that stage 5 subjects would have a low need. The SEA marginal findings support this finding. The CPI 'self-acceptance' scale was not significantly correlated with the SEA. This finding can be interpreted as due to the lack of a sufficient range of moral development stages: personal conscience versus social responsibility.

Fontana and Noel (1973) generally replicated Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968)

personality-morality relationships. Fontana and Noel compared students, faculty, and administrators on a number of demographic and personality variables, and on moral judgment. They did not report an instrument to instrument correlation between MJS scores and Machiavellian Social Desirability (MSD) scores. Individual MJS stage to MSD scores were, however, computed by a questionable, undescribed procedure. Stage 2 scores correlated signifcantly with MSD scores, $r = -.24$, $p = .05$, which was the only significant relationship. If the stage 2 moral person is analogous to Fromm's exploitative character and Shostrom's active manipulator then his control of others is through power domination and not social amenities. He does not need other's approval to acquire their support.

The order of correlation between MJS and MSD scores was stage 2, 3, 4, 6 and 5. This order varies in important ways from Haan, Smith, and Block who found an order of 6, 2, 5, 3, 4. This variance may result from the distinction between self-ideal description (Haan, Smith, and Block) and actual self-description (MSD). The correlation between stage 5 subject's MJS scores and MSD scores was marginally significant, $r = .20$, $p = .07$. The marketing character and the competitive manipulator (stage 5) must rely on establishing social good will in order to be successful.

Tracy and Cross (1973) administered the Children's Social Desirability Questionnaire (CSDQ) to their sample of 12 to 14 year old subjects along with the MJS. The CSDQ scores were not significantly correlated, $r = -.20$, $n = 76$, with MJS scores. A median split of low versus high CSDQ scores showed that low scorers, however, had significantly higher MJS mean scores (low = 281 MMS versus high = 255 MMS). MJS scores for this sample ranged from stage 1 to stage 4. This latter finding is consistent with the previous relationships.

Young adolescents are at a critical level of moral development. Turiel (1969) and Kohlberg (1958, & 1963) have shown that this is a period of rapid development. Tracy and Cross (1973) found that CSDQ scores were significantly correlated, $r = 24$, $p = .05$, with the MJS difference scores between two administrations. Those subjects with higher social desirability scores demonstrated greater jumps in MJS scores. Subjects developing from preconventional to conventional moral reasoning would be expected to reflect this relationship.

Empathy

"Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to oneself. It implies responsibility, care, respect and knowledge, and the wish for the other person to grow and develop" (Fromm 1956, p. 116). The unproductive form of relatedness to others, according to Fromm, is manipulation. Shostrom (1967) stated that actualizing love is characterized by empathy. He defined empathy as a "charitable, altruistic form of love, which cares deeply for the other person as a unique human being, ...charity or compassion"(p. 122).

This definition of empathy includes much more than role-taking ability. The distinction was made earlier in this paper between role-taking empathy and moral empathy. Moral empathy is the consideration of the consequences of one's actions for the welfare of others. The concept of "love" in Fromm (1947) and May (1969) and of empathy in Shostrom is considered to be moral empathy. Kohlberg (1958) stated that 'moral set' was higher than social role-taking but dependent on it.

Empathy on the most basic level can be dichotomized into egocentrism versus role-taking empathy. Egocentrism is behaving and interacting almost completely within the individual's private perspective, neither

communicating the self-assumed perspective to others nor considering the perspective of others into one's interaction. On the other end of the continuum would be role-taking empathy which is the ability to incorporate the perspective and feelings associated with a role other than one's own into one's own perspective. Since Piaget (1932) has shown that children develop from egocentric behavior to role-taking empathy, the review of the research will follow this developmental pattern.

Egocentrism

Kohlberg (1958) reviewed Piaget's and Mead's theories of moral development. Piaget (1932) theorized that higher moral reasoning required the ability to be aware of and use different points of view (role-taking). Mead (1934) developed a similar emphasis on reflexive and projective thought. Moral thought, according to Mead, is a process of inner intercommunication among the self and those to be effected by the consequence of a decision (role-taking). Both theorists predicted that children developed from an egocentric perspective to a more social, role-taking perspective. Piaget (1932), Ruben and Schneider (1973), and Moir (1974) have established this relationship.

As an adult personality trait, egocentrism can be considered as an unwillingness to consider the cognitions and feelings of others and as viewing everything in relation to oneself. The egocentric adult is capable of role-taking empathy but either willingly or neurotically chooses to disregard and disrespect others. Such egocentric individuals would be expected to be aloof, reserved and unresponsible in their interaction with others.

Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found that stage 2 females rated themselves significantly higher on the adjective "reserved" than the females of all other stages. Stage 6 males, however, had the lowest self-ratings on

on "reserved" and the highest self-ratings on the adjective "responsive."

The ideal-self descriptions of stage 2 subjects indicated some potential psychological conflicts. Although male stage 2 subjects desired to be "aloof," they simultaneously, however, communicated the ideal of being "responsive." The order on this adjective was stage 2 (5.36), stage 6 (5.31), stage 3 (5.20), stage 5 (5.04), and stage 4 (4.50). The difference between stage 2 and stage 4 was significant, $p = .05$.

Fontana and Noel (1973) factor analyzed a similar adjective self-description sorting resulting in seven factors. One of these factors they labeled "Egocentrist" because it was characterized by lack of both sympathy and moral empathy. An undescribed procedure of calculating only individual correlations between moral stages and egocentrist individuals was performed. This procedure is questionable. The egocentrists were significantly correlated, $r = .24$, $p = .05$, with stage 2 moral reasoning. The remaining order of declining positive correlations between egocentrists and moral stages was stage 3, $r = .04$, stage 4, $r = -.04$, stage 6, $r = -.10$, and stage 5, $r = .13$.

Role-Taking Empathy. Consistent with Piaget's and Mead's theories, Kohlberg (1958) found moral development to be dependent on role-taking ability. The subjects' teachers rated them on role-taking ability and social participation. These ratings showed a significant, $F = 44.18$, $p = .01$, difference between stages with role-taking empathy increasing with moral development. Selman (1971) hypothesized that role-taking ability was an age-developmental, social-cognitive process paralleling moral development. He defined role-taking as the ability to understand the interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's eyes. Role-taking would necessitate the cognitive abilities to make

specific inferences about another's capabilities, attributes, expectations, feelings, and potential reactions. These inferences must be based on the cognitive ability to attend to, shift, balance, and evaluate both perceptual and cognitive social-object input. Role-taking development involves an increasingly accurate perception of both what another will do in a specific situation and how one's own actions will effect the attitude of another towards oneself.

Selman (1971) administered two role-taking tasks to a sample of 8 to 10 year olds. The responses were structurally scored and dichotomized into reciprocal and nonreciprocal categories. The reciprocal category reflected role-taking ability.

The two levels of role-taking ability for both tasks were significantly associated with the preconventional versus conventional moral reasoning. Eighty percent of the preconventional subjects had non-reciprocal scores while 74% of the conventional moral reasoning subjects had reciprocal scores.

A subsequent, longitudinal study of the preconventional subjects indicated that no subject attained conventional moral reasoning without reciprocal role-taking. Selman (1971) concluded that reciprocal role-taking was a necessary and developmentally prior ability to conventional moral development.

Tracy and Cross (1973) administered two role-taking measures to 12 to 14.66 year old students. One of these was an adapted ES scale for children, the other was a projective story measure. A median split of scores on these two measures failed to significantly distinguish between moral maturity mean scores, and the correlations between the two role-taking tasks and MJS scores were not significant. Tracy and Cross (1973) suggested that their failure to replicate Selman's (1971) findings probably reflected both the variation in operational definitions of role-taking and the general lack of construct validity for role-taking.

Moir (1974) investigated the relationship between non-moral role-taking and moral role-taking ability. His measure of moral role-taking ability was the MJS. Two of the five non-moral role-taking measures were those used by Selman(1971). Only one of the measures used by Selman was significantly, r = .446, p =.01, correlated with moral maturity scores with intelligence controlled. Two of the other three measures with intelligence controlled were significantly correlated , r = .543, p=.01, and r = .417, p =.01,with MMS scores. Moral maturity scores were significantly correlated, r = .639, p =.01, with all role-taking scores combined and with intelligence controlled. Moir interpreted these findings as indicating that nonmoral and moral role-taking abilities are a structure d'ensemble defined by intrinsic structural connections.

Maitland and Goldman (1974) hypothesized that social participation in a peer group working towards consensus would foster role-taking and provide social role input to moral development. Subjects of ages 15 to 17 years were administered the OMJS and were assigned to one of three conditions on the basis of paired pretest OMJS scores, either an open-ended discussion group, a consensus orientation discussion group or no group participation. Only the consensus condition significantly increased pretest to post-test OMJS scores, 55.538 to 60.538, t = 2.241 (11), p = .05. Maitland and Goldman questioned the adequacy of the role-taking explanation in moral development. They claimed that the consensus and open-ended discussion conditions both provided equal opportunities for role-taking. Yet only the consensus condition significantly affected moral development. Furthermore, the OMJS scores for those in the open-ended discussion condition did not significantly increase over those who were in no group and who thus had no role-taking opportunities. They vaguely suggested that a will or desire

factor was present in the consensus condition that was not in the open-ended discussion condition.

Mead (1934) and Hoffman (1975) both presented evidence to support the hypothesis that role-taking empathy was an ability which was substantially developed before adolescence. Several studies have reported the relationship between role-taking empathy as an adult personality trait and moral judgment.

Kohlberg (1969) in his discussion of moral judgment and the Milgram obedience-to-authority experiment, stated that subjects with high versus low empathy scores showed no significant difference in obedience. Since Kohlberg neither specified the instrument used to measure empathy nor defined the type of empathy being investigated, further evaluation is speculative. Kohlberg did argue, however, that empathy was an affective aspect of moral judgment. A person's affective strength, however, was not the determining element of behavior. Kohlberg (1969) and Milgram (1974) both concluded that the cognitive definition of the Milgram-type situation determined behavioral choice.

Role-taking empathy involves not only recognition that others have their own perspective but also the ability to perceive, discern, and have insight into others' perspectives. Two measures of this type of role-taking are Hogan's (1969) Empathy Scale and the People Are Easy to Judge (PAEJ) scale on the Philosophy of Human Nature Scales. O'Connor (1971) found that subjects' level of moral judgment on the MJS was distributed in a rank order from highest to lowest on the PAEJ of stage 3, 4, 1 and 2, and 5 and 6. This order failed to match O'Connor's predicted order of 1 and 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Since subjects with conventional moral reasoning can be considered externally oriented, it could theoretically be predicted that they would require a higher effectiveness in social acuity.

The lack of a significant relationship between PAEJ scores and MJS scores may therefore be a function of the inappropriateness of the prediction.

Hogan (1973), and Grief and Hogan (1973), have investigated the relationship between the Empathy Scale (ES) and Measure of Moral Values. Social acuity as measured by the ES was significantly, $\underline{r} = .58$, $\underline{p} = .05$, $\underline{n} = 92$, related to MMV scores of maturity of moral judgment (Hogan 1973 and 1975) while Grief and Hogan (1973) found correlations of .48 and .51 for two samples, total $\underline{n} = 71$.

Empathy was one of the ego processes examined by Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973). It was theoretically considered a type of ego-coping, self-reflective, intraceptive operation. Subjects were divided into three moral stage groups: stages 2's, stage 3's, and stage 4's and above. A marginally significant, $\underline{p} = .10$, F ratio was calculated for these three groups on the measure of empathy. The stage 2 groups had the lowest empathy score while the stage 4 and above group had the highest. These findings partially support the actual rank order found by O'Connor (1971). More substantial support was precluded by grouping all stage 4, 5 and 6 subjects into a single category. This ordinal relationship appears to generalize from the Air Force cadet subjects of O'Connor to the "Haight-Ashbury Hippies" in Haan, Stroud, and Holstein's study.

DePalma (1975) reported research findings between scores on the DIT and the ES without providing statistical analysis of these findings. He found that subjects high on principled moral reasoning (DIT p scores $\geq$ 48) were more likely to be high on the ES. This implied, significant relationship was made somewhat ambiguous by the finding that subjects with principled moral reasoning scores below 48 were equally divided on high versus low

empathy scores. Hogan (1969 and 1973), and Grief and Hogan (1973), contend that empathy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral reasoning. It is but one of four components required for mature moral reasoning.

DePalma's findings initially seem to contradict the findings of O'Connor (1971), and Haan, Stroud, and Holstein (1973). This contradiction may be an artifact of the research and analysis. By grouping all stage 1 - 4 subjects together in the below 48 DIT score group, DePalma's analysis eliminated the potential discovery of a distribution of high versus low ES scores by DIT stage.

The research findings for role-taking ability are inconsistent for both pre-adolescent and adolescent samples. Much of this inconsistency may be due to the variety of measures of role-taking ability used: behavioral, teacher ratings, projective measures, and objective self-report measures. Another contributor to these variant findings may be the various ways the MJS and DIT scores are categorized for analysis. Future research needs to further investigate the relation of role-taking empathy to moral development.

Chapter VII

PROBLEM STATEMENT

This study has one primary objective: to test the relationship between moral reasoning structures and character (personality) structures. This primary objective encompassed four subgoals: (1) a comparison of moral reasoning instruments, (2) a test of a trait theory of moral character, (3) a test of the relationship between moral reasoning structure and level of self-actualization, and (4) a test of moral reasoning structures and personality organization.

Problem #1: Comparison of Moral Reasoning Instruments

Four (MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV) of the seven measures of moral judgment reviewed earlier were selected for comparison in this study (see Table 12). These instruments index the same construct of moral reasoning and have been used to investigate a similar range of research interests. This past research is not, however, comparable or generalized because the relationships between the MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV have not been systematically determined. The goal of this stage of the present study is to determine these inter-instrument relationships. These main considerations determined the selection of these instruments for comparison:

1. The instrument had to claim to measure moral reasoning and not a subtrait of moral reasoning.
2. The author of the instrument had to report a claim that his instrument measured the same construct as Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale.

3. The instrument had to be available to the author for inclusion in the study.

Several related instruments were not used because they did not meet one or more of the above criteria.

The Empathy Scale (ES) was eliminated because it failed to meet the first decision criterion. Hogan (1969) claimed that the ES measured only one dimension of moral judgment. The Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) was likewise eliminated because it measures a single trait of moral reasoning. Although Hogan proposed that the two ethical attitudes indexed by the SEA appeared to parallel Kohlberg's distinction between stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning, Hogan philosophically argued that neither attitude represented a higher form of moral reasoning. The SEA, therefore, failed also to meet the second decision criterion.

The Defining Issues Test (DIT: Rest, et al., 1974), however, was disqualified based on the third criterion. Rest et al. (1974; Rest, 1975, 1976) claimed that the DIT measured the complete concept of moral reasoning and measured the same Kohlbergian construct. The DIT requires, however, a different response task. The MJS responses require a spontaneous production type of response, whereas the DIT response involves comprehension and preference tasks. Unlike the instruments included in this study, Rest (1975, 1976) has conducted extensive DIT-MJS comparisons. He reported a correlation of .68 between the DIT and the MJS. The moral judgment instruments included in this study lacked such extensive validity and reliability comparisons.

Another instrument not available for this study was the Measure of Conscience (Hoffman, 1970). Gash (1976), however, has compared the MJS with the Measure of Conscience and found significant associations between

the two instruments. This association was particularly strong at the ends of the scales which indicate the greatest moral development.

The MJS, SMJS, OMJS, and MMV met all three decision criteria and were, therefore, included in this study. The MJS was designated as the validity criterion measure because of its extensive history of use, revision, and testing (Kohlberg, 1976).

Each instrument involved somewhat different problems to be investigated. The SMJS presented two problems. Reported data on the SMJS is based on pre-college age, adolescent subjects (Gilligan, et al., 1971). The increased intellectual and social sophistication resulting from reaching adult maturity may change the psychometric properties of the SMJS. The present study will broaden this data base by sampling adults ranging in age from twenty to fifty-one.

Turiel (1975) reported a study which failed to indicate the same developmental pattern for the SMJS as for the MJS. Turiel hypothesized that this finding could be interpreted as showing that the SMJS does not actually measure a moral domain, but rather a social custom domain which would not show a developmental pattern. The moderate, significant correlation between the SMJS and MJS reported by Gillian et al. (1971) was not replicated in the study cited by Turiel. The correlation between the MJS and the SMJS, along with the directional change in SMJS scores, needs to be replicated and extended to another sample. This study encompasses this aspect in its design.

Although Maitland and Goldman (1974) reported a comparison of OMJS scores and MJS maturity scores, this comparison was not based on a direct comparison in which the same group of subjects took both tests. They compared their OMJS scores with the MJS norms for a similar age group. This type of comparison provides suggestive supporting evidence, but

not empirical evidence. The OMJS and MJS, therefore, were administered to the same sample of subjects and then statistically compared.

The OMJS reported scores have only been based on 12 to 19 year old high school students. The reported psychometric properties are, therefore, sample age specific. Administering the OMJS to older, adult subjects would expand the age base upon which the psychometrics of the instrument are based. Again, the increased intellectual and social sophistication of adult subjects could change the reliability of the instrument. This hypothesis was tested in this study.

While Hogan and Dickstein (1972) claimed that the MMV was a parallel technique of the MJS, they failed to conduct either a direct or indirect comparison of the two instruments. Their claim is untested and unsubstantiated. This study conducted a direct comparison of the two instruments to determine the estimate of method variance and isomorphism between the scores of the instruments.

Problem #2: Test of a Trait Theory of Moral Character

The majority of research reviewed in this study investigated either one personality trait or a narrow selection of personality traits. The results of these investigations have been inconsistent for many of the traits (such as superego strength, ego strength, guilt, and intelligence). There are at least four hypotheses to explain these inconsistent findings: (1) the different instruments used to measure moral reasoning may account for the differences between studies, (2) the different instruments used to measure the same personality trait may account for the differences between findings, (3) the differences in sample populations tested may account for the differences in results, and (4) there may be no one to one relation between single personality traits and level of moral reasoning.

Kohlberg (1958) hypothesized the relationship between a variety of personality traits and stages of moral judgment. He warned that traits like autonomy and conformity would not show consistent relationships because both traits are ambiguous. They are ambiguous in the sense that Kohlberg distinguished two types of autonomy and noted that different stages would conform to different sources of influence. He noted the same type of problem with the need for the social approval trait. Kohlberg saw emotive traits like sympathy, guilt, and anxiety as bearing an uncertain relationship to moral reasoning because of their multiple definitions both within psychology and in the vernacular. Ego strength was the only trait which Kohlberg (1958, 1963) emphasized as bearing an important relationship to moral reasoning. He did not, however, specify this relationship.

Kohlberg (1958) hypothesized important similarities between the traits of stage 2 and stage 5 individuals. The pattern or organization of these similar traits with other traits distinguished one stage from the other. Kohlberg (1958) concluded his theorizing about the relationship between personality traits and moral judgment levels by hypothesizing that "the general elements of the type may hang together to form a distinct and unitary whole, or a concrete 'personality type'" (p. 229).

Kohlberg (1969) again treated the relationship between personality traits and moral judgment indicating deeper theoretical considerations. He proposed that only age-developmental personality traits would show any consistent relationship to the developmental moral judgment stages. Personality traits which are single dimension, polar traits would not have the formal-structural base paralleling the developmental, structural basis of moral judgment stages. Kohlberg suggested that two personality domains might possess a structural basis: affective and interpersonal schemata.

He did not list any traits which might be within the interpersonal domain and only two traits for the affective domain: guilt and empathy. Guilt was not defined and the change in Kohlberg's thinking (1958, 1969) was not discussed. He concluded by hypothesizing that consistent relationships should be found only between the few structural, developmental personality traits and stages of moral reasoning. He essentially denied a personality trait theory of moral reasoning.

Fromm (1947) also denied a personality trait theory of moral reasoning. He emphasized a conative organization theory of moral reasoning. The organization of traits is the fundamental entity of character, the single traits follow from the specific motivational structures. Fromm proposed five conative structures listing the traits in each (see Table 9).

This study attempted an initial test of the personality trait theory of moral reasoning. The possible inconsistencies due to the different instruments used to measure moral reasoning and personality traits in previous research were controlled by administering a single sample of subjects the same set of personality and moral judgment instruments. All comparisons were then computed on this comparable data. Separate personality trait scores were then calculated across the stages of moral reasoning.

Selection of Instruments for a Test of Moral Reasoning Structures and Personality Structures.

A study which attempts to empirically test the relationship between such broad constructs as personality and moral reasoning is confronted with the problem of selecting appropriate instruments to measure these constructs. Each construct represents a separate problem.

The detailed analysis of the four moral judgment instruments compared in Chapter IX of this research project formed the basis for selection of

the most adequate moral reasoning instruments. The OMJS was eliminated because of its poor reliability and failure to discriminate between stages of moral reasoning as determined by the MJS. The MMV showed promise as a reliable instrument,but it too failed to significantly demarcate the moral judgment stages determined by the MJS. The SMJS, however, replicated previous research (Gilligan, et. al, 1971) indicating acceptable reliability and comparable identification and discrimination of moral reasoning stages with the MJS. The small percentage of subjects scoring lower on the SMJS than on the MJS is consistent with theoretical and empirical reports (Kirkendall, 1967; Wisbroth, 1970; Barclay, 1975; D'Augelli & Cross, 1975; Turiel, 1976). The MJS interjudge agreement rate is substantial, adequate for research purposes, and comparable with that reported for other studies (Kurtines & Grief, 1974).

The combination of MJS scores with the SMJS scores constituted the final resolution for the most appropriate index of the moral reasoning construct. This decision is based on the following six reasons:

1. the specific construct of moral reasoning under investigation is the one proposed by Kohlberg
2. the MJS was constructed and standardized by Kohlberg
3. the SMJS was co-authored by Kohlberg to measure a specific content domain to which moral reasoning was applied
4. the majority of studies reviewed in this study were based on the MJS, only two studies reported findings based on the MMV
5. the psychometric properties of both the MJS and SMJS in this study are appropriate
6. the reliability of the index (stage) scores should have been increased by the judicious doubling of responses on which they were based by combining the MJS and SMJS scores.

The seemingly endless number and variety of instruments used to measure personality presents a formidable problem to researchers. An initial problem is the decision between selecting a single trait measure such as empathy or autonomy versus a multi-factor instrument like the 16 PF or Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Having made this initial decision, the researcher is then faced with selecting appropriate instruments for his purposes from the wide number and range that exist within either type.

This study began as a broadly conceived project to identify personality profiles and conative organizations. This original conception determined the selection of one or more multi-factor instruments. A sufficiently wide range of single trait instruments to measure personality organization would have required an inordinate amount of time of the subjects. The increased reliability and construct validity of single trait measures was sacrificed for the more time-efficient, global, multi-factor instruments.

Practical and theoretical considerations determined the final selection of personality instruments. The practical consideration concerned the selection of a widely used, extensively tested, instrument which would index as full a range of personality traits as possible. The theoretical selection sought to investigate the productive, self-actualization aspect of personality which provided a theoretical organization of this study.

The Cattell (1965) 16 PF most closely met the practical criterion. The 16 PF is one of the most extensively tested instruments, Cattell having continuously verified and revised the 16 PF. The 16 PF is further frequently used in a wide range of research indicating widespread recognition and acceptance. Cattell (1965) purposely constructed the 16 PF to measure what

is generally considered the complete range of personality dimensions. These dimensions consist of sixteen general cognitive-emotive-behavioral factors. Any findings between the 16 PF scores and the moral judgment stages is widely generalizable on a theoretical plane to the vast array of research using the 16 PF. The 16 PF Form A (1968 edition) was administered.

The Personal Orientation Inventory (POI: Shostrom, 1965) appeared to be the best selection to meet the theoretical goals. This study is based both on Fromm's character model of morality and Kohlberg's moral judgment developmental model. Fromm's distinction between the unproductive versus the productive character has strong parallels to May and Shostrom's theory of self-actualization as was noted in the literature review. There is a strong implication of greater moral efficacy with increased self-actualization in the writings of May (1967), Shostrom (1967), and Mahoney (1974). Self-actualization as a formal ethical theory has a long history from Aristotle to the Neo-Hegelians (Baldwin, 1940) through Kierkegaard (Shostrom, 1967) and Bradley (1951).

Shostrom (1965) specifically constructed the POI to measure the humanistic psychological construct of self-actualization. Shostrom (1968) reports substantial reliability and validity findings for the POI. There is a growing body of research based on the POI.

In addition to these strictly instrument related considerations, the POI was also selected for historical reasons. Shostrom developed his theory of actualization with an acknowledgement of Fromm. Shostrom stated "I was moved to write it [Man, the Manipulator] after reading an article, "Man Is Not a Thing", by Erich Fromm, in the March 16, 1957 Saturday Review" (1967, p. xiii). This influence is further demonstrated in the parallel of Fromm's four unproductive character types with Shostrom's

(1967) four manipulator types. The theoretical continuity from Fromm to Shostrom and May is maintained in another way through the POI. The time orientation construct in the POI is based on May's theorizing (May, Angel & Ellenberger, 1958). Yet, another continuity in moral development personality research is created between the Peck and Havighurst (1960) research and the POI since both relied on the inner-directed and other-directed dimension of Reisman et al (1961). The POI consists of fourteen scales measuring fourteen dimensions of self-actualization. The POI (1965 edition) was administered.

Problem #3: Moral Reasoning and Level of Self-Actualization

Implicit in self-actualization theory is the idea of concomitant moral development as a facet of self-actualization. The humanistic theory of self-actualization is a psychological model of human potential. Self-actualization has a much longer intellectual history as an ethical theory (Baldwin, 1940). The theorizing of Fromm (1947) and Shostrom (1965) has been directed toward integrating the psychological and ethical aspects of self-actualization. Child (1973) noted that Kohlberg's theory of moral development did not grow out of humanistic psychology, but that it has a distinctive humanistic character. The moral judgment theory is a developmental theory with analogous parallels to Maslow's hierarchy of need fulfillment development. Child concluded that "the research associated with Kohlberg's theory provides some of the most substantial and pertinent evidence for the value of a humanistic approach to the psychological study of personality and social interaction" (p. 25).

The extensive use of the theoretical ideas of Fromm, May (1969) and Shostrom (1967) which are essentially self-actualization oriented in the exposition of this study made it desirable to test the relationship between

moral judgment stages and levels of self-actualization. This hypothesis was included in the design by administering the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) constructed by Shostrom (1968) to the subjects along with the moral reasoning instruments. The POI subscale scores of subjects within each stage of moral reasoning were compared across stages and an overall self-actualization score was likewise analyzed.

Problem #4: Test of Moral Reasoning Structures and Personality Structures Model

The primary objective of this study is to empirically test the relationship between moral judgment stages and personality organization. Such a test involved four steps: (1) a test of a trait theory of moral character (see Problem #2), (2) the search for and determination of personality profiles for each moral stage group, (3) the statistical comparison of the stage-specific, personality profiles determined, and (4) a test of a character-moral reasoning structure model through an analysis of its predictive power. The specific character organizations proposed by Fromm (1947) were not empirically under investigation. Any parallels between his theoretical model and the empirical model will be discussed.

The discovery of personality profiles associated with moral judgment stages is a very different type of problem than that required for a test of the trait theory (see Problem #2). The discovery procedure required two stages of analysis. The first stage generated the empirical structure of scores on the POI and the 16 PF. A factor analysis of these subscale scores provided the underlying structures. The failure of the test of the trait theory of character to substantiate this model warranted a deeper structural analysis. This analysis was also felt to be appropriate because Shostrom (1965) reported only a matrix of correlations between

the POI and the 16PF. A factor analysis of the pool of both POI and 16PF subscale scores would determine whether any of these subscales measured factorially similar domains.

Although this involved factoring Cattell's 16PF factors, this procedure seemed appropriate in light of the criticism of Howarth (1976). He questioned the statistical assumptions and factoral methods employed by Cattell in his generation of sixteen personality factors. Howarth's review of research on the factoral structure of the 16PF items indicated that the most frequently found number of factors was five, seven, and ten. Howarth reanalyzed the 16PF items using more recent statistical guidelines, criteria, and computational procedures than the earlier, somewhat antiquated ones used by Cattell. This reanalysis resulted in only six rather than sixteen factors. Cattell's sixteen personality factors are not, therefore, sacred. Howarth's research reduced the concern that the factor analysis of the present study would generate second-order factors.

The second stage of this discovery process determined the factor scores for each of the moral reasoning stages. This required an analysis of variance to be computed on the factor scores. The patterns of these composite scores were then examined. This did not, however, provide a statistical comparison of the stage profiles.

In order to determine whether there are statistical differences between the stage-specific, personality profiles, a discriminant analysis will be used. The discriminant analysis determines and maximizes the differences between groups. The salient structural differences between the personality profiles, therefore, will be identified while leaving a residue of shared personality traits and structures between the groups. The discriminant analysis also provides a statistical test of the profile

differences between groups.

The first three steps of the structural model test provide evidence to substantiate the empirical presence of the model. The final step is to then test the power and efficiency of the model and to examine its predictive power. In the present study, the prediction of moral reasoning stages by personality structures is the directional test of predictive power. The information needed for this test is contained within the discriminant analysis. Since Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning consists of six stages within three levels of reasoning, it seemed desirable and appropriate to test the predictive power of the character model both for the six stages and the three levels separately.

Chapter VIII

Method Section

Descriptive Statistics

Subjects. The sample consisted of thirty-one continuing education students enrolled in Psychology 510, thirty-nine continuing education students enrolled in Psychology 521, and ten continuing education students enrolled in Psychology 450. Eighty-four percent (65) of these subjects were elementary and/or secondary teachers, counselors, and administrators. Eleven percent (9) were military personnel while five percent (3) were divided amongst a wide range of occupations.

There were forty-five female (57%) and thirty-four male (43%) subjects. Of these, fifty-five were married (70%), fourteen were single (18%), six were divorced (8%), and two were widowed (4%). Religious affiliation was distributed as follows: Catholic-10 (13%), Baptist-32 (42%), Methodist-10 (13%), Christian Church-5 (6%), other Protestant denominations-14 (18%), and no affiliation-6 (8%). The age range was from twenty-one to fifty-one with the mean age being 30.45 (Table 21).

Administration

All instruments were administered in a group form. This group administration required using a written format for the MJS. Although individual interviews were preferred by Kohlberg (1973), he stated that group, written administration was suitable for verbally proficient subjects. This sample of college enrolled students was assumed to be comprised of verbally proficient subjects.

Table 21

Moral Stages by Mean Age

Moral Stage	Mean Age
2	26.5
3	29.0
3-4	31.5
4	28.7
5	34.5

Pure stages only	$F = 2.738$	$p = .055$
Mixed stages included	$F = 2.117$	$p = .087$

Each group of subjects was told that data was being collected for a Master's thesis. Each was further instructed that this study was investigating the relationship between various personality variables and subjects' views on selected social problems and issues. The MJS, SMJS, MMV, and OMJS were contained in a mimeographed booklet which attempted to disguise their nature by being titled the "Social Attitudes Questionnaire" (SAQ). Appropriate instructions preceded the instruments to further this deception (see Appendix C).

Subjects were explicitly instructed that their supporting reasoning for their judgments was more important than the judgments alone. Subjects were requested to be as explicit and detailed in their supporting reasoning as possible. The instructions further noted that there were neither correct, nor right or wrong answers, and that the SAQ was purely an opinion survey. Confidentiality was assured and subjects were asked to be completely honest and to express their true feelings.

The administration procedure varied at each test site due to the time restrictions and other limitations. Each administration pattern, therefore, will be discussed separately.

Pattern A. Following the general instructions, half the subjects were administered the POI while the other half were given the 16 PF. The two sets of personality tests were then exchanged. The "Social Attitudes Questionnaire" was subsequently presented the subjects. The long administration time (3½ to 4½ hours) required that some subjects take the SAQ home with them. These subjects were explicitly instructed neither to discuss with nor collaborate with anyone else. The protocols were collected at the next class session.

Pattern B. An accomplice gave the general instructions and then

administered the SAQ package. Again, some subjects took the instrument home with them. The following week, the author administered the POI and then the 16 PF to the subjects.

Pattern C. A member presented both the general instructions and all instruments to the subject. The instruments were given over two sessions with the SAQ being taken home by some subjects.

Scoring

MJS. The protocols were initially scored by two judges. A third judge scored those protocols for which the first two judges either failed to agree on major stage assignment or had major-minor stage reversals. The judges applied different scoring procedures due to their respective training. Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1976a) stressed that research papers should specify which scoring method was used.

The MJS scoring procedures have been modified and revised twice since the original version by Kohlberg and his associates. Kohlberg (1976) discussed the differences, similarities, advantages, disadvantages, and consequences of these three scoring methods. The original formulation, called the Aspect-Scoring System, consisted of twenty-five (or twenty-seven, Kohlberg 1971) aspects which served as classification criteria. An aspect was defined as a consideration that people made about moral judgments (Kohlberg 1971). These aspects were clustered under eight issues. An issue is a designation of a content area (see Appendix A for the aspects and issues).

Responses to dilemmas could be scored either by sentence scoring or story rating. Story rating was used by one of the primary judges in this study. The rater read through the complete protocol for one story and isolated the main consideration (issues) produced by the subject. Each

of the aspects associated with that issue were then scored against the proto-typical manual responses. Any variation of stage scores across issues within a story were intuitively weighted to yield a dominant and a minor stage score for each story (see Kohlberg, 1976 for an example of this technique). An overall global score for a subject was determined by rereading the complete, four-story protocol and intuitively weighting the subject's responses as a whole across stories.

This scoring procedure was modified by Kohlberg (1976) to more closely approximate the construct validity of moral development. An apparent excess of extraneous content (aspects) was yielding stage classifications which were not invariant in longitudinally measured subjects. The modified scoring method was disseminated in 1972 (Kuhmerker, 1976a). Called Intuitive Issue Scoring, it further developed the issues of the previous Aspect scoring system. The original eight issues or types of content were expanded to eleven issues postulated to be found in every society and culture. The unit of scoring was little changed, e.g., all the ideas a person used concerning an issue in a story. The major change was a change from defining the stages on the basis of aspects to one of defining the stages on the basis of issues.

Kohlberg (1976) claimed that Intuitive Issue Scoring was theoretically the most valid method of scoring. It could be applied to any moral dilemma and was thus instrument free. Simultaneously, it was, however, too intuitive to provide satisfactory psychometric test characteristics. One disadvantage mentioned by Rest (1976) was the fact that this scoring method scoredthe content of the responses which included varying issues for different subjects. Kohlberg further revised the scoring system to partially incorporate this criticism.

This third version of scoring has been labeled Standardized Issue Scoring. The manual for standardized issue scoring was ready for distribution in 1975 (Kohlberg, Colby, Speicher-Dublin, and Lieberman, 1975). The manual was based on a standardized interview that probes only two issues for each story. The protocols are scored using a criterion concept which is the reasoning pattern that is most distinctive of a given stage. This criteria established a structural as opposed to a content scoring basis. Kohlberg (1976) noted that this newest scoring method returned to certain features of the 1969 procedure but with controls. These controls guarantee that each subject is explicitly probed for two and only two identical issues thus making all protocols more comparable. The second control replaced the aspect-content criterion for a structural criterion.

This review of these scoring methods is necessary to explain the scoring system used by the other primary judge. This judge used an interim version of the Standardized Issue Scoring (Candee, 1975), dated Jan. 30, 1973 and Nov. 15, 1974. The life and punishment issues are probed in the interim version while life and law are elicited in the current method for the Heinz dilemma. This change of issues does not change the control of invariant issues scored across subjects.

Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1976b) has warned that judges using the 1969, 1972, and 1975 versions can possibly come to different stage scoring conclusions. The divergence would primarily occur at two points. First, many protocols scored stage 4 by the aspect system are scored stage 3 by the 1972 and 1975 versions. The second discrepancy occurs in distinguishing adult stage 2 thinking from stage 5. The aspect scoring classified many responses as stage 2 which would be scored stage 5A by the more recent systems.

The three judges in this study were aware of the shifts in scoring and met to standardize their own scoring. The 1969 and 1974 interim systems were discussed and hypothetical dilemma responses debated. All raters scored protocols using a standardized issue scoring form (see Appendix D). This insured that all judges scored identical issues. It was hoped that these procedures would minimize discrepant classifications.

The major difference in scoring between judges was that the judge using the 1974 interim system made decisions on stage scoring for a story on a non-intuitive basis. A story was scored a pure stage if 75% of the issue responses were of a single stage. A major-minor score was attributed when responses distributed in a 60% to 40% pattern. The subject's global score across stories was determined by the same decision criteria. Discrepancies between the two primary judges were attributed to stage typing decisions and not to actual scoring. Such discrepancies were resolved through the independent scoring of the third judge.

SMJS. The SMJS was scored by both judges following the manual (Gilligan, Kohlberg, Learner, & Belensky; 1971). All scoring used a standardized issue scoring form (see Appendix D). The SMJS scoring form varies from the MJS form in that the SMJS has more than two issues per story. This maintained that all judges scored identical issues.

As in the MJS scoring, the two primary judges used different decision criteria for assigning a stage classification after issue scoring had been completed. The judge using the 1974 interim procedure assigned stage classifications on the 75%-25% criterion described in the previous section. The other judge used the intuitive method previously described.

MMV. Both judges scored the fifteen conversational responses using the procedure described by Hogan and Dickstein (1972). The responses

were scored two points if any one of four pre-defined moral concerns was clearly expressed: 1) concern for the sanctity of the individual, 2) judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law, 3) concern for the welfare of society as a whole, and 4) capacity to see both sides of an issue. A response was assigned one point if any one of the four concerns was easily implied. Each response was scored only once regardless of the number of concerns contained in a response. This method yields a score from 0-30 for the fifteen statements totaled. The average scale score assigned by the two judges for each subject was used as the best available index of the MMV.

Interrater Reliability

MJS & SMJS. The interrater reliabilities on the MJS and SMJS protocols were examined using the procedures followed by Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) and Gilligan, Kohlberg, Learner, and Belenky (1971). Agreement was defined as "either complete (both major and minor), major code only, or reversals of major and minor designations" (Haan et al, 1968, p. 182). The rates of agreement are shown in Table 22.

The raters had agreement rates of 68% for the Heinz Dilemma and 56% for the Karl and Bob Stealing vs. Lying Dilemma chosen from Kohlberg's (1974) Form A. This compares with a product-moment correlation of .79 for the Karl and Bob Stealing vs. Lying dilemma reported by Kohlberg (1958). These differences in interrater reliability for these two dilemmas are probably not random but reflect that: "This may be due to the differential values of the questions in representing the typology" (p. 91).

For the SMJS stories, the raters had agreement rates of 69% for Dilemma 'B' (sex in the context of a marital relationship) and 60% for Dilemma 'C' (premarital sex and pregnancy). These reliabilities compare

Table 22

SMJS-MJS Interscorer Agreement Levels

	Standard Stories		Sexual Stories		Global
	Heinz	Bob & Karl	Marital Sex	Single Woman's Pregnancy	
Major Stage Agreement					
a. perfect agreement	24 (30%)	20 (25%)	22 (28%)	20 (25%)	26 (33%)
b. difference in minor stage	26 (33%)	21 (26%)	26 (33%)	27 (34%)	22 (28%)
One Stage Disagreement					
a. major-minor reversal	4 (5%)	4 (5%)	6 (8%)	1 (1%)	11 (13%)
b. major stage one stage difference	11 (13%)	19 (24%)	16 (19%)	20 (25%)	12 (14%)
Two Stage Disagreement	14 (18%)	11 (14%)	8 (10%)	9 (11%)	7 (9%)
Unscorable	0	5 (6%)	1 (1%)	3 (3%)	2 (3%)
Defined Agreement	54 (68%)	45 (56%)	54 (69%)	48 (59%)	59 (74%)

with rates of 86% for Dilemma 'B' and 80% for Dilemma 'C' reported by Gilligan et al (1971).

Since the subjects' scores on the two sets of stories were highly similar, as is discussed later, the four stories were combined for a single global rating of moral judgment. The rate of interrater agreement in assigning global scores was 74%. This rate of agreement compares favorably with the 71% reported by Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) and stated as an acceptable degree of reliability by Kurtines and Grief (1974). Protocols on which the raters disagreed or had major-minor stage reversals (for example, one rater gave a subject a major stage rating of 4 and a minor stage rating of 3 while the other rater reversed these major-minor ratings) were scored by a third experienced rater. When the third rater's scoring agreed with either of the two primary judges, that agreement was accepted as the 'true' moral judgment rating of a subject. This procedure resulted in a final global score agreement rate of 91%.

Since there were few clear representatives of principled thought in the sample (i.e. stages 5 and 6), all subjects scored as major stage five by one judge and either a major or minor stage five by the other judge were classified as stage five for all subsequent analyses. For the same reason, a similar procedure was used for assigning subjects to stage two. Thus the subjects assigned to stages two and five are not necessarily pure types, but are subjects judged by both judges as having large components of these stages in their moral thought. There were no stage one or stage six subjects in this sample. The resultant distribution of subjects across moral stages is presented in Table 23.

Table 23

Distribution of Subjects by Moral Stage

Moral Stage	Number of Subjects
1	0
2-5A	4
3	12
4-3 mix	29
4	16
5B	12
6	0
Unscorable -	7
Total	80

Chapter IX

Results

Comparison of Moral Reasoning Instruments

Analyses of the moral reasoning instruments involved two types: (1) a test of the internal reliability of the instrument, and (2) a test of between instrument construct validity. Item-total reliability constituted the primary test of internal reliability where appropriate (OMJS and MMV). Internal reliability for the MJS and SMJS were determined using a less formal analysis. Inter-instrument comparisons used both correlational analysis and analysis of variance.

The internal reliability of the MJS and SMJS are estimated together. This estimation is based on the percentages of agreement in scoring between the two judges presented in Table 22. The range of perfect agreement varied from 30% for the Heinz story to 25% for both the 'Bob and Karl Stealing versus Lying' story and the 'Single Woman's Pregnancy' story. Examination of agreement percentages for major stage agreement with a difference in the minor stage revealed a similar range of percentages. The Bob and Karl story again has the lowest agreement rate with 26% while the other three stories have an agreement rate of either 33% or 34%. A chi-square analysis of the number of cases in each of these two levels of agreement failed to indicate any significant difference between agreement rates (see Table 24). A test of rates of both one stage and two stage disagreement revealed the same level of consistency (Table 25). For the two judges scoring these MJS and SMJS stories, the internal con-

Table 24

Test of Interscorer - Interdilemma Agreement Rates

Agreement Type	Moral Dilemma					
	Heinz	Bob & Karl	Marital Sex	Unwed Pregnancy	Global	Total
Perfect Agreement	24	20	22	20	26	112
Difference in Minor Stage	26	21	26	27	22	124
Major-Minor Reversal	4	4	6	1	11	26
Total Define Agreement	54	45	54	48	59	262

$\underline{X}^2 = 14.06$ (8) $\underline{p} \geq .05$

Table 25

Test of Interscorer - Interdilemma Disagreement Rates

Disagreement Type	Moral Dilemma					
	Heinz	Bob & Karl	Marital Sex	Unwed Pregnancy	Global	Total
Major Stage						
One Stage						
Difference	11	19	16	20	12	78
Two Stage						
Disagreement	14	11	8	9	7	49
Unscorable	0	5	1	3	2	11
Totals	25	35	25	32	21	138

$\underline{X}^2 = 9.27\ (8)$ $\underline{p} \geq .05$

sistency of their scoring and of the between-stories consistency is reliable. All of these four stories are used to calculate the global moral judgment score for each subject. All four stories are reliably consistent in their story-to-global agreement rates.

The more traditional alpha reliability coefficient is used to determine the instrument reliability for the OMJS and MMV. The item-total correlations for the OMJS are presented in Table 26. These range from a low of .06 for item 6 (Obedience to Military Authority) to .54 for item 10 (Landlord's Right of Freedom to Rent) with a mean of .30. All the correlations are significant at the $p = .05$ level except two: item 6, $p = .29$ and item 14, $p = .08$ (Lying to Deceive Another of Money). The alpha coeficient, however, is a low .48 for the present sample. This low alpha reliability is improved slightly to .51 by eliminating item 6 which is the least related item. The scale's reliability is not improved by additional deletion of items.

The internal reliabilities of the OMJS for this sample are substantially lower than in Maitland and Goldman's original study, $r = .71$. The present alpha of .48 is dangerously low for a research instrument. These differences in reliability found in the two studies may be due to the adult sample's more sophisticated comprehension of all choices. Maitland and Goldman's adolescent samples may reflect a comprehension ceiling consistency across items rather than an actual moral judgment. The obtained reliability in the present study, however, raises serious doubt concerning the reliability and usefulness of the OMJS.

The item-total correlations for the Measure of Moral Values (MMV) were computed for each rater and for the rater's pooled scores on each item. Table 27 presents these sets of item-total correlations. The correlations for judge 'A' range from .24 for item 9 (Death Penalty) to .52 for item

Table 26

Objective Moral Judgment Scale

Item-Total Correlations

OMJS Item	r	p
1	.411	.00008
2	.3905	.0002
3	.415	.0009
4	.3091	.0031
5	.5279	.00001
6	.0605	.2979
7	.2044	.0353
8	.4707	.0001
9	.3291	.0015
10	.5457	.00001
11	.3261	.0016
12	.21541	.029
13	.24201	.0158
14	.15493	.0863
15	.48142	.00001

Table 27

MMV Item-Total Correlations

Item	Scorer A	Scorer B	A + B Averaged	p
1	.51425	.45202	.50322	.00001
2	.48303	.52962	.55370	.00001
3	.38490	.60204	.55321	.00001
4	.51966	.33986	.43997	.00002
5	.43348	.29469	.34057	.001
6	.52032	.49469	.53696	.00001
7	.49719	.43412	.49894	.00001
8	.52761	.34344	.48896	.00001
9	.23986	.36769	.35492	.00062
10	.45450	.55001	.53652	.00001
11	.47970	.46804	.46199	.00001
12	.42726	.49578	.51260	.00001
13	.47360	.30717	.42357	.00005
14	.49205	.33587	.36900	.00038
15	.37621	.38017	.38812	.00019

8 (Incompetent Doctor and Illegal Abortion). For judge 'B', the correlations ranged from .29 for item 5 (Taking Credit for Another's Ideas) to .60 for item 3 (Displacement of Poor by Superhighway). The averaged scores of the judges showed the following range: lowest, item 5; highest, items 2 and 3. All of the item-total correlations are significant, $p = .02$. The total scale scores assigned by the two raters are correlated $r = .66$.

The coefficients of reliability were computed identically as for the item-total correlations. The alpha reliabilities are .69 and .68 for rater A and B respectively. The pooled scores have an alpha reliability of .72. The alpha coefficient was not improved for either rater or for the combined ratings by deleting peripherally related items.

Relations Between the Four Instruments

MJS-SMJS Comparison. The global scores on the MJS served as the criterion for a comparison with the SMJS scores. The findings of this comparison are similar to those found by Gilligan et al. (1971) but with important differences. Eighty-four percent (59 cases) of the subjects in this study reasoned at the same level for both the standard moral dilemmas (MJS) and the sexual moral dilemmas. This compares with a rate of 47% of adolescent girls and 50% of the adolescent boys in the Gilligan et al. study. Eight (11%) of 70 classifiable subjects were judged by both raters as consistently lower on the SMJS stories than on the MJS stories, while three subjects were judged as higher on the SMJS stories by both raters. Seventy-three percent of the small group that have different scores on the SMJS than on the MJS, scored lower on the SMJS. Seventy-nine percent of the adolescent girls and 80% of the adolescent boys in the Gilligan et al. (1971) study had lower scores on the SMJS than on the MJS.

Even though the percentage of subjects who scored differently on the two scales decreased substantially in the present study, the percentage of those who scored lower on the SMJS than on the MJS remained very similar in both studies. An additional 16 subjects are scored consistently lower on the SMJS stories by one of the judges, while five additional subjects are judged higher on the SMJS stories by one judge. In all cases, the difference between the mean scores assigned to the two sets of stories was one stage or less.

In spite of the tendency for subjects to score lower on the SMJS than on the MJS, the two instruments are correlated, $r = .66$. The moral maturity scores determined in the Gilligan et al. study for the standard stories and sexual stories were correlated, $r = .405$ for the girls and $r = .482$ for the boys. The increased correlation in the present study is probably attributable to the greater consistency in MJS and SMJS scores for the present adult sample than for the adolescent sample of Gilligan et al.

Turiel (1975) has challenged the validity of the SMJS. He contends that (a) the greater variability of response scores and (b) the trend for subjects to receive lower scores on the SMJS suggests that reasoning about sexuality is not moral but normative. He further cites a study which found that stage changes were not sequential for Gilligan et al's subjects over a two year period. The present results show that for an adult sample there is not a greater variability in scores and that the lower trend in SMJS scores is small. A suggested hypothesis to explain this greater consistency of adult subjects than adolescent subjects across content domains is that increased experience in sexual relationships provides the necessary experiential information to assimilate the sexual domain

into the general moral reasoning structure. In childhood and early adolescence, reasoning about sexual relationships and dilemmas may be largely normative. As these sexual relationships become part of the individuals experience, they loose their normativeness and assimilate into the moral reasoning schema of the person.

The present findings further substantiate the reliability of the SMJS and counter Turiel's (1975) claim that the SMJS is not an appropriate measure of a moral domain. Kohlberg et al. (1972) and Gash (1976) provided evidence indicating that judgments made about certain moral domains (prison dilemmas and closeness of relationship) were less developed than judgments made about 'normal' dilemmas. The present data suggest that the area of sexual relations is a moral domain which is also less developed in some individuals but becomes more developed for most individuals after adolescence.

Since the comparison of the MJS and SMJS revealed that the subjects' scores on the two instruments were similar, the combined global score compiled across all four dilemmas served as the stage classification for comparison with the MJS and MMV. One-way analyses of variance were used to test the relation between the subjects' global scores on the MJS-SMJS and on the scores of the OMJS and MMV. The subjects' classification on the moral stories served as the independent variable in each analysis. Six subjects who could not be classified were eliminated from these analyses.

MJS-OMJS Comparison. Contrary to Maitland and Goldman's (1974) theoretical predictions, the subjects' scores in the present study on the OMJS were not significantly related to their global MJS-SMJS scores, $F = 1.82$, $(4,64)$, $p = .15$. Table 28 presents the OMJS mean and standard

Table 28

OMJS Scores as a Function of Stage Classification on the Morally Ambiguous Stories

Moral Judgment Stage	#S's	Mean	SD	Standard Error
2	4	70.00	6.4807	3.2404
3	12	64.4167	8.1849	2.3628
3-4 mix	29	67.8276	14.3977	2.6736
4	16	67.1875	10.1929	2.5482
5	12	73.000	7.6277	2.2019
TOTAL	73	68.0959	11.3935	1.3335

deviation scores as a function of the MJS-SMJS scores. Scheffe's post-hoc comparison procedure indicated that none of the moral stage groups had OMJS means significantly different from one another. An Omega-square analysis revealed that only 4.4% of the variance in the OMJS scores was attributable to the subjects' global classification on the MJS-SMJS.

A separate analysis of variance was run on the OMJS scores eliminating the MJS-SMJS mixed 3-4 stage subjects. While the statistical inappropriateness of such a reanalysis is recognized, an attempt was being made to determine the impact of these mixed stage scores. Run with the purer stage scores only, the F-ratio increased to $F = 2.079$, $p = .117$. Although this is a substantial increase in F-ratio, the OMJS still fails to discriminate the MJS-SMJS stages. The non-significant relationship between the OMJS and the Kohlberg protocols is largely ascribable to the OMJS's low reliability and large within-group variance. This absence of relationship still shows that the OMJS does not validly assess the Kohlberg moral reasoning stages.

MJS-MMV Comparison. The findings for Hogan and Dickstein's Measure of Moral Values suggest that this instrument has greater potential. Table 29 presents the MMV means and standard deviations as a function of stage classification on the MJS-SMJS global scores. Analyses of variance were again computed for both the mixed 3-4 stage scores included and excluded. Unlike the OMJS, the MMV has significant relationships with the MJS-SMJS scores in both analyses, (mixed stages included, $F = 4.50$, $(4, 64)$, $p = .003$; and pure stages only, $F = 6.292$, $(3, 64)$, $p = .001$). Post-hoc analyses using Scheffe's test found that only the stage 2 and stage 5 subjects differed significantly, $p = .01$.

Table 29

Measure of Moral Values Scores as a Function of

Stage Classification on the Morally Ambiguous Stories

Moral Judgment Stage	#S's	Mean	SD	Standard Error
2	4	5.3750	.6292	.3146
3	12	8.7500	3.320	.9584
3-4	29	9.2759	3.8651	.7177
4	16	9.3438	3.8588	.9647
5	12	13.2500	3.7809	1.0915
TOTAL	73	9.6438	4.0229	.4708

An Omega squared analysis revealed that MJS-SMJS stage classification accounted for 16.7% of the variance in MMV scores. This increased substantially to 23.2% when the analysis excluded the 3-4 mixed stage subjects. Finally, the OMJS and MMV are not significantly correlated, r = .135. The MMV is, however, significantly correlated with the MJS-SMJS global scores (mixed 3-4 stage included, r = .399, p =.0002; pure stages only, r = .53, p =.0001). Haier (1975) reported MMV scores for college females to be significantly correlated with the MJS, r = .51, p =.01, but not for college males, r = .22, p =.05. The present study found no such sex differences.

The relationship of the MMV to the Kohlberg protocols is strong, particularly so since the reliabilities of the two instruments are only moderate. The reliability of the MMV can, however, be improved with only limited costs. The present 15-item format can be reliably scored in about five minutes. Doubling the length of the scale using similar items would increase its reliability to .83, and the scale could still be scored with a fraction of the effort required for scoring the Kohlberg protocols. The MMV in its present form, however, can be used as a quick, reliable, and valid index of mature moral judgment.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) demonstrated that adults scored as stage 2 in moral reasoning were more probably in transition from stage 4 to stage 5 and thus should be properly classified as stage 5-A. The MMV data suggest that the four subjects in the present sample are not stage 5-A because they have the lowest MMV scores rather than scores intermediate between stage 4 and stage 5. This ambiguous stage 2 (5-A) classification on the MJS and the MMV needs further clarification.

Since the MMV scores are continuous, the scale does not delineate MJS stage boundaries. The present MMV means and standard deviations cannot be used to establish MMV ranges which can be used as equivalents to the MJS stages. The MMV cannot, therefore, be used alone in any research which attempts to investigate Kohlberg's stages as stages per se. Researchers committed to the investigation of stages cannot use the MMV as the primary assessment technique. Those who wish to investigate the continuous concept of moral maturity should find the MMV suitable and convenient for their purposes.

Comparison of POI and 16 PF Traits with Moral Stages

MJS-POI Comparisons. Four analyzes were conducted on the POI scores to test the self-actualization character model: (1) a Pearson Product-Moment Correlation of POI subscale scores with moral stage scores and (2) an analysis of variance. The observed rank order of mean POI scores for each stage was also examined. The only analysis of the POI mean profiles for each moral stage group was a visual comparison. The standardized means for each moral stage group, the correlation coefficients, the F ratios, and observed order of POI means are presented in Table 30.

The most simplistic and direct hypothesis tested examined the hypothesis that self-actualization scores would possess a linear relationship to moral reasoning stages, i.e. self-actualization increases as the maturity of moral reasoning increases. A correlational analysis revealed only one significant and moderate correlation (Sy scale, $r = .27$, $p = .05$) between developmental level of moral reasoning and self-actualization as measured by the POI. As the level of moral judgment increases, the ability to be synergistic (i.e. to transcend dichotomies) increases. The correlational analysis, therefore, provided very little supportive evidence for the linear hypothesis.

Table 30

POI Scale Means as a Function of MJS Classification

POI Scale	Moral Stages 2	3	3-4	4	5
Ti	47.8	48.9	51.6	52.3	48.1
Tc	45.3	51.6	48.7	48.8	51.1
O	41.7	42.4	54.4	55.0	45.7
I	56.7	56.1	46.5	46.1	53.2
Sav	43.3	54.6	48.1	49.0	50.9
Ex	49.5	55.3	46.8	46.9	54.3
FR	51.6	53.5	47.7	45.3	53.8
S	50.7	55.3	49.6	48.7	51.3
S_R	51.8	51.5	50.2	49.5	50.3
S_A	54.5	54.2	48.1	47.8	51.1
N_C	37.8	50.9	50.5	47.3	51.5
Sy	39.7	53.9	47.5	49.9	55.3
A	46.1	55.3	48.1	48.8	49.7
C	46.9	55.0	48.1	45.7	53.5

continued

Table 30

continued

POI Scale	Correlations				F Ratios		Observed Order
	Pure Stages Only[a]		Mixed Stages[b]		Pure Stages Only[a]	Mixed Stages[b]	
	2,3,4,5	3,4,5A,5B	2-5	3-5B			
Ti	.01	.01	.07	-.06	.48	.51	2,5,3,3-4,4
Tc	.07	.04	.02	-.01	.46	.42	2,3-4,4,5,3
O	.16	.12	.01	-.05	2.98*	3.63*	2,3,5,3-4,4
I	-.17	-.12	.00	.05	2.87*	3.55*	4,3-4,5,3,2
S_{AV}	.03	.01	-.13	-.07	1.53	1.36	2,3-4,4,5,3
E_X	.00	.00	.02	.05	2.04	2.70*	3-4,4,2,5,3
F_R	-.01	-.03	.09	.06	2.15	2.20	4,3-4,2,3,5
S	-.13	-.11	-.12	-.08	1.68	1.61	4,3-4,2,5,3
S_R	-.08	-.06	-.03	-.02	.18	.14	4,3-4,5,3,2
S_A	-.15	-.11	-.04	.00	1.01	1.15	4,3-4,5,3,2
N_C	.20	.11	.00	-.07	1.90	1.93	2,4,3-4,3,5
S_Y	.27*	.20*	.02	.06	3.39*	2.96*	2,3-4,4,3,5
A	-.07	-.06	-.17	-.11	1.17	1.25	2,3-4,4,5,3
C	.02	-.01	.00	.00	2.45	2.31	4,2,3-4,5,3

a N = 44

b N = 73

* p = .05

The correlational results presumed the assumption that the stage 2 moral reasoning subjects were indeed genuine stage 2 subjects. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) concluded that most adults scored as stage 2 were more correctly classified as stage 5-A. Stage 5-A reasoning is reasoning which has content but not structural similarities to stage 2 reasoning and is expressed only by individuals who have developed stage 4 reasoning. Developmentally, therefore, the subjects judged as stage 2 in this study are more probably stage 5-A subjects. The scores of these subjects should be re-ordered to indicate their true developmental position. A reanalysis using the same correlational procedures failed to disclose any new significant linear relationships. Moral development received no support as a linear function of self-actualization. These findings resulted both when the scores were computed including the mixed stage 3-4 scores and when the mixed stage 3-4 scores were excluded from the analysis.

An alternative hypothesis proposed that the relationship between moral judgment and self-actualization is not a simple, linear function. An analysis of variance allowed a more statistically powerful technique to test this hypothesis than correlational analysis. ANOVA's were computed both including and excluding the mixed stage 3-4 scores. Seven significant F ratios, $p = .05$, resulted out of twenty-eight computations (see Table 30). Two of these significant findings duplicated the significant correlations on the Synergy scale. Four significant results appeared for the two bi-polar scales of Outer-Directed and Inner-Directed. The remaining significant finding was for the Existentiality scale with the mixed stage 3-4's included. Existentiality measures one's flexibility in using good judgment in applying values and principles to one's life. Since the Outer-Directed, Inner-

Directed scales are polar opposites, only three dimensions of self-actualization show any significant relationship to moral development: Inner-Outer Directedness, Synergy, and Existentiality.

The remaining two analyses, an examination of observed order of mean stage POI scores and a visual comparison of stage POI profiles, are most directly described by referring to Figure 2. This visual examination reveals some unexpected relationships between moral development and self-actualization subscale scores for stage 3 subjects. Stage 3 subjects have the highest mean scores on five of the twelve scales: Self-Actualization Value, Existentiality, Spontaneity, Acceptance of Aggression, and Capacity for Intimate Contact. The most morally developed subjects in this study (stage 5) have the highest scores on three of the scales: Feeling Reactivity, Nature of Man, and Synergy. Stage 2 (5-A) subjects have the highest scores on two subscales: Self-regard and Self-acceptance.

While these stage 2 (5-A) subjects are highest on these two scales, they are the lowest on four scales: Self-actualization Value, Nature of Man, Synergy, and Acceptance of Aggression. The stage with the largest frequency of lowest scale scores is, however, stage 4. Subjects in this stage are lowest on five scales: Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity, Self-Regard, Self-Acceptance, and Capacity for Intimate Contact. They also have the lowest score on Existentiality with the mixed stage 3-4 subjects. The stage 5 scores are not the lowest on any scale and are either the highest or second highest on all but one scale: Self-Acceptance.

Table 31 shows the distribution of POI subscale scores by moral stage. The 'Inner-Directed-Outer-Directed' scores are eliminated from this comparison. This distribution demonstrates important differences between the self-actualization profiles and tendencies between stages 3-4 and 4, and stages 3 and 5. Although there are almost no statistically significant

Figure 2
Moral Stage Profiles on the POI Self-Actualization Subscales



Table 31

Self-Actualization (POI)

Scores by Moral Stages

Moral Stage	Below 50	Between 50-52	Between 52-54	Between 54-58
2 (5-A)	7	3	0	1
3	0	3	2	6
3-4	9	2	0	0
4	11	0	0	0
5 (5-B)	1	6	2	2

differences between the scores of moral stage groups on the individual subscales, this distribution of the scores for each moral stage group over all subscales indicates substantial differences in their self-actualization scores. A chi-square check for significant differences between the moral stage distributions on subscales was not appropriate because of the high number of cells with zeros.

These profile scores and comparisons provide suggestive and moderately supportive evidence for the self-actualization - moral development relationship. This evidence is, however, not statistically significant.

MJS-16PF Comparisons. The same four types of analysis as performed on the POI scores were executed with the 16 PF subscale scores: (1) a Pearson Product-Moment correlation of 16PF subscale scores with moral stage scores, (2) an analysis of variance on the mean subscale scores for each moral stage, (3) an examination of the observed order of mean 16 PF scores for each stage, and (4) a visual comparison of the 16 PF mean profiles for each moral stage. The standardized means for each moral stage group, the correlation coefficients, the F ratios, and observed order of 16 PF means are presented in Table 32.

Unlike the POI scales which have a theoretical directionality from less self-actualized to more self-actualized, the 16 PF is not a unitary, dimensional scale. The sixteen factors are statistically independent with no predetermined, theoretical directionality. There is no underlying, value theory which distinguishes each factor scale from more desirable to less desirable. The correlation analysis is performed with these reservations taken into consideration. No directional hypothesis of 16 PF subscales for moral stages is proposed. The correlational analysis is testing for linear relationships in either direction. The 16 PF subscale scores

Table 32
16PF Scale Means As a Function of MJS Classification

16PF Scale	Moral Stage 2	3	3-4	4	5
A	41.8	48.8	52.6	52.7	44.1
B	51.9	43.6	53.2	47.5	52.8
C	46.5	51.1	49.0	48.1	55.0
E	61.8	45.8	48.6	49.5	53.0
F	52.0	51.3	50.4	49.8	51.1
G	42.3	46.1	52.1	52.9	43.2
H	54.3	52.6	49.3	49.2	49.7
I	46.5	47.8	47.9	50.6	56.8
L	53.1	47.7	53.4	47.3	40.4
M	51.8	44.1	48.0	47.1	55.3
N	43.3	51.6	50.7	49.8	47.9
O	46.0	50.0	53.4	50.0	44.1
Q_1	58.7	50.1	47.6	47.3	54.6
Q_2	48.5	49.2	47.5	48.5	54.9
Q_3	44.2	49.5	48.8	53.9	47.9
Q_4	43.7	49.4	51.2	49.7	49.2

continued

Table 32

Continued

16PF Scale	Pure Stages Only[a]		Mixed Stages[b]		F Ratios		Observed Order
	2,3,4,5	3,4,5A,5B	2-5	3-5B	Pure Stages Only[a]	Mixed Stages[b]	
A	-.00	-.02	-.26*	-.24*	2.63	2.88	2,5,3,3-4,4
B	.19	.10	.35*	.15	1.97	2.69	3,4,2,5,3-4
C	.18	.12	.15	.11	1.22	1.06	2,4,3-4,3,5
E	.00	.03	.30*	.25*	2.97*	2.09	3,3-4,4,5,2
F	-.03	-.02	.01	.00	.10	.06	4,3-4,5,3,2
G	.01	.00	-.19	-.19	2.54	3.29*	2,5,3,3-4,4
H	-.15	-.10	-.06	-.02	.42	.39	4,3-4,5,3,2
I	.34*	.28*	.30*	.27*	2.07	1.94	2,3,3-4,4,5
L	-.31*	-.27*	-.22	-.27*	1.79	3.30*	5,4,3,2,3-4
M	.21	.19	.35*	.29*	1.87	1.87	3,4,3-4,2,5
N	.00	-.01	-.14	-.14	.59	.63	2,5,4,3-4,3
O	-.12	-.13	-.24*	-.25*	1.00	1.94	5,2,3+4,3-4
Q_1	-.01	.00	.25*	.22*	2.28	2.36	4,3-4,3,5,2
Q_2	.22	.16	.25*	.20*	1.40	1.17	3-4,2+4,3,5
Q_3	.06	.09	-.12	-.03	1.20	1.16	2,5,3-4,3,4
Q_4	.09	.04	-.03	-.07	.38	.48	2,5,3,4,3-4

a $N = 44$

b $N = 73$

* $p = .05$

are analyzed for both the scores for pure moral stage subjects only and for all moral stage subjects including those with mixed 3-4 global scores.

Four significant, moderate correlations resulted from thirty-two computations. Two scales ('I,' Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded; $r = .34$ and 'L,' Trusting versus Suspicious $r = .31$) are significant for both the pure stage and mixed-stage analyses. Tender-mindedness increases with moral development while suspiciousness increases as one moves down the moral judgment stage hierarchy.

As with the POI scores, the 16 PF scores were reanalyzed changing the stage 2 scores to an intermediate stage 5-A between stage 4 and stage 5-B. This reanalysis produced sixteen significant correlations out of thirty-two computations. This number of significant correlations is a dramatic increase over the four calculated with stage 2 as the lowest rather than the next to highest moral stage. The six scales for which there are significant correlations for both the pure stage and mixed-stage computations are discussed first.

These six scales consist of: 'A,' Reserved versus Outgoing; 'E,' Humble versus Assertive; 'I,' Tough-Minded versus Tender-Minded; 'M,' Practical versus Imaginative; 'Q1,' Conservative versus Experimenting, 'Q2,' Group-Dependent versus Self-Sufficient. Being both reserved and assertive increases as moral development increases. Even though being tender-minded increases from the lowest stage to the highest moral stage when stage 2 is the lowest stage, this same linear relationship holds when stage 2 is the second highest stage. This finding suggests that the results are not influenced significantly by the stage 2 group scores which consist of only four subjects. This contradictory finding introduces

a problematical element to the interpretations of these correlational results. Continuing a review of the findings, imaginativeness and experimentingness increases as moral development increases. Self-sufficiency tends to increase with moral development.

Three scales have significant correlations only for either the pure stage comparison or the mixed stage analysis but not both. With the mixed 3-4 stage scores eliminated, intelligence 'B' increases with moral development. Two significant results exist only for mixed 3-4 stage scores included. Suspiciousness 'L' again increases as one moves down the moral stages. This is the same anomaly that arises with the tender-minded correlation above. Being self-assured increases with moral development.

An analysis of variance permitted an examination of between-moral-stage-group scores without the necessity of these being linear in any direction. ANOVA's were computed both including and excluding the mixed stage 3-4 scores. A total of five significant F ratios resulted from thirty-two computed and none of these five were significant for the mixed stage 3-4 scores both included and excluded. The only significant relationship, $F = 2.97$, $p = .05$, for the mixed stage 3-4 scores excluded is for subscale 'E,' Humble versus Assertive. This supported the significant correlation for 'E.' The significant F ratios for 'A' (Reserved versus Outgoing), 'B' (Intelligence), and 'L' (Trusting versus Suspicious) replicated the significant correlations for these scales. The 'G' scale (Expedient versus Conscientious) has a significant F ratio with no concomitant significant correlations. Stage 4 subjects are most conscientious while stage 5-A and 5-B subjects are the most expedient.

These statistical analyses were complimented with visual comparisons of both the 16 PF profiles for each moral stage and the observed order of

16 PF scores by moral judgment stage. These comparisons added little additional clarity to the analysis. Two types of visual examinations are possible: (1) a comparison of the paths of each moral stage to disclose parallel paths, and (2) a comparison of the moral stage profiles to determine the most normal and least normal profiles. The lack of unitary directionality of the 16 PF prevents other types of visual analyses.

There are not the strong parallel profile paths for the 16 PF (Figure 3) between stages 3-4 and 4, and between stages 3 and 5 as there are for the POI. The parallel paths of the stage 3-4 and 4 profiles will re-appear in the factor analysis and discriminant analysis generated profiles.

Although there is no theoretical directionality in the 16 PF, comparisons could be made with the norm. Table 33 presents the number of subscale scores within distributions around the norm for this sample. Even though a statistical test of this data is desirable, a chi-square test is not valid because of the large number of cells with zero frequencies. This data, however, does indicate that the stage 3-4 and stage 4 subjects constitute the norm for this sample. The stage 2 subjects are farthest from the normative group. A similar radical profile for the stage 2 group appears for the POI. It should be kept in mind that this group, however, consists of only four subjects.

Figure 3

Moral Stage Profiles Across the 16 PF Subscales



Table 33

16PF Subscale Score Distributions by Moral Stages

	Below	Norm Between	Above
	46*	46-54	54
Stage 2	5	8	3
Stage 3	3	13	0
Stage 3-4	0	16	0
Stage 4	0	16	0
Stage 5	4	7	5

* Z scores

Factor Analysis of Personality Traits

A central problem in using factor analysis is determing the number of factors and the most replicable and adequate factors. The present research encountered these problems. Although this research has primarily used Fromm's typology and the findings of Peck and Havighurst (1960), this research was not designed to test a hypothesized number of factors deduced from Fromm and Peck and Havighurst. This area of character structure was not felt to be sufficiently investigated to warrant such hypothesis testing. The present factor analysis, therefore, is an exploratory analysis.

Gorsuch (1974) discussed the problem of determining the proper number of factors and presented a number of methods for making this determination. Four decision criteria were chosen on the basis of Gorsuch's explication: (1) to extract only those factors which account for non-trivial variance, (2) to eliminate factors that account for such small portions of the variance as to be theoretically uninteresting, (3) to extract only those factors which would be most probably replicable in future research, and (4) to extract only those factors which were theoretically and meaningfully interpretable. The procedures used to accomplish these goals follow.

The initial analysis consisted of an unrestricted factor computation of the subscale scores for both the POI and the 16 PF for all subjects. The calculated eigenvalue for the nine factors ranged from 9.14661 to .57747. The fifth factor was the last factor to have an eigenvalue of greater than 1.00. Now that the maximum number of factors for the subscale scores had been determined, it was necessary to decide whether this was the 'proper' number.

The 'proper' number of factors was estimated using the scree test. The scree test (Gorsuch, 1974) is a procedure which can provide a solution

with the minimum number of factors accounting for the maximum amount of variance based on the factor's roots. The resulting scree for the nine factor analysis is presented in Figure 4. This scree test unfortunately does not provide a clear-cut solution. When there are more than two breaks in the plotted roots, it is difficult to decide which break represents the 'proper' number of factors (Gorsuch, 1974). Additional evidence is required to determine whether the 'proper' number of factors in this analysis is five or six as indicated by the number immediately preceding where the straight line begins.

Gorsuch (1974) suggested an additional method in the above situation which involved examining varying numbers of factors. This procedure involves five steps: (1) compute a factor analysis with no specified number of factors to be extracted (in the present study, this resulted in nine factors), (2) examine this factor matrix for trivial factors, (3) subtract the number of trivial factors from the total number of factors in step 1, (4) recalculate the factor analysis using a specified factor format indicated by step 3, (5) examine this new factor analysis for trivial factors and adjust the factor analysis again if trivial factors are still present.

An examination for trivial factors in the nine factors clearly eliminated one of the nine and suggested three others. Trivial factors are defined as: (1) those factors without a unique set of defining variables, and (2) those factors which do not have at least two loadings above .5. This loading minimum level was selected to maximize replicable factors based on the number of subjects and variables in the analysis. The nine factors with their subscale loadings are presented in Table 34.

Figure 4
Scree Test of Unrestricted Factor Analysis with
Nine Factors



Table 34

Defining Variables of Nine Factor Analysis

Factor	r	Factor Label
Factor 1		SELF-ACTUALIZATION
O	-.94022	other directed
I	.94264	inner directed
Ex	.78418	flexibility in applying values
Fr	.67533	sensitivity to one's own needs & feelings
S	.73615	ability to spontaneously express emotions
Sa	.68573	self-acceptance of one's weaknesses
A	.63727	acceptance of own aggression
C	.80965	capacity for intimate meaningful relationships
Sr	.53924	ability to like one's self because of one's strength as a person
O (16PF)	-.53305	confident vs. apprehensive (guilt proneness)
Factor 2		SOCIABILITY
A (16PF)	.65882	reserved-sociable, emotionally expressive
H	.76055	shy (inferior) - sociable, spontaneous, emotionally expressive
F	.64680	sober (introspective) - sociable (impulsive)
Q_2	-.51897	group-dependent vs. self-sufficient
Factor 3		SUPEREGO STRENGTH
G	.75987	expedient - superego strength
Q_3	.78615	self-conflict follows own urges - high self concept (follows self concept) impulse control
Factor 4		ANXIETY
L	.65928	trusting vs. suspicious
Q_4	.57880	(unfrustrated) - (frustrated)
Factor 5		CONFORMITY
E	.67159	conforming - assertive (authoritarian)
Q_1	.50601	conservative - experimenting
Factor 6		TIME ORIENTATION
Ti	-.83872	time incompetency
Tc	.75709	time competency
Factor 7		CONVENTIONALITY
M	.87622	conventional - imaginative (bohemian)
Factor 8		PERCEPTION OF NATURE OF MAN
Nc	.55865	ability to be synergic in understanding of human nature
Factor 9		ACCEPTANCE OF AGGRESSION
A (POI)	.67880	acceptance of own aggression

Factor nine by definition is a trivial factor since it is not defined by a unique set of defining variables. The sole defining variable for factor nine is also a defining variable for factor one. Factor six is defined by two variables which are statistically dependent due to the scoring system. The variables are defined dependently and scored dependently resulting in their being intercorrelated at almost 1.0. (Shostrom, 1965). Nunnelly (1967) lists this as one way to derive spurious factors. This examination further reduces factor six to being defined by only one variable. Both of these subscales further load greater than .46 on factor one. Factor six was, therefore, tentatively classified as a trivial factor at this stage of analysis.

Factors seven and eight are defined by only one variable each. A final judgment on these two factors was withheld, however, since this factor analysis consisted of a factor analysis of Cattell's 16 factors rather than discrete variables. To an extent, the factors determined are second-order factors, although none of the nine factors match Cattell's (1965) second-order factors. In this situation, a factor with only one defining variable may be a theoretically significant factor.

A second factor analysis (Table 35) with a specified seven factor format was computed based on the above analysis. Failure of either factor seven or eight to replicate on this second analysis was considered as evidence against their existence as a nontrivial factor.

A comparison of the nine versus seven factor analyses disclosed both the stability of defining variables within a factor and the replicability of the factors themselves. Factor eight in the first analysis did not replicate in the seven factor analysis. The 'Nature of Man' factor was therefore eliminated as trivial. The 'Conventionality' factor, however, replicated in the seven factor analysis. This supported its existence

Table 35

Defining Variables of Seven Factor Analysis

Factor	r	Factor Label
Factor 1		SELF-ACTUALIZATION
O	-.73874	outer directed
I	.74537	inner directed
SAV	.68586	affirmation of self-actualization values
Ex	.73100	flexibility in applying values
Fr	.74344	sensitivity to one's own needs and feelings
S	.68401	ability to spontaneously express emotions
Sa	.54696	self acceptance of one's weaknesses
Sy	.52203	ability to see life's opposites as related
A	.79519	acceptance of own aggression
C	.82583	capacity for intimate, meaningful relationships
Factor 2		SOCIABILITY
A (16PF)	.60572	reserved-sociable, emotionally expressive
F	.61077	sober (introspective) - sociable, impulsive expressive
H	.65553	shy (inferior) - sociable, spontaneous, emotionally expressive
Q_2	-.55232	group-dependent vs. self-sufficient
Factor 3		EGO STRENGTH
O (POI)	-.54502	outer directed
I	.53863	inner directed
Sr	.50647	ability to like one's self because of strength
O (16PF)	-.68488	self-confident (adequate) - apprehensive (guilt proneness)
Q_4	-.78672	composed (unfrustrated) - tense (frustrated)
Factor 4		SUPEREGO STRENGTH
G	.79325	expedient-superego strength
Q_3	.73784	impulse control, follows own urges — high self-concept, follows self-ideal
Factor 5		TIME COMPETENCY
T_I	-.78529	time incompetent
T_c	.85012	time competent
Factor 6		CONFORMITY
E	.65649	submitted vs. dominant
Factor 7		CONVENTIONALITY
M	.68719	conformity (accomodating)--assertive (authoritarian)

as a substantive factor. The 'Time Competency' factor which had been tentatively classified as a trivial factor previously, re-appeared as a distinct factor.

An examination of the remaining factors indicated that their respective defining variables were very stable. Eight of the defining variables for the "Self-Actualization" factor remained the same. The four defining variables for the 'Sociability' factor and the two variables of the 'Superego Strength' factor remained invariant. The composition of the defining variables for the 'Conformity' factor and the 'Anxiety-Ego Strength' factors, however, changed. The loading of the 'conservative-experimenting' variable dropped below the established inclusion level for the 'Conformity' factor. The change in the defining variables for the 'Anxiety-Ego Strength' factor changed more drastically. The 'trusting-suspicious' variable fell below the acceptable loading level while two unique variables (self regard and guilt proneness) and two non-unique variables (inner-outer support) rose above the inclusion level. This brought this factor into question as to its stability and replicability.

A final check for the 'proper' number of factors was perfomed by recomputing the factor analysis with a factor format of five. This procedure would permit an examination of the last three factors extracted in the seven factor format analysis.

Factor seven (Conventionality) was not extracted in the five factor analysis and its defining variable did not load heavily on any resulting factor. The 'Conformity' factor, however, retained its previous status while the 'Time Competency' factor became subsumed under the "Self-Actualization" factor. The defining variables of the remaining four factors maintained a high level of stability (Table 36).

Table 36

Defining Variables of Five Factor Analysis

Factor Analysis Interpretation

Factor	r	Factor Label
Factor 1		SELF-ACTUALIZATION
Ti	-.55002	time incompetency
Tc	.63463	time competency
O	-.81976	other directed
I	.82270	inner directed
SAV	.63118	affirmation of self-actualization values
Ex	.86196	flexibility in applying values
Fr	.71382	sensitivity to one's own needs & feelings
S	.75058	ability to spontaneously express emotions
Sa	.68596	self acceptance of one's weaknesses
A	.70217	acceptance of own aggression
C	.83124	capacity for intimate, meaningful relationships
Sr	.51266	ability to like one's self because of one's strength as a person
Sy	.53022	ability to see life's opposites as related
Factor 2		SOCIABILITY
F	.63092	sober (introspective) - sociable, impulsive, expressive
H	.69201	shy (inferior)-sociable, spontaneous, emotionally expressive
A (16PF)	.57601	reserved-sociable, emotionally expressed
Q_2	-.49105	group-dependent vs. self-sufficient
Factor 3		EGO STRENGTH-ANXIETY
C	.65175	low frustration tolerance, low ego strength (emotionally less stable)-high ego strength, emotionally mature
O	-.74304	self-confident (adequate)-apprehensive (guilt proneness)
Q_4	-.78589	composed (unfrustrated)-tense (frustrated)
Factor 4		SUPEREGO STRENGTH
G	.77346	expedient - superego strength
Q_3	.67370	impulse control, follows own urges-high self-concept (follows self-ideal)
Factor 5		CONFORMITY
E	.65557	conforming (accomodating)-assertive (authoritarian)

On the basis of evidence presented to this point, five factors were determined to be the minimum number of appropriate factors. This decision was, however, modified by theoretical and statistical considerations. Statistically, a factor analysis of known factors results in second-order factors. Not all of the prior factors would be expected to collapse into second-order factors. Factors in the present analysis which are defined by only one variable (a factor in previous research) are, therefore, considered as valid factors. Gorsuch (1974) stated that determination of the number of factors, particularly in situations where there were as few variables as thirty, should be mediated by theoretical purposes. The 'Time Competency' and 'Conventionality' factors have hypothesized theoretical significance in the current research. The final decision, therefore, was to use the seven factor results in all further analyses as the most appropriate number of factors. These factors are described in Table 35.

Analysis of Moral Stage Group Factor Score Means

The factor analysis grouped the sample of thirty variables into seven sets of correlated variables (factors). This prccedure permits a valid statistical analysis, based on sample size to variable ratio, of the variance between moral stage groups.

Factor scores were computed for each subject using the SPSS Factscore Program. The means for each group were calculated and an ANOVA was run for each factor. The Z-score means for each factor by each moral stage group are presented in Table 37. The 'Self-Actualization,' 'Superego,' 'Conformity-Assertiveness,' and 'Conventionality' factors were significant across moral stages. The 'Anxiety' factor was marginally significant, while the 'Sociability' and 'Time Orientation' factors were not significant.

Table 37

Means of Factor Scores by Moral Stages

Factor	Moral Stages							
	2	3	3-4	4	5	F-ratio	P	Observed Order
1	-.331	.618	-.254	-.270	.211	2.482	.05	2,3-4,4,5,3
2	-.517	.047	-.184	.144	-.234	.877	.51	2,5,3,4,3-4
3	1.062	.146	-.252	-.158	.246	2.124	.08	3-4,4,3,5,2
4	-.642	-.219	.148	.348	-.547	2.596	.04	2,5,3,3-4,4
5	-.616	-.034	-.014	.078	-.039	.357	.83	2,5,3,3-4,4
6	1.472	-.186	-.049	-.226	.120	3.756	.008	4,3,3-4,5,2
7	-.726	-.229	-.238	.043	.704	3.982	.006	2,3-4,3,4,5

The profiles of each moral stage group by factors are presented in Figure 5. This graph shows that the 'Ego-Strength' factor is relatively invariant except for stage 2. Since the stage 2 mean is based on four subjects, the marginally significant finding for 'Anxiety' must be conservatively interpreted. The 'Conformity' factor would also not be significant without the stage 2 scores. This significant difference on this factor therefore, should be cautiously viewed until a further study with a larger number of stage 2 subjects can be analyzed.

A visual analysis of the profiles in Figure 5 indicates a number of theoretically interesting findings. The first of these findings to be considered is the remarkably parallel profiles of the stage 3-4 and stage 4 subject means. There are at least three possible interpretations of these findings. These subjects may actually have personality profiles consonant with stage 4 subjects. A second explanation suggests that those subjects classified as mixed stage 3-4 subjects would have been more appropriately classified as stage 4. Kohlberg's (1976) contention that using different scoring systems and particularly the earlier systems could result in misclassification of stage 4 subjects seems substantiated by this finding. Another interpretation of this finding, that individuals in transition from stage 3 to stage 4 reasoning undergo personality changes consonant with stage 4 subjects, cannot be tested on the basis of the data from this study. A longitudinal study would be necessary to provide such data.

A second finding indicates that stage 3 subjects have profiles similar to stage 4 subjects except for an unexpectedly high self-actualization score. In addition, the 'Superego' factor mean for stage 3 subjects is lower than for stage 3-4 and stage 4 subjects, while the 'anxiety' scores are higher.

Figure 5
Moral Stage Profiles by Factor Scores



The profile for stage 5 subjects shows a distinctive difference in personality. For the first four factors, the profile of stage 5 subjects is practically a mirror image of stage 4 subjects. Stage 5 individuals are higher in self-actualization and in bohemianism or unconventionality. Stage 5 subjects also appear to be less unreasonably dominated by superego than stage 4 individuals.

Finally, there is a mild symmetry in vector paths between stage 3 and stage 5 subjects for the first four factors. Both groups have practically the same time-orientation mean. The difference between the two groups resides in the means for the "assertiveness" and "conventionality" factors. Both of these means are lower for the stage 3 group.

The most variant profile is that of the four stage 2 subjects. All of the factor means for the stage 2 group are either the highest or lowest for all groups. They have the lowest scores on 'self-actualization,' 'sociability,' 'superego,' 'time-orientation' and 'bohemianism' (conventionality factor). Alternately, they have the highest scores on 'anxiety' and 'assertiveness.' All individuals except stage 2 subjects had almost identical 'Time-orientation' scores. These extreme scores must be considered tentative based on the small sample size for the stage 2 group.

Analysis of Moral Stage Discriminant Centroid Means

The factor analysis and the resulting factor score profiles for the moral stages provided a statistical basis for the major personality dimensions of this sample. A discriminant analysis was subsequently calculated in order to statistically determine which of the personality dimensions constituted the major statistical differences between the moral stage groups. This discriminant analysis further permitted a general, if preliminary, test of the character-moral reasoning model by determining the ability of the

personality factors to predict moral stage classifications.

Discriminant analysis statistically maximizes the variance among groups by combining the given variables into linear functions. These functions represent the dimensions along which a priori groups distribute with minimal overlap of distributions. Since the functions are dependent on the a priori groups, a change in the set of groups can effect the resultant functions derived. The profiles in Figure 5 suggested that the stage 3-4 group and stage 4 group be equated as one group. In the actual analysis the stage 3-4 group was eliminated. Two separate discriminant analyses were, therefore, computed to examine the effect of such a consolidation.

An initial discriminant analysis used all the moral stage groups. This procedure extracted four discriminant functions (roots). Roots in a discriminant analysis are interpreted similar to factors. Table 38 presents the correlation matrix for the four roots. Only loadings equal to or greater than .50 were used to interpret roots.

The centroid means for each moral stage group across discriminant functions are presented in Table 39. Root one is defined by the "superego," "assertiveness," and "ego-strength" factors. The "conventionality" factor defines the second root. The third root is specified by the "self-actualization" and "conventionality" factors. The "ego-strength" and "superego" factors loaded heaviest on the fourth root. Table 39 indicates that only the first two roots significantly discriminate between the groups. Since the last two roots are non-significant explainers of between-group variance, they are not considered in further analysis (Nunnally, 1967).

Table 38

Mixed Stage Discriminant Analysis Correlation Matrix

Factors	Roots 1	2	3	4	Factor Label
1	.1985	.4179	.7501	.0816	Self-Actualization
2	-.3425	-.0153	.0845	-.1971	Sociability
3	.4987	-.0938	.1226	.6868	Ego Strength
4	-.5365	-.1659	-.1596	.6496	Superego Strength
5	-.1773	.1705	-.0316	.0688	Time-Orientation
6	.5342	-.4751	-.2083	-.1902	Compliance-Assertiveness
7	.1432	.7332	-.5861	.0569	Conventionality
% BWG Variance Accounted For	57.76	30.12	11.06	1.06	

Table 39

Mixed Stage Discriminant Function Means by Moral Stages

Moral Stage Group	Discriminant Functions 1	2	3	4
2	1.661	-1.366	-.047	.035
3	.104	.180	.674	-.006
3-4	-.381	-.276	-.027	-.143
4	-.467	-.020	-.201	.121
5	.741	.645	-.264	-.094
$\underline{x}^2$	34.98	20.47	8.26	.835
d.f.	10	8	6	4
p	.000	.009	.219	.931

The first root consists of a dimension with high superego, high compliance, and low ego strength representing one polar end and low superego, high assertiveness, and high ego strength at the other end. This multi-variable dimension accounted for 57.76% of the between-group variance. Root two, the other signficant discriminant function, is a single variable, "conventionality" dimension which accounts for 30.12% of the variance.

The discriminant analysis determined that the variance between groups can best be represented in a two dimensional space. Figure 6 shows the two significant centroids of the moral stage groups plotted in this two dimensional space. This visual representation indicates the relative position of each group in this space and the relative distance (variance) between the groups.

Before explicating this set of findings, the results of the second discriminant analysis which used only the pure stage groups (stage 3-4 eliminated) will be presented. This second analysis derived three roots (Table 40), again with only the first two being significant (Table 41). Root one has been reduced to a single-variable dimension in this analysis, with the "superego" and "ego-strength" factors falling below the a priori inclusion level. The "conventionality" root has remained unchanged. The percentage of variance accounted for by these first two roots remains substantially the same as in the first analysis. The distribution of the moral stage groups within the two dimensional space (Figure 7) is isomorphic to the spacial distribution from the first discriminant analysis. This evidence substantiates the previous interpretation that the stage 3-4 subjects are predominantly equivalent to stage 4 subjects.

Figure 6

Mixed Moral Stage Groups
by
Centroid Means



Table 40

Pure Stage Discriminant Analysis Correlation Matrix

Factors	Roots 1	2	3	Factor Label
1	-.0586	.4224	-.6917	Self-Actualization
2	.3525	-.0835	-.0179	Sociability
3	.4595	-.0449	-.2221	Ego Strength
4	-.4687	-.3707	.2702	Superego Strength
5	-.2485	.1049	.1144	Time Orientation
6	.8327	-.3056	-.0219	Compliance-Assertiveness
7	-.0583	.6366	.6348	Conventionality
% BWG Variance Accounted For	56.09	30.43	13.48	

Table 41

Pure Stage Discriminant Function Means By Moral Stages

Moral Stage	Discriminant Functions 1	2	3
2	1.7901	-.6681	-.1981
3	-.1426	.2703	-.6796
4	-.3603	-.1880	.2367
5	.5273	.8174	.1952
X2	24.085	14.874	7.305
D.F.	9	7	5
P	.004	.038	.198

Figure 7

Pure Moral Stage Groups
by
Centroid Means



These findings for both discriminant analyses can be described simultaneously because of their similarity. Stage 2 individuals based on the data may be described as possessing high ego-strength, low superego strength, high assertiveness, and high conventionality. High conventionality in this context represents a very practical approach to life, showing a strong pre-occupation with 'down-to-earth' concerns. This suggests that stage 2 individuals are not conventional due to social compliance but rather because being conventional is the most successful mode of achieving personal goals within their social context. If this interpretation is correct, then the actual behavior shown by stage 2 individuals would vary widely as their social class and social reference group varied. The stage 2 subjects in this study appear to be behaviorally moral to their social reference group and society in general. Stage 2 individuals in a 'street corner, gang society' (Whyte, 1955 and Hannerz, 1969), however, would be behaviorally moral within their reference group but not within the perspective of the majority society. This interpretation presents an hypothesis for future research.

Kohlberg (1969) classified stage 3 and 4 within the conventional level of morality. The current evidence from this study indicates that while both stages are conventional in their moral reasoning, the conative dimensions behind and/or associated with these stages of moral reasoning are fundamentally different.

Of all groups, the stage 3 subjects are the most 'normal' individuals as defined by statistical distributions. They are neither high nor low in either ego-strength, superego strength or assertiveness. They are only mildly "bohemian" but primarily are more spontaneously conventional. Their conventionality is not motivated by a compulsive superego.

Stage 4 subjects are in marked contrast to the stage 3 individuals in this regard. While stage 4 subjects are normal in their conventionality, this appears to be due to an overly compliant, compulsive superego and low ego-strength.

Post-conventional individuals as represented by the stage 5 subjects in this study show a very different personality profile. They have moderately high ego-strength and assertiveness, with moderately low superego strength. Stage 2 subjects showed a substantially lower, ineffective functioning of superego while the post-conventional individuals, also low in superego, demonstrated a mediating influence of rational, reality testing (ego-strength) on the dictates of the superego. Further, the largest difference between the stage 2 and 5 subjects concerns conventionality. The stage 5 individuals are the least conventional. They are not controlled by external, objective goals like the stage 2 subjects but are more concerned with internal, subjective essentials. In a behavioral situation which involved a conflict between their internal principles and social, external rules, the stage 5 person would more likely follow his universalistic principles. This would result in the appearance of unconventional, immoral behavior to the society at large.

This two-dimensional portrait of the personality profiles of the moral stage groups can be further fleshed out by incorporating the information from the earlier seven factor profiles. Both stage 2 and 5 subjects are lower than average on sociability, although not significantly. The stage 2's pre-occupation with personal, practical goals may interfere with their social inclinations and social expression.

The inner-directed interests and fidelity to those self-realities may decrease stage 5 subjects' level of sociability. Stage 3 and 4 individuals show an average level of sociability.

The self-actualization factor showed significant differences between groups. As would be expected from the descriptions of stage 2 and 4 subjects, both are low in self-actualization. A compulsive superego and weak ego-strength may account for the low level of self-actualization of the stage 4 group. The intense concern for objective, material goals without the balance of subjective, self-potential goals would preclude the achievement of self-actualization by stage 2 individuals. Unexpectedly, the stage 3 group possessed the highest level of self-actualization. An hypothesis for this result is that the comfortable, untroubled conventionality and inter-psychic balance of the superego and ego may facilitate the development of one's potentialities. Post-conventional individuals also possessed a higher level of self-actualization than average. The inherent awareness of self, subjective essentials, and self-motivated desire to achieve these inner potentials could explain the higher self-actualization scores. Their lower score than the stage 3 group is hypothesized to reflect the stressful conflict between inner-directed principles and the prevailing principles of a less than just and loving society. This interpretation is consistent with Fromm's (1947) theory that the socio-cultural milieu in which one lives is a limiting factor in the development of the productive personality. Our findings suggest that this restricting conflict is most severe for post-conventional individuals.

CHAPTER X

Discussion of Results and Conclusions

Test of Character Trait Hypothesis

The evidence provided by the series of analyses in this study support the hypotheses of Kohlberg (1969) and Fromm (1947) that testing individual personality traits will fail to demonstrate consistent and significant differences between moral stages. This failure also appeared in the review of the many personality trait studies. The correlations and ANOVA analyses computed on the individual POI and 16PF scales indicated few significant differences. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, however, important differences between the aggregate scale scores between moral stages.

These visual, non-statistical findings are statistically substantiated by the factor analysis profiles and especially the discriminant analysis. An examination of trait scores would lead to the conclusion that few, if any, relationships exist between personality and moral reasoning stages. This is exactly the hypothesis predicted by Kohlberg and Fromm. The alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship between personality structures or schemas and stages of moral reasoning received statistically potent support from the discriminant analysis.

Test of the Self-Actualization Hypothesis

The implications by Shostrom (1965), Fromm (1947) and May (1967) that increased self-actualization is an inherent schema of moral development received equivocal support. Significant, consistent differences between moral stages appeared only for the Synergy scale. Stage 5 subjects

have the highest scores for this ability to transcend dichotomies in order to see the opposite of life as meaningfully related. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that moral development requires more cognitively adequate schema capable of evaluating and integrating the complexities of moral situations and principles.

This absence of evidence for specific traits is counter balanced by the moral stage POI profiles (Figure 2 and Table 31) which indicate a strong pattern of relationships between self-actualization and moral development. Stages 4, 3-4, and 2 have consistent profiles of low self-actualization scores. Stages 3 and 5 have consistent patterns of scores above the norms for this sample. Most unexpectedly, the moral stage 3 subjects have the highest self-actualization scores. Moral stages 3 and 5 subjects additionally have parallel path profiles except for the scales 'Spontaneity' and 'Self-Acceptance' on which the stage 3 paths rise while the stage 5 paths fall. A similar parallel path pattern emerged for the stage 3-4 and 4 scores. There are three points out of thirteen vectors which major divergence in path direction between the two profiles occurs. This divergence occurs on the scales of 'Feeling Reactivity,' 'Nature of Man,' and 'Acceptance of Aggression.'

Despite these strong nonstatistical patterns, the statistical test which used the discriminant analysis failed to substantiate the non-statistical evidence. This adds to the equivocal nature of any conclusions. The self-actualization factor failed to reach the significance level ($p = .21$) set for the discriminant analysis. Self-actualization is not a dimension which statistically discriminates between the moral stage groups. Future research, however, is needed to try to overcome this equivocal evidence.

Future research is particularly important to test the supportive profile patterns in Table 31 and Figure 2 because of the hypotheses this evidence suggests. Two hypotheses are proposed from this admittedly equivocal data: (1) based on the stage profiles, stage 2 is a transitional stage between stage 4 and stage 5 as proposed by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969); and (2) that moral development is personality-based and involves conative and affective dimensions as well as Kohlberg's cognitive dimensions. Providing that this evidence can be replicated and statistically validated in future research, it seems unlikely that the radical shifts in POI scores between stage 2 and stage 3 would occur. A more consistent interpretation posits that the so-called stage 2 profile is a transitional one between stages 4 and 5. The direction and magnitude of the changes supports this transition between the least self-actualized profile (stage 4) to the next highest self-actualization profile (stage 5). An interpretation which accepts the hypothesis that individuals develop from one of the lowest self-actualized stages (2) to the highest self-actualization stage (3) without moving through intermediate levels of self-actualization and moral stages is theoretically tenuous.

The second hypothesis that there are multiple developmental paths (conative, affective, and cognitive) to the moral stages is a theoretically much more significant one. Kohlberg (1969) claims a single, unitary developmental path, namely cognitive development. This cognitive theory has been proposed for childhood and adolescent development and has received empirical support. Kohlberg, however, has not been able to explain why individual adults stop developing before reaching principled moral reasoning. Kohlberg's theory needs such an explanatory proposition to fully elaborate his unidimensional developmental model.

The equivocal self-actualization data suggests that instead of this

unidimensional development, there is a personality based, multi-dimensional development of moral judgment. Fromm (1947) presents this hypothesis that character is a conative structure which determines the level of moral development. An individual's moral reasoning cannot progress beyond his conative structure. Once an individual develops the stage of moral reasoning congruent with his conative structure, any further development requires that the conative structure change. This hypothesis better fits the self-actualization profiles presented in Figure 2. This interpretation states that an individual will develop to and stabilize at a moral reasoning stage 4 because of his conative structure. He will cognitively develop through the Kohlberg schema, including stage 3 but will terminate at stage 4 because of his personality structure. Stage 3 individuals likewise will stabilize at this stage rather than further developing because of personality factors and not cognitive factors. The stage 5 adult individual will cognitively develop through all of the previous moral reasoning stages until he stabilizes at a moral reasoning stage psychologically consistent with his conative structure. A further hypothesis would be that stage 3 adults are more likely to eventually develop to stage 5 reasoning than stage 4 adults because of the greater similarity between the personality structures of stage 3 and 5 individuals. Adult individuals with a conative structure congruent with stage 4 reasoning will develop through the 5-A moral judgment stage before stabilizing at stage 5-B.

Test for Character Model

The factor score profiles and discriminant analyses have demonstrated significant differences between the personalities of moral stage groups. A final question now considered is: how successfully can the knowledge

of the relevant personality dimensions be used to place individuals within the moral stage groups? If there is an actual personological model that either parallels or underlies Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages, then such a model should be able to correctly predict a person's moral stage solely on the basis of his pertinent personality dimensions. The discriminant analysis provides the information necessary to test this hypothesized model.

The discriminant analysis computes a classification matrix which shows how successfully the discriminant functions can predict the a priori groups. Table 42 presents the matrix for the discriminant analysis of all moral stages included. A purely random prediction would correctly classify 20% of the subjects into the moral stage groups. The prediction rate for this specific model of all stages is 53% which is significantly greater than chance (z = 5.4842, p = .000). A closer examination of the table indicates that the poorest prediction rates occur for stages 3-4 and 4. The single highest misclassifications are of stage 3-4's as stage 4 (24%) and of stage 4's as stage 3-4 (31%). This further substantiates an earlier interpretation that those judged as stage 3-4 by the current judges would have been more appropriately classified as stage 4. With only three cases as exceptions, all misclassifications form a normal distribution in which the a priori moral stage represented the median and the mode. Although only slightly over half of the total cases were correctly predicted by the personality model, the misclassifications constitute a normal distribution which substantiates the model. Overlapping distributions (misclassifications) should be contiguous.

The classification matrix was recalculated using only the pure stage scorings (Table 43). This procedure was done in order to test the effectiveness of the model without the ambiguous stage 3-4 group. The

Table 42

Discriminant Classification Matrix for Mixed Stages Included

Actual Classification by Personality Dimensions	Predicted Stage 2	3	3-4	4	5	Total Cases
2	2	1	0	0	1	4
%	50%	25%	0%	0%	25%	
3	0	9	2	1	0	12
%	0%	75%	16.67%	8.33%	%	
3-4	0	6	13	7	3	29
%	0%	20.69%	44.83%	24.14%	10.34%	
4	0	3	5	7	1	16
%	0%	18.75%	31.25%	43.75%	6.25%	
5	0	2	0	2	8	12
%	0%	16.67%	0%	16.67%	66.67%	
Total	2	21	20	17	13	73

Multivariate Theta = .5342
$\underline{Z}$ = 5.4842 $\underline{P}$ = .0000 (one-tailed test)

Table 43

Discriminant Classification Matrix for Pure Stages Only

Actual Classification by Personality Dimensions	Predicted Stage 2	3	4	5	Total
2	3	0	0	1	4
%	75%	0%	0%	25%	
3	0	9	3	0	12
%	0%	75%	25%	0%	
4	0	3	12	1	16
%	0%	18.75%	75%	6.25%	
5	0	2	1	9	12
%	0%	16.67%	8.33%	75%	
Total	3	14	16	11	44

Multivariate Theta = .750
Z = 6.6884 P = .0000 (one-tailed test)

successfulness of the model increased to 75% as compared to a random probability of 25%. Six out of the eleven misclassifications involved stages 3 and 4. This may reflect the scoring difficulties pointed out by Kohlberg (1976). The predictions are consistent for each stage, (75%). The model, therefore, has consistency throughout and not only overall.

Kohlberg's developmental model consists of three developmental stages with two levels in each. Focusing on the three stages (Preconventional, Conventional, and Postconventional), the predictive power of the personality model improves. Thirty-nine of the forty-four cases in the pure-stages analysis are correctly classified by the model. The predictive percentage increases from 75% to 88.6%. The prediction rate increases even more substantially when making the same comparison with the mixed-stage scores included. The correct percentage rises from 53% to 86%. Seventy percent of the incorrect predictions in the mixed-stage analysis are classified correctly within the broader pre-conventional, conventional, and postconventional stages. Both models are consistent in their level of prediction (88% and 86%). Overall, the character-moral reasoning model receives impressively substantial support.

Deficiencies of the Present Study and Directions of Future Research

This research has attempted to test the relationship between two broad theoretical models: moral development structures and personality organization. In attempting such an extensive study, there are a number of potential weaknesses. The sample chosen is one area of concern. The sample of teachers, counselors, and administrators is a highly homogeneous, skewed sample of the population. They represent a relatively homogeneous socioeconomic class, educational background, intelligence level, occupation, and geographical region. The results of this study

are, therefore, potentially limited to this very specific sample.

Future research should expand the sample by testing a wider range of subjects. Subjects should be chosen from the five major socioeconomic levels: poverty level, working class, middle class, upper middle class, and upper class. Even within the middle class and upper middle class the range of occupations represented by the sample should be expanded. The educational level of future subjects should be broadened to include below high school, high school graduate, and college graduates. The range of subjects' intelligence should also be expanded. Geographical variables should be more extensively examined to include both regional variables and urban versus rural differences. Although the present sample has an age range from twenty to fifty-one, Dortzbach (1976) reported research which indicated generational differences in moral judgment. This suggests that a thorough test of the theory should test subjects beyond the age of fifty. Marginally significant differences of moral stage by age was found in the present sample (see Table 21). Age may be a more important variable than has previously been suspected.

The sample of subjects is as important as the sample of instruments selected for the research. A thorough test of moral judgment instruments in this study forms the basis for confidence in their selection. Confidence in the personality instruments chosen is not founded on such empirical grounds. The 16PF is a highly reliable, widely used instrument. It is, however, an omnibus measure. There are a wide range of other such omnibus tests. The POI is a more specialized instrument chosen for the specific construct which it measures.

Research on such an important topic as these theories should not be based on only one or two measures of personality. These results should

be tested for generalizability by using other personality tests. Another direction for future research is to select instruments which specifically measure the relevant personality traits identified in this study. An analysis of the results of a battery of specially selected trait measures might provide a more detailed, clear resolution of the moral stage personality profiles.

The most severe restrictions of the present findings are products of the analysis. Two basic deficiencies are associated with the analysis: the total number of subjects and the number of subjects in each stage. Both factor analysis and discriminant analysis are the main statistical methods of this study. The reliability of both types of analysis increases as the total number of cases analyzed increases. Gorsuch (1974) stated that the sample used in factor analysis should be no less than 100 and should be at least five times greater than the number of variables. Neither condition is achieved in this study, and this represents a major deficiency. Future research should, therefore, use an appropriate sample size.

The reliability of discriminant analysis increases with the number of cases in each and every group analyzed. The largest group in the current analysis is twenty-nine while the smallest is four (see Table 23). All of the other groups number sixteen to twelve. The reliability of the profile for the stage 2 group, which is based on only four subjects, is not statistically satisfactory. Future research needs to significantly increase the number in all groups in the discriminant analysis.

This study has established relationships between moral reasoning structures and personality structures. Provided that these findings are replicated in future research, the next most important direction of

research should be a developmental study of the development of these two structural systems. Only a developmental study will determine whether there is either a causal relationship between the two developmental structures and what the direction is of this causality or whether both are the result of an underlying causal factor. This research might further discover characterlogical mechanisms in moral stage transition. Selman (1971) has already concluded that empathy is a necessary and developmentally prior trait to conventional moral development. Future research may determine more complex trait structures which developmentally precede stage 4 and stage 5 moral reasoning respectively. Possibly the rarity of the individuals functioning with stage six moral reasoning reflects the special personality structure accompanying it.

In addition to testing generational differences, more attention needs to be focused on sex differences. Haier (1975) reported significant differences between the moral reasoning scores of females and males. No test is made for sex differences on the MJS, SMJS, OMJS, or MMV in this study. The possibility that males and females may have either different moral reasoning structures for the same personality organization or vice versa is, therefore, not known. A check of the subscale scores on the POI and 16PF in the present study revealed that females had significantly ($p. \leq .05$) higher scores on the following subscales: POI-Feeling Reactivity, 16PF-Tough Minded-Tender Minded (I), and Relaxed-Tense (Q_4), while males had significantly higher scores on: Expedient-Conscientious (G), Trusting-Suspicious (L), Conservative-Experimenting (Q_1), and Undisciplined Self-Conflict-Controlled (Q3). This evidence further supports the need for future research to explore sex differences. There may be different character structure for males and females.

Not only may there be different character structures for each sex, but there may also be cultural differences in character structure. Sex differences in personality have been clearly attributed to cultural socialization (Mead, 1935). Kohlberg (1969) claimed that his theory was a genetic model. He (1969) has supported this claim with cross-cultural research. Simpson (1974) challenged Kohlberg's view and asserted that his moral development scheme was ethnocentric and culturally-biased. Another approach to establishing the cross-cultural validity of moral development is to investigate the personality structures concomitant with the moral stages. This would provide a test because of the personality developmental schemas Kohlberg (1969) proposed as paralleling moral development. Cross-cultural comparisons of character structures need to be undertaken regardless of Kohlberg's hypotheses about personality schemas.

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CORRECTION

PRECEDING IMAGE HAS BEEN REFILMED TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY OR TO CORRECT A POSSIBLE ERROR

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Appendix A

Kohlberg's 1969 Moral Aspect List

Grouping I. The Categories

A. Prima-Facie Obligations

Aspect 1: Extra-Legal or Moral Norms. Ways of invoking and conceiving of rules, norms, and role-stereotypes.

Aspect 1M: Metaethical issues about relativity of moral norms and rules.

Aspect 2: Legal Norms. Ways of invoking and defining legal norms. (Either explicitly or if norms about stealing, etc., are talked about in ways implying crime, police, etc.)

Aspect 2M: Metaethical issues about relation of morality to law. Issues of legitimacy of civil disobedience. (Aspect 22_{II}: General reasons for making and keeping laws is listed under Grouping III as a value.)

B. Conceptions of Prima-Facie Rights

(These are all defined under Grouping III where each value aspect has a rights subaspect and a value subaspect.)

C. Conceptions of Dutiful Choice

Aspect 3: Concept of "should" or "ought" for an actor in a choice situation involving a conflict between rules or between rules and the interest of self or of others.

Aspect 3R: Obligation when have right not to fulfill obligations-the relation between rights and obligations.

Aspect 3M: Metaethical issues about relativity of obligations.

D. Taking Responsibility

Aspect 4: Limiting consequences and persons actor is responsible for.

Aspect 5: Limiting autonomous choice by reliance on advice or compromise with others.

Aspect 6: Accountability. Limiting accountability for (not) performing an act because of ignorance, lack of self control, etc.

E. Praising and Blaming-the Worth of Persons and Personal Actions

Aspect 7: Culpability or Blame. Judgments of whether to blame someone as a person when he has violated a norm or obligation.

(Aspect 8: Praise and Admiration.)

F. Meting Out Punishment and Reward

Aspect 9: Rules for Punishing. When, how, how much to punish.

(Aspect 23_{II}: the general purpose of punishment, its basic functions as expiative and preventive--is listed under Grouping III as a value.)

Aspect 10: Rules for Rewarding. When, how to reward.

(Aspect 24_{II}: purpose or function of reward--is listed under Grouping III as a value.)

Grouping II. The Principles

G. Considerations of Prudence

Aspect 11: Fear of Punishment and anticipation of guilt (or shame) was reasons for following norms.

(Aspect 12: Anticipation of Reward or of pride or self-esteem as reasons for following norms.)

Aspect 13: Anticipation of pain to the self, of injury or failure as reasons for following norms. (Differs from Aspect 11 in that these bad consequences are not punishment--

they may be interpersonal, however. The harm to the self coming from disruption of desired relations is Aspect 13, altruistic relations are Aspect 15.)

(Aspect 14: Anticipation of pleasure to self (outside a defined reward system) as a reason for following norms.)

H. Consideration of Welfare of Others

(Note where the welfare is a matter of definite values of Aspect 22_{II}, Maintenance of Law; of Aspect 26, Life; of Aspect 27, Property; of Aspect 28, Liberty; of Aspect 29, Love and Fraternity--it is scored under Grouping III values.)

Aspect 15: Welfare of other individuals (Love and friendship as altruistic motives or reasons for helping others or conforming come here, the reasons for entering into and maintaining love or friendship relations are scored Aspect 29, Love.)

Aspect 16: Welfare of group, institutions, and societies, as a reason.

I. Considerations of Respect

Aspect 17: Respect for persons and personal authority as a reason.

Aspect 18: Respect for the group, for group consensus, and for social order as a reason.

J. Considerations of Justice

Aspect 19: Maintaining positive reciprocity and trust.

Aspect 19RX: Defining or justifying obligations by stating actor should exchange places with the victim-Golden Rule.

Aspect 20: Maintaining negative reciprocity by vengeance or by refusal to honor non-reciprocal demands.

Aspect 21: Distributive Equality -- Maintaining equality or equity (equality relative to need) as a reason.

Grouping III. The Basic Values and Rights

Aspect 22: Security of Law and Legal Order as a Value.

Aspect 22_I: (Not used as comes under Aspect 2)

Aspect 22_{II}: Reasons why laws and their enforcement are necessary or desirable.

Aspect 23: Punishment as a Value

Aspect 23_I: (not used as comes under Aspect 9)

Aspect 23_{II}: Reasons, purposes of punishment, its basic functions as expiative and preventive.

(Aspect 24: Reward as a Value.)

Aspect 24_I: (not used as comes under Aspect 10)

Aspect 24_{II}: Reasons, purposes of reward.

Aspect 25: Contract, Promise and Non-Deception as Values.

Aspect 25_I: Definition and Use of Contract and Promise-Keeping Concepts.

Aspect 25_{II}: Reasons for Maintaining Contract and Promise

Aspect 25M: The Social Contract--the contract of the individual with abstract institutions or with society.

Aspect 25T; Truth values.

Aspect 26: Life as a Value.

Aspect 26_I: Definition of the nature of Life's Value, of the Right to Life, e.g. of what lives are valuable under what conditions.

Aspect 26_{II}: The reasons why life is morally valuable.

Aspect 27: Property as a Value.

Aspect 27_I: Definition of Property Rights and Values.

Aspect 27_{II}: Reasons for maintaining property rights.

Aspect 28: Liberty or Autonomy as a Value.

Aspect 28_I: Definitions of rights and values of freedom from coercion

Aspect 28_{II}: Reasons for valuing freedom, for having rights of liberty.

Aspect 29: Love and Fraternity as Values.

Aspect 29_I: Definition of the obligations and nature of a good relationship or of a good love motive.

Aspect 29_{II}: Reasons for love and friendship being valued.

Aspect 30: Sexual Values

Aspect 30_I: Definition of appropriate sexual relations.

Aspect 30_{II}: Reasons for valuing appropriate sexual relations.

Objective Moral Judgment Scale

1. You want very much to go on a trip with your youth group. Your father promises you that you can go if you save up the money for the trip yourself. So you work hard at your part-time job and save up the money it will cost to go on the trip, then your father changes his mind. Some of his friends have decided to go on a special fishing trip, and your father is short of the money it will cost. So he asks you to give him the money you have saved from your job. You don't want to give up going on your trip so you think about refusing to give your father the money.

Does it matter that it is your father involved here, rather than someone else? Why?

(1) Yes, though only as an issue of greater emotional concern because of the nature of this relationship. My affection for him and the expectation of mutual interest would lead me to expect more from the "contract" which we made.

(2) Yes, my father is in the position to do something nice for me in return for a favor or to punish me for not doing what he asks. Others do not have as much power to do this.

(3) Yes, I have a responsibility to my father and an obligation to honor his wishes. This is an opportunity for me to repay him for things he has done for me in the past.

(4) Yes, obligations here are defined by conscience. Love or affection for my father is a value which I have chosen and I should be aware of the implications of that choice.

(5) Yes, I should feel gratitude and appreciation for what my father has done for me in the past. His affection is important to me. I should be concerned for his feelings and willing to act unselfishly.

(6) Yes, It is my duty to do what my father asks and give him the money. Obedience to my father is essential.

2. You want to go on the trip but you are afraid to refuse to give your father the money. So you give him $10 and tell him that is all you have made. You take your remaining $40 and pay for your trip with it. You tell your father that the director said you could pay later. So you go off on your trip and your father doesn't go on his fishing trip.

Before you leave on your trip, you tell your younger brother that you really have made $50 and that you lied to your father and said that you had made only $10. He is now wondering if he should tell your father or not.

Why would you think your brother should not tell your father what he knows?

(1) I won't trust him anymore if he does and he may very well need me to do the same thing for him someday.

(2) Keeping secrets is a necessary part of maintaining friendships. He knows that I won't desire his friendship if I can't trust him.

(3) He shouldn't see the need to tell him. He should respect my rights as those of anyone else and respect my ability to make decisions and to tell whomever I choose.

(4) He has a right to privacy, if my father doesn't ask he's really not doing anything wrong. He is merely withholding information which has not been requested.

(5) He shouldn't tell because he is younger than I am and, therefore, shouldn't break his word to me. I have more power and authority than he does. If he breaks his word he risks the consequences of going against that authority.

(6) I told him because I trusted him and thought I could rely on him. If he tells, he'll force reconsideration of that trust.

3. Your mother is near death from a special form of cancer. There is one drug that the doctors think might save her. It is a form of radium that a druggist in your town has recently discovered. The drug is expensive to make, but the druggist is charging ten times what the drug costs him to make. He pays $200 for the radium and charges $2000 for a small dose of the drug. You have gone to everyone you know to borrow the money, but you can only get together about $1000, which is half of what it costs. You tell the druggist that your mother is dying and ask him to sell it to you cheaper or let you pay later. But the druggist says, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So you get desperate and break into the man's store to steal the drug for your mother.

Why shouldn't you steal the drug?

(1) I am quite desperate in this situation and I may not truly realize I'm doing wrong when I steal the drug. But I'll certainly know I've done wrong after I'm punished and sent to jail. I'll always feel guilty about being dishonest and breaking the law.

(2) I may not get much of a jail term if I steal the drug, but my mother will probably die before I get out so it won't do me much good. If my mother dies, I shouldn't blame myself, it isn't my fault she has cancer.

(3) I'll get caught and sent to jail if I do. If I get away my conscience will bother me thinking how the police will catch up with me at any minute.

(4) It isn't just the druggist who will think I am a criminal, everyone else will too. After I steal it, I'll feel bad thinking how I've brought dishonor on my family and myself; I won't be able to face anyone again.

(5) If I stole the drug, I wouldn't be blamed by other people but I'd condemn myself because I wouldn't have lived up to my own conscience and standards of honesty.

(6) I would lose my standing and respect in the community and violate the law. I'd lose respect for myself if I'm carried away by emotion and forget the long term effects of my actions.

4. The drug didn't work and there is no other treatment known to medicine which can save your mother, so you know she has only about six months to live. She is in terrible pain, but she is so weak that a good dose of pain killer would make her die sooner. She is delirious and almost crazy with pain and in her calm periods she asks you to give her enough of her medicine to kill her. She says she can't stand the pain and she is going to die in a few months anyway.

How would the law influence your decision in this instance?

(1) I'd consider the rules about killing, but with the view that they should not be finally determining here. The sympathetic nature of my killing her out of mercy makes the action not really murder.

(2) No one has the right to take someone else's life and mercy killing is in fact violation of the law, but I would expect modification of the law in this situation.

(3) I would hesitate to institutionalize or legalize mercy killing since human life retains its value even under conditions of pain, but I would be conscious of the necessity to value human personality and life in other than physical terms.

(4) Killing her wouldn't be bad because it has no effects, she would die anyway. I could avoid legal complications by getting her permission in writing, suggesting suicide, or making the death look natural.

(5) I wouldn't see murder rules or laws as binding in this situation. It is hardly murder when agreement and consent of the 'victim' are involved.

(6) It is against the law to torture people and make them suffer. By refusing to give her the drug, I'm violating this law.

5. Imagine your country has been attacked in war. You are fighting in a company of troops which is way outnumbered and is retreating before the enemy. Your company has crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy is still on the other side. If someone goes back to the bridge and blows it up, with the head start the rest of the company would have, they could probably escape alive; there will be about a 4 to 1 chance that he will be killed. You, the leader, are the one who knows best how to lead the retreat. You ask for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If you go yourself, the troops will probably not get back safely and you are the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

Do you have the right to order a man to go if you think that is the best thing to do? Why?

(1) Yes, it is part of my job to see that respect is maintained. Respect for my position is a symbol of respect for the rules and laws of society. It is therefore my duty to exercise the power associated with my position.

(2) Yes, in this instance I am aware of what is in the best interest of all. I can better understand the circumstances than my subordinates as well as being aware of their point of view.

(3) Yes, I have been placed in command of the company. Anything I have the power to command I also have the right to command.

(4) Yes, I have the right in that the others in the company, including the man ordered to go, would see the necessity for my order. I give the order with the understanding that my request is something the man ordered to comply with would himself choose to do.

(5) Yes, I have the right to order my troops to do whatever I consider necessary. They may not respect my authority, but they must obey my command.

(6) Yes, according to the rules of military command, I have the right to order a man to do this. However, I must also recognize that individual autonomy of a subordinate allows him the right to refuse to comply.

6. You have finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. You think it is best to pick one of your two demolition men. Both of these men have been trained to use dynamite to blow up bridges and fortifications at the least risk to themselves. One of the demolition men has a lot of strength and courage, but is a bad troublemaker. He is always stealing things, beating up the other men, and not doing his work. The second demolition man has gotten a bad disease and is likely to die in a short time anyway, though he is strong enough now to do the job.

How should either of these men feel about obedience to your orders, as opposed to a request from another person to do the same thing?

(1) It is worse not to obey my official orders because it does more harm. It is deviation against the government, or public service rather than against an individual.

(2) Though my request may be more directly relevant to the general social system, one man's request or order holds no more weight than that of another.

(3) My position of authority comes from the trust and respect which the company has placed in my judgment--the exercise of that authority is like the return of an act of trust. It would seem most important to be consistent with this trust in obeying my orders.

(4) He should feel that it is not that bad to refuse my orders because a refusal would not affect me that much. I am in the position to order another man to do the same thing.

(5) It would be worse not to obey my order because I give so much in my responsibility for the company and work so hard to get things done in the ways that are best for all.

(6) He should realize that it is always worse to disobey the request of an authority than that of anyone else.

7. In your town a few years ago there was a poor man who could find no work. Without money, he stole food and medicine that he needed for himself and his family. After a year, he escaped from prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for people who couldn't afford good medical care. A number of years has passed since that time. You see the factory owner and recognize him as being the same man--the escaped convict whom the police have been looking for back in your home town.

What would be your feelings about the punishment he now deserves?

(1) It would be very wrong to punish a man who thought he was doing the correct and moral thing. He has more than adequately demonstrated his respect for other men and his commitment to right. He shouldn't be punished.

(2) He broke the law and was sentenced. The rest of his sentence is yet to be served.

(3) Neither his motives nor intent at the time of the crime were evil. Minimal punishment would be sufficient to indicate that stealing is not a practice to be followed.

(4) Illegal acts are wrong, regardless of the motive. In spite of the fact that he has acted favorable since the time of the crime, I can appreciate the position of the victim of his crime and see the need for his punishment.

(5) He has undone the harm which he caused and there would therefore be little need to punish him.

(6) Someone should not be punished in a situation where everyone would be expected to do the same thing; laws come from the will of the community and the will of the community in this instance would be not to punish.

8. You are involved in war and your city is often bombed by the enemy. So each person in the city has been given a post to go to right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started and to rescue people in burning buildings. You have been made the chief in charge of one fire engine post. The post is near where you work so you can go there quickly during the day, but it is a long way from your home. One day there is heavy bombing and you leave the shelter in the place you work and go toward your fire station. But when you see how much of the city is burning, you get worried about your family. So you decide you have to go home first to see if your family is safe, even though your home is a long way off and the station is nearby and there is somebody assigned to protect your family's area.

Was it right for you to do this? Why?

(1) No, I should respect all persons' right equally. By leaving my post I'm showing that I don't have that respect. It is inconsistent with equal regard for all men and the rights of all to equal treatment.

(2) No, the authority and power of those above me requires me to go to my post under such circumstances. I act here in violation of those commands.

(3) No, if I am to expect protection for myself and my family I must earn that by doing my assigned job.

(4) No, if I do this I am violating the rights of others to protection. My personal rights can only come from a general social order.

(5) No, I am putting myself in a lot more danger by going across the city. My first duty is to myself, not others. I should stay at my post.

(6) No, I am expected by others in the town to be at my post; I am not doing my expected job in deserting my station.

9. Imagine that you are living before the Civil War and that there are laws that allow slavery. According to the law, if a slave escapes, he has to be returned to his owner like a runaway horse. You don't believe in slavery and disobey the law and hide runaway slaves and help them to escape.

Relate your feelings about slavery to your actions in this situation.

(1) Laws shouldn't interfere with individual rights. I have a responsibility to protect those rights for others since they form the basis of our whole system of justice.

(2) Every human life has a right to respect an equal treatment. Slavery laws violate these rights and go against the principles of human dignity and conscience.

(3) Slavery is wrong; you can't own other people. However, as the law stands, it is wrong to help escaped slaves.

(4) People with more power have a right to control those with less. The law says that slavery is legal, by acting in this way I break the law.

(5) I did break the law, but I don't know if it's right to have laws which restrict other rights.

(6) Everyone has a right to do what he wants, the law can't tell me how to live my life.

10. Imagine that you are the owner of a rooming house which holds seven rooms. The rent from the rooming house provides you with just enough money to make ends meet.

All of your roomers are white and you know them very well. They have told you that if you ever rent a room to a Negro they would move out. If this happens you will receive much less money than the small amount you now receive. But you also know that if you refuse a Negro a room you could get into trouble because the open housing law makes it illegal for you to refuse to rent a room to a person because of his race.

A young black man, Mr. Jones, has just received a job in town. He has looked around the town all day for housing without success and toward

evening notices the sign "Room for Rent" in front of your house. When he asks you about the room, you tell him that you have just rented the room and that there are no more rooms left. In fact, there are two vacant rooms in your house at the time.

Should you have the right to say who lives in your rooming house? Why?

(1) Yes, I work hard for the small amount I get from the house. I have a right to what I earn and no one can ask me to give that up for them.

(2) Yes, I have the right to control my own property. It's none of the business of the people to whom the house does not belong. I have absolute rights in matters concerning my house.

(3) Yes, ideally, but property cannot be owned and controlled outside of a system of general justice where each man's rights and duties are respected equally. Discrimination goes totally against that equality.

(4) Yes, I should be able to expect my tenants to value my property and appreciate my need to maintain a full rooming house, an impossibility if I allow a Black man to move into the house.

(5) Yes, but I must recognize that property rights come only from individual rights and by not equally respecting the rights of all I risk forfeiting the right to control my property.

(6) Yes, I own the house and people who live there are under my authority.

11. You have a very close relationship with a (boys) girl, (girls) boy during your senior year in high school. Separated for the summer, you grow apart and return with very mixed feelings about one another. One evening, feeling again your former closeness and attraction, you go further and further and have sexual intercourse. A few weeks later you find out (boys) she is, (girls) you are pregnant.

What would be your feelings about abortion in this instance?

(1) It's not really killing. The fetus is not really alive. It's killing something that was never really there. The life isn't worth anything to the baby and it can only cause trouble for me.

It's an unborn baby, that's the whole point. If a kid isn't born I can't see how anyone can say he's alive. Even little kids, babies when they're just born, the only reason they're alive is because someone knows them. And so the only people that they really hurt if they die are their parents. But if this kid isn't born yet, then I don't--nobody knows him. It wouldn't be hurting anyone.

(3) Life is a universal human right. The life of the fetus, apart from all of the considerations of difficulty for me has value in its own right, and deserves the equal treatment of any human being.

(4) Life should be considered in the context of the baby's future. It should be viewed not as a biological phenomenon but as an attitude of respect for personality and justice. The fetus exhibits only the biological aspects of life and the chances for respect for its personality and justice for it in the future under these circumstances seem limited.

(5) Physically the fetus hardly exists, one way or the other it really makes very little difference.

(6) An unborn baby has just as much right to live as anyone else and I don't think that I or anyone else has the right to decide whether it should live or not. Life is sacred and humans have not the right to terminate it.

12. Your parents are away for the weekend and you are alone in the house. Unexpectedly, on Friday evening your (girls) boyfriend, (boys) girlfriend comes over. You spend the evening together in the house and after a while start necking and petting and having sexual intercourse.

What considerations would lead you to think your behavior is wrong in this instance?

(1) It would be wrong if we had sexual intercouse without any thought about pregnancy because of the inconvenience--a child could cause a lot of disturbance--especially to kids in high school.

(2) If we did not have intercourse we would show discipline and our ability to wait for marriage when sex will be more meaningful for us and more satisyfing because it will not be in violation of social and religious norms.

(3) Because of our youth and even minimally dependent relationships of our parents, we cannot fully respond to considerations of personal dignity and responsibility most necessary under such circumstances.

(4) If pregnancy resulted from intercourse in this instance, my parents would be most upset and even my friends might shy away from me.

(5) Since we were not totally convinced of the rightness of our actions and able to fit them into a logically thought out pattern, we would be apt to be bothered by conscience or other considerations.

(6) Sex in this instance could be an example of our using each other for personal advantage. It would be very difficult at this age to have built a relationship of real honesty and trust which would eliminate the difficulties of personal advantage seeking.

13. You are thinking about putting out a mimeographed newspaper for students in your school which would express many of your strong feelings. In particular, you want to voice your opposition to the war in Viet Nam and to many of the school's regulations.

Before publishing your newspaper, you ask your principal for permission. The principal agrees on the condition that you submit all of your articles to him for approval. You agree and begin to submit your articles. The principal approves all of them and you publish two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal has not thought about the great attention your newspaper would receive. Students read the paper eagerly and are beginning to organize against school rules. Many classes are spent talking about the paper and rallies are held before and after school. Furthermore, many parents who favor Viet Nam war are phoning the principal and angrily telling him that the newspaper is unpatriotic and should not be published.

As a result of the commotion, the principal considers ordering you to stop publishing the newspaper. He gives as a reason that your activities are disruptive to the operation of the school.

If you had advocated the dropping of nuclear bombs on North Viet Nam and China, what difference, if any, would this have made on the consideration of your rights to continue publication?

(1) Rights and duties are very different. In this case it would seem that legally I would have the right to publish what I want, but the rightness of my actions in the latter case would be doubtful. My rights here come from equal respect for others' rights--publication of the latter articles would not show that respect.

(2) It's nobody else's business what I write in my newspaper. I have absolute rights to write and publish whatever I want.

(3) It's all in the hands of the principal. If the latter position were less acceptable to him, then my rights to their publication would also be less.

(4) I have worked to publish this newspaper. That right to publish is mine in spite of others' interpretations of my use of it as good or bad. I have the right to publish what I choose to publish.

(5) A student newspaper should express the views of students in general. The latter positions do not fairly represent these views and therefore I don't have as much right to publish them.

(6) Equal rights have meaning only within a system of general justice for all. The latter positions are in violation of the principles of that justice. I can expect the rights to consistently publish what I want only if I am personally consistent in upholding an equal justice structure for all.

14. You have gotten into serious trouble. You are secretly leaving town in a hurry and need money. You can't get it from anyone you know and you are faced with going to a retired old man who is known to help people in the town. If you tell this man that you are very sick and need $500 to pay for an operation, he will give it to you. Really you aren't sick at all and have no intention of paying the man back. Although he does not know you very well, he would loan you the money.

How important is it that you tell the truth in this situation?

(1) The old man gives money to people he doesn't even know. It really shouldn't matter to him what the money is used for. It's not like I'd be lying to someone I know and who depends on me. What I say to him really makes little difference.

(2) My telling the truth is essential. Truth forms the whole basis of our socialorder; it's something I have the right to expect and people must expect from me.

(3) Since I need the money so badly, the truth matters very little. I should do and say what I have to in order to get the money.

(4) The value of my word goes beyond situational consideration. Justice and respect for human dignity can only be upheld in the context of consistent truth.

(5) If this man is willing to give me money, he has earned the right to expect the truth from me.

(6) He has lots of money and power so his word is important. I don't have any money or power, so my word is worth very little one way or the other.

15. One day the air raid sirens begin to sound. Everyone realizes that a hydrogen bomb is going to be dropped on the city by the enemy and that the only way to survive will be in a bomb shelter. Not everyone has bomb shelters, but those who do have enough air space inside to last you and your family five days. You know that after five days the fallout will have diminished to the point where you could safely leave the shelter. If you leave before that, you will die. There is enough air for you and your family alone. Your next door neighbors have not built a shelter and are trying to get into yours. You know that you will not have enough air if you let the neighbors in, and that you will all die if they come inside. So you refuse to let them in.

So now the neighbors are trying to break the door down in order to get in. You take your rifle and tell them to go away or else you will shoot. They don't go away. So you either have to shoot them or let them come into the shelter.

Why should you shoot?

(1) I have the most power in this situation and I must do what it will require to hold that position.

(2) Society is based on living up to special obligation of contract or agreement. The special obligations to my family require that I see first to their protection in this instance.

(3) There is nothing to be gained from letting them in and much to be lost from their entrance. I have no responsibility to protect them.

(4) I have placed myself in a position where my family depends on me. In spite of love and all other considerations, I owe more to those who depend on me than I owe to humans in general. I must protect my family first.

(5) My family is more important to me and personal affection makes my duty to protect them the most binding.

(6) My rights to property are essential here. My family must see me as responsible and reliable in my care for them.

Scoring Key for Objective Moral Judgment Scale

Situation:	Item Selection: 1	2	3	4	5	6
1	5	2	4	6	3	1
2	2	3	6	4	1	5
3	4	2	1	3	6	5
4	3	4	6	2	5	1
5	4	3	1	6	2	5
6	4	5	6	2	3	1
7	6	1	3	4	2	5
8	6	1	4	5	2	3
9	5	6	4	1	3	2
10	4	2	6	3	5	1
11	2	3	5	6	1	4
12	1	3	5	2	6	4
13	5	2	1	4	3	6
14	3	5	2	6	4	1
15	1	5	2	6	3	4

Appendix C

Social Attitudes Questionnarie

This booklet consists of two different questionnaires. Each questionnaire presents statements and questions dealing with several current social problems and issues. Please read the instructions for each questionnaire and its statements and questions carefully. Be sure to answer each question. Questions are on the front of each page.

The space provided for you in which to write your answers may be small, you may, therefore, have to write small. Please state your opinion or beliefs fully, explaining why you believe that way. There are no right or wrong answers.

Instructions precede each questionnaire. This booklet usually takes from 40 minutes to no more than 90 minutes to complete.

Thank you.

Instructions for Questionnaire 1:

The following eleven pages present four different stories. Each story situation is followed by questions about your attitudes relating to certain aspects of the stories. Answer each one fully with your supporting reasons. Please give your everyday, honest opinions. There are no right or wrong answers.

Story: In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging 10 times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz have stolen the drug? Why or why not?

In this situation law and life come into conflict. How can you resolve the conflict taking the best arguments for both into account?

Would you have stolen the drug if it was your wife who was dying? Why?

If you were the one dying, would you want your husband or wife to steal the drug? Why?

If the husband doesn't love his wife, is he obligated to steal the drug for her? Why or why not?

Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as his wife? Why?

What are the rights of the druggist in this case? Does he have a right to charge that much? Why or why not?

Heinz was arrested. Should the judge sentence him or should he let him go free? Why?

What responsibility does the judge have to follow the law? Is it ever right to disobey the law? Why or why not? If so, when?

Story: A man and woman fall in love and get married. They have never had sexual relations before marriage. After they are married, the woman finds she doesn't like having sexual intercourse; it just makes her feel bad and she decides not to have intercourse with her husband.

Was it right or wrong for the wife to do that? Why or why not?

Would you say that it is a duty for a wife to sleep with her husband? Why or why not?

They talk it over at great length and no matter what the husband says, the wife won't change her mind. What would be the best thing for the husband to do? Why?

Does the husband have any obligation to the wife? Why or why not?

He finally decides that the only way to save the marriage is to threaten to separate from her. He thinks if she does have relations, after a while she will get used to it and like it. Should he do that? Why?

Should the husband get divorced in a case like that? Why or why not?

Under what conditions might divorce be the best solution? Should the law allow divorce only under these circumstances?

The husband doesn't get divorced. But he meets another girl and they have sexual relations. Was he wrong to have relations with another woman in this case? Why or why not?

Why is it (usually) wrong for a husband to have relations with someone besides his wife?

Is it the same for a wife to have relations with someone besides her husband? Why or why not?

Do you consider sexual intercourse in marriage right but not outside of marriage? Why would that be?

Suppose that the husband and wife have an open marriage in which they have mutually agreed that outside sexual relationships are OK if these outside sexual relationships are approached with the same committment to mutual growth and with the same measure of respect that exists within the marriage. Is this right? Why or why not?

Story: A man and a woman have a very close relationship. Separated for the summer, they grow apart and return with very mixed feelings about each other. One evening, feeling again their former closeness and attraction, they go further and further and have sexual intercourse. But afterwards the doubts about the relationship return. A few weeks later the woman finds that she is pregnant.

What would be the right thing for them to do? Why?

Who is responsible for making this decision? Why? What if they disagree about the right thing to do?

She knows that she could arrange an abortion. Would it be right or wrong for her to arrange an abortion? Why?

She considered having the baby and placing it for adoption as an alternative to abortion. Would that be the right thing to do? Why?

The woman decided that she wants to get married and have the baby. Is it the man's responsibility to marry her? Why? (If no:) What is his responsibility to her?

They decide that abortion is the best solution. Why is ending the life of an unborn baby different from ending any other human life?

What about the child seriously defective at birth-would it be right for the doctor to let it die? Why?

Are there any conditions that might make abortions right (and wrong)? What and why?

What if they were married and just didn't want the baby?

Would it make any difference if abortion was legal or illegal? Why? Should abortions be legalized?

Do you think these issues about sex have anything to do with morality and immorality?

What does the word moral mean,and what is its relation to sex?

Can you tell me something that you think is immoral in sex? Why?

Is this immoral for all people everywhere or only in societies where it is not accepted? Why?

Story: Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Karl, the older one, broke into a store and stole $1,000. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Bob told the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man

back. Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he loaned him the money. So they skipped town, Bob with $500 and Karl with $1,000

Which would be worse, stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob? Why?

What is so bad about lying to people, in general?

Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?

What is the basic value or importance of property rights?

Which would be worse in terms of society's welfare: cheating like Bob or stealing like Karl? Why?

Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like Bob or stole like Karl? Why?

What do you mean by conscience? What do you think of as your conscience and what does it do?

What do the words morality or ethics mean to you?

Do you believe there is an objective right or wrong in morality or is it a matter of personal opinion? For instance, in the first story some people say that Heinz should steal the drug, some say he shouldn't. Do you think there is an objective right answer to that kind of question? Explain.

It was a common practice in some ancient societies to kill many of their female babies. Can you say whether something like this is <u>really</u> right or wrong? That is, can one make valid moral judgments about a practice in another society? Explain.

The following pages contain 15 sentences. Read each statement and assume that it has been made by a person with whom you are having a conversation. Then, on the line below each statement indicate what your reaction would most likely be.

1. The FBI has its hands tied in many cases because of the unreasonable opposition of some people to wire tapping.

2. (Black speaker) Even after graduation from high school I can't find work. Yet I know many white dropouts who have good jobs.

3. The city is going to repeat what has been done in many other cities by building a superhighway right through the slum district. Many apartments will be torn down and the people will be forced out.

4. Some boys had it so easy. They went to college and got out of the draft, and we got sent to Vietnam. (Veteran speaking)

5. I told Jack my ideas for the new project. He took them to the boss and got the credit.

6. The new housing law is unfair. Why should I be forced to take in tenants that I feel are undesirable?

7. In many medical laboratories experiments are performed on live animals and very little care is taken to minimize pain.

8. I read another story today about a girl who was refused an abortion in a hospital. An incompetent doctor gave her an illegal abortion and she died.

9. I think it is unnecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners on death row for so long, and to make the execution such an elaborate ritual.

10. The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the foundations of our society.

11. The government shouldn't have passed the medicare bill. Why should we pay other people's doctor bills?

12. A powerful group representing hunters and gun manufacturers is holding up a gun control law that the majority of the people in this country want.

13. Several policemen were called into a slum area to break up a street fight but when they arrived the local residents threw bricks at them from the windows.

14. During last year's ghetto riots a shopowner saw a boy jump out of the broken window of his store with a television set. The man shot the boy, who is now crippled as a result.

15. The police were rough when they broke up that crowd of students, even though the students were parading without a permit.

What do you think this test was trying to find out?

What comments do you have about this test?

Appendix D
Standardized Scoring Form

Case _____ Scorer _____

Story 1:

Life:

Punishment:

Global:

Story 2:

Marital Sex:

Extramarital Sex:

Fixity:

Roles:

Power:

Global:

Story 3:

Laws killing:

Laws sex:

Value life:

Affection:

Conscience:

Civil liberties:

Power:

Global:

Story 4:

Property/Trust:

Conscience:

Global:

Overall Global: _____