The Great Men of Christendom: The Failure of the Third Crusade

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THE GREAT MEN OF CHRISTENDOM: THE FAILURE OF THE THIRD CRUSADE

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THE GREAT MEN OF CHRISTENDOM: THE FAILURE OF THE THIRD CRUSADE

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This thesis is a study of the reasons for the failure of the Third Crusade to achieve its stated objectives, despite the many advantages with which the venture began. It is proposed herein that the Third Crusade—and by extension all of the previous and subsequent Crusades—were destined to fail because of structural disadvantages which plagued the expeditions to the Holy Land. The Christians in the Holy Land were not self-sufficient, and they depended on an extensive amount of aid from Europe for their existence, but the Christians of Europe had their own goals and concerns which did not allow them to focus on building a stable kingdom in the Holy Land. For European Christians, crusading was a religious obligation, and once their vows were fulfilled, they no longer had any desire to remain in the Levant. Although the Crusaders did score some short-term victories over their Muslim adversaries, the Christian presence in the Holy Land was unsustainable, for the Crusades—from the European perspective—were a religious movement without a tangible, long-term political objective, and given those circumstance, any crusade would be unsuccessful.
Introduction

The Crusading movement was one of the transformational events of the Middle Ages, when the knightly classes of Europe were directed to turn away from internal squabbles and become the soldiers of Christ. For almost 200 years, knights of Christendom waged war against Muslim armies in and around Jerusalem, pledging to redeem the Holy Land from the infidels and avenge the offense given to their Lord. These intermittent conflicts ranged from the inconsequential to the cataclysmic, and the fortunes of war teetered back and forth between the two sides until the Muslims finally rolled over the last Christian stronghold at Acre in 1291. For most of these expeditions, the Crusading armies were led by the most powerful Christian rulers of the Middle Ages: the kings and emperors of Latin Europe. At first blush, the monarchs of Europe would appear to be ideal for leading any expeditions to the Levant, given that they controlled large territories from which they could procure soldiers and money for the Crusades and were commonly thought to have been entrusted by God to their positions. There were, perhaps, no greater defenders of the faith than they.

That ideal, however, could rarely be upheld, and the Third Crusade serves as an excellent example of the perils of having monarchs at the head of expeditions to the Holy Land. The appearance and interference of European leaders often exacerbated local political tensions in the Levant, failing to truly unify the Christian forces under their respective banners. Kings often gave priority to their own kingdoms or imperial designs over the needs of the Holy Land, and jealous ambitions among the royals further hampered efforts to recapture Jerusalem. Although the roles of Frederick Barbarossa and
Philip II will be explored, particular attention will be paid to the actions of Richard the
Lionheart, as he was the sole monarch who undertook the expedition who was part of the
Crusade from its conception to its conclusion. It is my intention to show that the
participation of monarchs in the Third Crusade had an adverse effect on the outcome of
the Crusade. Whatever positive aspects of monarchical involvement in the Third Crusade
were to be had can be seen at the beginning of the venture, when the Church needed
financial and material support, as well as the prestige that royal participation could offer.
However, when it came to the day-to-day prosecution of the campaign, I hope to
demonstrate that the actions of the kings, partly as a necessary result of their positions as
kings, actually hampered the Third Crusade, first by examining their approach to the
Holy Land and then looking at their actions once in the Levant.

Furthermore, a wider argument will be made that the Third Crusade, as well as the
crusading movement as a whole, was structurally doomed to fail. For European
Christians, particularly the monarchical rulers, crusading was a religious obligation, the
rewards of which were often intangible, and this often caused them to work at cross-
purposes to those Christians living in the Holy Land. Once their vows were fulfilled, the
Christians of Europe no longer had any desire to remain in Outremer, but without a heavy
European presence, whatever gains they made would be erased. The Christians in the
Holy Land were simply too weak to withstand a concerted Muslim advance without help
from the continent, and once those forces withdrew, the long term security of Christian
possessions could not be guaranteed. In effect, as a political movement, the Crusades
were unwinnable. Crusading itself was designed as a religious ideal, an example of one’s
devotion to God, not an end to a political means, and once a European crusader’s
religious vow was fulfilled, he was under no obligation to remain in the Holy Land, although this was necessary to the long term stability of the political regime of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. As a result, even though European involvement was critical to military and political success in the Holy Land, such involvement offered no permanent security. The Europeans had their own concerns, and once they had received the spiritual benefit of pilgrimage, they would naturally return to their own kingdoms and their own lives. The political consequences to the Levant Christians did not factor into their calculations. The Kingdom of Jerusalem did not have enough men, money, or materials to be self-sufficient in the face of such a vast Muslim host, and without the willingness of the European contingent to remain around Jerusalem, whatever was accomplished during the crusade would be undone once that contingent was removed. The Kingdom did survive, of course, for almost 200 years—which is not an inconsequential achievement—but the Kingdom’s survival was facilitated as much by Muslim disunity and by assistance from the continent as it was by its own self-sufficiency; the same dynastic quarrels which plagued the Levant Christians occasionally occurred in the Muslim realm, allowing the Kingdom several lengthy respites from the outside pressure. In the long run, however, the Christian presence in the Holy Land was unsustainable, for the Crusades—from the European perspective—were a religious movement without a tangible, long-term political objective, and under those parameters, any crusade was ultimately doomed to failure. The problems of the Third Crusade are fairly representative, a microcosm of the macrocosm.

Though the Third Crusade has not attracted the same scholarly attention that either the First or Fourth Crusade has, it is quite well documented, and substantial sources exist
from all three kingdoms involved, as well as from chroniclers on the Muslim side. For the purposes of this project, two particular sources will be used: the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* and the Old French *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*. In the Forward to her translation of the *Itinerarium*, Nicholson calls the source “one of the most controversial chronicles of the Third Crusade,” although it contains a “wealth of details” and has a “high level of accuracy.”¹ The controversy actually lies in questions over authorship and the dating of the manuscript, as well as the “sometimes difficult” Latin employed by the author. Further complicating the issue is the scholarly consensus that the edition of the *Itinerarium* published by William Stubbs in the nineteenth century is actually a compilation of several different versions of the surviving text.² While early scholarship suggested that a Templar may have been the author of the *Itinerarium*, Nicholson disputes the notion, pointing out that the chronicler’s knowledge of the Templars is generally sparse. She makes a compelling argument that the chronicler is a crusader from England—he does seem particularly knowledgeable about and interested in events on the island, and there is no doubt that King Richard is the hero of his tale—but little else can be definitively said about the authorship. Though much of the material in the text was recorded by a contemporary, Nicholson suggests that the finished product probably surfaced in the early thirteenth century, possibly in preparation for the Fifth Crusade. Nicholson notes that crusading histories were sometimes written “in preparation for the next [crusade], to encourage recruitment and

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² Ibid., 5-6.
remind the leaders of what went wrong last time.”\(^3\) To Nicholson, it is overall a highly accurate compilation, if one “written in a complex rhetorical style.”

The *Continuation* covers much of the same ground as the *Itinerarium*, beginning with the disasters in the Holy Land and then recounting the efforts of the Third Crusade. The text translated by Edbury exists as a single manuscript in Lyon and is a French translation and continuation of Archbishop William of Tyre’s Latin history. Edbury notes that while the section of the text from 1197 to 1248, which is where the text stops, can be found in other sources, the section “for the years 1184 to 1197 is unique,”\(^4\) and of the sources based on William of Tyre, the Lyon manuscript presents the most detailed accounts of events in those years. Completed approximately 50 years after the events it describes, the Lyon text “is a compilation containing the handiwork of several contributors,” and as such, “like all narrative accounts of past events,” it does have some errors in it.\(^5\) That should not, however, serve as a reason to avoid the text, as it remains a key source for the Third Crusade.

Working with these two particular texts presents some unique challenges. For one, each chronicler noticeably champions one of the two main antagonists in the drama that was the Third Crusade: the *Itinerarium* was generally more favorable to Richard, and the *Continuation* author supported Philip Augustus. This dichotomy of opinion certainly colored how each source presents certain information, particularly that relating to the relationship between the two kings and Philip’s motivation for leaving the Crusade.

Apart from their biases, the sources do vary in quality, with the *Itinerarium* providing the

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\(^3\) Ibid., 11.
\(^5\) Ibid., 7.
fullest accounting of the Third Crusade. At points in this project, it was quite frustrating to find a bit of information in the *Itinerarium* that was omitted from the *Continuation*; knowing the pro-English bias of the *Itinerarium* author, it would have been helpful to have additional context and a potentially contrarian viewpoint for certain events during the Crusade, as when discussing events after Philip’s departure. Furthermore, the author of the *Continuation* does sometimes conflate information, as when he confuses the two separate advances made by Richard against Jerusalem and records them as though they were one event. In those respects, at least, the *Continuation* proved to be something of a disappointment, making it more secondary in value to the *Itinerarium*.

The Crusades marked a pivotal moment in European history that transformed both East and West. Given the great paucity of sources that we find while studying other Crusades, we are lucky indeed that the exploits of Richard, Philip, Saladin, and their compatriots is so well attested to.
Chapter One: To the East

Then came Clement III who...sent to all the great men of Christendom—emperors, kings, counts, and marquises—and to the knights and sergeants telling them that he would take upon himself and acquit before God all the sins of those who would bear the sign of the Cross to go recover the Promised Land provided they had confessed and were truly penitent...When the great men of Christendom heard the news, the emperor, the kings, the archbishops, the bishops, and all the other people took the Cross.  

At the time of the Third Crusade, England had very little history in the crusading movement, as France and Germany had provided the bulk of the knights, foot soldiers, and spiritual and intellectual heft of the First and Second Crusades. England had the potential to be a major player in the Crusades, for historians from Tacitus to Bede commented on the island’s abundance of resources, and the material wealth of the Anglo-Saxon monarchs attracted the attention of Viking raiders for centuries and was commented on by the Normans before their 1066 conquest. Despite this great potential, no English kings were involved in either the First or Second Crusade. When the First Crusade was launched in 1095, England was ruled by the generally “irreligious” William Rufus, who spent more time quelling baronial insurrections and nursing his ambitions of taking control of Normandy than heeding the call of Pope Urban II. When Rufus’ successor, Henry I, passed away, Stephen ascended to the throne. His reign, which overlapped the disastrous Second Crusade, was marred by considerable internal warfare between Stephen and Matilda and their respective barons, with Matilda and her supporters arguing that she had the better claim to the throne. This fighting was at its most violent between 1141-1146, during which time the Second Crusade was actually

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6 Edbury, *Conquest of Jerusalem*, 75.
8 Ibid., 173.
launched, and the island was not at peace again until 1148, the same year that the Christians were crushed at Damascus, thus ending the Crusade. By the time of King Richard I’s Crusade, however, the succession issue had been thoroughly resolved, and England was now in a position to join the other Christian kingdoms when another attempt to secure the Holy Land was made.

The years immediately preceding the launch of the Third Crusade saw an incredible deterioration of the Levant Christians’ position in the Holy Land. These years were marked by political strife and civil infighting, as well as devastating battlefield losses for the Christian side. Factionalism was a major issue in the kingdom, and the bad blood between Guy of Lusignan and Raymond of Tripoli became so problematic that the latter actually formed an alliance with Saladin in an attempt to make himself king in Jerusalem. Reverses on the battlefield proved even more damaging, as the defeat at the Horns of Hattin left Tyre besieged and the entire kingdom in Muslim hands. Given the deteriorating situation facing the Holy Land Christians, it is little wonder that they would have looked to a unifying force from outside the local political arena to come in and help re-establish order and recover what had been lost in the Levant. It seems equally natural that their gaze would turn to a powerful Christian monarch, for the medieval king could control troops and fleets, provide much needed financial resources, and lend considerable prestige and reputation to the enterprise. The advantages of having a royal-led Crusade were many indeed.

In fact, at this point, seeking outside assistance was a necessity; following Hattin, “without assistance from the West, their chances of holding Tyre were small, and their
chances of recovering lost land were none.”⁹ This fact was a fundamental flaw in the crusading movement: though Europe was more than willing to contribute its soldiers and material to the defense of the Holy Land, such assistance was not permanent. The forces which came from Europe had no intention of staying. Their one goal was the pilgrimage to Jerusalem; once that was accomplished, their crusading vow would be fulfilled, and they would return to their own concerns and their own lands in Europe.

In the Holy Land itself, contemporary chroniclers blamed the poor situation on the lax spiritual state of the Outremer’s defenders and citizens. The author of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* believed that it was “the Ancient Enemy” of the faith who “spread the spirit of corruption far and wide” in Syria, causing Christ to “[spurn] His Inheritance” and allow the Gentiles to rule over the land.¹⁰ The author of the *Continuation* sounded a similar note, saying that Saladin’s victory over the Kingdom of Jerusalem came about because “the anger of God was so great against the Christian host because of their sins.”¹¹ Such corruption permeated the entire kingdom, and God “did not deign to hear the prayers or noise that was made in the city. For the stench of adultery, of disgusting extravagance and of sin against nature would not let their prayers rise” to Heaven.¹² In a letter to Pope Urban III, the patriarch Eraclius proclaimed that “truly…the anger of the Lord has come upon us” and that the terrors of God’s wrath had

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¹² Ibid., 59.
put the people “to confusion.”\textsuperscript{13} Apart from this religious explanation for their recent reversal in fortune, there was also a political reason for their troubles, namely the fact that the pride and ambition of those who desired the crown of Jerusalem helped bring about this sorry state of affairs. Too often, personal rivalries and jealousies trumped sound strategy and the need to unite for the defense of Jerusalem, and the “dark intrigue”\textsuperscript{14} which was such a part of Baldwin IV’s reign was perhaps an even larger threat than Saladin himself. The political maneuvering in Outremer was merely a prelude in miniature to the high-level gamesmanship that would occur once continental leaders became involved, and later events during the Third Crusade would further highlight the detrimental aspects of involving European monarchs in the affairs of the Holy Land.

At the beginning of the Third Crusade, it would have appeared that the Christians of the Latin Kingdom were blessed with an embarrassment of riches, as the three most powerful Christian rulers of the Latin West committed themselves to journey to Jerusalem: King Philip II of France, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, and King Richard I of England. The expectation of the trio’s arrival was a much needed balm to the battered Christian defenders. Indeed, events had become so dire that Conrad of Montferrat wrote Baldwin, the Archbishop of Canterbury, during the siege of Acre and—evoking the image of the feudal relationship between Christ and His warriors which was such a common rhetorical motif of the crusading movement—said that he would “not stop imploring [the Archbishop] to encourage kings and rouse the people so that the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[13] Ibid., 162.
\end{footnotes}
patrimony of Jesus Christ may be recovered,”15 and Conrad’s words give an indication of the great hope that Holy Land Christians had in the monarchs of Europe to tilt the balance against the Muslim armies. His sentiments were echoed by Hubert Walter, Bishop of Salisbury, who wrote in 1191 that the defenders of Acre were holding out hope that they could “maintain their efforts and withstand the discomfort of the siege until the coming of our kings,” and the bishop lamented the certain outcome if the trio continued to tarry: “if they were to put off their coming any longer, the money needed for our expenses will run out, and the hope of worldly consolation will die away.”16 From a psychological standpoint, the impact of having the European monarchs in the Holy Land can hardly be overstated, and the ability of the kings to bolster the Levant Christians’ sagging morale was one of the advantages of having the royals at the helm of the Crusade.

In theory, having the great kings of continental Europe leading Crusades would provide the effort with some considerable advantages, and some of those advantages did materialize quite quickly once Richard, Philip, and Frederick took the Cross. Perhaps the greatest advantage that they enjoyed was that they had a ready source of knights and retainers under their immediate influence around which they could build a substantial army. Apart from those subordinates who were already loyal to the king or were otherwise under royal command, the king’s personality—his aura, charisma, and reputation especially—could help to inspire countless others to also take the Cross. In England, for example, the Itinerarium chronicler writes that when Henry II took the

15 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 169.
16 Ibid., 172.
Cross, scores of princes, monks, and knights followed his example, and this scene would be repeated when Richard (as count of Poitou) made his vow, causing “an immense number of people [to take] the cross with him.” One should not take any source too uncritically, of course, and it could be argued that this chronicler was predisposed to favor Richard I and may have inflated the impact of Richard’s crusading vow on others in the kingdom. However, despite the chronicler’s tendency to favor Richard, he does acknowledge that when Henry II and Philip II sealed their peace treaty by agreeing to take the Cross, “an immense number of people of both sides also took it, partly from love of God…and partly out of respect for the kings.” It is, of course, not possible to ascribe a single motivation for each participant in the Crusade, and sincere religious devotion certainly played a role in the recruitment of large crusading armies. Apart from that, it is also true that Richard assembled a sizeable army, as well as a fleet to convey his troops to the East, and Richard enjoyed a greater control over his vassals than did Philip over his.

The ability of the monarch to draw a sizable force to his banner is equally well-attested in the case of France and Germany. The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, which is generally quite favorable to Philip, records the great size of the king’s retinue, saying that the size of Philip’s force, with its “great fleet of ships” and “plenty of

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20 Madden, Crusades, 85. The author of the Old French Continuation of William of Tyre maintains that the French force was the greater power, for just before the old king’s death, the chronicler states that “the power at Henry’s disposal did not measure up to that possessed by King Philip.” Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 91-2.
barons and knights as befits the crown of France,” emboldened the defenders of Acre.\textsuperscript{21}

The size of the French monarch’s force is confirmed by the chronicler of the \textit{Itinerarium Peregrinorum}. Though the \textit{Itinerarium} is less favorable to Philip than to Richard, the author does say that when King Philip II arrived for the siege of Acre, he had brought with him the counts of Flanders, St. Pol, and Perche among others, and Philip’s host was so great that “there was not a man of great authority or renown in France who did not come, then or later, to capture Acre.”\textsuperscript{22} Frederick Barbarossa met with similar success in recruiting men to his banner, for when he issued his “imperial edict” to assemble at Metz in March 1188, “the magnates of the whole empire” followed his lead in taking the Cross.\textsuperscript{23} The Emperor’s influence even helped bring knights from other lands to the Crusade. When Frederick’s host advanced into Hungary, for example, the sight of the Holy Roman Emperor and his “holy army” brought out the local people who “were inflamed by his excellent example and followed him.”\textsuperscript{24}

It is important, though, not to overstate the effect of royal leadership on recruitment efforts to the Crusade. While it seems quite true that European kings could command or sway their subordinates and their retainers to accompany them to the Levant, it must be remembered that there were other motivations that would have brought large numbers of knights into the Third Crusade. Most notable, perhaps, is the fact that the Crusade—while a military venture in execution—was still a highly religious undertaking in

\textsuperscript{21} Edbury, \textit{Conquest of Jerusalem}, 98.
motivation. When word of the recent disasters around Jerusalem reached Europe, Pope Gregory VIII called on the warriors of Christ throughout Europe to “[hasten] to help the Holy Land with all their strength,” and the Pontiff declared that they would “obtain mercy for all their sins” and that he would “[absolve] anyone who immediately undertook this pious and necessary work from their guilt for past sins.”

The chronicler records that “an enormous number of people of various nationalities, especially French and English, were roused into putting their devotion into practice” by taking the sign of the Cross. While it could be argued that the chronicler was overstating the response to dramatic effect, it is significant that he records this outpouring of support for the Crusade before either Richard I or Philip II had taken the Cross or even ended their hostilities with each other. In fact, he only includes the account of Richard’s and Philip’s commitment to the Third Crusade after noting that the people, who were driven “by the inspiration of God…to the pious labours of pilgrimage,”

began to take notice of those who had not yet made their crusading vow: “it was not a question of who was wearing the cross, but rather who was not yet girded with such a pious burden!” This would suggest that Richard was responding to popular crusading enthusiasm in England rather than being the precipitator of the initial fervor in England in favor of the Third Crusade. Put simply, the crusading host would likely have been quite large even without the monarchy at the helm because the religious aspects of crusading were still present and still quite alluring. One can perhaps look to the First Crusade as an example.


when, despite having no king to lead it, Pope Urban’s call to recover Jerusalem from the Muslims spurred an enormous force of knights from across the continent to journey to the Holy Land. In that case, at least, monarchical influence was not necessary to produce a substantial crusading army.

Not only could kings secure the assistance of many knights to accompany them in their campaigns, but they could also bring the power of the royal purse to bear. With the vast resources of their kingdoms at their disposal, the monarchs had the ability to recruit mercenaries, pay their armies, build fleets, and secure supplies and other material on a scale that lesser lords could not. Henry II, for example, had often proven to be a key benefactor for the Holy Land, as he sent an estimated £20,000 to the kingdom of Jerusalem over many years, money that “was usefully employed in the defense of Tyre and the rest of the kingdom’s business.”

According to the Old French Continuation, Henry sent this money to the Templars and Hospitalers as a penance for his martyrdom of Thomas Becket, and the money was used by King Guy of Jerusalem to hire thousands of men into the service of the Holy Land. Richard benefited from the revenues of the Saladin tithe that had been instituted by his father in 1188, which was a tax on “rents and movable goods” to be used for the reclamation of Jerusalem, and Richard himself added to this royal income by “[selling] off many of his rights and properties to increase his war chest.”

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28 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 36.
29 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1188Saldtith.html
30 Madden, Crusades, 85.
as Flori notes, “even that was not enough, partly because much of it had been frittered
away in various ways, in particular on the war between Henry II and Philip.”31 Although
all nobles had access to property and tenants, none could hope to match the royal treasury
in size and scope.

This ability to quickly provide men and material to the Holy Land was demonstrated
quite early, for even as the three major European monarchs delayed their participation,
the alacrity of King William II of Sicily provided a huge boost to the Christian defenders
in 1188. The author of the Itinerarium notes that the Sicilians were the first European
relief group to arrive, a contingent of 500 knights led by two counts and accompanied by
50 galleys. Even though the force sent by William was small compared to the combined
might of England, France, and Germany, the intervention of his men had the desired
effect. As Runciman noted when describing the Sicilian venture, “it was well for the
Franks in the East that other Crusaders had not been so dilatory,”32 and Runciman
directly credits William with helping to save the kingdom. Within a short time, the
Sicilians and Levant Christians had held Tripoli, Antioch, and Tyre and had protected the
inhabitants of the coastal regions.33 One thing that distinguishes William’s contribution
from the other continental monarchs is that he did not personally oversee the expedition,
choosing instead to allow a subordinate, Margarit, to handle the fighting. The last
Sicilian king to involve himself in the Crusades was Roger II during the Second Crusade,
a predecessor of William. Roger had used his participation in the Second Crusade to

31 Jean Flori, Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight, trans. Jean Birrell (Westport, CT: Praeger
32 Runciman, History, 9.
33 “…sicque manu in brevi multa et valida confluent, nostrorum maritima servatur illaesae.”
continue the kingdom’s feud with Byzantium, a move which ultimately detracted from efforts in the Holy Land. William himself only concluded another treaty with the Byzantines in 1189 (the year of his death), and he had long been at enmity with Frederick Barbarossa. Given the rivalry which would so badly affect the working relationship between Philip and Richard, one can only imagine the opportunities for tension had William and Frederick made it to the Levant. As it was, the death of William ended Sicily’s interest in the Third Crusade, and Tancred, his successor, turned his attention to his quarrel with Frederick’s successor.

In addition to Henry II’s direct financial assistance to the Crusade, kings had other ways of using money to help bring about the success of a Holy Land expedition. Kings could further attempt to swell the ranks of their crusading armies by offering temporary debt relief to any man who would willingly take the Cross. In England, for example, Henry II exempted the knights and clerics who had already taken the Cross from paying the Saladin Tithe “except from their own goods and the property of their lord; and whatever their men owe shall be collected for their use…and returned intact to them.”

In France, Philip II issued several financial privileges to those in his kingdom who joined him on crusade, mimicking those proposals put forward by the popes during previous crusades. In 1188, Philip decreed that those “who have taken the cross, shall have a respite of two years - dating from the first feast of All Saints after the departure of the king - in paying the debts which they owed to Jews or Christians before the king took the cross.” Additionally, the king placed restrictions on interest accrual on a crusader’s debts and on lawsuits involving those who took the Cross. By adding such material

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34 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1188Saldtith.html
35 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/cde-privs.html#philip2
protection and financial inducements to the religious benefits of crusading, it became that much easier to recruit and maintain an army.

However good the theory of European monarchical leadership of the Crusade may have been, it did not play out nearly so well in practice. In fact, the Third Crusade had barely gotten off the ground before it experienced its first major snafu: Frederick Barbarossa died before even reaching the Holy Land when, on 10 June, the Emperor drowned in the River Saleph. This episode demonstrates one of the dangers involved in having monarchs leading the Crusade, namely the risk that something bad could happen to the king or emperor. When the king took part in the campaign, his persona became a very real part of the campaign, and the morale of the army and the various nationalities under his command could be greatly affected by his actions. In this case, Frederick’s death resulted in a fracturing of the German contingent of the Crusade as most of them returned home rather than continue on to the Levant without their leader. The men in the German contingent had no personal stake in the Third Crusade apart from feudal service to their Emperor, and because they had no reason to be personally concerned by events in the Holy Land, many felt no qualms about returning to Europe. Although Europe had the ability to raise huge armies and sums of money for the Christians in the Levant, this support could not necessarily be counted on when it was most needed. The Christians in the Holy Land desperately needed this assistance for their survival, but the same situation which doomed German participation in the Crusade foreshadowed what would happen later in the Third Crusade: with no personal reason attached to serving the Kingdom of Jerusalem or to remaining in the crusading army, these men returned to Europe and abandoned the Holy Land to its fate.
Although the German army had sustained a few losses at the time Frederick died, “the Emperor’s army was still formidable”36 and would have made a valuable addition to the Crusader army in Outremer. However, “the Germans…are usually demoralized when the leader disappears…The Duke of Swabia took over the command; but though he was gallant enough, he lacked his father’s personality…bereft of the Emperor’s control, the troops lost their discipline.”37 As the Continuation put it, the emperor’s army “scattered in different directions like sheep without a shepherd.”38 The author of the Historia notes that the army was caught between “hope and dread” at their loss and “would have ended their lives with him,” while others became so concerned that “God did not care for them [that] they renounced the Christian faith to become pagans among the heathen.”39 While the Historia’s author may be guilty of giving his work a dramatic flourish, there is no denying that the death of Frederick I largely removed the German contingent from having any further important role in the Third Crusade. Ibn Al-Athir, who saw in the Emperor’s death a sign that God had delivered the Muslims from a grave threat, corroborates the Historia in describing divisions in the German army, and Al-Athir records that after spending a short time in the Holy Land, the German crusaders decided to return home, leaving before Richard and Philip arrived.40 The sudden disappearance of the German threat provided more than just a morale boost for the Muslims; it allowed “the army that Saladin had gathered to hold the Germans in Northern Syria [to] safely be reduced and

36 Runciman, History, 16.
37 Ibid
38 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 89.
39 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1190barbarossa.html
detachments sent to join his forces on the coast of Palestine.”\textsuperscript{41} The morale and cohesiveness of the German component of the Crusade had been so centered on the person of the Emperor that when he suddenly died, the entire venture faded away, and because Frederick was the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire as well as the crusading army, his death left both entities in turmoil. His successor, Henry VI, proved more interested in occupying Sicily than continuing his father’s crusade. Frederick’s death deprived the Third Crusade of a large percentage of its available manpower and resources, preventing his army from arriving intact in the Holy Land and uniting with the French and English.

Even while he was alive, Frederick’s actions were far from helpful to the Christians of Acre who were desperately awaiting his arrival. The \textit{Itinerarium} chronicler praises the Emperor for his prompt response to the Crusade, saying that “the king who had been the last to make his vow of pilgrimage hurried to be the first to discharge it.”\textsuperscript{42} However, Frederick’s progress towards the Holy Land was hardly a model of speed and efficiency. The Emperor called on his followers to assemble in Metz on 27 March, 1188, but it was over a year later, on 11 May, 1189, before the Emperor actually left from Regensburg. Compounding this delay was Frederick’s decision to forgo naval transportation to the Holy Land, choosing instead to march overland through Hungary, the Byzantine Empire, and Iconium on his way to Acre. According to the \textit{Continuation}, Frederick chose this route because an astronomer at his court in Germany predicted that the Emperor would

\textsuperscript{41} Runciman, \textit{History}, 16.
die in water, and Frederick “took the word to heart and never forgot it.” The
*Itinerarium* chronicler suggests that it was a combination of Frederick’s righteous haste to hurry to the Holy Land and the sheer logistics of moving such a large force by sea in a timely manner that caused the Emperor to take the pragmatic approach and move overland. If Frederick truly believed that the overland route would be the fastest route for his men, his expectations were to be sorely disappointed. Neither was it necessarily the safest route to Acre, as Frederick surely would have remembered the fate of his uncle and predecessor Konrad III and the last German crusading contingent which passed through Asia Minor in preparation for the Second Crusade. It seems more likely, contrary to what the *Itinerarium* author would claim, that there was another reason for Frederick’s preference for an overland campaign, a reason which had little to do with the situation in the Levant and everything to do with Frederick’s imperial designs.

For all the talk of the practicality of taking the land route, Frederick must have known that his path across the Byzantine Empire could (and most likely would) be contested both by the Greeks and their Muslim neighbors, resulting in further delays in their progress toward Acre. That is, in fact, precisely what happened. The chronicler records that once the imperial army crossed the Danube and entered into the Bulgarian interior, Huns, Bulgarians, and others attacked the army in the country’s mountainous terrain, and Frederick’s men encountered similar obstacles when they passed into Macedonia. The chronicler attributes these problems to “the villainous emperor” of Constantinople,

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43 Edbury, *Conquest of Jerusalem*, 89.
Isaac Angelus. It is true that both Isaac and the Sultan of Iconium were alarmed by the fact that Frederick’s army was approaching their territories and that Frederick was personally at the helm of such a large force, and neither was certain of the Emperor’s real intentions.

Isaac certainly had reason to be suspicious of the Emperor’s motives, and the chronicler records that “the Byzantine prince feared…that the whole empire would be destroyed.” Ever since the First Crusade, the Latin West had distrusted the Greeks, believing them to be too cozy with the infidels and too ready to negotiate with Muslim rulers. Such a perspective displayed a basic misunderstanding of the diplomatic realities the Byzantines faced living next door to powerful, hostile neighbors, and Frederick shared this anti-Greek bias. In a letter to his kinsman Duke Leopold of Austria, the Emperor laments that he can no longer “have [any] confidence in the words and oaths of the Greeks,” and he blames the Byzantines for “grievously delaying our march until the dangerous winter season.” The Emperor’s inherent anti-Greek bias may have been exacerbated by Germany’s recent history with the Byzantines, in particular Constantinople’s decision to join the Lombard League against Frederick’s Italian policy in the 1160s. Overall, it is not difficult to imagine that Frederick was motivated to cross through Constantinople by more than just Christian zeal, and it seems that the Emperor and his followers wished to settle old scores between the two empires.

47 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/1189barbarossa-lets.html
48 http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06252b.htm
chronicler explicitly disavows the notion that the Latins had “come to plunder other people’s property, for they had enough of their own,”49 but he does relate how Frederick’s son, the Duke of Swabia, “decided that the army needed exercise”50 at Adrianople, causing him to attack a Greek castle near the city. The resulting German victory netted many prisoners and forced the Greek Emperor to sue for peace with Frederick.

The Emperor had similar problems as he moved his army through Iconium, and the Itinerarium goes into some detail on the difficulties the imperial army faced from the Muslims. As the Germans passed further into Turkish territory, they were subjected to continual ambushes, and these threats forced the knights to eat and sleep under arms for six weeks. Furthermore, the army was plagued by food and water shortages, so much so that “they drew relief and great pleasure from eating the horses’ flesh and drinking the blood.”51 The problems facing the Emperor’s Crusade were similar to those encountered by the knights on both the First and Second Crusades, and both the First and Second Crusade could have served as a warning to Frederick about the dangers of progressing overland. Had the imperial army actually made it to Acre intact, it is likely that between the supply problems, constant attacks, and the major confrontation at Iconium, Frederick’s army would have been seriously depleted by the time it reached Holy Land.

Regardless of Frederick’s motives for taking the overland route through Constantinople,

the end result was still the same: the imperial army wasted time, energy, and resources fighting in Byzantium and Iconium.

As it happened, Frederick’s decision to approach Outremer by land, with its symbolic allusions to the path of the victorious First Crusade and the Emperor’s victories over the Greeks and the Muslims, did add to his fame and glory, but Barbarossa had little, if any, lasting positive impact on the course of the Third Crusade. The fighting between the Greeks and the Germans, possibly provoked in part by the Holy Roman Emperor as a result of past grievances with Byzantium, actually may have had a deleterious effect on the outcome of the campaign. In late autumn and early winter of 1189, at roughly the same time that the imperial army was negotiating a peace treaty with the Byzantines which would allow them to safely winter at Adrianople, the chronicler notes that the siege of Acre began. It was a siege that would drag on for two years, during which the besieging Christian army would suffer many reverses, including the 4 October encounter which felled 1500 Christians, including Gerard de Ridefort, the Master of the Temple.52 At a time when Christians in the Levant were eagerly anticipating the arrival of the European monarchs with their much needed reinforcements, Frederick was distracted for over a year in campaigns that had little to do with the Holy Land. The capture of Adrianople probably pleased the Emperor’s Norman allies, and the capture of Iconium was a great Latin victory over the Turks, but neither had any impact on Saladin’s armies. All of this was achieved with relatively modest losses in manpower for the Germans—up to November 1189, Frederick estimated losing only about 100 men to the Byzantines—

but the Emperor did admit that “his horses had been reduced in number,” a fact that would have complicated supply and transportation issues. Because of the decisions made by the Emperor, the Christians opposing Saladin were left without support much longer than was necessary. In Germany’s case, at least, it would have been better if the Crusade’s royal patron had taken a less direct role in the campaign. The Emperor’s son, the Duke of Swabia, was a well-respected figure and would have, as the Emperor’s son, carried his authority. As it was, the German crusaders were largely taken out of the picture by Frederick’s death, and any hope of recapturing Jerusalem now lay with the combined French and English army. Unfortunately, tension between Richard and Philip started shortly after the Third Crusade got underway, and their royal rivalry would eventually play a key role in bringing the Crusade to its early conclusion. More will be said of this in the second chapter.

The fighting between Frederick and the Greeks would not be the only time that disputes with the Eastern Empire would distract the Latin West from defending the kingdom of Jerusalem. Though both the Itinerarium and the Continuation speak positively of King William of Sicily, the latter provides a somewhat more balanced account of William’s impact on the fighting in the Holy Land. The chronicler says that when William heard of the fall of Jerusalem, he felt that he was partly to blame because, during his war with Constantinople, he had recruited knights from the Holy Land to fight in his armies and went so far as to “retain the pilgrims from other lands who were passing through his kingdom.” As a result, “no one was coming to the land of Outremer” and

54 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 74.
“the land was greatly weakened” by William’s actions. The *Continuation* specifically links King Guy’s defeat and the conquering of all the lands except Tyre to the fact that Guy “had very few men at his disposal,” and “that was why King William said that he was much to blame for the loss of the land.” As with Frederick I—and later with Richard—William subordinated the needs of Jerusalem to what he saw as the best interests of his kingdom. This is not surprising, certainly, for the goal of the Europeans was not to take and control land for themselves; it was merely to preserve the land for the Outremer Christians. Once the fighting in the Holy Land ended, the European nobles would return to their own lands, so it was not feasible for them to place the long-term needs of Jerusalem over the needs of their own lands. Further, this episode highlights the extent to which the Kingdom was dependent on constant assistance from Europe, without which the Kingdom would suffer.

The cross-Channel monarchical tensions that would plague Richard and Philip’s relationship during the Crusade were foreshadowed by events in Europe before either had even taken the Cross. Neither France nor England was able to join the Crusade in 1189 or 1190 because the dispute between Philip and Henry II had not yet been settled, thus delaying their participation in the Jerusalem campaign for months. Fighting between the two kingdoms had been constant from the time of the Norman Conquest, and though both Henry and Philip were willing to go crusading, neither would act without the other acting also. The chronicler records that both kings “seemed to be taking a wise precaution” because neither trusted the other, and each feared that “if one of them happened to stay
behind, he would invade the country of the one who was on pilgrimage.”55 This would become an issue between Philip and Richard later in the Third Crusade, and it was this problem that most contributed to the derailment of the latter’s campaign against Saladin and the failure to reclaim Jerusalem.

When Henry II died in July 1189, Richard displayed no great urgency in rushing to the Holy Land. Indeed, it was about two months after his father’s death before he finished his affairs in Normandy and crossed back into England for his official anointing on 3 September, 1189. Richard spent the next few months in England establishing himself as the new English ruler: celebrating his coronation, making a pilgrimage to Bury St. Edmunds, obtaining assurances of loyalty from the magnates of England, and ordering the filling of bishoprics which had gone vacant during his father’s reign. Even after Richard returned to Normandy, it was several months before he met with Philip to make arrangements for the campaign and settle on 24 June as the date of departure, almost a full year after Richard’s father had died. The chronicler is eager to persuade his reader that the delay in fulfilling his vow was greatly troubling to Richard, and around Christmas 1189, he wrote Philip and urged him to set out speedily and beware the danger of delay.56 It is difficult to know whether this represents Richard’s actual position or if it reflects more the concern of the Itinerarium author. The evil of delaying one’s crusading vows is, after all, one theme which recurs in the chronicle, as when the author chastises


56 http://gallica.bnf.fr, pgs. 145-46. Transl. Nicholson, Chronicle, 147. Philip, of course, did not fulfill his vow with excessive speed. Runciman defends Philip on this count, saying that Philip “was no idealist, and he went crusading merely from political necessity.” He could not abstain from going, but “his kingdom was vulnerable, and he was rightly suspicious of Angevin ambitions. He could not afford to leave France until he knew that his rival of England was also on his way.” Runciman, History, 34.
both Henry II and Philip, saying that “their delay in actually setting out on the journey should be absolutely condemned. This was the work of the enemy of the human race.” Whatever the case may be, Richard’s duties as the new king of England did contribute to the delay in the crusade getting underway.

The pomp and pageantry surrounding the medieval monarchy further delayed the crusade as the Christian host descended on Messina. While at Tours, Richard ordered the royal fleet—over 100 ships—to sail for Messina, and there they would wait for Richard as he and his army, like that of Frederick Barbarossa, proceeded by land. Rather than transport his men by sea, which would have been the faster route, the young king marched his army from Tours to Messina with great fanfare. The chronicler records that “the roar of the great multitude made the local people tremble,” and “those who watched them as they set out in due order felt such deep emotion that they were moved to tears.” What may seem to be an ostentatious display on Richard’s part actually served a fairly important symbolic function for the monarchy, for such theatrics, according to the Itinerarium, were meant to be representative of the king’s power:

It is a recognized custom that when a king in particular or the prince of some country is on the march, his progress should be as distinguished and grand and project as much authority as the power which he actually holds. He should not appear less than he is; no, his appearance should match his actual power. The king’s splendor should reflect his royal office; his exterior appearance should declare his inner virtue.\footnote{Accusanda vero fuerat admodum itineris arripiendi dilatio. Fuerat autem humani generis inimici haec operatio cujus interest et odium inexorabile suscitare et perpetes fovere discordias. http://gallica.bnf.fr, pg. 141. Transl. Nicholson, Chronicle, 143.}

\footnote{“Igitur rex cum sociis suis dum a Turonis exiret, a tantae fremitu multitudinis commoti sunt inhabitantes terram…quos qui seriatim progredientes viderunt, ab intimis praecordiis, eliciente lacrymas pietate.” http://gallica.bnf.fr, pg. 148. Transl. Nicholson, Chronicle, 149.}

Even though it inevitably contributed to the delay in reaching the Holy Land, Richard recognized the necessity of making such a grand public display. In fact, when Richard did finally reach Acre, the pageantry of his arrival had the desired effect on his Muslim opponents; Muslim historian Baha ad-Din wrote that the king’s “arrival made an enormous impression” and “put fear into the hearts of the Muslims.”

The efficacy of such displays may also be demonstrated by contrasting the perceptions of Philip and Richard. Philip’s entrance and actions upon arriving at Messina were quite opposite to Richard’s. The chronicler writes disapprovingly of Philip entering the city with only one ship; and as if he was avoiding human gaze, he took himself secretly into the city’s castle harbor. Those waiting on the shore for his arrival accused him of being timid and jeered him, saying that this king could not easily accomplish great deeds of valor since he was so wary of human gaze.

Although the people of Messina were greatly let down by Philip’s low-key arrival, the big production surrounding Richard’s arrival did not disappoint. As Richard approached Messina, the people crowded the shoreline, where “they saw the sea covered with innumerable galleys” and heard “from afar the sound of war-trumpets,” and Richard, “elegantly dressed,” stood up on the prow of his vessel and “willingly [put] himself on show for all to see.” The display was so powerful that the commoners acclaimed him as one who “deserves to be set over peoples and kingdoms.” Similar tensions can be detected in how ad-Din describes the kings’ arrivals at Acre. Philip came to the Holy Land on 20 April, 1191 with six ships, and though he was regarded as “a great and

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60 Gabrieli, Arab Historians, 212-13.
honored ruler, one of [the Christians’] mightiest princes,”63 the only anecdote ad-Din relates following Philip’s arrival was how Philip’s white falcon escaped from him and was seized by the Muslims. Richard, however, arrived with 25 ships, brimming with “men, arms, and equipment,”64 and as was noted above, ad-Din writes of the great fear Richard inspired in his Muslim enemies. Though neither chronicler says so explicitly, it seems likely that, in both cases, Philip would have lost no small amount of honor with such a vivid, negative contrast to Richard. More will be said of this in the next chapter.

Having arrived in Messina in September 1190, Richard continued to demonstrate a lack of haste. It is possible that this delay could be explained away as a diplomatic necessity, as Richard needed time to conclude a treaty with King Tancred of Sicily (which occurred in March 1191) because of the island’s importance as a supply route between Europe and the Levant. Additionally, given the lateness of the year, it is also plausible that Richard felt venturing across the sea in such potentially volatile weather was an unacceptable risk. However, neither suggestion is entirely convincing. For example, it was on Tancred’s initiative that the meeting at Catania in March which resulted in the treaty and alliance between the two kings was initiated, not Richard’s. If anything, Richard’s delay here seems to have been influenced by financial motives. The Continuation records that Richard “never stopped begging his sister to sell her dower,” for “he had already come to an agreement with King Tancred over its sale.”65 Richard did manage to convince his sister to give up her dower—which Tancred bought for over 100,000 marks—and “by the time Richard had received Tancred’s payment, the March

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63 Gabrieli, Arab Historians, 212.
64 Ibid., 213.
65 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 97.
sailing was approaching.” Furthermore, improved sailing conditions in the Spring of 1191 did not spur Richard to quicker action, for although he and Philip agreed that any further delay would be an inconvenience, Richard did not accompany Philip when the later departed for Acre on 30 March, 1191. The *Itinerarium* says that Richard did not embark yet because he was not yet satisfied that he had sufficient supplies to begin the campaign, but there may have been another motive for the English king.

There is some indication that Richard’s kingdom was still at the forefront of his thinking. While Philip and Richard were preparing to sail from Messina, word arrived that Queen Eleanor was on her way to meet up with her son, and it was after this news arrived that Richard declared himself unready to depart; indeed, it would be 17 days after Philip’s departure before Richard’s English contingent would leave Sicily. When mother and son meet, Richard asked Eleanor “to take over the guardianship of his kingdom jointly with…Archbishop Walter of Rouen” and sent her back to watch over his affairs in Normandy. Despite all the careful arrangements Richard had made prior to departing France, it is obvious that he, like his father, still harbored suspicions about the safety of his possessions while on pilgrimage. He worried not only about “a possible attack by supporters of Philip,” but also concerned himself with protecting Aquitaine, “his favorite province,” because the barons there “might at any moment foment revolts and disturbances.” It may be that Richard’s position as king hindered his role as crusading

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66 Ibid., 98.  
70 Flori, *Richard the Lionheart*, 86.
general, but whatever the motivation for Richard’s lack of progress, the delay did not go unnoticed by the king’s men. The chronicler indicates that morale began to sag during their stay at Messina: “all that summer, the knights had incurred heavy expenses…and were resentful at the long, idle delay there. They objected that their brothers in Christ were constantly struggling in the siege of Acre while they idled away their time in Messina.”71 Unbeknownst to them, there was to be yet one more delay.

The trip from Messina to the Holy Land processed no less slowly, for like Frederick Barbarossa, Richard allowed himself to get side-tracked in a military campaign against a Greek opponent on his way to Acre. It is unnecessary to recount in detail the entirety of Richard’s actions in Cyprus: his initial campaign against the Cypriots was an unavoidable confrontation which Richard had to fight to ensure the safety of the queens shipwrecked on the island and to avenge the loss of so many of his men to the Cypriots. Even the Continuation, which is generally ill-disposed toward Richard, exclaimed that it was God, “the King of Glory, who had brought King Richard thus far and who wanted to plant here the good seed on the island, that is to say establish the Holy Church and Roman Christianity and to eradicate the evil root of the wicked Greeks.”72 From this perspective, the opening stages of the Cyprus campaign served a religious function. Although Richard fully intended to pursue the emperor with his army until he captured him or forced him to capitulate,73 the Hospitaller Master in Jerusalem arranged a conference between the king and the Cypriot emperor which should have ended the

72 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 103.
affair. After all, the emperor had promised the English king that he would be his faithful man and to accompany him to Jerusalem with a company of horsemen, as well as providing Richard with substantial financial compensation and control over the castles and fortifications of Cyprus. Richard had also already received news that Philip had arrived safely in the Holy Land and that he was presently constructing siege machines while he waited for the remainder of the Crusader army to arrive. The campaign against Acre was essentially in a stalling pattern until Richard arrived, and the emperor’s capitulation to Richard in the aforementioned conference should have allowed the English forces to continue on their way.

The next night, however, a rumor reached the emperor that Richard was preparing to seize him, causing the emperor to flee, leaving all his equipment behind in his desire to reach Famagusta. Although the Cypriots were no longer a threat to him, Richard decided that his opponent had broken faith with him and ordered his men out in pursuit. Richard’s army ranged through Cyprus, plundering the towers and castles of the island for their gold and equipment and capturing a great number of noblemen, from whom the king received homage. The entire campaign took 15 days, after which Richard treated it as his own royal possession, giving it to his own men inhabit. While the king’s expedition had proven to be of great benefit to him, his actions rankled many of his fellow Crusaders. While the army was still at Famagusta, messengers came from Philip urging him to come to Acre with haste so that the campaign could get underway. Furthermore, the messengers “added abusively that instead of coming speedily with his forces, he had given up essential business and was concentrating his efforts on useless

exercises,” and they upbraided the king as one who “seemed so valiant” but “when it
came to engaging the Saracens, he turned out to be a coward.”76 Though greatly angered
by this criticism, Richard simply ignored the messengers and only moved towards Acre
when a rumor circulated that the city was about to be captured. Richard reportedly
exclaimed, “God forbid that Acre should be won in my absence…for it has been besieged
for so long, and the triumph—God willing—will be so glorious.”77 Neither religious
devotion nor appeals for aid from the beleaguered Levant had succeeded in speeding the
English king to Acre; it was the threat of lost glory and honor that finally brought the
famed monarch to the Holy Land.

It has been argued that the campaign for Cyprus should not be seen as a detriment to
the course of the Third Crusade. Madden, for example, has emphasized the strategic
importance of the island to the Latins, saying that the capture of Cyprus was “an
important milestone in the history of the crusades,” and that it would be “difficult to
imagine how the crusaders could have continued their war against Saladin without their
base in Cyprus.”78 Gillingham has taken a similar approach, and he writes that modern
historians have typically seen Richard as a pragmatic leader on Crusade: “Whenever
possible, he chose options…which made strategic sense and which brought substantial
and lasting gain for the shattered Christian foothold in the Middle East.”79 Furthermore,
Cyprus was “infinitely more important than Jerusalem” on a strategic level, although the

appearance of the messengers, but it does not that Philip “could have easily taken the city had he wished,
but he was awaiting the arrival of King Richard of England because they had traveled together and had
made an agreement…concerning all the conquests they should make.” Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 99.
77 “Nolite,” inquit, “Deus, quod, me absente, obtineatur Achon, tanto tempore obsessa, et tanto gloriuosus
78 Madden, Crusades, 87.
island had no religious significance. However, both Madden and Gillingham are seeing the Cyprus campaign with the benefit of hindsight. For example, the way that Gillingham states his argument suggests that he feels Richard’s decision to overrun and use Cyprus as a supply base was a conscious decision on the part of the English king and part of his overall, long-term plan. However, there is no evidence in the *Itinerarium* that Richard had given Cyprus any forethought, and though the *Itinerarium* does discuss the importance of the island as a supply base, it only mentions that aspect of the campaign after the arrival of the French messengers, seemingly as an after the fact justification of Richard’s actions. Richard came to the island to ensure the safety of the queens shipwrecked there, and after he had recovered the queens and avenged the loss of his men, he continued the Cypriot campaign, securing for himself glory and financial reward. The goal—the recapture of Jerusalem—was again momentarily postponed.

While any discussion of what would have happened in the Holy Land had Frederick, Philip, and Richard arrived on schedule and at full strength will always remain largely conjectural, there are a couple of points that can be made. Contemporary observers understood the delay of the European monarchs as deleterious to the effort to take Acre, and the capture of the city was a necessary prerequisite to further operations in the Levant. Furthermore, Acre was besieged for two years, and at no point during that time were the Christians of the Kingdom of Jerusalem able to take the city. Their forces were sufficient to maintain the siege, but as Edbury noted, “the death of Frederick Barbarossa in June 1190 and the fact that both Richard of England and Philip-Augustus of France delayed their departure until the summer of 1190 meant that they lacked the ability to tilt
the balance decisively in their favor." It was only after the arrival of the kings and their continental armies that Acre succumbed. Before that, the Levant Christians had squandered thousands of men against the walls of the city to no good effect.

As the most powerful leaders in the secular world, the kings of Latin Christendom were looked to as the mortal saviors of the besieged Holy Land. With their ability to recruit armies, inspire the masses, and use the wealth of their kingdoms to fund their expeditions, they were naturally held to be the most capable to reverse the advance of Islam in the Lord’s birthplace. As the Third Crusade demonstrates, however, kingship carried with it certain disadvantages that hindered the Crusade’s launch and would eventually lead to the defeat of the entire venture. Richard I was the exemplar of the chivalric warrior king, the man the Christian world hoped would retake the city of Jerusalem, but even his actions would be disappointing before reaching the besieged Acre. As the Christians in the Holy Land were engaged in constant warfare with the Turks, suffering hardships and awaiting reinforcement from Europe, Richard delayed his coming until he felt secure in leaving his English and French possessions behind, and even then, Richard would always be looking back over his shoulder, keeping a wary eye on his kingdom. This constant concern for his continental possessions would eventually doom the Crusade when his rivalry with Philip II would force him to leave the Holy Land and return to fight for his kingdom. However, these tensions would only come to the fore after the fall of Acre and the breach between Philip and Richard became irreconcilable.

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Chapter Two: the Siege of Acre

You would have reckoned that no rough terrain, no fierce enemy could defeat them, and that they would never give way before any injury—as long as they supported each other in one mind with united strength and mutual assistance. For although an army may glory in its great numbers, be protected by its weapons and burning with passion, if disputes arise within it or friends fall out, it is routed and destroyed.81

With the long-delayed arrival of Richard and Philip in the Holy Land, the Third Crusade—which had been initiated with such hope and expectation of success—seemed to finally be on the verge of accomplishing its objective. The combined armies of France and England tightened the noose around the embattled Acre on land, and the Christian naval forces dominated the coasts and prevented Egyptian aid from coming to the defenders. Shortly after Richard arrived, for example, an Egyptian vessel “full of men, arms, Greek fire, and supplies intended to sustain the Saracens” was intercepted by Richard’s galleys and sunk, at which point “the hearts and wills of the Saracens who were inside the city of Acre were weakened.”82 As the situation for the Muslims besieged behind the walls of Acre continued to deteriorate, the historian Abu Shama echoed the chronicler’s sentiments, deriding the lack of conviction among the Muslim host and lamenting that “as long as the seas bring reinforcements to the enemy and the land does not drive them off, our country will continue to suffer at their hands, and our hearts to be troubled by the sickness caused by the harm they do us.”83 The sight of a unified Christian army outside the city naturally had a much different effect on the Franks, but despite the renewed enthusiasm surrounding the much-needed infusion of material and

82 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 104.
83 Gabrieli, Arab Historians, 214.
morale occasioned by the arrival of the European monarchs, the situation in the Levant was still quite tenuous.

Apart from the stalled military situation which greeted them, Richard and Philip became embroiled in serious local tensions almost immediately, and it would take deft leadership and finesse to manage it all successfully. Instead, both men wound up kicking a hornet’s nest that would prove unhelpful to the crusading venture and have far-reaching effects for the Kingdom of Jerusalem. One of their more immediate political concerns was the as yet unresolved conflict over the crown of Jerusalem, a problem which would see Richard and Philip take opposing sides in the bitter dispute between Conrad of Montferrat and King Guy of Jerusalem. Following the unmitigated disaster at the Horns of Hattin, Guy—at one time one of Richard’s feudal retainers—sought to salvage his reputation by taking up arms against Saladin again and leading the assault on Acre. At the outset of the campaign, Guy’s force was small, and he marched to Tyre and appealed for assistance from Conrad, who had saved the city after the defeat at Hattin. Conrad, however, proved obstinate and would neither assist in a campaign against Acre nor even recognize that Guy was the ruler of the kingdom.

Though Conrad was attempting to set himself up as the hero of the Levant Christians, the balance of opinion shifted against him as more and more forces arrived from Europe. These crusaders, who “were surprised to see the king of Jerusalem at odds with the self-proclaimed lord of Tyre,” ultimately sided with Guy and joined him on his march against Saladin’s forces. Under this pressure, Conrad grudgingly joined in the enterprise and helped swell the crusaders’ ranks outside Acre. Unfortunately, the solution to this crisis

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84 Madden, *Crusades*, 83.
between Guy and Conrad proved to be short-lived, for Queen Sibylla, through whom Guy
received his right of kingship, died of disease during the siege. The lord of Tyre moved
quickly to undercut his rival’s authority by forcibly marrying the sole heir to the
 kingdom, Isabella, after which he left Acre. Guy had powerful enemies, and “to the
 surviving barons of the kingdom, led by Balian of Ibelin, it seemed an opportunity for
 ridding themselves of his weak, unlucky rule.”85 This turn of events now greatly divided
 the crusading force which had been rallying behind Guy, and the wait for the arrival of
 Richard and Philip now took on greater urgency.

The problem of the succession surfaced before Richard had even arrived in the Holy
Land. While Richard was still conducting his campaign in Cyprus, Guy arrived on the
island to seek out Richard in order to obtain “his counsel and aid because the king of
France had decided that the marquis…should be made king of Jerusalem and King Guy
deposed.”86 As the two most powerful monarchs of Christian Europe, it was only natural
that they would be asked to intervene in the matter, and it was equally natural “that their
responses would be different because each was entangled in the skeins of western feudal
and family relationships. Conrad was Philip of France’s cousin. Guy’s family, the
Lusignans, were feudatories…of Richard’s county of Poitou.”87 Neither king could
reasonably be seen to act in an objective manner when such familial and feudal relations

85 Runciman, History, 30.
86 Venerat autem idem Guido ad regem Ricardum, petiturus consilium et auxilium, super eo quod rex
Francia disposuerat Marchisum de quo prius supradictum est, fieri regem Jerosolimorum, abjecto rege
mother was the sister of King Conrad III of Germany and of Barbarossa’s father, Frederick of
Hohenstaufen, giving him support within the German elements of the Crusade. Cf. Nicholson, Itinerarium,

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were intertwined, but the succession crisis would prove to be yet another sticking point in a relationship that was not good to begin with.

Despite the seemingly joyous reunion between the two kings at Acre, where the two kings “[showed] each other every respect and deference,” the tensions between the two camps did not improve after Richard’s arrival in the Holy Land on 8 June, 1191.88 Almost immediately, a dispute arose between Philip and Richard over the necessity of making a quick assault on Acre, with Philip backing an immediate attack and Richard urging delay. According to the chronicler, Richard was reluctant to attack at this point because “his body was still racked by pain and because some of his forces had not yet arrived.”89 Philip, however, believed that this was insufficient reason to delay storming the city; as the chronicler himself noted, Acre was already “surrounded by an enormous besieging force…from every Christian nation under heaven, the elite of the Christian people.”90 With these combined forces, it hardly seems necessary that a delay was warranted for lack of soldiers. It may be, rather, that Richard’s actual concern was that the assault should be delayed until he was well enough to participate in taking Acre and win the acclaim that would go with such a feat. Given Richard’s propensity for being at the fore of his battles, it is unlikely that Richard would have willingly missed the opportunity to gain credit for being the king who finally ended the two-year siege of Acre. It is equally plausible that Philip wanted to take the city before Richard fully recovered so that he did not have to share the credit with his rival. Such a scenario is

hardly inconceivable, given the history of bad blood between Philip and Richard on
issues of honor and reputation. A similar disagreement had previously arisen between
them in Sicily, when neither would “give way to the other: the king of France felt he
would demean himself if he committed himself to the judgment of an inferior, while King
Richard thought he would be dishonored if he submitted to a man whose feats were less
impressive than his own.”91 In either case, a major decision on campaign strategy was
being made based on the ambitions and reputations of the commanding monarchs, not on
what was best for the Holy Land.

Whatever the motives of those involved happened to be, the siege and capture of Acre
seems to have driven the final wedge between the two kings. Diplomatically, each had
opened separate negotiations with Saladin for the surrender of the city, a situation which,
at least in part, “grew out of their respective support for the opposing claimants to the
Jerusalem throne.”92 The situation was no better on the military side. Against Richard’s
objections, Philip launched his assault against the city, but his attempt to end the siege
failed, with heavy losses among the French contingent. After this initial failure, the
chronicler reports that the people cried out “O why did we wait so long for the kings’
arrival…what pointless hope! Now they have come, and we are no better off; in fact, we
are even worse off than we used to be. What we longed for is worth less than we
hoped.”93 As the French continued their efforts against Acre, Richard, though still sick,

91 ...rex Francia inferioris se committeret arbitrio, et eo suae derogaretur dignitati, sed nec rex Ricardus ne
92 Christopher Tyerman, God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP,
2006), 450.
93 O quid tanto tempore regum expectatus adventus hue spes frustrata. Jam venerunt et nihil proticimus sed
prepared to lead his knights forward because “he was very anxious to capture the city” and was, perhaps, afraid that the city would be taken without him.\textsuperscript{94}

The internal friction between Richard and Philip became so great that it affected military operations around Acre, and the two seemingly did not even always communicate their own maneuvers with one another, an omission that could cost many lives on the battlefield. This happened on more than one occasion, which “endangered the military operations” and caused them to launch uncoordinated attacks which ultimately failed.\textsuperscript{95} Such lack of communication resulted in other equally serious problems. In early July, for example, as the Muslim garrison was nearing capitulation, envoys from the city approached Philip to request “that he should pause his assaults and give them a safe-conduct to come and speak with him.”\textsuperscript{96} During this embassy, Richard, “so as to get his own back on the king of France because he would not keep him informed of what was going on, had the assault on the city stepped up.” The Muslim envoys were greatly angered at this violation of the truce and returned immediately to Acre, telling Philip that this was necessary “since you lack the authority to forbid the assault,” a jab that must have cut Philip to the quick, given how Richard’s presence and actions on the crusade had already wounded his pride and undermined his authority. The French and English soldiers had already come to blows once on the way to the Holy Land when they fought against one another at Messina, and Philip’s anger almost brought a similar rupture outside the walls of Acre. According to the \textit{Continuation}, the French king was so


\textsuperscript{95} Tyerman, \textit{God’s War}, 450.

\textsuperscript{96} Edbury, \textit{Conquest of Jerusalem}, 105.
enraged at Richard’s actions that he ordered his men to attack the English king, and Philip was already getting into his armor for the attack when cooler heads prevailed.

Thankfully for the crusaders, the siege of Acre was entering its final act; one can only imagine the potential for other such episodes had the siege continued much longer. As it was, without reinforcements and running out of supplies and willpower, the garrison surrendered on 12 July, 1191, and Richard and Philip set about dividing the spoils between them. Given the tensions between the two kings before and during the siege, the partition of the goods went quite smoothly: “the city was divided equally between the two kings; they also divided weapons and foodstuffs they found into equal shares. The sum total of the captives was also reckoned up and divided by lot...so each peacefully received his share.”\textsuperscript{97} This display of unity was, however, short-lived, for the underlying strains between Richard and Philip were still smoldering below the surface, waiting to rise to the fore again.

With the siege over and the immediate military condition calm, Richard and Philip set about organizing the burgeoning Crusader kingdom of Jerusalem, as they worked to settle ownership disputes, improve the city’s destroyed fortifications, and oversaw the consecration of new churches. Their most pressing task, however, was the long-running conflict over the crown of Jerusalem, and all eyes focused on settling the succession dispute between Conrad and Guy once and for all.\textsuperscript{98} Before the negotiations even began,


\textsuperscript{98}Während in Akko nach der Wiederherstellung christlicher Herrschaft Kirchen neu geweiht, Besitzansprüche geklärt und die beschädigten Festungsanlagen ausgebessert wurden, richtete sich das Bestreben der zwei Könige vornehmlich darauf, den langwierigen Konflikt um die Krone des Königreiches
Richard and Philip had already lined up their support behind opposing candidates. When Guy arrived at Cyprus to beseech Richard’s help, he told the king that both Philip II and Leopold V of Austria had given their support to Conrad. With many of the local barons having sided with the marquis as well, Richard was Guy’s last hope. Although Richard had good reason to deny Guy’s request for help, the king received him warmly, welcomed him openly with gifts, and agreed to take his side. The chronicle records that “an enormous disagreement arose between the two kings…The king of France favored [Conrad] and had decided to give him all his share of everything gained in the Holy Land and his entitlement to future gains. Being sympathetic to the plight of King Guy, King Richard was unwilling to give his assent to this condition as it seemed more appropriate for King Guy.”99 The two sides were at an impasse.

There is some question as to why Richard himself would not have backed the marquis at this point, particularly given that Guy had exhibited disloyalty to the king in past, causing Richard to expel him from Poitou. Madden proposes two possible solutions to the question: either Richard was naturally predisposed to side against any person that Philip favored, or perhaps the king “simply warmed to Guy, who was, in culture and temperament, not unlike Richard himself.”100 Neither answer is particularly satisfactory, however. As Riley-Smith noted, the relation between Richard and Guy was entwined in

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100 p. 88
conflicting feudal relations; the Lusignan family, in fact, were “rival claimants to a prize which had been seized by [Richard’s] father.”101 This prize would remain a sticking point between the two parties, and “given the need to placate an angry family, it is not surprising that during the Third Crusade, Richard was to show the Lusignans exceptional marks of favor.”102 Although Conrad’s support ran fairly deep among the influential local leaders in Outremer, it seems that the pressures of continental politics persuaded Richard to take Guy’s side. This decision would have far-reaching ramifications for the remainder of the Crusade.

On 28 July, a compromise was reached by the local barons of Outremer and the European monarchs, namely that Guy would remain ruler of the Kingdom of Jerusalem until his death, at which point the marquis or his heir would ascend to the throne. An irate Conrad returned to Tyre, where he pointedly refused to participate in the Crusade any further and would come to openly undermine Richard’s efforts for the remainder of his life. This anger was not limited to the marquis. Contemporary chroniclers certainly recognized the importance of presenting a united Christian front if the Third Crusade was to succeed, but the contentiousness and hard feelings which resulted from Richard and Philip’s compromise fractured any hope for that, not only between the French and English continental contingents—the former being upset at the lack of acknowledgment they and their king had received for their part in the crusade—but also between the European and Levant forces. As Riley-Smith observed, King Richard “was not nearly as successful in local politics as he was on the battlefield,”103 and his problems with Conrad

101 p. 134
102 Ibid 134
103 Ibid., 145.
and his supporters would constantly plague him. Later in the crusade, the king’s “support of Guy of Lusignan, to whom he was prepared to surrender his conquests, was frustrated by Conrad of Montferrat, the French crusaders, and the local lords, who had never really accepted the compromise.”104 The local and continental strains stirred up by Richard’s decision encouraged them “to undermine his military efforts, since they knew the territory he gained would be handed over to Guy, and they negotiated behind his back with the Muslims in the hopes of getting grants of land directly from Saladin.” As so often happened during the course of the Crusades, European leaders had trouble negotiating the difficult waters of Levant politics, and this proved to be a decisive factor in hampering their efforts in the region.

Once the compromise between the contending forces was concluded, Philip decided that the time was right to return to France, despite the fact that much remained to be accomplished in the Levant. Many reasons have been postulated for Philip’s decision to leave the Levant at this critical juncture, and they largely do not paint a positive picture of him. The primary motivation cited for the king’s decision was his ongoing rivalry with Richard, and it was a feud in which Philip seemed able to score few—if any—points in the court of public opinion. Indeed, even when the French king held majority opinion and support, his rival still managed to outmaneuver him. During the succession crisis, for example, Tyerman notes that the entire episode “says much for Philip’s political weakness and Richard’s practical dominance that, in spite of the French king having the favor of a majority of the important local Outremer barons and with most of the crusader

104 Ibid
leaders being his vassals, Conrad’s succession remained blocked.”

Having suffered similar public reversals against Richard throughout the Crusade, Philip did not have the appetite for further humiliation.

A standard consensus has arisen to explain the animus between the two kings, namely that Philip was jealous over Richard’s success and influence. According to the Muslim historian Baha ad-Din, Philip, “a great and honored ruler, one of their mightiest princes…was to assume supreme command” of the crusading army upon his arrival at Acre. That was a reasonable conclusion, given that Richard was Philip’s man, having “[come] to the king of France and [doing] homage to him for the land he held on that side of the sea” before leaving on the crusade. As such, Philip would rightly feel that it was he who should be in charge once their forces combined at Acre, but Richard surpassed Philip in his actions en route to the Holy Land, and his wide acclaim allowed him to assume control. When Richard arrived at Acre, the people shouted, “This man is certainly worthy of authority! He deserves to be set over peoples and kingdoms.” As kings, Richard and Philip were equal in title, but in the estimation of the people, only one could actually be the leader of the crusade. It is little wonder, then, that Philip would be resentful of the masses’ adoration for Richard, whose “kingdom and standing were inferior to those of the French king” but whose “wealth, reputation, and valor” were esteemed greater. Tyerman describes the rivalry between Richard and Philip as “debilitating,” saying that “Philip’s sense of grievance at his treatment in Sicily…was

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105 Tyerman, God’s War, 450. 
106 Gabrieli, Arab Historians, 212. 
107 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 92. 
109 Gabrieli, Arab Historians, 213.
exacerbated at every turn.” 110 This sense of honor and propriety dictated much of Philip’s response to events, and what the chronicler said about Philip and Henry II can just as readily be applied to Philip and Richard: “each was ashamed to allow himself to be brought low without retaliating, for fear of damaging his honor and reputation.” 111 The consequences of this developing hatred would have ramifications beyond the Third Crusade, but its immediate result was to further hamstring the crusading effort at the moment when the most good could have been achieved: a powerful and united Christian army, fresh from success at Acre, was facing down an exhausted and divided Muslim force. One can only wonder and consider the possibilities had Philip not returned home when he did.

For Philip, another good reason to return home now was to take back the land currently held by Richard in France. At this time, the kings of England remained, at least nominally, vassals of the French king, but the Capetian monarchs had proven too weak to make their English subjects obey. Philip, however, “adopted a much more aggressive anti-Angevin policy than his father pursued,” 112 and before the Third Crusade was called, Philip had been at war variously with Richard and Henry II over their holdings in France. Back in France, Philip simply returned to form, snapping up Richard’s Angevin possessions and fomenting trouble with the English king’s aggrieved younger brother John. The Continuation hints at the immense satisfaction Philip received from his plots against Richard: though Philip “was careful not to betray his feelings or show any sign of

110 p. 450
outrage at what King Richard had done to him” by reneging on his pledge to marry Philip’s sister, the French king “showed his outrage clearly when he got back to France.” ¹¹³

While Philip’s departure was undoubtedly influenced by his jealousy and animus toward Richard—as well as his desire to capture some of the English king’s French holdings—there is also some evidence to suggest that Philip’s monarchical responsibilities did legitimately convince him of the necessity of leaving the crusade. The *Continuation* records an episode which, while undoubtedly part invective directed at Richard, shows one of the risks to crusading kings: succession crises in Europe. The story the author relates says that while Philip was gravely ill, Richard—hoping to “kill the king of France without touching him—deliberately mislead Philip into believing that the latter’s son and only heir, Louis, had died.¹¹⁴ Philip was greatly disturbed by the news, for if he were to “die in this land, the kingdom of France will be left without an heir.” According to the *Continuation*, it was at this point that Philip, even though he realized that the story was untrue, “immediately ordered his galleys to be made ready so that he could pass overseas.” Further, the author records that “it was said that he hastened to go so as to prevent anyone taking the county of Flanders, for Count Philip of Flanders had died and the county had escheated to [the king].”¹¹⁵ Runciman suggests that the situation in Flanders was a major factor in complicating the relationship between Richard and Philip: “while the King of France had some claim on the inheritance, the King of England was unwilling to let so rich and strategically placed a province fall into

¹¹³ Edbury, *Conquest of Jerusalem*, 104.  
¹¹⁵ Ibid., 110.
his rival’s hands.”\textsuperscript{116} Furthermore, as the king, Philip was “personally responsible” for the solution to the Flanders crisis, and it was necessary for him to oversee the affair in person.\textsuperscript{117}

Whether Richard’s part in the story is accurate or not, the tale illustrates a very real concern that a European monarch would face while being so far away from control of his realm. In fact, Tyerman seems to suggest that this was a primary motivator for Philip’s abrupt departure, as he focuses heavily on this aspect of the controversy. He writes that while the king’s apologists struggled to explain his actions, the answer is really quite simple. Because of the Count of Flanders’ death mentioned above, “Philip stood to gain the strategically and economically important region of Artois and would be able to manipulate the contested Flemish succession to his material advantage. But he needed to be present to ensure the process went smoothly” so that he could fully control these areas, “which were vital to Capetian security.”\textsuperscript{118} While Madden and Tyerman both mention the king’s health as a potential factor in his decision, with the former arguing that he had been sick almost since his arrival,\textsuperscript{119} it was not necessarily Philip’s health for his own sake that troubled him. The issue was, most likely, how the succession crisis would destabilize the French realm. While it is true that there are many possible reasons for the French king’s departure from the Third Crusade, there is little doubt that Philip saw the crusading effort as a distraction from his duties as king of France and as potentially detrimental to his lineage.

\textsuperscript{116} Runciman, \textit{History}, 49.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{118} Tyerman, \textit{God’s War}, 453.
\textsuperscript{119} Madden, \textit{Crusades}, 88.
The reaction to Philip’s departure was mixed, with this ambiguity of feeling best summarized by the *Itinerarium* chronicler. The king was lambasted for his “shameful” and “outrageous” decision to “leave when there was still so much pressing business to be done! It was his duty to guide this great crowd of people, to encourage the Christian people in such pious and necessary work, and to ensure the progress of such an arduous undertaking!”\(^{120}\) It was all the more stunning considering that Philip had been in the Holy Land such a brief time. In the same breath, though, the chronicler concedes that Philip’s “reputation should not be completely blackened. He had expended a great deal of effort and expense in that country…given aid and support to a great many people [and] the very authority of his presence had brought about more quickly and easily the completion of that great undertaking.”\(^{121}\) Despite this more balanced assessment of Augustus’ actions, Tyerman notes that the general consensus was one of “almost universal opprobrium,” and he faced “accusations of greed, fear, and dereliction of duty.”\(^{122}\) This would, of course, be forgotten later on when Philip’s other successes caused his contemporaries to see him in a more favorable light. While the French king’s decision did not sit well with many of his contemporaries, Richard was surely not unduly displeased “as it consolidated his control over the enterprise.”\(^{123}\) With Philip gone, he could more freely dictate policy himself.

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\(^{122}\) Tyerman, *God’s War*, 454-455.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., 454.
Unfortunately for the success of the Third Crusade, the local political tensions that had been stirred by the interference of the European Christians could not be erased by Philip’s departure. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the stance taken by the Marquis of Tyre toward Richard following the departure of Philip, who was, as previously mentioned, a strong supporter of the Marquis. In some respects, Conrad was emboldened to defy Richard by the largesse of Philip himself, who gave to the Marquis half of the city of Acre, some of Philip’s Muslim hostages from the siege of that city, and lordship over Tyre. Tyerman notes that the amount of autonomy given to Conrad by Philip’s grant allowed the Marquis to become “a focus for dissent” on those occasions when “members of the local Jerusalem baronage became disenchanted with Richard.”

 Though Richard still commanded a great deal of respect, his base of power remained with his European Christian followers, and the divide between the Levant Christians and the European Crusaders would present difficulties for the Third Crusade going forward.

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124 Ibid., 455.
Chapter Three: Advancing on Jerusalem

Nothing is more destructive than rivalry. There is nothing that is more dangerous in destroying unity and peace and also pollutes the alliance of affection. Whatever is created by the bond of mutual love and strengthened by the grace of friendship is dissolved by the ferment of envy.125

For a time after Philip’s departure from the Levant, it appeared as though Fortune’s wheel had decidedly turned in favor of the European Christians. After two long years and many casualties, the stronghold of Acre had finally fallen, and Saladin was on the defensive. The march to Jerusalem could now begin anew. Although Conrad of Montferrat had abandoned the crusade and returned to Tyre following the settlement of the succession, Richard had assumed command of the entire venture. Basking in the glow of his victory at Acre, the English monarch did what any good high-ranking noble would do to reward his faithful followers: he doled out huge amounts of largesse. The chronicler notes that when Richard “saw that he now held chief responsibility for the entire enterprise, its progress, operations, and costs, he cheerfully distributed great quantities of gold and silver to the French and foreigners of any nation so that they could more than recover their means and redeem the securities they had given for their debts.”126 The celebratory mood of the moment was to be quite deceiving, however, for Philip’s departure had set into motion the final act of the Third Crusade. Events stemming from the French king’s abandonment of the expedition—and the increased animosity between Richard and Philip which the Crusade had fostered—would bring the Third Crusade to its premature and unsatisfactory conclusion.

125 Nicholson, Chronicle, 293.
Even though “Philip’s absence both simplified and complicated the situation facing
the crusaders,” 127 there was now an opportunity for the Crusade’s stalled momentum to
begin again. Richard wasted little time in pressing his advantage after the fall of Acre.
He immediately opened communication with Saladin in hopes of securing a quick
settlement, but once it became apparent that the negotiations were going to achieve
nothing, the army set out with great alacrity. Richard elected to move immediately on the
city of Jaffa, the port closest to the crusaders’ target of Jerusalem. Saladin made only one
attempt to stop the Christian army before it reached Jaffa, bringing Richard’s forces to
battle at Arsuf on September 7th. After a pitched fight, the English king dispatched his
adversary with heavy losses, and Saladin ceded the port city to Richard and did not again
attempt to lure him into battle. According to the chronicler, when the infantry
approached Jaffa on 10 September, they found that it “had been so completely destroyed
by the Saracens that the army could not find anywhere to lodge” and so encamped in the
gardens outside Jaffa. 128 Over the following days and weeks, more and more men and
provisions would arrive from Acre in preparation for the next stage of the Crusade.

From his position at Jaffa, Richard had four options before him: he could make an
immediate move against Jerusalem; occupy and fortify the strategically vital port at
Ascalon; invade Egypt; or attempt to conclude a peace treaty with Saladin. The first
option was unquestionably risky, for the route to the Holy City was a long one across
inhospitable terrain, and the route did not lend itself to easy resupply. Naval power was
crucial to supplying the crusader army, and Jerusalem was far from this vital supply line.

127 Tyerman, God’s War, 455.
128 Antecedebant exercitum usque Joppen, jam a Saracenis funditus dirutam, ita ut in ea non posset
exercitus hospitari, sed in ejus parte sinistra. Fixis igitur tentoritis in oliveto pulcherrimo manebat eo
Furthermore, despite the crusaders’ convincing victory over Saladin at Arsuf, Riley-Smith notes that an overland campaign against Jerusalem remained “dangerous while there was a large Muslim army in the vicinity,”¹²⁹ and visions of Hattin must surely have been in the background of Richard’s thinking. Indeed, although the Christians had been victorious at Arsuf, Saladin and his army still commanded a great deal of respect and awe in the crusader ranks; for example, when news reached Jaffa that Saladin had ordered the razing of the fortifications of Ascalon, the chronicler reports that the Europeans “found it incredible that Saladin should have ordered this to be done out of desperation…for they believed that he was very strong and powerful.”¹³⁰ At the same time, there was enormous political pressure on the English king to move quickly to restore Jerusalem to Christian control, without which the Third Crusade could not plausibly be called a success. Though this was not his preferred choice, Richard knew that “if the army was to stay together and his leadership recognized, both prerequisites for the effectiveness of his continuing diplomacy with Saladin, he had to march towards Jerusalem.”¹³¹ A direct assault on Jerusalem would have to remain on the table even as he entertained other possibilities.

The second option—the occupation and refortification of Ascalon—was a much more inviting option for Richard, and it was the one he proposed to his followers. After listening to the counsel of his followers, the king declared that he “must tell you that I feel the soundest advice would be to chase off the Turks from Ascalon and preserve the

¹²⁹ Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 144-145.
¹³¹ Tyerman, God’s War, 462.
city undamaged…this seems to me to be what we should do.” Ascalon was a vital port for the crusaders; Christian control of the city would effectively hamper Saladin’s supply lines and communications with Egypt, and “if the Third Crusade’s conquests were to outlast the crusade itself, the crusader barons would need control of Ascalon.”

Furthermore, with an established base at Ascalon, Richard would have a suitable jumping off point for his third option, a potential invasion of Egypt. This option, though less appealing to Richard’s followers, would have the effect of “[adding] to the diplomatic pressure on Saladin” to either move against the Christians or sue for peace terms.

The final alternative available to him was to seek a treaty with Saladin in hopes of negotiating a settlement to the crusade, and these negotiations would actually drag out for an entire year. On 20 October 1191, al-Malik al-‘Adil, Saladin’s brother and an intermediary between the two sides, readied a proposal to send to the English king.

According to Baha al-Din, who was himself involved in the negotiations, records that the plan was that [al-‘Adil] himself should marry the King’s sister…and her brother was to give her the whole of Palestine that was in his hands: Acre, Jaffa, Ascalon, and the rest, while the Sultan was to give al-‘Adil all the parts of Palestine belonging to him and make him their King, in addition to the lands and fees he already held. Saladin was also to hand over the True Cross to the Franks. Villages and forts belonging to the Templars were to remain in their hands, Muslim and Frankish prisoners were to be freed, and the King of England was to return home by sea.

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133 Madden, Crusades, 90.
134 Tyerman, God’s War, 461.
135 Gabrieli, Arab Historians, 226-227. According to Riley-Smith, the offer of Joan’s hand to al-‘Adil actually came from Richard’s camp, and “Saladin seems to have considered that this offer was not a serious one.” Riley-Smith, Crusades, 145.
Al-Din further asserts that Saladin himself was amenable to these terms because he knew “quite well that the King of England would never agree to them, and they were only a trick and a practical joke on his part.”

There is some question as to how seriously both sides pursued these negotiations early on, particularly on the Muslim side. Tyerman notes that “for Saladin, it offered a chance to buy time to allow more reinforcements to arrive; for Richard, it formed part of his consistent strategy of allying diplomatic with military pressure.”\(^\text{136}\) The chronicler, however, writes that Richard did contemplate Saladin’s offers with great deliberation, even faulting the king for his excessive imprudence; Richard “thought over their confused situation, reflecting that the outcome of the war hung in the balance, and judged that, for the time being, he ought to wait and see what came of it.”\(^\text{137}\) This was a mistake on the king’s part, however, as “he had no premonition of their fraud. He did not foresee that they would draw him on with prevarications…[entrapping] the overly credulous king with his shrewdness and [deceiving] him with smooth words.” On this point, at least, the Muslim historians agree, with Baha al-Din writing that “the Sultan’s real object was to undermine the foundations of peace on those terms…and he only moved toward peace in response to external pressure.”\(^\text{138}\)

Regardless of how seriously Richard may have entertained these early offerings, there is evidence in the sources that he was anxious to reach a quick settlement and return to England. Although Richard felt “it would be sound counsel to make an honorable peace

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\(^{136}\) Tyerman, *God’s War*, 458.


which would increase Christendom and extend its frontiers,” his attention was always being diverted back to his Angevin lands, making him “all the more anxious for peace because the king of France had already departed, and he feared his unreliability and dishonesty.” At first glance, one would assume that concluding peace after the crusader victories at Acre and Arsuf would have been a distinct possibility for Richard, particularly considering that Saladin, as Madden suggests, “had an army that was increasingly demoralized and a council of emirs that wanted peace with the Christians as soon as possible. Most of all, the Muslim lords wanted Richard I to go away.” A peace that was successfully negotiated on terms favorable to the Christians was actually Richard’s best option if he wanted to speedily return to his own lands while still being able to claim a victory for all of Christendom, as was his goal. Attempting a military victory was the more difficult and (theoretically) more time consuming option. Despite having a substantial upper-hand, Richard was, if anything, just as eager as Saladin for the Crusade to come to a speedy conclusion, and as he assembled his army at Jaffa, the king kept all of his options open, negotiating with Saladin even as he prepared for a military strike into Muslim territory.

The army had been at Jaffa for seven weeks when, “refreshed by rest and [seeming] to have recovered its former vigor, a royal edict went out instructing everyone to arm for an expedition in the Lord’s name!” The road to Jerusalem was not an easy one, and the

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140 Madden, Crusades, 91.

chronicler records how the men, having spent about six weeks around Ramula, suffered through numerous Muslim raids, as well as bad weather which made setting up camp difficult. Throughout the month of December, the army was buffeted by violent storms which damaged their armor, killed pack animals, and ruined the camp’s food supply. The advance was painfully slow, but the crusaders gradually crawled to within sight of the Holy City, and visions of a repetition of 1099 buoyed their spirits in spite of the miserable conditions.

Thus far, Richard’s participation in the Third Crusade had seemingly been an unqualified success: breaking the siege at Acre, repulsing the famed Saladin at Arsuf, and having driven far into Muslim territory. It was at this juncture, however, that the divide between the European and Levant contingents of the crusade would show itself, highlighting one of the disadvantages of having a European monarch at the helm of such an endeavor. As had happened so often through the course of this crusade, there was a division of opinion between those crusaders who came from Europe and those who were native to the Levant about how to proceed. Such problems had arisen at Jaffa, for example, when the French argued against moving toward Ascalon, advising instead that “it would be better to rebuild Jaffa itself” as it “could be completed more conveniently and so their pilgrimage to Jerusalem would be shorter.”\(^{142}\) At this point, the chronicler records that many of the common people, having endured an “epidemic of misery” from Jaffa to Jerusalem, were given solace by only one thought: “they hoped that they were very soon going to visit the Lord’s Sepulchre, for they had an indescribable yearning to

see the city of Jerusalem and complete their pilgrimage.”\textsuperscript{143} Indeed, they “were very eager to complete their pilgrimage so that they could go back home without delay,”\textsuperscript{144} and as has already been shown, Richard had his own incentive to complete the crusade with rapidity. On the other side of the equation, though, were “the wiser people” who advised Richard that he should not “acquiesce in the common people’s rash desires. For the Templars and Hospitaliers and also the Poulains, natives of that country, who could see clearly what needed to be done for the future, advised King Richard not to go towards Jerusalem at that juncture.”\textsuperscript{145} The military orders perceived that such a move presented two dangers, namely that it opened the army to a counter move from Saladin’s army and that capturing the city would lead to the premature disbursement of the army as Richard’s followers returned home. Without “[assigning] the toughest men to guard the city” when it fell, the Templars and Hospitaliers realized their gains would be wiped away once their strength was depleted. They strenuously advocated “that the advance should be deliberately postponed in order to retain their military strength and the common people’s forces…for as soon as their vow was discharged, the army would break up.”\textsuperscript{146} The chronicler notes, however, that “full attention was not paid to their advice.”\textsuperscript{147} An

\textsuperscript{147} Sed adhuc consilium eorum non omnino exuaditum. Ibid
advance against Jerusalem was in the works. The year 1192 dawned with division and apprehension in the Christian ranks even as the army’s main objective stood within reach.

Thus was exposed perhaps the greatest underlying weakness of the Third Crusade specifically and the crusading movement generally. The vast majority of those crusaders who came from Europe had no personal stake in the outcome of the crusade; they had undertaken this effort as a religious pilgrimage, and upon having completed their vow, they would return home to their own lands. For those Christians who would remain in the Holy Land after the crusade was over, the stakes were much higher, for the ramifications of the crusade would impact their daily lives. Furthermore, any long-reaching success the crusade could generate was dependent on the European contingent remaining in the Levant. The Holy Land Christians were simply not sufficient in number to hold their own over an extended period of time. It was this necessity to have heavy reinforcement from the continent, this lack of self-sufficiency in material and manpower, that would help doom the Third Crusade, as it had done to the Second Crusade and would do future crusades. From this point forward, Richard would base many of his decisions on a timetable that had more to do with what was best for him rather than for what successful long-term operations in the Levant. As the leader of his own kingdom in Europe, little else could reasonably be expected.

The division over the proper course of action would continue into the new year, and the local leaders made yet another attempt to impress upon Richard and his followers that there was a better option than a direct attack on Jerusalem. For the locals, particularly the military orders, rebuilding Ascalon was the top priority, and “the wiser people,” as the chronicler refers to them, made a compelling argument for its priority. With a heavily
fortified and garrisoned Ascalon, it would be possible to block a Muslim advance from Egypt to Jerusalem and control the flow of supplies from that area. Such a course of action would not only benefit the crusade now—preventing reinforcements and materials from reaching the Muslims stationed in Jerusalem—but also be advantageous to the locals, giving them a stronghold near the Holy City that was readily defensible and serving to hinder the free movement of the Muslim forces. The situation for the Muslims in Jerusalem was already perilous, suffering from shortages, bad weather, and poor morale, and a more deliberate approach would have allowed the locals to strengthen their defenses in anticipation of a future occupation of the city while denying the Muslim host a chance to replenish its supplies and numbers. This time, Richard acquiesced and ordered the army to retire towards Ascalon.

The reaction from the European contingent bordered on inconsolable. The chronicler, who sided with the Templars’ view, observed that “when the army was actually informed about the decision to retreat, the common people pined away with indescribable grief,” and in their despair, “they called down every evil on” those who caused “the delay in carrying out their vow.”148 At this point, national tensions further complicated matters as both the Continuation and the Itinerarium single out the French soldiers for their desertion of the campaign. According to the Continuation, national pride was the motivating factor in Hugh of Burgundy’s abandonment of the campaign. When the army had begun its initial advance from Jaffa to Jerusalem, it had been decided that the English would lead the march on Jerusalem with the French comprising the rearguard, a decision which greatly upset Hugh. Speaking to his followers, the duke lamented

If we go to Jerusalem and take it, it will not be said that the French have taken it. Rather it will be said that the king of England has taken it. Great shame will it be to the king of France and great reproach to the whole kingdom, and they will say that the king of France had fled and that the king of England has won Jerusalem, and never again will France be without reproach.149

Now having been ordered to retreat, many of the French knights departed: some, under the duke, returned to Acre; others went to Jaffa; still others joined Conrad’s forces at Tyre, as the marquis had been encouraging them to come to his side. As Tyerman writes, “if diplomacy rather than force were to determine the crusade’s outcome and allocate the winnings, Richard was not the only player with a prospect of success.”150 Both chroniclers decry these tensions as moments of great loss for the Third Crusade, with the author of the Continuation despairing over how “great harm was done to Christendom by [the duke’s] counsel. But for his disagreement over the march on Jerusalem and his departure from the king of England’s side, the Christians would have won the whole kingdom.”151 Just short of their objective, the strength of the crusader army was being rapidly depleted, and the army began its long, disheartening move back toward Ascalon.

Richard and the army reached the city on 20 January, at which point the king began the delicate process of putting the pieces of his army back together, as well as reopening channels with Saladin to talk peace. While the constant interference from the marquis did Richard no favors in his negotiations with Saladin, who was deftly using the internal disagreement to his own advantage, the king was able to coax many of the French knights back to his side, at least temporarily. With the campaign season approaching again, Richard sent a conciliatory message to his erstwhile knights, saying that it would be best

149 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 111.
150 Tyerman, God’s War, 464.
151 Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 111.
“if the whole army is present so that we can discuss these things with proper deliberation. Otherwise—God forbid—there may be disagreements and we may be left dangerously lacking in mutual aid, reduced to desperate straits and overcome by our treacherous enemies.”152 The French replied that they would return to Richard under certain conditions, and being in no position to oppose them, he accepted their terms, completing the reunion of the army. The work of rebuilding the ravaged city was immediately resumed.

Such harmony between the English king and his French soldiers would be short-lived, and a disagreement soon arose between him, the duke of Burgundy, and the nettlesome marquis which would prove to be a lengthy distraction from the work of the Crusade. When the king refused the duke’s request to lend him money so that he could pay the French their wages, the French set out for Acre to unite with Conrad. The situation that Richard now confronted was rather serious. The marquis had considerable support among the local barons, certainly more than his preferred candidate, Guy of Lusignan, and now an important component of his army had deserted him again. Allowing the dispute to continue to drag out would be a detriment to the entire venture. What was more troublesome was that Conrad was fomenting a civil war of sorts in the city of Acre, attempting to seize control for himself. When the French came to Acre, they found the Pisans—allied with Guy and Richard—engaged in a bloody fight with the Genoese, who had been contracted by Philip to convey his men to the Holy Land and now backed Conrad. Caught between the combined forces of the marquis and the French, the Pisans

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sent word to Richard, pleading with him to come to their assistance. Even as Richard’s position in the Holy Land was badly threatened by the fighting in Acre, and a move against Jerusalem was again delayed by in-fighting, “he was already envisaging his own departure for his responsibilities in west.”\textsuperscript{153} Before the crusade could proceed and he could return home, he would have to deal with this distraction in person.

On 20 February, 1192, Richard came to Acre. With Richard’s approach, the marquis and his French supporters retreated to Tyre, and the king quickly settled the dispute between the Pisans and Genoese. At this point, the renewal of the crusade had already been delayed several weeks, and the continuing dispute with the French and the marquis would take up several more weeks. When conferencing with the marquis failed to produce results, Richard decreed that “the duke of Burgundy, the marquis, and the French had absented themselves from the army of their own free will,”\textsuperscript{154} and this allowed him to deny Conrad the revenues of the kingdom of Jerusalem which had been allowed him previously. Disagreements between both sides persisted, and the confusion which resulted from the ongoing disagreement persuaded Richard not to leave the city Acre for over a month, from 20 February until 31 March.\textsuperscript{155}

Far from getting better, the situation became worse. The marquis and the duke ordered the French knights remaining at Ascalon, some 700 in all, to come immediately to Tyre. Conrad and Hugh appealed to the oath that the French soldiers had previously given to Philip, for they “were obliged to obey him alone,” and the marquis “intended to

\textsuperscript{153} Tyerman, \textit{God’s War}, 465.
withdraw them from the campaign so that Richard would be left less able to carry on the business of the kingdom.”¹⁵⁶ Feudal obligations far outweighed whatever commitment they had made to the service of the Holy Land and the fulfillment of their vows. The chronicler records his disgust at how the rivalry between the French and the English king allowed the efforts of the crusade to suffer, lamenting that when Jerusalem had been threatened previously, “no army under a single general was ever broken up by disagreement; those from different regions were never torn apart by contentious rivalry. Those acting under the authority of one prince were never divided by envy; there was never abuse or taunts between them.”¹⁵⁷ The severity and length of the in-fighting attracted the attention of the Muslim host, and when news of the defections reached Saladin, the sultan eagerly reconstituted his army in preparation for an offensive against Richard’s greatly reduced force.

Even as Richard debated how best to handle the situation and continue the crusade, disturbing news arrived from England. A prior from Hereford brought the king a message from William Longchamp, one of the men Richard had left in charge of the kingdom in his absence, stating that the entire kingdom was in uproar. Many of Richard’s followers had been expelled from their positions and fled to Normandy after John, the king’s own brother, had sought to seize power himself, and he extracted oaths from the nobles and earls of the kingdom that they would be loyal to him, and he forced

them to submit control of their castles. The prior also warned the king that worse things would happen if he did not “get speedy agreement to your returning home as quickly as possible to avenge yourself for these injuries which are arising against you…and you will not be able to recover your rights again without the peril of war.”158 The uprising by John reportedly caught Richard by surprise, so much so that he thought it impossible at first, and though he was not certain about the veracity of the report, it increased his anxiety about remaining much longer in the Holy Land.

News of the potential disturbance spread quickly through the rank-and-file, creating much confusion and distress. Many “realized that if the king left, they would not be able to find anyone to remain in the country, since there was jealousy and wrangling between the people of Ascalon and of Tyre, so without a doubt, the empty country would fall into Turkish hands forever.”159 The entire venture seemed on the verge of collapse. Richard himself recognized that his departure at this critical juncture would preclude any hope of retaking Jerusalem; indeed, it would lead to the Muslims recapturing much of what they had so recently lost. The king was not oblivious to the untenable nature of the kingdom of Jerusalem without European support, but his kingdom on the continent was paramount. When he joined the crusade, Richard was not looking for land to claim as his own; therefore, he had little material stake in the long-term viability of the kingdom of Jerusalem. He had come to the Levant for less tangible rewards—glory and spiritual

reward. If he could secure that in the short term, he could return home and legitimately claim to have done all that was expected of him.

Here one finds the great paradox of the crusading movement: European money and material were vital to propping up the kingdom of Jerusalem against the more numerous Muslim host which surrounded it, but having Europeans interfering in the affairs of the Holy Land often made the situation worse as the continental contingent was often at loggerheads with the local barons. Even had the Levant and European Christians not been at odds so often, it was not possible for the European Christians to remain overseas indefinitely. The defense of Outremer was dependent on outside assistance from Christian Europe, a situation that could not be remedied unless the kingdom of Jerusalem was able to unite under a strong ruler who could bring the various factions together in relative harmony.

For his part, Richard recognized the difficulty of the situation, and even as he digested the bad news from his homeland, he did make an attempt to shore up the Levant Christians before his inevitable departure. First, he informed the leaders of his army that he would, out of his own personal coffers and presumably for the remainder of the Crusade, provide 300 knights and 2,000 infantrymen for the campaign after his own departure, and he would allow his followers to decide whether they wished to remain or return with him. More importantly for the long-term security of the kingdom of Jerusalem, he and his lords decided to settle the dispute over the crown once and for all, recognizing that “the most essential thing was to create a new king whom everyone would obey, to whom the country could be entrusted, who would wage the people’s wars and whom the army would follow. If this did not happen before King Richard’s
departure, [the wiser of Richard’s followers] declared that they would all leave since they were unable to guard the country by themselves.160 When Richard inquired as to which man, Conrad or Guy, they preferred to support for the kingdom, his followers selected Conrad, which was somewhat upsetting to the king. Despite his intense dislike of the marquis, Richard’s desire to conclude the Third Crusade and return to England would compel him to compromise.

The English king summoned the marquis with full honors to tell him of his popular election, but the attempted settlement was almost squelched in its infancy by the murder of the marquis on 28 April. Recriminations flew furiously in the immediate aftermath, with some suggesting that Richard himself had played a role in the murder. Rather fortuitously for the crusaders, just when it appeared that factionalism would again polarize the army, a consensus candidate appeared: Henry of Champagne, who was related to both Richard and Philip. On 5 May, with Richard’s blessing and just one week removed from Conrad’s assassination, Henry married the marquis’ widow and solved the succession crisis to the satisfaction of all parties. Having been awarded the lordship of Tyre and Jaffa by Richard, Henry marshaled his forces and moved towards Acre in order to supply his soldiers and prepare for the upcoming campaign.

Even as things appeared to be looking up for Richard and the army, Fortune’s wheel continued to turn, and as so often happened throughout the course of the Third Crusade, bad news quickly followed the good. The king continued to be flooded with contradictory messages from the continent; “messengers frequently came to King

Richard, appealing to him to come home. Some of them claimed that all was well, others
that the kingdom of England was about to be conquered...they confused him so much
with their various claims that he was completely baffled as to whom he should
believe.”161 Over the next few weeks, more evidence came to him that the reports were
ture, and he was particularly shaken to learn in June that John was receiving active
support and encouragement from Philip Augustus, as they kept in constant
communication via messengers. Many in the army were left guessing as to Richard’s
intentions, and the appearance of vacillation on Richard’s part seemed to hurt his
standing among the soldiers. Leaders from the many groups under Richard’s
command—France, England, Anjou, Maine, Normandy, Poitou—decided that they
would not wait for the king to make up his mind, declaring that they would take
Jerusalem whether Richard stayed or left. Word soon spread to the rank-and-file, and “by
leaking their decision to the army, they totally outmaneuvered Richard.”162 It was only
after a fair amount of pressure that the king publicly declared he would not return home
until next Easter, April 1193.

With campaign season again approaching, the one question remaining was how best to
proceed, and Richard’s options were much what they had been in the fall: move directly
against Jerusalem to besiege it, invade Egypt, or come to negotiated peace with Saladin.
In council, the French argued vociferously for a siege on the Holy City, but the king
demurred, arguing just as forcefully that such a maneuver was unwise. The problem of

161...frequenter venerunt nuncii ad regum Ricardum, sollicitantes ipsum ut repatriaret. Quorum quidem
asserebant omnia tuta, alii terram Angliae in proximo occupandam, quidem persuadebant ut repatriaret, alii,
ut perquirendae peregrinationis terrae, quam adierat, omnem adhiberet diligentiam. Sic diversis ipsius
162 Tyerman, God’s War, 467.
supplying the army through a protracted siege invited disaster if the Muslims managed to block the lines, and besides that, the army itself was too small to completely encircle Jerusalem. Richard refused to let himself become the architect of a plan he felt was destined to fail, and he instead proposed that it would be safer to act with the advice of the natives of the country, who wish to recover their former territories and inheritances, and do what seems appropriate to them because they have better knowledge of the terrain. It seems to me that we ought to follow whatever course of action the Templars and the Hospitallers honestly judge...whether we go to seize Babylonia [Egypt] or Beirut or Damascus. If we act in accordance with their decision, our army will no longer be torn into factions by our disagreements, as it is now.163

This compromise placated the French, and a council of twenty jurors was selected to adjudicate the matter, five men each representing the interests of the Templars, Hospitallers, French, and native Syrians. Though maintaining the veneer of impartiality, the king had successfully selected a “composition of the committee [that] guaranteed the result of its deliberations.”164 As a result, the council’s decision naturally followed closely Richard’s own line of thinking, asserting that an invasion of Egypt would be the most advantageous policy. When that decision was rendered, the French angrily announced that they would participate in nothing but the siege of Jerusalem.

Richard’s reaction to this turn of events is rather curious. He would not prevent an assault on Jerusalem; neither would he lead it. He and his retinue would merely go with the army on the move. It is incredible that the king, having just argued that disaster

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164 Tyerman, God’s War, 469.
would befall any attack on Jerusalem, could simply ignore the advice he had solicited from the local leaders. The chronicler was equally baffled, writing that he felt “it would appear to have been extremely unwise and audacious to desire this course of action at such a doubtful and uncertain juncture, let alone to begin a siege of Jerusalem after the jurors had advised so much against it.” The question remains open as to why Richard would have accepted the rebellion of his French followers so freely. It is likely that Richard, with his attention divided between Jerusalem and his lands on the continent, was anxious for the crusade to be over, and he did not want to have to deal with yet another delay in operations. If the French deserted the army again, it could take weeks—possibly months—of negotiations to bring them back into the fold, and every day that passed shortened the campaign season. Perhaps Richard felt it best to gamble on an attack against Jerusalem to keep the fragile harmony in his army, particularly if he wanted the opportunity to return to England before his Easter 1193 deadline. Political calculations likely convinced Richard to disregard the advice of the native leaders, which actually tracked with his own best judgment, and caused him to give tacit sanction to a new advance on the Holy City.

What precisely happened next is a bit muddled. The *Itinerarium* records that the army began preparations for a siege of Jerusalem, and Henry’s force arrived from Acre and joined with Richard’s army. Richard occupied his time raiding caravans and distributing the spoils to his army. As these preparations are seemingly being undertaken, “word spreads to the army that they were not going to advance to Jerusalem and that in fact the

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army was going to turn back,” devastating the morale of the rank-and-file. The chronicler does not say what prompted this change of heart from Richard beyond reiterating that the Templars and Hospitallers had opposed the move. The Continuation is unhelpfully silent on this period. What is certain is that the army, having come so close to Jerusalem for the second time, would again have to about face and leave the Holy City behind. As Tyerman wryly notes, “any semblance of Christian unity now collapsed” as the French abandoned the crusade in droves.

With all hope of taking Jerusalem gone, and with his army evaporating around him, Richard knew that all that remained was to sue for peace and return to England before his lands slipped from his control. As Saladin exulted in his triumph and waited for reinforcements to arrive, he entertained truce talks with Richard, but knowing the weakened state of the army facing him, the Sultan was not willing to grant many concessions. Indeed, Christian and Muslim sources both affirm that Saladin’s hand was much strengthened, and he refused to do anything unless the walls around Ascalon were razed. Richard pointedly refused this condition, and even as his army returned to Acre, “indescribably devastated and dismayed because so many things had been going against them,” Richard ordered the walls of Ascalon to be reinforced.

Incredibly, even though no settlement had yet been reached, “Richard was hurrying to depart from Acre so that he could get home quickly.” As Saladin’s emboldened army

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167 Tyerman, God’s War, 469.
set forth from Jerusalem, the king was willing to leave the Levant Christians to their fate in order that he might save his own dominion first. Although he had not succeeded in capturing Jerusalem, Richard felt as though he had acceptably completed his vow, having been in the service of God for three years now. Though Richard earnestly wanted to triumph in the Holy Land, his concern for his continental possessions necessarily outweighed any considerations for what occurred in the Levant in his absence. Only the news of Saladin’s arrival at Jaffa and the subsequent siege of the city arrested Richard’s departure from the Holy Land.

Events at Jaffa in July 1192 further illustrate the difficulty the Crusaders had of securing any long-term holdings in Outremer without constant, consistent support from the continent. As soon as he was told that Jaffa had been left “without the king’s protection, Saladin made his army ready to advance towards it, hoping that he would be able to capture the city easily in King Richard’s absence.”

Despite heavy resistance, Saladin’s army slowly but steadily rolled over the defenses of the outnumbered citadel. The defenders, who had sent word to Richard at Acre immediately upon Saladin’s first arrival, held on to the hope that the king would relieve the garrison quickly. Luckily for the besieged in Jaffa, Richard had not yet departed, and when the king heard the news, he rushed his army back to Jaffa in time to prevent Saladin from taking the city. Without the timely intervention of the European army, the city would have fallen, leaving Saladin in a much stronger position to exert his power over the political and military situation in the Levant. As it was, the two sides now returned to an uneasy equilibrium, and “negotiation

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became the only option for both sides, who increasingly resembled tiring heavyweight boxers slugging it out while dropping from injury and fatigue.”

The final act of the Third Crusade proved rather anti-climactic. For Richard, having become dangerously ill from the campaign, “the growing alarm that his possessions in France were in danger of being lost to the conspiracy between John and Philip II” fostered a belief that “urgency to reach agreement transcended all other considerations.” Richard called together Count Henry of Champagne, the king-designate of Jerusalem, and his local supporters, telling that he wished for some of them to go to Ascalon and oversee its defense while others remained to protect Jaffa; with his army thus positioned, he would then return to Acre to recuperate from the arduous exertions that had left him so ill. Despite the king’s request, “with one mind and identical voice, all of them opposed him. They claimed that under no circumstances would they watch over any fortification in his absence, and they persisted firmly in this decision.”

Much to his dismay, he found that “no one had even the slightest concern for the common interest,” and having done all that could be done, Richard sought a three year truce with Saladin. Such was the king’s haste that he “capitulated to Saladin’s insistence on the demolition of the walls of Ascalon,” a major blow to the long term security of the Christian holdings in the Levant—but one that was necessary if Richard were to secure a peace deal with the Sultan that would allow him to return home. Also,

171 Tyerman, *God’s War*, 471.
172 Ibid
the king felt that he must make some deal—any deal—with the Sultan, for “he knew how weak a position the people of the kingdom would be in if he went off without making a truce.” An accord was approved on 2 September.

Just as the locals feared, with the Third Crusade having come to a close, the Europeans completed their pilgrimage and returned home. Soon, the local barons became embroiled in a conflict with Count Henry, the man Richard had selected to rule the kingdom of Jerusalem after the marquis’ death, and Saladin died, setting off a power struggle in the Muslim lands. The security of the kingdom of Jerusalem must have seemed uncertain, at best. A campaign which had begun with so much hope and possibility came to an end with that hope unfulfilled: Emperor Frederick Barbarossa was dead, the great Christian kingdoms of England and France were again at enmity, King Richard was imprisoned by Leopold of Austria—who he had offended at the siege of Acre—after having returned from the Holy Land, and the holy city of Jerusalem remained in Muslim hands, just as it had following the Battle of Hattin some five years earlier.

175 Edbury, *Conquest of Jerusalem*, 121.
176 It has been suggested that Leopold’s imprisonment of Richard was possibly instigated with the collusion of Philip and Emperor Henry of Germany, using the assassination of Conrad as the pretext for his capture. Richard was only freed after a large ransom was paid on his behalf.
Conclusion

The Third Crusade was seemingly the last best hope for Europe to regain control of the Holy Land. The great kingdoms of Europe provided the Levant with huge amounts of money and supplies, and the most powerful army Christendom had ever assembled, headed by the continent’s most famed monarchs, were put at its disposal. Yet, even they could not gain ultimate victory. The following century was not kind to the Holy Land: the Fourth Crusade, far from strengthening the Crusader states, only weakened them by “[siphoning] off to Greece some of Europe’s crusading energy.” No other crusade truly came close to establishing a long-standing settlement in the region, and intermittent wars would flare on and off between Christians and Muslims until 1291 when the Muslims overran the city of Acre, putting an end to the last Christian stronghold in the Holy Land. What would have been necessary for Christian Europe to make durable gains in the Holy Land? Were the Crusades, in fact, doomed to fail?

The course of crusading history shows that certain elements had to be in place before the Latin East could be successfully defended: a strong military and fortifications; a powerful ruler over the kingdom of Jerusalem; a willingness to make deals with neighboring Muslims; a considerable amount of Christian unity; and a divided Muslim enemy. If more than one of these components were missing, the crusader states could not stand long. More often than not, however, multiple elements were missing from the equation, causing the Latin states to appeal to Europe for assistance. This measure would, however, prove entirely insufficient, for the Europe crusaders who ventured into the Holy Land faced the same problems and concerns as their Eastern brethren: they

177 Madden, Crusades, 120.
were constantly plagued by in-fighting and weak rulers, and many European monarchs—the principle leaders of the Crusades—did not accept that making deals and concessions to the Muslims was simply a reality of life in the Levant. Because the later Crusades were directly spiritual movements—venturing to the Holy Land as expiation for one’s sins—and not an attempt to secure additional lands for Christ, once a European Christian’s vow was fulfilled, he would naturally return to his lands and his family in Europe. To survive, the Latin states needed to be self-sufficient, a goal which would require them to meet the first four conditions described above.

For a brief time, all of these elements were in place for the Outremer Christians. After the First Crusade, it “was expected that any conquered lands would be restored to the Byzantine Empire.”\textsuperscript{178}  Such a move would have been wise, for even though Byzantine military power waxed and waned throughout the crusading era, the Empire was ruled by a central ruler, was in very close proximity to the area, and had a long history of dealing with the local Muslims. The Latin conquerors rejected this move, however, because of what they saw as Greek betrayal during the First Crusade. The burgeoning Crusader states managed to survive the chaotic government-building process between the 1099 fall of Jerusalem and the Second Crusade precisely because they consistently attained that perfect storm of conditions. Crusade leaders like Godfrey, Baldwin, and Fulk provided strong leadership for the nascent Outremer Christians, and despite numerous disagreements between the various local leaders, the early crusaders exhibited a considerable degree of unity of purpose. Though many new crusaders came to the Levant from Europe, the Christian community there was always going to be a small

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 37.
minority. In recognition of this fact, the crusaders established massive fortifications and strategic locations and established permanent military orders, such as the Templars and Hospitallers, to provide a ready source of warriors against Muslim attack. Such preparations allowed them to use minimal manpower to achieve the maximum protection of their lands. Baldwin I, perhaps the most effective of the early Outremer kings, “had transformed a tenuous arrangement into a solid feudal state.”179 In only ten years time, he “established a strong monarchy, conquered the Palestine coast, reconciled the crusader barons, and built strong frontiers against the kingdom’s Muslim neighbors.” Such a perfect storm would not be seen during the remainder of the Latin states’ existence.

Unfortunately for the kingdom of Jerusalem, it would always be dependent on European involvement to survive after the calling of the Second Crusade. As Riley-Smith observed of the early Latin kingdom, “the western settlers were dependent on resources which were never adequate.”180 The military orders which were permanently settled in the area, though very famous, were not very numerous, and the cost of raising and equipping knights was quite high; circa 1180, “it would be very surprising if Jerusalem could count on putting more than perhaps 500 fief knights into the field,” and though sergeants from surrounding towns and churches were available to serve, “the fact that they served in contingents mustered only in an emergency suggests that they were not highly trained.”181 Riley-Smith estimates that around this time period, the entire Latin lands in Syria and Palestine could, at best, muster “probably no more than 2,000”

179 Ibid., 43.
180 Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 102.
181 Ibid
knights, “a very inadequate figure for such exposed settlements.” Further complicating matters was their alienation from the Byzantines and the precarious position of being surrounded by their Muslim enemies. Their European allies had concerns and internal struggles of their own, however, and they would prove to be inconsistent allies at best. Any Crusade which set out in this environment faced a doubtful fate. There were factors both controllable and beyond their control which mitigated against them and which suggests that any long-term Christian success in the Holy Land—barring a kingdom of Jerusalem that was largely self-sufficient—was not possible.

Thus we see in the Third Crusade a microcosm of the whole: a venture initiated with much pomp and circumstance, lead by the most powerful and respected leaders of Christendom. From its inception, it was plagued by discord and distractions both from Europe and from the Levant, and the lack of a strong, unifying force in the Latin East aided in the breakdown of the crusading force into opposing factions. Factionalism weakened the army, a critical component for its success, and problems in Europe would prompt its conclusion before final victory was achieved. Unbeknownst to the participants themselves, the Third Crusade was destined to fail from its very origins.

\[182\] Ibid., 103.
Bibliography

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