Fall 1965

UA35/11 Perspectives on Contemporary Man

WKU Honors Program

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LECTURES
HONORS COLLOQUIUM
FALL 1965
Western Kentucky University. Freshman Honors Colloquium, Fall, 1965.
Perspectives on contemporary man.

1965.
The following essays are a series of lectures delivered to the Freshmen Colloquium in the fall of 1964.

The Freshmen Honors Colloquium is a special course open only to freshmen students whose test scores, on the battery of tests administered to all entering freshmen, fall in the upper 15 percent and who graduated in the top quarter of their high school graduating class.

The Colloquium in the fall of 1964 consisted of eight lectures delivered by different faculty members at Western Kentucky State College on the topic of "Contemporary Man." Each faculty member presented one perception of man from his own academic discipline. This was then discussed by the group. The students prepared for these lectures and discussions by reading in advance of the lecture a book relating to the particular point of view of the lecturer.

Much of the import of the thought presented in these lectures can only be acquired through a deliberate and reflective reception, not fully possible in a lecture situation. So it was decided to present these lectures again, in the printed form, to the participants of the Colloquium so that they might read and re-read the material contained herein. Further, it was felt that the ideas in these lectures deserved a larger audience than just the thirty-four participants in the Colloquium, so it was decided to put these lectures down in print, thus preserving them for others to read.

The speakers in order of their appearance in this Colloquium are:

Dr. Donald Bailey-Department of Biology
Dr. Ronald Nash-Department of Philosophy, Chairman
Rev. Charles Tachau-Episcopal Rector
Dr. John Watson-Department of Economics and Sociology
Dr. Charles Shedd-Department of Psychology, Chairman
Dr. Thomas Stone-Department of Music, Chairman
Dr. Carlton Jackson-Department of History

The students who participated in the Colloquium are:

Angevine, Roger Lee
Ashby, Larry Wayne
Carroll, Thomas Earl
Carter, David
Chapman, Marion Sue
Clark, Bruce Frederick
Clark, Craig David
Collier, Janice Marie
Collins, Charles Vernon
Cornwell, Joseph Miller
Crouch, John Clavel
Eberth, Edward Palmer
Ellis, Glenn Atwood
England, Charlene
Fowler, Claudia Louise
Fykes, Beverly Jean
Garrison, Karen Lee
Geary, Sandra Elaine
Hardison, Shirley Jane
Hildreth, Dana Lee
Hill, Ronald Buford
Hollan, Harriett
Humphries, William
McGee, James Andrew
McRoy, Joyce
Mayes, Connie Jerome
Mercer, Sarah Frances
Purvis, Sue Carol
Smith, Pamela Lee
Thomas, Edward
Triplett, Martha Joy
Wagoner, Paula Anne
Willoughby, Linda
Wood, George Stephen
WHAT IS A MAN, ACCORDING TO A BIOLOGIST?

-Dr. Donald Bailey

In attempting to discuss this question I will have to use my own frame of reference. I cannot speak for all biologists, or even for the average biologist; I can only speak for myself. So it is that as I look at this subject, there are certain things I find I cannot escape considering, though they may very well be left without reference by another biologist dealing with the same question.

I find it impossible in my thinking about man to leave out the religious and the philosophical. Man is everywhere incurably religious; and, therefore, every judgment and action is influenced by this facet of his nature. Further, I have not been able to discover a rational way to avoid the idea of "purpose" in any contemplation of living beings. If there is not ultimate purpose toward which all these biological processes gravitate, then there is really little of any long-range significance which I can tell you. If the body is worth less than $2 in terms of the chemical constituents, then I find it hard to generate much enthusiasm in myself in the prospect of telling a group such as this about it. If the mechanist is right, and there is no purpose, then most of life becomes a "so what" matter. Let me ask you: Can you define any organ of the body without stating its immediate purpose? Try defining the word, stomach; or the word, brain.

A final factor which I must consider in evaluating man is evolution and the associated process of adaptation. Nearly everyone accepts to some degree the potential and/or actual occurrence of evolution. Some people deny flatly that there is such a thing as evolution; they are not acquainted with observed processes in their own day and time. Others proclaim evolution as a basic fact and argue by it, so to speak, when it very obviously does not qualify as a fact, but rather as a philosophy.

Many biologists cannot give you any sort of satisfying answer to this question, "What is Man?" I do not claim that my comments will satisfy you either, but they will represent an approximation of what for this time reasonably well makes sense to me. The inability of some to approach this question rests in the omission of some vital part of the whole question, such as the purpose I have mentioned. I repeat: I do not think any satisfying answer which attempts to evaluate man can leave out any one of these three points. You may take issue with many of my ideas, and that is desirable; but I feel confident that my thoughts will accomplish two things: Make you think, and challenge you to evolve.

To begin to seek an answer to the question, we must first study at least in principle natural selection and genetic adaptation. The theory of natural selection is based on three observable facts and two deductions from those facts. The first fact is that living organisms tend to increase in number by a geometric progression if there are not environmental checks (or inhibitions). The second observation is that natural populations of animals and plants tend to remain relatively constant in number of individuals present year after year after year. This seems to occur in spite of the tremendous
reproductive potential seen in most organisms. Therefore, the first deduction is that there must be a struggle for survival among all the organisms provided for in reproduction. This is the only way we can account for the relative constancy of the numbers of individuals. The third fact is that all organisms show individual variations; no two are alike even in the same species. Therefore, our final deduction is that it is the best adapted (fittest) variants which survive in proportionately greater numbers and produce a proportionately greater part of the next generation. It is these organisms which predominantly extend their genes and heredity to the next generation. Other genes which tend to make organisms less fit for the struggle tend to be eliminated in succeeding offspring.

The result of natural selection is to lead toward genetic adaptation. Since the "fitting" genes tend to be preserved, the species in question will progressively become better and better suited or adapted to the environment in which it finds itself. This leads to stability of the species and loss of variability. This to a large extent is the true condition of the animal phyla today; they are largely stagnated in a niche of adaptation to a certain fixed environment.

Now it is true that greater adaptation leads to greater survival, but this statement presupposes that the environment in which the organisms live will not change. Actually, it is only when rapid climatic, etc., changes occur that adaptive balance is upset. Many adaptations have perished, as is clearly indicated by the fossil record. Genetic adaptation has produced inflexibility which cannot be reversed quickly enough to allow survival at times when the earth's climate has changed. If the environmental changes occur slowly enough, then animals may pass through certain stages of adaptation by retrograding, but this is very tedious apparently, and environmental changes have generally not been that slow in geologic time. We can see examples of this retrograding in parasites particularly; it is also seen in blind fish and blind crayfish.

To summarize, adaptation leads to a decided loss of the future ability or freedom to modify. From the standpoint of evolution, genetic adaptation always leads to evolutionary dead ends. An animal or plant stops evolving when it adapts. It is only the variants, less well fitted for the struggle for survival, which do happen to survive, which can participate in the process of evolution.

The variants appearing are generally few in number, as would be expected from their lower survival rate. Many of these variants eventually die and with them their particular variation-producing genes. But all surviving variants serve as experiments in evolution. If a variant is to evolve, it must do so quickly; the only other alternatives are adaptation to fit the environment, or death. The surviving variants become "transitional stages" which because of their relatively small population number and relatively short duration in geologic time leave no trace in the fossil record. The animals appearing in the fossil record are those which adapted, flourished, and statistically had a chance to fossilize.

Next, I would like to indicate to you why there must be a purpose in evolution. The continual process of evolution has occurred in only one line,
that leading to man. All other lines have deviated from this one "main trunk" of the evolutionary tree and have progressed toward adaptation. These virtually have become evolutionary dead ends. It is true that some slow evolutionary processes do continue in these groups, but these processes lead only toward less variability and less freedom to change. All changes are extremely slow—so slow that it is a mathematical impossibility that such could have been the rate of progression in the line leading to man. And all these changes lead only to greater instinctiveness, better fittedness to the environment as it exists at this time—to greater enslavement to the environment. The lack of evidence of the transitional stages in the line leading to man is a clear implication of the transitory nature of those stages. This explanation very nicely accounts for the virtual impossibility of reconstructing from the fossil record more than the immediate geologic past as far as man is concerned.

Now, the question that comes to mind as a result of these observations is: What was the reward in this one line that caused the otherwise slow (as we know it) process of natural selection to race on? A careful analysis of the many variations appearing in possible variant forms and the characteristics found in animal phyla today seem to clearly state that the most rewarding of all possible heritable variations was the ability to survive without having to go through genetic adaptation. This represents freedom in some small degree from the genetic background; it presented the animal simultaneously with the ability to modify and with the choice (or flexibility) of relating its behavior to necessity rather than purely to the genetic background. In all animals in which such variations have occurred, this flexibility has been centered in that part of the anatomy which we call the nervous system and in higher animals more specifically the brain. The occurrence and gradual accumulation of this type of variation in evolutionary history has been favored far beyond any type of genetically induced direct adaptation ever appearing. We as human beings are living proof of the greater selective value of freedom and liberty (flexibility) over the enslavement to instincts which result from adaptation. To put this another way, the accumulation of mutations which allowed the possessor to be flexible, conferred upon the possessor a superiority over other animals, and therefore a selective advantage, which no possible combination of adaptations could ever produce. Therefore, the "reward" ever before those evolving organisms in the line leading to man was freedom. And in this freedom or liberty is the ultimate goal or purpose built into and permeating the evolutionary process. It is only in lines leading to liberty in which evolution on any scale other than toward adaptation (the dead end) has occurred. Evolution leads purposefully only toward liberty and freedom, and the ability of man to realize this forms the very basis of that which makes man different from other animals.

Lecomte du Nully likens the course of evolution to the many "rivulets" flowing from a lake high in the mountains. The goal of all the rivulets is the floor of the valley below, and each is drawn toward that goal by the irresistible force of gravity. But many of the rivulets run into pools, even though the pull of the purpose is still there. And so it is in evolution that
every living creature yearns for this purpose; but only those which do not adapt have the opportunity to approach the goal.

Consider the mighty insect. He has adapted to every habitat and niche of the world and outnumbers in species all other animal groups put together. He is a superb example of magnificent adaptation, but he is just as good an example of enslavement. I know of nothing the insect does which is not instinctive and therefore totally inflexible. Nocturnal insects instinctively navigate by the light of the moon by setting a fixed course relative to the angle from which the moonlight reaches them. This instinctive mechanism did not take into account the possibility that man might come along millions later and introduce into his environment some artificial lights. The inflexible instinct compels the captive insect to circle a light, keeping it at a fixed angle; and in ever narrowing circles he flies inward until he crashes and must resume the process again. Of course, if the light source is a fire, the results may be irreversible.

With this information and these considerations behind us, let us now look at the evolution of man more specifically. The first humanoid forms were animals, being far less than the other Primates we know at present. His daily activities consisted entirely of fulfilling the physical needs of the body as established by his genetic endowment. He did not have the modern problem of finding something to do; on the contrary, he found it an all-day job simply securing food, fighting for his life, providing for himself some form of cover, and producing the next generation.

New variations of pre-man constantly appeared and with the appearance of each mutation toward greater freedom, a group of more evolved men flourished, ever widening the gap between themselves and the rest of their kind. Certain variations particularly enhanced the evolution of the mind. For example, the evolution of the opposable thumb led to greater freedom of use for the hand; and ultimately this gave stimulus to assumption of an upright posture, forever freeing the hand from supporting the weight of the body in walking. The upright posture led to special development of the foot to walk on land (rather than in trees) and may have had something to do with development of the distinctively human position during sexual intercourse. Evolution of the gill arches and associated structures produced the basic structures of the jaw and the speaking apparatus.

With the advent of primitive thought man could communicate his drives and needs by gestures and instinct-like postures (seen in animals other than man today). Thinking regardless of how primitive it may have been at first presented man with choice-making as a responsibility. Man also realized that there were better ways to do some things—he realized good choices could bring him improvements that absence of choice could never have brought him by chance.

Thinking and speech have to go hand-in-hand. With speech the way was opened for evolution such as had never occurred before. Prior to this man had been able to pass to his offspring only what his genes could carry,
but through speech he was able to pass on all he had learned from all his past experiences. A whole new orientation of man through capacity for speech arose as personality took form.

Many signs exist today to prove this decidedly new orientation. The most significant of these is seen in the fact that man began to bury his dead. What else can one conclude, but that man loved those whom he thought enough of to bury. It is possible that prior to this man may have placed the dead in the ground to hide the stench (though there is no evidence for such), but the presence of various trinkets and tools of life in the graves undeniably indicates that man thought that the dead would live again and have need of these possessions. This care of the dead, the memory of the dead, and love gave rise to some of the specifically human notions pertaining to life after death. This projection of man outside himself to create, without an inkling of proof or evidence, a life for the departed typifies the new orientation of man. Here was evolution on a mental or spiritual level—indicated by man’s capacity for abstract thinking.

Still today man if far from liberty. His hereditarily controlled body is basically the same in all ways as that of the familiar animals. Man must fulfill all the requirements of the physical body. In the past man has had many times to come to see that to evolve meant to struggle for freedom from the hereditary—-from the instincts, the drives, the animal-like characteristics. With the concept of the “better way” came the birth of human dignity, which demanded of man that he be more than the least he could be.

The well-known duality of human nature became apparent, as the concept of the better way to do things evolved into a concept of "good" and "bad.” Another step in purposive evolution had occurred; the basis for religion, philosophy, etc., had arisen. Man became different from all other animals; for him to evolve required a striving against his very nature. Evolution for him had to be on an entirely new plane, and human dignity required that he deny himself certain things.

The concept of good and bad led to the very rapid appearance of moral values and the conscience. Moral values apparently evolved rapidly and spontaneously in numerous independent places as evolution advanced. Again the transitory, intermediate stages in moral evolution did not survive in time’s record. Our earliest records of moral codes reveal values as far advanced as they are today. I have little doubt that moral evolution is finished—moral values, already inherent in the Eternal Purpose, had only to appear for man.

Moral values prove the existence of societies of people and ultimately of civilizations; for there is no need for morals without concern for others. Civilizations in their turn were responsible for further great advances in human evolution. What one man could share of his own abilities with another contributed to the betterment of each. Cro-Magnon man drew extensively, not just for his own benefit but for the enjoyment of others. His art is a characteristic of his civilization. Even when civilizations fall their culture is preserved in innumerable ways and the best of that culture can be selected by succeeding civilizations.
A civilization, like individual man, must either evolve or stagnate. Every civilization has a constant challenge or threat before it, which prompts some sort of an adjustment, either toward adaptation or toward the higher liberty. These challenges reach the transitory element in the civilizations and inspire them to slip on by the adapting elements. The adapting elements are content to insulate themselves from the challenges. In spite of the challenge civilizations tend to become adapted and stagnant.

The subject of intelligence plays an interesting part in all this. Intelligence is a creation of the mind, which the mind must in turn constantly scrutinize, if man is to continue to evolve. Intelligence may become an end, and as an end can only glorify logical thinking and the products of logical thinking through technology. But logical thinking by an individual can never encompass enough of the overall perspective of the purpose to do more than lead to "habits" of thinking or action which we assume for ourselves, which are practical and useful for a time and even comfortable and pleasing to use. Such "habits," however, are tremendous temptations toward adaptation—toward enslavement, wherein man lets these implementations for the sake of comfort, etc., become goals or ends, rather than only the means to the purpose. Future evolution in man demands that he conquer these habits created along the way by his rapid progress. The aim of evolution is to lead man to greater freedom and not to develop contraptions to make life fat and easy.

As stated previously, the appearance of the duality of human nature initiated that sort of thinking which has evolved to that which we call religion today. Religion, too, has an indispensable part in the evolution of man.

In every instance it appears that the origin of religion has been in this "thing" we call superstition. And superstition finds its origin in a fear of that which is unknown. Wild animals are instinctively afraid of fire—so was man, until he conquered it. However, what man could not understand or control, he deified; he then went out of his way to try to appease these unknown deities and in doing so concocted numerous artifacts of worship which we see to be superstitions. These superstitions were necessary, however, in that they were the beginning of a great process, even though they opposed evolution and degraded human dignity. But superstitions served profitably only as long as they were a step toward pure religion and the complete man. Superstitions in themselves (as ends) are stagnations; once man becomes enthralled with such, he ceases seeking higher solutions. Consider where man would be today, if he had continued to worship the "fire god" and never asked himself if this fire might, rather than a god, be a tool to be conquered and used.

Superstition is seen today in the "prestige" afforded science. Man's base nature seeks stability—it wants to quit striving and rest in confidence on something, anything; scientific "fact" and "law" are in vogue in our day as the "holy cow." One must remember that scientific fact and law are only the
rules that adaptation and genetic and inorganic evolution follow; these can only lead backward in evolution because they lead to greater simplicity. Man's higher calling is to uproot, make new, improve, and evolve.

Superstitions had their value as primitive stepping stones to religion; and religion is man finding an expression and cognizance of the purpose of evolution. In religion man worships not that which he fears but that which as best he can see is the key to his divinely inspired purpose to reach toward the perfect freedom exemplified by his God.

Again, there have been for centuries the transient few who have led and pointed the way in this religious evolution—and it is not finished today. Though rejected and dispossed in his time, Christ did not come too soon. Only such an example, as was His, of perfect liberty in a human life could have so greatly inspired men on toward the goal. Christ's doctrines were far too simple for men in his day, as they are for most today; but a few transitional forms seized what they could of the vital force in Christ's life and teaching and evolution of man leaped forward again. Wherever the teachings of Christ and Christianity have gone in the world, human evolution and "modern" civilizations were soon to follow.

Though religions have arisen in the same general fashion, and today they take on many outward forms. All have had to fight adaptation in the same sense that there is that constant tendency to develop the feeling that each has a "corner on God's truth." Stagnations have led to many bloody purges of one rivulet by another, but always the less well-decided (adapted), the questioning, the transitional forms have survived the purges to push on ahead.

The multitude of the world's religions, like Du Nouy's rivulets, all have gravitated toward the same goal. The uniting force in all religions in the goal they seek, and not the features which are distinctively human in their doctrines. These are only the various crevices and gullies through which the rivulets find their ways. Inevitably the goal which all religious evolutions have striven toward is the quest for ONE god; all present rivulets bear this out. The remaining question is, "Which religion honoring which ONE god is correct?" This is a very necessary question to face, if one is interested himself in evolving.

Of the present-day attempts toward evolution in religion, some, if not many, can be seen to represent stagnations or adaptations. We may ask why, in view of the purpose of evolution, are some of these attempts dead ends. The answer is that any religious movement that does not lead man to liberation and freedom is in the process of adaptation to a static, "corner-on-God's-Truth" pattern. For example, Islam is a religion so legalistic that the follower has few, if any, free choices as to which course is the best course. He is considered a member of the group and not an individual; he is subject to rules, w' obeyed are said to make him moral. The follower is more enslaved than ever in this situation, and unless transitional forms escape the prison of fear-inspired regulations, then all of evolution in this...
In the Judo-Christian line of religious evolution, the story has been the same: A stagnation, the escape of a remnant of transitional individuals, a new and rapid evolution, and a repeat of the cycle. At the time of Christ's coming the Jewish religion had stagnated; again the prison was legalism. But through the inspiration in Christ's example of what man could evolve to--through the newly awakened emphasis on faith of the individual--a few escaped the enslavement and Christianity explosively evolved for several centuries. Then Christianity too began to stagnate, as man himself tried to lay down group patterns and group-binding legalisms--man tried to make rules which would substitute for the need for decision making. The Christian religion and the world went into the Dark Ages.

The failure of the established church to assist man to reach toward God produced a tremendous unrest in the masses, as evidenced by the many experiments (or "heresies") appearing during this time of stagnation. These experiments represented the transitional forms deviating in new lines of evolution, most of which were to be abortive.

It was not until the great renaissance that Christianity explosively evolved again; the basis was revival of the fundamental requisite of individual, faith-inspired seeking after the ONE God, the Eternal Purpose. This is a requisite which no one can legislate or formulate for another; to make any attempt to do so is to begin to adapt. Of the many rivulets springing forth from the renaissance, all have been plagued constantly by the tendency to make rules for guidelines and thus adapt, but always there has been the "remnant" which has not been satisfied with being less than it could be.

I belong to a church of a local denomination, and I belong there by choice. I was not "born" into this pattern of religious worship, nor did I "grow up" in it; my choice depends on my personal belief that it stands closer to the mainstream of religious evolution than any other. There are many facets of my personal religious faith which I have not bothered to mention here; these are the points which contain the real assurance--the faith-proof of all that is really valuable to me. But I also believe that my own denomination is progressively stagnating. This can be seen to be largely true of the great majority of protestantism today--we are stagnating in fixed forms and habits that were meant to be only stepping stones toward the Truth which sets men free--the "high calling of God in Christ." There is no reason to doubt that the future will be full or further explosive religious evolution. The present-day, constant appearance of new sects ever reminds us of our failings to satisfy the needs of men's souls.

Let me conclude. I apologize for not giving you a chemical analysis or mechanistic interpretation of the body of man, if that is what you had hoped to hear. But Biology is the science of living things, the study of life itself, One cannot help but feel that the life is worth talking about much more than is the vehicle of that life. When Darwin opened the door to an understanding...
of the principles of organic evolution, this gave meaning to the presence of stable forms known as species, and integral part of Biology. But indirectly Darwin also clearly pointed out the mechanism of purpositive evolution which has continued to the present and bears every indication of continuing on ad infinitum.

What is man? Let me say that man is you: Spiritual evolution, unlike genetic evolution, does not place the emphasis on the species, but on you, the individual. Every individual has the free choice to evolve or to stagnate, to conform or to transform, to live or to die. But no living being endowed with the human mind has the choice to avoid religion. Even the avowed atheist has his religion. His god, as is everyone's, is that which he worships—that which he holds above all else in life and in the world to be most real and most deserving of his dedication. Perhaps the object of the atheist's worship is the contrivance of his own mind, his intelligence-gained "habit." In the end he too worships, but it is only himself that he worships—he is his own dead end.

It has been my observation that the soundness of a man's argument is usually inversely proportional to the amount of time he spends trying to persuade others of the truth of his proposition. This is typical of every professed atheist I have ever known. Each defends his point of view, even when no one has bothered to contest it.

In our own day, as has always been the case, men evolve to different levels. Some men revert to essentially animal patterns of life and thus never feel the pride of human dignity. All these people ever see of evolution is the back end because it has long since gone on without them. There are men, who in their actions follow the higher calling, but do so only to conform—only to be part of a group. These are the conformists who do what they do for no better reason that that others are doing it. These are stagnant forms, glued to conformance out of fear of what might befall them should they not conform. A third group consists of individuals who live with dignity, but not knowing why. They attribute their behavior to their practical thinking. These persons are truly evolved forms (or maybe I should say "advanced forms"), but they no longer contribute to evolution. They are content to accept the advantages of being man, but not the responsibilities. The ultimate purpose of evolution is to reduce the size of these three groups and to add to a fourth group which seeks to know the freeing Truth.

Again we ask the question, "What is Man?" I hope you find out. I would not be true to the ideas I have advanced if I even attempted to answer that question for you, for the evolving man must answer this question and all related questions for himself. No one can do this for you—unless you decide you would rather adapt or stagnate.

While here at Western you will take many courses of study. You will study Biology and living things; you will delve deeply into Philosophy, perhaps; you will wrestle with Theology and Religion; you will study Sociology and society organization; you will be exposed to the vast wealth of literature; you will enjoy and take part in the Fine Arts; you will take Psychology and study
your own personality structure; you will study History and bring it to bear on
your own time; and you will learn vast lessons from your interpersonal relation-
ships here on this campus. But if you fail to seek out and read the handwriting
on the wall of the Eternal Purpose throughout these disciplines, then I say you
have missed it all.

A PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT MAN

-Dr. Ronald Nash

I have decided to look at man through the eyes of two philosophers
of the nineteenth century--Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard. I have
not selected these two men because I think their views are more important
than other Western philosophers. Nor have I chosen them because I necessarily
agree with any major portion of what they wrote. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard
do afford an interesting contrast on a few important points; they have both
exercised a significant influence on the contemporary philosophic movement
known as existentialism and they both had some very pointed things to say
about man and his station in this world. Thus, perhaps the title of this talk
should be amended to: A philosopher looks at man through the eyes of Nietzsche
and Kierkegaard.

While both of these men lived and died in nineteenth century Europe,
neither knew either the person or writings of the other. One was a German;
the other a Dane. Both, as I said, exercised an influence on modern existen-
tialism. Both led rather tragic lives. Each wrote with fervor and imagination--
expressing his philosophical ideas in an arresting and striking narrative style.
Kierkegaard was a cripple; Nietzsche died insane. Nietzsche was the son of a
Lutheran minister who died an atheist. Kierkegaard has become to many a
Protestant saint whose theological writings have served as the fountainhead of
a new theology.
There is no better way to begin one's study of Nietzsche than with a famous passage from *The Gay Science*.

**The Madman.** Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God!" As many of those who do not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his glances.

"Whither is God" he cried, "I shall tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers... God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him...

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke and went out. "I come too early," he said then; "my time has not come yet... this deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars—and yet they have done it themselves."

No one will be able to understand the rest that Nietzsche says unless he understands what Nietzsche was trying to get at in this madman's proclamation of the death of God. The first thing we must realise is that Nietzsche's startling statement that God is dead is not an assertion of his own personal atheism. It was not so much a piece of metaphysical speculation about the non-existence of God as it was a diagnosis of the civilisation of his day. What Nietzsche was trying to say was that men no longer believe in God. That is, for all that it matters, men have destroyed their own faith in God—they have killed Him. Study the passage above and note that the very men who ridicule the madman's search for God are the same men who are shocked by his apparent blasphemy. Nietzsche's point has even more force in our own society where with few exceptions men live their lives as if there were no God and yet still carry on a profession of religiosity. As Nietzsche pictures it so poetically, there is something tragically absurd in the man who is shocked by someone else's atheism when it is impossible to discover any genuine religious faith in the man himself. I once heard a professor of mine at Syracuse University say that the great sin of America was not atheism (for this shocks us) but rather making God irrelevant. For the average American today as for the individual in the Germany of Nietzsche's own day, it simply does not make any practical difference whether God exists or not. Consider again the piercing words of the madman: "This deed is more distant from them than the distant stars—yet they have done it themselves."

But what we have said thus far has not yet reached the matter that most concerned Nietzsche. His main concern was not religion but ethics. Even the men no longer believed in God, the morality of the Western world was still grounded on the existence of the Christian God. Nietzsche realised that if civilisation were to survive, men needed standards and values by which to live. But he also realised that traditional morality, that is, the morality of Western Europe, and the Christian Faith went hand in hand. What will happen, Nietzsche was asking, when men see the incongruity between their rejection of God's existence and their acceptance of a morality grounded on the nature and being of God? What will happen when men finally understand that the foundations of Western morality are no longer solid rock but only sinking
sand? This is what Nietzsche feared most and he had a special term for it—
he called it nihilism. Nihilism would be a condition in which all ultimate values
lose their value, that is, traditional moral values will become obsolete with the
knowledge that their logical ground (God) is non-existent. Thus, Nietzsche
feared, when men awaken from their sleepwalking, civilization will collapse
and nihilism will result.

Clearly, what is needed—if Nietzsche's diagnosis is correct—is a
new foundation of morality and much of his philosophy should be understood as
an attempt to provide just such a new foundation—in Nietzsche's own terms,
"a revaluation of all values." As Nietzsche has his prophet Zarathustra say,
"To value is to create: hear this, you creators! Valuing itself is of all valued
things the most valuable treasure, . . . Change of values—that is a change of
creators. Whoever must be a creator always annihilates." That is, the
creation of new values must be accompanied by the annihilation of old ones.
And so Nietzsche attacked traditional morality with all the vehemence of man
tottering on the brink of insanity. Christian morality, he wrote, is the morality
of weak, decadent people. What we need to replace it is a morality of strength,
of power—yes, that's it, the will to power. In place of what he called the
'slave-morality' of Christendom, Nietzsche proposed to substitute a 'master-
morality' in which the chief virtues were strength, dominance and the will to
power.

What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling
of power in man, the will to power itself. What is bad? Every-
thing that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The feel-
ing that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. (The
Anti-Christ)

The final result for those who understood Nietzsche and were able to
follow him would be the superman (ubermensch). This term which occurs so
often in Nietzsche is better translated "the overman" for what Nietzsche was
trying to say is that man in his present condition is only a bridge to a higher
form of life. "I teach you the overman. Man is something that shall be over-
come. What have you done to overcome him?" (Zarathustra I, 3) Again he
wrote, "Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman—a rope over an abyss.
A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a
dangerous shuddering and stopping. What is great in man is that he is a bridge
and not an end." (Zarathustra I, 4) Behind man is the beast from which he
came—ahead is the being he can become provided he lets Nietzsche guide him.
But if man should falter, look back and fail to move ahead to the superman, he
will fall from the precarious perch he now has into the bottomless pit of nihilism.

But it still is not clear what Nietzsche meant by "the will to power" and
"the superman". The superman is the strong man whose will refuses to
submit to the values and standards of others. He is the powerful man who
creates his own values. The strong man for Nietzsche is not the man who
says, "I ought" (i.e., who submits to rules and standards laid down by God or
anyone else). Rather, the superman is the man who says, "I will!" Some try
to read into Nietzsche's words an advocacy of a life of moral libertarianism.
But he would hasten to point out that a man who is dominated by his lusts, who
cannot control his passions, is not a strong man. The superman will be master
both of himself and his environment. Actually, Nietzsche taught, the value of
an action lies in the agent and not in the action. He does not really care whether a man lives a life of self-control or licentiousness as long as it is done with the proper motive which is strength or power.

So Nietzsche's transvaluation of traditional morality emphasizes egoism and individualism. The good man is the strong man who does what he wishes not out of dependence upon his passions or lusts but out of a feeling of power. In the Honors Colloquium a number of difficulties with Nietzsche's view were noted. Clearly, Nietzsche did not believe everyone could become an overman. But when one begins to consider what a world would be like if it had many of Nietzsche's supermen in it, his morality might bring about moral anarchy and nihilism more quickly than the so-called decadent morality he attacked. Then, too, it was suggested that Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality is superficial and based on many serious misunderstandings. It was suggested that had Nietzsche really understood the man whom he called "the first and last Christian," he might have regarded Christ as the fulfillment of his dream of the superman.

There is much that can now be learned from trying to see Kierkegaard's thought in the light of what we have said about Nietzsche. While Kierkegaard's problem was different, it can be expressed in Nietzschean terms. Kierkegaard was distressed by the condition of Christendom in his native Denmark. He was convinced that the state church--to which most most Danes belonged from birth--had departed from the teachings of early New Testament Christianity. For example, Jesus had taught that the way to the kingdom of God was a narrow road travelled by few. But in Denmark, Kierkegaard complained, the road was as wide as the entire country and hardly anyone was excluded. The New Testament stressed conversion and the need for personal faith whereas the Danish state church taught that everyone, by virtue of his baptism at birth, was a Christian. Thus, Kierkegaard was trying to say (although he used different terms, of course) that God was dead in Denmark. Kierkegaard would have regarded Nietzsche's parable of the madman as an apt picture of the religious bankruptcy of his own land. And to make things worse, the Danish church--with its de-emphasis on faith and personal commitment--was the chief culprit.

If you have followed me thus far, I'm sure you will see the interesting situation we now have. Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard noticed a situation that is even more aggravated in contemporary America. Most men, in spite of pious professions to the contrary, go on acting as if God doesn't really exist. For all practical purposes God is dead since men really don't believe in Him. But while Nietzsche and Kierkegaard agreed on the diagnosis, they differed as to the cure. Nietzsche, as we have seen, was willing to destroy the old foundations of morality and substitute a new naturalistic basis of value. Had Kierkegaard lived to see Nietzsche's proposals, he would have objected. While you may be able to save some lives by amputating an arm or a leg, you can never save a life by removing the patient's heart. If God is dead, the only way to save society is to confront men with their unbelief and secularism and challenge them to reaffirm their faith in a living God. If men no longer believe in God, it will not do to bury God. One must bring men to a dynamic and living faith by returning to New Testament Christianity.
Anyone familiar with the intellectual climate of our own day will recognize that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard represent the two major options that we face. We stand at the crossroads in a world in which God is dead or rapidly dying. Some like Marx, Sartre, Dewey and others urge us (for different reasons, of course) to abandon the supernatural assumptions of the past and ground our lives, our values and our society on naturalistic premises. Some, convinced that naturalism is a false world view and afraid that it can only produce the very nihilism that terrified Nietzsche, urge a return to the controlling assumptions of a Christian world view. But, of course, even this is not enough unless accompanied a genuine personal religious faith. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard each made their choice, as indeed each one of us must. The option is a momentous one and fraught with dangerous consequences should we err and take the wrong turn.

I have tried to show you briefly how two philosophers look at man. One thing you should see is that no philosopher looks at man in isolation from underlying views about reality and God. For one of these philosophers, man is an animal rising from his primitive beginning. But man must not stop where he is now. Freed from the shackles of a decadent morality and religious superstition, he must proceed to build a new society without God—a society based upon naturalistic principles and the assertion of the will to power. For the other philosopher, man is a pitiful being estranged from his creator and too blind to even see his unbelief. This philosopher holds that the only way for man to conquer himself and his weaknesses is to acknowledge his inadequacies and receive power from a higher source.

A THEOLOGIAN LOOKS AT MAN

-Rev. Charles B. Tachau

In a series of lectures and discussions centering around the topic of Man—or Contemporary Man—it seems to me appropriate to begin by first telling you a few things that are pertinent about the particular man who is to lead the tonight's discussion.

It is significant, I think, that I am the only one of your nine speakers who is not a member of the faculty of the College. Those responsible for organizing the Honors Colloquium apparently recognized the importance of including a talk entitled A THEOLOGIAN LOOKS AT MAN in such a series, but a College such as this one simply does not have a professional Theologian on its faculty. This is a good illustration of the present position of Theology—which used to claim the proud title of "Queen of Sciences"—in the contemporary academic world. I do not complain about this precisely—indeed, I would say it has certain definitely positive features—much less do I want to seem defensive about it. Tonight I merely want to draw it to your attention. In the Middle Ages of our era Theology and theologians completely dominated all higher education—in fact, all education of any kind. Today Theology is not even officially represented on a campus such as this.

I myself have only a flimsy claim to the title of Theologian—I have no advanced degrees in my field like most of your other speakers—just a three year basic course in theology at a Seminary, and a simple Bachelor of Divinity Degree such as most clergymen have.
I should explain, too, I think, that I am an Episcopalian—many of you—most of you—do not belong to this denomination. I do not intend deliberately to say anything that is particularly episcopal. What I mean to do is to present to you as nearly as I can a Christian view of man. But it would be silly to pretend that Christians are unanimous on this point any more than they are on any other. Certainly there would be some who would disagree with some, or even all, of what I am about to say—some of you may feel this way. For that matter, some of you may not be Christians, and there are certainly other kinds of theology than Christian. The trouble is, I don’t know enough about them to talk intelligently about them.

I think it is probably true that I will say some things that you will find controversial that I didn’t even think about as being so. I am inevitably influenced, often unconsciously, by my own background and training and experience. I don’t intend this to be a highly controversial talk that those of you from different Christian traditions will react violently to. But I do mean it to suggest some ideas and ways of looking at things that may be new to you and which will stimulate you to think through some ideas of your own.

On the other hand, I am not going to say anything to you that I do not myself believe to be true. Persons representing other disciplines can and do often use the exaggeration, even a positive statement which they personally believe to be untrue, as an effective and stimulating teaching device, or they may present a summary of the thought of some great man in their field. I do not criticize them for this. But I think it is unsuitable in my particular case.

This is one of the few really clear distinctions I am able to articulate between theology and philosophy. Philosophy involves reason, logic, argument, appeal to authority—this kind of thing. Theology does, too, but it also involves faith and commitment to an idea or a truth; and, most important, to a person. To theologize aloud is to bear witness to one’s faith. The Philosopher is quite justified (I believe) if he makes statements "for the sake of argument" or for the sake of stimulating the thoughts and reactions of his listeners, statements in which he himself does not believe. But the Theologian cannot do this. And I shall not do it—intentionally.

Well, what about man? How does a Theologian see and understand man? I want to talk to you this evening about man in three aspects: (1) Man as he was meant to be, (2) Man as he actually is, and (3) Man as he will be.

Man as He Was Meant To Be.

In Biblical terms, man as he was meant to be is Adam and Eve still in the Garden of Eden. In philosophical terms we might say he is "essential" man—the word essential is related to the Latin "esse" meaning "to be"—thus essential man is man in his true inner being. This is similar to the way in which we might say of someone, "he is essentially a cheerful person." Our use of "essential" as a sort of synonym for "necessary"—"It is essential that President Johnson be re-elected" for instance— is not strictly correct, and is not the way I mean it here.

This man-essential man—has never really existed in the real world. He existed, and still exists in the mind of God perhaps. I say "perhaps because
I am not sure that there is really a proper use of the word "exist." But we'll let that pass for the moment. In some sense he "is" in the mind of God, let's put it that way. He has "being" and he need not have being. His being depends upon God and is grounded and based in God's Being. We might call him in a sense "ideal" man, although "ideal" is a tricky word. I don't mean it in any technical sense, in case some of you have studied Plato, just in the ordinary every day sense—an ideal that does not really exist.

This essential man has a certain being in the mind of man, too. We, all of us, in our more thoughtful moments have a sort of faint memory of this man—a sort of vague consciousness of some state of being, which we identify as "past", a state of perfection, of peace and harmony, of a sort of dreaming innocence. You may or may not personally have ever experienced this feeling—this consciousness of some sort of earlier perfect being—but I think this feeling lies latent in all of us. We may identify it with ourselves—we may perhaps, in this Freudian Age, think of it as before we were born—still in the womb to which we long to return. If we are Hindus or Buddhists, or attracted to that sort of Philosophy, we may think of it in terms of some previous existence or life—or perhaps a future one. Or we may conceive it in terms of some previous age in time—as applying to an earlier race of men.

If we are deeply steeped in the Bible and its way of thinking, we think of this in terms of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Living a sort of ideal and idyllic life of plenty. You may eat of every tree's fruit—a life of peace and harmony—having dominion or rule over the whole animal and vegetable kingdom. A life of innocence—not yet even knowing the difference between good and evil. A life of intimate fellowship with one another and with God upon whom their being was based and by whom they had been created and to whom they were perfectly obedient.

This is the sort of picture language in which the Bible—Genesis—depicts essential man, man before he entered existence—man before sin and death. I think it a deeply true picture—a way of describing the situation which makes it much easier to grasp and know than the kind of abstract, philosophical language I've been using. I believe it completely. But personally I do not believe it literally. You may if you like—I don't think it matters much, not for present purposes at any rate. But personally I don't think this situation ever really existed in the real world, at a particular time and a particular place. I don't personally believe that if we were just a little smarter we could discover exactly where on the face of this earth the Garden of Eden was, or on what day God created it and those who lived there. I don't think this is a scientific account of how the universe and life came into being. It is a theological account—an interpretation of the scientific facts, a way of saying what they mean in terms of God and man's relationship to Him. But if I want scientific knowledge about this in the modern sense—dealing with the cold physical facts of phenomenology—I'll turn to modern science which seems to me in its theories of evolution and related ideas to give a much more convincing explanation of the things—of certain facts and phenomena (like fossils and skeletons, etc.) which we actually observe.
This, however, is somewhat of a side issue as I see it. We are concerned tonight to try to get an idea of a theological view of man. A view of man from God's standpoint, so to speak. From this point of view whether you believe in the literal, historical, scientific accuracy of the Genesis material or not is beside the point. What is important is that I affirm it to be profoundly true and accurate theologically.

So all right--here we have man then in the Garden of Eden--essential man. Everything is perfect--the only trouble is, it isn't real. And this essential man seems to feel that everything is worthless and useless finally--despite all the peace and the harmony and the innocence--if he can't be a real man--have a real existence. In the terms, or the frame of reference, that Dr. Bailey was using four weeks ago when he spoke to us on a scientific view of man, man wants to be free. He is too dependent upon God somehow. This is symbolized or expressed in the command not to eat of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. It seems to be an arbitrary command in the first place. At least no reason is given. In the second place, and more profoundly, it robs man of his freedom, because without knowledge of the difference between good and evil, in what sense could we describe man as free to choose between them?

God does not want man to have this freedom the Genesis material says--and yet in some sense He must have wanted it, too, for He did confer upon man the power to take it anyway despite the commandment not to. Would not it have been simpler if God were all-powerful, simply never to have allowed man the power to disobey? In terms of the Biblical imagery, I suppose we could say, He could have put the fruit on the tree out of man's reach so that no question of his disobeying the command to let it alone could have arisen.

But this is the way a parent treats a small child. We don't tell a toddler not to cross the street; we put him in a play pen so that he can't. But eventually the child grows to the point where this tactic doesn't work anymore, and, to tell the truth, the parent, if he is a wise parent, doesn't really want it to work. Because the child can never really become a mature person--a real person--what he is meant to be--until his obedience comes out of reason and love and trust, rather than out of force.

To carry this analogy somewhat further--the comparison of the relationship of God and man with a parent to his child--let me suggest that it is actually quite close to the relationship of a very wise parent to an adolescent. The parent knows if the adolescent is ever to mature and become a real person in his own right, he must rebel against parental authority, and so, in a sense he wants this to happen--he longs for it to happen. But again he dreads and fears and hates the thought of it--for he knows that he is so much wiser, and everything will go so much better if only he is obeyed. Rebellion leads to all manner of bad things, from colds from not wearing a sweater, to fearful automobile accidents or unauthorized pregnancies. So the parent desires the rebellion and dreads it.

In some degree I think God's attitude toward man's freedom and personhood must be similar to this. He wants man to be a real person, so he
gives him the power to choose between obedience and disobedience. He gives the commandment, but he does not coerce obedience to it by the simple expedient of putting the fruit out of reach.

What we are talking about here, as some of you may have recognized, is an age-old problem which, put in philosophical terms, is the question of whether you understand man as having a free will—an area of decision—or whether you think that everything is pre-determined in advance, and our feeling of having the power to choose is only an illusion. The issue of free-will versus determinism. I am suggesting that there is no simple answer to this, but a paradoxical, complicated answer.

Returning to the Genesis narrative, something now comes into the picture for which we cannot account. This is the Serpent—the tempter. The biblical writer makes no attempt at all to explain how a creature with such an evil will could ever have intruded himself into the idyllic Garden in the first place. He is described simply as "the most subtle" of all the beasts, and we must doubtless be content to leave it at that—a rather terrifying suggestion incidentally for those of us who like to fancy ourselves as intellectuals—but we must let that pass. It appears that we must understand the presence of evil as being essentially irrational—unexplained and unexplainable by rational means. We can not see how God who is Good—the Good as Plato said—God who is Love, as St. John said—how this God could have created Evil, He permitted and permits it. This is true and helpful to a certain extent, but it does not answer this particular question, for we cannot really understand or explain how such a God could even permit Evil to be in His world. We must simply acknowledge that we observe both facts to be true: that God is Good and that Evil is, nonetheless. It is contradictory, unexplainable, irrational, but it is true.

The Bible depicts the serpent—evil personified—as something simply and wholly outside man. Modern psychological insights suggest that this is really what is called a "projection"—something inside oneself—inside one's mind—which is unacceptable and which one therefore, by an unconscious trick of the mind, "projects" onto something outside oneself which can then be blamed. The scape-goat. A person thinks that he is evil and dirty—ne projects this outside himself and hears "voices" telling him dirty stories. A typical case of paranoia. Eve is tempted by the serpent; Adam is tempted by Eve—this is actually the excuse Adam gives when God calls him to account for his disobedience and defiance.

We need to realize this, but we must not dismiss too lightly Genesis' at-first-sight naiver account. For there is some sort of sense in which Evil is outside us. It comes from within us and our own thoughts and feelings and longings. Jesus said once, "Whatsoever thing from without entereth into the man, it cannot defile him... that which cometh out of the man, that defileth him. For... out of the heart of men proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness: All these evil things come from within, and defile the man." (Mark 7:18-23) Yet it does come—it issues out
of us and rises above us, and it seems to have a power over us in the face of which we are powerless—it has in a sense a life and a being of its own. The psychologist may be quite right—I think he is, and so did Jesus—in suggesting that in origin the Evil, the demon, comes out of us and is projected in our minds. Yet once he comes he takes on an objective reality which is by no means so easy for the psychologist either to explain or to cope with. Telling us that our feelings of being tempted by something outside ourselves are mere figments of our imagination turns out to do no good about 95 percent of the time however true it may be to the outsider. It doesn't seem to help much. And even if we can get rid of one demon this way occasionally, we nearly always find his place quickly taken and, as Jesus once pointed out, it is apt to be taken by, not one, but seven other devils more wicked than the first. (Luke 11:26) Modern psychology has never given us a deeper insight than this.

So man's longing for reality, for existence, finally wins out. Eve eats the apple and persuades Adam to do so, too, and their eyes are opened; they know Good from Evil, and they see Evil in themselves; their nakedness of body now appears to them as Evil though in fact it is no different than it was a moment before. And it is Evil for them precisely because they perceive it as such.

If we accept the general outlines of Darwin's Theory of the Evolution of Man from some lower form of animal life (as I personally do) as being an accurate-scientific account of what actually happened; nevertheless, this story still fits in. For one of the chief ways—perhaps THE chief way—in which man is to be distinguished from other forms of animal life is in his consciousness of the difference between Good and Evil or between Right and Wrong. And there must have been some moment in time when that first half ape—half man saw this dimly and naively—and that was the moment the decisive, crucial moment—when he became MAN. He knew Good from Evil, and he also knew that he would die some day, (which Genesis hints at, too, as being important, though not too clearly) and so he now was man—an ape no longer.

Man comes into existence. He becomes real. He actualizes his potentiality. It is a glorious moment in one sense.

But, of course, it is a tragic moment, too. Man becomes man—he comes into existence—he happens—by exercising his power to choose between Good and Evil—his God-given power, but he exercises this Power by choosing Evil, not Good. He takes the path of rebellion rather than obedience. He sets himself up as a god and refuses to acknowledge his dependence upon, and obligation to love and serve and obey, the true God, his maker. This is not only the story of Adam and Eve, it is the story of every man, woman and child who has ever lived and lives now or ever shall live in this world. Not that he is wholly evil, or never chooses right; but that he always may, and sometimes does, choose wrong, and that, in any case, circumstances are almost always such that he really does not have a simple, clear-cut choice between right and wrong. There are two sides to every question, we say, and this is profoundly true. This is the ambiguity of existence. It is good to exist—to be real—and
yet it seems to come through Evil—through choosing Evil. Through rebellion and alienation—alienation from God and alienation from our fellow men.

This is the terrible predicament of man that St. Paul sees and feels so acutely that he at length cries out, "O, wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from the Body of this Death?" After a life time of struggle to deliver himself by ever more and more heroic efforts to keep God's law and will, which, simply because he is a human being, he finds impossible, he calls finally for a deliverer—someone bigger and stronger than himself to save him from that which he can no longer pretend to be able to conquer by himself and notice that he identifies this simply as his own human nature—"the body of this death".

In a quieter mood the great fifth century saint and theologian, St. Augustine of Hippo, expressed much the same thought when he said, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Thee."

We are in bondage, then, to Sin, to Evil, to Rebellion against God, and to Death. We seem to be alive, but Death is in us, getting stronger and stronger. This is man in existence. This is the existential situation.

I agree with the insights Dr. Bailey shared with us four weeks ago when from his point of view as a biologist and evolutionist, he identified the goal of the evolutionary process as freedom, but I am not sure we would give the same name to that from which we are striving to be free. St. Paul calls it Sin and Death. In terms which seem very powerful in our times, I would perhaps be more inclined to call it "alienation" or "estrangement" or "loneliness" or "meaninglessness". Dr. Bailey might say freedom from the necessities placed upon us by our exterior environment; nature, I would suggest that equally, if not more, important is freedom from our own interior environment, our human nature, the body of this death.

This, then, is the problem—but what is the solution? At first sight it might seem to lie simply in a return to the Garden of Eden. But this, upon closer examination proves to be neither possible nor desirable for several reasons.

To begin with, God has forbidden it. He has set a cherub with a flaming sword to guard the gates of Eden. I do not say this simply naively as though I meant or believed it literally. But this powerful imagery expresses a profound understanding and interpretation of the Divine Will. He does not want man back in the Garden of Eden—and this for man's sake. Remember, that in the Garden man was without sin, but he was also without reality or actuality as we have interpreted the story. He was not really man, but something less than man—"subman" perhaps we should label him. In any case, he did not know Good from Evil and was, therefore, unable to choose either of his own free will. He was not yet fully the image of God that he is ultimately destined to be, to use the biblical phrase—and this precisely because he was not yet truly free.

Come at it through the Bible through Genesis—or come at it through a Theory of Evolution—you get the same result it seems to me. Man in actual
historical existence as we know him is far from perfect in any respect—indeed, he is in a pretty sorry case—but still he is farther along the road toward his ultimate destiny—the image of God—than he was when he was a dreaming, and dream-like innocent in the Garden—or than he was when he was a sort of half man, half ape, whichever way you want to put it.

Thomas Wolfe, the American novelist, wrote a book once entitled, "You Can't Go Home Again," and this is very true. It is true in the life of an individual and it is true in the life of the human race. Clearly, we have no power simply to return to Eden, even if we should want to. The great philosopher and poet, Omar Khayyam, said:

"The moving finger writes, and, having writ,
Moves on; nor all thy piety nor wit
Can call it back to cancel half a line,
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it."

That is a philosophical or metaphysical insight. Jesus puts the same thing in terms of a moral principle where He says, "No man, having put his hand to the plow, and looking back, is fit for the Kingdom of God."

(Luke 9:62)

We can't go home again—back to Eden or back to the cave or back to the womb—and we don't really want to. For this would be to lose our reality—our manhood.

What then do we need? First of all, we need something stronger and bigger and more powerful than ourselves—something wiser and something better. Something which can be our deliverer. Something to save us from that from which we cannot save ourselves.

And yet this something must not at the same time destroy us—it must not take away our reality, our existence. It must leave the Good while overcoming the Evil; it cannot simply destroy the Evil for that is too much a part of us and to do so would involve destroying us into the bargain. Note the parable of the Wheat and the tares at this point (Matthew 13:24–30). If one were simply to take away or destroy the Evil, it would be necessary to destroy our capacity to choose Evil. And this would be back in the Cave—subman.

The Evil can not be destroyed, uprooted. It must be overcome—overcome by Good—transformed into Good (Romans 12:21). Death must be transformed into Life and this can only be done by One who is Goodness Itself—Life Itself—yet who does not force or coerce us by superior power—but one who shows us the way—one who leads us instead of pushing or driving or trapping us. And such a One—a One we will follow freely and of our own choice—can only be one of us. One who is "tempted like as we are, yet without Sin" (Hebrews 4:15).

In short, what we need is God become man.

It is the faith of the Christian Church that this is what has actually happened. That it happened right in our world of time and space approximately 2,000 years ago now, in an obscure corner of the great Roman Empire that was then called Judaea, was, for a long time called Palestine, and which we have recently started to call Israel again.
And it happened for this very purpose—to save man from this situation that he had got himself in and had been in ever since he first really became man. This whole situation we have been talking about up to now and which we have labelled the "existential" situation.

It is the faith of the Christian Church that this happened—that God took the initiative and came into the world to save it from the existential situation I have been describing. According to the writer of the Fourth Gospel, Jesus Himself, described His own mission in a famous verse: "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son to the end that all that believe in Him should not perish but have everlasting life." (John 3:16). St. Paul puts it, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself (II Corinthians 5:19). St. John emphasises the goal as "life"—"everlasting life". St. Paul puts the emphasis on the reconciliation. The one is stressing the idea of the enemy as Death; the other sees it in terms of Sin and Evil—both are right and both points need to be made. In a sense, this corresponds to what we were suggesting earlier when we talked about the double nature of Evil—it both comes from within us, and yet rises above and has power over us.

But both sayings agree in putting emphasis on God—it was God's action—God's initiative. Man was helpless and could do nothing to save himself. In was God who "so loved the world that He sent His only begotten Son, etc." It was God who "was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself," Christ is the one who came to "deliver us from the body of this death". He it is who "came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many" (Mark 10:45).

This He accomplished, as the last text suggests, on the Cross, where He humbled Himself—humbled Himself to God's will, and became obedient unto death (Phil. 2:8). In so doing it was God acting to save man, and it was also man acting to save man—it was God become man. Just here the story of Adam is finally reversed. Christ is the new Adam as St. Paul suggests (I Cor. 15:21, 22). The obedient Adam where the first one was disobedient, the one who gives life where the first one brought Death.

The word "life" (or its opposite "death") is of crucial importance here. Genesis suggest that it was through the sin of Adam that Death came into the world. The New Testament has many sayings about life, some of which we have already quoted, "he that believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life"—"I am come that they might have life" (John 10:10).

And yet in the ordinary way we use the word "life" it seems that man had life before Jesus came, and he still has it. And on the other hand, he does not seem to have eternal life any more than he ever had it before Jesus. He certainly still dies. What can the New Testament be talking about when it speaks of Jesus as having conquered death, when as a matter of fact everyone goes right on dying? What do we mean when we say Jesus conquered sin, when everyone goes right on sinning?

It seems to me we have to re-think and re-define what we really mean by the word "life". I should like to suggest that maybe the best way to do this is by distinguishing life from another word we have been using quite a lot this evening, and which we generally use as though it were exactly the
same as "life." I'm speaking now of the word "existence." But they are not the same. You may have occasionally heard or read of someone saying "I'm not living; I'm just existing." Such a person is expressing the fact that he finds his existence empty, meaningless, futile, unhappy, just the same old thing day after day and never really getting anywhere. In this slightly "slangy" way he is expressing a very important distinction between existence and life, that our more educated speakers often seem to miss or overlook. The same thing is true of expressions like "Man! That's really living!" or "Come on, let's live a little". There is a difference between mere existence and real, true, actual, full, abundant life!

Until Christ came, man was in the stage of existence in this sense. And he is still in it. Christ is the only one who has had life in the sense we are speaking of it. He is the only one of whom we can affirm that He has eternal life--the full life, the abundant life--and we affirm this because we believe that He rose from the dead on the third day, and ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father, and "ever liveth to make intercession for us" (Hebrews 7:25).

We are not in this stage--clearly we are not. We are still in existence, we still struggle with Sin and Death. But in Christ, and in the Spirit which He gives to those who ask it (Luke 11:13) and because of Him and what He has done once for all on Calvary's tree, we, too, can enter into this Life eternal, by uniting ourselves with and into Him, and His Love.

This, then, is the Christian's Hope, and this is Christ's promise for mankind. The essential and the existential man will be united with himself; he will no longer be a sort of schizophrenic or split personality. He will know who he is because he will know who God is. As Jeremiah puts it, "No longer will every man have to exhort his neighbor saying, 'know the Lord,' for they shall all know Him" (Jer. 31:34). He will be both essential man, perfect man, innocent man, sinless man, obedient man. And at the same time he will be existential man, real man, actual man, individual man, man who knows Good from Evil, but who now chooses Good. He will be man with life, life eternal, life abundant. Man no longer alienated, estranged, lonely, rebellious, in pain and sorrow. He will be united to God and to himself and to his fellow man.

The Presbyterians have a wonderful statement and I'm sure you will pardon me if I close by quoting it. They say: "The chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever."
A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT MAN

-Dr. John Watson

To follow the most of the introductory texts in the field of sociology or social science, the first discussion we ought to entertain would be: Is sociology scientific? In another sense we could ask: Is sociology actually one of the humanities trying to be scientific? From your reading of What Is Sociology? by Inkeles you know already that sociologists themselves don't agree and that certainly social scientist often attack each other about scientism. Footnoted in your booklet was a reference to one of the most debates between Russell Kirk, a leading political scientist, and Robert K. Merton, a leading sociologist. This argument appeared in June 25, 1961, and July 16, 1961, and subsequent issues of the New York Times.

It would be a mistake to assume, from emphasis upon differences, that social scientists have little in common. In the first place all humanities and social science have the common subject matter of mankind or human behavior. How to treat and study subject matter has been an argument in all science in all times (see p. 104, What is Sociology?).

If you accept the idea that science deals with the methods rather than the subject matter then sociology could be as scientific as any other discipline depending upon the methods employed. It can be argued that the natural or physical sciences are far ahead of the social sciences in their application of scientific methods to their subject matter. Often overlooked is the fact that human behavior is actually a vastly more complex subject matter than that of any of the natural or physical sciences; that variables in human behavior are often infinite in number and their complexity of relationship. If science is viewed as cause and effect relationship of variables then social science is handicapped by the great number of variables it needs to consider.

The humanities, including history and philosophy, can be described as a study of man without attempting to apply scientific methodology in the arriving at generalizations about his behavior. Philosophy has a dictionary meaning of: "the science which studies the real but unseen nature and causes of things" but the modern scientific methods allowing verification from one scientist to another is not used nor desirable. I am sure we could not resolve this question in the time allotted so I wish to talk about some of the basic concepts of sociology regardless of whether sociology is viewed as one of the humanities, a true social science, or perhaps an upstart discipline with a subject matter in the humanities and a methodology borrowed but poorly applied, from the natural sciences.

The Nature, Concepts, and Profession of Sociology

Most of my talk tonight will be based on sources other than your reader but with enough duplication, I hope, that your reading of What is Sociology? can be applied to what I might say. The different topics I would like to discuss briefly are:

2. The Nature of Behavior in a Social Setting
3. The Function of the Social System
4. The Role of the Individual in Society
5. The Development of Sociological Theory
6. The Impact of Technology on Society
7. The Role of Education in Sociological Research
8. The Importance of Ethical Considerations in Sociological Practice
9. The Application of Sociological Theories to Real-World Problems
10. The Future of Sociology in the 21st Century
1. The Nature of Sociology

2. Basic Sociological Concepts
   a. Culture
   b. Social Organization
   c. Symbolic Communication
   d. Socialization
   e. Population
   f. Social Institutions
   g. Social Stratification

3. Sociology as a Profession

The Nature of Sociology. I am following, in this discussion about the nature of sociology, one of the leading sociologists in the United States. We will notice, from my introductory remarks and your reading, that not all leading sociologists would agree as to what sociology is or ought to be. Robert Bierstedt, New York University, has described modern day sociology as having seven characteristics. They are as follows:

(1) Sociology is a social science not a natural science. This characteristic has only to do with content, not method. It distinguishes those sciences which deal with the physical universe. It distinguishes sociology from physics.

(2) Sociology is categorical not a normative discipline. It does, or should, confine itself to statements of what is and not what should be or ought to be. If sociology attempts to decide which values should be held, it is no longer a science but becomes a philosophy or dogma of some sort.

(3) Sociology is a pure science rather than an applied science. Here perhaps is one of the areas of greatest argument and misunderstanding. Sociology in this country started with a social reformer--most of them with a background in theology. The emphasis was upon social problems and their solution. Most sociologists today are still viewed by the average person as a social worker both studying and applying his knowledge of society. Modern sociologists are usually "professionalized"

in their graduate training to see themselves as acquiring knowledge about society to include knowledge that could be used to solve problems but most sociologists disdain the role of applying this knowledge.

(4) Sociology is an abstract science and not a concrete one. Sociologists are concerned with the form and pattern of human events and not with concrete or unique events.

(5) Sociology is a generalising rather than a particularising science. It must seek laws or principles of human interaction and association. History might, on the other hand, attempt complete and comprehensive descriptions of particular societies or events without any attempt at generalization about the nature, form, content, and structure of human groups and societies.

(6) Sociology is both a rational and empirical science. All modern science makes use of empirical findings and a rational approach to order and arrange information. This relates to the old argument about theory and facts.

(7) Sociology is a general and not a special social science. This accounts for some of the bitter disputes between social scientists. Perhaps economics is a special social science but the sociologist is interested in man's economic behavior so that there is a sociology of economics in spite of the fact that economics as a social science is older and more specialized than sociology.

So in summary--sociology claims to be a social, a categorical, a pure, an abstract, a generalising, both a rational and empirical, and a general science. Is it any wonder that other disciplines including the natural and social sciences can attack sociology as a pretentious unstart? Is it any wonder that sociologists themselves don't agree as to what sociology is or should be?
At least a semester's work should be spent on the differences between and the
overlapping of sociology with other disciplines or fields of study. Is anthropology even more general than sociology? When are you being anthropological and/or sociological?

Basic Sociological Concepts. Culture is perhaps the most basic and useful sociological concept but the anthropologists first defined culture. A brief definition or description of culture is: shared, learned behavior. Culture is what man learns from other men and in turn transmits to others, the socially acquired and communicated functions of thinking, feeling, and acting. Peculiar to man alone, cultural behavior is man made, and in turn it makes man what he is. Unlike animal behavior, culture accumulates and changes, but always in a structured or organized context. The basic idea that culture is man made exclusively is being re-examined currently by anthropologists in studies of primate behavior. Their findings seem to indicate that apes and monkeys do have culture or proto-culture, but there is such a large gap between man's ability to accumulate and transmit culture and that of any other species that this concept of man's cultural behavior is not really challenged.

Social organization is group patterns formed by two or more interacting humans for the purpose of facilitating the achievement of at least one common purpose. This social organization forms the structure within which cultural patterns take shape. A social organization ranges from an association or single purpose group at one extreme, to society an inclusive, multipurpose social structure which at least engages in maintenance and perpetuation of its members at the other extreme.

Man is the only animal able to form and use true language. This helps to account for the great gap between man's culture and that of the apes. This occurs through symbolic communication or "algebraic thinking." This ability plus the fortunate combination in man of unusual intelligence, habit-forming capacity, and physical equipment such as vocal cords sets him well above any other animal in ability to acquire and transmit culture.

The individual human undergoes the process of socialization of humanization. He learns the culture and actually becomes human in the sense of having a personality or concept of self.

Basic to any study of human behavior are the vital processes of population growth, composition, distribution and mobility.

Social institutions are those complex and relatively permanent clusters of both structure and function involving statuses and roles, and revolving around basic human need and drives. The major social institutions usually recognized and elaborated in sociology are the family, the economy, religion, government, and education.

Social stratification or as often seen and discussed by sociologists under the more inclusive heading of social differentiation seems to be universal in societies. It takes many different forms but enough difference seems to exist in any society to give different positions and roles to people. A classification of people of like statuses as contrasted to those of different statuses
will give some idea of layers or stratification. This stratification is often called classes or caste systems. Is the American Negro in a caste system or is most of his number in the lower class?

Whatever measures are used to make or show differences in strata usually consider the unequal social distribution of prestige, authority, power, and wealth. Most of this material about sociological concepts is from Contemporary Sociology An Introductory Textbook of Readings, Edited by Milton L. Barron.

Sociology as a Profession. Seventy percent of American sociologists are associated with American colleges and universities. This percentage was much higher earlier. The thirty percent of sociologists who are working outside of an academic setting shows a modern trend from almost 100 percent of sociologists who taught their subject. Of those 70 percent in colleges and universities all are not teaching and most perhaps are engaged in both research and teaching. It is rather usual in our universities which have graduate schools of sociology to save the professor for research and some graduate classes and have the undergraduate, especially the principles or introductory courses in sociology, taught by graduate students.

In spite of the earlier claim of sociology to be a pure science, more and more professional sociologists are working for government and industry—very often mixing pure and applied research.

In our attempts to hire Ph. D.'s for our expanding sociology sub-department here at Western, we see that currently there is a "sellers' market" and that young Ph. D.'s without experience are much in demand. Because of this unfilled demand M. A.'s are hired usually with the mutual expectation of employer and employee that he will continue his studies toward the Ph. D.

We are attempting to offer at Western a good, solid undergraduate program which will admit students to graduate schools of sociology, give them training in sociology under the education curriculum which will qualify for certification at the secondary level; and we hope to offer a major in sociology with a social work emphasis (12 hours of social work).

There is presently a trend by graduate schools to require more mathematics of entering students. This comes about because of the emphasis on research in the graduate schools and the greatly increased emphasis on statistical methodology within research by sociologists.

Summary

We have looked very briefly at the field or discipline of sociology. Most sociologists believe the nature of man to be rather neutral and subject to the influence of his culture or social situation. We identified seven characteristics of modern sociology according to the beliefs of Robert Bierstedt, one of our leading sociologists. Some, but certainly not all, of the concepts of sociology were reviewed and lastly a very brief glimpse at the profession of sociology and the curriculum here at Western was reviewed.

For lack of time, I have left out the history of sociology to include the different "schools" of thought or theory within sociology. The methods and
models used to analyze the subject matter, some of the universal processes such as cooperation and competition which you would hear about in any first course in sociology—e ven folkways and mo res as an elaboration of culture were omitted here.

I have deliberately left out a one-sentence definition of sociology. If one were demanded it would sound like that of Sorokin's: "A generalizing science of socio-cultural phenomena viewed in their generic forms, types, and manifold interconnections." One sentence but broad enough to include everything the sociologist does.

I hope you will have begun to realize from the other speakers you have had in this series on modern man that we all might well be talking about the same thing, i.e. human behavior but that the approach is different. No one approach is necessarily best and ideally college students should somehow acquire knowledge from all of these fields of study before he launches on specialization in what some writers consider an overspecialized American society.

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A PSYCHOLOGIST LOOKS AT CONTEMPORARY MAN

-Dr. Charles Shedd

One of the more popular pastimes of scholars is to contemplate present conditions and predict future events. A preoccupation born, perhaps, from the desire to be scientific and stimulated, without doubt, by a need of reassurance. Beneath our boisterous facade and seeming self-confidence is fear. Not fear of some Jungian racial origin or some realization of a micro-genetic contamination, but fear of the future which we are in the process of creating. This fear derives from a basic consideration that function presupposes structure, or more specifically, that whatever man really may become is dependent upon the basic nature of man. Many psychologists are among the optimistic in believing that it is the scientific temper which has brought man from the sympathetic magic of caves to the age of nuclear fission. They would argue that the nature of man is amenable to the same investigation. There are not a few of these who would have us believe that we know sufficiently enough about human nature to improve it vastly, verily in a single generation. With present knowledge we are led to believe that we could reduce tensions among individuals, within groups and between nations.

This is a relatively new role for psychologists, for until recently they have not been presumptuous enough to propose recipes for human nature or social organizations which, if followed explicitly, will produce the productive individual and the creative society. They have, in the past, left this task to those engaged in literature, art, philosophy, and religion.
No doubt growing bolder with increased numbers and greater affluence, psychologists have started pointing out that the models proposed by their more artistic colleagues are obviously inadequate. The obvious justification of their criticism is the miring of mankind in anxiety and frustration. It is, indeed, easy to see, they believe that the models and creeds now existent are in need of modern restatement or, at least, of dynamic implementation before they can be made effective in an age of atomic energy and totalitarian peril. That we are living in an era of insecurity is iterated so frequently that it is almost a slogan. Such also are the notions that: both for nations and individuals life has become a matter of survival; there is a restless necessity of living for the day with immediate and personal interest as the motivating force, pressure groups strive diligently to promote their limited self-centered interests completely indifferent to an understanding; there is a lack of a common ideal to capture the imagination; there is no common purpose to which individuals will dedicate themselves with subordination of selfish goals; we have not inculcated a brotherhood of man in numbers sufficient to constitute in the social order a determining influence of sufficient magnitude to make an individual feel strange or abnormal in not conforming with this belief.

This array of evidence is sufficient to justify the allegation that our religions and philosophies have been ineffective and we should resort to new methods, new ideas, and new disciplines in meeting these difficulties. That some group of specialists is aware of the problems and concerned with their solution is comforting. That some individuals with a lot of brains will save humanity at the proper moment is reassuring.

No only may we rest confidently that someone is keeping an eye on things, but we may obtain volumes prepared by these eagle-eyed individuals, which, if followed carefully will point the way to greater happiness, security, and togetherness.

Science has made such tremendous inroads on disease that it is almost presumptuous to question those who claim to have a scientific solution to psychological and social problems. Yet there is a nagging idea which confronts me as I read these prescriptions, maybe, just maybe, there isn't any future for men. Maybe that which we are concerned with as a problem is representative of the nature of man. Maybe the nature of man is so indifferent to the environmental surroundings that the limits of development have already been achieved. What if the hand that hefted the ax, the man who won for us against the ice, the tiger and the bear, is the same hand that fashions the atomic bomb. Maybe that which we hope is the future of man is the capacity of man to dream. Maybe all culture is at the expense of the nature of man.

Certainly we must garner the same type of evidence regarding the nature of man as we collected concerning the inadequacy of his philosophies. Immediately it is apparent that man has been man for so long that no one bothers to be surprised by this fact. We need little encouragement to believe that our children will resemble us. Likewise we are not astounded that cats will have kittens and kittens will become cats. It is so habitual an event that we don't stop to ask why this happens or to question the amazing precision in the results. As men began their groping to classify and order the world and
as they have continued in this pursuit, it has been remarkably clear that there is little variability within all species. Despite creative whimsy, there are no evidences of men with ears so large that their owners could sleep in them, or monopods, or of giants, or of cyclopes. There is an amazing regularity in pattering. What is in this pattering we find the origin of individual and social disturbances?

Leaving these questions for a moment, let us view, rather generally, the diagnoses and prescriptions that have been proffered. By far the most dominant thesis has been to conceive of society as made up on interacting individuals. The beliefs, feelings, and actions of these individuals determine the success or failure of the social organization of which they are a part. If harmonious human relationships are to be established, it is necessary for individuals who comprise the society to achieve a psychic integration. One in which there is freedom to have mature relationships and one in which there are desires to be socialized. Without going into great detail, let it be said that among the criteria for maturity is one common item, a sense of secure personal status. Interpretation of this dicta includes the necessity to accept oneself as an individual entity, with innate dignity and value, such that it is not at the mercy of opinion, but is established with consideration of it. There should be a freedom to observe reality without the need to distort it. There should be freedom to think without protective blind spots from past, painful experience. There should be freedom to choose and implement behavior. This capacity is learned, not innate. It is achieved, however, only in successfully responding to basic problems.

One such basic problem requiring solution is handling contradictory innate impulses. These impulses are constructive and destructive. In the former there is a loss of a sense of self. This, supposedly, is manifest in feelings of love aroused by a sense of oneness. Success of this impulse is contingent on the elimination of the self as a separate entity. The latter tendency has as its goal the accentuation of a defined and separate self. In this case the satisfactions are associated with muscular activity that arouses feelings of power and pride and gives evidence of an ability to impress the environment. The self that produces this condition is removed from the environment.

In the first instance, status is dependent upon other people. Only the trust and assurance of being loved and wanted can bring this impulse to fruition. In the second, status is self-determined. To be oblivious to what the need of the environment might be enhances the power in the self.

The conditions of childhood are viewed as enhancing the first of these. The sensual satisfactions of warmth, of security, of fulfillment experienced in nursing to a state of satiety. Frequent repetition establishes a conviction that pleasure may be expected later in life, yet at the same time there is a pleasure in action which finds expression in power. The consciousness of power carries with it a recognition of its effects.

In satisfying each of these impulses, frustration is inevitable. Hence, frustration becomes a problem to the individual for which a solution must be found. In the dual functioning, complete and absolute fulfillment of either
of personal relationships and social acceptance. The meaning and discipline of these impulses should be learned, but it is viewed as essential that this be accomplished without the loss of personal status and with feelings of being loved and loving. A self must evolve and be capable of accepting the mental pain of devaluation or frustration without abolition of a sense of status.

In other words social disorder, neurosis, and perversion are indirect functions of methods of individual control. These are the prices paid for control of sexual and aggressive impulses necessary, or deemed necessary, by society. This presents three logical possibilities relative to resolution:

1. Withdraw social control or demands
2. Accept abnormality as a "natural consequence of restriction or
3. Devis a method which will provide maximal individual spontaneity and social control.

The most acceptable solution, apparently in terms of present knowledge, has been the first which advocates withdrawal of social control. In effect this is a reinstitution of a conception of man a la Rousseau which believes that by nature man is basically good and if uncontaminated by social pressures and demands, he will express a "natural" ethic which will provide individual creativity and productiveness and social harmony.

That a total abolition of society can be accomplished or a minimal society established immediately is understood; but until such a program is in operation, we can reduce the difficulties by accepting that personality disorders and social disorganization are not one’s own fault but the result of overstrong superego which are consequences of too strenuous socialization of individuals at the hands of harsh unloving parents and an irrational society. These helpless individuals are innocent victims of the "sins of their fathers". "Our
natural and social environments oppress us with its foreignness, its unsuitability as a home for all that is specifically human about us as individuals. If we are genuine persons, sensitive to the human situation, we can gain no hold or support in nature or society!"

Liberating man from tradition, superstition, convention, authoritarianism, monotheism, social and economic class limitation will produce reason and beauty.

There are those who allow a historical view to enter their conceptions who find acceptance to the foregoing proposals. Sasse points out:

"The notion of mental illness (produced by the superego conflict) has outlined whatever usefulness it might have had and now functions as a convenient myth... mental illness is a myth, whose function is to disguise and thus render palatable the bitter pill of moral conflicts in human relations."

A historical view further indicates that man will be ruled. The majority of men lack the power to form their own conceptions of the real and the ideal. There will be guiding principles. There will be uniform and authoritative rules based on guiding ideals. There will be men who propose, represent and who embody ideals, and who make and enforce the rules based on them.

As the supposed horrors of social influences have been removed rather than spontaneously creative individuals, we find men living by individual taste and desire. Meaning and commitment disappear to be replaced by the frivolous and boring. There are no deep convictions, no strong principles, to suggest such creates embarrassment. A kind of skepticism or even cynicism undermines all intentions and movements. It becomes a matter of pride to remain cool, aloof and uncommitted.

In our social orders the individual suffers a split in attitude. Society nurtures and strengthens men, and men require an ordered society in which to unfold their powers. On the other hand there may be a lunging animal drive for unlimited satisfaction, but there must be inculcated the notion that order is necessary for human striving. Throughout human history, authority has been conceived as sin and escape from authority has been viewed as freedom. The guilt, if the term may be used somewhat broadly, is order itself. The guilty are those who impose authority. While man has this realization he has not been foolish enough to recommend a liberation from regulation except in limited and restricted circumstances such as in folklore where we find the symbolism of the dying king, the mock king or the king as fool or in such lapses of authority as the Roman Saturnalia. More realistically man has seen the necessity of a heroic quality.

Authority, then, is faced with the thankless task of demanding from the less competent, conformity to regulations. The authority may attempt to seek support to restrictions by either love and/or fear.

Machiavelli understood this problem for when the question of whether a prince should be loved or feared, he replied:

"One ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to
be wanting. For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours; they offer you their blood, their goods, their life, and their children, as I have said before, when the necessity is remote, but when it approaches, they revolt, and the prince who has relied solely on their words, without making preparations is ruined; for the friendship which is gained by purchase and not through a grandeur and mobility of spirit is bought but not secured, and at a pinch is not to be explained in your service. And men have less scruples in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose, but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails. Still, a prince should make himself feared in such a way that if he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids hatred; for fear and the absence of hatred may well go together!"

When the plight of man is grasped, it is sensed immediately that any attempt at a solution is artificial, i.e., it is a work of art rather than of nature, it is false because it attempts to solve a dilemma which is inherent in man and polity. It becomes remarkably clear that man may not be allowed the privilege of a private conviction, i.e., a public statement of duty, responsibility and goodness must be made and adhered to by all.

A grave task is imposed upon the one who assumes authority. He must be acutely aware of that which is deterministic and that which is free. Hence, he has the capacity to throw his weight, however slight it may be, on the side of one particular response among several possible ones. This capacity is not license, not doing as one pleases, not living by whim, but rather a realization that one lives in a world, further, he must have the capacity to accept and bear anxiety, for without this he has no capacity to learn. This man must possess a measure of rationality, some freedom, a generic conscience, propriate ideals. In other words, he must be different from his fellow men. He is not pushed by drives alone, molded entirely by environmental circumstance. He is not a consequence of the small and partial, the internal and mechanical, tied to the peripheral and opportunistic. But neither can he project his behavior to all mankind. He must be constantly aware that the future of man might be sabotaged by assumptions which discard the truth. Psychology must be willing to correct its own exuberance and be willing to admit that the ballot box and liberated individuals may destroy those very things which they were designed to create.
MODERN MAN AND HIS MUSIC

-Dr. Thomas Stone

"The Artist...speaks to our capacity for delight and wonder, to the sense of mystery surrounding our lives; to our sense of pity, and beauty, and pain; to the latent feeling of fellowship with all creation—to the subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts, to the solidarity of dreams, in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear which binds men to each other, which binds together all humanity—the dead to the living and the living to the unborn."

Joseph Conrad in The Conditions of Art

It is reasonable to assume, I am certain, that when man from his very beginnings has filled his belly in order to sustain life, when he has managed to clothe his body for protection against the sun's heat and wind's cold, and when he has secured himself from the more rigorous of nature's elements—the hurricanes and blizzards—by putting a roof over his head, that when he has accomplished these primary operations necessary for comfortable survival, he has merely prepared himself to experience the first pangs of dissatisfaction with his state on earth. It is basic in man's nature that existence, however comfortable that experience may be, is an insufficient state for him and that to remain in this state is most unsatisfying.

Modern man is no different from ancient man in his need for expressing himself. Perhaps, as the first seacoast dwellers rested on a beach, they may have idly sketched designs in the smooth sand with their toes, or fingers, or with a stick. As you know, some of the first evidences of man's expressing of himself in art are found in primitive sketches in the caves of Southern France.

In music we may assume that primitive man found the thumping sound produced when a hollow log was struck gave him a measure of satisfaction beyond the reals of food, shelter, clothing, or security. In similar fashion, it is quite probable that primitive man found himself humming, much the same as modern man discovers, in the midst of a task, that he is humming or whistling. From such beginnings, certainly, must have come sophisticated instrumental and vocal expressions of the contemporary scene.

With the development of vocal and instrumental performing skills, man discovered a new medium for communicating. Through art and music he found himself in possession of a "language of intuition and perception" through which he could express his inner life. He did not have to "translate" this language into terms of reason; his statement did not need to hold "true" for everyone. With art, man found he could exercise his imagination in creating an image which reflects and exalts truth and beauty through the organization of his chosen medium, painting, sculpture, and music, to name only three of the more important forms.

As with all forms of communication, at least two individuals must be involved. In music a relationship of communication is established between the creator (composer) and audior (listener). It is this rapport with which we are primarily concerned in this particular seminar, for man has, for many centuries, employed music principally as an esthetic experience.
We have paid almost no attention here to the transition of music from the primitive to the esthetic. Many theories have been advanced concerning music's beginnings. Some believe its origins may be found in the imitation of bird songs; others feel that music had its roots in the dance, or in emotional speech. Perhaps, as Sachs and Parker hold, it had its beginnings in song, however primitive, and that it evolved because of the great need for communication in primitive life. Expressions of emotions—happiness, anger, sorrow—could be made by voice inflections; perhaps the primitive singer discovered he could "sing" these same emotions.

The change in purposes for instruments which provided intertribal communications and accompaniments for the dance, came about when these instruments were made for their own sake. At this time both vocal and instrumental music became a free art and the esthetic purpose became more important than the utilitarian.

Esthetics, you will recall, is derived from the Greek "aisthēsia", which means feeling-sensation, and attempts in its philosophical division, to "systematize a body of ideas and principles that deal with the beautiful, sensation, and emotion, as related to works of art." Musical esthetics studies the relationship of music to the senses and intellect of man. It deals with the beautiful in music. The evaluation of this beauty depends, of course, on who makes the evaluation—the philosopher, who considers values; the psychologist who considers behavior; or the critic who considers standards. In examining several periods of music history briefly, we shall concern ourselves with philosophers who are important in the history of music, and we shall make this brief examination only to substantiate our promise that music, for modern man, has essentially the identical purposes it has had for men of every period.

The Greeks, who established what was known as a science of music, related the mathematical theory of harmony to the harmony of the universe. Plato related music to moral conduct. He believed music had the therapeutic properties of being able to calm the emotions. Music, for him, was the foremost of arts and was not to be used only for amusement.

During the Middle Ages we find an Aristotelian realistic view of music in which only an actual experience with music gave one a real knowledge of the art. A study of music was advocated for its educational and therapeutic values, for amusement, and its appeal to the intellect.

The Christian Chant (Gregorian) developed during this period. This monophonic form permitted man to merge his personality in something outside itself. Even in Medieval secular music, in the ballad forms, there was a parallel impersonality. "The natural instinct for the dramatic was absorbed into the wide context of the relation between God and man; into the ritual of the Mass and into ceremonial pageantry. There was a continual interaction between technical and spiritual qualities in the religious art music and popular folk music of the day. The two elements of folksong and liturgical chant were the source of all medieval monody. Troubadors, you will recall, were the representatives of the sophisticated and aristocratic culture of the period, but were usually trained in monasteries..."
In summary, Medieval music, whether ritualistic, sophisticated and popular unaccompanied monody, derived from the "nature of the medieval view of human experience, from the search for the unity and universality of God.

The Gothic period saw architecture eclipsing the other arts. Music made a transition from sacred to secular, but remained a moral power, acting on the mind. Polyphony superceded monody in what was perhaps an attempt to extend music's resources without breaking from the moral and religious implications of medieval style. Organum, a simple way of singing the same melody in a slightly different way, soon invited experimentation by composers with the more complex and more rhythmically elaborate counter melodies. With more than one part involved, it became increasingly different to keep the performers together and mensuration (time-keeping) was inevitable. The change from monody to polyphony was basically a rhythmic one. There was much dance music in the Middle Ages.

It was then that the fusing of the ripening social and personal consciousness with the old religious impersonality began. The new polyphony reflected a growing concern for the rise of social groups. The old monody expressed the Catholic ideal of spiritual world unity; the polyphonic experimentation of the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries paralleled social upheavals of the times.

Humanism dominated the esthetic point of view of the Renaissance Period and secular music benefited most. "Beauty was cultivated for its own sake." Invention of the printing press made music available to greater numbers of people, a great socializing effect. The advent of vertical-chordal texture dictated that harmony become the essence of the musical esthetic doctrine of the period.

The Renaissance is the real starting point of instrumental music, though there occurred, also, a renewed emphasis on sacred music. Often, because of the inter-penetration of Christian and humanistic elements, there was no differentiation between secular and liturgical style. Man, in this period, as in the past, was adapting his music to his needs.

The Baroque Period (1600-1715, approximately) interests us specially because it is the "first period to be consistently represented in concert repertory." We have, today, a great revival in the forms of baroque music.

This was the era of absolute monarchy. It was an age of reason. Kepler, Galileo, Copernicus, Descartes, Spinoza, Harvey, Locke, and Newton are names to be remembered from this period. The middle classes gained wealth and power as did the conquistadors.

Music and art reflected the times--they were expressions imbued with the dramatic and the grandiose. Music making for the middle classes centered in the home, the church, and the university. The comic opera
The baroque artist was often the composer himself. His music was created for a special occasion—a royal wedding or a religious service. It was always for immediate use. As Machlis reminds us, "He was an artisan in a handicraft society" and "functioned as a religious man fired by the word of God, or as a loyal subject exalting his king. He had never heard of art for art's sake... He did not discuss aesthetics of the nature of inspiration; but, impelled by a lofty moral vision, he united superb mastery of his craft with profound insights into the nature of experience. He began by writing for a particular time and place; he ended creating for the ages."

Rococo music and art were doomed because they were geared to the wrong segment of society—aristocracy. In this period following the baroque (1715-1750) profusely ornamented melody, chiefly secular, was the dominant element. Rococo music, centered in the court salon, was a distinct change from baroque seriousness and heaviness to lightness and elegance (gallant style).

The "style bourgeois," a branch of Rococo, gave rise to the Classic period of 1750-1825. To lightness was added simplicity, warmth, soul, and genuine sentiment. The newly educated middle class of society reflected this warmer climate. Composers created with the media of simple ornamented melody and simple harmony. There was greater expressiveness in this music with the use of contrasting dynamic effects ranging from triple piano to triple forte. In instrumental works there was a trend to absolute music with the development of the sonata and finally the symphony—then considered...
the highest form of instrumental music. This leaning toward the classic idea in which form the beauty are emphasized gave the period its name, Classic.

The Romantic Period (1825-1900) represented a revolt from the esthetics of the classic period which were based on order, form, and discipline. Music became more personal; the composer reflected the greater individual freedom of the times and his works acquired a subjective quality. Describing Beethoven's music, E. T. A. Hoffman wrote: "Beethoven's music sets in motion the lover of fear, of awe, of horror, of suffering, and awakens just that infinite longing which is the essence of romanticism."

This was the romantic spirit into which Wagner was born and the philosophy with which he advocated the fusion of the arts. Anti-Wagner romanticists argued that music is an autonomous art, without extra-musical qualities. The Romantic Period was one of esthetic contrasts.

Chromatic harmony, program music, and gigantic instrumental ensembles were products of this period.

And so we arrive at the Modern Period--1900 to the present. We recall, with Machlis, that only the rate of change varies in art; the element of change is ever present. It is interesting to note that only three dates in history are associated with abrupt change: 1300, the rise of ars nova (new art); 1600, the "new music;" and 1900, also "new music."

Shock came with the beginning of each period, but 1900 brought the greatest dislocation of all. Poets, painters and composers really did "upset the apple cart" of the romanticists with their new concepts around 1900.

Adjustment is still being made after half a century, but there are yet many for whom "this modern stuff" is but a perpetration of creative artists who seem to be attempting to destroy all the values in art that the public had come to cherish.

As we mentioned, the adjustment is well under way. In 1913, when Stravinsky's "Le Sacre du printemps" (Rite of Spring) was first performed, the premiere was described as "one of the most scandalous in modern musical history; the revolutionary score touched off a near-riot. People hooted, screamed, slapped each other, and were persuaded that they were hearing what constituted a blasphemous attempt to destroy music as an art."

It took only a year to find Stravinsky vindicated when the same composition was received with enthusiasm.

A change from Romanticism was inevitable. Bombast, verbosity, sensual intoxication, unbridled emotionalism, the characteristics which derived from a too great fondness for the theatrical and grandiose, finally exhausted the irrepressible vitality which had carried music through the 19th century. The revolt of the modern movement brought a swing toward a new classicism--something of a "history repeats itself" idea. Like the classic creator, the modern classic composer (neoclassicist) takes for granted the power of music to express emotion and directs his attentions to "craftsmanship, beauty of design, and purity of style." He attempts to achieve a balance between the "need for expression and the control of form."
Unlike their predecessors, modern composers do not "emulate either the formal beauty of classical melody or the lyric expansiveness of the romantics." They may choose for models from "the plasticity of Gregorian Chant, the subtle irregularities of medieval and renaissance music," or "the luxuriance of Bach's melodic line." They may even "aspire to capture for the west the freedom, the improvisational quality of oriental melody."

The modern composer, again reflecting his times, abhors the superficial. In his melodies he states an idea once rather than two or three times and abandons symmetry and repetition in an attempt to "achieve a vibrant, taut line." This makes it imperative that the listener be alert, for the melody, especially without repetition, may not reveal its meaning readily.

Our present day composer is not unlike his contemporaries in literature in respect to this condensation of ideas. The rolling sentences of Victorian writers are a far cry from the "sinewy prose" of Hemingway and Steinback.

Familiar chords are not a background for contemporary melody--there is no keynote or returning "home base" note as there once was. This revitalization enables the melodic line to convey new meanings--20th century meanings.

While many people may think modern music has abandoned melody, they forget that the 20th century "recognizes the primacy of melody" but has abandoned only the "familiar landmarks" by which melody was once recognized.

Today we have discarded the punctuation marks of the good old days. As Stravinsky points out, "What survives change of system is melody."

It must be remembered that 20th century musicians, like those of every period, have sought new methods of expression. We have briefly touched upon new melodic expression. Harmony, the element of depth and perspective in music, no less than melody, has had a change since 1900. The triadic chord structure is still fundamental to many 20th century composers, but today's harmony may consist of tonalities superimposed upon each other so that we hear simultaneously the tonalities our forebears heard successively. Thus, the new phenomenon of polytonality or polyharmony. This clash of harmonies produces a bright virile sonority that typifies the 20th century revolt against the sweet sound of the romantic era."

Another significant step in 20th century harmony is the construction of chords on the interval of the fourth instead of the third. This combination offers a "pungency and freshness" akin to the new age.

In modern music dissonance is only relative. We have become adjusted to and accustomed to chords whose dissonance would have been unlistenable to audiences of an earlier era. The modern composer often ends his work with a dissonant chord. Henry Cowell's tone clusters ("forearm chords") are an extreme device of modern harmony. Dissonance, once merely a catalyst in the chordal progression, is now a value in itself. We of the 20th century are interested in dissonance, per se, rather than its resolution. Is this not a reflection of our disturbed and tense times?
Implicit in these greater dissonances is our use of all available
twelve tones within the century-old octave. No longer do we adhere strictly
to a major-minor feeling, and the twelve tone system "serves to create an
ambiguous tonality"--a sort of "Twilight Zone" of harmony--quite congenial
to the taste of our time.

Rhythm, today, no less than in the past, controls every aspect of
musical composition (music is an art that exists solely in time). However,
modern man has demonstrated a tendency of contemporary art to break from
conventional symmetry to the unexpected. Today "we enjoy the irregular
more than the regular when we understand it." Instead of conventional
duple, triple, and quadruple patterns we venture into combinations which
produce fives and sevens, and even eleven, and thirteen-beat patterns.

Modern composers have returned to classic ideals in their treatment
of the orchestra. The swollen sound of great masses of tone color so enjoyed
by Wagner and Strauss have been replaced by the "sharply defined colors of
the 18th century style." Individual timbres (tone color) are emphasized
instead of the mere doubling of melodic lines in various instrumental choirs.
This might be compared to the discarding of rich composite colors in all
painting for the austere lines of etching.

A warning comes from such outstanding 20th century composers as
Hindemith, Schoenbert, and Stravinsky that we must not indulge in the "fundamental error" of regarding orchestration (writing for orchestra) as a "source of enjoyment independent of the music. The time has come to put things in their
proper place."

In musical form, as in all art forms, the basic principle of repetition
and contrast serves to provide unity and variety. The one satisfies man's
need for reassurance and happiness in the familiar and the other side his
craving for the challenge of the unknown. Here again, we have the elements
of tension and relaxation. Ernst Toch happily describes form as "the bal-
ance between tension and relaxation."

Perhaps man's highest development of musical form was reached in
the classic period with the sonata--usually a four-movement cycle for solo,
duo, trio, quartet, quintet, concerto, or symphony. Briefly, the character-
istic movement of the cycle is the first constructed in sonata form. This
"epic-dramatic" form is based on opposing ideas--a home key idea and a
contrasting one in a related key. An Exposition sets forth these two ideas,
the first usually highly rhythmic and virile, the second more lyrical and
feminine. A Development section follows in which the composer reveals his
craftsmanship by hurling fragments of the ideas in conflict. Tension is built
up through a succession of melodic devices of inversion, augmentation, dimin-
ution, changes of rhythmic patterns, and through harmonic alteration with
frequent changes of keys. In the third section, a Recapitulation or Restate-
ment, the material is brought to a triumphant finale. The themes are
restated in proper order and the conflicting keys are resolved by presenting
both themes in the home key. A closing section (Coda) provides a final
affirmation of the home tonality.
Less lengthy than the classic sonata, that of the 20th century is compact and firm in design. There is little repetition and even the Restatement is curtailed. A composer may abridge a theme or introduce the subordinate theme before the principal theme in the Restatement. New developmental material may be introduced into the Restatement in order to heighten the listener’s interest. "His greater use of developmental material results often in a single span form, with "an unaltering drive that steadily mounts in tension." The 20th century composer dispenses with much of his punctuation, his cadences, thus relinquishing clarity for uninterrupted momentum.

Essentially, the 20th century composer derives his concept of form from the great traditions of the past, adding new elements and adapting old ones to his use. Form remains to this day, prime in the musical tradition of the west: "form as the supreme gesture of creative will and imagination; as the subjugation of all that is capricious and arbitrary to the discipline, the logic, the higher unity of art."

And how is the music of the 20th century composer received by 20th century audiences? Certainly it is music which reflects the spirit of tension-filled times; music which is the product of composers who, with the exception of those living in Russia, are permitted to work in an atmosphere of complete freedom; music which is evolving in an atmosphere of experimentation; and music which has passed the half century mark in age.

Unfortunately, the 20th century audience has not accepted music as readily as audiences of the baroque and classic eras did their contemporary works. The "meat" of concert hall music today is still that of the romantic era with a good proportion of baroque and classic literature added. It is risky for an conductor to plan all-modern programs. The Louisville Orchestra attempted this once and had to retreat, partially. Perhaps modern man needs the reassurance of the familiar musical literature contained in the vast repertoire of romantic music. Perhaps modern man, unsurprised as he may be at any scientific achievement and willing as he is to venture into unknown areas of space with all its physical dangers, may not be ready to venture deeply into modern music unless accompanied by a familiar friend from the past. Perhaps modern man is not yet ready to venture into the realm of modern esthetics alone. True, the shock of change from Romantic music to Modern music was probably greater than that produced by any previous change, but we are still a long way from general acceptance of our contemporary musical idiom.

Some day there will be greater acceptance of contemporary music. There will be greater acceptance of modern music when elementary and high schools and colleges and universities accept the responsibility for introducing more contemporary music. Each institution has relied too heavily upon the repertoire of the past. When children begin to hear contemporary music from the cradle through college, then, and only then, will they begin to live with music of their own time and only then will they begin to understand it.
Music, and all art, is today, as it was for primitive man, a necessary ingredient for a full expressive and enjoyable life. For Music as Boyden states, "never exists in a vacuum." "Every piece of music has some relation to the culture of which it is a part--an exciting discovery to many people. The medieval cathedrals express their time, but so does a medieval motet--if we have the wit and musical understanding to discover it. The Romanticism of the nineteenth century is reflected just as surely in Verdi as in Victor Hugo, in Wagner as in Nietzsche. In our own time the clean, objective functionalism of architecture has corresponding analogies in the music of Stravinsky and others. Our pleasures in music are not simple or static. Over the years they become an inseparable blend of intuitive response, of our appreciation of music in its own terms, and of all the peripheries of our knowledge and experience."

THE HISTORIAN LOOKS AT MODERN MAN

Dr. Carlton Jackson

Since this is the eighth meeting you have had in this series of the Honors Colloquium, let me express the opinion that in many ways you have already studied the historian and modern man. You have heard lectures on man and biology, philosophy, religion, sociology, psychology, literature, and music. These subjects cover a wide range of what man has done, what he is doing, and what he is capable of doing. Because history borrows considerably from such disciplines as the humanities, languages, literature, philosophies, and fine arts, and in return contributes to these disciplines a sense of time and change and social involvement, I repeat that you have already studied the historian and modern man.

These introductory remarks lead me to the expression of another opinion, I should like to strike a blow for the unity in fields of knowledge. There is a close connection between and among all the subjects you have studied so far, and a unity between all these and the discipline of history. It is regrettable that so much compartmentalization of subjects exists. One should, therefore, strive to see the overall associations of the fields with which he comes into contact.

Now, having made those rather perfunctory statements, I shall discuss for a short time "the historian looks at modern man." To get a base for this discussion, I need to identify several schools of historical thought;
and then concentrate on the area that I find most acceptable to my own views.

In his far reaching book, The Future of Mankind, the German existentialist
philosopher, Karl Jaspers, gives three broad categories of historical inter-
pretation. They are: causal, teliological, and ideological. The first, or
causal, is similar to the "germ theory" in which modern institutions are
 traced back to the remotest origin possible. An example of this is Max
Weber and his famous thesis which connects the rise of Calvinist Protestant-
ism with the development of modern Capitalism. Here he held that the
Puritan equation or worldly success with a divine condition broke down medi-
eval regulations upon economic activity. I should point out, however, that
the American historian, Samuel Elliot Morrison, refutes this thesis by point-
ing to certain regulatory practices of economics by the Puritans. The second,
or teliological, pronounces judgments on men and events in accordance with
the desirable end product instead of emphasizing the means. An example of
this would be Machiavelli and his famous book, The Prince. To a lesser
extent than Machiavelli, perhaps, would be the development of William
James's Pragmatism as showing teliological interpretations. The third
area, and the largest, ideological, is divided into several sub-groupings
by Professor Jaspers.

The first area of ideology he identifies as organic. This holds that
human existence, though unequal, is preordained by God. This order can be
disturbed or adhered to by man, but it cannot be fundamentally altered. The
organic interpretation claims that nations, like individuals, are born, they
grow old, and then die. An example of this belief is Oswald Spengler, who
expressed his opinions in The Decline of the West. Here he propounded the
cyclical theory that western civilization was on the verge of disappearing.

Of course, many historians took exception to Spengler's views. One of the
most forceful is by a present day historian, Herbert J. Muller, who in The
Uses of the Past states that Spengler never proved the necessity of the
cyclical theory. Spengler, according to Muller, adopts a biological approach
to his theory of civilization which cannot be proved by the present day accumu-
lation of knowledge.

Jaspers' second area of ideology is the natural law thesis. One
part of this belief implies a resignation to living in a sinful world. It holds
that we, as sinners, cannot change the world. The best we can hope for is
that some kind of relative order will emerge from the general chaotic con-
ditions. An example of this belief would be the Puritans in America who
believed in the utter depravity of man and who believed further that they repres-
tented the best chance for "relative order." The American historian, Loren
Baritz, has an excellent discussion of Puritan belief in this respect in his
book, City On A Hill. The title comes from the writings of that great Puritan
divine, John Winthrop, who said of the early Puritan settlements in America:
"Man shall say of succeeding plantations: the lord make it like that of New
England: for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the
eyes of all people are uppon us." In instituting his "city on a hill," Winthrop
claimed that the Massachusetts magistrates literally became "gods on earth"
whose will would have to be obeyed without question, for they were the direct agents of God to produce relative order in a sinful world.

A second interpretation can be given to the natural law thesis. Whereas the Puritans used it for obtaining "relative order" to produce a static society, such people as John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine viewed it in an entirely different manner. To these three people, and to many others who could be mentioned, man had certain inalienable rights. He had these from the simple fact that he was born—that he existed. Whenever a government threatened these natural rights of individuals, they had not only the right but the duty to revolt. Thus this side of the natural law thesis could and did lead to doctrines of revolution. Obviously, such doctrines would not be taken to heart by the early Puritans even though they believed in natural law. This differentiation of the natural law thesis points out clearly the importance of interpretation when considering events of history. I shall endeavor to enlarge upon that statement later in this presentation.

A third area of ideology discussed by Jaspers is called authoritarianism. This is the philosophy that domination is the basic fact of human existence. There must be a system in which the authorities alone are responsible for the well-being of the peoples. A good example of this line of thought was expressed by Thomas Hobbes whose most important work was *The Leviathan*. Hobbes believed that it was essential for subjects to give undisputed authority to their rulers for their own well-being. Once they had contracted away their individual rights for the more important collective rights, they had no recourse whatever. To a much lesser extent than Hobbes, but still a pertinent example, would be Alexander Hamilton who during the American Federalist period encouraged strong governmental authority over the lives of the citizens.

After authoritarian ideology, continuing Jaspers' classification, comes nationalism. This characteristic of a people is, of course, the most difficult of all to define. Generally, though, it is as Jaspers says: a belief that "my people, their state, and its present interests are paramount in politics. There is nothing above the nation." History abounds with examples of nationalism. The French revolution, activity in the Balkan countries prior to World War I, and Hitler's Germany need only be mentioned to show not just nationalism, but the system gone mad as well.

Humanitarianism is another example of Jaspers' categorization of ideology. Universal rightfulness in the treatment of mankind is the objective of this school. Some examples of humanitarianism were expressed in some ways by Frederick the Great, Theodore Roosevelt, and Herbert Hoover. Poles away from the humanitarian strain is Jaspers' next classification, anarchism. This holds that man is caught up in eternal revolution and that there should be a destruction of the so-called organic order. The Syndicalist movement in France and Italy in the early 1900's would be an example of this philosophy.
The last category of ideology Jaspers calls chiliasm. This belief is that the present moment is unique. No frame of reference exists for what happens; there is only newness. Perhaps our own times have come closest to resembling the chilastic interpretations. In an age when inventions are superseded or outdated almost as soon as they are put into use, it does appear that there is only newness in the world of our time.

Now, it is clear that these historical distinctions do not apply wholly to any period in the history of man. Of course, there are many overlappings. For example, John Winthrop and the Puritans could fit into the authoritarian and organic schools just as easily as the natural law. There are, moreover, many divisions of these categories in which the adjectives could go on ad infinitum. Finally, these are only a few of the categories of historical mood and behavior which can be identified. There are many more.

It is the task of the historian, when writing or teaching about a certain period, to identify as many of these categories as are necessary for clear presentation. He must then stress the category or categories of a given time in relation to his narration of people and events. For these categories, far from being applied only to governments, seep down into even the smallest organizations, public and private. Thus, it can be seen that the categories form the bases for institutions within a society. To an extent, as the author of your reference book points out, institutions reflect the moods of the classes in power, but they also develop a policy and spirit of their own. This development determines the inclination of the particular institution within the overall framework of categories discussed by Professor Jaspers. It is the noting of these inclinations of particular institutions at a given time and putting each into the framework of the whole, that gives to the historian one of his greatest challenges.

The manner in which the historian accomplishes this deed depends largely upon his philosophy of history, that is, his definition of the discipline. There are usually two broad definitions. One is that history is the sum total of all human activities. The other definition regards history as a record of events rather than the events themselves. It is easily seen that the first definition lends itself to scientific interpretations and that the second one leads to a stronger relativist position than the first. The scientific historian has been described by some as being interested only in observation, hypothesis, and conclusion of a specific historical event in relation only to a specific time and place. Some examples of scientific historians with whom you may become acquainted are the German scholar, Von Ranke, and the American historian, Herbert L. Osgood.

In contrast to the purely scientific historian is the one who puts just as much stress—or perhaps more—upon the interpretation or synthesis of history as upon the facts themselves. Whereas the scientific historian examines an event and is content to analyze it in the light of everything else that is happening at the same time, the relativist analyses the event no only in connection with the time in which it happened, but also in connection with
events of future generations. The theme of historical relativism was served well by the influential Cornell professor, Carl Becker. For a few moments I wish to give you the outline of his philosophy of history.

First, he believed that the pursuit of historical facts merely for the sake of reconstructing the past was worthless. Those facts had to lend themselves to a philosophical analysis. Moreover, this philosophical analysis had to be done in the light of a contemporary society. Thus, historical fact can be a potent force in helping solve the particular problems of each generation.

One of Becker’s life time questions was “What is history?” In defining the term, Becker was forced to ask another question: “What is the historian’s relation to society?” History itself, according to Becker, was far from being a science. He felt that if it were, the chief job of the historian would be to establish facts of a given period and omit any interpretation of them in line with the mood of future generations. Becker always felt that history should be a branch of the humanities. The concept meant that history was an art—a highly interpretive art at that.

The most noble purpose of history, according to Becker, was the service it rendered in “... the effort to solve the everlasting riddle of human existence.” History has to be re-written by each generation, because the problems of one generation are not necessarily the problems of another. The real facts of history then are largely the product of the person recording them. Becker compared history to a flash on a movie screen. The screen, representing the past, was permanent and unchangeable. Whatever was seen on that screen, though, depended on whoever was running the projector. Therefore, the historian largely creates his own facts.

This by no means gives the historian the latitude to do with historical facts just what he wishes. The historian must honestly and dispassionately seek the truth as he understands it. Exact, or absolute, truth in history cannot be found according to Becker:

The extent to which the recreation (of history) resembles the actual past is something we cannot know, but it will depend upon the quantity and quality of the records used, and the quality of the imagination that does the re-creating. Therefore, any re-creation of the past is only relatively true.

How historical facts aid in social progress was one of the most important questions studied by Becker. He sharply criticized scientific history for being so objective. He said scientific history required the present to be done away with so that the past may be constructed as a whole.

Agreeing with the eminent Italian historian, Benedetto Croce and the English statesman, Edmund Burke, that there are no really distinct divisions between past, present, and future, Becker maintained that the past is worthless unless it can be adopted to the needs of the present. Thus Becker once carried on during the nineteenth century and all of the knowledge gained therefrom was worthless because it did not prevent World War I.

Becker is at the heart of his relativist belief when he asks: “What is the historical fact, where is the historical fact, and when is the historical
fact?" The answer to the first question comprised most of Becker's feelings about history. One cannot deal directly with a historical event, but one can deal with a statement about the event. The statement confirms the fact that the event occurred. This affirmation of the event, then, is the historical fact.

On the location of historical facts, Becker felt that if they did not live in the mind of a person, they were nowhere. If they are merely lying untouched in the sources, they are dead and "incapable of making a difference in the world." Becker continued that historical facts do not belong to the past only. They are equally the property of the present and the future. Therefore, historical fact is now in the present. "Moreover," to quote Becker, "since they are in the same mind at the same time, images of past events are often, perhaps always, inseparable from images or ideas of the future."

 Appropriateness in history was important to Becker. For example, an event is re-created by a symbol. The symbol is not "hard or cold or true or false" as scientific history makes them, but "appropriate." The symbols are appropriate to the needs and wishes of the person making them. The needs of the author, as Becker saw them, was to record the truth for the purpose of society. The author's wishes constituted his purposes for doing the work. History has to be the spokesman for the facts--not merely the recorder of them. History has to take its share of the responsibility of society so that it can help society. . . "understand what it is doing in the light of what it has done and what it hopes to do."

A word or two in a more specific manner should now be given of Becker's attack on scientific history. As before stated, Becker felt that history should be a branch of the humanities. This would expose historical facts almost completely to interpretation in evaluating their worth. Just as poetry and great literature take on different meanings for different generations, history as a branch of the humanities, should play a similar role.

The scientific historian is too objective and aloof--he thinks that historical fact can stand alone. Science, says Becker, is concerned with constant, ever-recurring events. History is concerned with past, never-recurring events. Therefore, scientific fact, once truthfully established, remains constant through time. But this is not true for historical fact. A historical fact may be as true today as it was two hundred years ago, but truthful to whom? The actual truth comes in the interpretation, and it is the interpretation that changes.

History, being only relatively true, could not conform itself to a scientific ideal, which implied an absolute truth. Historians have things in common with the bards, poets, and minstrels, according to Becker. History must carry on the tradition of a people rather than "butt its head against a wall" of nothing but hard, cold fact. "History is a tool, a weapon, and must be forged to meet the needs of the day."
Becker, of course, had his problems with his theories. He was attacked by the older school of historians as being illusory in his concoctions, and by some as being a mere charlatan. In addition to criticism from his colleagues, Becker had to fight the narrowness of mind that usually reacts when something new comes along. He wrote a high school textbook called Modern History. Every paragraph in this book is headed "where," "why," or "how" an historical event occurred. Becker continually compares events of the past in this book with the needs of the present. In the section on economics, Becker devoted much space to a discussion of modern Socialism. This part of his writing was undoubtedly connected with some disparaging remarks about Capitalism that he had made earlier. The result was that a Washington, D.C., textbook investigating committee branded his work as Communistic. The event was widely publicized. The Hearst newspapers praised the work of the textbook committee, and the Washington Herald spoke of Becker as a "well-known Communist writer." Becker and his publisher, Silver Burdette, took the affair to court and Becker was completely exonerated.

I have emphasized Becker because his influence has been so great in American historiography. He and Charles A. Beard belong in the same class in regard to historical interpretation. Beard, you may remember, shook the intellectual world with his book called An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. Here he argued that the Founding Fathers created our government to protect certain economic investments. Needless to say, Beard was chastised for his "un-American" behavior. Other historians and writers who have attacked scientific premises in the discipline can be mentioned. One of the most interesting was Edward Bernstein, the nineteenth century German Socialist who is best remembered for his revisionist writings on Marxism. Bernstein believed that mankind progressed through peaceful evolution rather than by the revolutionary contradictions between classes that Marx talked about. He rejected completely the Marxist thesis that the coming of a Socialist state would be scientifically predictable. Even if one could prove scientifically the inevitable collapse of Capitalism, as claimed by Marx, there was no way to deduce that Socialism would necessarily be the successor. For a science to be pure, said Bernstein, it must be free of bias. In human history there are too many "isms" for there to be no biases. People use terms like "industrialism," "capitalism," "socialism," "colonialism," "communism" etc. All of these "isms" denote a particular mood of those who belong to a particular movement. They also denote the desires, both inner and expressed, of the members. The desires of people, if nothing else, would prove ultimately that there cannot be a true science of history. Scientific history, too, would presuppose the inevitability of specific, predictable events. In reality no historical incident is necessarily predictable. I daresay that more people looked upon World War II as inevitable in 1945 than did in 1939. What I mean to say here is that things, especially catastrophes like World War II, are usually said to be inevitable only after they have happened, rarely before.
I have now emphasized the two points of view that historians use in relation to institutional categories when studying events and people. Undoubtedly, you have gathered that I support the theory, as being the most reasonable, that history cannot be a science. To give a few further examples of how history is relative, I wish to quote from a provocative essay by Professor C. Van Woodward which appeared in the July, 1963 issue of the New York Times. He points out that within the last thirty years there have been four basic changes in historical interpretations:

(1) Historical reputations have been overhauled. In past thinking, some reputations had been exalted while others were lowered. Much attention has been given of late to new looks at the great people of history. Examples of this overhauling can be seen in recent historical treatments of Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Herbert Hoover.

(2) "There has been a general abandonment," to quote the Professor directly, "of the economics interpretation as an adequate or even acceptable account of historic movements." World War I would surely be a case in point here.

(3) There is a movement to minimize conflicts and contrasts in American history and emphasize the similarities. This seems to work well for everything but the Civil War.

(4) There is a movement to abandon the hunt "for domestic villains" to blame for our foreign wars. Of course you are familiar with the beliefs held by some that World Wars I and II were caused in part by those who stood to gain economically from such struggles.

These changes in interpretations can be seen working in recent treatments of the Puritans who were viewed as always being sour, fan-hating, and completely moral. The Founding Fathers are once again regarded as having other than economic interests in their making of the Constitution, and much revisionism has taken place on the Age of Jackson, so much indeed that some historians believe that linking Jackson with the rise of American democracy should be discontinued. The business tycoons of the Gilded Age had their reputations appreciably changed in the finance-dominated 1920's, and an excellent example of revisionism is the recent treatment of the Negro as slave, freedman, and underprivileged person. This treatment is directly connected with what has been called in the 1950's and 1960's The Second Reconstruction.

Obviously, relativity in history has its drawbacks. It can be abused by demagogues who rewrite history to justify certain practices or institutions. Of course, one could argue that a firm belief in scientific history could lead to the same thing because of its deterministic qualities. That history has been rewritten to justify certain events and institutions is one of the easiest things to detect nowadays. In a speech of a session of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, University of Kentucky Professor, Bennett Wall, noted that some contemporary history textbooks on the grammar and high school levels omit any reference to the institution of Negro slavery in this country. In my own examinations of some textbooks, I have been unable to find references to such outstanding figures as Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Paine. In the South, uncomplimentary remarks about slavery are sometimes subject to repression by textbook committees. In the North,
uncomplimentary remarks about the industrial wage systems of the nine-
teenth century are sometimes treated with the same kind of suspicion. It
is possible for you to read a textbook which is used in both the North and
the South and read completely different things about the pet institutions of
those two sections. Recently, an article appeared in the Bowling Green
Park City Daily News discussing the handicaps that writers and teachers of
history face from various pressure groups who want their ideals and philos-
ophies treated as if they came directly from Mount Sinai.

Of course, this sort of thing is not just regrettable—it is abominable.
But it should not be used to condemn relativism in history because the pos-
itive points in the method are so much greater than the deficiencies. Any-
way, there is little to be gained in trying to condemn or justify relativist
history—it is simply a relative fact of life—a fact that scientific history
during its heyday, that is the 1920's, could not change. One can only hope
that present and future historians will abide by the words of Carl Becker
who urged truthfulness and honesty on the part of the person doing historical
research.

In conclusion, I should like to point out that man is too diverse for
draw parallels between the assassinations of Presidents Lincoln and Kennedy,
but the point is that history does not repeat itself. If it did, it would be
predictable and human beings are simply not predictable to the extent that
one may say exactly what they are going to do.

Many recent books and speeches about present conditions seem to
express much optimism about what man is capable of becoming. The unpre-
cedented existence of nuclear power may have at last forced men into a
position in which they will have to live in relative peace. Nuclear power
does, very painfully, offer an alternative to living in peace. Whichever
alternative man chooses will depend upon the extent of his rationality, but
history cannot say which alternative he will ultimately take. It can only say
that "here are two paths that may be followed, and these have been created
by a threat to the entire existence of man."

Those of you who heard the recent Rodes-Helm lecturer, Dr. Fern
Stukenbroeker, should have been impressed with his appeal for people to do
their own thinking; for them to express their opinions in an unfearful manner
regardless of those who might differ with them. In a democracy, or in any
part of that democracy, whether it be a religious institution or a state college,
it is dangerous for there to be a complete uniformity of thinking. If history
has ever taught anybody anything, it is that uniformity of thought is not a
characteristic of a democratic government or institution. I do not mean here
that one should always take the negative merely for the sake of being different.
There are bounds of propriety out of which one should rarely go. What I am saying is that people—especially college students—should never be afraid to express honest differences with others, regardless of whether those "others" happen to be college professors, college deans, or college presidents. History has pointed out that whenever there have been lively curiosities and peaceful differences of opinion, the civilization fortunate enough to have them has been happy indeed.