Abstract
In addition to full beliefs, agents have attitudes of varying confidence, or credences. For instance, I do not believe that the Boston Red Sox will win the American League East this year, but I am at least a little bit confident that they will – i.e. I have a positive credence that they will. It is also common to think that agents have conditional credences. For instance, I am very confident – i.e. have a conditional credence of very-likely strength – that the Red Sox will win the AL East this year given that their pitching staff stays healthy. There are good reasons to think that conditional credences are neither credences nor some combination of credences. In this paper, I show that similar reasons support thinking that agents have what we can call quantificational credences – attitudes like, thinking that each AL East team with a healthy pitching staff is at least a little bit likely to win the division – which are neither credences, conditional credences, nor some combination thereof. I provide a framework for assessing the rationality of credal states which involve quantificational credences. And I give a general picture of credal states that explains the similarities and differences between ordinary, conditional, and quantificational credences.
Disciplines
Epistemology | Philosophy | Philosophy of Mind
Recommended Repository Citation
Lennertz, Benjamin. (2015). Quantificational Credences. Philosophers' Imprint, 15 (9), 1-24.
Original Publication URL: https://works.bepress.com/benjamin-lennertz/1/download/
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/phil_rel_fac_pub/37
Comments
This work was originally published in Imprint. Permalink to original publication: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0015.009